PEOPLE VS PERFECTORGR NO. L-18463 OCTOBER 4,1922

Facts:

Gregorio Perfector, Editor of La Nacion stated in his article derogatory statement about an issue where the documents which constituted the records of testimony given by witnesses in the investigation of oil companies, had disappeared from the office of the Secretary of Philippine Senate, Fernando Gregorio. The Philippine Senate then adopted a resolution authorizing its committee to file an action against Perfector for violating Article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code, punishing "Any person who, by . . . writing, shall defame, abuse, or insult any Minister of the Crown or other person in authority . . .," . The decision of the lower court was in against Perfecto. The latter contented the allegation stating that under the Helbig case, Spanish law is not applicable since there was a change in the government.

Issue: WON Article 256 is still in force.

Held:

It is a general principle of the public law that on acquisition of territory the previous political relations of the ceded region are totally abrogated. "Political" is here used to denominate the laws regulating the relations sustained by the inhabitants to the sovereign. (American Insurance Co. vs. Canter [1828], 1 Pet., 511; Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific Railway Co.vs.McGlinn [1885], 114 U.S., 542; Roa vs. Collector of Customs [1912], 23 Phil., 315.) Mr. Justice Field of the United States Supreme Court stated the obvious when in the course of his opinion in the case of Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific Railway Co. vs. McGlinn, supra, he said: "As a matter of course, all laws, ordinances and regulations in conflict with the political character, institutions and Constitution of the new government are at once displaced. Thus, upon a cession of political jurisdiction and legislative power — and the latter is involved in the former — to the United States, the laws of the country in support of an established religion or abridging the freedom of the press, or authorizing cruel and unusual punishments, and he like, would at once cease to be of obligatory force without any declaration to that effect." To quote again from the United States Supreme Court: " It cannot be admitted that the King of Spain could, by treaty or otherwise, impart to the United States any of his royal prerogatives; and much less can it be admitted that they have capacity to receive or power to exercise them. Every nation acquiring territory, by treaty or otherwise, must hold it subject to the Constitution and laws of its own government, and not according to those of the government ceding it." (Pollard vs. Hagan [1845], 3 Hos., 210.)

Decision: Reversed;defendant acquitted

DE LEON VS ESGUERRAG.R. No. 78059 / 153 SCRA 602 August 31, 1987

FACTS: Petitioner was elected as Barangay Captain together with other petitioners as Barangay Councilmen of Barangay Dolores, Municipality of Taytay, Pronice of Rizal in a Barangay election held under Barangay Election Act of 1982. 

Petitioner received a Memorandum from OIC Governor Benjamin Esguerra which provided

the designation of respondent Florentino Magno as Barangay Captain of the same barangay

and the other respondents as members of the barangay Council of the same barangay and

municipality. Petitioners maintain that Sec 3 of the Barangay Election Act of 1982 provides

that the terms of office shall be six (6) years which shall continue until their successors shall

have elected and qualified. Also, in accordance with the recent ratification of the 1987

Constitution, it seems that respindent OIC Governor no longer had the authority to replace

them as well as designate successors. 

Petitioner prayed that the Memorandum be declared null and void and that respondents be

prohibited from taking over their positions.

ISSUE: Whether or not designation of respondents to replace petitioners was valid.

HELD: The Court ruled in the negative. SC declared that the Memorandum issued by

respondent OIC Governor designating respondents as Barangay Captain and Councilmen of

Barangay Dolores has no legal force and effect. 

The 1987 Constitution was ratified in a plebiscite on February 2, 1987. By that date

therefore, the provisional constitution must be deemed to have been superseded. Effectivity

of the Constitution is also immediately upon its ratification.

ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR. vs. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVESG.R. No. 160261. November 10, 2003.

FACTS:On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution, sponsored by Representative Felix William D. Fuentebella, which directed the Committee on Justice "to conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of disbursements and expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF)." On June 2, 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices of this Court for "culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and other high crimes." The complaint was endorsed by Representatives Rolex T. Suplico, Ronaldo B. Zamora and Didagen Piang Dilangalen, and was referred to the House Committee. The House Committee on Justice ruled on October 13, 2003 that the first impeachment complaint was "sufficient in form," but voted to dismiss the same on October 22, 2003 for being insufficient in substance. To date, the Committee Report to this effect has not yet been sent to the House in plenary in accordance with the said Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution. Four months and three weeks since the filing on June 2, 2003 of the first complaint or on October 23, 2003, a day after the House Committee on Justice voted to dismiss it, the second impeachment complaint was filed with the Secretary General of the House by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William B. Fuentebella against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated by above-mentioned House Resolution. This second impeachment complaint was accompanied by a "Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment" signed by at least one-third (1/3) of all the Members of the House of Representatives.

ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the filing of the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. with the House of Representatives falls within the one year bar

provided in the Constitution.

2. Whether the resolution thereof is a political question – has resulted in a political crisis. 

HELD:1. Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the impeachment complaint and referral to the House Committee on Justice, the initial action taken thereon, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated in the foregoing manner, another may not be filed against the same official within a one year period following Article XI, Section 3(5) of the Constitution. In fine, considering that the first impeachment complaint, was filed by former President Estrada against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., along with seven associate justices of this Court, on June 2, 2003 and referred to the House Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003, the second impeachment complaint filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William Fuentebella against the Chief Justice on October 23, 2003 violates the constitutional prohibition against the initiation of impeachment proceedings against the same impeachable officer within a one-year period.

2.From the foregoing record of the proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, it is clear that judicial power is not only a power; it is also a duty, a duty which cannot be abdicated by the mere specter of this creature called the political question doctrine. Chief Justice Concepcion hastened to clarify, however, that Section 1, Article VIII was not intended to do away with "truly political questions." From this clarification it is gathered that there are two species of political questions: (1) "truly political questions" and (2) those which "are not truly political questions." Truly political questions are thus beyond judicial review, the reason for respect of the doctrine of separation of powers to be maintained. On the other hand, by virtue of Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, courts can review questions which are not truly political in nature.

MANILA PRINCE HOTEL VS GSISGR NO. 122156 FEBRUARY 3, 1997

Facts: 

The Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), pursuant to the privatization program of the Philippine Government under Proclamation 50 dated 8 December 1986, decided to sell through public bidding 30% to 51% of the issued and outstanding shares of the Manila Hotel (MHC). In a close bidding held on 18 September 1995 only two bidders participated: Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for the same number of shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner. Pending the declaration of Renong Berhard as the winning bidder/strategic partner and the execution of the necessary contracts, the Manila Prince Hotel matched the bid price of P44.00 per share tendered by Renong Berhad in a letter to GSIS dated 28 September 1995. Manila Prince Hotel sent a manager’s check to the GSIS in a subsequent letter, but which GSIS refused to accept. On 17 October 1995, perhaps apprehensive that GSIS has disregarded the tender of the matching bid and that the sale of 51% of the MHC may be hastened by GSIS and consummated with Renong Berhad, Manila Prince Hotel came to the Court on prohibition and mandamus.

Issue(s):

Whether the provisions of the Constitution, particularly Article XII Section 10, are self-executing.

Whether the 51% share is part of the national patrimony.

Held: A provision which lays down a general principle, such as those found in Article II of the 1987 Constitution, is usually not self-executing. But a provision which is complete in itself and becomes operative without the aid of supplementary or enabling legislation, or that which supplies sufficient rule by means of which the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is self-executing. Thus a constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature and extent of the right conferred and the liability imposed are fixed by the constitution itself, so that they can be determined by an examination and construction of its terms, and there is no language indicating that the subject is referred to the legislature for action. In self-executing constitutional provisions, the legislature may still enact legislation to facilitate the exercise of powers directly granted by the constitution, further the operation of such a provision, prescribe a practice to be used for its enforcement, provide a convenient remedy for the protection of the rights secured or the determination thereof, or place reasonable safeguards around the exercise of the right. The mere fact that legislation may supplement and add to or prescribe a penalty for the violation of a self-executing constitutional provision does not render such a provision ineffective in the absence of such legislation. The omission from a constitution of any express provision for a remedy for enforcing a right or liability is not necessarily an indication that it was not intended to be self-executing. The rule is that a self-executing provision of the constitution does not necessarily exhaust legislative power on the subject, but any legislation must be in harmony with the constitution, further the exercise of constitutional right and make it more available. Subsequent legislation however does not necessarily mean that the subject constitutional provision is not, by itself, fully enforceable. As against constitutions of the past, modern constitutions have been generally drafted upon a different principle and have often become in effect extensive codes of laws intended to operate directly upon the people in a manner similar to that of statutory enactments, and the function of constitutional conventions has evolved into one more like that of a legislative body. Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution are self-executing. If the constitutional provisions are treated as requiring legislation instead of self-executing, the legislature would have the power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental law. In fine, Section 10, second paragraph, Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive command which is complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its enforcement. From its very words the provision does not require any legislation to put it in operation.

In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term patrimony pertains to heritage. When the Constitution speaks of national patrimony, it refers not only to the natural resources of the Philippines, as the Constitution could have very well used the term natural resources, but also to the cultural heritage of the Filipinos. It also refers to Filipino’s intelligence in arts, sciences and letters. In the present case, Manila Hotel has become a landmark, a living testimonial of Philippine heritage. While it was restrictively an American hotel when it first opened in 1912, a concourse for the elite, it has since then become the venue of various significant events which have shaped Philippine history. In the granting of economic rights, privileges, and concessions, especially on matters involving national patrimony, when a choice has to be made between a “qualified foreigner” and a “qualified Filipino,” the latter shall be chosen

over the former.The Supreme Court directed the GSIS, the Manila Hotel Corporation, the Committee on Privatization and the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel to cease and desist from selling 51% of the Share of the MHC to Renong Berhad, and to accept the matching bid of Manila Prince Hotel at P44 per shere and thereafter execute the necessary agreements and document to effect the sale, to issue the necessary clearances and to do such other acts and deeds as may be necessary for the purpose.

Rev. Ely Velez Pamatong Vs. Commission on ElectionsG.R. No. 161872, April 13, 2004

FACTS:

Petitioner Pamatong filed his Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for President. Respondent COMELEC declared petitioner and 35 others as nuisance candidates who could not wage a

nationwide campaign and/or are not nominated by a political party or are not supported by a registered political party with a national constituency.

Pamatong filed a Petition For Writ of Certiorari with the Supreme Court claiming that the COMELEC violated his right to “equal access to opportunities for public service” under Section

26, Article II of the 1987 Constitution, by limiting the number of qualified candidates only to those who can afford to wage a nationwide campaign and/or are nominated by political

parties. The COMELEC supposedly erred in disqualifying him since he is the most qualified among all the presidential candidates, i.e., he possesses all the constitutional and legal

qualifications for the office of the president, he is capable of waging a national campaign since he has numerous national organizations under his leadership, he also has the capacity to

wage an international campaign since he has practiced law in other countries, and he has a platform of government.

ISSUE:

Is there a constitutional right to run for or hold public office?

RULING:

No. What is recognized in Section 26, Article II of the Constitution is merely a privilege subject to limitations imposed by law. It neither bestows such a right nor elevates the privilege to

the level of an enforceable right. There is nothing in the plain language of the provision which suggests such a thrust or justifies an interpretation of the sort.

The “equal access” provision is a subsumed part of Article II of the Constitution, entitled “Declaration of Principles and State Policies.” The provisions under the Article are generally

considered not self-executing, and there is no plausible reason for according a different treatment to the “equal access” provision. Like the rest of the policies enumerated in Article II, the

provision does not contain any judicially enforceable constitutional right but merely specifies a guideline for legislative or executive action. The disregard of the provision does not give

rise to any cause of action before the courts.

Obviously, the provision is not intended to compel the State to enact positive measures that would accommodate as many people as possible into public office. Moreover, the provision

as written leaves much to be desired if it is to be regarded as the source of positive rights. It is difficult to interpret the clause as operative in the absence of legislation since its effective

means and reach are not properly defined. Broadly written, the myriad of claims that can be subsumed under this rubric appear to be entirely open-ended. Words and phrases such as

“equal access,” “opportunities,” and “public service” are susceptible to countless interpretations owing to their inherent impreciseness. Certainly, it was not the intention of the framers to

inflict on the people an operative but amorphous foundation from which innately unenforceable rights may be sourced.

The privilege of equal access to opportunities to public office may be subjected to limitations. Some valid limitations specifically on the privilege to seek elective office are found in the

provisions of the Omnibus Election Code on “Nuisance Candidates.” As long as the limitations apply to everybody equally without discrimination, however, the equal access clause is not

violated. Equality is not sacrificed as long as the burdens engendered by the limitations are meant to be borne by any one who is minded to file a certificate of candidacy. In the case at

bar, there is no showing that any person is exempt from the limitations or the burdens which they create.

The rationale behind the prohibition against nuisance candidates and the disqualification of candidates who have not evinced a bona fide intention to run for office is easy to divine. The

State has a compelling interest to ensure that its electoral exercises are rational, objective, and orderly. Towards this end, the State takes into account the practical considerations in

conducting elections. Inevitably, the greater the number of candidates, the greater the opportunities for logistical confusion, not to mention the increased allocation of time and resources

in preparation for the election. The organization of an election with bona fide candidates standing is onerous enough. To add into the mix candidates with no serious intentions or

capabilities to run a viable campaign would actually impair the electoral process. This is not to mention the candidacies which are palpably ridiculous so as to constitute a one-note joke.

The poll body would be bogged by irrelevant minutiae covering every step of the electoral process, most probably posed at the instance of these nuisance candidates. It would be a

senseless sacrifice on the part of the State.

The question of whether a candidate is a nuisance candidate or not is both legal and factual. The basis of the factual determination is not before this Court. Thus, the remand of this case

for the reception of further evidence is in order. The SC remanded to the COMELEC for the reception of further evidence, to determine the question on whether petitioner Elly Velez Lao

Pamatong is a nuisance candidate as contemplated in Section 69 of the Omnibus Election Code.

Obiter Dictum: One of Pamatong’s contentions was that he was an international lawyer and is thus more qualified compared to the likes of Erap, who was only a high school dropout.

Under the Constitution (Article VII, Section 2), the only requirements are the following: (1) natural-born citizen of the Philippines; (2) registered voter; (3) able to read and write; (4) at

least forty years of age on the day of the election; and (5) resident of the Philippines for at least ten years immediately preceding such election.

At any rate, Pamatong was eventually declared a nuisance candidate and was disqualified.

Maria Cerdeira died in Tangier, (an international zone [foreign country] in North Africa), on January 2, 1955. At the time of her demise, she was married to a Spanish Citizen and a permanent resident of Tangier from 1931 up to her death, on January 2, 1955. She left properties in Tangier as well as in the Philippines. Among the properties in the Philippines are several parcels of land and many shares of stock, accounts receivable and other intangible personal properties. On the real estate the respondent Antonio Campos Rueda, as administrator of her estate, paid the sum of P111,582.00 as estate tax and the sum of P151,791.48 as inheritance tax, on the transfer of her real properties in the Philippines, but refused to pay the corresponding deficiency estate and inheritance taxes due on the transfer of her intangible personal properties, claiming that the estate is exempt from the payment of said taxes pursuant to section 122 of the Tax Code and that he could avail of the reciprocal provisions of our Tax Code. The Collector of Internal Revenue in a decision assessed the estate of the deceased, as deficiency estate and inheritance taxes, the sum of P161,874.95 including interest and penalties, on the transfer of intangible personal properties of Maria Cerdeira..

ISSUE: Whether or not Rueda is rightfully assessed those taxes.HELD: “Foreign Country” used in Sec 122 of the National Internal Revenue Code, refers to a government of that foreign power which although not an international person in the sense of international law, DOES NOT impose transfer of death taxes upon intangible personal properties of citizens not residing therein. Or whose law allows a similar exemption from such taxes. It is not necessary that Tangier should have been recognized by our government in order to entitle the petitioner to the exemption benefits provided by our Tax Law. But since such law has not been alleged, this case is to remanded to the lower court for further trial.

xxx

It does not admit of doubt that if a foreign country is to be identified with a state, it is required in line with Pound’s formulation that it be a politically organized sovereign community independent of outside control bound by penalties of nationhood, legally supreme within its territory, acting through a government functioning under a regime of

law. 9

 It is thus a sovereign person with the people composing it viewed as an organized corporate society under a government with the legal competence to exact obedience to its

commands. 10

 It has been referred to as a body-politic organized by common consent for mutual defense and mutual safety and to promote the general welfare. 11

Correctly has it been

described by Esmein as “the juridical personification of the nation.” 12

 This is to view it in the light of its historical development. The stress is on its being a nation, its people occupying a definite territory, politically organized, exercising by means of its government its sovereign will over the individuals within it and maintaining its separate international personality. Laski

could speak of it then as a territorial society divided into government and subjects, claiming within its allotted area a supremacy over all other institutions. 13

 McIver similarly would point

to the power entrusted to its government to maintain within its territory the conditions of a legal order and to enter into international relations. 14

 With the latter requisite satisfied,

international law do not exact independence as a condition of statehood. So Hyde did opine. 15

Even on the assumption then that Tangier is bereft of international personality, petitioner has not successfully made out a case. It bears repeating that four days after the filing of this

petition on January 6, 1958 in Collector of Internal Revenue v. De Lara, 16

 it was specifically held by us: “Considering the State of California as a foreign country in relation to section 122 of our Tax Code we believe and hold, as did the Tax Court, that the Ancilliary Administrator is entitled the exemption from the inheritance tax on the intangible personal property

found in the Philippines.” 17

 There can be no doubt that California as a state in the American Union was in the alleged requisite of international personality. Nonetheless, it was held to be a foreign country within the meaning of Section 122 of the National Internal Revenue Code. 

DECISION : CTA revesed the decision; in favor of campos rueda

REAGAN VS CIR

GR NO. L-26379 DECEMBER 27, 1969

Facts

Reagan is a US citizen assigned at Clark Air Base to help provide technical assistance to the US Air Force. In April 1960 Reagan imported a 1960 Cadillac car valued at $6443.83. Two months later, he got permission to sell the same car provided that he would sell the car to a US citizen or a member of the USAF. He sold it to Willie Johnson Jr for $6600.00 as shown by a Bill of Sale. The sale took place within Clark Air Base. As a result of this transaction, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue calculated the net taxable income of Reagan to be at P17912.34 and that his income tax would be P2797.00. Reagan paid the assessed tax but at the same time he sought for a refund because he claims that he is exempt. Reagan claims that the sale took place in “foreign soil” since Clark Air Base, in legal contemplation is a base outside the Philippines. Reagan also cited that under the Military Bases Agreement, he, by nature of his employment, is exempt from Philippine taxation.

ISSUE: Is the sale considered done in a foreign soil not subject to Philippine income tax?HELD: The Philippines is independent and sovereign, its authority may be exercised over its entire domain. There is no portion thereof that is beyond its power. Within its limits, its decrees are supreme, its commands paramount. Its laws govern therein, and everyone to whom it applies must submit to its terms. That is the extent of its jurisdiction, both territorial and personal. On the other hand, there is nothing in the Military Bases Agreement that lends support to Reagan’s assertion. The Base has not become foreign soil or territory. This country’s jurisdictional rights therein, certainly not excluding the power to tax, have been preserved, the Philippines merely consents that the US exercise jurisdiction in certain cases – this is just a matter of comity, courtesy and expediency. It is likewise noted that he indeed is employed by the USAF and his income is derived from US source but the income derived from the sale is not of US source hence taxable.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. SANDIGANBAYAN, MAJOR

GENERAL JOSEPHUS Q. RAMAS AND ELIZABETH DIMAANO,

G.R. No. 104768, July 21, 2003, J. Carpio

FACTS:

The PCGG created an AFP Anti-Graft Board tasked to investigate rports of unexplained wealth and corrupt practices by AFP personnel

(active or retired). The AFP Board investigated various reports of alleged

unexplained wealth of respondent Maj. Gen. Josephus Ramas. The Boards

finds that a prima facie case exists against respondent for ill-gotten and

unexplained wealth and recommended that he be prosecuted and tried for

“Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act” and “Forfeiture of Unlawfully

Acquired Property”. Thereafter they filed a Petition for Forfeiture against

him before the Sandiganbayan. The Sandiganbayan dismissed the case on

several grounds one of which is that there was an illegal search and seizure

of the items confiscated.

A petition for review on certiorari is filed before the Supreme Court,

raising the point that the seizure occurred when there was no Constitution in

effect in the country.

HELD:

The petition was dismissed.

The Supreme Court said that even in the absence of a Constitution, the

right against unlawful seizure obtained under the Universal Declaration of

Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights:

Nevertheless, even during the interregnum the Filipino people

continued to enjoy, under the Covenant and the Declaration, almost the

same rights found in the Bill of Rights of the 1973 Constitution.

The revolutionary government, after installing itself as the de jure

government, assumed responsibility for the State’s good faith compliance

with the Covenant to which the Philippines is a signatory. Article 2(1) of

the Covenant requires each signatory State “to respect and to ensure to all

individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights

recognized in the present Covenant.” Under Article 17(1) of the Covenant,

the revolutionary government had the duty to insure that “[n]o one else

shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy,

family, home or correspondence.”

The Declaration, to which the Philippines is also a signatory,

provides in its Article 17(2) that “[n]o one shall be arbitrarily deprived of

his property.” Although the signatories to the Declaration did not intend it

as a legally binding document, being only a declaration, the Court has

interpreted the Declaration as part of the generally accepted principles of

international law and binding on the State. Thus, the revolutionary

government was also obligated under international law to observe the

rights of individuals under the Declaration.

The Universal Declaration “constitutes an authoritative interpretation

of the Charter of the highest order, and has over the years become a part of

customary international law.” It “spells out in considerable detail the

meaning of the phrase ‘human rights and fundamental freedoms,’ which

Member States have agreed to observe. The Universal Declaration has

joined the Charter… as apart of the constitutional structure of the world

community. The Declaration, as an authoritative listing of human rights, has 5

become a basic component of international customary law, indeed binding

all states and not only members of the United Nations.”

G.R. No. 146738 Estrada vs. ArroyoG.R. No 146710-15 Estrada vs. DesiertoMarch 2, 2001FACTS:

Estrada was inaugurated as president of the Republic of the Philippines on June 30, 1998 with Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as his Vice President.

In October 2000, Ilocos Sur governor Luis “Chavit” Singson, a close friend of the President, alleged that he had personally given Estrada money as payoff from jueteng hidden in a bank

account known as “Jose Velarde” – a grassroots-based numbers game. Singson’s allegation also caused controversy across the nation, which culminated in the House of

Representatives’ filing of an impeachment case against Estrada on November 13, 2000. House Speaker Manny Villar fast-tracked the impeachment complaint. The impeachment suit

was brought to the Senate and an impeachment court was formed, with Chief Justice Hilario Davide, Jr. as presiding officer. Estrada, pleaded “not guilty”.

The exposé immediately ignited reactions of rage. On January 18, a crowd continued to grow at EDSA, bolstered by students from private schools and left-wing organizations. Activists

from the group Bayan and Akbayan as well as lawyers of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and other bar associations joined in the thousands of protesters.

On January 19, The Philippine National Police and the Armed Forces of the Philippines also withdrew their support for Estrada and joined the crowd at EDSA Shrine.

At 2:00pm, Estrada appeared on television for the first time since the beginning of the protests and maintains that he will not resign. He said that he wanted the impeachment trial to

continue, stressing that only a guilty verdict will remove him from office.

At 6:15pm, Estrada again appeared on television, calling for a snap presidential election to be held concurrently with congressional and local elections on May 14, 2001. He added that

he will not run in this election.

OnJanuary 20, the Supreme Court declared that the seat of presidency was vacant, saying that Estrada “constructively resigned his post”.  Noon of the same day, Gloria Macapagal-

Arroyo took her oath of office in the presence of the crowd at EDSA, becoming the 14th president of the Philippines.

At 2:00 pm, Estrada released a letter saying he had “strong and serious doubts about the legality and constitutionality of her proclamation as president”, but saying he would give up his

office to avoid being an obstacle to healing the nation. Estrada and his family later left Malacañang Palace.

A heap of cases then succeeded Estrada’s leaving the palace, which he countered by filing a peition for prohibition with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction. It sought to enjoin the

respondent Ombudsman from “conducting any further proceedings in cases filed against him not until his term as president ends. He also prayed for judgment “confirming petitioner to

be the lawful and incumbent President of the Republic of the Philippines temporarily unable to discharge the duties of his office, and declaring respondent to have taken her oath as and

to be holding the Office of the President, only in an acting capacity pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution.”

ISSUE:

1.)    Whether or not the case at bar a political or justiciable issue. If justiciable, whether or not petitioner Estrada was a president-on-leave or did he truly resign.

2.)    Whether or not petitioner may invokeimmunity from suits.

HELD:The Court defines a political issue as “those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government.  It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of a

particular measure.”

The Court made a distinction between the Aquino presidency and the Arroyo presidency. The Court said that while the Aquino government was a government spawned by the direct demand of the people in defiance to the 1973 Constitution, overthrowing the old government entirely, the Arroyo government on the other hand was a government exercising under the 1987 constitution, wherein only the office of the president was affected. In the former, it The question of whether the previous president (president

Estrada) truly resigned subjects it to judicial review. The Court held that the issue is legal and not political.For the president to be deemed as having resigned, there must be an intent to resign and the intent must be coupled by acts of relinquishment .  It is important to follow the

succession of events that struck petitioner prior his leaving the palace. Furthermore, the quoted statements extracted from the Angara diaries, detailed Estrada’s implied resignation On

top of all these, the press release he issued regarding is acknowledgement of the oath-taking of Arroyo as president despite his questioning of its legality and his emphasis on leaving

the presidential seat for the sake of peace. The Court held that petitioner Estrada had resigned by the use of the totality test:  prior, contemporaneous and posterior facts and circumstantial evidence bearing a material relevance on the issue.As to the issue of the peitioner’s contention that he is immuned from suits, the Court held that petitioner is no longer entitled to absolute immunity from suit. The Court added that, given

the intent of the 1987 Constitution to breathe life to the policy that a public office is a public trust,  the petitioner, as a non-sitting President, cannot claim executive immunity for his alleged criminal acts committed while a sitting President.  From the deliberations, the intent of the framers is clear that the immunity of the president from suit is concurrent only with his tenure(the term during which the incumbent actually holds office) and not his term (time during which the officer may claim to hold the office as of right, and fixes the

interval after which the several incumbents shall succeed one another).

MMDA v. Viron Transportation Co., Inc.,530 SCRA 341 (2007)

Facts: PGMA issued EO 179, which provided for the establishmentof a Mass Transport System for Greater Manila. Pursuant to this EO, the Metro manila Council of the MMDA cited the need to remove thebus terminals located along major thoroughfares of Metro Manila.Respondents, provincial bus operators who had bus terminals that were threatened to be removed, alleges that EO should be declared unconstitutional and illegal for transgressing the possessory rights of owners and operators of public land transportation units over their respective terminals

Issue: Whether or not EO 179 is a valid exercise of police power

Held: Petition denied. EO 179 is null and void. MMDA has no police power, let alone legislative power. In light of the administrative nature of its powers and functions, the MMDA is devoid of authority to implement the Project as envisioned by the EO; hence it could not have been validly designated by the President to undertake the Project. It follows that the MMDA cannot validly order the elimination of the respondents’ terminals.

Police power rests primarily with the legislature, such power may be delegated, as it is in fact increasingly being delegated. By virtue of a valid delegation, the power may be exercised by the President and administrative boards as well as by the lawmaking bodies of municipal corporations or local government under an express delegation by the LGC of 1991.

Measures calculated to promote the safety and convenience of the people using the thoroughfares by the regulation of vehicular traffic present a proper subject for the exercise of police power.

On Constitutional Law, “The true role of Constitutional Law is to effect an equilibrium between authority and liberty so that rights are exercised within the framework of the law and the laws are enacted with due deference to rights.”

Metropolitan Manila Development Authority vs. Trackworks Rail Transit Advertising, Vending and Promotions, Inc.

G.R. No. 179554          December 16, 2009

Petitioner: Metropolitan Manila Development AuthorityRespondent: Trackworks Rail Transit Advertising, Vending and Promotions, Inc.

Facts: In 1997, the Government, through the Department of Transportation and Communications, entered into a build-lease-transfer agreement (BLT agreement) with Metro Rail Transit

Corporation, Limited (MRTC) pursuant to Republic Act No. 6957 (Build, Operate and Transfer Law), under which MRTC undertook to build MRT3 subject to the condition that MRTC would own MRT3 for 25 years, upon the expiration of which the ownership would transfer to the Government. In 1998, respondent Trackworks Rail Transit Advertising, Vending &

Promotions, Inc. (Trackworks) entered into a contract for advertising services with MRTC. Trackworks thereafter installed commercial billboards, signages and other advertising media in the different parts of the MRT3.  In 2001, however, MMDA requested Trackworks to dismantle the billboards, signages and other advertising media pursuant to MMDA Regulation No.

96-009, whereby MMDA prohibited the posting, installation and display of any kind or form of billboards, signs, posters, streamers, in any part of the road, sidewalk, center island, posts, trees, parks and open space. After Trackworks refused the request of MMDA, MMDA proceeded to dismantle the former’s billboards and similar forms of advertisement.

Issue: Whether MMDA has the power to dismantle, remove or destroy the billboards, signages and other advertising media installed by Trackworks on the interior and exterior

structures of the MRT3.

Ruling: That Trackworks derived its right to install its billboards, signages and other advertising media in the MRT3 from MRTC’s authority under the BLT agreement to develop commercial premises in the MRT3 structure or to obtain advertising income therefrom is no longer debatable. Under the BLT agreement, indeed, MRTC owned the MRT3 for 25 years,

upon the expiration of which MRTC would transfer ownership of the MRT3 to the Government.Considering that MRTC remained to be the owner of the MRT3 during the time material to this case, and until this date, MRTC’s entering into the contract for advertising services with

Trackworks was a valid exercise of ownership by the former. In fact, in Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v. Trackworks Rail Transit Advertising, Vending & Promotions, Inc., this Court expressly recognized Trackworks’ right to install the billboards, signages and other advertising media pursuant to said contract. The latter’s right should, therefore, be respected.

It is futile for MMDA to simply invoke its legal mandate to justify the dismantling of Trackworks’ billboards, signages and other advertising media. MMDA simply had no power on its own to dismantle, remove, or destroy the billboards, signages and other advertising media installed on the MRT3 structure by Trackworks.   In Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v. Bel-Air Village Association, Inc., Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v. Viron Transportation Co., Inc., and Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v. Garin, the Court had the occasion to rule that MMDA’s powers were limited to the formulation, coordination, regulation, implementation, preparation, management, monitoring, setting of policies, installing a

system, and administration. Nothing in Republic Act No. 7924 granted MMDA police power, let alone legislative power. 

The Court also agrees with the CA’s ruling that MMDA Regulation No. 96-009 and MMC Memorandum Circular No. 88-09 did not apply to Trackworks’ billboards, signages and other advertising media. The prohibition against posting, installation and display of billboards, signages and other advertising media applied only to public areas, but MRT3, being private

property pursuant to the BLT agreement between the Government and MRTC, was not one of the areas as to which the prohibition applied.