pointer v31n2 training expert decision makers

8/14/2019 POINTER V31N2 Training Expert Decision Makers

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EDITORIAL

FEATURES5 Connectedness and Cooperation in the 21 st Century:

The RSAFs Perspective and Practice of Multilateralismby MG Lim Kim Choon

13 Effects-Based Operations: A U.S. Commanders Perspectiveby LG David A. Deptula

21 The Second Gulf War and the Debate on Military Transformationby Prof Christopher Coker

30 Training Expert Decision Makersby COL Ong Yu Lin and LTC Lim Beng Chong

43 Re ections on the Operational Framework forInternal Maritime Securityby LTC Cheong Kwok Chien

http://www.mindef.gov.sg/safti/pointer Vol 31 No 2 [2005]

CONTENTS


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TECH EDGE52 Aerodynamic Shape Design Using CFD and Stochastic Optimisation

by COL Lee Shiang Long

VIEWPOINT58

My Experience and Perspective of OFEby MAJ Nur Effendi

BOOK REVIEW61 Geoffrey Tills Seapower: A Guide for the Twenty-First Century

FEATURED AUTHOR64 Geoffrey Till

PERSONALITY PROFILES67 World War II Russian Theatre: Zhukov vs Guderian

CONTENTS ...contd


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IntroductionIn our earlier article, Decision-

Making in a Brigade Command Team:Integrating Theory and Practice 1(featured in POINTER Vol. 30 No. 4),

we argued that the SAF relied tooheavily on an analytical approach todecision making and that it should becomplemented by a naturalistic approach.While we believe an analytical approachto training is useful to develop desiredskill sets, it is incomplete as a trainingpedagogy. The analytical approach totraining decision making skills in ourleaders must be complemented by themore naturalistic approach to decisionmaking. That is, complementing logicalproblem solving with intuition. A morecomplete approach to developingdecision making skills in leaders is tocreate a training system that develops both analytical skills and intuition.

Anyone who is sceptical aboutthe existence or the usefulness of intuition should speak to the groundcommanders involved in OperationFlying Eagle (OFE)2. Many of thesecommanders decisions were madeunder time pressure and uncertainty.They did not have the luxury of time andresources, nor the information requiredto perform an analytical decision makingprocess. Under these circumstances,they often made decisions based on theirintuition. Critics may argue that these

Training Expert Decision Makersby COL Ong Yu Lin & LTC Lim Beng Chongcommanders had simply conductedall the analysis and problem solvingsubconsciously at the back of theirminds. Yes, the critics are right, and thatis precisely what intuition is about! Akey aspect of intuition is the speed of decision making. Intuition is also aboutthe ability to ll in any information gaps by matching the current perception of the situation to pre-existing knowledgeor templates, and adapt them forframing the current situation. Themore extensive the repertoire of pre-existing knowledge and templates, themore likely the commander is able to

accurately make sense of the currentsituation.

To build up an extensive repertoireof knowledge and templates requiresconstant practice but yet the militaryprofession is one where its membersdo not and cannot do so. Only aconstant state of war would allow that.The honing and development of themilitary skills must therefore take otherforms and through repeated practice. Indecision making, there is no substitutefor experience and there is no substitutefor intuition that comes from repeatedpractice. Constant practice will developwhat Clausewitz called coup d oeil orintuition. Clausewitz described it asthe commanders ability to recognise atthe precise moment in battle the truth,or a high level of situational awareness that the mind would ordinarily miss


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or would perceive only after long studyand re ection. 3 It is the ability to seepatterns and opportunities in the strikeof the eye .

A Balance Of Analysis And Intuition

Decision making is a balance of intuition and analysis, and the currenttraining of our of cers in the areas of decision making focuses purely on theanalytical aspects. Intuitive methods cancomplement the analytical methods to

speed up the decision making processespecially when we operate in the Known and Knowable or collectivelytermed ordered domains of the Cyne nframework (See Figure 1). Analyticalmethods such as the SAFs Appreciationof Situation (AOS) process perform verywell in these domains and the analyticalapproach can be honed to achieve

automated responses as the Cause-Effect relationships are obvious.

In an analytical process such asthe AOS process, the decision makeris given a finite problem space anda specific outcome to achieve, andthen is allocated a certain amountof time for the speci c training. Thedominant framework toward achievingthe outcome is to follow a set of steps.Given specific outcomes to achieve,

rst understand the situation (missionanalysis), determine a number of coursesof action, compare them and identifythe best option for execution. This isessentially a problem solving approach.

Such an approach however throws upsome questions: Is it robust enough to be employed in the unordered domainwhere there is high level of uncertainty?How are we shaping the cognitiveprocess with this training approach?

The danger is that too muchdeference is given to the notion of train as you ght

. The problem arisessimply because we confuse the training

Figure 1. Snowden s Cyne n Framework.


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procedures and training aids with theskills we are trying to develop withthese training procedures and trainingaids. During training, we demarcate theproblem space clearly, state explicitlythe desired outcome to achieve, andstipulate a time when the exercisewill end. We also put in place a battleprocedure, depicting the steps to followto ensure that planners work throughthe problems the way we want themto. This may be appropriate for trainingpurpose, but it may not be applicableto real-time operational contexts where

most decisions have to be made undertime pressure and uncertainty.

Research has clearly shown thathumans do not make decisions undertime pressure and uncertainty theway we train them for. Under suchcircumstances, commanders do notthink in the way they are trained

under the current training approach.Commanders in operations oftencomplement their analytical problemsolving approach with intuition whenunder time pressure and uncertainconditions. This is not surprising if oneunderstands the differences between thetraining context and the real operationalcontext. The key differences are:

Ill-structured problem space the problem space is clearlydemarcated and structured in thetraining context, not in a real-timeoperational context;

Outcome uncertainty desiredoutcome is explicitly stated in thetraining context, but not in a real-time operational context;

Time uncertainty there iscertainty of when the training context

will end, but not in the real-timeoperational context;

Tempo uncertainty pace of training can be regulated accordingly, but pace and intensity is often beyondthe control of the commanders in areal-time operational context, and

nally;

Information uncertainty thereis more information certainty inthe training context than in a real-time operational context where

missing, ambiguous or unreliableinformation is the norm rather thanthe exception.

Considering these key differences between the training context and thereal-time operational context, thequestion is how junior commanderscould be trained to think during training

so as to facilitate their thinking processand actions in an operational context.To incorporate such a process into thetraining processes, it is crucial that wedevelop a complementary intuitivethinking process to achieve a higherspeed of command (making plans betterand faster and a faster decision-to-actioncycle). The need for a training methodto develop both analytical and intuitiveskills of junior commanders is criticalas the future junior commanders willincreasingly have to deal with issuesthat straddle the ordered and unordereddomains, which can span any part of thespectrum of operations. Even then, thedemarcations between various typesof operations in the spectrum are alsofast blurring. Krulak (1999) describedit as the 3-Block War , one wher e soldiers may be confronted with theentire spectrum of tactical challenges in


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the span of a few hours and within thespace of three contiguous city blocks 4 .The SAFs Chief of the Defence Force,LG Ng Yat Chung in an address to SAFof cers extended the idea to a 4-Block War , where soldiers have to contendwith an enthused media as they executethe 3-block war. Other examples includehumanitarian assistance and disasterrecovery (HADR) operations, peacesupport operations (PSO) and homelandsecurity and defence operations whichhave the potential to quickly evolveto pose a wider spectrum of tactical

challenges. A common consequenceregardless of whether soldiers areoperating in one part of the spectrumor simultaneously over many parts of the spectrum is that decision makingis now delegated to commanders atthe lowest level. They will need to relyon their intuition to fill in the gaps,arising from the inherent uncertainties

in a given situation and the lack of precise instructions and guidance fromsuperiors, in order to act and executetheir tasks with con dence in a semi-autonomous manner. What we wantto hear is: 2LT Tan has exercised goodinitiative or CPL Ang is street-smart .This is the age of the strategic corporalsand lieutenants.

An intuitive process draws heavily onexperience and yet junior commanders,given their limited exposure, oftenlack the necessary experience. Hence,the need to equip them with intuitiveskills has become even more critical.Moreover, junior commander trainingforms the basis upon which higher-order decision making and thinking

skills are built. Many of the basic skillsand behaviours acquired during theirinitial years are honed further over the

course of their careers. However, in viewof the Keep SAF Young policy, it is notonly critical to be able to accelerate theexperience gaining process of our juniorcommanders, but also to have a systemwhich can capture experience fromexpert commanders (tacit knowledge)and translate them into doctrines,processes and systems (explicitknowledge) in order to maintain, growand leverage on past experience 5.

In this paper, we put forward atraining approach for decision making

that, we believe, is currently not fullyutilized in the SAF, and thus has greatpotential to make a difference to the waydecision making abilities of our juniorcommanders can be trained to produceexpert decision makers.

Expert Decision MakerWhat makes a commander an

expert decision maker? In short, anexpert decision maker is one that canappropriately use both intuition andanalysis in a given problem space.Hence, apart from continuing to dowhat we do best training the analyticalmind we need to develop intuition inour commanders to make them expertdecision makers. According to GaryKlein, given any domain, experts can be differentiated from novices basedon eight aspects of their expertise (seeTable 1).

So given what we know about thenature of expertise, what and how dowe train our commanders to makethem expert decision makers? Ourproposition is for a training system thatfocuses on developing these six aspectsof expertise in our commanders:


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Knowledge base or repertoireof patterns for a given domain throughscenario-based learning (paper-based orPC simulations).

Se l f -aw areness o f one s behaviours and actions throughconstant feedback (subordinate, peerand superior).

Mental simulation skills usingvisualisation training and two-sidedexercises to carry out the action-reactionprocess.

Ability to recognise cues

including anomalies, see relationshipsand construct possible stories throughstory telling exercises.

Lateral thinking and hencecognitive adaptability by taking multipleperspectives on the same situation anddeveloping multiple applications of atool or procedure.

Con dence to challenge sourcesof information (including equipment)when in doubt.

The Proposed Pedagogy -TALAC

These six aspects of expertise can betrained using a pedagogy that develops both analytical skills and intuition

simultaneously during the learningprocess. The TALAC (Think and ActLike A Commander) pedagogy is

Table 1. Nature of Expertise Differences between Experts and Novices.


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appropriate for training of all levels of decision makers. Its utility, in the trainingof of cer cadets, is diagrammaticallyshown in Figure 2:

to perform each activity as well as toleverage on previous learning to lift thelearning value of the next activity to ahigher order.

Figure 2. TALAC Pedagogy.

The TALAC pedagogy seeks to build a knowledge base or repertoireof patterns and pattern recognitionskills through each of these activities.The values and limitations of theseindividual learning activities are welldocumented in research. Althoughmany of these activities have beenused independently to train decisionmakers as well as command teams, aholistic approach where the insightsgained from previous activities aresynthesised with the next activity todeepen the ability to see patterns andopportunities is often missing. Thevalue of the TALAC pedagogy is that itis a learning value chain akin to Porter svalue chain 13 of economic activities. Thekey to obtaining maximum value inthis learning value chain is the ability

The objective of TALAC is to holdthe learner in the cognitive frame of acommander and for the learner to re ecton their thinking process as and afterthey execute a plan. It is essentially acase-based reasoning approach. 14 As thelearner progresses from one activity toanother he draws on his prior experiencesor reason from rst principles to solveproblems. The problem space becomesincreasingly dif cult and complex, withless information or cues and a widerrange of possible options / solutionsand consequences as the learner movesto the next activity. This graduatedscenar io-based t ra in ing a l lowslearners to see any emerging situation

from multiple perspectives andchallenges them to make sense of thesituation by constantly defining the


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problem, actively seeking cues andlinking them to form possible patterns,seeking solutions and understandingthe consequences of their actions while bearing the commander s intent intheir minds. Throughout this learningprocess, feedback points are embeddedwithin each activity to align learner sdevelopment to the six aspects of expertise mentioned earlier. This isa learner-centric approach with theinstructors playing a coaching orfacilitating role. The TALAC pedagogyis being implemented at the Officer

Cadet School to s trengthen theattainment of mission competencyin planning, decision making andexecution. The detailed approach isdiscussed below.

Step 1: The pedagogy starts withthe acquisition of knowledge, whichincludes the study of concepts and

principles and even the mechanicsof analytical processes such as theAppreciation of Situation (AOS) process.The information and knowledge can bedelivered in variety of forms rangingfrom written notes to interactive mediastreamed over a network of computers.The instructor may play the role of asubject matter expert to provide theinformation and knowledge or actas facilitator to guide the learner inhis search for the information andknowledge.

Step 2: This step employs scenarioor problem / case-based learning topractice the process, understand, applyand learn principles and concepts insimple but yet realistic conditions. As

the understanding increases or the levelof training increases, it can be expectedthat the problems will increase in terms

of dif culty and complexity. To trainexpert decision-makers, an effectiveway is to employ tactical decision games(TDG) to encourage the learners to makedecisions based on their understandingof the tactical situation and intent. TDGencourages a balanced use of analysisand intuition and is a safe-to-try and astructured means to acquire experiencein cue and pattern recognition for aparticular domain of interest. It alsoallows learners to generate multipleperspectives and hence story lines froma same set of cues. Subsequent group

discussion of the TDG scenario providesthe opportunity to hear and learn fromone another. TDG can also incorporatenewly acquired operational knowledgefrom recent con icts to emphasize anddisseminate learning points. However,one of the limitations of paper-basedTDG is that it does not facilitate thelearning process by allowing learners to

execute their decisions and experiencethe frictions in the decision-to-actioncycle. Given this limitation, paper- based TDGs are often kept simple. To build on the learning from paper- based TDGs, computer-based TDGsimulations can be developed to captureor replicate the dynamic interactions of competing actions and reactions, andfriction arising from terrain and weatherfactors.

Step 3: Computer-aided simulationprovides the next level of value inpresenting a virtual representationof the real world, with virtual actors.Advances in the speed of computerprocessors, high resolution graphicsdisplay, realistic surround sound

technology and high speed networkshave spawned popular and realisticcommercially available PC games such


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as Command and Conquer, CounterStrike, Operation FlashPoint (OFP)to high-end constructive simulatedwar gaming systems such as the SAFSIMLAB and the likes, in use in othermilitary forces around the world.Simulation systems allow the learnerto test his solutions including thosefrom TDGs in a virtual yet realisticworld repeatedly without the need todeploy large numbers of troops andequipment in a training area. Throughrepeated runs of the same scenario withdifferent actions and reactions, learners

can substantially and rapidly increasetheir repertoire of relevant cues andpatterns associated with a particularscenario. In other words, experiencethat can only be gained through yearsof practice in the past can now beacquired with advanced technology.Such a technological platform can also be extended to two sided exercises to

further enhance ones mental simulationability.

Step 4: At this stage of theirdevelopment, learners are ready to put

their acquired experience to test. Thisis an important step as learners nowcan anchor their experience to reality a reality check process. Staff Rideand tactical exercise without troops(TEWT) provide the opportunities forthe learners to continue learning ina real environment from an expert sperspective. The Staff Rides consist of apreliminary detailed study of selected battle or campaign, a eld visit to theactual battle site and an opportunityto learn and re ect on what went welland not so well. It differs from a guided

battlefield visit in that the learnersplay an active role in discovering the what happened? , the why? and the consequences . It resembles a businesscase study but conducted on site. It is anopportunity to learn from the decisionmaking of the commander by askingquestions such as:

Basic set of questions: What were the critical decisionsmade by the commander? Why are thesecritical?

An Ops FlashPoint (OPF) game15

with Blue and Red Teams at the Of cerCadet School.

OPF has been customised with local training areas and SAF equipment.


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Were they dif cult decisions?Why were these decisions dif cult?

What were the cues /informationand the understanding of the situation(i.e., patterns) by the commander thathad in uenced his decisions?

What was that key missinginformation that would have helped themost?

What were the other optionsconsidered but not chosen? Why?

How would I have acted in hisplace?

Optional questions if appropriate: What were the anomalies in

the situation that were observed bythe commander? Why were theseanomalies?

Were there occasions where thecommander challenged the validity andreliability of the information presentedto him? What were these? Was the

commander correct in not going withthe information? Were there occasions where

the commander was aware of his ownactions and behaviours, and how thesehad affected the performance of histeam /unit?

A TEWT focuses on tac t ica lproblems designed to emphasize theunderstanding and application of principles and concepts. TEWT usesterrain and not history as a teachingvessel; any relationship to historicalevents is usually coincidental. TEWTsare excellent follow-on to TDGs andthey offer the opportunity for TDGplans to be executed on the ground.A TEWT involves a tactical execution

of the plan by key commanders andunits to gain deeper understandingof the strengths and weaknesses of

the plan or a walking discussion of the various courses of actions andtheir plausibility for execution. Theprocess can also be interactive andhasten learning by referring to a seriesof cue cards listing decisions tasks andactions required at various juncture of walking through the plan . Executionof the plan by walking on real terrainovercomes the limitations of a TDGand allows further opportunity tocarry intuitive decision making todeal with real world issues suchas communication screening, and

previously unknown or unnoticedobstacles or terrain of tactical signi cance.The instructors may also role play thekey commanders in a guided TEWTand share their understanding of thesituation and the rationale behindtheir decisions so that the learners canobserve their actions and hear theirthought process.

Step 5: Nothing can replace theexperiential learning of a live executionof the plan with the full complementof troops and equipment especiallyagainst a thinking adversary in a 2-sided exercise. To enhance the learningprocess, the learners can also attack and then subsequently defend thesame objective to develop furtherunsights into the tactical decisionmaking process as they will have theadded opportunity to see it from theadversary s perspective. Field tacticalexercises are, however, a resourceintensive and costly training methodthat many militaries are increasinglysubstituting with other trainingactivities. The instructor may play the

role of a coach and even an evaluatordepending on the desired trainingoutcomes of the live exercise.


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Role of the InstructorThe role of instructors in this pedagogy

ranges from being a subject matterexpert in providing the information,

to that of motivator, facilitator, coachand even an evaluator. The learningresponsibility is also shifted from theinstructor to the learner, becoming morelearner-centric further up the learningvalue chain. The instructor plays therole of a facilitator or moderator in asimulation exercise, during the staff ride or TEWT to the keep the gameplay going and the discussion focused,lively and purposeful. The instructorshould only as a last resort intervene asa subject matter expert.

The role of the instructor is graphicallysummarised in Figure 3. Regardlessof the role, key skills required areperformance coaching (using the GROWmodel) and facilitation skills to elicitunderstanding and learning points forfurther re ection at each step of thepedagogy.

Key Processes UnderpinningTALAC

There are two key processesins t rumenta l to the successfulimplementation of the TALAC pedagogy a cognitive task analysis (CTA), and adecision making critique (DMC). Theformer is to build the expert knowledgedatabases to design the decision tasksin each of the training activities andthe latter is to facilitate the feedback onwhat went well, what did not and whatwas learnt.

The CTA process can be used to identifycritical decisions a commander can beexpected to make in a given militaryscenario. Expert knowledge databasesare then built by eliciting expertise fromexperts (senior commanders and subjectmatter experts) on how they go aboutmaking decisions in these scenariosusing CTA. Central to this methodologyis the use of semi-structured interviewswith cognitive probes designed to elicitexpert knowledge behind decisions

Figure 3. Role of the Instructor.


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made under the conditions of timepressure and a complex problem spacewith many non-linear interactiveelements. The acquired knowledge isthen used to design the training scenariofor each of the learning activities in theTALAC pedagogy.

The other key process is a decisionmaking critique to obtain accurateand diagnostic feedback as part of theafter action review (AAR) at the endof each training activity in the TALACpedagogy. This feedback forms the

basic experiential learning cycle of action-observation-reflection or theKolb Experiential Learning Cycle.Pliske, McCloskey and Klein (2001) 16described the decision making critiqueas thinking about what went welland not so well during an exercise. It

consists of a series of questions designedto identify the dif cult decisions made(see Table 2). These questions exploreimportant cues that might have beenseen, assessment mistaken and the typeof uncertainty encountered and theywere handled . The decision makingcritique provides a tool to close thelearning loops, deepen understandingand accumulate patterns.

ConclusionTo effectively train leaders to

function in this increasingly complexand ambiguous operational context, weneed to rethink the way we train ourleaders. Here, we advocate a trainingpedagogy that develops commandersinto expert decision makers. While weused of cer cadet training as an example,

Table 2. Decision Making Critique Questions.Source: Pliske, R., McCloskey, M., & Klein, G.A. (2001). Decision Skills Training: FacilitatingLearning From Experience.Note: Italicised entries are the authors addition.


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the proposed training paradigm isequally applicable to the training of section commanders and higher-levelcommanders such as company and battalion commanders.

In conclusion, we believe that thekey elements of a future training systemmust consider the following:

Uncertainty is the norm. Removecertainty in terms of time and effects toachieve. Higher intent should want bevague. There is no certainty when an

exercise ends, and it ends only whenthe desired outcomes are achieved.

Train commanders to developstandard operations procedures(SOPs), and more important ly,evaluate adaptation of SOPs to novelsituations.

Create training scenarios withmultiple perspectives and dimensions(military, psychological, social,economic, political).

Evaluate what they can do otherthan just what they are trained to do.

Train as you fight may have been taken too far. It is necessaryto differentiate training proceduresand training aids from skills are wetraining for. Often, we use trainingprocedures and training aids to developa desired skill. However, once the skill isdeveloped, we may not need the sametraining procedure and training aids toexecute the skill.

Endnotes1 Y.L.. Ong and B.C.Lim, Decision Making in A

Brigade Command Team: Integrating Theoryand Practice , Pointer , Vol. 30 No. 4 (2005).

2 Ops Flying Eagle is a humanitarian assistanceand disaster relief (HADR) operationundertaken by the SAF in response to theBoxing Day tsunami in Aceh, Indonesia. Theco-author, LTC Lim Beng Chong was deployedin the operation as a Field Psychologist.

3 Carl von Clausewitz, On War , ed. and trans.Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton,N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976),p102.

4 Gen. Charles C. Krulak, The StrategicCorporal: Leadership in the Three Block War , Marines Magazine , January 1999.

5 De Groot, A.D. (1946 / 1978); Endsley, M.R.(1995); Klein & Crandell (1995); Klein &Hoffman (1993).

6 Endsley, M.R. (1995); Klein (1997).7 De Groot, A.D. (1946 / 1978); Klein &

Hoffman (1993); Shanteau (1992).8 Klein & Hoffman (1993).9 Dreyfus & Dreyfus (1986); Shanteau (1992).

10 Cohen, Freeman and Wolf (1996); Glasser &Chi (1998).11 Chi, Hutchinson & Robin (1989); Klein (1997);

Klein & Hoffman (1993).12 Cannon-Bowers; Salas & Converse (1992).13 M.E. Porter, Competitive Advantage: Creating

and Sustaining Superior Performance(FreePress, 1998).

14 Schank, R.C Berman, T.R & Marpherson, K.A;(1999)Learning by Doing, Instructional DesignTheories & Models, Vol IIReigehoth, C.M(Ed),Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, pg 166

15 OPF game in OCS has been customised withlocal training areas and SAF equipment.

16 Pliske, R. M., McCloskey, M.J., & Klein, G.,Decision skills training: Facilitating learning from experience. In E. Salas & G. Klein (Eds.),Linking expertise and naturalistic decisionmaking. (Mahwah, N.J.: Lawrence ErlbaumAssociates, 2001), p44.


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COL Ong Yu Lin is currently the Commander of Of cer CadetSchool in SAFTI Military Institute. He is a Guards Officer by training and has attended the Royal Military Academy atSandhurst, U.K., the U.S. Army Infantry School at Fort Benning,and the Australian Command and Staff College. He has previouslyheld command appointments in the battalion and brigade levels.He holds a BSc in Physics from the National University of Singapore, a Master of Management in Defence Studies from the

University of Canberra, Australia, and an MBA from the NanyangFellows Programme in Nanyang Business School, NanyangTechnological University.

LTC Lim Beng Chong, PhD, a Guards Officer, is currentlyHead Training Psychology Branch, Applied BehaviouralSciences Department. He holds a BSc (Honours) in Psychologyfrom University of Nottingham, U.K., a MSc in Training andDevelopment from Leicester University, U.K., MA and PhD inIndustrial and Occupational Psychology from University of Maryland, U. S.

pointer v31n2 training expert decision makers

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