policy attributes and state policy innovation

POLICY ATTRIBUTES AND STATE POLICY INNOVATION

Jill Clark University of Texas at Arlington

This paper generates new hypotheses for research on policy innovations. Some of these hypotheses explore the extent and speed of the diffiion of innovations across states. Others consider the circumstances and conditions when later adopters either expandthe scope of innovations or reinvent the policy of leaders. The focus here is on the attributes of innovations rather than the characteristics of adopters. The goal is to encourage studies that compare diffusion patterns among policies as well as among states.

Decentralizing tendencies in the intergovernmental system from the Nixon administration to the present have provided opportunities for states to assume more domestic policy making responsibility (Gray and Eisinger 1997). Hanson suggests that in response to a recent “devolution revolution,” “The action is at the state level, where governors and legislators are discussing what to do about health care, educational reform, economic development, and a host of controversial issues, including the right to die, affirmative action, immigration and the like” ( I 999,32). These discretion- ary opportunities have sometimes been constrained by federal preemption, unfunded mandates or other restrictions associated with permissive federalism (Walker 1995). However, the block grant strategy of the Reagan administration in several policy areas, and more recently, welfare reform allows states more flexibility in designing policy alternatives. At the same time, federal aids to states have decreased, and state governments have experienced the effects of the change to a postindustrial economy (Saffell and Basehart 1997). These developments, along with earlier, institutional reforms that enhanced the governing capacities of state legislators and executives, have prompted scholarly interest in the nature of state government responses to these changes in federalism, economic restructuring, and institutional modernization (Van Horn 1996).

Van Horn, among others, suggests that the typical response of state governments has been policy innovation, where states have become leaders in economic development, education, welfare and environmental protection policy making. He comments, “How profoundly state governments have

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changed. They now are arguably the most responsive, innovative, and effective level of government in the American federal system” (Van Horn 1989,l). By the 1990s, he suggests that states have had an influence on the national agenda: “Innovative economic development, education, and health care programs laid the foundation for federal statutes” (1996, 1). Bowman and Kearney express a similar characterization of state policy leadership: “Policy innovation during the 1980s and perhaps beyond is the beloved stepchild of the states, adopted from neglectful national parents” (1986,27).

One expectation associated with state discretion, whether in the traditional policy responsibilities of states or because of a federal block grant strategy, is that there will be substantial variation in state innovation behavior. This variation is presumably related to differences in internal political, administrative and socioeconomic factors. Eisinger underscores a further difference among the states in terms of embracing or resisting new, industrial policies: “Among the states, degrees of self-conscious en- trepreneurialism vary, as does the willingness to experiment in this newer policy realm. No state, however, represents a pure type, exclusively com- mitted to either entrepreneurial or traditional policy approaches” (1 988,9). Additionally, state government choices may be connected to other internal, policy making process factors, such as established precedents or priorities both in programs where states have had primary policy responsibility, such as education, and in programs, such as welfare, where states have previously functioned largely as administrative units for the federal government.

The propensity of states to experiment with new solutions also responds to external factors, factors that will encourage similarities among the states. According to previous research on policy innovation (first-time adoption) and diffusion among the American states, one of these external factors is the policy choices of other states. The argument is that a state is influenced by the previous adoptions of “leader” states or adoptions in neighboring states (Walker 1969). In fact, one of the controversies of this literature is whether innovations diffuse from a central group of leaders who are innovative in most policy areas, or whether there are regional centers of innovation and different leaders for different policies (Gray 1973; Nice 1994; Walker 1969). Other innovation studies have concentrated on the channels of communication or policy networks involved in interstate d i f i - sion (Gray 1973; Mintrom 1997; Mintrom and Vergari 1998; Savage 1985b). Another major interest in the field has been the identification of internal factors that have an influence on whether a state adopts a new policy or when it adopts a new policy (Gold 1995; Nice 1994; Savage 1985a). A few studies have examined both the effects of adoptions by other states and

P o k y Attributes and State P o k y Innovation 5

internal characteristics in explaining policy diffusion (Berry and Berry 1990, 1992; Berry 1994). Still other research has investigated a possible link between the scope or stringency of policies and time of adoption, i.e., whether later adopters choose broader, more comprehensive policies than leaders (Allen and Clark 1981; Clark 1985; Clark and French 1984; Eyestone 1977; Glick and Hays 1991; Glick 1992; Hays 1996a, 1996b).

It seems reasonable that the policies of other states will be more important influences on interstate diffusion under some circumstances and conditions than others. Most previous studies have delineated these circumstances and conditions in terms of leader states and their characteristics, regional influences, the availability of channels of communication for policy diffusion, or internal factors related to innovative behavior- state's problems, resources or political culture. In other words, the focus has typically been on adopter characteristics and channels of communication for policy diffusion, not policy attributes.

The purpose of this paper is to change the emphasis to policy attributes as a perspective for understanding patterns of interstate diffusion. The goal is to encourage studies that compare diffusion patterns among policies, as well as among states. This approach leads to the generation of hypotheses where innovation attributes are related to differences in the extent, speed, or scope of state adoptions. Similar hypotheses focusing on innovation attributes have been tested in the innovation literature of other disciplines for decades (Fliegel and Kivlin 1966; Musmann and Kennedy 1989; Warner 1974). Rogers ( 1 995) includes findings from studies in several disciplines where there is a focus on innovation attributes, their operational indicators, and possible relationships between these indicators and the diffusion of innovations. While the general characteristics of innovations, like relative advantage, are useful for the study of interstate policy diffusion, the identification of operational measures for an innovation must be specific to the innovation at issue. Consequently, the policy attributes approach here relies on the identification of attributes found in the general models of innovation and diffusion, but operational indicators are suggested by the typologies of state policies found in the political economy and policy making literatures of political science A policy attributes approach is intended to supplement, not replace, the importance of adopter characteristics and channels of communication for policy diffusion.

First, the political economy perspective and its relationship to innovation is presented with an emphasis on operationalizing policy attributes that may have an impact on the number or timing of state policy innovations. Next, certain policy making process concepts, especially those drawn from the agenda setting literature, are examined for insights about both measures

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of policy attributes and issue networks for the diffusion of innovations among the states. The emphasis in these two sections is on the policy attributes of relative advantage and compatibility. Hypotheses linking these policy attributes and patterns of diffusion are presented at the end of this section. The third section of the paper examines the relationship between the timing of innovations and program scope. This section focuses on the innovation attribute, trialability, and discusses trialable innovations with the attributes of compatibility and relative advantage. Finally, hypotheses relating the timing of innovations and program scope are presented.

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY APPROACH AND POLICY ATTRIBUTES

The political economy approach is typically employed to emphasize both the influence of economic constraints on state policy choices and the priority accorded economic development policy by state governments. However, this approach is also useful in delineating one of the conditions where the American states have displayed a good deal of innovative behavior and where new policies have diffised rapidly to other states.

Eisinger (1988), for example, demonstrates that the number of state economic development programs adopted increased significantly from 1966-1985. Specifically, the number of programs per state nearly doubled from 16.8 in 1966 to 32.3 in 1985. Bowman and Kearney also find evidence of the rapid diffusion of development policies by the early 1980s. “Eighty percent of the states have adopted at least 40 percent of the available promotion options” (1 986, 200). However, they argue that at some point there may be a trade-off between competitive strategies and program costs. “Consequently, a safe political strategy may be to enact measures that will make a state competitive but not vulnerable to a raid on its treasury by greedy firms” ( 1 986,200).

The basic thesis of this political economy approach is that corporate mobility engenders interstate tax base competition for business location. This tax base competition, especially during the current era of economic restructuring, globalization and mobile capital, encourages states to invent new development policies, such as tax abatements or other public subsidies for business location (supply-side policies). These developmental policies are assumed to increase the economic well being of the state. The innovation literature suggests that one of the attributes of innovation is the perception of relative advantage, presumably the case for developmental policies. The hypothesis generated is “The relative advantage of an innovation, as perceived by members of a social system, is positively related to its rate of adoption” (Rogers 1983,218). This hypothesis was confirmed

PoIicy Attributes and Stare Policy Innovation 7

in many studies reviewed by Rogers, but the exceptions occurred where potential adopters of new agricultural technologies, farmers in developing nations, attached more importance to social approval than economic gain.

Developmental policy making may in fact define one of the primary conditions where states influence one another. Interstate competition has extended beyond property tax abatements and other business subsidies to alternative strategies like the availability of well-trained labor to attract emerging industries. As a result, states may be influenced by the educational reforms enacted by neighbors or leader states, at least those reforms that are expected to enhance educational quality and a state’s competitive edge in attracting businesses.

Innovations in other substantive policy areas may be motivated by the policy attribute, relative advantage; for example, one state’s income or sales tax rate level may have an impact on neighboring states. Lower tax rates function as a strategy to attract businesses, and residents cross state borders for purchases where sales tax rates are lower. Using historical event analysis, Berry and Berry (1 992) find that state tax adoptions were influenced by similar adoptions in other states. State-sanctioned or state-oper- ated gambling devices, such as lotteries or horse racing, are not only an alternative for keeping tax rates competitive, but they also draw residents from one state to another to spend entertainment dollars. In another study, Berry and Berry ( I 990) find that neighboring states influence one another in the adoption of lotteries. Tourism, the arts, “quality of life” services, transportation facilities, and convention sites may also be areas where states seek relative advantage through infrastructure improvements.

Gray and Eisinger argue that the rapid diffusion of supply-side strategies later encouraged the invention of new, competitive strategies. “By 1985, so many states had adopted so many of the supply-side policies that their relative effectiveness was in doubt. Thus, the states began to emphasize the newer demand-side policies’’ (1 997, 377). These demand-side policies included targeted aid, international trade, high technology development and venture capital programs instead of production subsidies. This tendency toward a change in state strategies is quite interesting for innovation research in the developmental policy area; that is, once existing policies no longer provide a competitive edge, some states invent new strategies. Earlier studies have examined the possibility that slack resources or changes in internal, state problem indicators stimulated innovative behavior. In this case, the factor may be a policy attribute, relative advantage.

The political economy approach, which highlights external economic influences on state policy choices, also suggests an incentive for all states to reduce redistributive expenditures (policies that transfer income from the

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more to the less affluent) (Peterson 1995). Harrigan makes this point in discussing the contemporary era of competitive federalism: “If states are put in competition over social services, there will be a natural tendency to hold taxes down by keeping social service expenditures as low as possible. This is because no state will want to look more profligate than its neighbor” ( 1 998, 57). Additionally, the real or perceived disincentive of becoming “welfare magnets” and attracting possible recipients might be another factor in supporting the expectation of declining state welfare expenditures or coverage over time (Peterson and Rom 1990).

The same expectation for over time program reductions in welfare may be relevant to state health care policy responsibilities. Craig, for example, finds that “an answer depends on the relative importance of redistribution to insurance motives in policy design” (1996,247). In other words, there is an indication of a “race towards the bottom” in redistributive health care programs, but not in programs that require health insurance coverage. He explains the argument. “Eficiency-enhancing policies will be supported by the states’ residents, and successhl policies are likely to be copied by other states. On the other hand, the ability of the states to use health care policies to redistribute appears more circumscribed” ( 1 996,247).

Some research suggests that in another redistributive policy area, environmental protection, the most stringent environmental regulations impact- ing business do not diffuse extensively to other states. Harrigan comments on the tendency for business corporations to threaten to move if regulations are rigid. “In order to prevent that from happening, each state will have a powerful incentive to promote weak rather than strong environmental regulations” ( 1 998, 57). Instead, stringent environmental regulations may be more closely related to internal factors-the extent of a state’s pollution problem and the strength of its environmental or industry interest groups (Ringquist 1993).

Finally, implementation research on federal policy compliance at the subnational level indicates that developmental policies have been carried out both more extensively and in a shorter time period than redistributive policies (Peterson, Rabe, and Wong 1986).

Economic parameters, then, may account for some similarities in interstate diffusion patterns of either developmental or redistributive policy innovations. That is, states facing a similar and challenging economic environment are likely to seek relative advantage by offering as much or more state assistance for business development than other states. The same argument holds that states will avoid new redistributive policy responsibilities and seek to minimize expenditures for existing redistributive policies. Developmental policies underscore the capabilities of the states to meet

Policv Attributes and State Policv Innovation 9

challenges, to innovate and to reinvent strategies, as well as their awareness of the behaviors of other states where comparative advantage is at issue. Kenyon suggests, however, that a constraint of interstate competition does not mean all states will enact exactly the same policies. “The convoy metaphor implies that interstate competition does constrain state policy choices, but does not require states to adopt identical policy choices. Instead, there is constrained diversity” ( 1 996,255).

ALLOCATION POLICIES: THE POLITICAL ADVANTAGE ATTRIBUTE

One possible implication of this political economy argument is that regulative or allocational policies (those that neither add to nor detract from the economic well being of the state) are less likely to diffuse as rapidly or as extensively as policies where states seek economic advantage. The timing of adoptions of new regulative and allocational policies, compared to developmental or redistributive policies, may be more responsive to internal state characteristics than to external pressures from other states. Several studies of regulatory policies, however, indicate rapid diffusion patterns for some regulative policies (Hays 1996b; Savage 1985b). It could be that the pol icy attribute, relative advantage, associated positively with expansions in developmental policies and negatively with expansions in redistributive policies, sometimes applies to regulative or allocational policies as well. Politicians, for example, may claim they are “tougher” on crime or more fiscally responsible than the leaders of other states. Com- parisons not only allow politicians an opportunity to enhance their electoral advantage within the state, but also for possible presidential bids in the case of governors (Gray and Eisinger 1991; Morehouse 1981; Zimmerman 1996). Dye and Zeigler (1 996), for example, discuss President Clinton’s strategy as a governor to become a viable presidential candidate. Part of that strategy included developing credentials as a “new” Democrat by embracing positions in favor of workfare, more stringent penalties for criminals and economic development. Thus, the diffusion of innovations in regulative or allocational policies may be related to attributes of relative political advantage. Regulative policies with relative, political advantage will diffuse more rapidly than those without this attribute.

In fact, Eisinger argues that economic development policies may sometimes have an attribute of relative, political advantage. In a 1995 survey of state strategies he concludes, “I am suggesting that policy change in state economic development is occurring primarily because of a change in strategic calculations by state-elected oficials-much more than as the result of program evaluations, changes in partisan control, or ideological


transformations” (1995, 155). I n an examination of interstate competition, Zimmerman also notes that political advantage was a factor in the adoption of economic development policies. He suggests that if these programs are successful, then they are advantageous for those seeking higher office. He also identifies another political motivation for enacting developmental policies. “In addition, the efforts to recruit business firms may divert public attention away from important divisive issues that need to be addressed by the governor and the state legislature” (1996,157). If this is the case, then it may be more likely that more states will adopt new, politically advantageous programs during election years. Eisinger suggests this hypothesis for future research.. “We may also hypothesize that big industrial recruit- ment efforts are more likely to precede elections, while controlling for changes in partisan control of the statehouse” ( 1 995, 157).

Landy and Levin suggest that another policy type related to political advantage is citizen rights policies. They argue that rights policies are likely to increase during periods of divided party control, weak party organizations, and enhanced party competition for large numbers of independent voters. “Rather than creating stasis, institutional weakness and policy fragmentation have actually served to increase the competition for policy innovation and enhance the power of strategically placed policy entrepreneurs” ( 1995, 278). Furthermore, they argue, “This expansion of rights claims, which forms the core of the new constitutional order, is the spark that ignites the proliferation of policy” (1995, 285). While their analysis is aimed primarily at national politics, it may also apply to states; states with divided party control, high levels of party competition, or weak party organizations may be more likely to adopt new, politically advantageous policies at an earlier time than states with single party control and strong legislative parties. Calvert (1 994) provides some evidence to substantiate this relationship at the state level. He revisits Walker’s (1969) innovation study and finds a relationship between both party competition and legislative professionalism and state policy innovation. “The hypothes is that government and party reforms lead to policy innovativeness and thus to improved socioeconomic standing is retained “ (Calvert 1994, 39).

Another innovation attribute, compatibility, refers to the idea that a policy fits the beliefs of an adopter. Rogers (1995) hypothesizes that rate of adoption of an innovation is positively related to its perceived compatibility. Nice (l994), whose primary purpose is the identification of internal correlates of state adopters and non-adopters, notes that certain policy adoptions are not especially responsive to either problems or resources. Instead, these policies “fit” the political culture (dominant attitudes and beliefs) of some states and not others. Among the policy areas he identifies

Policy Attributes and State Policy Innovation I1

as exhibiting this compatibility trait were anti-sodomy laws, sunset legislation, and state support ofa federal balanced budget amendment. Adopting states tended to be those with elements of the traditionalistic political culture. Vandenbosch (1993) also finds that lotteries were adopted later or not at all in traditionalistic political culture states. She reports relationships between other social issues, such as capital punishment and ratification of the Equal Rights Amendment by states, and state political cultures.

Rose (1993) also emphasizes the importance of value compatibility in facilitating adoption of new policies. In fact, he argues that political values often guide policy adoption, rather than a careful examination of the performance of policies, i.e., whether they accomplished their goals or produced meaningful change where they had already been implemented.

In conclusion, the political economy approach categorizes policies as developmental, redistributive or allocational. In the context of the Ameri- can states, the literature suggests that most states pursue developmental policies which they perceive as enhancing their economic well-being in a competition with other states. Conversely, most states tend to avoid or minimize redistributive policies because they perceive these policies are detrimental. As a result, this approach provides a means for operationalizing the policy attribute, relative advantage. Allocational policies are conceptualized as those that are neutral in terms of effects on the overall economic health of a state. However, allocational policies sometimes connote another type of relative advantage, political gain, for politicians seeking to establish a positive record for re-election. As a result, the Rogers hypothesis relevant to relative advantage is adapted to incorporate political, as well as economic, advantage.

While a focus on relative advantage may be useful in delineating some hypotheses regarding interstate policy diffusion, the case of social and morality policies suggests that another attribute, value compatibility, may be relevant to both the extent and speed of policy diffusion. In fact, there is some suggestion that value compatibility or incompatibility is sometimes more important than information about a policy’s performance in explaining diffusion.

Next, the policy making process literature is examined for fkrther insights into the relevance of policy attributes for innovation studies, particularly the relative advantage and compatibility attributes.

THE POLICY MAKING PROCESS AND POLICY ATTRIBUTES

Baumgartner and Jones ( I 993) make a distinction between cases where new policies require the creation of new institutions and those where new

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policies involve the reform of existing institutions or policy triads. The application of this distinction to a policy attributes focus may be fruitful. If the policy proposal involves the reform of an existing triad (bureaucrats, interest groups and legislative committees), then the policy may be incompatible. That is, if the innovation challenges the ideas and values underpinning existing institutions, it will meet resistance. On the other hand, if the proposal creates a new triad, then it is compatible and there is no threat to existing institutions. Policy entrepreneurs will emphasize the policy’s benefits and face little organized opposition (Baumgartner and Jones 1993). Sabatier, who focuses more clearly on the role of advocacy coalitions underpinning triads and policy changes hypothesizes that “The core (basic attributes) of a governmental program is unlikely to be significantly revised as long as the subsystem advocacy coalition that instituted the program remains in power” (1993, 34). Thus, policies that establish new triads, rather than those that weaken established triads, might be regarded as more compatible. As a result, new policies, rather than reform policies, are likely to diffuse more rapidly across the states.

Additional explanations for differences in the timing of adoptions among states might be tied to an agenda setting model where new agenda items result from the convergence of problems, politics, and solutions streams (Kingdon 1995). The problems or the politics stream open a window of opportunity for agenda setting, and then a policy entrepreneur couples the solution to the problem. In other words, there are solutions chasing problems. In the case of state policy diffusion, the solution, except for pioneering states, is external, but the problems and politics are typically treated as internal. Nice (1994), for example, finds that problems, as opposed to resources, are salient in explaining state adoption or nonadop- tion of five different types of policy innovations.

Perhaps more important, problems are sometimes defined at the national level, not within a particular state. If that is the case, then these “national” solutions may take on the policy attribute, relative advantage. That is, policies promoted as national standards or endorsed by professionals may connote more status than other alternatives.

A closer examination of interstate policy communities illustrates this possibility. States influence each other through issue networks (such as the National Governors Association) where governors define problems and set policy priorities for all states, or through communication of program innovations and/or evaluations by professional channels and networks (Gray 1973). Eisinger suggests that industrial policy innovations were not developed through avenues of party and media politics. “They appear instead to be technocratic experiments, emerging from the nexus of research

Policy Attributes and State Policy Innovation 13

institute, academic and bureaucratic connections, to achieve highly general and universally popular employment goals articulated most often by political chief executive^^^ ( 1 988, 342). Rose (1993) also underscores the role of professional networks in the diffusion of ideas among the American states and refers specifically to the Ford Foundation’s Innovation Award program. Clearly, the innovations selected as winners by this foundation carry a status attribute or professional seal of approval.

Dye provides an explanation for the importance of status advantage as a policy attribute and suggests why professional legislatures are more likely to adopt these “status” policies:

We might speculate that professionalism among both legislators and bureaucrats encourages the development of national standards for governmental admin istration. Professionals know about program- matic developments elsewhere through professional meetings, jour- nals, newsletters, and so on. More important, they view themselves as professional administrators and government leaders, and they seek to adopt the newest reforms and innovations for their own states ( 1995,309).

Another example of the diffusion of expert solutions is in the area of educational reform. Following the “Nation at Risk” report by the National Commission on Excellence in Education in 1983, many states adopted the educational reform policies advocated in the study. Shinn and Van Der Slik (1988) report that the average for states was eight of the forty possible reforms; the range for states was from zero to twenty-three.

In a closer examination of the role of policy entrepreneurs and issue networks at the state level, Mintrom ( 1 997) finds that the presence of a policy entrepreneur was a significant influence on whether school choice proposals gained agenda status in a state. Furthermore, Mintrom and Vergari ( I 998) find evidence of the importance of external policy networks in influencing state agenda setting. Internal policy networks, on the other hand, were factors at both the agenda setting and adoption stages in the area of state education reforms.

In a study of Republican Contract for America policies adopted by state parties, Little (1 997) identifies another case of national solutions marketed to states. The national Republican Party leadership encouraged state con- tracts with policy priorities similar to the national contract, and several states adopted contract policy positions-both the problem definitions and the solutions. He finds that the presence of a state-level entrepreneur enhanced the likelihood that Republican contract issues would reach a state’s legislative agenda.

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Even the president may function as “Governor in Chief’ if he sets voluntary national goals for states (defines national problems) and articu- lates potential solutions for all the states.

Finally, national media events like coverage of a child molestation case can result in legislative solutions across the country, whether or not a state has experienced an increase in these offenses. Similarly, death penalty legislation might be adopted because it is part of a national interest group or political party strategy, not because the states’ murder rates have increased or more convicted murderers have been released.

In summary, the major argument is that state policy innovations and their subsequent diffusion to other states may be a common response of many states to a problem defined at the national level. Solutions have been formulated that have the policy attribute of relative status advantage. These solutions are characterized as “the national standard,” or the “professional solution,” by organizations such as the National Governors Association, or by political parties, interest groups, presidents, task forces, or the national media. If these solutions connote relative advantage, then it is likely that they will diffuse rapidly among the states. In other words, given the support of prominent entrepreneurs outside a state, these solutions may be not only salient, but also associated with a status attribute. Status attributes expand the list of possibilities for measuring relative advantage generated from a political economy perspective: economic advantage (developmental ver- sus redistributive policies) and political advantage (allocational policies).

Furthermore, the policy making process literature suggests that compatibility is greater when policies create new triads, rather than reform existing institutions. This definition of compatibility supplements the perspective discussed earlier, the notion that policies are compatible when they match the political culture of a state.

A policy attributes perspective in combination with a political economy and policy process approach, then, suggests these hypotheses comparing diffusion among policies:

1 . Developmental or efficiency-enhancing policies, positively associated with the innovation attribute relative advantage, are likely to diffuse more extensively and rapidly across the states than policies without this attribute. Examples of developmental policies include tax abatements, educational reforms, tax types or rates, and lotteries.

2. State redistributive policies, negatively associated with the relative advantage attribute, are likely to be characterized by expen- diture declines over time. Examples of redistributive policies


include welfare, health care for the economically disadvantaged, and stringent environmental regulations.

3. Allocational or regulative policies may connote relative, political advantage, rather than economic advantage. If a policy connotes political advantage, it will diffuse more extensively and rapidly across states than those policies without this attribute. An example of policies with political advantage is citizen rights policies. Policies with political advantage may diffuse more rapidly during election years than at other times.

4. New policies that are perceived as setting national standards or representing professional innovations suggest relative advantage in terms of status. Those policies with status advantage are more likely to be adopted more extensively and by more states than policies that do not carry this connotation.

5 . Social or morality policies reflect the policy attribute, compatibility, and are likely to be adopted where there is a fit between the policy goal and a state’s political culture. Examples of these policies are anti-sodomy laws, capital punishment, and the ratification of the Equal Rights Amendment.

6 . Policies that are compatible, that is, create new triads will diffuse more rapidly and more extensively than those that require the reform of existing triads.

7. Once existing policies no longer provide a relative advantage, some states will invent new strategies. Thus, while program innovation may sometimes be a function of problems or resources within a state, at other times, the relative advantage of existing policy options in comparison to other states will encourage the invention of new programs.

POLICY ATTRIBUTES AND POLICY SCOPE The policy attributes discussed so far maybe useful in accounting for

the timing, speed or number of state adoptions of new policies. However, another dimension of innovation research has focused on the content of policies-whether there is a relationship between the scope or stringency ofpolicies and the timing ofadoptions. The major hypothesis, derived from technology diffusion research, is that policies will become more comprehensive over time; later state adopters will choose broader policies than earlier adopters. Scope is not an attribute of an innovation, but a possible consequence of an innovation attribute, trialability. Rogers defines trialability as “the degree to which an innovation may be experimented with on a limited basis” (1 983, 23 1). That is, a state may adopt a new policy,

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but do so in a limited fashion. He argues that later adopters move to “full-scale use” faster than early adopters because early adopters have no precedent, no peers who had adopted the innovation. Thus, while the specifics of policy content may be responsive to other policy attributes or adopter characteristics, the propensity to expand is external, the existence of at least minimal policies in other states.

In a recent study of state policy innovation, Hays ( 1 996b) finds evidence of laggards adopting broader policies in two areas: child abuse reporting legislation and compensation for the victims of crime. Additionally, some leaders later expand the scope of their policies, perhaps in response to the actions of laggards: As a result, there is a “cross-fertilization” effect, according to Hays. In a study of interstate diffusion of living will legislation from 1976 to 1990, Glick (1992) finds some evidence that policies selected by later adopters are broader. He concludes that the earliest adopters had very restrictive laws. However, among later adopters, many states chose broader policies for living wills, making it easier for citizens to make living wills; but other states did not. The relationship between time of adoption and policy scope was weak (Glick 1992).

On the other hand, there is some evidence that policy scope does not always expand. Hays (1996b) finds that the scope of public campaign finance legislation grew narrower over time and diffused to a much smaller number of states than child abuse reporting or the crime victim compensation legislation. Allen and Clark (1981) find that in two policy areas, competency-based education and lobby regulation, later adopters did not expand the policy scope beyond the parameters set by pioneering states. Middle range adopters, however, tended to select less comprehensive policies than either the earliest or the latest adopters.

Clark and French (I 984) use a measure of incremental innovation and find that early adopters of redistributive, state revenue sharing programs with localities tend to have more complex, needs-based formulas (as opposed to return to origin) than later adopters. However, later adopters tend to favor higher funding levels for revenue sharing than earlier adopters. For later adopters, property tax relief goals may have a higher priority than tax base equalization goals.

These differences in findings might be reconciled by looking beyond trialability to other policy attributes. One attribute that may be germane is compatibility, and one indication of compatibility is whether the policy involves the creation of a new triad or the reform or destruction of an existing triad. Child abuse reporting or crime victim compensation legislation would create a new triad, a vehicle for program expansion. On the other hand, in the case of a reform policy, established triads or organized

Policy Attributes and State Policy Innovation I 7

opponents muster opposition. It seems likely that there would be such opposition in the cases of competency testing, lobby regulation, or campaign finance regulation. This opposition has more time for organization in laggard states, since opponents have been alerted by adoptions in other states. As a result, laggards’ programs may be narrower, perhaps symbolic or experimental. It is also possible that resistance is strong enough in laggard states to prevent adoption. Glick (1 992) describes this situation in a study of the diffusion of living will laws. He finds organized opposition from the Catholic Church and right-to-life groups in cases where laggards’ policies become more restrictive rather than broader. Glick and Hays ( 1 99 1 ) later investigate a subhypothesis that policy reinvention by laggard states moves in more than one direction, more comprehensive in some cases and more restrictive in others. It appears that if trialable policies are compatible to laggards, they expand the scope. If not, laggards either narrow the scope of a policy or reject its adoption.

Other factors that impact the timing of adoptions may also affect the expansion or restriction of policy scope by later adopters. The political economy approach leads to an emphasis on relative advantage as a policy attribute, and one method of outdoing other states is to extend the scope of tax abatements or other locational incentives for business. Bowman and Kearney (1 986) examine increases in the number of developmental policies as an indication of scope. They move beyond a focus on a single policy and instead index a range of development policies. The result is a composite economic development innovation score for each state, where states receive a point for each of the policies they have adopted.

Shinn and Van Der Slik (1988) also use a scope measure forthe number of educational reforms adopted by states in the year after the publication of A Nation at Risk. The states adopting more of the reforms were those with more professional legislatures, more financial resources, and centralized state control of education. With one exception, the states that adopted the largest number of reforms were Southern states. Scope measures may be useful when policies are not trialable, where expansion requires an additional, new policy, or when diffusion is extremely rapid.

A focus on a single policy, the staple of innovation research interested in relationships between policy scope and time of adoption, overlooks this possibility. Furthermore, a state may choose one option rather than another, but if a single policy is examined, that information is lost. For example, one might examine school choice policies in terms of open enrollments in public schools. To do so, however, overlooks the possibility that some states elect charter schools or voucher programs, rather than open enrollment, as a choice policy.


It is possible that political advantage is at issue in the choice of property tax goals in the study of diffusion of revenue sharing policies (Clark and French 1984). With equalization goals, there are winners and losers; some localities get state revenue increases, but others experience a loss. As a result, tax equalization may suggest negative political advantage. Other policies that have been the subject of innovation studies may connote comparative political advantage, perhaps those emphasizing citizen rights, such as consumer protection (lemon laws) and safety (child safety seats) (Savage 1985b). These are the types of policies that Landy and Levin ( 1995) argue expand rapidly as both political parties seek to gain the support of independent voters.

This discussion of the likelihood that later adopters will increase or decrease the scope of trialable policies suggests that a distinction between agenda setting and formulation might be fruitful (Kingdon 1995). That is, trialable policies may reach the agendas of later adopters due to their adoption by other states, but formulation, i.e., expansion or narrowing, will be responsive to other policy attributes-compatibility, and/or relative advantage. One of the discussion group “findings” at a conference on the diffusion of public sector innovations was “Diffusion is easier when programs are open to adaptation and reinvention” (Cope 1992, 1 17).

Adaptation and reinvention may sometimes involve policy evaluation to determine whether the program accomplishes its goals or what amount of change the policy is likely to produce. Rose (1993), for example, examines policy innovation among both the American states and nations in terms of lesson drawing. He argues that policy makers are motivated by dissatisfactions or problems in searching for new solutions among their peers. However, he makes it clear to practitioners that lessons must be drawn from the experience of early adopters. “Searching for information about programs elsewhere is useful but incomplete; what is learned must then be evaluated” ( 1 993, 7 1).

Peters also underscores the importance of evaluation in assessing innovations for government, most notably the market and citizen participation models. He concludes, “To the extent that these models have been irnple- mented in the real world (particularly the market model) they have been put forward for ideological reasons as much as from any thorough and impartial consideration of their merits” (1996, 133). He further suggests the following: “Any choice of paradigms for government and administration is unlikely to be Pareto optimal, but the benefits and sacrifices should be clear in making judgments about governance” (1 996, 133).

While Rose (1 993) and Peters (1996) advise the evaluation of innovations before adoption, both suggest that compatibility with the values of the


adopter often precludes the necessary analysis. Eisinger ( 1 995) comes to a similar conclusion in examining state industrial policy strategies. He suggests that political considerations outweighed policy learning. “The ferment of the 1990s is, probably, a product of policy learning in which feedback on economic development programs and strategic emphasis comes not primarily from the experience of program administration but rather in the form of various political signals” ( 1 995, 154). Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith take the issue of the possible conflict of core values and analysis a step further and attempt to identify the circumstances where policy analysis is most likely to have an influence. “Of particular importance is that the issue be subject to moderate levels of conflict sufficient to encourage the mobilization of sufficient analytical resources yet not sufficient to lead policy elites to refuse to consider analytical findings that depart from the preconceptions” (1993, 233).

Whatever the guide to reinvention of policies by later adopters, politics or policy analysis, it might be useful to distinguish between cases where states expand or narrow the coverage of a policy (incrementalism or decrementalism) and when they use the “borrowed” policy to accomplish a new objective (reinvention). For example, competency based education might be used to set statewide standards of educational performance. Initially, it might cover a few subject areas and/or grade levels. Thus, states could expand the scope of the policy by including more subjects or more grade levels.

However, some states might see this policy as a solution for accomplish- ing other goals. Thus, reinvention may represent a compromise, where the original goal is preserved, but an additional policy goal is incorporated to garner sufficient legislative support. Funding levels for school districts or teacher raises could be based on student test score rankings. As a result, the test ranks would address an accountability goal, rewarding “merit” in funding formula allocations. Other states might utilize test scores by mandating that low ranking schools develop a remediation plan or require parenuteacher conferences when students earn poor scores. These policies would meet a goal in increasing the participation of school boards and parents in improving the perfonance of students. In the competency education example, the relevant attribute might be compatibility. One would expect that traditionalistic political culture states, characterized by greater state centralization, would favor the state-level accountability policy. Moralistic political culture states, on the other hand, would favor increased citizen participation in problem solving at the local level. In fact, the accountability policy is part of the Texas law, and Wisconsin prefers the alternative. Reinventions, then, might be conceptualized as different From

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expansions in scope; instead they involve decisions to use a borrowed policy for a new goal, rather than simply increasing its coverage.

Another example might be providing school choice for parents, but limiting eligibility to those with children in low income or low performing schools. The policy is no longer based solely on market theory to improve the overall performance of public schools. Now the policy has a new use, it is redistributive, an equalization policy. Its new use is to provide better educational facilities for some children in low income or poor performing sc hoo Is.

Innovation expert Rogers describes this reinvention phenomenon as, “What I mean by reinvention is the way that the innovation is changed as it spreads, changed by the use of it as it diffuses. So much so, that sometimes when you look at the innovation someone else is spreading, you almost don’t recognize it, and sometimes, in fact, it is called by a different name” (1992, 13).

As a result, there is another option for late adopters in addition to the possibilities of increasing the scope of compatible policies. They might reinvent the policy not only by putting it to full use, but to a new use. Later adopters will be reinvention leaders because the new policy goal is amena- ble to their problems and environments, not those of initial innovators. An increase or decrease in scope is related to the policy attributes of the original innovation, while the diffusion and scope of the reinvention is related to its policy attributes, not those of the original policy.

In conclusion, trialable policies may diffuse more extensively and rapidly than nontrialable policies, but there may be differences among trialable policies relevant to their other attributes. That is, trialable policies that are also compatible or those that connote relative advantage may be related to expansions in scope by later adopters. Trialable policies with a compatibility or relative advantage attribute may also stimulate cross-fertilization diffusion. If a trialable policy is incompatible to a later adopter, that state may reinvent it, perhaps by finding a new use, coupling this solution to another problem. Alternatively, a state could narrow the scope of the policy or fail to adopt it. If a policy is not trialable, but connotes relative advantage, then a state may elect to adopt additional programs that accomplish the same objective. Thus, increases in scope are indicated not by expansions within a single policy, but by the addition of similar policies that are expected to accomplish the same goal.

The scope and reinvention hypotheses that might guide studies of diffusion of policies across states are:

1. When trialable policies are compatible, then later adopters will expand the scope of the policy. Since the policy was also


compatible for leaders, they are likely to expand policy scope in response to the actions of laggard states (cross-fertilization). Citizen rights policies and those that establish new triads, rather than the reform of existing triads, are likely to be expanded by later adopters.

2. When trialable policies are incompatible, then laggard states will narrow their scope or fail to adopt the policy. They may also find an alternative policy solution, one that is compatible, and adopt that policy. Charter schools, for example, may be an alternative to open enrollment or voucher policies for public schools.

3 . When policies have low trialability, but connote comparative economic or political advantage, later adopters may develop more programs in order to expand the scope of the policy.

4. Reinventions are likely to occur when a new use makes the policy more compatible, perhaps when a new use provides a basis for legislative compromise and adoption.

Overall, then it appears that external pressures, the behavior of other states, stimulates growth in the state government sector. There are a number of innovation attributes that predict extensive diffusion of new policies among the American states-those related to relative economic, political or status advantage and those that are compatible with the values of adopters. Furthermore, later adopters expand compatible policies or those with relative advantage, or states may reinvent policies or strategies. The resulting pattern of adoption is one in which state policies may be similar, but not identical.

While the patterns of state adoptions of innovations are interesting questions, perhaps the most provocative hypotheses generated by the innovation literature are the ones based on trialability. These hypotheses focus on the circumstances where later adopters expand or narrow policy scope or reinvent policies. In some cases, there is cross-fertilization where pioneering states adopt these reinventions. It could be that this cross-fertilization pattern also helps to account for the constrained diversity in policy content among the states. The diffusion of ideas across states not only encourages adaptation in terms of broadening or narrowing policy scope, but also reinvention. In some cases, a state may find a new use for a policy.


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