Valerie NiklasPSC 408Policy Paper

Comparative Look at Egyptian and Tunisian Revolutions

I. Abstract

The role of this paper is to compare the transitions that took place in Egypt and Tunisia

following the Arab Spring, in order to better understand what went wrong in Egypt. It will ask

what Egypt can learn from the relative success of Tunisia’s transition towards democracy. It will

begin with a detailed look at the results of their revolutions, followed by a look at what Tunisia

did successfully and what is still problematic for them, and then a look at what went wrong in

Egypt. It will conclude with possible solutions and recommendations for Egypt to move towards

a successful transition into democracy. The main conclusion of this research is that Egypt’s revo-

lution failed to oust all affiliations of the past regime, resulting in a dominant role of a select

group of parties, a failure to include all groups resulting in exclusionary politics, a failure to im-

plement important pillars of democracy, and a failure to engage in democratic and unified politi-

cal practices.

II. Introduction

The Arab Spring was a revolutionary movement which toppled authoritarian regimes in

North Africa and the Middle East. Although at the time it was regarded as a new wave of democ-

ratization for this region, we see now a failure by some states, such as Egypt, and success in oth-

ers, as seen in Tunisia.

The Egyptian and Tunisian revolutions initially had several similarities. They were both

in response to unemployment, poverty, and corruption. Both of their armies sided with the peo-

ple. Both countries had a change of government, a breakdown of the old regimes, and an imple-

mentation of new constitutions (Inmaculada). However, some key differences would prove to be

instrumental to a successful transition into democracy. Primarily, the role of the armies during

and after the revolution was monumental. Although both armies sided with the people, Tunisian

forces stepped down, whereas Egyptian forces decided to take power and control of the country.

This would be the main factor leading to the failure of the Egyptian revolution, and will be dis-

cussed in greater detail later on. As an introduction, Tunisia put in place a proportional represen-

tation system which took into account population and administrative divisions, overrepresented

divisions with fewer residents, guaranteed equality between sexes, and required one candidate to

be younger than 30 (Inmaculada). Comparatively, Egypt put in place a complex parallel voting

system which would go through several revisions over the years. These initial steps can be seen

as the preliminary factors which led to either a successful or failed transition into democracy.

III. Tunisia’s Democratic Success and Problems

Tunisia’s revolution has been generally regarded as a success as they have managed to

create a system which values democratic principles. This section will discuss what Tunisia did to

allow this, and what problems they still face. The primary factors that led to their success were

the role of the military, the inclusive and unified consensus practices, and potentially their differ-

ing cultural and societal norms. The primary challenges to democracy for Tunisia is Salafism and

the Salafi movement, which would lead to some tensions in the country.

i) Role of the Military

To understand why the military forces reacted differently in Tunisia, the history of the

military must be understood. Ben Ali, the autocratic ruler of Tunisia before the revolution, had

focused on weakening the army in order to maintain power and avoid a potential coup (Gaaloul).

Therefore, the military lacked political experience, was disadvantaged compared to the armies of

other authoritarian regimes, and as a result of this, most soldiers had disdain for the “presidential

clique” (Barany). When the time for revolution came, siding with the people was then an obvious

choice for the military, and stepping down when the time came was the most sensible move since

they had never been in a position of power in politics. Despite this, the military played a key role

in ensuring a smooth transition. It continued to provide it’s services to allow crucial tasks to con-

tinue, such as safeguarding wheat and date harvests, ensuring national baccalaureate exams could

be completed, and deploying troops to polling and vote-counting centers (Gaaloul). Furthermore,

they made it clear that their intention was to back down when the time came and police could

once again fulfill their duties (Hanlon). It is quite possible to say that the military single-hand-

edly ensured a smooth, peaceful, and successful transition into democracy. The military is what

finally pushed Ben Ali to flee; it ensured that economic resources were safeguarded, it ensured

that daily activities could be performed, and ensured that democratic actions were actually being

taken. They took control of the situation, and then peacefully backed down. We will see later on

how this drastically differs from the Egyptian military intervention.

ii) Inclusive and Unifying Consensus Practices

One of the most impressive aspects of the Tunisian transition into democracy was the

level of acceptance and inclusiveness during the use of agreements, negotiations, and conces-

sions. Settlements were made possible by peaceful civil organizations and union groups which

worked with other political actors and the predominant party. They promoted debate and solu-

tions that would be accepted by a majority of the public. Their attempt to include all voices and

parties proved successful, resulting in 117 parties versus the 3 that existed during the Ben Ali

regime (Inmaculada). These democratic practices of open debate, majority rule, inclusiveness,

and negotiation proved to be powerful tools in ensuring a smooth transition.

iii) Cultural and Societal Norms

Finally, it could be said that cultural and societal norms are what allowed for this smooth

transition. As we have already seen, the previous regime’s military policy proved to be very im-

portant later on. Other factors might have played important roles. According to Romdhani Ous-

sama, economic prosperity and political stability are more important to Tunisians than democ-

racy. These values might have translated into democratic practices which give way to stability

and prosperity. Tunisia also had a large and educated middle class which might have allowed for

proper and educated decision making (Romdhani). One of those important decisions was to draft

a bill for the exclusion of anyone from the old regime, a lesson they drew from Egypt’s failure to

do so.

iv) Salafism

Despite the major representation of most groups, one group was left out of the 2011 elec-

tions, the Salafis. Salafism promotes fundamentalist, ultra-conservative values, and the use of

Sharia law. In Tunisia, they are regarded as extremists and are therefore marginalized by the po-

litical process. This proved to be problematic for Tunisia, as these groups would then see the po-

litical process with hostility, and would lead to radical jihadist movements. They also tend to be

young citizens who believe that it is an escape from the dire circumstances in which they live.

They would burn police stations, courts, public buildings, and attacked the US embassy (Lesch).

Tunisian Salafis believe that Tunisia is a “land of preaching in which jihadis should take root

peacefully, taking advantage of the emergence of lawless areas in order to advance Islamic law”

(“Tunisia: Violence And The Salafi Challenge - International Crisis Group"). This poses a prob-

lem for surrounding areas which are taking the brunt of these jihadist groups. Therefore, al-

though it seems Tunisia is outsourcing its problem, this could lead to further international con-

flict and terrorism. It is their role to implement policies which provide social and economic sup-

port for underprivileged regions, and improve educational and professional opportunities in order

to subvert some of these movements towards jihadism.

IV. Egyptian Failure Towards Democracy

According to Nathan Brown, two things were needed for Egypt to succeed in transition-

ing into a democratic government: an agreement among elites on the rules of the transition, and a

procedure that allowed open decision making made by the people. Unfortunately, neither of

these things would be accomplished. After the fall of the Mubarak regime, the SCAF or Supreme

Council of Armed Forces along with the Muslim Brotherhood took matters into their own hands.

However, they did not agree on most things, creating a disconnect in the illegitimate government

put in place. Furthermore, many decisions were made behind closed doors, leading to low voter

turnout and high voter apathy. As previously stated, the primary factors that led to the failure of

Egypt’s transition are the illegitimate governance by the SCAF, a failure to include all groups,

resulting in exclusionary politics, a failure to implement important pillars of democracy, and a

failure to engage in democratic and unified political practices.

i) The Army Coup

One of the key players in the Egyptian transition was the army or SCAF. The SCAF took

relative control over the country after they forced Mubarak to resign. Unfortunately, they did not

do so in the same way Tunisia did, and this was due to a much stronger and influential army.

During the revolution, elite military personnel were working to advance their position in the gov-

ernment, and believed that continuing to support Mubarak would diminish their legitimacy and

influence, and therefore opted to oust him and take control (Barany). As a result, many of these

elite personnel from the Mubarak regime were able to maintain their seats of power. This was a

key difference between the Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions. Tunisia saw a complete removal

of all members of the old regime, whereas although Mubarak was removed, many of his close

members and supporters remained. President Morsi, a member of the Muslim Brotherhood, had

been hastily elected and civil unrest grew as the people believed he did not represent all the peo-

ple. The SCAF used this as an opportunity to set in motion another coup and oust Morsi (Inmac-

ulada). These examples show the extent to which the army took control of the government, en-

forced an illegitimate government, and gave a false sense of democracy while maintaining the

status quo.

ii) Exclusionary Politics

Another important difference between Egypt and Tunisia is that Tunisia made a great ef-

fort to promote inclusive politics, with debates and representation for all. After the overthrow of

Mubarak, the political scene in Egypt continued to be monopolized by two parties: the SCAF and

the Muslim Brotherhood, leaving liberal and Christian masses marginalized (Lesch). This exclu-

sion led to highly fragmented and polarized politics. Tunisia created 117 parties, whereas Egypt

only increased to 42 (Inmacualda). This power came because of the legacy of the Mubarak

regime. Decades of suppression led to an unbalanced political scene where Islamist groups were

already well founded and coordinated, while secular and liberal groups were unable to get to-

gether and mobilize in time for elections (Hashim). This exclusionary politics appears to have

played a large role in the stability in the country, and are indicators that a real democracy has not

been put in place in Egypt.

iii) Failure to Promote Democratic Processes

In order to have a properly functioning democracy, a multi-party system is not the only

ingredient. Democratic principles of liberty and freedom of expression must also be ensured and

promoted. First, Egypt lacked an independently owned press. There was a state owned press

which promoted the agenda of the elites (Brown). A truly democratic nation cannot be achieved

until there is freedom of the press. Second, voter turnout never reached high levels, compared to

Tunisia, with a voter turnout of 86.1%. Egypt’s voter turnout was a dismal 32.9% (Inmaculada).

This could be a result of voter apathy and distrust of the government, which was not mended

with the revolution. Finally, the country’s definition of terrorism limits civil liberties because of

it’s vague definition. Egypt defines terrorism as “any use of force, or violence or threat”, and any

act “disturbing the peace or resulting in damage or destruction to life” (Chiha). This vague defi-

nition thwarts citizens ability to protest among other important freedom of expressions. These are

some examples of the ways Egypt has failed to align with core democratic principles, and has

failed to transition successfully away from an authoritarian regime.

iv) Failure to Engage in Democratic Practices

Finally, the use of democratic practices in politics was key to the success in Tunisia, and

the failure in Egypt. According to Mady, there was a need for alliances and a national coalition

across all parties to have a successful transition into democracy. He insists that “rule of law,

transparency, tolerance, openness, and self-criticism” are crucial to the success of a democratic

nation (Mady). These practices can be seen in Tunisian politics, however, Egyptian politics con-

tinue to be riddled with bargaining and pressuring instead of compromise and negotiation. Most

academic scholars agree that this is a crucial reason for the failure of the Egyptian transition.

Romdhani, Inmaculada, Lesch, Brown, and Mady all mention the importance of compromise,

reconciliation, and dialogue between parties, and all insist that leaving behind animosity between

parties is essential to creating a more unified and diverse government.

V. Possible Solutions

i) Responses by the U.S.

Since the U.S. gives billions of dollars of aid to Egypt, it is crucial that the U.S. use this

leverage to intervene. The United States could respond by reorganizing their funding to Egypt,

which currently favors the army by almost a billion dollars (Riechmann), and by using their aid

as leverage to press for more open elections. First, reorganizing funding in favor of the economy

rather than the military would boost the economy, therefore enhancing the lives of millions of

disgruntled citizens, and lessen the power of the military. The disadvantages to this could be that

the current power that Egypt holds over the area could be jeopardized, therefore threatening the

safety of the country. If the United States used their aid as leverage, this would be a great incen-

tive for the military, which would suffer great losses and potentially loss of power. The disad-

vantage of this would be that Egyptian people might end up paying the price if the army then

sought funding from other sources, as a result the economy could suffer, and anti-terrorism ef-

forts in the country and region might be jeopardized if the army is not able to support them.

ii) National Responses:

Most crucial to a successful transition into democracy are: political groups working to-

gether rather than against each other to resolve historical issues and tensions, and the populace

peacefully protesting once again against the regime and working towards a new transition into

democracy, thus following the Tunisian blueprint. The advantage of political groups unifying

would be that the country could see a more democratic process taking place, one that would en-

sure the country is being fully represented and that all those groups are making concessions and

coming to agreements. The disadvantage would be the difficulty with which this change would

come. Putting behind decades of animosity would prove very difficult on an individual basis, and

throughout parties. As these animosities are currently being fueled by jihadist movements and re-

pression of secular groups, it might be very hard for the country to find peace among such dis-

trust. If nothing resolves itself with the above responses, the only option left for the people is to

protest once again. This would give the country a potential to rebuild, reconstruct, and follow the

Tunisian strategy. The disadvantage to this would be that it has the potential to be violently re-

pressed by military forces, and by international powers such as the U.S., whose ambassador to

Egypt once stated that elections are more important than street action (Gamal). This statement is

especially harmful since street politics prove to be the most democratic in Egypt, especially

against the illegitimate governance of the president to which she was referring. The Egyptian

people need to weigh which is more important to them: liberty or stability.

VI. Recommendations

After reviewing and comparing both countries and the reasons for their successes and

failures, I suggest four courses of action:

i) The US government should alter it’s funding to provide the majority of the aid to the econ-

omy rather than to the military. The reorganization of funding would boost the economy,

while weakening the SCAF and potentially leading them to step down or relinquish some

power. Despite the argument that this may weaken the country and jeopardize the safety of

the citizens, those living in marginalized and impoverished communities have been more

likely to join jihadists groups, therefore ameliorating the economy could lessen terrorism. In

doing so, less military expenditure on terrorism would be necessary.

ii) Political groups must reconcile past animosity, anyone from the old regime should be re-

moved from power, and different tactics need to be used by parties in order to come to con-

sensuses. Working within the principles of democracy, rather than feuding, bargaining, and

working behind closed doors must be promoted in order to have a successful democracy. It is

also important that all parties be represented, in order to have an inclusive system.

iii) Egypt must promote a free media, encourage voter participation, and revisit it’s terrorism

laws. In doing so public debates, protests, and other democratic processes may take place

lawfully. Furthermore, marginalized groups that are otherwise silenced will be able to orga-

nize and mobilize in order to take part in the democratic process, and be represented in the

government. These changes could also restore faith in democracy in the Egyptian people.

iv) If all this fails, the Egyptian people must attempt another revolution. This option may not be

peaceful, as it would be the people versus the military. However, if the U.S. has sufficiently

cut funding to the army, this could significantly weaken them, lead to disgruntled soldiers,

and potentially lead to a similar military role as the one that was played in the Tunisian revo-

lution. If the U.S. fails to alter funding, or cut it, then Egypt could see a bloody revolution. In

this case, the international community would have a responsibility to intervene. This seems

appropriate if the current government is not meeting the needs of the majority of the people.

Once the people overthrow the new post-Mubarak regime, they may begin a peaceful transi-

tion into democracy using the previous recommendations.

VII. Conclusions

In conclusion, Egypt’s revolution seems to be a complete failure. Fortunately, the reasons

for this have become quite clear, especially when comparing the transition with Tunisia.

Whereas Tunisia’s army played a pivotal role in ensuring the country transitioned smoothly,

Egypt’s army took control. In doing so they failed to oust all members of the Mubarak regime,

and undemocratic practices continued; including a failure to ensure freedoms of expression, a

failure to unify the country and represent all Egyptians, and a failure to achieve goals in an open

and consensual way. In order for Egypt to become a democratic nation, the United States must

alter it’s funding and discontinue to back the SCAF, and Egypt must ensure that it’s citizens are

represented and have a right to speech, protest, and vote. A failure to do so will result in another

revolution that might not succeed without foreign intervention.

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