policy-driven, knowledge-centric, holis

NetSecOps:Policy-Driven,Knowledge-Centric,

Holis<cNetworkSecurityOpera<ons

(Acollabora<veprojectbetweentheUniversityofKentuckyandtheUniversityofUtah)

JamesGriffioen,

LaboratoryforAdvancedNetworkingUniversityofKentucky

NSFCC*/CICIPIWorkshop2017Albuquerque,NM

October3,2017

NSFCampusCyberinfrastructurePIandCybersecurityInnova9onforCyberinfrastructurePIWorkshop

October3-4,2017|Albuquerque,NM

BroaderImpact:•  Limitorpreventthegrowingnumberof

a[acksoncampusnetworks.•  Addresstheshortageofqualified

securityexpertsoncampuses,andmakeITsecurityteamsmoreeffec<ve.

•  Advancescien<ficresearch,par<cularlyresearchusingbigdata

Solu9on/Approach:

Metadatatag:<tohelpothersunderstandyourcurrentstate–pickoneormany>•  <projecturl>•  <Readyfortransi5ontoprac5ce!>•  <Publica5onspending>•  <Needcollaborators!•  <Needmorefunds>•  <Socialmedia>•  <Studentengagement>

QuadChartfor:SecureandResilientArchitecture:NetSecOps—Policy-Driven,Knowledge-Centric,Holis<cNetworkSecurityOpera<ons(Acollabora<veNSFCICIprojectbetweenUnivofUtahandUnivofKY)

Network

KnowledgeStore

NetworkControl

ExistingData Sources

NetworkControl Apps

KnowledgeDiscovery Apps

PolicyDocuments

Policy Generation& Verification Apps

h[p://www.flux.utah.edu/project/NetSecOps h[p://www.netlab.uky.edu/NetSecOps

Challenge:•  Campussecurityopera<onsrelyon

humandomainexpertstointerpretandmaphigh-levelpolicydocumentstolow-levelnetworkconfigura<ons.

•  Segmentsofthecampushaveverydifferentpoliciesandregula<on.

•  Data-intensivescien<ficresearchtrafficoeenrequiresexcep<onstoITpolicies.

•  Goal:AssistITsecurityteamsbyautoma<ngopera<onalstepsthataretediousanderror-prone.

•  Systema<callycapturecampusnetworksecuritypolicies.

•  Developfine-grainedcontrolabstrac<onsandSDNcapabili<estoimplementbothsecuritypoliciesand(research)policyexcep<on.

•  Createpolicytraceabilitytoolstoverifyintegrityofpolicymappings.

•  Reasonaboutsecurityusinginforma<onfrompointsolu<ons.

NetSecOps(NetworkSecurityOpera<ons)

BasicGoal:AssistITsecurityteamsbyautoma<ngnetworksecurityopera<onalstepsthataretediousanderror-prone.

Network

KnowledgeStore

NetworkControl


NetworkControl Apps


PolicyDocuments


NetSecOpsArchitecture

Network

KnowledgeStore

NetworkControl


NetworkControl Apps


PolicyDocuments


NetSecOpsArchitectureHowdoesthisaffectthedesignofScienceDMZs?

Internet

BldgA

BldgB

BldgC

Middleboxes

CampusCore

FirewallsEdgeRouter

HPC

MiddleboxBo[lenecks

TypicalCampusNetwork

HPC

Conven9onalScienceDMZ

ScienceDMZ

Internet

BldgA

BldgB

BldgC

Middleboxes

CampusCore

FirewallsEdgeRouter

UKYSDNCore

Internet

BldgA

BldgB

BldgC

Middleboxes

CampusCore

FirewallsEdgeRouter

SDNCore

SDNSwitch SDNSwitch SDNSwitch

HPC

UKYSDNNetwork

Internet

BldgA

BldgB

BldgC

Middleboxes

CampusCore

FirewallsEdgeRouter

SDNCore


HPC

UKYSDNNetwork

Internet

BldgA

BldgB

BldgC

Middleboxes

CampusCore

FirewallsEdgeRouter

SDNCore


HPC

SDNController

Controllertellsswitchesto:1.  Actlikealegacyrouter

bydefault2.  Routeauthorized

sciencetrafficdirectlytotheedge(bypassingmiddleboxes)

UKYSDNNetwork

Internet

BldgA

BldgB

BldgC

Middleboxes

CampusCore

FirewallsEdgeRouter

SDNCore


HPC

NormalFlowPath

UKYSDNNetwork

Internet

BldgA

BldgB

BldgC

Middleboxes

CampusCore

FirewallsEdgeRouter

SDNCore


HPC

NormalFlowPath

High-speedFlowPath

(a.k.a.,VIPLanes).Note:thesearePolicyExcep9ons

All-CampusScienceDMZ

Flows(notmachines)jointheDMZ.

UKYAll-CampusScienceDMZ

Internet

BldgA

BldgB

BldgC

Middleboxes

CampusCore

FirewallsEdgeRouter

SDNCore


HPC

NormalFlowPath

High-speedFlowPath

InternetPerformanceResults

SeeICCCN2017VIPLanesPaper

Mbps Gbps

SecuringanAll-CampusScienceDMZ

•  ScalingtheScienceDMZtotheen<recampus– Thenumberofmachinesismuchlarger– Thenumberofpoten<alusersismuchlarger– Thenumberofpoliciesismuchlarger•  policiesareperflow,notpermachine

•  Scalingthedecision-makingprocesses– Definingpolicies– AuthorizingUsers– DefiningTrustrela<onships

Establishing/ManagingTrust(InanAll-campusScienceDMZ)

•  AuthorizedBypassFlows:Authorizedbypasstrafficshouldbeatthegranularityofflows,asopposedtoallScienceDMZtraffic.

•  TrustedUsers:Users(notmachines)shouldbeauthen<catedandtrusted(i.e.,trustshouldbetraceabletopeople,notmachines).

•  LimitedTrust:Usertrustshouldbelimitedtoaspecificsetofflowsforalimitedamountof<me.

•  DistributedTrustInfrastructure:Trustdecisionsshouldnotbemadebyasingleen<ty(e.g.,campusIT),butrathershouldbedistributedinacontrolledwayamongtrustedusers.

•  DynamicallyEstablishedAuthorizedFlows:Trustedusersshouldbeabletodynamicallycreateauthorizedbypassflows.

•  RefinableTrust:Ifaflow’scharacteris<cscannotbeknownun<ltheflowbecomesac<ve,trustshouldberefinedtomatchtheflowassoonastheflowappears.

•  Trust,butverify:Userscouldmisuseprivilegeinunauthorizedways.Usageshouldbeverified.

•  BackwardCompa<bility:Legacyapplica<onsshouldbeabletomakeuseofVIPLaneswithoutmodifica<on.

NetSecOpsPolicyExcep<ons

•  Flowsspaceisarrangedintoahierarchy–  Root=allflows–  Subnodes=strictsubsetofparent’sflows–  Flowsdefinedbytuple(e.g.,src/dstIPaddrsandports)

•  TrustedUsersassignedtomanagepor<onsofthehierarchy–  Caninstan<ateaflow(i.e.,createapolicyexcep<on)–  CandelegatecontroltootherTrustedUser– Delega<ondefinesahierarchyofresponsibility

SeeICCCN2017VIPLanesPaper

Src:*Dst:*Group:CampusIT

Src:128.123.4.160/27Dst:*Group:CoEIT

Src:128.123.123.0/24Dst:*Group:A&SIT

Src:128.123.4.160/28Dst:*Group:CSResearchers

Src:128.123.4.176/28Dst:*Group:ECEResearchers

Src:128.123.4.160/29Dst:*Group:VIPLanes

Src:128.123.4.168/29Dst:*Group:GENIResearch

ExamplePolicyExcep<onTree

Policytreeiscreatedbyusersinadistributedway(throughawebserverthatmaintainsthepolicytree).

ThankYou

Ques<ons?

Thisworkissupported,inpart,bytheNa5onalScienceFounda5onunderNSFgrantsACI-1642134,ACI-1642158,ACI-1541426andACI-1541380