policy landscape affecting first generation entrepreneurs in india · 2013-04-16 · • india‟s...
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© 2011 Intellecap. All rights reserved www.intellecap.com
Policy landscape affecting First Generation
Entrepreneurs in India
December, 2011
© 2011 Intellecap. All rights reserved
Challenging for small and startup FGEs to source debt or equity due to
concerns with policy design, implementation and eco-system issues
2
EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY
Introduction
• Entrepreneurs are a vital catalyst for India‟s economy. However, many first generation entrepreneurs (FGEs) are unable to take the
plunge due to lack of access to finance and a business environment that is difficult to navigate for first-timers.
• This report provides a review of the specific challenges that FGEs face to start, run and scale their businesses. It then goes on to map out
policies and interventions that address and exacerbate these challenges. In most circumstances, we have also provided initial thoughts on
the scope for improvement in these policies.
Debt Financing
Equity
Financing
Non-financial
aspects
Next steps
• Debt is the dominant source of formal capital, accounting for 95% of India‟s business capital (excluding business‟ own investments).
• Low supply of institutional funding plagues the „Micro‟ and „Small‟ enterprise segments, as they are considered too risky to be served by
large banking institutions, and too large to benefit from Microfinance, leading to a significant financing gap.
• Various enabling policies and interventions exist to address financing challenges to FGEs. However, a significant scope for improvement
exists in terms of policy design and last-mile implementation issues. There is a need for policies which act as incentives to lenders.
• India‟s VC industry does reasonably well in international comparisons. However, the share of early stage deals, vital for FGEs, is low.
There is a lack of an enabling ecosystem for FGEs, and high startup risks make investing in this segment riskier for investors.
• According to investors, India‟s regulatory framework is inhibiting, changing and ambiguous. This environment compounds the riskiness of
investing in Indian enterprises and hampers investments in smaller deals and startups.
• Over the last decade, the RBI and SEBI have introduced certain measures to ease regulatory bottlenecks, however, there is scope for
further development.
• Heavy paperwork and compliance requirements, and limited enforceability of legal contracts make doing business in India challenging
and increase the possibility of failure, especially for FGEs.
• Limited levels of infrastructure – resulting in high transport costs, underdeveloped supply chains, lack of office space, etc. – increases
costs and makes certain businesses unviable in India. There is scope for the public education system to improve its contribution towards
providing employable youth across sectors.
• Reforms in regulatory procedures to start a business; more government focus on skill development are addressing some of these risks.
• Nearly 40 government policies and interventions are discussed in this report. The next step is to identify a prioritized list of 4-6 workable
policy recommendations that can have a huge positive impact on FGEs. These policies should be feasible for the government to
implement.
• These recommendations will be whetted by experts. After this, we will work with policy makers and other stakeholders to influence
policies, government interventions and schemes that encourage First Generation Entrepreneurship in India.
© 2011 Intellecap. All rights reserved 3
i. Executive Summary
ii. Table of Contents
iii. Acronyms and Abbreviations
1. Introduction
2. Overview of Financing to FGEs
3. Debt Financing
a) Challenges
b) Policy Landscape
c) International best practices
4. Equity Financing
a) Challenges
b) Policy Landscape
c) International best practices
5. Non-financial Aspects
a) Challenges
b) Policy Landscape
6. Concluding Thoughts and Next Steps
iv. References
pg. 2
pg. 3
pg. 4
pg. 7
pg. 10
pg. 13
pg. 13
pg. 17
pg. 36
pg. 39
pg. 39
pg. 42
pg. 57
pg. 59
pg. 59
pg. 60
pg. 63
pg. 65
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Table of Contents TABLE OF
CONTENTS
© 2011 Intellecap. All rights reserved 4
Abbreviation Full form
ARC Asset Reconstruction Company
BC Business Correspondent
BF Business Facilitator
CART Credit Appraisal & Rating Tool
CCI Controller of Capital Issue
CERSAI Central Electronic Registry of Securitization Asset
Reconstruction and Security Interest of India
CGTMSE Credit Guarantee Fund Trust for Micro and Small
Enterprises
CIBIL Credit Information Bureau India Limited
CIC Credit Information Company
CLCSS Credit Linked Capital Subsidy Scheme
CONFIDI Credit Guarantee Consortium (Italian)
CRA Credit Rating Agency
CRISIL Credit Rating Information Services India Limited
DC Development Commissioner
DFCF Discounted Free Cash Flow
DIC District Industries Centre
DMCC Dubai Metal Commodity Centre
FDI Foreign Direct Investment
Abbreviation Full form
FEMA Foreign Exchange Management Act
FGE First Generation Entrepreneur
FI Financial Institutions
FINO Financial Information Network & Operations
FSLRC Financial Sector Legislative Reforms Commission
FVCI Foreign Venture Capital Investor
FY Fiscal/Financial Year
HR Human Resources
HTIL Hutchison Telecom International Limited
INR Indian Rupee
IOSCO International Organization of Securities Commission
IPO Initial Public Offering
ISARC India SME Asset Reconstruction Company
IRDA Insurance Regulatory Development Authority
IT Information Technology
ITES Information Technology Enabled Services
KVIC Khadi and Village Industries Commission
LIS Low Income States
LLP Limited Liability Partnership
MFI Microfinance Institution
MGS Mutual Guarantee Societies
Acronyms and Abbreviations (1) ACRONYMS &
ABBREVIATIONS
© 2011 Intellecap. All rights reserved 5
Abbreviation Full form
MoF Ministry of Finance
MSE Micro and Small Enterprises
MSME Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises
MSMECDP MSME Cluster Development Program
MSMEFDP MSME Financing and Development Project
MRIP Modified Rural Industries Programme
NBFC Non Banking Financial Company
NES North Eastern States
NGO Non Governmental Organization
NKC National Knowledge Commission
NMPC National Manufacturing Competitiveness Programme
NSTEB National Science & Technology Entrepreneurship
Development Board
OBE Off-Balance Sheet Exposure
PE Private Equity
PFRDA Pension Fund Regulatory and Development Authority
PLI Primary Lending Institution
POS Point of Sale
PSU Public Sector Undertakings
RAM Risk Assessment Model
Abbreviation Full form
RBI Reserve Bank of India
RRB Regional Rural Bank
SARFAESI Securitization and Reconstruction of Financial Assets
and Enforcement of Security Interest Act
SBI State Bank of India
SCB Scheduled Commercial Bank
SEBI Securities and Exchange Board of India
SFC State Financial Corporation
SICA Sick Industrial Companies (Special Powers) Act,1985
SIDBI Small industries Development Bank of India
SIDC State Industrial Development Corporation
SIIC SIDBI Innovation and Incubation Centre
SSI Small Scale Industries
SMERA SME Rating Agency
SVCL SIDBI Venture Capital Limited
TBI Technology Business Incubator
UCB Urban Cooperative Bank
USD United States Dollar
VC Venture Capital
VCF Venture Capital Fund
Acronyms and Abbreviations (2) ACRONYMS &
ABBREVIATIONS
© 2011 Intellecap. All rights reserved 6
i. Executive Summary
ii. Table of Contents
iii. Acronyms and Abbreviations
1. Introduction
2. Overview of Financing to FGEs
3. Debt Financing
a) Challenges
b) Policy Landscape
c) International best practices
4. Equity Financing
a) Challenges
b) Policy Landscape
c) International best practices
5. Non-financial Aspects
a) Challenges
b) Policy Landscape
6. Concluding Thoughts and Next Steps
iv. References
pg. 2
pg. 3
pg. 4
pg. 7
pg. 10
pg. 13
pg. 13
pg. 17
pg. 36
pg. 39
pg. 39
pg. 42
pg. 57
pg. 59
pg. 59
pg. 60
pg. 63
pg. 65
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Table of Contents TABLE OF
CONTENTS
© 2011 Intellecap. All rights reserved
First generation entrepreneurs are a vital catalyst for the economy;
important to ensure conducive policies are in place to support them
7
INTRODUCTION
About this report: How policies affect India‟s first generation entrepreneurs
Entrepreneurs are a vital catalyst for India‟s economy. However, many first generation entrepreneurs (FGEs) are unable
to take the plunge due to lack of access to finance and a business environment that is difficult to navigate for first-timers.
In this report, we analyse the specific challenges that FGEs face and map these challenges to the various policies and
interventions by the Government of India.
Many policies seek to address the difficulties faced by FGEs but often have room for improvement. For example, the
Ministry of Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises (MSME) introduced a Credit Guarantee Scheme to enable
entrepreneurs to access debt without collateral. Considering lack of collateral is a major impediment in raising debt for
FGEs, this scheme had a huge potential for impact. However, this guarantee is accompanied by various clauses which
limit it‟s attractiveness amongst banks to lend using this “guarantee”. One such requirement is to declare a loan as a
non-performing asset (NPA) before claiming a refund. Since most banks wish to bring down the number of NPAs, this
clause reduces the attractiveness of lending under this guarantee, making it not altogether different from collateral-
based lending. This could be an example of a well-meaning policy not having the desired impact due to design issues.
There is also scope for improvement in the on-ground implementation of various well-meaning policies or interventions.
For example, various State Governments have set up incubators to provide office and equipment facilities for first-time
entrepreneurs. The effectiveness of this intervention, aimed at creating a strong ecosystem support for FGEs, is limited
in places because the government-run incubation offices may not be functioning properly. Therefore, while an
incubation centre has been allocated, in practice, there is a need to utilise this facility more efficiently.
Finally there is a need to review certain policies, as they sometimes contribute to exacerbating existing challenges faced
by FGEs. Consider one last example: foreign equity investors in India cannot issue a loan to an entity they have already
invested in. The government places this restriction because it wants to guard the ability of foreign capital to provide
loans (which has implications on monetary policy and inflation). However, this has the unintended effect of preventing
investors from supporting FGEs they are associated with by, say, issuing a short-term loan. Limitations such as these
compound the existing risks of doing business in India and make investors more risk-averse, especially towards FGEs.
This report provides a baseline of all such policies and interventions that affect the ability of FGEs to start, run and scale
their businesses. In most circumstances, we have also provided initial thoughts on the scope for improvement in these
policies. In the future, we will be streamlining the findings in this report into a specific and prioritized list of workable
policy recommendations for the government. The final aim is to go beyond the report and support policy makers in
making India‟s business landscape more attractive for FGEs.
© 2011 Intellecap. All rights reserved
Features of this report
8
INTRODUCTION
Scope
Research Methodology
Definitions
Most terms and concepts used in this report are explained as
and when they come up. The following three terms, however,
are used extensively throughout the report and hence defined
here:
• First generation entrepreneurs: all entrepreneurs whose
parents did not run businesses. The basic premise is simply
that FGEs do not have an existing ecosystem to support
them and find it harder to run businesses and raise capital
compared to second generation entrepreneurs.1
• Policy: All Acts and Regulations authored by Central
Ministries or autonomous Government bodies, such as the
Reserve Bank of India.
• Interventions: Government schemes and actions where
resources of the exchequer are expended beyond
administrative purposes. For example, a State Venture
Capital Fund or Credit Guarantee Scheme.
We used the following four methods to complete the research
for this report:
• Review of government policy documents and policy drafts
as available on the internet.
• Secondary research on challenges and government policies
& interventions affecting FGEs.
• Interviews of investors, lenders and FGEs.
• Existing Intellecap knowledgebase, where available.
Structure of report
The rest of this report is as follows.
Chapter 2 sets the context by providing a
brief overview of the debt and equity
financing landscape in India. This overview
provides the broad contours of debt and
equity financing for businesses and
compares them vis-à-vis each other.
Chapter 3 delves into the challenges that
FGEs face while trying to access debt
capital and how various policies and
government interventions are addressing
or exacerbating these challenges. The last
section of this chapter lays out in detail
each of these policies, their impact or
benefits and what, if any, is the scope for
improvement. Chapter 4 follows a similar
pattern for equity financing.
Chapter 5 covers the non-financial
challenges of running a business in India,
especially for FGEs. As in the previous two
chapters, policies that are interfacing with
these challenges are detailed therein.
Chapter 6 concludes with a final
assessment of the report‟s findings and
delineates next steps in the direction of
making policy recommendations and
influencing policies in this arena.
The topic of policies affecting FGEs in
India is broad. Therefore, to get traction on
key issues, we have defined the scope of
this report as follows:
• While all aspects of doing business in
India is covered, the report will
especially focus on access to finance
for FGEs. This is because financing is a
major hurdle for most FGEs; further,
most non-financial issues affect access
to finance as well.
• Most policies in India that affect the
functioning of FGEs do not refer to
FGEs specifically as a target base.
Therefore, for debt, we focus on
government policies directed to
MSMEs. For equity, we look at
government policies affecting seed and
early stage enterprises. The rationale
for these choices are explained on
page 11.
• We cover FGEs in all sectors.
However, we do not cover sectoral
policies, such as, say, a subsidy for
clean energy businesses.
• We focus on Central level policies and
look at the State level only if relevant.
1 Source: National Knowledge Commission, 2008, Entrepreneurship
© 2011 Intellecap. All rights reserved 9
i. Executive Summary
ii. Table of Contents
iii. Acronyms and Abbreviations
1. Introduction
2. Overview of Financing to FGEs
3. Debt Financing
a) Challenges
b) Policy Landscape
c) International best practices
4. Equity Financing
a) Challenges
b) Policy Landscape
c) International best practices
5. Non-financial Aspects
a) Challenges
b) Policy Landscape
6. Concluding Thoughts and Next Steps
iv. References
pg. 2
pg. 3
pg. 4
pg. 7
pg. 10
pg. 13
pg. 13
pg. 17
pg. 36
pg. 39
pg. 39
pg. 42
pg. 57
pg. 59
pg. 59
pg. 60
pg. 63
pg. 65
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Table of Contents TABLE OF
CONTENTS
© 2011 Intellecap. All rights reserved
Debt and equity are complementary sources of finance for FGEs;
currently in India, debt is the dominant source of capital
10
FINANCE
OVERVIEW
0
2000
4000
6000
8000
10000
12000
14000
16000
18000
FY 2007-08 FY 2008-09 FY 2009-10 FY 2010-11
Gross credit to industry Total VC/PE investments
Debt vs. equity to Indian enterprises (INR bn)
Notes: VC/PE investments, usually expressed in USD, were converted @ INR 45 to 1 USD. The term
'industry' includes small, medium and large enterprises.
Sources: Credit data: Handbook on Statistics on Indian Economy 2010-11, Reserve Bank of India.
Equity data: India Private Equity Report 2011, Bain Capital, Inc.
• Debt accounts for over 95% of India‟s business capital needs,
excluding business‟ own investments.
• Even when equity investments peaked in 2007, it only
accounted for 8% of total business capital in India.
• The above graph includes large and late stage enterprises;
therefore, share of equity capital to FGEs is likely to be smaller.
• The dwindling share of equity capital during 2008-09 was a
result of dwindling foreign capital owing to the economic crisis.
Overview of debt financing to the MSME sector in India
• The main categories of suppliers of debt capital include Scheduled
Commercial Banks (comprising public sector, private sector and foreign
banks), Government institutions such as Urban Cooperative Banks, State
Financial Corporations and Non-Banking Financial Companies.
• Public sector banks are the largest suppliers of institutional finance to MSMEs.
• Products offered through institutional finance cater to a variety of requirements
ranging from short term to long term credit needs, and include fund based
products (e.g. cash credit, overdraft, etc.) and non-fund based products (e.g.
letter of credit, bank guarantee, etc.). There is a skew towards fund based
products, and short term working capital loans in particular.
• While branch banking continues to be the main delivery channel to cater to
these enterprises, „branchless banking‟ initiatives via business
correspondents, mobile phones, etc., have emerged recently.
Debt is dominant capital source for businesses
Overview of equity financing to seed and early stage FGEs in India
• Equity investors provide risk capital to enterprises in hope for commensurately
high returns. While there is a high variability, investors typically expect to exit
their investments within 3 to 7 years.
• Since investors seek potential for high growth (to accrue high returns), only
certain type of enterprises get access to such capital. In India, early and growth
stage investments have focussed on Information Technology (IT) and IT
Enabled Services (ITES).
• For FGEs, there are two formal sources of equity infusion: a) high net worth
individuals called “angel investors”, who provide seed and early stage funding,
and b) Venture Capital Funds (VCFs), which provide equity for early and
growth stage enterprises.
• FGEs can get equity infusion by agreeing to dilute ownership of the company
with the investor. The specific structure of each transaction, however, has many
variations and can include a combination of instruments like preferred stock,
convertible debt, mezzanine debt, etc.
© 2011 Intellecap. All rights reserved
• Equity investors predominantly target
energy, real estate, financial services
and telecom to invest in. These are
large and relatively “safe” sectors .
• Among smaller deals, IT & ITES
dominate, accounting for around
20% of deals from 2004-10.
• Of all VC backed firms in India, 50-
60% are based out of Bangalore and
Mumbai. Around 98% of the firms are
concentrated in 6 Indian cities,
though operations extend to smaller
cities and urban India as well.
11
By Size By Stage By Sector/ Geography
• Early-stage enterprises in the
MSME sector face challenges with
respect to access to institutional
finance.
• Reliance of traditional banks and
financial institutions (FIs) on
established track records, as one
of the key parameters for issuing
loans, constrains supply to early-
stage enterprises.
• According to a survey conducted by
the National Knowledge Commission
(NKC), FGEs believe that access to
early stage finance from banks is
very difficult at the startup stage, and
is relatively easier at the growth
stage.
• Only around 15% of equity deals
are for seed & early-stage
businesses.
• Growth-stage deals (companies with
an established business model and
team and are looking to expand)
account for around 20% of all equity
deals.
• Over 60% of equity deals are for late
stage and private investments in
public equity (PIPE) because
investors consider them safer. These
have little bearing on FGEs.
• The average deal size in early and
seed stage deals in India is USD 3
million (INR 15 crores) from 2006 to
2010. In the US, this average is
almost half at USD 1.7 million in PPP
terms.2 This indicates that VCFs in
India are not supporting smaller
FGEs compared to their American
counterparts.
• While data on angel investments are
not available, qualitative information
suggests that there are far lesser
angel investments in India as well.
Insights on financing by size, stage, sector & geography; analysis
of which FGEs to focus on in terms of debt and equity capital FINANCE
OVERVIEW
• Information asymmetry, dearth of
credit history, high transaction costs
and susceptibility to shocks
constrain supply of finance to
micro enterprises, making them the
most difficult segment for banks.
• Medium enterprises are considered
more equipped to absorb external
shocks, and are better served than
other segments.
• Micro enterprises mainly use fund-
based products, where as mature
small and medium enterprises also
utilize non-fund based products.
• Working capital contributes to a large
extent of debt demand as
manufacturing enterprises face
high trade credit requirements and
enterprises in the service sector are
labor intensive.
• Knowledge based service
enterprises due to intangibility of
operations and limited collateral face
challenges in accessing debt finance.
• Penetration of institutional finance in
North Eastern States (NES) and
Low Income States (LIS)1 in India is
restricted due to low levels of
industrialization, infrastructure, high
cost of operations and an unstable
political environment.
1 LIS includes Bihar, Uttar Pradesh, Rajasthan, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Madhya Pradesh & Orissa and NES includes Sikkim, Assam, Meghalaya, Arunachal Pradesh, Tripura, Nagaland, Manipur, Mizoram 2 In exchange rate terms, this is USD 5 million. In Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) terms, USD 1 is approximately equal to INR 16, or approximately one-third of the exchange rate.
Source: http://nextbigfuture.com/2010/02/implied-ppp-and-big-mac-exchange-rates.html; India Private Equity Report 2011, Bain Capital, Inc.; Stanford Business School conference on venture capital in India; Primary interviews
De
bt
Eq
uit
y
FGE Focus
From this analysis, it is
clear that the most
under-served FGEs
are micro & small in
size and tend to be in
early stages of their
businesses.
For this report, we
look at FGEs by size
and focus on access
to debt for micro &
small FGEs. This also
corresponds to most
government policies
and interventions in
this space.
In terms of equity, the
most under-served
FGEs are those in
seed and early stage
businesses. Therefore,
we focus on policies
affecting such
enterprises.
We also look at
policies affecting
FGEs that are looking
for smaller deals.
© 2011 Intellecap. All rights reserved 12
i. Executive Summary
ii. Table of Contents
iii. Acronyms and Abbreviations
1. Introduction
2. Overview of Financing to FGEs
3. Debt Financing
a) Challenges
b) Policy Landscape
c) International best practices
4. Equity Financing
a) Challenges
b) Policy Landscape
c) International best practices
5. Non-financial Aspects
a) Challenges
b) Policy Landscape
6. Concluding Thoughts and Next Steps
iv. References
pg. 2
pg. 3
pg. 4
pg. 7
pg. 10
pg. 13
pg. 13
pg. 17
pg. 36
pg. 39
pg. 39
pg. 42
pg. 57
pg. 59
pg. 59
pg. 60
pg. 63
pg. 65
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Table of Contents TABLE OF
CONTENTS
© 2011 Intellecap. All rights reserved
≤ 25 Lakhs
13
Small
Micro
Informal sector
4.7%
Overview of MSME sector by initial investment; size, sector and other features
Medium
Source: 4th All India MSME Census (2006 – 2007), MSME Annual Report, 2010
.
95%
0.21%
DEBT FINANCE
CHALLENGES
Source: MSME Development Act 2006, 4th All India MSME Census (2006-07), MSME Annual Report 2010
Definition of MSMEs in terms of initial investment (INR) Size: The number of enterprises in the MSME sector in India amounted to 26.1 million
units as per the 4th MSME Census (2006-07) with the Micro segment accounting for
95% of units in the sector.
Registration: 24.5 million enterprises in the MSME sector are unregistered
enterprises, amounting to nearly 94% of total enterprises in the sector.
Sector: The Services sector dominates over the Manufacturing sector amongst
MSMEs, with ~71% of enterprises engaged in the Service sector.
Type of organization: Close to 95% of enterprises in the MSME sector are
Proprietorships, followed by Partnership form of organization.
State-wise distribution: more than 55% of units are in 6 states: Maharashtra, Tamil
Nadu, Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal.
Overview of Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises; MSMEs contribute
significantly to the Indian economy, but face significant funding shortages
Share of Manufacturing output (in terms of value): 45%
Share of total exports (In terms of value): 40%
Contribution to GDP: 8%
Contribution to employment: 60 million
The MSME sector has consistently registered a higher growth rate than the rest of the Industrial sector
Manufacturing
sector
Services
sector
> 25 Lakhs and
≤ 5 Crores
> 5 and ≤ 10
Crores
≤ 10 Lakhs
> 10 Lakhs and
≤ 2 Crores
> 2 and ≤ 5
Crores
Landscape of MSME sector
(In terms of enterprises)
To provide context for analyzing policies related to debt to MSMEs, here we describe important
features of this sector…
© 2011 Intellecap. All rights reserved
0
50,000
100,000
150,000
200,000
250,000
Public SectorBanks
Private SectorBanks
Foreign Banks GovernmentInstitutions
FY 2008 FY 2009
93%
5%
2%
No Finance/SelfFinance
Finance throughInstitutional Sources
Finance through Non-Institutional Sources
14
Debt is the predominant source of capital for businesses. However, given a low penetration of institutional debt to MSMEs, there is a
pressing need to strengthen the role of Banks and Financial institutions in providing institutional finance to enterprises in this sector.
• Close to 95% of enterprises in the MSME sector do not have
access to finance from Institutional sources
• Heavy dependence of MSMEs on personal savings and Non-
institutional sources such as borrowing from friends and family,
money lenders etc. owing to limited supply of institutional finance
• Propensity amongst Banks/ Financial Institutions (FIs) to
undertake lending decisions based on availability of collateral and
established track record
• High risk perception of enterprises in the MSME sector, and high
transaction costs involved in serving these enterprises often
deters certain Banks / FIs from lending to the sector
A large number of enterprises in the MSME sector face severe
challenges with respect to funding from Institutional sources
1. Notes:
• Government institutions comprise Urban Cooperative Banks (UCBs), Regional Rural Banks (RRBs), State Financial Corporations
(SFCs), State Industrial Development Corporations (SIDCs) and SIDBI (Direct Credit to MSE)
• NBFCs excluded from graph due to unavailability of official data regarding NBFC financing to the sector
2. Sources: RBI Annual Report 2009-10, Report on trends and progress of Banking in India 2009-10, MSME Annual Report, 2010,
SIDBI MSME Database, 2010
Sources of Finance to MSME units (No. of units) Snapshot of Outstanding credit to MSEs in India from Institutional sources (INR crore)
Source: 4th All India MSME Census (2006 – 2007).
Scheduled Commercial Banks
“Only 4-5 % MSMEs are covered by Institutional funding, given that approximately 95 % of villages are not covered by banks.
There is, therefore, a need to bridge this gap through enabling policies.” - Dr. K C Chakrabarty, Deputy Governor, RBI (May, 2010)
• Scheduled Commercial Banks are the key sources of institutional financing for the sector,
with ~88% of outstanding credit to the MSE sector in FY 2009 contributed by Public sector
banks, Private sector banks and Foreign banks together
• Public sector banks account for a clear majority (~75% of outstanding SCB credit to MSE
sector) when compared to Private sector and Foreign banks
• Credit outstanding to the MSE sector from SCBs grew increased to INR 364, 012 crores in
2009–10, with Public sector banks continuing to outpace Private sector banks and Foreign
banks with a y-o-y growth of ~45% (over 2008–09)
DEBT FINANCE
CHALLENGES
© 2011 Intellecap. All rights reserved 15
• Government institutions such Urban Cooperative Banks
(UCBs), State Financial Corporations (SFCs), State Industrial
Development Corporations (SIDCs), Regional Rural Banks
(RRBs) etc. have been instrumental in serving the MSME
sector due to greater access to entrepreneur information
and an extensive network
• However, a large number of these institutions have been
displaying signs of weakness, highlighting the need for
measures to improve governance, financial health, reduce
Non-Performing Assets (NPAs) etc.
• Scheduled Commercial Banks are down streaming
operations to serve the MSME sector
• Public sector banks are the leading suppliers of debt capital to
the MSME sector on account of their wide branch footprint,
with State Bank of India leading bank financing in the sector
• As Private sector banks and Foreign banks are largely
present in urban areas, they have limited outreach in the
MSME sector
• The NBFC segment comprises of large NBFCs that serve
Medium and Large enterprises and niche NBFCs that serve
the Micro and Small enterprise segment
• MFIs are also up-scaling their operations beyond the Informal
sector to cater to the Micro enterprise segments
UCBs, SFCs, SIDCs, RRBs
etc.
Niche NBFCs
TYPE OF ENTERPRISE
Informal
sector Small Micro Medium
DEBT
FINANCE
SUPPLIER
MFIs
Large
Government
Institutions
Private sector Banks &
Foreign Banks
NBFCs
Public Sector Banks
Scheduled
Commercial
Banks
Large NBFCs
Players in the Debt landscape operate at varying risk segments,
leading to a significant financing gap, especially for the MSE sector
Suppliers of Debt finance operate at various parts of the spectrum. However, differing risk appetites limit the supply of finance to the
MSME sector, which is generally perceived as risky by Banks and Financial Institutions
Largely unserved by Institutional finance
Low supply of institutional funding plagues the „Micro‟ and „Small‟ Enterprise segments, as they are considered too risky to be served by
large banking institutions, and too large to benefit from Microfinance, leading to a significant financing gap.
DEBT FINANCE
CHALLENGES
Source: Intellecap Analysis; Primary Interviews
© 2011 Intellecap. All rights reserved 16
i. Executive Summary
ii. Table of Contents
iii. Acronyms and Abbreviations
1. Introduction
2. Overview of Financing to FGEs
3. Debt Financing
a) Challenges
b) Policy Landscape
c) International best practices
4. Equity Financing
a) Challenges
b) Policy Landscape
c) International best practices
5. Non-financial Aspects
a) Challenges
b) Policy Landscape
6. Concluding Thoughts and Next Steps
iv. References
pg. 2
pg. 3
pg. 4
pg. 7
pg. 10
pg. 13
pg. 13
pg. 17
pg. 36
pg. 39
pg. 39
pg. 42
pg. 57
pg. 59
pg. 59
pg. 60
pg. 63
pg. 65
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Table of Contents TABLE OF
CONTENTS
© 2011 Intellecap. All rights reserved 17
Lead Actor1 Acts; Regulations; Policy Documents
Reserve Bank of India (RBI)
• RBI Guidelines for Banks;
• RBI Guidelines for Priority Sector Lending,
• RBI Guidelines on Business Correspondents and Business Facilitators (2006)
Ministry of MSME • MSME Development Act 2006, Package for Promotion of Micro and Small Enterprises (2007)
Ministry of Finance
• Securitization and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest (SARFAESI) Act 2002
• Department of Financial Services: Credit Information Companies (Regulation) Act (2005)
• Policy Package for Stepping up Credit to Small and Medium Enterprises (2005)
Ministry of Consumer Affairs,
Food & Distribution • Warehousing (Development and Regulation) Act (2007)
Ministry of Corporate Affairs • Limited Liability Partnerships Act 2008
• Provincial Insolvency Act 1920 (Covers Proprietorships and Partnerships)
Regulatory framework guiding lending practices in India and
Government Committees on issues of commercial debt financing DEBT FINANCE
POLICIES
RBI is the main regulator of debt capital; rules and regulations initiated by various Central Government Ministries
Four Step process for raising debt capital in India
Lead Actor Recommendatory Reports
Prime Minister‟s Office • Report of the Prime Minister‟s Task Force on MSME (2010)
Committees / Working Groups
instituted by various
Government institutions
• Report of the Committee on Comprehensive Regulation of Credit Rating Agencies (2009)
• Report of Working Group on Rehabilitation of Sick SMEs (2008)
• Report of the In-house Working Group on Asset Securitization (1999)
• Report of Working Group to review the Credit Guarantee Scheme of the CGTMSE (2010)
• Report of the Working Group on the Issues and Concerns in the NBFC Sector (2011)
Various steering committees instituted by the Government provide policy recommendations on key issues
1 The Acts listed under the various ministries (in green) affect most the Ministry indicated here, but also has ramifications on other Government institutions.
© 2011 Intellecap. All rights reserved 18
DEBT FINANCE
POLICIES
Information asymmetry, risk of doing business & high transaction costs
are key concerns for banks when lending to MSMEs
Banks / Financial Institutions rely to a great extent on availability of
adequate collateral and an established track record to evaluate credit
worthiness of firms; conditions largely unmet by firms in the sector
This leads to MSMEs availing of non-institutional
sources of finance as they may not have the
required collateral or track record
Concerns/ challenges faced by Banks/ Financial Institutions when lending to the MSME sector stem from the following reasons:
Lending to
MSMEs is
RISKIER
Lending to
MSMEs is
COSTLIER
Limited Financial
Transparency
High Information
Asymmetry
Low levels of Financial
Literacy
Vulnerability of Business
operations
High mortality of units and
weak creditors rights
High transaction costs
Limited outreach
• High risk perception of MSMEs and limited risk appetite of banks/ financial institutions at
times due to internal policies which encourage cautious lending impact credit flow
• Lack of suitable financial information & an inadequate information infrastructure
leads to information asymmetry between lenders and enterprises in the MSME sector.
• Limited information on the enterprise inhibits access to finance, as banks consider
accounting systems and financial records of these firms to be inadequate in many cases
• Insufficient information with respect to collateral, and lack of relevant credit history
information leads to challenges in risk assessment and recovery on loan defaults
• Entrepreneurs in this sector usually have limited information on financial sources,
products and services available., and limited skills with respect to the same
• Weak financial strength of enterprises on account of vulnerability to demand and market
shocks, shortage of working capital and rising NPAs contribute to lenders‟ concerns
• High turnaround time of processing MSME loan applications due to limited information
regarding the credit history of enterprises.
• High transaction costs involved (cost of sourcing, acquisition and servicing) in serving this
sector often adversely affect lenders‟ inclination to lend
• Limited outreach of commercial banking institutions and lack of tailored products to cater
to needs of this sector, contribute to higher transaction costs
© 2011 Intellecap. All rights reserved
16. Cluster Development Programmes to
leverage economies of scale (Financing &
Non-Financing aspects)
1. Sector specific act defining MSMEs: MSME
Development Act (2006)
2. Inclusion of Credit to MSEs in Priority Sector
Lending Guidelines (RBI)
3. Promotional Programmes/ Policy Packages:
o PM‟s Task Force on MSMEs (2010)
o Package for Promotion of Micro and Small
Enterprises (2007)
o Policy Package for Stepping up Credit to
Small and Medium Enterprises (2005)
19
DEBT FINANCE
POLICIES
Mapping policies and interventions to the various financing
challenges
Concerns/ challenges faced by Banks/
Financial Institutions when lending to the
MSME sector: Need to increase Supply of
Capital
Lending to
MSMEs is
RISKIER
Lending to
MSMEs is
COSTLIER
Limited Financial
Transparency
High Information
Asymmetry
Low levels of Financial
Literacy
Vulnerability of Business
operations
High mortality rate and
weak creditors rights
High transaction costs
Limited outreach
Challenge Faced Enabling Policies Enabling Interventions
4. Schemes/ Programmes by Ministry of
MSME to promote MSME sector. Overview
of schemes implemented through:
o Office of Development Commissioner
(MSME)
o National Small Industries Corporation
5. SIDBI: Financing & Non-Financing
initiatives
6. Other enabling institutions: SFCs, UCBs
& District Industries Centre (DIC)
7. Facilitating Asset recovery and reconstruction:
SARFAESI Act (2002)
9. Credit Guarantee Fund Trust for Micro and
Small Enterprises (CGTMSE) to enable
collateral free loans
10. Instituting a new form of collateral:
Warehousing (Development and Regulation)
Act (2007)
11. Establishment of Credit bureaus: Credit
Information Cos. (Regulation) Act (2005)
Infrastructure support to mitigate
Information asymmetry and risk:
8. Asset Re-construction Company (ARC)
12. Credit Bureaus (E.g. CIBIL)
13. Collateral Registry (E.g. Central Registry
maintained by CERSAI )
14. Credit Rating Agencies (E.g. SMERA,
CRISIL, ICRA etc.) and Performance &
Credit Rating Scheme (NSIC)
15. Institution of Branchless banking initiatives: RBI
Guidelines on Business Correspondents &
Business Facilitators (2006)
Constraining
Regulations /
Policies
17. Archaic Bankruptcy laws for Proprietorships and Partnerships (Provincial Insolvency Act 1920)
18. Inadequate legal & regulatory framework for alternative forms of working capital finance such as
Factoring/ Securitization of receivables
19. Regulations constraining on-lending to NBFCs (other than MFIs categorized as NBFCs) limit their
access to debt finance from banks (Exclusion from Priority Sector Lending guidelines)
© 2011 Intellecap. All rights reserved
All debt-related policies are
marked using the same
numbers on page 19, the
policy overview page
Enactment of a sector-specific law and inclusion of credit to MSEs
as Priority Sector Lending were significant steps for the sector
20
DEBT POLICY
ENABLERS
Sector-specific
Act governing
promotion and
development of
sector: MSME
Development Act
(2006)
Policy Overview Impact / Benefit Scope for improvement
• Clear legal definition of units that fall
under the MSME sector
• Expansion of plant and machinery
limits and recognizing that investments
in service units may be smaller.
• Facilitated formulation and execution of
schemes and funds for promotion and
development of the sector
• Provisions for penalties on late
payments aim to encourage smoother
cash flow to micro/ small units
• Simplification of registration processes
• Proposed procurement policy to guide
purchase of supplies and Exit policy to
regulate liquidation of sick units
• Guidance from National Board in policy
formulation and programme execution
• The MSME Development Act came into
force from October 2, 2006.
• Classified units in the Micro, Small and
Medium category, based on total
investment in plant and machinery for
manufacturing units and equipment for
service units
• Facilitated formation of the National
Board of MSME - an apex, statutory,
advisory body to advise the Government
on issues relating to the MSME sector
• Imposed penalties for delayed
payments by large companies to Micro
& Small enterprises
• Made provisions for development of
future policies such as a procurement
preference policy and exit policy
• Stronger enforcement of policies such
as penalties for delayed payments are
required to ensure a continuous stream
of working capital
• Need to introduce policies mentioned
in the Act, such as the Procurement
preference policy and Exit policy
• Scope to include special provisions for
promotion of women entrepreneurs in
procurement policies etc.
• Tendency amongst Financial
Institutions to use annual sales for
definition of units, leading to
inconsistency with government
mandates at times
Inclusion of
Micro & Small
Enterprises in
„Priority Sector
Lending‟
guidelines
• Aims to address the shortage of funds
in the MSE sector, by targeting bank
lending to this sector
• To ensure allocation of sufficient
financing to MSEs, RBI has accepted
the following recommendations by PMs
Task Force on MSMEs (2010):
o Year-on-year credit growth of 20%
to MSEs
o Micro segment to account for 60%
of annual outlay to MSE sector
o Target of 15% growth per annum in
number of micro enterprise
accounts in commercial banks
• As per RBI mandates, „Priority Sector
Lending‟ targets are 40% of Adjusted
Net Bank Credit (ANBC) or Off-Balance
Sheet Exposure (OBE) (whichever is
higher ), for domestic commercial banks
while it is 32% for foreign banks
• Lending to the Micro & Small
enterprise sector is considered in
computing performance of domestic
commercial banks under the overall
PSL target, while foreign banks have
sub-targets of 10% of ANBC or OBE
(whichever is higher).
• Scope to fix a sub-sector target within
the overall priority sector ceiling (40%),
as MSEs have to compete with
Housing, Education etc. for the residual
12% after sub-targets fixed for
agriculture and weaker sections
at18% and 10% respectively
• While current regulations focus on
large commercial banks serving
MSMEs, there is a need to recognize
that smaller financial institutions such
as NBFCs, can complement the
services of large commercial banks
2
1
Source: Micro, Small & Medium Enterprises Development Act, 2006; Report on Entrepreneurship in India, National Knowledge Commission, Government of India (2008); „Entrepreneurship Development in the Micro Small and Medium Enterprise Sector in India‟ - A Report by
Shamika Ravi, Indian School of Business (July 2009); RBI Master Circular - Lending to Priority Sector (July 1, 2011); http://www.sme.in/CurrentNews.aspx?NewsID=1824
© 2011 Intellecap. All rights reserved
1. Prime Minister's Task Force on MSME (2010):
• Set up to evaluate the issues raised by various
MSME associations and develop an action plan to
address the issues of the sector
• Final report submitted on January 30, 2010, with
recommendations on issues relating to credit,
taxation, marketing, labor, exit policy, infrastructure/
technology/skill development and packages for North
East, Jammu & Kashmir etc.
2. Package for Promotion of Micro and Small
Enterprises (2007):
• Consists of various proposals/schemes to support
MSMEs with respect to credit, fiscal matters, cluster-
based development, infrastructure, technology and
marketing
• Package also focuses on capacity building of MSME
associations and support to women entrepreneurs
through guarantee covers, financial assistance etc.
3. Policy Package for Stepping up Credit to Small and
Medium Enterprises (2005):
• Package was introduced aiming to double the credit
flow to the sector within five years
• Measures to increase the quantum of credit include
directives for banks to attain a minimum 20% year-
on-year growth in credit to the MSME sector and
provide credit cover on an average to at least 5 new
MSMEs at each of their semi-urban/urban branches
annually
The Government has undertaken efforts to provide stimulus to
MSME financing and capacity building via policies and packages
21
DEBT POLICY
ENABLERS
Government
support through
Policies/
Promotional
Packages
Overview of intervention Impact / Benefit Scope for
improvement
• Stipulations in the Report of the PMs
Task Force on MSMEs with respect to
the following are likely to facilitate
credit flow to MSMEs:
o Strict adherence by banks to 20%
year-on-year growth for MSE
lending with 60% allotment for Micro
sector
o Creation of a fund with SIDBI called
„Special Fund for Micro Enterprises
using shortfall against MSE credit
targets for commercial banks
• The Task Force also indicates
introduction of a Public Procurement
Policy with a target of at least 20% of
annual purchase volume from MSEs
for government departments and
PSUs, need to re-engineer and
strengthen the District Industries
Centers (DIC) to facilitate promotion
and capacity-building of MSMEs etc.
• In addition to bank targets for lending,
measures in the Policy package for
stepping up credit include the need for
banks to follow a transparent rating
system to determine cost of credit,
adoption of a cluster based approach
for SME financing etc.
• Implementation closely monitored by
RBI and Government, facilitating
accountability and adoption
• Issues in
implementation, long
turn around time etc.
often limit
effectiveness of such
support. E.g.
Introduction of Public
Procurement Policy
mentioned in the PMs
Task Force Report on
MSMEs (Target of
>20% of annual
purchases from
MSEs) has seen
limited progress
• Need for formulation
of concrete plans of
action and/or fund
allocations in order to
ensure effective
execution of indicated
measures, in line with
urgency of
requirement
• In addition, there is
scope for increased
private participation
for implementation of
various government
schemes
3
Source: business.gov.in; Report of Prime Minister‟s Task Force on MSME (GoI) – January 2010; Package for Promotion of Micro and Small Enterprises (Ministry of Small Scale Industries & Agro & Rural Industries) – February 2007; Policy Package for Stepping up Credit to Small
and Medium Enterprises (Announcements made by Union Finance Minister) – August 2005;www.rbi.org.in,dcmsme.gov.in,www.iiaonline.in
© 2011 Intellecap. All rights reserved
1. Ministry of Micro, Small & Medium Enterprises:
• Nodal Ministry for development of policies/
Programmes/ schemes to promote and advance the
MSME sector, execution and co-ordination
• Supported by the Office of Development
Commissioner (MSME), National Small Industries
Corporation (NSIC), Khadi and Village Industries
Commission (KVIC) and Coir Board
2. Schemes operated by DC (MSME):
• Credit Linked Capital Subsidy Scheme (CLCSS)
for technology upgrades: Aims at facilitating
technology upgrades by providing15% capital
subsidy to MSEs on institutional finance availed by
them
• National Manufacturing Competitiveness
Programme (NMCP): Aims to improve
competitiveness of MSMEs across value chain of the
sector and involves 10 components. NMCP includes
programmes such as setting up of new tool rooms,
product and process quality improvement, cost
reduction etc.
• Other schemes include a scheme for capacity
building (to strengthen MSE database), MSE-CDP
(Cluster Development), CGTMSE etc.
3. NSIC: Public Sector enterprise set up to provide
technical, financial and marketing assistance to MSMEs
• Undertakes schemes related to raw material
procurement, product marketing, credit rating and
technology support such as the Marketing
Assistance Scheme, Performance and Credit Rating
Scheme etc.
Schemes to promote and develop the MSME sector have been
formulated and executed through varied implementation agencies
22
DEBT POLICY
ENABLERS
Ministry of MSME
& Implementing
Partners:
Programmes &
Schemes
Overview of intervention Impact / Benefit Scope for
improvement
• Establishment of a distinct Ministry for
the MSME sector facilitates the
formulation and implementation of
targeted policies/ programmes/
schemes aiming to increase the
competitiveness of MSMEs and
facilitate credit flow to the sector,
amongst other advantages
• Setting up of a Call Center of the
Ministry – „Udyami Helpline‟,
contributes to improving the financial
literacy of FGEs by providing a single
point facility for information on
formalities for setting up an enterprise,
obtaining bank loans, subsidies etc.
• The DC (MSME) functions as an apex
body supporting Government in
developing and implementing policies
and programmes for the sector, and
provides assistance in varied areas
such as marketing, technology,
entrepreneurial development etc.
• Schemes implemented by NSIC assist
MSMEs in raw material procurement
and marketing of products (through
consortia and tender marketing, single
point registration for government
purchase, credit support for
procurement etc.), and contribute to
enhancing the competitiveness and
marketability of their products
• The „Strategic Action
Plan of Ministry of
Micro, Small and
Medium Enterprises‟,
notes that a key
challenge is
multiplicity of
programs/ schemes
undertaken by
various departments/
ministries for the
same target group.
This duplication with
respect to design,
implementation and
communication often
leads to confusion
• Need for effective
coordination between
various stakeholders,
with synchronization
of communication
strategies
• In addition, there is a
need for greater
involvement of the
private sector in
scheme execution
and improved
awareness building
initiatives
4
Source: msme.gov.in;nsic.co.in; business.gov.in; Strategic Action Plan of Ministry of MSME
© 2011 Intellecap. All rights reserved
• Principal Financial Institution for promotion, financing
and development of MSME sector and co-ordination of
related activities of organizations
• Financial support is provided through Direct lending,
Refinance to eligible Primary Lending Institutions (PLIs)
such as Banks, State Financial Corporations (SFCs),
State Industrial Development Corporations (SIDCs) etc.
and financial assistance through loans, grants, equity/
quasi-equity to NGOs / MFIs for on-lending to MSMEs
• SIDBI funding schemes relate to composite loans,
financing marketing activities, equipment finance etc.
• In addition to finance, SIDBI has undertaken various
initiatives with respect to non-credit requirements such
as equity capital, credit rating, credit guarantee,
technology up gradation etc.
• SIDBI is the implementing agency of the MSME
Financing and Development Project (MSMEFDP), a
multi activity, multi-agency project on financing and
development of MSMEs through provision of financing
and non-financing services, and development of an
enabling eco-system. The project components include:
o Credit facility from World Bank & KfW Germany used
for extending credit to existing and new MSMEs
o Risk Sharing Facility (Piloted through CGTMSE)
o Technical Assistance by DFID UK, KfW and GtZ
Germany covering capacity building of banks /
financial institutions and borrowers, addressing policy
and regulatory issues, promotion of market oriented
business development services etc.
• SIDBI‟s Modified Rural Industries Programme (MRIP)
aims at stimulating viable rural enterprise through
facilitating availability of business development services
As the apex institution for promotion, financing and development
of the MSME sector, SIDBI has a prominent role to play
23
DEBT POLICY
ENABLERS
Small Industries
Development
Bank of India
(SIDBI):
Financing & Non-
Financing
support
Overview of intervention Impact / Benefit Scope for
improvement
• Provides financial support through
Direct lending and Refinance, along
with Development & Support services.
• Facilitates development of an enabling
eco-system by varied initiatives:
o Establishment of an Asset
management company managing
Venture Capital funds: SIDBI
Venture Capital Limited
o Credit guarantee support to
collateral free loans: CGTMSE
o MSME specific credit rating agency
for transparent and comprehensive
risk profiling: SME Rating Agency of
India (SMERA)
o Establishment of India‟s first MSME
focused Asset Reconstruction
Company for quicker resolution of
NPAs: India SME Asset
Reconstruction Company (ISARC)
• SIDBI has also undertaken efforts to
promote Microfinance across India to
cater to enterprises which do not have
access to institutional finance
• The MSMEFDP aims to make MSME
financing an attractive and viable
option for banks/ financial institutions in
India, and caters to financing and non-
financing needs of MSMEs
• MRIP caters to MSE needs relating to
financial & non-financial services such
as market linkages, technology etc.
• The Report of the
PMs Task Force on
MSMEs (2010)
recommended the
institution of
measures to
enhance resource
support to SIDBI and
to make available
cheaper resources
for on-lending at low
interest rates to the
sector
• There is also scope
for SIDBI to
encourage private
players to set up
Venture Capital
Funds catering to the
sector
5
Source: Report on Entrepreneurship in India, National Knowledge Commission, Government of India (2008); business.gov.in; SIDBI; www.msmefdp.net; Business Standard
© 2011 Intellecap. All rights reserved
1. State Financial Corporations
• A key objective of SFCs is to
contribute to regional development
in their areas of operation
• SFCs and twin-function State
Industrial Development
Corporations (SIDCs) are the key
sources of long term finance for
the MSME sector at a state level
2. Urban Co-operative Banks (UCBs)
• Refers to primary cooperative
banks located in urban and semi-
urban areas
• In urban areas, UCBs largely
finance varied types of people for
self-employment, industries, small
scale units, home finance etc.
• UCBs undergo duality of control,
with banking related functions
regulated by RBI and registration,
management, liquidation etc.
governed by State Governments
3. District Industries Centre (DICs):
• Key function is to develop and
promote „Cottage and Small Scale
Industries‟ in the district (SSI
defined as Industries with
investment up to Rs.1 Crore in
Plant & Machinery)
• Envisioned as key agencies for
promotion of MSME sector
While smaller banking institutions such as SFCs and UCBs have
played a pivotal role in financing MSMEs, they face viability issues
24
DEBT POLICY
ENABLERS
Other Enabling
institutions:
SFCs, UCBs and
DICs
Overview of intervention Impact / Benefit Scope for improvement
• SFCs have assisted in the
development of MSMEs as majority
of their efforts at financing and
promotion in their respective states
are directed towards this sector,
with the objective of attaining
balanced regional growth,
generating employment, stimulating
investment etc.
• In addition, SFCs supported many
FGEs at a time when venture capital
and angel funds were not prevalent,
and have undertaken special
schemes of seed capital assistance
for women entrepreneurs.
• Similar to SFCs, UCBs have played
a pivotal role in development of the
MSME sector through timely
financial assistance, and act as an
important financial intermediary
providing financial services to the
unorganized sector
• The Report of the PMs Task Force
on MSMEs (2010) envisaged the
role of DICs to be that of a facilitator
providing Business Development
Services to prospective and existing
entrepreneurs by undertaking
activities such as information
dissemination, financing linkages,
marketing support, facilitating skill
development etc.
• Need to strengthen SFCs‟ role as regional
development banks, due to large scale
sickness observed on account of:
o Losses due to rising NPAs, low return on
investment in MSME sector, and long
gestation period of loans to MSME
o Need for greater transparency
o Dependence on state government rules
and political environment of state
o Inability to keep pace with market
competitiveness
• The Report of Working Group on
Rehabilitation of Sick SMEs recommended
that State Governments be directed to make
available a one time financial support for
recapitalization of viable SFCs, and arrange
for the winding up of unviable SFCs ,
including settlements with creditors/ lenders
• Many UCBs have displayed signs of
weakness on account of low profitability,
growing NPAs, limited operational and
managerial efficiency and inadequate
corporate governance. Thus, there is a
need to consolidate and strengthen the
UCB segment, and introduce greater
transparency and accountability
• Need to re-engineer and strengthen DICs
by providing funds for upgrading existing
infrastructure and capacity building of
existing human resources to contribute
more actively in advocacy and capacity
building for entrepreneurs
6
Source: Report of Working Group on Rehabilitation of Sick SMEs; business.gov.in; dcmsme.gov.in; Rediff; iem.edu.in; www.mucbf.org; www.dicgc.org.in; Report of Prime Minister's Task Force on MSME (January 2010)
© 2011 Intellecap. All rights reserved
Measures to improve the recovery of debt include enabling regulations like
the SARFAESI Act and formation of Asset Reconstruction Companies
25
DEBT POLICY
ENABLERS
Facilitating Asset
recovery and
reconstruction:
SARFAESI Act
(2002)
Overview of Intervention Impact / Benefit Scope for improvement
• Prior to the Act, an underdeveloped
legal framework led to slow recovery of
defaulting loans and rising NPA levels
of banks and financial institutions. The
Act facilitates an organized mechanism
for managing mounting NPA stocks
• As intended in the Act, it has:
o Enabled banks/ FIs to realize long-
term assets, manage liquidity
problems and asset-liability gaps
o Improve recovery by taking
possession of securities, selling
them and reducing NPAs by
adopting recovery or reconstruction
measures
• The Securitization and Reconstruction
of Financial Assets and Enforcement of
Security Interest Act, 2002 enables
Banks / Financial Institutions to recover
their non-performing assets (NPAs)
without the intervention of the Court
• Permits Banks/ financial institutions to
seize and auction collateral assets
when borrowers fail to repay loans
• Empowers banks/ financial institutions
to reduce NPAs by undertaking
measures for recovery or
reconstruction
• Provides a framework for debt
recovery and creditor right protection
• The benefits of the SARFAESI Act are
applicable to a limited type of lenders,
with small institutions like NBFCs
currently excluded from the coverage of
this Act
• The „Report of the Working Group on
the Issues and Concerns in the NBFC
Sector‟ (Aug 29, 2011) recommended
the inclusion of NBFCs under the
coverage of the Act to enable quicker
recovery of their NPAs
• Empowering NBFCs to utilize the
provisions of the Act to enforce their
security interests would encourage
NBFCs to better serve the sector
Managing NPAs:
Asset
Reconstruction
Companies
(ARC)
• Accumulation of substantial NPAs in
the banking sector due to low levels of
credit recovery, lengthy legal recourse
etc. results in blocking of funds in
NPAs and diversion of management
and financial resources from core
business to NPA resolution efforts
• ARCs, vested with special powers and
relevant professional expertise in
recovery, reduce the significant time,
effort and costs involved for banks/ FIs
in NPA resolution, and result in cleaner
balance sheets for banks/ FIs
• ISARC aims at tackling the high levels
of NPAs in Banks/ FIs through its focus
on the MSME sector, deemed as „risky‟
• Asset reconstruction refers to purchase
of any right or interest of any bank/
financial institution in any financial
asset for the purpose of realization
• Under the SARFEASI Act (2002),
establishment of ARCs was identified
as a focus area for NPA resolution
• ARCs aim at speedier resolution to
unlock idle NPA assets for productive
purposes and enable improved credit
flow from the banking sector to MSMEs
• SIDBI and many public sector banks
have launched the India SME Asset
Reconstruction Company Limited
(ISARC) to deal with NPAs related to
the MSME sector.
• ARCs are at a nascent stage in India,
and faced with a limited investor base
and low inclination amongst investors
for securitized investment instruments
• Need for flexibility in ARC controlling
structure, to foster private participation
• Scope for simplification and reduction of
registration fee and stamp duty to
lessen transaction costs involved
• Formulation of laws to speed up the
lengthy recovery process
• Need for periodic monitoring of ARC
operations for greater transparency
• Possibility that ISARC may face issues
similar to mainstream ARCs, especially
with regard to transaction costs
8
7
Source: SARFESI Act, 2002; Report of the Working Group on the Issues and Concerns in the NBFC Sector (RBI); Business Standard ; Hindu Business Line; www.dnb.co.in; http://wirc-icai.org; www.lawguru.com; SIDBI; india-financing.com
© 2011 Intellecap. All rights reserved
Innovative forms of risk underwriting have been introduced through credit
guarantee schemes and warehouse receipt financing
26
DEBT POLICY
ENABLERS
Collateral free
loans to MSEs:
Credit Guarantee
Scheme
Policy Overview Impact / Benefit Scope for improvement
• Facilitation of credit flow to MSE sector
by enabling the availability of bank
credit to enterprises in this sector
without the hassles of collateral or third
party guarantees
• Enables lenders to secure credit
provided purely on the primary security
of assets financed (through credit
guarantee cover provided under this
scheme)
• Aims to encourage composite credit to
borrowers so both term loan and
working capital can be obtained from
the same source
• The scheme, operational from January,
2000 was implemented by establishing
Credit Guarantee Fund Trust for Micro
and Small Enterprises (CGTMSE) by
Ministry of MSME and SIDBI
• Credit facilities include term loans and
working capital which are covered
under the scheme up to Rs. 100 lakh
per borrowing unit, extended without
any collateral security/ third party
guarantee to a new/ existing micro and
small enterprise
• The guarantee cover available is to
the extent of 75/ 80/ 85% of the
sanctioned amount depending upon
the quantum of underlying credit
• Scope to include NBFCs as eligible
Member Lending institutions to make
their portfolio more secure
Limited uptake of scheme due to:
• Low awareness among potential
beneficiaries and branch level functions
of banks
• Limited utilization by banks due to
partial credit guarantee cover,
procedural hassle of initiating legal
proceedings and lock-in period of 18
months prior to lodging claims etc.
• Protracted claim settlements
• Need to record NPAs prior to claims
contributes to banks displaying lesser
leniency during credit assessment
.
Building credit
infrastructure
(for agriculture):
Warehouse
Receipt financing
• The pledging of agricultural produce
with a legal backing (through
negotiable warehouse receipts)
provides a new, reliable form of
collateral for the agricultural sector
which was largely dependent on land
• Provides assistance to farmers in
obtaining better credit facilities by
enhancing the bargaining power of
farmers, and helps in avoiding distress
sales
• Reduces risks involved in extending
credit to farmers and could potentially
contribute to improved warehouse
standards, supply chains etc.
• The Warehousing (Development and
Regulation) Act, 2007, came into
force from Oct 25, 2010.
• In addition to mandating the
negotiability of warehouse receipts, it
directs the procedure for registration of
warehouses and issue of negotiable
warehouse receipts
• The Act also prescribes the setting up
of a Warehousing Development and
Regulatory Authority (a regulatory
body) to register and accredit
warehouses, and establish a system of
quality certification and grading of
commodities
• Still a nascent concept in India amongst
banks and NBFCs. SBI, HDFC, UTI etc.
are some of the banks pioneering this
effort.
• Need for promotion of awareness and
capacity building amongst end-users to
increase uptake.
• Lack of suitable processes has led to
instances of fraud receipts, low quality
of storage etc.
• Currently, paper receipts are issued by
accredited warehouses. Need for
transition to electronic warehouse
receipts for improved transparency.
10
9
Source: www.cgtmse.com; RBI Master Circular: Lending to MSME Sector; SME World; Report of Working Group to review the Credit Guarantee Scheme of the CGTMSE ; A 100 Small Steps: Draft Report of the High Level Committee on Financial Sector Reforms (2008)
© 2011 Intellecap. All rights reserved
• The role of a Credit Information Company (CIC) is to
provide accurate information to lenders to enable
effective credit decisions, risk assessment, reduce
adverse selection of customers and to enable a person
to obtain his/ her own credit information
• The CIC Act (2005) is a legislation passed to regulate
the actions of CICs and to facilitate the efficient
distribution of credit and for related matters
• Effective December 14, 2006, with Rules & Regulations
issued under the Act coming into force on this day
• Provisions of the Act include the following:
o Rules provide that appropriate policies and
procedures should be framed by the credit institution
and CIC with respect to data collection, processing
and collation, security and protection of data and
credit information, and suitable measures for
maintaining accurate, complete and updated data.
o Regulations provide for principles and procedures
relating to personal credit information with regard to
method and purpose of collection of personal data,
solicitation of personal data, accountability in data
transfer to third party, protection of personal data etc.
o The privacy principles indicated in the regulations
include accuracy, security, secrecy, adequacy of data
collected and limitations on the use of data
• In addition, the Act mandates that every credit institution
has to become a member of at least one CIC within a
period of 3 months from commencement of the Act or
any extension permitted by RBI
• CICs in India include Credit bureaus such as Credit
Information Bureau (India) Limited, Experian, Equifax
etc.
The passing of the Credit Information Companies Act facilitated the
setting up and regulation of credit bureaus in the country
27
DEBT POLICY
ENABLERS
Credit
Information
Companies
(Regulation) Act
(2005)
Policy Overview Impact / Benefit Scope for
improvement
• The benefits of CICs include:
o Enabling lenders to take informed
decisions leading to efficient risk
assessment and credit allocation
o Empowering lenders to make fair,
consistent and profitable lending
decisions in a quick manner
o Protecting lenders against fraud
o Assisting in faster and improved
access to credit for borrowers
o Protecting customers against over
indebtedness by providing credit
exposure information
• Laws comprise elaborate provisions
governing who can become members
of a CIC (Credit Institutions, CIC,
Specified users such as Insurance
companies, Cellular/phone company,
Rating agency etc.), regulating the
collection and provision of information,
permissible uses of credit information
etc. thereby facilitating the functioning
of CICs in India
• The CIC laws also offer credibility to
the sensitivity of credit information , as
they encompass numerous provisions
with relating to accuracy, completeness
and protection of credit information,
privacy guidelines for CICs and
members, and provisions relating to
security of and access to credit
information
• Dispute resolution in
case of complaints
regarding information
privacy, data
protection etc. are
covered to a limited
extent. There is a
need for complete
provisions regarding
complaints and
remedies, and
resolution of credit
reporting disputes.
• In cases of a dispute
for which no remedy
has been provided
under the Act, it shall
be settled by
arbitration. As the
course of arbitration
legislation is fairly
cumbersome, there is
scope for another
remedial approach.
• While the Act currently
covers the tracking of
only credit information,
the inclusion of
additional information
would greatly assist
credit assessment in
the sector.
11
Source: Credit Information Companies (Regulation) Act, 2005 (Summary of Draft Rules & Regulations released by RBI for feedback on April 5, 2006); eport.equifax.co.in; www.experian.in; idpl.oxfordjournals.org
© 2011 Intellecap. All rights reserved
Formation of the supporting information infrastructure has been initiated
through establishment of Credit bureaus and Collateral registries
28
DEBT POLICY
ENABLERS
Enabling flow of
credit
information:
CIBIL
Overview of Intervention Impact / Benefit Scope for improvement
• Composite credit bureau with a
centralized database of credit
information on both commercial and
consumer borrowers
• Provides comprehensive credit
information to lenders by collating and
disseminating the same on demand, in
the form of credit information reports
• Credit reporting leads to greater
transparency, thereby reducing
problems of adverse selection and
moral hazard, and more ease in
making funding decisions
• Aims to limit NPAs and improve
lender‟s portfolio quality by assisting
lenders in the loan appraisal process
Credit Information Bureau (India)
Limited (CIBIL):
• India‟s first credit information bureau,
containing credit history of commercial
and consumer borrowers, available to a
closed user group of members
• Members include Banks, FIs, NBFCs,
SFCs, Housing Finance Companies etc.
with data sharing based on the principle
of reciprocity
• The consumer bureau covers credit
availed by individuals while the
commercial bureau tracks enterprises
• Current database size of 170 million
consumer and 6.5 million company
records provided by 500+ members
• Credit bureaus in India are still fairly
nascent with limited MSME data
• As many MSMEs may not have historic
credit information, information obtained
regarding non-financial parameters
such as discipline with utility bill
payments, cash flow assessment etc.
would be useful alternative modes of
credit appraisal for banks, as they
could be tracked to evaluate credit
worthiness of enterprises
• Scope for setting up of a CIBIL like
credit and non-credit information
platform focused on the MSME sector,
which utilizes non-traditional models to
analyze credit behavior
Information
Infrastructure
support: Central
Collateral
Registry
• Insufficient information relating to
collateral (ownership, pledge history
etc.) increases time and cost of
assessment for Banks/ FIs and issues
in case of default regarding liquidation
• Dealings relating to securitisation and
reconstruction of financial assets and
mortgage by deposit of title deeds to
secure loan/ advances by banks/ FIs,
are to be logged in the Central Registry • Availability of records with a Central
Registry will contribute to prevention of frauds involving multiple lending against security of the same property, and fraudulent sale of property without disclosing security interest
Central Registry of Securitization Asset
Reconstruction and Security Interest of
India (CERSAI):
• Set up under the SARFAESI Act, 2002,
CERSAI is a government company
licensed under Companies Act,1956
• Set up by RBI and National Housing
Board, operational March 31st, 2011
• To avoid fraudulent loans, transactions
using property as collateral to obtain
loans from Banks/ FIs are to be
recorded with a Central Registry
maintained and operated by CERSAI • Records maintained by the Registry are
available to lenders/ other persons keen to deal with the relevant property
• The Central Registry records
transactions related to immovable
collateral only. Registration of movable
collateral such as inventory is
fragmented, with need for a
comprehensive legal framework
• Due to lack of adequate provisions
regulating movable collateral, a large
number of banks/ FIs do not accept
movable collateral for credit lending
• Scope for establishment of a collateral
registry maintaining pledge information
of both movable and immovable
assets, thereby providing a
consolidated information infrastructure
13
12
Source: Report on Entrepreneurship in India, National Knowledge Commission, Government of India (2008); www.cibil.com; www.igovernment.in; cersai.org.in; Economic Times; foundation.moneylife.in
© 2011 Intellecap. All rights reserved
1. SME Rating Agency of India Ltd. (SMERA):
o First MSME focused third-party rating agency in India
o Aims to provide comprehensive, transparent and reliable
ratings and risk profiling
o Established in 2005 by SIDBI, CIBIL, Dun & Bradstreet ,
and numerous leading banks in India
o SMERA has pioneered a rating model tailored to the
MSME sector which considers the applicants‟ financial as
well as non-financial factors, nature of industry and
business environment
o CRISIL & ICRA are examples of mainstream credit rating
agencies (CRA) that undertake SME ratings
2. NSIC „Performance and Credit Rating Scheme for Small
Scale Industries‟ (SSI):
o Developed by NSIC along with stakeholders such as
Indian Banks‟ Association, rating agencies such as
CRISIL, ICRA, Dun & Bradstreet etc.
o Aims to encourage SSI units to obtain credit ratings from
reputed credit rating agencies
o Implementation undertaken through empanelled agencies
such as CRISIL, ICRA, SMERA etc.
o The unit‟s rating is arrived at based on a combination of
performance and credit worthiness of the unit
o Partial reimbursement of rating fee through NSIC with a
turnover based fee structure
3. In addition, the Policy Package for Stepping up credit to
SMEs advised banks to: o Follow a transparent rating system, linking cost of credit to
credit rating of the enterprise o Utilize models like Credit Appraisal & Rating Tool
(CART) and Risk Assessment Model (RAM) developed by SIDBI for risk assessment and rating of SME proposals
Setting up of an MSME focused credit rating agency and subsidy
schemes aim to encourage firms to get themselves rated
29
DEBT POLICY
ENABLERS
Risk
Management:
Credit Rating
for MSMEs
Overview of Intervention Impact / Benefit Scope for
improvement
• The benefits of Credit Rating include
the following:
o Enabling banks/ FIs to manage
credit risk by providing an
objective, reliable third party
opinion on capabilities and credit-
worthiness of enterprises
o Contributes to reduction of
information asymmetry, helping
banks to lessen paperwork and
turnaround time, thereby leading to
reduced transaction costs
o Facilitating quicker and cheaper
access to credit for enterprises by
enhancing credibility and
acceptability in the market
o Favorable borrowing terms such
as lower collateral requirements,
reduced interest rates, simplified
lending norms etc.
o Enabling enterprises to determine
their strengths and weaknesses
and take remedial measures to
enhance capability
• Schemes such as NSIC‟s
Performance and Credit Rating
Scheme incentivize enterprises to get
credit themselves rated through a
subsidized fee structure, with eligible
SSI units enjoying rating fee subsidy
up to 75%
• Recommendations of the
Report of the Committee on
Comprehensive Regulation of
Credit Rating Agencies (2009)
include:
o Need to avoid conflict of
interest and maintain CRA
independence through
enhanced disclosure of
revenues from issuer/
borrower, and non-rating
services like advisory
o Scope for a lead regulator
model to overcome
multiplicity of regulators
(E.g. SEBI, RBI, IRDA)
governing the rating of
varied products
o Mandate of process and
compliance audits
o Need for voluntary CRA
compliance with the IOSCO
code of conduct (Relates to
quality, integrity of rating
etc.)
• In addition, SME credit rating
is impacted by limited SME
data, and difficulty in
assessing historical
performance of nascent/
smaller units
14
Source: Report on Entrepreneurship in India, National Knowledge Commission, Government of India (2008); www.smera.in; Union Minister's Policy Package for stepping up credit to SMEs (2005); www.nsic.co.in; NSIC Performance & Credit Rating scheme for Small Industries; rbi.org.in;
Report of the Committee on Comprehensive Regulation of Credit Rating Agencies appointed by GoI; Study by the National Institute for Securities Markets entitled An assessment of the long term performance of the Credit Rating Agencies in India; www.msmestartupkit.com
© 2011 Intellecap. All rights reserved
• Branchless Banking refers to the
outsourcing of transaction processing
by banks to third-party agents, in order
to reduce costs of servicing clients and
enable greater accessibility for clients
• In January 2006, RBI issued new
guidelines permitting the use of 2
categories of intermediaries by banks -
„Business Correspondents‟ and
„Business Facilitators‟, creating a
new model of „Branchless banking‟
• The circular enabled banks to use the
services of NGOs/ SHGs/ MFIs etc. as
intermediaries in providing financial
and banking services, to increase
outreach of banking sector
• Under the BF model, intermediaries
may be used for providing facilitation
services including identification and
fitment of borrowers, processing of
loan applications, awareness building,
post sanction monitoring etc., but
cannot transact on behalf of the bank
• BCs in addition to activities
undertaken by BFs, are permitted to
carry out small value transactions on
behalf of the bank as agents
• RBI has oversight and regulatory
responsibility over these channels
• Examples of a Bank/ BC relationship:
SBI/ FINO Fintech
While the Business Correspondent guidelines were instituted to enable
reduction of transaction costs, they have faced limited success
30
DEBT POLICY
ENABLERS
Branchless
Banking:
Business
Correspondents
& Business
Facilitators
Policy Overview Impact / Benefit Scope for improvement
• Significant costs in processing
MSME loan applications and service
delivery lead to high transaction
costs. Branchless banking initiatives
contribute to reducing transaction
costs and information asymmetry of
MSME lending, and improved
access to finance for the sector
• It also increases convenience for
the clients, thereby facilitating
increased client coverage and
financial inclusion
• BCs complement the branch
network of banks as they facilitate
extension of financial services to
unreached clients beyond the
bank‟s branch network
• BCs are a better alternative when
compared to setting up bank
branches as they enabler outreach
faster and at a lower cost
• As these banking channels involve
significant reputational, operational
and legal risks, technology based
solutions are being adopted to
manage the risk, such as POS
devices, Mobile phones etc.
• Doorstep banking and loan
facilitation by local channels leads to
better accessibility and enhanced
quality of assets through greater
client familiarity and reduced risk
• Mixed responses to BC guidelines, with
scope for greater flexibility to enable viability
of the model. Issues faced by banks are:
o Operational issues such as irregular
accounting of transactions by BCs, risk
of fraud, high cost cash handling
operations due to largely cash
transactions, challenges in technology
integration with BCs etc.
o Viability issues such as large number of
inactive accounts, losses in BC
operations as compensation structure
doesn‟t cover costs etc.
o Regulatory issues such as interest
capping which results in banks not being
able to recover higher delivery costs,
limiting distance requirement of 15kms
from partner bank branch, cash
settlement within prescribed 24 hour
timeline, low value transactions etc.
• Need to lay emphasis on financial viability
of the BC model, in addition to focusing on
number of accounts opened and
achievement of financial inclusion targets
• Capacity building of BCs through trainings
on products, systems, technologies etc.
• With respect to regulations, settlement
timelines should be more relaxed given
inaccessibility of areas of operation, and the
thrust of location criteria should be on ability
of bank to effectively supervise BC
operations, rather than physical distance.
15
Source: RBI Circular on „Financial Inclusion by Extension of Banking Services - Use of Business Facilitators and Correspondents‟ (January 25, 2006); www.microfinanceindia.org
© 2011 Intellecap. All rights reserved
• A Cluster refers to a sectoral and geographical
concentration of MSE units, which produce and sell a
range of related products and are, therefore faced with
common opportunities and challenges.
• MSE units operating in such clusters enjoy competitive
advantage from closeness to raw material sources and
other inputs, presence of sufficiently tailored business
development services, abundance of clients and
availability of a skilled workforce
• In addition, the similarity of needs and requirements,
speeds up best practice dissemination and distribution of
fixed costs, leading to economies of scale. Cluster
development programs involve adopting a coordinated
and combined action to address the needs of such
clusters in terms of infrastructure, technological and
marketing support
• The government has identified Cluster development as
a key strategy for promotion of the sector, and has
encouraged banks to adopt a cluster based approach
for financing the SME sector due to benefits such as
lower transaction costs and risk mitigation
• The Ministry of MSME has launched the „Micro and
Small Enterprise Cluster Development Programme
(MSE-CDP), implemented by the DC (MSME) for overall
development of selected MSE clusters through
management of the value chain on a co-operative basis
• Includes measures for collective capacity building of
cluster units, skill development, credit facilitation,
marketing support, technology up gradation, quality up
gradation and certification, improvement of infrastructural
facilities, establishment of common facility centers (for
testing, training etc.)
Programs for financing and capacity building of MSMEs have been
aggregated through Cluster Development Programs
31
DEBT POLICY
ENABLERS
Leveraging
Economies of
Scale: Cluster
Development
Programs
Overview of Intervention Impact / Benefit Scope for
improvement
• Benefits of a cluster based approach
for SME development include:
o Opportunities for information and
knowledge networks, co-operation
and collective learning
o Emergence of specialized
infrastructure and services based
on cluster specific needs/ skillsets
o Optimal scale of operations and
improved efficiency can be
achieved through specialization
o Economies of scale, leading to
reduced transaction costs
o Improved access to credit
o Enhanced bargaining power of
enterprises through capacity
building of MSEs for joint action via
SHGs, consortiums etc.
o Technology, Skill and Infrastructure
up gradation
• To step up credit to the MSE sector,
the PMs Task Force on MSMEs,
recommended that banks should open
more MSE focused branches at
identified MSE clusters to enable easy
access to bank credit .
• The benefits of a cluster based
approach to lending include availability
of greater information for risk
assessment, ability to deal with definite
and familiar groups, enhanced
monitoring etc.
• Limited clarity in
cluster definition has
led to identification of
a large number of
clusters beyond the
current capabilities of
of institutions
involved in cluster
development
programmes
• Thus, there is a
needs for clearer
definition of clusters
in the guidelines of
the cluster
development
programme, to
enable a more
focused and viable
set of clusters for
improved
effectiveness of
interventions under
the programme
16
Source: www.dcmsme.gov.in; www.centralbankofindia.co.rbi.org.in; finmin.nic.in; planningcommission.nic.in; www.dnb.co.in; www.smeworld.org; www.nabard.org
© 2011 Intellecap. All rights reserved
Archaic bankruptcy laws and limited enforcement of creditor rights
impact sick enterprises and associated creditors
32
DEBT POLICY
CONSTRAINTS
Sick enterprises:
Need for avenues
to support
Enterprises and
Creditors
Challenge Faced Constraining Policy Scope for Improvement
As per the Report of PMs Task Force on
MSMEs (Sub-Group on Exit Policy):
• Insolvency of corporate entities like
companies/ LLPs are ruled by the
Companies Act, 1956, Sick Industrial
Companies (Special Powers) Act,1985
(SICA), SARFAESI Act 2002, Limited
Liability Partnerships Act 2008 etc. with
avenues for revival, rehabilitation of
units or restructuring of financial assets
• However, insolvency in proprietorship/
partnership firms is governed by the
Provincial Insolvency Act 1920, which
has largely stayed the same, focusing
on recovery of unsettled dues through
the courts rather than rehabilitation or
organized exit in the event of failure
o No stay against proceedings
initiated such as for recovery of
statutory dues, during the interim
period when the insolvency petition
is awaiting disposal
o Entrepreneur is faced with
significant social stigma while
attempting to revive the unit, and
could be prosecuted and penalized
under various regulations.
o The entrepreneur‟s ability to raise
finance again/ seek employment is
inhibited as he/ she continues to be
declared insolvent, if unable to
settle the debt.
• Some of the key reasons for sickness
in the MSME sector include lack of
demand, shortage of working capital,
raw materials, labor problems etc.
• The MSME sector is faced with limited
options upon insolvency with respect
to rehabilitation, and /or smooth exit,
and creditors rights. Challenges include:
o Unlimited liability of the entrepreneur
upon default, as majority of
enterprises are either proprietorships
or partnerships, with no separation of
business and personal liability
o Absence of provisions for a
„standstill‟ period for temporary
protection from statutory dues or
other creditor action, to enable a
distressed unit to focus on its revival
o Social stigma upon insolvency and
exit due to restricted options for
clearing dues with non-financial
creditors such as suppliers, labor etc.
o Low enforcement of creditors rights,
with legal challenges affecting
financial institutions with respect to
collateral claims and liquidation,
increasing the service cost and risk
perception of MSME financing
o Lack of an efficient and transparent
liquidation process to repay creditors,
inhibiting entrepreneurship and re-
entry into the marketplace
• Need for development of an MSME
sector specific law/regulation to
manage insolvency, assist enterprises
in coping with sickness through
rehabilitation or graceful exit, and
improve the safeguard of creditor rights
• The Report of Working Group on
Rehabilitation of Sick SMEs noted:
o Need for an institutional mechanism
for timely identification and remedial
action for rehabilitation of viable
units by business restructuring etc.
o Need for a sound, transparent and
equitable exit policy focusing on
efficient liquidation of nonviable
units, fair treatment of creditor rights
• Recommendations in the Report of the
PMs Task Force on MSMEs include:
o Setting up of a rehabilitation fund
under the Ministry of MSME to
provide bridge finance towards
promoters‟ contribution to the same
o Standstill period for statutory dues
o Formulation of a revised insolvency
code for proprietorships/
partnerships with provisions for a
quasi-judicial body to assess
viability and develop time bound
revival/ closure plans, a holding
period for revival, segregation of
business assets from personal, and
speedy winding up of unviable units
17
Source: Report of Working Group on Rehabilitation of Sick SMEs ; Report of Prime Minister's Task Force on MSME ; „Scaling-Up SME Access to Financial Services in the Developing World‟ (G20 Stock taking report on MSME) – IFC
© 2011 Intellecap. All rights reserved
Scope for comprehensive regulations with respect to alternative
sources of finance like factoring/ securitization of trade receivables
33
DEBT POLICY
CONSTRAINTS
Limited legal
& regulatory
framework
for factoring/
securitization
of
receivables
Challenge Faced Constraining Policy Scope for Improvement
• Limited legal and regulatory framework to
protect/ encourage institutions providing
factoring/ securitization limit these services
• Challenges faced include:
o Lack of suitable legislation
o Need for greater clarity on accounting and
taxation treatment unclear
o Unviability of transactions due to high
incidence of stamp duties payable, which
lack uniformity across States
o Lack of awareness and understanding
• The Report of the In-house Working Group
on Asset Securitization (1999) noted the
need for:
o Defining securitization in „Transfer of
Property Act‟ for a uniform approach
o Standard rate of 0.1% for stamp duty on
all securitization transactions
o Inclusion of securitized instruments in
„Securities Contract Regulation Act‟
o Scope for an „umbrella legislation‟
covering all aspects of securitization
• The Report of Working Group on
Rehabilitation of Sick SMEs (2008)
suggested that banks be encouraged to
introduce factoring services, especially for
MSMEs by: o Introducing legislation for factoring o Exemption of stamp duties/ prescription of
ceiling on the same o Refinance at concessional rates from
SIDBI/ RBI
• Working capital demand in MSMEs tends to
be high due to high receivable days, long
production cycles etc. Units face severe
shortage of working capital
• The gap between allocated and actual
working capital could be addressed by
factoring, reverse factoring and
securitization of trade receivables
• Factoring refers to a receivables
management and financing service where a
business sells its accounts receivables to a
third party (Factor), at a discount, involving
transfer of ownership and rights related to
the receivables to the factor. In non-
recourse factoring, the factor assumes
credit risk.
• Reverse factoring refers to the discounting
of supplier bills in respect of regular client
purchases
• Securitization refers to a process where
non-tradable or illiquid financial assets are
transformed into liquid marketable securities
• Advantages include immediate liquidity by
conversion of accounts receivable to cash,
thereby improving cash flow and covering
risk on credit sales
• The services of commercial banks in the
MSME sector could be augmented by
factoring and securitization of receivables,
reducing the working capital strain on
enterprises
• Need to review existing legal and
regulatory framework on factoring/
securitization and evaluate inclusion of
special provisions for MSMEs
• The Report of the PMs Task Force on
MSMEs (2010) recommended
development of workable legal structures
and provisions for securitization of trade
credit receivables and promotion of
factoring. It also noted that RBI has
formed a Working Group on
Securitization of Trade Credit
Receivables to study alternatives for
liquidating receivables before maturity
• The Regulation of Factor (Assignment of
Receivables) Bill, 2011 was approved by
Parliament on 27th December, 2011.
o Aims to regulate the business of
factoring through a mechanism for
assignment of receivables to a factor
and payment by the factor to the
industrial unit
o Aims to protect factors by providing
legal recourse to recover assigned
debt and receivables from buyers While the Bill is a significant step to address liquidity problems of MSMEs, it is a recent development, therefore ramifications and enforcement of the Bill are yet to be assessed
18
Source: Report of Prime Minister's Task Force on MSME, 2010; A 100 Small Steps, Dr. Raghuram Rajan; Report of Working Group on Rehabilitation of Sick SMEs, 2008; Report of the In-house Working Group on Asset Securitization, 1999; Express India; PRS India; Hindu Business
Line; www.isb.edu; Access to financing for SMEs - Sankar De Executive Director, Centre for Analytical Finance, ISB; ww.rbi.org.in; www.vinodkothari.com; Nishith Desai Associates - SECURITISATION IN INDIA (Daksha Baxi & Vikram Shroff); tradeindia.com
© 2011 Intellecap. All rights reserved
Exclusion of NBFCs (except MFI NBFCs) from PSL guidelines impacts debt
funding to NBFCs with majority of portfolio in MSE lending
34
DEBT POLICY
CONSTRAINTS
Regulations
constraining on-
lending to NBFCs
(other than MFIs
categorized as
NBFCs) affects
their access to
debt finance
Challenge Faced Constraining Policy Scope for Improvement
• As per RBI‟s circular dated May 3,
2011, titled „Bank loans to Micro
Finance Institutions (MFIs) – Priority
Sector status’, loans sanctioned for on-
lending with effect from April 1, 2011to
NBFCs (other than MFIs which adhere
to the specified RBI criteria), are not
included under priority sector lending
• The exclusion of loans given to NBFCs
from the priority sector aims to prevent
instances of arbitrage due to conditions
associated with bank loans to MFIs,
which impacts on-lending to MFIs
• Subsequent to RBI‟s directive to
commercial banks to discontinue
priority sector lending through NBFCs
(excluding MFIs categorized as
NBFCs), sources of debt funds to
these institutions has been affected
• Likely to have an unfavorable impact
on credit flow to MSMEs, as NBFCs
due to their organizational flexibility
and outreach were able to serve rural,
semi-urban areas etc. and high risk
enterprises through unsecured
products, segments which commercial
banks may have limited exposure to
• In addition, commercial banks prefer to
provide debt financing to established
NBFCs, on account of the unsecured
nature of their portfolio
• Limited outreach of commercial
banks impacts availability of finance to
the MSME sector, as a number of
enterprises are located in semi-urban
and rural areas. Public sector banks on
account of an extensive branch footprint
are better able to serve the sector, when
compared to private sector banks and
foreign banks who have a smaller
branch network
• As the branch footprint of NBFCs is
far wider than that of commercial banks,
especially private sector and foreign
banks, and in light of the significant role
of relationship/ branch banking in the
Indian context, a large number of private
sector and foreign banks utilize NBFC
intermediaries to deploy small and micro
loans and gain last-mile reach
• In addition, NBFCs provide customized
products by leveraging local intelligence,
involving reduced turn around times,
lesser collateral requirements, tailored
service etc.
• However, RBI has mandated that bank
loans to NBFCs, excluding Microfinance
Institutions categorized as NBFCs,
would not be classified as priority sector
loans. This has adversely impacted the
flow of funds from banks to NBFCs
which focus on the Micro and Small
enterprise segment
• Need to review the inclusion of NBFCs
who have a majority micro and small
portfolio (non-MFIs) under Priority
Sector Lending. To prevent the risk of
fund misuse, inclusion in priority sector
lending could be restricted to a distinct
class of NBFCs with Micro and Small
enterprise (MSE) accounting for
majority of their portfolio
• In addition, the unsecured nature of the
portfolio of these NBFCs limits the
availability of debt financing to them.
Hence, there is scope for formulation
of a credit guarantee fund which can
possibly facilitate small NBFCs with a
focus on MSE sector to obtain debt
finance from commercial banks by
reducing the risk perception associated
with them through a guaranteed
portfolio
19
Source: RBI's Priority Sector Lending Guidelines: (Circulars on): Master Circular - Lending to Priority Sector; Bank loans to Micro Finance Institutions (MFIs) – Priority Sector status ; Economic Times; Rediff
© 2011 Intellecap. All rights reserved 35
i. Executive Summary
ii. Table of Contents
iii. Acronyms and Abbreviations
1. Introduction
2. Overview of Financing to FGEs
3. Debt Financing
a) Challenges
b) Policy Landscape
c) International best practices
4. Equity Financing
a) Challenges
b) Policy Landscape
c) International best practices
5. Non-financial Aspects
a) Challenges
b) Policy Landscape
6. Concluding Thoughts and Next Steps
iv. References
pg. 2
pg. 3
pg. 4
pg. 7
pg. 10
pg. 13
pg. 13
pg. 17
pg. 36
pg. 39
pg. 39
pg. 42
pg. 57
pg. 59
pg. 59
pg. 60
pg. 63
pg. 65
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Table of Contents TABLE OF
CONTENTS
© 2011 Intellecap. All rights reserved 36
Best
Practice Example Features Benefits
Scope for India
Adoption
Provision of
multi-level
partial
guarantees
to increase
on-lending
to MSMEs
Italy
CONFIDI
(Credit
Guarantee
Consortium
)
• CONFIDIs serve as intermediaries
between member MSMEs and banks/
Financial institutions
• Mutual Guarantee Consortia (MGC)
formed at a national level by aggregation of
numerous CONFIDIs
• CONFIDIs extend partial guarantees for
loans to their member enterprises, which is
counter-guaranteed by MGCs to enable
on-lending to MSMEs
• Lessens risk perception about MSME, thereby
facilitating financing
• Lower collateral requirement benefits MSMEs
with respect to easier and quicker access to
credit from the banking system
• Decentralized approach improves the outreach of
the guarantee program
Establishment of a guarantee
fund through aggregation of
multiple local / regional
Mutual Guarantee Societies
(MGS) at a central / state
level
Provision of
credible
credit
information
and ratings
on SMEs
Credit
Bureau
Malaysia
• Initiative of the Credit Guarantee
Corporation Malaysia Berhad (CGC) to
improve SMEs access to financing
• Provides lenders with a useful one stop
centre to obtain credit information and
ratings for credit assessment
• Leading supplier of comprehensive and
reliable credit information and ratings on
SMEs in Malaysia
• Bridges the information gap through access to
timely and credible information on SMEs
• Enables enterprises to develop a track record and
credit standing for quicker processing of credit
applications, and facilitates good payment
behavior
• Ratings calculated by the Bureau are dynamic
and updated every time new credit information is
available
Scope for incorporation of
Ratings into services offered
by credit bureaus, as linking
ratings to credit information
ensures availability of
updated ratings
Encouraging
financing
against
Movable
Assets as
Collateral
Collateral
Registry of
China and
Property
Law
• China undertook a reform of its movable
collateral framework since 2004, with
development of the Property law in 2007,
creation of an electronic receivables
registry for pledged assets and training of
lenders to utilize movable collateral for
lending
• The registry enables SMEs to use movable
assets such as inventory and receivables
as a basis for borrowing
• The Property law improved the legal framework
for asset-based finance in China, as it expanded
the scope of movable collateral, enabled ease of
creation of security interest, established clear
priority schemes for creditors etc.
• The Registry reduces risk of lenders by making
pledges in movable collateral transparent, and
encourages financing against movable assets
such as inventory and receivables
Development of an enabling
collateral regime comprising:
• Laws permitting a wide
range of permissible
collateral (especially
movable collateral)
• Modernized registries also
tracking movable collateral
• Effective enforcement of
collateral upon default etc.
Evolved legislations and interventions in various countries could
serve as a guide for Indian practices (1/2) DEBT BEST
PRACTICES
Source: The Global Best Banking Practices in MSME Financing and Development (SIDBI); Scaling-Up SME Access to Financial Services in the Developing World (IFC)(G20 Stock-taking report); Italy CONFIDI; Credit Bureau Malaysia; Collateral Registry China;
© 2011 Intellecap. All rights reserved 37
Best Practice Example Features Benefits Scope for India
Adoption
Comprehensive
laws for revival
of troubled
units, and/ or
liquidation
proceedings
U.S.
Bankruptcy
laws
• Repay of debts by liquidating assets or by
creating a repayment plan.
• Enterprises seeking protection under the
US Bankruptcy Code may file a petition for
relief under:
o Chapter 7: Governs the course of a
liquidation bankruptcy (i.e. sale of a
debtor‟s non-exempt property and
distribution of proceeds to creditors)
o Chapter 11: Permits reorganization
under the bankruptcy laws , whereby a
Chapter 11 debtor proposes a plan of
re-organization to keep the business
afloat and pay creditors over time
• Provision of a grace period for enterprises
to deal with distress, through an automatic
stay against creditor action when a
bankruptcy petition is filed
• Chapter 7 provides important protections:
o Discharge of an entrepreneur‟s
unsecured personal and business debt
and exemption of future earnings from
the obligation to repay debt, thereby
enabling a “fresh start”
o Exemption levels for current assets
which vary by state, whereby non-
exempt assets beyond the state‟s
exemption levels are to be surrendered
to repay debt
Need for comprehensive laws
which ensure that insolvency
of enterprises is dealt with in
a manner enabling revival or
rescue prior to liquidation,
and whereby entrepreneurs
can gain a fresh financial
start and pursue productive
lives unaffected by past
financial issues
Utilizing
“Mobile
branches” to
enable
Branchless
banking
Opportunity
International
Bank of
Malawi
• Provision of banking services in rural areas
via mobile vans which are equipped with
GPS tracking systems, satellite linkages,
ATMs etc. for real time processing of
transactions
• Extension of Microloan and deposit
services through the mobile branch facility
• Increased accessibility and enhanced
access to finance for microenterprises
• Widening outreach to cover areas not
served by physical branches, with limited
investment when compared to a physical
branch
Scope for formulation of
necessary regulatory
framework for granting of
branch licenses to banks/ FIs
to cater to MSMEs in rural
areas through mobile van
based banking services
Deployment of
web based
warehouse
receipts to
increase on-
lending to
MSMEs
Dubai Metal
Commodity
Centre
(DMCC)
• Web based warehouse receipt system
which enables financing against physical
inventory pledged
• Certification of goods by issuer of the
receipt providing reassurance to the lender
regarding quality of inventory
• Reduced chances of fraud by avoiding
multiple lending against the respective
inventory
• Reduced processing time and monitoring
cost for lender due to quality assurance and
periodic monitoring by issuer
Need for development of an
electronic warehouse receipt
system to enable greater
efficiency, security and
standardization of
transactions
Evolved legislations and interventions in various countries could
serve as a guide for Indian practices (2/2) DEBT BEST
PRACTICES
Source: US Bankruptcy laws; Report of Working Group on Rehabilitation of Sick SMEs ((Submitted April 17, 2008); Report of Prime Minister's Task Force on MSME (January 2010); The Global Best Banking Practices in MSME Financing and Development (SIDBI) - 2011
© 2011 Intellecap. All rights reserved 38
i. Executive Summary
ii. Table of Contents
iii. Acronyms and Abbreviations
1. Introduction
2. Overview of Financing to FGEs
3. Debt Financing
a) Challenges
b) Policy Landscape
c) International best practices
4. Equity Financing
a) Challenges
b) Policy Landscape
c) International best practices
5. Non-financial Aspects
a) Challenges
b) Policy Landscape
6. Concluding Thoughts and Next Steps
iv. References
pg. 2
pg. 3
pg. 4
pg. 7
pg. 10
pg. 13
pg. 13
pg. 17
pg. 36
pg. 39
pg. 39
pg. 42
pg. 57
pg. 59
pg. 59
pg. 60
pg. 63
pg. 65
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© 2011 Intellecap. All rights reserved
India‟s VC industry ranking falling in international comparisons
owing to limitations in the regulatory framework
EQUITY
FINANCE
OVERVIEW
15.7
18.4
20.3
16.2
21.0 21.2
23.8 25.9
12.0
14.0
16.0
18.0
20.0
22.0
24.0
26.0
28.0
2007 2008 2009 2010
India USA
%ge share of early stage deals
out of total – India & USA
Notes: Early stage data for India gleaned from a graph. Calculations exclude data on buy-outs. To see note on PPP, see slide 11.
Sources: India: India Private Equity Report 2011, Bain Capital, Inc. USA: Yearbook 2011, National Venture Capital Association
Share of early stage deals in India lower but comparable to USA
10
20
30
40
50
60
Y2006 Y2007 Y2008 Y2009 Y2010 Y2011
Brazil Russia India China
Global rankings of attractiveness
of VC industry
• The share of number of early stage
deals is lower in India than the US.
The differences seem to widen
during better growth years for
India, 2007 and 2010. See graph.
• The average deal size for early
and seed stage investments in
India is USD 3 million, while it is
USD 1.7 million in America (in PPP
terms), indicating that equity
financing is going to much larger
firms in India.
Source: The Global Venture Capital and Private Equity Country Attractiveness Index, 2011, Ernst & Young, by A. Groh, H
Liechtenstein and K Lieser,
India‟s VC industry behind China due to regulatory issues
• India‟s VC industry is ranked 29
out of over 80 countries in terms of
attractiveness to investors.
• India has placed 2nd amongst BRIC
countries since 2006 (see graph).
South Africa and Malaysia are
ahead of India in global rankings.
• However, far from improving,
India‟s ranking has steadily fallen
since 2006, while China is 9 ranks
ahead of India at 18th in 2011.
• According to the underlying data,
the main contributing factors to this
drop are India‟s inhibiting
regulatory and tax policies.
India‟s regulatory framework described as
inhibiting, ambiguous and changing
Inhibiting policy: Example
• SEBI has placed restrictions on the ability of foreign capital
to structure equity investments. For example, VCs cannot
issue non-convertible debt unless they comply with External
Commercial Borrowing Guidelines of the RBI.
Ambiguous policy: Example
• As seen in the Vodafone case, India‟s tax policies are
ambiguous about the IT department‟s jurisdiction to tax off-
shore deals on Indian companies.
Changing policy: Example
• Recently SEBI released a draft on new regulations that
proposes to classify funds by investment mandates, such as
VCFs, Real Estate Funds, Infrastructure Funds, etc.
Investors have had mixed responses to this move and are
citing it as an example of the changing policy landscape
Lack of an enabling ecosystem & startup
risks make investing in FGEs riskier Startups in India offer an inferior risk / return profile as
compared to bigger deals, such as buy-outs and PIPE deals.1
There are three main reasons for this:
• One, India does not have an enabling ecosystem for
startups to succeed easily. There are few peers to get good
advice from; also, various facilities such as office space,
equipment, HR services are not easily accessible to FGEs.
• Two, given the high risks and small ticket sizes, transaction
costs to conduct early-stage deals are much higher.
• Three, it is difficult for FGEs to do business in India due to
heavy paperwork, compliance requirements, etc.
39
1 Recently 4 investment managers from the VCF Sequoia split to focus on PIPE deals
and cited higher returns in the latter as one of the reasons for the shift.
© 2011 Intellecap. All rights reserved
Investors lament regulatory constraints and an underdeveloped
ecosystem to support FGEs; FGEs have reservations about equity
40
EQUITY
FINANCE
OVERVIEW
“If you look at the e-commerce space, I think a lot of money is
chasing a few quality deals. There is a lot of competition. In other
sectors, such as agri-business, services, etc., there are more
entrepreneurs trying to raise equity capital without understanding why
equity investors invest.”
Venture Capital Investor
“VCs don‟t do enough early stage funding in India. It‟s too expensive to manage investments of the size of around USD
250,000. A VC investor prefers to invest in a late stage of USD 5 million than 5 early stage investments of USD 1 million
each. They don‟t want to spread themselves too thin.”
Venture Capital Investor
“I think the missing part in India is a larger eco system supporting
startups. In the Silicon Valley, for example, there are many eco-system
players such as firms that provide accounting support, HR support, IT
support for startups. Some even take equity positions and don‟t charge
fees! Universities are also an important ecosystem support.”
Venture Capital Investor
“I feel India‟s regulatory framework does not provide a level playing field for investors. Policy changes are unpredictable
and often confusing. For example, if you invested in mobile payments in 2008, you will see that the business model after
the regulatory guidelines came in have completely changed. It becomes too hard to navigate with this uncertainty.”
Venture Capital Investor
Regulatory
constraints to
invest in India
Teasers received:
100%
Tentative term sheets
submitted: 3%
Detailed due diligence done: 2%
Submitted investment
bid: 1%
Only 1% of proposals received by
VC/PE firms reach bidding stage
“I have to admit, I am a little averse to angels and sleeping investors
because I have to keep explaining my plans and actions; I am not
keen on that. I don‟t think equity investors can add value so early on.
Perhaps at the right stage, I will look for a strategic investor, someone
who will invest keeping in mind business synergies.”
First Generation Entrepreneur
These issues are covered in other
sections of this report • Low access to debt
• Heavy regulation to start and run businesses
• Limited Infrastructural support
• Inadequate training institutes
Source: India
Private Equity Report
2011, Bain Capital, Inc.
Investing in FGEs
is Riskier:
1. Limited
ecosystem to
support FGEs
a) Little advisory
support to FGEs
b) Inadequate
facilities to
support FGEs
c) FGEs often
uncomfortable
or unaware
about equity
infusion
2. High transaction
costs to invest in
FGEs
3. Difficulty to do
business in India
© 2011 Intellecap. All rights reserved 41
i. Executive Summary
ii. Table of Contents
iii. Acronyms and Abbreviations
1. Introduction
2. Overview of Financing to FGEs
3. Debt Financing
a) Challenges
b) Policy Landscape
c) International best practices
4. Equity Financing
a) Challenges
b) Policy Landscape
c) International best practices
5. Non-financial Aspects
a) Challenges
b) Policy Landscape
6. Concluding Thoughts and Next Steps
iv. References
pg. 2
pg. 3
pg. 4
pg. 7
pg. 10
pg. 13
pg. 13
pg. 17
pg. 36
pg. 39
pg. 39
pg. 42
pg. 57
pg. 59
pg. 59
pg. 60
pg. 63
pg. 65
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Table of Contents TABLE OF
CONTENTS
© 2011 Intellecap. All rights reserved
TARGET
COMPANY Target company
can be a domestic
Indian company or be a
MNC subsidiary.
Restrictions on investing
in listed companies.
VCFs also invest
using different
routes depending
on their
registration and
source of capital
The FVCI route has advantages over the FDI route (slide 44).
However, given the challenges in registering as a FVCI, this route is
less common. Another route is Foreign Institutional Investment (FII);
however this is usually for investment in listed shares.
TARGET
COMPANY Target company
can be a domestic
Indian company or be a
MNC subsidiary.
Restrictions on investing
in listed companies.
Regulatory framework guiding equity investments in India and
investment options for domestic and foreign investors EQUITY POLICY
LANDSCAPE
42
VENTURE
CAPITAL FUND This can be a domestic or
offshore fund. Either can
raise fund from domestic
and international sources.
VCFs usually choose the
companies to invest in.
Direct route (Used by individuals, corporates, investment funds) DOMESTIC INVESTORS Includes individuals, investment funds,
corporate bodies
FOREIGN INVESTORS Includes individuals, investment funds,
corporate bodies FDI Route (Used by individuals, corporates & investment funds)
FVCI Route (Used by various types of investment funds)
OP
TIO
N O
NE
:
Inve
st
dir
ec
tly
Direct route DOMESTIC INVESTORS Includes individuals, investment funds,
corporate bodies
FOREIGN INVESTORS Includes individuals, investment funds,
corporate bodies FDI Route
FVCI Route
OP
TIO
N T
WO
:
Inve
st
usin
g V
CF
Lead Actor Acts; Regulations; Policy Documents; Approval processing
Securities and Exchange Board of
India (SEBI)
• SEBI (Venture Capital Funds [VCF]) Regulations 1996 (two Amendments in 2006 and one in 2010)
• SEBI (Foreign Venture Capital Investors [FVCI]) Regulations 2000 (Amendments in 2004, 2006 & 2010)
Reserve Bank of India (RBI) • Foreign Exchange Management Act 1999 (FEMA)
• Sectoral caps on FDI & stipulation of sectors in “automatic route” (approvals not required to invest in these sectors)
Ministry of Finance
• Foreign Investment Promotion Board: Approvals of FDI that do not come under the automatic route
• Department of Revenue: Income Tax Act 1961 (Amendments later)
• Department of Revenue: Double Taxation Avoidance Treaty with Mauritius, Singapore, Cyprus and other nations
Ministry of Commerce & Industry • Dept. of Industrial Policy and Promotion: Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in India – Policy and Procedures
LE
AD
AC
TO
RS
AN
D
DO
CU
ME
NT
S
RBI, SEBI, Ministry of Finance and Ministry of Commerce & Industry are the main regulators
Investors can invest directly or through a Venture Capital Fund into a target company in India
© 2011 Intellecap. All rights reserved
Mapping challenges in equity space to enabling and constraining
policies and interventions EQUITY POLICY
LANDSCAPE
Regulatory
constraints to
invest in India
Inhibiting regulations
Ambiguous regulatory
framework
Changing and unpredictable
regulations
Limited ecosystem
to support FGEs
Little advisory support to
FGEs
Not enough investible FGEs
Inadequate facilities for FGEs
FGEs unaware or not keen on
equity infusion
High transaction
costs to invest in
FGEs
Small ticket size leads to low
profits & capital inflow
Challenges in India‟s equity investing space Policy landscape interfacing with these challenges
1. SEBI 1996 & 2000 VC regulations
created space for risk capital
2. FDI 2000 regulations paved the way
for foreign investments
3. FVCI regulations ease restrictions
for risk capital
4. FEMA regulations enables easier
repatriation of invested capital
5. India-Mauritius tax treaty enables tax
holidays on capital gains.
6. RBI relaxed pricing norms for sale of
shares b/w residents & foreigners
7. RBI dropped approval requirements
for transfer of shares
8. SEBI places restrictions on the
instruments that foreign capital can
use to invest in India
9. Capital gains tax is double for sale of
unlisted shares vs. listed shares
10. Ambiguity in the Vodafone case is
indicative of India‟s unclear tax laws
11. SEBI & FEMA rules differ on the
investment options of FVCIs
12. Pass-through tax laws are
inconsistent and often unclear
13. SEBI‟s new proposal seeks to
classify funds by sector; move gets
mixed responses from VCFs
Policies addressing regulatory issues
with scope for improvement
Policy landscape exacerbating
regulatory issues with scope for change
14) Various government institutions
setting up incubators to promote
FGE ecosystem
15) Government institutions sponsoring
Venture Capital Funds to invest in
SMEs
16) SME exchange creates an
alternative platform for raising capital
17. India‟s pension funds are a large
untapped source of funds for
stimulating entrepreneurship
Policies addressing lack of an
ecosystem and high transaction costs
Policy exacerbating ecosystem issues
with scope for change
Next few slides will go into details of each of these policies…
43
© 2011 Intellecap. All rights reserved
All equity-related policies are
marked using the same
numbers on page 43, the
policy overview page
FDI and VC regulations paved the way for foreign investments into
Indian enterprises EQUITY POLICY
ENABLERS
Policy / Intervention Overview Impact / Benefit Scope for Improvement?
SEBI 1996 and
2000 regulations
on VC funds
paved the way
for structured
equity
investments
• VCFs have invested in over USD 50
billion from 2004 to 2010 alone. While
this only caters to about 5% of India‟s
total business financing needs, most of
the investments have been into sectors
to which banks do not traditionally lend.
• Venture capital has been pivotal in
spurring innovation and funding high-
risk but high-growth businesses.
• Various seed & early stage deals have
enabled FGEs to get the requisite
funding to run their businesses
• SEBI (Venture Capital Funds)
Regulations, 1996 paved the way for
structured equity financing of private
sector enterprises in India. These
regulations laid down the procedures
and eligibility criteria for starting a VCF
and regulations to guide broad
investment practices.
• SEBI (Foreign Venture Capital
Investors) Regulations, 2000 paved the
way for international investors to get
special concessions to invest in
potentially risky Indian ventures.
• One important scope for improvement
is broadening the type of instruments
investors can use to invest in
companies in India. See page 48. 1
FDI 2000
regulations
paved the way
for foreign
investments
• FDI increased from USD 165 million in
1992-93 to USD 37 billion in 2009-10,
or over 200 times.
• Foreign investment into Indian
companies has not only meant an
infusion of capital but also technology
and global best practices.
• Venture Capital Funds have also used
the FDI route to channel their funds
into early and growth stage
businesses.
• After India liberalized it‟s economy in
1991, it opened its doors to Foreign
Direct Investments.
• Initially, certain sectors were opened
for investment without government
approval. In 2000, an FDI policy was
established which allowed investment
into all but a few specific sectors
without prior approvals. In the
remaining sectors, either investment
caps were specified (such as 49% in
aviation) or a total ban was placed
(such as in tobacco and lottery).
• There are still, however, several
restrictions or paperwork requirements
put on FDI in India. Some of these
restrictions are meant to avoid capital
flight and safeguard other aspects of
India‟s economic and strategic
interests. However, these have
unintentionally come in the way of risk
capital investments in India by VCFs.
• In view of this, SEBI has established
another route for Foreign Venture
Capital Investors (FVCI). See the next
page for the restrictions removed using
the FVCI route. Therefore, while FDI is
an important channel, going forward,
improvements need to be made in the
FVCI route.
2
44
Source: SEBI VCF Regulations, 1996; SEBI FVCI Regulations, 2000 “FDI Policy in India”, Invest India, Ministry of Commerce and Industry, FICCI “Foreign Direct Investment in India: A Critical Analysis of FDI from 1991-2005”, 2005, Kulwindar Singh, Centre for Civil Society; Private
Equity Report 2011, Bain Capital, Inc
© 2011 Intellecap. All rights reserved
FVCI regulations ease restrictions on risk capital but significant
last-mile issues remain EQUITY POLICY
ENABLERS
Policy / Intervention Overview Impact / Benefit Scope for Improvement?
FVCI regulations
ease restrictions
on risk capital
but significant
last-mile issues
remain
• Venture Capital into FGEs seek high
returns for the risks involved. Having a
mandatory lock-in period post IPO
went against the grain of this need and
hence dropping that requirement for
FVCIs has encouraged many Venture
Capital Funds to use this route.
• Freeing up FVCI from FEMA‟s pricing
guidelines frees buyers and sellers of
shares to determine prices
independently. This is important
because the pricing guidelines put non-
resident investors at a disadvantage as
it creates a price ceiling on which they
can sell their shares to residents.
• Not having to adhere to RBI‟s pricing
guidelines under FEMA and not having
to take permission from FIPB for
certain investments, also reduce the
procedural hassles for FVCIs. For
example, ascertaining prices as per
FEMA involved the additional step of
taking an opinion from a third party
accountant or banker.
• In 2009, FVCI investments into India
amounted to around USD 23 billion,
while that of FDI was around USD 35
billion.
• Foreign capital can invest in Indian
companies using two routes: Foreign
Direct Investment (FDI) and Foreign
Venture Capital Investor (FVCI).
• The latter category was formed to ease
restrictions to attract more risk or
venture capital into India.
• Using the FVCI route over FDI has
various advantages. One, there is no
lock in period to hold shares once a
company has gone public (if pre-IPO
holding was over 12 months). Under
FDI, investors are locked into their
investments until 12 months post IPO.
• Two, a FVCI does not have to adhere
to the pricing guidelines stipulated in
FEMA for transfer of listed and unlisted
shares between residents and non-
residents.
• Three, in certain sectors, investors
need to take approvals from the
Foreign Investment Promotion Board.
In the case of FVCI, if the permission is
acquired once, they do not need
permission again if the investment in
the same sector. *
• While the FVCI route is meant to make
it easier for risk capital to enter India,
the paperwork involved in getting a
FVCI registration has been described
as difficult and lengthy by investors.
• In addition, the RBI has also been
cautious in granting approvals from its
side. One concern of the RBI is that
those not investing in “risky” sectors
are also using this route, such as real-
estate investors. In 2008, around 50
registration forms were pending
because of this concern.
• Another concern of the RBI is thin
capitalization of some of the funds. To
this end, SEBI now requires applicants
to show a firm commitment of USD 1
million from its investors.
• While RBI‟s concerns are genuine,
there is a need to ensure that genuine
venture investors are not affected
adversely undoing the purpose of the
FVCI regulations.
3
* A fourth benefit is that In case an FVCI remains invested after an IPO, it can sell back its shares to the promoter without triggering an “open offer”. However, the SEBI has recently eased the open offer trigger from a minimum of 15% to 25% for all investors. It is unclear what is
the position of FVCIs under this new stipulation
Source: Key Structuring Issues for Investing in India, Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati; An Update on Structuring Venture Capital and Other Investments in India, undated, Fenwick & West LLP, by F. M. Greguras and S. R. Gopalan; FDI Statistics - Flow of Funds by Country,
2011, Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion, Ministry of Commerce and Industry, GoI.
45
© 2011 Intellecap. All rights reserved
FEMA regulations makes repatriation of invested capital easier;
India-Mauritius Tax Treaty enables tax holidays on capital gains EQUITY POLICY
ENABLERS
Policy / Intervention Overview Impact / Benefit Scope for Improvement?
FEMA
regulations
makes
repatriation of
invested capital
easier
• This is fundamental to allow foreign
capital to come into India. Only with the
guarantee that all profits, capital gains
and dividends can be repatriated will
investors consider investing in India.
• Foreign capital in India can be
repatriated along with capital gains as
long as due taxes are paid within India
and the investment was made on a
repatriation basis.
• RBI approvals are still required as
these represent capital account
transactions.
• Investors have suggested that despite
these regulations the RBI is wary of
excessive funds leaving Indian shores
and is prone to be stringent on all the
paperwork. However, as long as there
are no excessive delays, this kind of
due diligence is perhaps healthy and
doesn‟t affect investor confidence.
4
India-Mauritius
Tax Treaty
enables tax
holidays on
capital gains
• In India, in most cases, sale of
company shares in a public offering is
not liable for a capital gains tax (15% if
sold within one year). Therefore, the
India-Mauritius tax treaty primarily
benefits when exits are likely to be in a
private sale.
• The efficacy of this treaty is evident
from the fact that Mauritius is the single
largest investor into India. From April
2010 to February 2011, 42% of total
FDI in India was routed from Mauritius.
Singapore and the US ranked at a
distant second and third position with 9
and 7% share of total FDI into India
during this period.
• Under the India-Mauritius tax treaty, a
Mauritius-based company can invest in
an Indian company and sell it for a
profit without attracting a capital gains
taxes either in India or Mauritius.
• To make use of this treaty, an offshore
company establishes a Mauritius
based subsidiary to invest in India.
• Certain restrictions exist for such
investments: a) the Mauritius company
cannot be set up for the purpose of
trading in shares in India, b) the
Mauritius company should not be seen
to be managed from India (though this
is a subjective assessment), and c) the
Indian subsidiary should not be
deemed a “permanent establishment”
in India – i.e. it should not be
independently contracting business,
etc.
• This three-decade treaty has at times
been subject to criticism for loss of
revenue to the Indian Government. In
addition, it is not clear whether such
tax holidays are necessary to attract
investment into India.
• A transparent and fair tax policy is
likely to be more efficient. Because of
this tax treaty, almost all international
investors create front companies in
Mauritius (and other countries with
which India has similar tax treaties).
• However, given various other
restrictions to investing in India,
removing such tax holidays will be met
with stiff resistance.
• The Indian Government has insisted on
review of the clauses of the treaty
since 2006, but has not received an
enthusiastic response from Mauritius.
5
46
Source: “RBI relaxes norms for transfer of shares”, News flash, November 2011, ALMT Legal; Destination India: Overview of the tax and regulatory framework in India, 2010, PricewaterhouseCoopers; “India pushes to review Mauritius tax treaty amid revenue leaks”, Reuters, by
M. Kumar; Mauritius TT - “An Update on Structuring Venture Capital and Other Investments in India” by Fed M. Greguras & S.R. Gopalan
© 2011 Intellecap. All rights reserved
RBI recently eased pricing guidelines and dropped approval requirements
for transfer of unlisted shares between residents & non-residents EQUITY POLICY
ENABLERS
Policy / Intervention Overview Impact / Benefit Scope for Improvement?
RBI dropped
approval
requirements for
transfer of
shares
b/w residents &
non-residents
• This significantly reduces the
procedural formalities associated with
transferring of company shares
between resident and non-resident
parties.
• In addition to reduction in paperwork, it
smoothens the process for undertaking
such transactions.
• As of November 2011, the RBI relaxed
norms for transfer of shares of an
Indian company between non-residents
and residents.
• Earlier, if a foreign investor wanted to
exit his/her investment in an Indian firm
by selling the unlisted shares to an
resident Indian, required RBI approval
• After this recent relaxation, as long as
the transfer follows the pricing
guidelines stipulated by RBI (above),
India‟s FDI policy and exchange
control regulations, no prior RBI
approval is required.
• Not applicable.
7
RBI recently
eased the pricing
guidelines under
FEMA
• These policies affect investments
through the FDI route as the FVCI
route is exempt from adhering to these
guidelines.
• The DFCF methodology is considered
more scientific and since one buys
shares with a view of future
performance, it stands to reason to use
a pricing norm that is aligned to this.
• The DFCF method is likely to result in
higher valuations than the CCI
methodology.
• RBI‟s FEMA regulations stipulate price
floors for sale of (listed and unlisted)
shares from residents and non-
residents and price ceilings for transfer
of shares from non-residents to
residents.
• Earlier these pricing norms were
arrived at using Controller of Capital
Issue (CCI) Guidelines which looks at
a company‟s historic performance to
arrive at a valuation.
• As of 2010, these prices are calculated
using the Discounted Free Cash Flow
method (DFCF), an assessment of the
company‟s future performance.
• Scope to review the need for a pricing
norm, as leaving pricing decisions to
the market, as is done in the FVCI
case, may be more prudent.
• It may be alright to stipulate a price
floor to insure resident shareholders
from excessive losses. However, fixing
the same price floor as a price ceiling
for foreign investors may lead to a non-
level playing field between resident and
non-resident investors, and could act
as a deterrent to foreign investors in
India.
6
47
Source: An Update on Structuring Venture Capital and Other Investments in India, undated, Fenwick & West LLP, by F. M. Greguras and S. R. Gopalan; FDI Statistics - Flow of Funds by Country, 2011, Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion, Ministry of Commerce and
Industry, GoI.; “New pricing guidelines for issue and transfer of shares”, Taxand; “New FEMA Pricing Guidelines for transfer of shares”, May 2010, Tax Egde, BMR Advisors
© 2011 Intellecap. All rights reserved
SEBI places restrictions on using non-convertible debt and other
instruments that foreign capital can use to invest in India EQUITY POLICY
CONSTRAINTS
SEBI places
restrictions on
the instruments
that foreign
capital can use to
invest in India
Policy / Intervention Overview Impact / Benefit Scope for Improvement?
• Investors prefer the flexibility to lend to
their portfolio companies without the
obligation of taking more equity. This is
done if there is a need for short-term
working capital or if a second round of
fundraising is taking longer than
expected. However, the restrictions on
issuing non-convertible bonds makes
this illegal in India. In other economies,
this is a simple procedure that once
decided takes less than a day to
execute.
• As per SEBI regulations, foreign direct
investment (FDI) and foreign venture
capital investors (FVCI) can use only
three instruments for investing in
Indian unlisted companies: a) shares,
b) fully and mandatorily convertible
debentures, c) fully and mandatorily
convertible preference shares.
• Therefore, foreign investors cannot
issue non-convertible debt.
• Given the difficulty for Indian firms to
access debt in the first place, there is a
pressing need to consider revoking this
policy.
• The underlying aim of not allowing
foreign capital to provide loans is to
ensure that the power of RBI‟s
monetary policy is not impacted as
interest rate hikes can be circumvented
by borrowing from foreign sources.
However, it is important to think
through a policy change that addresses
concerns of both the RBI and foreign
investors.
8
Capital gains tax
is double for sale
of unlisted
shares vs. listed
shares
• Venture capital investors find it
“archaic” to doubly tax capital gains on
unlisted shares. In the US, for e.g.,
long term capital gains are generally
taxed at 15% (and 10% for those in
lowest income bracket) regardless of
listing of shares.
• On the other hand, India‟s short term
capital gains taxes are only at 15% for
listed shares, while it is about 30% on
average in the US.
• It is also important to note that the
India-Mauritius tax treaty enables all
capital gains taxes to be avoided
enabling many investors to work
around these tax laws in any case.
• The capital gains tax on long-term
capital assets that are listed is either
exempt or 10% depending on the
category of the listed assed. However,
the capital gains tax on unlisted long-
term capital assets is 20%.
• Further, while residents can index the
acquisition cost of the asset (to
account for inflation), this option is only
available to non-residents for purchase
of shares that are not in foreign
currency.
• It is unclear what is the logic behind the
double taxation of unlisted shares.
Depending on the motivation for double
taxation, the MoF can consider doing
away with this differentiation.
• There is also scope, as mentioned
earlier, to have a more transparent and
fair taxation system and do away with
circumvention of tax obligations via tax
havens.
9
48
Source: Foreign Investments in India, 2010, RBI; http://www.rbi.org.in/scripts/FAQView.aspx?Id=26; Economic Timrs; Destination India: Overview of the tax and regulatory framework in India, 2010, PricewaterhouseCoopers; Private Equity Report 2011, Bain Capital, Inc; US
capital gains tax info from wikipedia
© 2011 Intellecap. All rights reserved
India‟s tax laws are often ambiguous and contribute to investor
concerns EQUITY POLICY
CONSTRAINTS
The ambiguity in
the recent
Vodafone case is
indicative of the
need for clarity in
India‟s tax laws
Policy / Intervention Overview Impact / Benefit Scope for Improvement?
• While this case is between two large
multinationals on a high-value deal, tax
ambiguities in general have a huge
effects on FGEs.
• Therefore, the main implication of the
eventual Supreme Court verdict goes
beyond this case. Currently, many
investors feel that India‟s tax laws are
ambiguous in many respects, including
this case, which is about its jurisdiction
to tax such transfers.
• Various investors are seeking clarity
from the Supreme Court‟s verdict on
this case. They wish that the Court will
articulate clear, just and internationally
comparable principles on how India will
treat all such cases in the future (and
the past).
• The recent Vodafone tax case in India
has highlighted certain ambiguities in
India‟s taxation policies.
• To briefly explain the case, Vodafone
bought over Hutchison Essar in May
2007 for USD 11.2 billion. The transfer
was between Hutchison Telecom Int‟l
Ltd (HTIL) in Cayman Islands and
Vodafone Int‟l Holdings in Netherlands.
The parent companies are based in
Hong Kong and United Kingdon
respectively. Since none of the asset
transfers were within India, the
transaction did not pay capital gains
tax in India.
• India‟s Revenue Department issued a
show-cause notice to Vodafone
arguing that the transfer of Indian
assets and hence liable for tax in India.
• The issue, now with India‟s Supreme
Court, is complex and it is not clear
which way the hearing will go. The
main issue is to determine if it can be
argued that a transfer of Indian assets
took place and if so, of what value and
between which entities. This will be the
basis for taxation in India.
• There is a need for a holistic review of
India‟s exhaustive regulatory
framework and the linkages between
various policies.
• To that end, the Ministry of Finance
has constituted the Financial Sector
Legislative Reforms Commission
(FSLRC). This commission has been
tasked with reviewing over 60
Acts/Rules/Regulations and rewriting
financial sector legislations, simplifying
them, enhancing clarity and covering
gaps. This Commission is due to
submit draft legislations to the MoF by
March 2013. The ramifications of the
above remain to be assessed, with
respect to the extent new Acts and
policies are enacted based on the draft
legislations.
10
49
Source: Frequently Asked Questions, Foreign Investments in India, 2010, RBI, http://www.rbi.org.in/scripts/FAQView.aspx?Id=26; Economic Times; “Vodafone case: What the HC really decided”, Nov 22 2010, G N Gupta, Business Standard; “India: International Taxation –
Recent significant pronouncements”, Jan 2009, Tax & Corporate News Bulletin, Vaish Associates Advocates
© 2011 Intellecap. All rights reserved
India‟s regulatory framework is fairly unpredictable and changing EQUITY POLICY
CONSTRAINTS
SEBI and FEMA
regulations differ
on the
investment
options available
to FVCIs
Policy / Intervention Overview Impact / Benefit Scope for Improvement?
• The implications of such ambiguities go
beyond just this particular example. It
is indicative of the confusion and
multiple interpretations possible across
various rules and regulations.
• As per SEBI regulations, FVCIs and
VCFs are allowed to invest up to
33.33% of their funds in listed
companies. However, as per FEMA
regulations, FVCIs can only invest in
either a) a domestic unlisted company
or b) in a VCF. Therefore, as per
FEMA, it seems that FVCIs are not
allowed to invest in listed companies.
• As mentioned above, such ambiguities
in India‟s regulatory framework need to
be ironed out to ensure that investors
and entrepreneurs, alike, face a
streamlined set of rules to guide their
actions.
• Once again the FSLRC, mentioned
above, has potential to address such
ambiguities.
11
50
Changes in tax
pass-through
regulations
create
unfavorable
terms for
domestic VCFs
• This has adversely affected domestic
investors because foreign investors
anyway tend to route their money
through Mauritius or other tax havens.
• This creates disadvantages at two
levels: a) it becomes difficult for VCFs
to raise funds from domestic sources,
b) it indirectly restricts investments that
VCFs can undertake using domestic
capital to nine specific sectors.
• This also has a significant impact on
early stage funding as domestic
investors play a bigger role in funding
seed and early stage deals.
• India‟s tax laws allow VCFs to pass on
tax liabilities to their investors.
Therefore they only accrue taxes on
their own business income.
• However, this “pass through” status
has recently been restricted to nine
sectors such as nanotechnology,
pharmaceuticals etc.
• The logic for introduction of this change
does not seem apparent, and hence,
greater clarity is required regarding the
objective. Pass-through laws ensured
that VCFs were only taxed for their
own business income and not that of
their investors.
• There is scope to consider revoking
this change, as it appears to have an
adverse impact for domestic investors
and VCFs.
12
Source: “The ambiguous FVCI and VCF Investment Regime – Whose line is it anyway?”, Mar 21 2011, Aashit Shah and Siddharth Shankar, Bar & Bench; “Regulatory Reforms in Venture Capital”, 2007, Sameer Rastogi, India Juris
© 2011 Intellecap. All rights reserved
SEBI‟s new proposal seeks to classify funds by sector; move met
with mixed reactions from VCFs EQUITY POLICY
CONSTRAINTS
SEBI‟s new
proposal seeks
to classify funds
by sector; move
gets mixed
reactions from
VCFs
Policy / Intervention Overview Impact / Benefit Scope for Improvement?
• While the main aim of this proposal is
to facilitate more capital towards seed
and early stage funding, the restrictions
it imposes, according to industry
experts, is more likely to detract
investors rather than attract capital.
• For one, classification means that
sector agnostic investors will be forced
to choose between sectors. This will
not be an attractive proposition for
many global investors. This will also
create excessive paper work for VCFs
if they wish to maintain investment
freedom, they have to operate two
entities and seek separate
registrations. It is not clear, whether
this will be permitted in the first place.
• More generally, this note also feeds
into the notion that India‟s regulatory
framework is a changing environment
and new positions by the regulators
often have unintended consequences.
• In August 2011, SEBI released a
concept paper on new draft regulations
to oversee Alternative Investment
Funds (AIFs). The final version of this
draft is meant to subsume the existing
VCF and FVCI regulations.
• One of the main objectives of bringing
in these changes is to better target
regulations and concessions as per the
investment mandate of the fund. Noting
that the initial impetus to VCF and
FVCI regulations was to incentivize risk
capital to early stage enterprises, SEBI
feels that currently various other deals
are being done using the same routes.
• To better “target”, SEBI proposes to
classify funds by broad investment
mandates, such as Venture Capital
Funds, Real Estate Funds,
Infrastructure Funds, etc.
• It also stipulates that VCFs should
have a maximum size of Rs. 250 crore.
• Various other changes have also been
mentioned in the note, such as PIPE
investors being allowed to invest in non
convertible debt. The key change,
however, is the classification of funds.
• SEBI has put out these drafts for
comments. Many VCFs have sent their
detailed feedback on this note.
• The main feedback has been to restrict
the classifications to two or three broad
categories – say, VC Funds, PE Funds
and Alternative Funds.
• Further, the current draft seeks to
mandate funds to invest in early stage
undertakings. Instead, it has been
suggested that it would be better if
SEBI set up adequate incentives for
such transactions. These may increase
the attractiveness of such deals and
draw in more capital and lead to more
enterprises getting funded.
13
51
Source: “Concept Paper on Proposed Alternative Investment Funds Regulations for Public Comments”, 2011, SEBI; “SEBI Draft Regulations for PE/VC Industry May Raise Cost Of Business”, 2011, Vijay Sambamurthi, VCCircle; Interview with Mahendra Swarup, Chairnman,
IVCA
© 2011 Intellecap. All rights reserved
Government has set up incubators that facilitates FGE ecosystem,
but impact is limited due to implementation issues EQUITY POLICY
ENABLERS
Various
government
institutions
setting up
incubators to
promote FGE
ecosystem
Policy / Intervention Overview Impact / Benefit Scope for Improvement?
There are two primary benefits from these
incubators:
• These centres train entrepreneurs on
technical skills as well as business
skills to set up successful enterprises.
This capacitates more FGEs to take up
businesses.
• These centres make fundraising easier
and enables better access to advice
and start up facilities, such as office
space, etc.
In terms of impact:
• Various enterprises have successfully
left these incubator to continue
independent operations. As of
November 2008, there were 8 such
enterprises from SIIC.
• However, the impact of these
incubators have only been on the
margin and have not made a significant
dent in creating a thriving
entrepreneurship ecosystem. VCs are
not aware of some of these incubators.
• National Small Industries Corporation
(NSIC) has set up Training cum
Incubation Centres.
• The National Science & Technology
Entrepreneurship Development Board
(NSTEB) has set up Technology
Business Incubators (TBI). Each TBI is
registered as an autonomous society
and focuses on incubating enterprises
for 2-3 years.
• The Small Industries Development
Bank of India has set up a SIDBI
Innovation and Incubation Centre
(SIIC) at IIT Kharagpur.
• National Institute for Entrepreneurship
and Small Business Development has
also set up Training cum Indcubation
Centres. The Centre focuses on
certain sectors such as garments.
There are three broad considerations for
improving current incubation efforts:
• These policies need to be executed on
the ground with greater efficiency. An
incubator in Punjab, for example, had
underdeveloped facilities in the
building, according to an FGE
interviewed.
• In addition to setting up its own
incubators, the government should also
focus on incentivizing the private sector
to set up incubators, and emphasize
efficient management of incubators, to
provide entrepreneurs with apt
business advice and support.
• Mainstream incubation efforts by a)
consolidating the various efforts and b)
advertising these centres prominently.
This will ensure better penetration.
14
52
Source: Risk Capital and MSMEs in India, SIDBI
© 2011 Intellecap. All rights reserved
Government institutions sponsoring Venture Capital Funds to
invest in SMEs EQUITY POLICY
ENABLERS
Government
institutions
sponsoring
Venture Capital
Funds to invest
in SMEs
Policy / Intervention Overview Impact / Benefit Scope for Improvement?
• Most of the government-backed funds
have investment mandates that focus
on SMEs and on seed & early stage
funding. They therefore have the
potential to be an important source for
finance for FGEs.
• These funds are not necessarily
chasing the best risk-return profiles
and hence can make investments even
with higher transaction costs.
• Various VCFs in India are backed by
the government. They are of 3 types.
• One, funds promoted by development
finance institutions that are controlled
by the Central Government: ICICI
Venture Funds Ltd. or SIDBI Venture
Capital Limited (SVCL).
• Two, funds promoted by certain state
governments: Gujarat Venture Finance
Ltd. or Punjab Infotech Venture Fund.
• Three, funds promoted by public
banks, such as Canbank Venture
Capital Fund.
• There is a strong need to improve the
visibility of these funds. Many of the
privately run VCF investors mentioned
that they have not come across these
funds when competing for investment
bids.
• There is scope to introduce
professional management in these
state government funds to ensure a
more business-minded attitude. A shift
for these funds to professional
managers with investment experience
should be considered.
• In addition, the government could
consider being a Limited Partner to
some of the privately run funds. They
can delineate clear investment
preferences to ensure their SME and
early stage focus is maintained.
15
53
Source: “Venture Capital”, undated, Business Financing, Business Knowledge Resource Online; Kerala Venture Capital Fund website (www.keralaventure.org); Gujarat Venture Finance Limited website (www.gvfl.com)
© 2011 Intellecap. All rights reserved
SME Exchanges being introduced to provide alternate sources for
equity finance EQUITY POLICY
ENABLERS
SME Exchanges
being introduced
to provide
alternate sources
for equity finance
Policy / Intervention Overview Impact / Benefit Scope for Improvement?
• According to the BSE SME exchange,
around 1 million SMEs out of a total of
30 million will be eligible to raise capital
through this route.
• Around 60 SMEs have already
expressed their desire to use the BSE
SME exchange to raise capital once it
is launched.
• Since, the focus is on smaller
enterprises in tier 2 and 3 urban
centers, this has the potential to serve
a currently large scale
• The Bombay Stock Exchange and the
National Stock Exchange have both
revealed plans to launch an SME
exchange for smaller businesses to
raise equity finance through IPOs.
• SMEs with a post-issue paid up capital
in the range of INR 10 to 25 crore
(USD 2 to 5 million) can list on it as
against the minimum of Rs. 25 crore
for the mainstream exchanges.
• Issues will be 100% underwritten, with
15% being underwritten by the
Merchant Banker used to conduct the
IPO. The banker will also provide
market making support for three years.
• The requirements of merchant bankers
are quite onerous. They have to
underwrite 15% of the issues and
provide market making support for 3
years. Given the low ticket sizes, the
costs of underwriting and support
provision will be very expensive for
most bankers from a profitability
viewpoint. There is a need to review
the terms for Merchant Bankers, and
modify them to more favorable and
practical terms, for successful
development and adoption of these
exchanges.
16
54
Source: “SME exchange targets small towns, cities”, October 18 2011, Shishir Prashant, Business Standard; “NSE aims to launch SME exchange platform”, November 3 2011, The Hindu
© 2011 Intellecap. All rights reserved
India‟s pension funds are a large untapped source of funds for
stimulating entrepreneurship EQUITY POLICY
CONSTRAINTS
India‟s pension
funds are a large
untapped source
of funds for
stimulating
entrepreneurship
Policy / Intervention Overview Impact / Benefit Scope for Improvement?
• The impact on account of the inability
of pension funds to invest in Indian
ventures through VCs is quite
significant. As an illustration, India‟s
largest pension fund, the Employee
Provident Fund Organisation manages
around USD 70 billion. Even if 2% of
these funds are used to fund early
stage entrepreneurs in India, it will
mean a near 30% increase in risk
capital for India‟s early stage deals.
• Recently the Ministry of Finance
introduced the Pension Fund
Regulatory and Development Authority
(PFRDA) Bill, 2011 in Parliament.
• This bill sets the guidelines governing
the National Pension Scheme (NPS), a
mandatory pension scheme for all
government employees who joined
after Jan 2004, and open to all other
Indian citizens voluntarily.
• India‟s pension funds have traditionally
not been allowed to invest in equity
markets of any sort. However, this bill
seeks to allow fund managers to invest
up to 50% of total assets under
management in the equity markets.
• However, the investment guidelines do
not list venture capital or private equity
as potential investment destinations.
This is very different from international
markets where pension funds are a
vital and stable source of capital for
VCs and PEs. In fact, around 15 of the
world‟s top 20 pension funds invest in
India‟s VC/PE industry.
• If the government can allow 50% of the
total funds of NPS (USD 2 billion on
July 2011) to be invested in equity
markets, a smaller portion can also be
clearly earmarked for the VC industry.
• Doing so is not only a prudent
investment decision, it has the
multiplier effect of boosting India‟s
growth and employment prospects
through entrepreneurship. Therefore,
there is a need for the government to
consider this investment option as is
done in various other countries.
17
55
Source: “Legislative Brief: The Pension Fund Regulatory and Development Authority Bill, 2011”, 2011, M R Madhavan, Sana Ganwani, PRS Legislative Research; “India: putting pension funds to work in the stock market”, Aug 1 2011, Chris Food, beyondbrics, Financial Times
blog; “Funds hope for “free” India pensions”, Jul 31 2011, Ben Leahy, Financial Times; “Detailed investment guidelines for all citizens under the New Pension Scheme”, undated, Pension Fund Regulatory and Development Authority
© 2011 Intellecap. All rights reserved 56
i. Executive Summary
ii. Table of Contents
iii. Acronyms and Abbreviations
1. Introduction
2. Overview of Financing to FGEs
3. Debt Financing
a) Challenges
b) Policy Landscape
c) International best practices
4. Equity Financing
a) Challenges
b) Policy Landscape
c) International best practices
5. Non-financial Aspects
a) Challenges
b) Policy Landscape
6. Concluding Thoughts and Next Steps
iv. References
pg. 2
pg. 3
pg. 4
pg. 7
pg. 10
pg. 13
pg. 13
pg. 17
pg. 36
pg. 39
pg. 39
pg. 42
pg. 57
pg. 59
pg. 59
pg. 60
pg. 63
pg. 65
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© 2011 Intellecap. All rights reserved 57
Best Practice Example Features Benefits Scope for India Adoption
Participation of
Government
Pension Funds in
Venture Capital
Funds
FMIEE in
Brazil
FTP in
Peru
• A public private partnership
between Government Pension
Funds, private sources of
finance and professional fund
managers is set up to direct
pension funds to finance
ventures.
• Government provides
regulatory support to pension
funds for this.
• Increase in domestic capital to
seed and early-stage startups.
• Diversified portfolio for pension
funds creates better risk-return
profiles for them.
• Private sector money and
management ensures efficient
deployment of pension funds with
minimal oversight.
• As highlighted above, there is a high scope
for India adoption.
• Currently, the government is already opening
up pension funds to invest in public equity
markets. Directing a portion of funds to
venture capital is likely to improve the risk-
return profile of these investments.
• In addition, as mentioned above, even a
small portion of pension funds invested in
seed and early stage ventures can increase
the capital flow by nearly 30%.
Shared investment
in SMEs between
Angel investors,
Government &
Development
Banks
FINEP
(Brazilian
Innovation
Agency)
• The Angel Investor invests
20% of a SME‟s equity needs;
FINEP invests up to 40%;
remaining is invested by
development banks.
• FINEP also underwrites the
investment by Angel investors.
• The inclusion of an Angel Investor
helps greatly in the due diligence
process, as most banks and
government agencies dealing with
many SMEs are not in the right
position to do such due diligence.
• Enables Angel Investors to
leverage their equity with debt
from development banks.
• Since development banks (like SIDBI) are
already providing risk and debt capital and
there already exist VCFs run by state
governments, there is a high scope to adopt
such a co-investing model that bring in the
private sector investors to increase due
diligence capability and capital flow.
International best practices in equity financing for seed and early
stage ventures EQUITY BEST
PRACTICES
Source: The Global Best Banking Practices in MSME Financing and Development (SIDBI) - 2011
© 2011 Intellecap. All rights reserved 58
i. Executive Summary
ii. Table of Contents
iii. Acronyms and Abbreviations
1. Introduction
2. Overview of Financing to FGEs
3. Debt Financing
a) Challenges
b) Policy Landscape
c) International best practices
4. Equity Financing
a) Challenges
b) Policy Landscape
c) International best practices
5. Non-financial Aspects
a) Challenges
b) Policy Landscape
6. Concluding Thoughts and Next Steps
iv. References
pg. 2
pg. 3
pg. 4
pg. 7
pg. 10
pg. 13
pg. 13
pg. 17
pg. 36
pg. 39
pg. 39
pg. 42
pg. 57
pg. 59
pg. 59
pg. 60
pg. 63
pg. 65
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Table of Contents TABLE OF
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© 2011 Intellecap. All rights reserved
Non-financial constraints often make undertaking business in India
challenging & impact access to capital
NON-
FINANCIAL
ASPECTS
Non-financial challenges to doing business in India for FGEs Policy responses
• Heavy-regulation makes it hard to start and run businesses in India, especially for FGEs.
• India‟s global ranking on the ease of starting a business is a at 166 out of 183 countries;
similarly, in terms of the number of compliance issues faced, India ranks at 181.
• The average business in India makes 60 taxation payments, which takes 34 man days to do.
• National Knowledge Commission (NKC) reports these problems are more acute for FGEs.
• While efforts have been made to streamline various process and introduce greater
transparency in procedural requirements, there is scope for much to be done.
Heavy-regulation on
business processes
• Single window clearances
• Composite application form
• It takes on an average close to 4 years to enforce contracts in India, with 5 other countries
faring worse than India with respect to the same.
• India‟s bankruptcy and labour laws are fairly archaic, and there is scope to make them more
business-friendly.
• After filing for bankruptcy, recovery for claimants is 11.6%, compared to 81% in the US.
Legal hurdles and
limited ability to
enforce contracts
• Lack of workspace is a significant problem for FGEs. NKC reports that only 15% of FGE
start ups had access to office space, compared to 56% of second generation entrepreneurs.
• Limited public infrastructure in India is a significant problem for all businesses including that
of FGEs.
• Some examples of infrastructure challenges faced by various sectors include: Agri
businesses are impacted by underdeveloped supply chains; FGEs in manufacturing face
high costs of transportation and frequent power shortages; inadequate broadband capacity
for IT services
Under-developed
supporting
infrastructure
• According to a recent NASSCOM report, only 10-15% of India‟s business graduates and 26%
of its engineering graduates are directly employable after graduation.
• FGE startups find it difficult to source good talent because of cultural issues. Top talent
prefers to work for big brands often not understanding the potential for value creation in
startups. This is likely to change as more and more startups demonstrate success in India.
Lack of adequate
skilled workforce
• Limited liability partnership
• Commercial courts
• Ongoing infrastructure
reforms as part of Central &
State development plans
• Industrial Training Institutes
• Ongoing reforms in higher
education
Reviewed in next page
1
2
3
4
5
x Source: National Knowledge Commission, 2008, Entrepreneurship in India; World Bank, 2011, Doing Business; NASSCOM, 2010, Perspective 2020: Transform Business, Transform India
© 2011 Intellecap. All rights reserved
Single window clearances, composite application forms, new
registration rules – all are easing paperwork requirements for FGEs
Single window
clearances ease
paperwork
requirements for
FGEs
Policy / Intervention Overview Impact / Benefit Scope for Improvement?
• Having a single-window system brings
down the paperwork requirements, and
streamlines the process for obtaining
the required clearances.
• Many Indian states have introduced a
single-window clearance system to
facilitate all the paperwork related to
starting a business.
• Some states, like Rajasthan, have also
ensured that empowered bodies are
created that can singularly grant all
approvals from different departments.
• In states that have a single-window
system, but no empowered body to
grant all approvals, it still takes
considerable time to get all approvals.
• Hence, there is room for improvement
of the implementation efficiency of
such initiatives
60
NON-
FINANCIAL
POLICIES
One application
form reduces
paperwork
• This step too directly minimizes the
paperwork requirements for FGEs
• Nine Indian states have introduced a
single composite application form,
which enables entrepreneurs to fill up
just one form for all clearances.
• Not applicable.
Registering
startups as a
Limited Liability
Partnership
reduces
paperwork
• This act facilitates the entry of FGEs as
it has the advantages of both – the
informal arrangement of partnership
and the advantages of a company
without its heavy procedures.
• Since the introduction of this Act, many
new enterprises have been registered
as LLPs. Lawyers have described this
form of registration as “very popular”.
• Limited Liability Partnership Act 2008
(LLP) provides for a flexible
governance structure to be determined
by the partners themselves by mutual
agreement, easy compliance
requirements and combined with
limitation of liability to the extent of the
partners‟ contributions.
• Under the Act, provisions have been
made for enabling schemes of revival
as well as liquidation and winding up
through rules to be notified as
subordinate legislation.
• While the LLP act coupled with other
initiatives has greatly enhanced the
ability of FGEs to start businesses,
implementation issues leave scope for
improvement.
1
2
3
Source: Business Standard, 2010, “Punjab industrialists can now submit composite application form online”, February 23
© 2011 Intellecap. All rights reserved
Commercial courts being considered for speedy disposal of
business cases
Commercial
courts being
considered for
speedy disposal
of business
cases
Policy / Intervention Overview Impact / Benefit Scope for Improvement?
• The potential benefit of a future form of
the bill is faster disposal of commercial
cases, making it easier and faster to
enforce legal contracts.
• This will be especially a boon for FGEs
who do not have the resources to
expend on long court cases.
• The lower house of the Indian
Parliament passed the Commercial
Division of High Courts Bill without
voting in the 2011 winter session,
which the upper house deferred to
incorporate changes.
• The bill argued for a division of a
section of all High Courts to deal
exclusively with commercial cases to
ensure faster disposal of such cases.
• The bill was deferred because it moved
resources of the High Court away from
other legal needs and because it was
found that High Courts are not the best
institution to deal with such cases.
• Not applicable.
NON-
FINANCIAL
POLICIES
Training centers
to focus on
building youth
employability
• For FGEs involved in technical
enterprises, this initiative has the
potential to increase the supply of
skilled manpower.
• In 2007, with the support of a USD 280
million loan from the World Bank,
India‟s Directorate General of
Employment and Training launched
the Vocational Training Improvement
Project.
• This project will focus on a) improving
the quality of vocational training, and
b) aligning training with industry needs.
• It is important for such institutes to
dynamically change training content to
keep up with the industry‟s changing
needs, as far as possible.
• Strict evaluation standards need to be
adopted to understand the true impact
of training centres on incomes and
employability of trainees.
4
5
Source: Parliament of India, 2010, “Report of the Select Committee on the Commercial Division of High Courts Bill, 2009”; Indo Asian News Service, 2011, “Rajya Sabha defers bill for commercial division in high courts”, December 13; World Bank, 2007, “India: Vocational
Training Improvement Project”; Government of India, 2007, “Vocational Training Improvement Project of Government of India: Project Implementation Plan”
© 2011 Intellecap. All rights reserved 62
i. Executive Summary
ii. Table of Contents
iii. Acronyms and Abbreviations
1. Introduction
2. Overview of Financing to FGEs
3. Debt Financing
a) Challenges
b) Policy Landscape
c) International best practices
4. Equity Financing
a) Challenges
b) Policy Landscape
c) International best practices
5. Non-financial Aspects
a) Challenges
b) Policy Landscape
6. Concluding Thoughts and Next Steps
iv. References
pg. 2
pg. 3
pg. 4
pg. 7
pg. 10
pg. 13
pg. 13
pg. 17
pg. 36
pg. 39
pg. 39
pg. 42
pg. 57
pg. 59
pg. 59
pg. 60
pg. 63
pg. 65
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© 2011 Intellecap. All rights reserved 63
CONCLUSION Concluding thoughts and next steps
Concluding thoughts…
Overall
• There is a need for a balanced combination of debt and equity forms of financing, as they are largely complementary, and relevant at different stages
and for different types of enterprises. It is also important for equity investors to have access to debt to leverage their investments.
Debt
• Private sector banks and foreign banks have a smaller branch footprint and face constraints on on-lending to intermediaries for credit deployment.
Hence, there is a need to consider both branch based and branchless strategies in order to expand their reach in the MSME segment.
• The focus on large banks moving downstream to serve the MSME sector should be complemented with initiatives to encourage smaller institutions
such as NBFCs etc. which have local context and could serve these markets well
Equity
• Broadly, three changes required are a) more stability in India‟s regulatory framework with regards to equity, b) more clarity in terms of simpler and
consistent laws, and c) lesser restrictions to make deals less risky and more attractive
• Specifically, foreign capital should be allowed to structure deals more freely and use instruments that are as per international benchmarks.
• And, while the government is providing more access to equity via state-run bodies, varied models of delivering this to FGEs should be considered,
such as public-private partnership, or investment of government monies into privately run VCFs, or hiring professional fund managers.
Non-financial
• Heavy regulations and paperwork often make it difficult to start and run businesses in India, especially for FGEs.
• The government‟s current efforts of simplifying registration processes, etc. are laudable but more needs to be done in terms of last-mile
implementation issues.
• Prioritized efforts also need to be made to address various infrastructural bottlenecks and improve the quality of human capital, to develop India‟s
entrepreneurship (and business) landscape.
The next steps with regards to this engagement are as follows:
• From the nearly 40 government policies and interventions discussed in this step, identify a prioritized list of 4-6 workable policy recommendations that
can have a huge positive impact on FGEs and is feasible for the government to undertake and implement.
• Share findings and stress test policy recommendations with experts.
• Work with government policy makers to influence them on making the recommended changes.
Next steps…
© 2011 Intellecap. All rights reserved 64
i. Executive Summary
ii. Table of Contents
iii. Acronyms and Abbreviations
1. Introduction
2. Overview of Financing to FGEs
3. Debt Financing
a) Challenges
b) Policy Landscape
c) International best practices
4. Equity Financing
a) Challenges
b) Policy Landscape
c) International best practices
5. Non-financial Aspects
a) Challenges
b) Policy Landscape
6. Concluding Thoughts and Next Steps
iv. References
pg. 2
pg. 3
pg. 4
pg. 7
pg. 10
pg. 13
pg. 13
pg. 17
pg. 36
pg. 39
pg. 39
pg. 42
pg. 57
pg. 59
pg. 59
pg. 60
pg. 63
pg. 65
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© 2011 Intellecap. All rights reserved 65
End of
Document
Contact Details:
Nisha Dutt
Director, Business Consulting
M: +91 8008111418 | T: +91 40 40300200 (extn:218)
5th Floor, Building 8-2-682/1, Banjara Hills Road No 12, Hyderabad - 500034, India
© 2011 Intellecap. All rights reserved
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