Police Governance: Practice and Challenge

Andrew Graham

Adjunct Professor

The key conclusion to the research to date is why does Canada have such

exemplary governance of police in some places and a questionable dearth in

others? Or, why is our concern for police oversight so weak where it should so strong and so strong where it may not

need to be?

Put another way: why is there an active police service board providing civilian oversight in Amherst, Nova Scotia (24 sworn officers) and Kawartha Lakes,

Ontario (38 sworn officers) and none for the RCMP (26,000 sworn officers) and

the City of Winnipeg (1300 sworn officers)?

Why is the Oversight and Governance of Police a Special Matter of Public Policy?

The police have a unique set of relationships to state authority.

As the powers that individual police officers and police organizations exercise on behalf of the state is considerable, its restraint and oversight are as important as the legislative means that permits them to exercise it.

The distinction between appropriate political direction from a government to the police, and inappropriate political interference in operational policing matters is an immensely significant one

Why is the Oversight and Governance of Police a Special Matter of Public Policy?

Individual police officers exercise considerable individual discretion under the criminal and related legal codes. The exercise of that power must be independent of external direction or political interference but subject to judicial oversight.

Police organizations are also responsible to the civil authorities from whom they derive their authority in matters of legislation, policy, accounting both for results and compliance and unique forms of oversight and recourse.

Why is the Oversight and Governance of Police a Special Matter of Public Policy?

Policing needs its organizational independence as much as adequate accountability – oversight boards are seen as supplying these.

Police oversight and direction demand informed and focused attention

Governance is that set of practices, bodies, institutions and relationships that provide for oversight and direction to an organization.

The Challenges of Police Governance in a Democracy

The paradox of police governance: There is a need to balance the unwarranted exercise of coercive power by the police with enabling their effective operation.

Policing is political: Policing is about the exercise of power and there are competing options for policing priorities and style.

Financial stewardship: The police need to be held accountable for their use of public resources.

Police legitimacy: Police in democratic states strive for legitimacy to achieve the active cooperation and trust of the policed. Accountability contributes to the legitimacy of the police.

What are the elements of police governance as practiced in Canada? Rule of law in how police actions are undertaken,

application of the law to the conduct of investigations, arrest and detention and answerability to the courts for these actions,

Operation of police services within existing laws of the state in matters of public funds, availability of information, treatment of staff and responsibility to account for the actions of the police service and the results it is expect to achieve,

Accountability to the public, both through the legislature and to related oversight bodies,

What are the elements of police governance as practiced in Canada? Transparency in carrying out both

investigative functions such as arrest, detention and charging (to the courts) and in preventive and control functions such as demonstration control (to either political or oversight bodies especially appointed to oversee police services),

Principle of restraint, Development of a professional police service

with service standards, adequate minimum training and regular public reporting.

Governance Practice: what is a police board/commission and what does it do?

Composition: varies across the country, but a mix of local and provincial appointees – not truly representative of the community

Roles: 1. Employers of the sworn and civilian staff; 2. Policy and direction setters; 3. Financial overseers; and 4. Discipline authorities for policy and service

complaints, with the Chair being responsible for disciplinary matters related to the Chief of Police and

Deputy.

Police Governance and Westminster-model democracy Unique form of oversight with some distance

and independence from political direction Gains in transparency, focus and expertise Looses in terms of pure democratic theory Inherent ironic construct: created to expand

oversight of an important institution, but often at odds with municipal councils that try to limit police budgets

Fits nicely into notion of checks and balances

Police Governance and Westminster-model democracy Subject to provincial oversight as well – consistent

with provincial responsibility to administer justice Balancing act: the inherent dangers of direct political

oversight are seen where special bodies are not created: Ipperwash, the RCMP never stops

Many examples within Westminster systems of police oversight that removes direct control of police from the executive arm. Roles then become: • Minister/legislative body sets policies and resource

parameters Board or Commission provides direction, oversight and

accountability Police Service delivers policing services and accounts

for them

Looking Internationally – How we compare? United States

Courts and internal inspectorates France

Traditional role of judiciary in supervising investigations

New complaints process United Kingdom

Tripartite model: Home Office, local police authority and police service

If Governance is so Important, why is Canadian Practice so Varied It is and it isn’t: major diversion is Quebec,

Manitoba and Newfoundland: all other provinces have some form of oversight which is clouded by the role of the RCMP in contracted policing

Major gaps: RCMP, SQ, OPP and Winnipeg

Issues

Can the need for the police to remain apolitical and autonomous be reconciled with these mechanisms of governance and accountability?

Making Police Boards more effective – creation of national standards or best practices – the role of CAPB

Building greater representivity

A Focus on the RCMP and Issues of Oversight More than just an issue of dealing with

complaints effectively An organization that has developed strong

internal values at the cost of the external accountabilities that continuous oversight brings

Can political oversight as it now exist work – reluctance of politicians to interfere and the ability of an organization to shield itself because of that.