polaris_special_oct 2007

POLARISSPECIAL ISSUE

OCTOBER 2007

N A T O

S C H O O L

NATO AND CHINA: AN EMERGING RELATIONSHIP

BY STEPHEN CONRAD

VISITING RESEARCHER, NATO SCHOOL

NATO SCHOOL POLARIS Special Issue October 2007

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NATO SCHOOL Research Department Am Rainenbichl 54 82487 Oberammergau GERMANY URL: www.natoschool.nato.int E-mail: [email protected] Subscription is free of charge. Please provide us with your contact information.

POLARIS STAFF Commandant: COL James Tabak, USA AF

Dean of Academics: LTC Gerald Conrad, CAN AF

Editors: Liliana Serban, ROU Civ Caterina Pino, ITA Civ Phillip Cornell, USA Civ

Disclaimer: The NATO School (NSO) is not responsible for the factual validity of the articles covered in POLARIS. The opinions and analyses expressed in POLARIS are those of the individual authors. Publication of articles does not constitute approval or endorsement by the NSO, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the Partnership for Peace Program, member states, or partner governments. The NSO respects individual opinions and protects academic freedom.


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Editorial

The aim of POLARIS, the NATO School’s occasional paper series, is to highlight issues of wider importance to the Alliance both operational and strategic. In this month’s issue Stephen Conrad examines one of NATO’s most nascent and important relationships – that with China. By developing its ties with China, NATO is truly stretching across the globe to engage what some analysts would warn is a strategic competitor. But others would point to the enormous scope for cooperation between the primary security alliance of the West and the fastest-growing power in Asia. Which is it then? Potential competitor or potential partner? Rapidly militarizing expansionist power, or rapidly integrating and peaceful economic co-actor? Do new Chinese force-projection capabilities signal a move to challenge the West globally, or to contribute to global security within cooperative frameworks? And should the Shanghai Cooperation Organization be seen as a rival to NATO reminiscent of the Warsaw Pact, or as a regional cooperation group with limited security ambitions? The answer is likely all of these and none - first because China’s strategies seem to eschew such blunt definitions, and second because those strategies themselves are notoriously opaque. Conrad’s analysis pushes into the fog of Chinese strategy, and describes an emerging power whose rhetoric and actions are those of a state bursting into the globalized era. NATO meanwhile is itself an entity confronting globalization and fluidity. Redefining its mandate, its geographical bounds, its functional role – indeed itself – the Alliance has been discovering the necessity of global partnerships. Its push to create a formal framework to bring in Japan, South Korea, Australia, and New Zealand failed at the 2006 Riga Summit, but the move brought an organisation founded in contradistinction to communism perhaps uncomfortably close to Beijing.

Fears of encirclement might be justified. International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) troops patrol on China’s western border and NATO partners lie to the north, east, and south. Together with a rapidly growing Chinese military budget, the outcome could look confrontational and bleak. Conrad’s conclusions are refreshingly optimistic however, and point to the many areas where cooperation is possible and indeed already a reality. In that light, China’s growing capabilities, and also NATO’s expanding Asian partnerships, are welcome signs of global security cooperation based in practical competence. Whether those conclusions prove well founded or otherwise, I am sure the following piece will offer enticing food for thought at a moment when this important relationship is proving increasingly relevant. Phillip Cornell Senior Fellow, NATO School and October 2007 POLARIS Editor


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NATO and China: An Emerging Relationship

In the past decade NATO has gone far beyond the area of operations set out in its original mandate. Through expansion to 26 states, and the inception of “out of area” missions such as ISAF in Afghanistan and disaster relief in Pakistan, it has been suggested that “with little fanfare – and even less notice – the North Atlantic Treaty Organization has gone global”1. The concept of extra-European contacts is not new - since 1994 a plethora of non-European countries have collaborated through NATO frameworks such as the Partnership for Peace (PfP), the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI), and the Mediterranean Dialogue (MD). Countries even farther afield are participating alongside NATO politically or on the ground, if bilaterally and outside of specific frameworks. Australia, New Zealand, Singapore, South Korea, and Japan are linked to NATO through their relations with NATO members, and to various degrees, through direct dialogue with the NATO secretariat.2 With increased contacts in the Asia Pacific region, NATO has arrived at the door of an upcoming world power - China. As contact between them manifests around the world, the effects should be of concern to all involved.

This paper will seek to provide an analysis of that contact and its implications by examining the strategic trajectory of China, as well as NATO’s own aims and dynamics. The hope is to provide a clearer picture of the common future for the two entities, and identify potential pit falls.

1. Globalized Strategies I: China 1.1. Extending Military Reach

China is growing at an astonishing pace, both economically and militarily. On a worldwide scale it ranks second in conventional arms imports, and first in arms production employment. China’s publicly disclosed military budget stands at $45 billion, and Beijing reports an annual increase of 17.9 percent. But the official budget is in all likelihood inaccurately low. American intelligence has pegged the true amount within 1 Daalder, Ivo and Goldgeier, James. “Global NATO” Foreign Affairs Vol 85 #5 , p. 105 2Nazemroaya, Mahdi Darius "Global Military Alliance: Encircling Russia and China" Global Research May 10th 2007

an estimated range of $85-115 billion.3 These figures put Chinese military spending behind only American expenditure even by conservative estimates, and the funding acceleration is a testament to China’s desire to increase but also diversify its military might. 4

Indeed, more telling of this expansion is where the money is going. Unsurprisingly given tensions in the Taiwan Straits, China has “developed and tested offensive missiles, upgrading and deploying 900 mobile units.”5 But other upgrades include purchasing more missile destroyers from Russia, building and testing second generation Jin-class long-range missile submarines, acquiring new sea to air missiles, deploying F10 multi-role fighter units, producing multi-role F11A aircraft, improving and testing attack helicopters, improving and increasing deployments of Surface-to-Air Missile (SAM) missile batteries, and purchasing more artillery pieces, Armoured Personnel Carrier (APC)’s and Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAV)’s.6

It is revealing however that most of the Chinese budget increase is going to naval expansion. Those acquisitions support two pillars of Chinese strategy as outlined by the US Department of Defense: the old desire to reclaim Taiwan, but also a more contemporary focus on regional contingencies, such as conflicts that disrupt oil flow.7 An emphasis on force projection at distance reinforces China’s increasingly global presence and underscores its evolving strategy away from a singular focus on Taiwan and the immediate neighbourhood. 1.2. Developing Global Relationships

China’s economic rise and more global presence are not necessarily indicative of confrontation, however. Beijing is also seeking to enhance links with the various nations which comprise NATO and its partners, including active relations with the European Union (EU) and security cooperation with its Central Asian neighbours.

3 Department of Defense “Annual Report to Congress: Military Power of the People’s Republic of China 2007, p. 25 4 http://www.nationmaster.com/graph/mil_exp_dol_fig-military-expenditures-dollar-figure 5 Supra note 3, p. 3 6 Ibid , p. 3-5 7 Department of Defense “Annual Report to Congress: Military Power of the People’s Republic of China 2007”, and Dickie and Fidler, “Dragon Fleet” Financial Times, June 12 2007


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1.2.1 China and the European Union

The EU is a preferred East-West economic link for China partly because it sidesteps direct engagement with Washington.

China has used its partnership with the EU to chase two notable security pursuits - lifting a longstanding arms embargo and promoting the ‘one China’ policy. It nearly succeeded in achieving the former in 2005, due largely to French and German support. In the end, wider EU uncertainty and strong opposition from the United States grounded the lift. EU states ultimately predicated a policy shift on improving the “atmosphere for lift, [including] making progress on China’s human rights situation; working to improve cross-strait relations; and by improving the transparency of its military expenditure”.8

With regard to the ‘one China’ policy, the EU relationship has borne more fruit for Beijing. It successfully persuaded France to block an arms delivery to Taiwan, and in barring the Taiwanese president from visiting the European Parliament in 2003.9

European proponents of a stronger China relationship cite its growing economic importance and global presence. Wise commentators urge caution though, particularly given China’s aims, ambition, strategy and structure. Jonathan Holsag states that “Europe’s soft hearted attempt to create a like-minded partner turns out to be unsuccessful”, and suggests that although economic change is moving in the right direction, the EU is patently over-optimistic with regard to China’s democratic and human rights progresses.10

1.2.1. The Shanghai Cooperation

Organization For its part, China has been nurturing

its own flagship international grouping, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). The SCO is currently undergoing a “building phase”, eschewing expansion while accepting observer nations such as Iran. The SCO’s purpose, according to Chinese and Russian officials, is to promote economic and collective security. However the group also declared that 8 Commision of the European Communities “Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament EU-China: Closer partners, growing responsibilities ” 2007 9 Holsag, Jonathan “The European Union and China: The Great Disillusion”, European Foreign Affairs Review 11; p. 555-580 10 Holsag, Jonathan “The European Union and China: The Great Disillusion”, European Foreign Affairs Review 11; p. 555-580

different models of social development should not be exported or used as a pretext to interfere in the internal affairs of other countries. The statements were widely interpreted to mean, ‘We don’t want your democracy here’.11

While such rhetoric would seem incompatible with NATO values, the Alliance appears unconcerned. Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer declared; “We have made clear that we see no conflict or competition between our Partners' cooperation with NATO and their membership in the SCO.”12

Despite NATO’s downplay, the SCO undoubtedly presents at least the potential for rivalry. The group’s first military exercises, “Peace Mission 2007”, took place in Russia in August, and were used as a venue for Moscow’s announcement that it would reinstate Cold War-style bomber patrols. Chinese Foreign Minister Yang praised the SCO talks surrounding the exercises for upgrading Sino-Russian strategic cooperation. And a flurry of media reports, including one penned by the vice president of the Chinese Institute of Contemporary International Relations, spoke of a “rekindled Cold War mentality” and equated NATO expansion with American hegemony.13 In the end, the SCO is in its infancy and Sino-Russian interests which drive the organisation are far from aligned. But its growing importance highlights the new relevance of alternative multilateral security frameworks to NATO. 1.3. Opaque Intentions

Chinese officials have perhaps unsurprisingly denounced more accusatory Western analyses, especially regarding its military expenditure boost and claims of insufficient budgetary transparency. Referring to the annual “China Report”, China’s Foreign Minister stated that “The report of the USA Department of Defence continues to spread myth of the ‘China threat’ by exaggerating China’s military strength and expenses out of ulterior motives. It is a grave violation of the norms governing international relations and brutal interference in China’s internal affairs.”14 And to allay such criticisms Beijing has 11 Petrou, Michael “Is this a rival to NATO?” Maclean's, Vol. 119, Iss. 31; p. 33 12,Zhang Niansheng, ”“NATO not pushing into Asia-Pacific region: Interview” Peoples Daily China, November 27 2006 13 Mengzi, Fu. “ “ China Daily 14 “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Jiang Yu's Remarks on the USA DoD Report on Chinese Military Power” 28 May 2007, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the People’s Republic of China


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released a series of Defence White Papers in recent years outlining its military policies and budget.

But China’s attempts to improve transparency still omit significant elements, according to the China Report. Particularly, it “does not publish an equivalent to the US National Military Strategy. Outside observers therefore have few direct insights into the leadership’s thinking.”15 The implication is that such strategic secrecy is part of a purposeful misinformation strategy. Indeed, the idea is openly espoused in Deng Xiaoping’s 24 character strategy. “Observe calmly; secure our position; cope with affairs calmly; hide our capacities and bide our time; be good at maintaining a low profile; and never claim leadership.”16 Deng’s famous words are considered to be guiding elements of China’s modernization; as such they still constitute core principles in China which presumably pervade strategic policy.17

In addition to intentional secrecy, China applies supposedly ‘core’ foreign policy values inconsistently. That of non-interference is a classic example; “No country is entitled to impose its own will upon others, or maintain its security and development at the price of the interests of others.”18 While Chinese officials use the concept to reject external meddling, they appear to ignore it abroad (particularly with regard to Japanese education policy). 19

But mixed messages, misinformation, and secrecy in Chinese policy cannot necessarily be construed as intentional strategy. In some cases the government is simply unaware of goings on within its own branches. When an American spy plane was captured in 2001, “Military authorities on Hainan Island, where the EP-3 was forced to land, did not provide full or accurate details of the incident to Beijing - especially not to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.”20 More recently, following the test firing of an anti satellite 15 Supra note 3 page 11 16 Supra note 3 page 7 17 Wacker, Gudrun. “China’s Grand Strategy” China’s Rise: The Return of Geopolitics? SWP-Berlin, February 2006 http://www.boell.de/downloads_uk/chinas_grand_strategy.pdf 18 China White Paper: China’s peaceful development road, Sect V, Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, 12 December 2005 19 http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/xwfw/s2510/t143120.htm “It is an interference of China's internal affairs and we are resolutely opposed to it.” Foreign Ministry Spokesperson’s press conference on July 13 2004, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Peoples Republic of China, Zhang Qiyue 20 Kleiber, Martin and Gill, Bates “China's Space Odyssey: What the Antisatellite Test Reveals About Decision-Making in Beijing” Foreign Affairs Vol. 86, Iss. 3; pg. 2

missile, “officials from the United States and around the world concluded that the leaders of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs had not been informed of - much less consulted about - it in advance.”21 Bates Gill and Martin Kleiber attribute such incidents to China’s particular political culture. “Chinese bureaucrats tend to hoard information to ensure that rivals cannot manipulate it to their advantage. Although this dynamic is found in all bureaucracies, the current Chinese system takes it to an extreme.” 22

Whether the causes are strategic, structural, cultural, or bureaucratic, China has proven itself to be often unpredictable and contradictory - two dangerous qualities in the contemporary global context. As stated in the May 2007 China Report, “this lack of transparency in China's military affairs will naturally and understandably prompt international responses that hedge against the unknown.” Another product is the wide variety of external strategic evaluations which impedes international unity of approach. When the EU was debating lifting the arms embargo, a stunned Washington objected immediately and threatened to curb the “transfer of advanced national defence technologies to EU members.”23 Such public intra-Alliance conflict demonstrates a level of disunity which can seriously undermine any combined security approach to China. 2. Globalized Strategies II: NATO

NATO’s contemporary strategy, as outlined in its 1999 Strategic Concept, is rooted in a recognition of the changed ‘threats cape’ in the post-Cold War world. Its survival is a testament to its adaptability in today’s altered and more fluid strategic environment.

2.1. Wider Mandate The changing mandate of NATO is central to its current trajectory. It has altered the space considered “mission viable”, expanding beyond its own Euro-Atlantic borders, and also branched out into other functional areas. Specifically, “NATO has already broadened its vision of cooperation with countries both inside and outside of Europe and modified its Strategic Concept in such a way as to include issues other than 21 ibid 22 ibid 23 USA thwarts EU lifting arms ban on China Updated: October 18 2004 China Daily


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simply military affairs.”24 In practical terms, the Alliance has conducted relief operations in Southeast Asia, Pakistan, and the Gulf Coast, in addition to mission support in Darfur and its main stabilisation operation in Afghanistan.

Indeed, NATO today considers itself an alliance to deal with global security threats to its member nations. As de Hoop Scheffer has stated, “Today’s security threats are global in nature. Hence a narrow, regional approach will not do.”25

2.3. Partnerships An expanding mandate has naturally been complimented with growing partnerships through NATO’s various frameworks and bilateral relationships. However the nature and intensity of those partnerships was a hotly contested topic at the last NATO summit in Riga. Washington was pushing its proposal for a global partnership scheme that would have placed such countries as Japan, Australia, and South Korea into an official framework with NATO. The idea was rejected at the summit, due largely to French, German, and even outside Russian opposition. Moscow’s concern stemmed from traditional encirclement fears, and Germany is traditionally reluctant to militarize global issues. But France was most vocal, expressing concern that the American influence in NATO is too large, and opposition to a global role in which NATO establishes special partnerships with Australia, New Zealand, Japan and other countries. Paris worried that NATO's global ambition, particularly in East Asia, could produce friction with China.26 The Secretary General also voiced opinions against the initiative, stating that “…these threats do not require NATO to become the world's policeman.”27 In the end member nations agreed to “fully develop the political and practical potential of NATO’s cooperation programmes” including “its relations with contact countries, in accordance with the decisions of our Istanbul summit.”28 Translation: stay the course on ‘small-P’ partnerships.

France’s comments demonstrate the role of the ‘China factor’ in the partnership

24 Zhang, Zuqian “Bejing Calling” NATO Review, Issue 3 25 Global NATO? Remarks by Secretary General, Jaap the Hoop Scheffer, Speech 29 October 2004 26 Nye, Joseph “NATO after Riga” Taipei Times, 12 December 2006 27 “On road to Riga, NATO leader rejects idea of making Alliance global” Inside the Pentagon Vol. 22 No. 45 28 Riga Summit Declaration, 29 2006

scheme’s rejection. While China has not publicly taken a position against NATO-Asia Pacific relations of late, it has in the past been extremely critical of a NATO presence in the region. NATO’s Secretary General was reacting to such fears in the run-up to Riga, when he stated that “NATO is not pushing into Asia or the Pacific region… The Alliance very much welcomes [regional partnerships], just as it would welcome closer contacts with China.”29 3. Thawing China-NATO Relations

Distrust between the entities should not come as a surprise. What existed of China-NATO relations in the past was often abysmal. The key contemporary aggravate was NATO’s bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade during the 1999 Kosovo campaign. Resolute government denunciations and large scale protests at the United States Embassy in Beijing demonstrated the intensity of China’s outrage over the issue.30 “Purposeful targeting” remains China’s preferred explanation, as a Foreign Ministry spokesperson recently confirmed at a press conference. “The conclusion was already drawn eight years ago. We have been very clear about our position on this issue. The so-called ‘accident’ theory is untenable and unacceptable.”31 Rhetoric at the time even declared that the government would “wage a forceful and resolute struggle against the acts of infringements on China’s sovereignty perpetrated by the USA-led NATO.”32

Suspicion over the Belgrade bombing was driven by a wider and established distrust of NATO’s purpose. According to a NATO Parliamentary Assembly (PA) report, “The Chinese once saw NATO as an aggressive and dangerous power. NATO enlargement was understood as part of a global American containment strategy.”33

Today concerns about NATO persist among Chinese analysts, but their expression is notably tempered. During a NATO PA visit “one Chinese professor suggested that there

29 Supra note 12 30 MacKinnon, Rebecca “Up to 20,000 Chinese protest Embassy bombing” CNN May 9 1999 31 Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Jiang Yu's Regular Press Conference on 29 May 2007, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Peoples Republic of China 32 Jiaxuan, Tang “China’s Diplomatic Policy and Foreign Relations” Ministry of Foreign Affairs the People’s Republic of China, 24 November 2003 33 NATO PA, Summary of the meeting of the economics and Security committee 28 May 2005


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were many views, but that, in general terms, China had some concerns about NATO's presence in Central Asia.”34 Chinese state media euphemistically claim only that “Chinese readers are… concerned about NATO's involvement in [the] Asia and Pacific region.”35 Such commentary is a far cry from the harsh criticism levelled against NATO in the past, and even these tempered concerns hint at a palpable improvement in perceptions.

More importantly, official positions have also warmed. In response to a question on Japan-NATO relations, a Chinese official stated, “I am not in a position to comment on the exchanges between Japan and NATO. But we hope the relevant exchanges are conducive to regional peace and stability.”36 And more recently another official stated that, “Under the current new circumstances, we stand ready to work with NATO on the basis of equality and mutual respect and maintain our contact and enhance our exchanges with NATO. It would be helpful in enhancing our mutual understanding and for the peace and stability in the region and the world at large.”37

For the most part, such “work with NATO” has amounted to Chinese cooperation on a dialogue basis only, but the engagement is significant. Chinese and NATO officials have participated jointly in a wide variety of each other’s events, conferences, and seminars. This is in addition to a flurry of comments between NATO and Chinese officials, and statements on either side expressing a strong willingness for further co-operation. And in June, NATO’s Assistant Secretary General for Political Affairs was welcomed in Beijing for the first high-level direct talks.

The thaw in China-NATO relations is the result of several factors. For one, China has modernized its foreign policy in line with its integration into the global economy, including stepped-up engagement with international organizations and regional bodies. Leadership changes also brought in a younger generation of Chinese government officials generally more keen to engage the West constructively. And from its side, NATO’s history of the past

34 NATO Parliamentary association “23-27 October 2006 – Visit to Beijing and Ningxia Hui autonomos region, Peoples Republic of China by the Sub-committee on Transatlantic Economic Relations 35 Supra note 12 36 Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Liu Jianchao's Regular Press Conference on 16 January 2007, Ministry of Foreign Affairs for the People’s Republic of China 37 Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Jiang Yu's Regular Press Conference on 24 May 2007, Ministry of Foreign Affairs for the People’s Republic of China

decade has brought about internal shifts, and schisms within the West over issues like Iraq have helped to debunk the view that NATO is a tool for American hegemony. 4. China-NATO possible futures

While significant sources of potential friction remain in the NATO-China dialogue, areas of aligned interests and increasing room for cooperation suggest that efforts toward partnership will outweigh such detractions.

4.1. Global Events: Pushing Together, Pulling Apart 4.1.1. Darfur Darfur poses one ongoing point of friction. While NATO assists the African Union/ United Nations (AU/UN) peacekeeping and stabilization force there, China is actively supporting through arms sales and financial transfers a government in Khartoum complicit in the atrocities in western Sudan. It is estimated that China supplies nearly all the AK-47’s used in Darfur.38 In addition to small arms, “China has sold Sudan $100 million worth of Shenyang fighter planes, including 12 supersonic F-7 jets.”39 That China is courting Khartoum for its oil while the West condemns the government’s actions in Darfur is a clear case of conflicting interests which undermine NATO efforts. 4.1.2. The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation Another friction point is over possible contention between NATO and the China-led SCO. Some analysts have already begun to question the SCO and its possibility to become a “rival NATO”, with such commentary multiplying since the military exercises in August.40 While the SCO does not currently constitute much of a power bloc, the convergence of China, Russia, and Iran (as an observer) brings together major international players with high growth in terms of both economic and military capacities. The potential for rivalry is reinforced by the recent national policies of all three – individually each has a strained relationship with the West. Collectively those strains could well be more difficult to

38 Kristof, Nicholas D. “A Choice For Darfur; [Op-Ed]” New York Times, 25 May 2007 39 The Statesman (India), India loses out to China in arms sales, 5 November 2006 40 Supra note 11


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overcome, and the SCO’s prophesized rivalry could prove self-fulfilling if it becomes a magnet for those harbouring gripes with the West. 4.1.3. Afghanistan Elsewhere though, events point to the potential for concrete cooperation. China, which shares a small border with the Afghani province of Badakhshan, is implementing initiatives to improve infrastructure there. The province currently relies on income derived from its poppy crop. While poppy eradication is not the responsibility of ISAF, diversifying the economy away from narcotics is one of the elements of NATO reconstruction efforts. China is also concerned about poppy production, with an official statement declaring that “China is also willing to offer anti-drug law-enforcement training for neighbouring countries.”41

Badakhshan represents a major area of potential co-operation between NATO and China, with benefits for both. While Chinese support to building roads and bridges is likely driven by the intent to access the province’s mineral reserves of lapis lazuli, ruby, and emerald, diversifying the economy and improving infrastructure helps to achieve the regional stability sought by both China and NATO. Cooperation in the region should start with security; with ISAF accommodating China’s rebuilding efforts by providing the necessary protection for Chinese personnel.42 4.1.4. Terrorism Indeed China and NATO have shared interests in combating sources of transnational instability the world over. Within its own borders China has always kept a watchful eye (and sometimes suppressive hand) on its own Muslim minority, fearing the emergence of Islamist and separatist ideologies. As terrorism rose to the top of the Western agenda after 11 September 2001, what was once decried as Chinese repression became a source of anti-terrorism cooperation with the West. This includes the United States State Department’s classification of the Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement (a separatist group in Xinjiang province) as a terrorist organization.43 Such declarations led to further co-operation - the

41 “China promises further international cooperation on drug control” Peoples Daily, 26 May 2007 42 “Unknown Militants attack Chinese construction camp in Afghanistan” Xinhua net 12 May 2006 43 Supra note 22

FBI works with Chinese public security officials to track the role of such groups in China’s northwest in terrorist activities and their possible links with al Qaeda.44

Eager to assert internal control while improving ties with the West, senior officials in Beijing boast that “China is putting anti-terrorism at the top of its agenda to ensure national and social public security.”45 With this increased awareness of threats “China would be better off integrating itself into the international security system in such a way that it comes to enjoy common security together with other members of the international community.”46

While such examples of anti-terror cooperation are primarily with Washington on a bilateral basis, terrorism (particularly in the vicinity of Afghanistan) remains a problem with which all NATO allies must grapple. 4.2. A Co-operative Future Given current trends, NATO and China are likely to see a greater convergence of goals over time and an expanded remit for cooperation. Although the possibility remains for a classic realist great-power confrontation (particularly over the dangerous issue of Taiwan), it becomes ever slimmer as economic forces and unconventional security threats gather strength. Those convergent economic and security interests have helped to foster improved political relations in recent years, adding to the cost of a potential military confrontation. Indeed China has worked hard to improve its image globally. And unlike during the days of Tiananmen, that image now has an economic impact which goes far beyond damaged sensibilities. As much as confrontation could impact negatively, international security cooperation in fact reinforces China’s image as a reliable partner. One analyst assesses that over the past several years, China’s “international image has clearly improved as the country has committed more resources to international security.”47 With that in mind, it is unlikely that China will take drastic moves to confront the West.

44 Xuequan, Mu “FBI hails U.S. – China terrorism co-op”, Xinhua net, 13 June 2007 45 Xiaodan, Du “China holds anti-terrorist exercise for 2008 Olympics” CCTV 20 June 2007 46 Supra note 22 47 Supra note 22


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Economic interests also nurture the Chinese interest in global stability. One Chinese official has admitted that “unless the world as a whole enjoys peace, stability and prosperity, China cannot, for example, expect to meet the ambitious targets of its economic development programme.”48 Beijing is thus increasingly compelled to join international efforts to mitigate instability – for example by committing to UN peacekeeping efforts in greater numbers than ever before. To the extent that cooperation with NATO helps to achieve those aims (for instance through dialogue or by enabling better joint operation), China will in the future be more prepared to engage with the organisation. 4.2.1. Overcoming Differences In Sudan, China is supporting Khartoum in order to guarantee access to energy resources. China has broadly worked to shield Sudan from attempts by the international community to pressure it through sanctions, and was sympathetic to Khartoum’s efforts to keep a UN peacekeeping force out (prompting some Western calls to boycott the 2008 Olympics). In the end however, the negotiated 26,000 troop “hybrid” AU-UN force is symbolic of overlapping interest – and indeed China has pledged to send its own troops to support the mission. Such pragmatism should be a model for future areas of friction.

China’s military expansion is not in itself an impediment to strong strategic cooperation with the West and particularly NATO. Indeed, the reverse could be true. Enhancing Chinese capabilities at a time when it seeks to become more involved in international stabilisation efforts could facilitate burden-sharing to a new degree. China’s minor ‘reconstruction’ role in Afghanistan, and participation in various UN missions, could herald a new era of Chinese contribution to stabilization, reconstruction, and peacekeeping efforts.

48 Supra note 22

As China begins to take an active role even further into the realm of international affairs, it too will continue to change. Greater international engagement will raise the return on transparency across the board, and encourage the kind of global security cooperation which NATO increasingly represents.

5. Conclusion

To ensure the continuation of such trends, the key for NATO is to recognise that the emergence of non-traditional transnational threats puts every country, regardless of governing ideology, in a position to contribute to mitigating shared threats. China’s capabilities enhancements certainly merit close monitoring, but developing China as a capable partner rather than upcoming adversary is widely beneficial. The key for China is realising that NATO is an organisation it can work with and which is open to genuine cooperation - not some American Trojan horse. More and more, cooperation serves Chinese interests; particularly as economic integration brings them increasingly into line with those of the West.

If NATO and China can build on recent work and develop a more cooperative and mutually positive relationship including formal ties, it could see benefits for the organisation, for Western countries, for China, and indeed for the entire global security environment.


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