plotinus and aristotle on the simplicity of the divine intellect

8/14/2019 Plotinus and Aristotle on the Simplicity of the Divine Intellect

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Plotinus and Aristotle on the Simplicity of the Divine Intellect

Exam No.: B029330

MSc Ancient Philosophy

The University of Edinburgh

2013


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Table of Contents

Abstract 3

Introduction 4

Chapter 1: The Requirement of the First Principle and Simplicitys Role 7

1.1 Aristotles Search for the First Principle 7

1.2 Aristotle on Unity and the Simplicity Sought for the First Principle 10

1.3 Plotinus on Unity as the First Principle 14

1.4 Conclusion: Comparing the Unmoved Mover and the One 18

Chapter 2: Divine Intellect and Self-Thinkings Unity or Duality for Aristotle and Plotinus 20

2.1 Aristotle on the Unmoved Mover as Divine Intellect 20

2.2 Human and Divine Intellection Compared 23

2.3 Plotinus on Intellect 25

2.4 Plotinus on the Necessity for Intellects Duality 27

Chapter 3: Comparing Divine Intellects Self-Thinking and Simplicity Between Aristotle andPlotinus 33

3.1 The Epistemological Necessity for Identity and Distinction 33

3.2 Reconsidering Aristotle 35

3.3 Conclusion 37

Primary Sources 39

Secondary Sources 40

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Abstract

Aristotle and Plotinus both demonstrate the existence of a first principle as cause of the existence of

all things. Aristotle puts forward that this first principle is a divine intellect which thinks on itself, and in

being the highest being in complete actuality and without potentiality, it is also absolutely simple.

Plotinus, on the other hand, sees reason to assert that the divine intellect can not be absolutely simple

but a duality of some sort, and thus the first principle, as a cause of unity for all things, must be beyond

the divine intellect and thus beyond being in being, itself, absolutely simple. Comparing Plotinus to

Aristotle, Plotinus position appears odd at the outset given that he also holds to the divine intellect

being completely in act and that it thinks on itself. Why thinking should be dual even when it is self-

referential and unified in its activity is not apparent, and so Aristotles position seems the more coherent

one. Yet, through an analysis of both positions, this dissertation proposes that Plotinus better accounts

for the problem of self-intellection as requiring some form of distinction in thought while maintaining

an identity between the subject and object of thought. If absolute simplicity is an essential attribute to

being the first principle, Plotinus position is ultimately more consistent in positing a first principle

beyond the divine intellect while also holding to a more coherent understanding of thinking with his

understanding of divine intellect as a duality instead of an absolute simplicity.

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We may wish to pause on this last statement. Given the implication of the last line, why is there

duality in thinking by default? On Aristotles account of the intellect, thinking implies the possession of

the object of thought, so that it is when the intellect acquires and, in some sense, becomesthe object of

thought that it is thinking. Aristotle would then assert, contrary to Plotinus, that there is not a duality but

rather simplicity in thinking, especially when the divine intellect has itself as the object of its own

thinking. Plotinus concedes that Intellect is one in a sense, but he would disagree with Aristotle by

asserting that there is a kind of duality and division needed in all thinking.

Given that Aristotle and Plotinus agree on the necessity for a first principle and the existence of a

divine intellect on some level, whose account best argues for the simplicity or duality of the divine

intellect as reason to posit it as the first principle or as a secondary principle of the cosmos? In this

dissertation, I wish to analyze the respective arguments put forward by Plotinus and Aristotle, looking at

the philosophical background and context presupposed in each position. I ultimately wish to show that

Plotinus argument against the absolute simplicity of the divine intellect better accounts for the reality of

self-intellection when compared with Aristotles account. A review of the nature of the divine intellects

self-thinking will show that Aristotles account, although rigorous in its own right, fails to account for a

proper distinction between the subject and object of thought which would otherwise make possible the

divine intellects full knowledge of itself as the subject of its own thinking. Plotinus, on the other hand,

preserves this distinction which makes possible Intellects transparent knowledge of itself as the subject

of its thinking, thus validating his assertion of Intellects duality compared to Aristotles assertion of the

divine intellects simplicity.

Given what is to be shown, certain premises need to be elaborated. First, we must clarify the kind of

first principle sought by Aristotle and Plotinus in the form of the unmoved mover and the One,

respectively, to show in what way the divine intellect factors in with their general inquiry into the first

principle (Chapter 1.1, 1.3). It must then be shown how both understand the importance of simplicity

and unity in relation to the first principle, especially in seeing how Aristotle prioritizes substance

compared to Plotinus placing unity over substance as a prior principle of reality (Ch. 1.2, 1.3). On

comparing these latter two conceptions, Plotinus account will be shown to have more of a direct causal

explanation for all beings as both an efficient and a final cause in comparison to Aristotles which causes

motion as a final cause; the role of simplicity for each will show how a thinking intellect must match this

simplicity (for Aristotle) or must be beyond all being, including intellect (for Plotinus) (Ch. 1.4). An

analysis of the divine intellect for both, including a consideration of the nature of intellect and self-

intellection as implying simplicity or duality for Aristotle and Plotinus (respectively) must next be shown,

(Ch. 2). Afterward, Plotinus and Aristotles different accounts of the divine intellect must be compared,

Divine Intellects Simplicity in Aristotle and Plotinus

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Chapter 1:

The Requirement of the First Principle and Simplicitys Role

In considering the question of the simplicity or duality of the divine intellect, it will be

important to first see how Plotinus and Aristotle understand simplicity and unity (1.2,1.3), starting with how both see the necessity to assert the existence of a first principle(1.1, 1.3). This consideration will show in what way the divine intellect will be the firstprinciple for Aristotle, while for Plotinus it will not. It will also contextualize how thedivine intellect is ultimately simple for Aristotle, while for Plotinus it is unable to be. Acorollary to this discussion will be that Plotinus gives greater causal power to his firstprinciple as an efficient (as well as final) cause of the existence of all beings, more sothan Aristotles first principle which is a final cause for things movement and existence(1.4).

1.1 Aristotles Search for the First Principle

First, what particular kind of first principle ("#$%) is being sought by Aristotle for the unmoved

mover of Metaph.!.6? Since the unmoved mover is discussed as a first principle,3it will be helpful to

consider what Aristotle means by the term. If we consider the word by itself, "#$%implies either

beginning, origin, element, and as we have used it, first principle. Aristotle looks into the various

usages of the word inMetaph. &.1:

It is common, then, to all origins ('()*+,-+./+0.1+2+3*+"#$*+) to be the firstpoint from which a thing either is or comes to be or is known; but of these some are

immanent in the thing and others are outside. Therefore the nature of a thing is anorigin, and so are the elements of a thing, and thought and choice, and substance, andthat for the sake of whichfor the good and the beautiful are the origin both of theknowledge and of the movement of many things. (Metaph.1013a18-23)

In this passage, to be an origin ("#$%) implies being the first cause or basis on which something comes

to be known, has its being, or from which it comes into existence. The examples that Aristotle lists of

the origin of somethinga things nature or elements, thought and choice, or that for the sake of

whichbrings to mind the four kinds of cause from PhysicsII.3: formal, efficient, material, and final.4

At least in this sense, origin implies cause although in the sense that it is the first one from whichsomething is (or comes to be or is known); thus the contrary, cause implying origin, would not

necessarily follow. The example of the good as a final cause of knowledge and movement is helpful

insofar as there is nothing further for which something moves or acts except insofar as the good is

sufficient and complete in itself; the good, in this sense, is a first principle of movement.


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3Metaph. 1071b12-22, esp., speaking in context of the unmoved mover: There must, then, be such a principle

("#$%+), whose very substance is actuality.4Physics194b24-195a6.


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With this general sense of being a first principle in mind, it will help to situate Aristotles search for

the unmoved mover in the context of its function as a first cause of all beings. We may get a clearer idea

by looking at how Aristotle beginsMetaph.!.1, where the unmoved mover is eventually discussed:

Substance is the subject of our inquiry; for the principles and the causes ((4 "#$(5 0(536(731() we are seeking are those of substances. For if the universe is of the nature ofa whole, substance is its first part; and if it coheres by virtue of succession, on this view

also substance is first, and is succeeded by quality, and then by quantity. (Metaph. !.11069a18-21)

Some unpacking of this may be helpful. Aristotle begins by asserting that substance is prior in being

when compared to the other kinds of beingsuch as quality, quantity and the others referenced in

the Categories5so that the other kinds are dependent on substance for their own existence, either by

being present in, or predicated of, substance.6By seeking the principles of substance, we are then

seeking those which also end up being the principles of all beings. Yet, what would constitute these

principles of substance? And in what sense would these principles stand in relation to the other kinds of

being (e.g. as direct or indirect causes of their being)? We get a further clue inMetaph.!.5:

(1) And if we inquire what are the principles or elements of substances and relations andqualitieswhether they are the same or different, clearly when the terms principle andelement are used in several senses the principles and elements of all are the same, but

when the senses are distinguished the causes are not the same but different, except thatin a special sense the causes of all are the same. (2) They are in a special sense the same,i.e. by analogy, because matter, form, privation, and the moving cause are common to all

things; and the causes of substances may be treated as causes of all things in this sense,that when they are removed all things are removed; further, that which is first in respectof fulfillment is the cause of all things. (1071a29-36)

In (1), Aristotle asserts that the principle of all things will be the same in a certain way, even though the

particular causes and principles are distinguished according to their kinds, like those of colours, sounds,

substances, etc. Yet common to those varied principles is the existence of certain principles like matter,

form, privation, and the moving cause, which are common in all cases. This is carried further in (2)

where Aristotle elaborates that when the principle which is common to the particular principles of

qualities, relations, and others is taken away, the latter principles are also removed. So the kind of

principle being sought for substances would be one which has an analogically causal relationship to all

things insofar as by supporting the motion and existence of substances, it would also be supporting the

existence of the other kinds of things, like relations, qualities, etc. Consequently, the principle would

have to be itself a substance or individual which is the first cause by which all other substances, both


8

5Categories 1b25-27.

6Categories2b15-17.


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primary and secondary (as with universals, such as that of man, animal, etc.), have their existence.7On

this reckoning, Aristotles first principle could not simply be such in a simple, absolute sense but only in

the analogous sense just spoken of by keeping substances in existence and, with them, the other kinds of

being.

InMetaph.!.6, Aristotle goes on to show the first principle with his discussion of the necessity for

an immaterial substance responsible for the motion and existence of all things. In doing this, Aristotle

brings in his discussion of the three kinds of substance from!.1, which are: 1) sensible and perishable;

2) sensible and eternal; and 3) immaterial, non-sensible, and therefore unmovable.8While the first kind is

self-evident for us, we may be unsure about the existence of the second. Implied in this latter kind is

Aristotles argument from On Generation and CorruptionII.9-10which ascribes the cause of continuous

coming-to-be and passing-away to bodies such as the sun, stars and, implicitly, the planetary bodieswhich have the needed regular motion.9These kinds of bodies must in some way be tied to a movement

which is single, unmoved, ungenerated, and incapable of alteration (On Gen. and Corr. 337a21) in such a

way that the continuity of movement in bodies which come into being and perish is preserved.10

Because of the existence of this second kind of substance which provides the eternal movement

supporting the existence of perishable substances, this eventually leads to the necessity of a first,

unmoved mover in the form of the third kind of substance:

Since there were three kinds of substance, two of them natural and one unmovable,

regarding the latter we must assert that it is necessary that there should be an eternalunmovable substance. For substances are the first of existing things, and if they are alldestructible, all things are destructible. But it is impossible that movement should eithercome into being or cease to be; for it must always have existed. (Metaph.1071b3-6)


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7As implied earlier atMetaph.1071a18-23, esp.: The universal causes, then, of which we spoke do not exist. Forthe individualis the source of the individuals. For while man is the cause of man universally, there is no universalman.

8Metaph.1069a30-36.

9On Gen. and Corr. 336b1-13, 337a16-23; on circular motion as causal explanation of the continuity of sun andplanetary bodies motions, see 337a1-5.

10The argument for the continuity of motionseen in PhysicsVIII.1 (esp. 251b8-252a4)going back to a first,ungenerated movement is also carried over from PhysicsVII.1 (esp. 241b24-6, 242a14-21) which shows thenecessity for a first movement behind a series of motions. Inevitably this leads to the necessity for a first,unmoved mover: it is clear that the first unmoved mover cannot have any magnitude. For if it has magnitude,this must be either a finite or an infinite magnitude. Now we have already proved in our course on Physics thatthere cannot be an infinite magnitude: and we have now proved that it is impossible for a finite magnitude to havean infinite force, and also that it is impossible for a thing to be moved by a finite magnitude during an infinite

time. But the first mover causes a motion that is eternal and causes it during an infinite time. It is clear, therefore,that is indivisible and is without parts and without magnitude (PhysicsVIII.10 267b18-26). As we eventually see inMetaph.!.6, this is reaffirmed in terms of the unmoved mover being completely actual and without potentiality.


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As in !.1, the implication of the dependence of the other kinds of being on substance is re-affirmed by

Aristotle saying that they are destructible if substance, by itself, is destructible. Yet how is this first kind

of substance necessary for the existence of all things? Understanding the role of the second kind of

substance (sensible and eternal) as providing the basis of existence for perishable beings, Aristotle isreaffirming the necessity for eternal motionbut in such a way that this necessitates the existence of a

first, unmoved mover. Without a first mover whichis unmoved, the motion of the eternal substances as

the first moved sensible beings could not be explained, and subsequently all substances would lack a

basis for their being. Thus, the existence of the third kind of substance, that which is a first mover and

unmoved, must be posited in explaining the continuous motion and existence of all substances.

In stipulating the existence of the unmoved mover, Aristotle shows that it must be completely in act

(8+9#:;1() and without any capacity or potencyliterally, its substance must be actuality.11As we will

eventually see, thinking is the activity which constitutes this actuality, and in being identical with that

activityparticularly in its thinking on itselfthe unmoved mover will necessarily be absolutely simple.

Before this, we must consider this next question: what does Aristotle consider simplicity and unity to be

in relation to the unmoved mover?

1.2 Aristotle on Unity and the Simplicity Sought for the First Principle

The consideration of the unmoved movers simplicity comes up inMetaph.!.7, where Aristotle

shows that the unmoved mover, as the best and first among all beings, causes motion as an object of

thought:

And thought is moved by the object of thought, and one side of the list of opposites isin itself the object of thought (+.?39#()@)3.1$A(0(BC(D3E+); and in this,substance is first, and in substance, that which is simple and exists actually (0(5 3(F3.H)A('#I3


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among the others which are ultimately accidents of substance. Among the kinds of substance, that

which is completely in act and simple would then come first among all the perfections of the list of

opposites, where the opposite of being in act and being simplepotentiality and multiplicityimply a

lack of perfection in being posterior to actuality.14Consequently, the unmoved mover causes motion,

particularly for the second kind of substance with the eternally-moving sun and stars, as a final cause

(and, in some sense, an efficient cause) in being an object of thought which is best and most desirable

among all beings.1516

One particular attribute to note is that being first and completely in act also implies being entirely

simple. This is further carried in the distinction Aristotle makes between one and simple, where the

latter implies a things nature while the former implies being a unit to measure the number of other

things of that kind. Implicit from this is that to be one of a kind implies a necessity to be simple in

possessing a whole, complete nature. Carrying this to the unmoved mover, if it is the first of all beings

as a kind of measure and completely in act, it must then be simple. Yet this is an aspect to consider

further: in what way does simplicity for the unmoved mover imply being in complete act and being of a

certain nature?

We can see this aspect considered in Aristotles discussion on the various senses of unity,beginning

inMetaph.O.1. Speaking from what is less one to more one, the senses of unity or being one include: 1)

the continuous;172) that which is a whole, including having a shape and form which is one;183) that in

numberthe individual is indivisible;19and 4) that in kind: that which is in intelligibility and in

knowledge is indivisible, so that that which causes substances to be one must be one in the primary


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14Regarding how actuality (8+9#:;1() is prior in substance, cf.Metaph.P.8 1050a4-16; in regards to how actualityis prior in a general sense, seeMetaph.P.8 1050b6-34, esp. 1051a3: Obviously, then, actuality is prior both topotentiality and to every principle of change.

15Metaph.!.7 1072a24-b13. See Politis 277-8, esp. in relation to how the unmoved mover could be considered as

an efficient cause in a loose sense: For the ultimate cause of change is not simply the object of thought anddesire of the cosmos, it is a supremely real thing and it produces this thought and desire in the cosmos, i.e. itcauses the cosmos to have this thought and desire; similarly, cf. Bradshaw 38-44.

16On how thoughtis moved by what is best, see On the Soul III.10 433a27-b17. Cf. Politis 277, 293-4, esp.: Inparticular, God moves and generates the rationally changing universe because the rationally changing universesomehow imitates Godhe moves as a paradigm (paradigma). But what the rationally changing universe imitatesabout God is nothing but what God ishis essence, i.e. reason and rational activity. On how the unmoved movercauses the primary movement (of the sun and stars),which is circular motion and by implication the closestimitation of the unmoved movers eternal activity, seeMetaph.1072b5-10.

17Metaph. 1052a19-22.

18Metaph. 1052a22-31.

19Metaph. 1052a32.


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sense.20In each case, Aristotle sees being one as relative to the thing in consideration, whether one as

referring to what is continuous (e.g., a line is one in being continuous with itself), one as referring to

the individual (e.g. one thing), etc. This much is made clear later on:

For this reason to be one is to be indivisible (being essentially a this and capable ofbeing apart either in place or in form or thought) but it is especially to be the firstmeasure of a kind, and above all of quantity; for it is from this that it has been extendedto other categories. (Metaph.1052b15-20)

Aristotle sees that to be one is ultimately to be a unit of measure by which other things are measured in

some way. When someone speaks of being one, it is in reference to one of a specific kind: one horse,

for example, can be taken as a unit by which a number of other horses are counted. Being a unit then

implies being an individual of a certain kind by which one measures the number of other beings of that

same kind. This is implied by what Aristotle next says: For everywhere we seek as the measure

something one and indivisible; and this is that which is simple either in quality or in quantity (Metaph.

1052b34-35). The criterium for being one is then something which is simple in quantityaunit among

other thingsor in qualitysomething which has a specific nature or form apart from other kinds of

quality. In speaking of one horse by which other horses are measured, the one horses simplicity as an

individual of the kind horse is an important factor in considering it as a measure of that kind. In that

case, it would have to be the nature of horse which unifies and provides the simplicity for being one of

that kind. This would be as opposed to identifying the one particular horse as, for instance, a multiplicity

of legs, which then implies identifying one legone particular of a certain kindamong other parts

belonging to that horse. Being one of a kind implies that it must have an accountthe essence of

horse, for instancewhich unifies the various other parts that that thing otherwise may have. The

simplicity of an individual one of a kind would then refer to that things nature or actuality,21which

would explain Aristotles statement inMetaph.!.7 that one indicates measure while simplicity indicates

a things nature.

Anticipating Plotinus argument for a one distinct from being, why can we not refer to a distinct

one apart from it being a measure of a certain kind? This is a question Aristotle takes up inMetaph.O.2

with his response to Plato and the Pythagoreans on the question of whether the one stands apart as a

being or as referring to an individual of a certain kind.22Aristotles answer, we may next see, is premised

on some sense of the primacy of substance:


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20Metaph. 1052a32-33.

21Where actuality refers to a things form or substance, seeMetaph.VIII.2, On the Soul II.1 412a7-12.

22Metaph.1053b9-16.


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If, then, no universal can be a substance, as has been said in our discussion of substanceand being (';#5 .H)A(G0(5 ';#5 3.NQ+3.G), and if being itself cannot be a substancein the sense of a one part from the many (for it is common to the many), but is only apredicate, clearly the one also cannot be a substance. (Metaph. 1053b17-23)

Because being can be used as a predicate for the various kinds (like substance, quality, quantity, etc.), it

could not be considered as a separate kind or substance over and distinct from the other kinds of being.

Aristotle then sees the one similarly: it is also a predicate used of the different kinds of being in

different senses, and not something apart. Thus Aristotles conclusion:

That the one, then, in every class is a definite thing, and in no case is its nature just thisviz. unity, is evident; but as in colours the one itself which we must seek is one colour, sotoo in substance the one itself is one substance. (Metaph. 1054a10-13)

The one, for Aristotle, must refer to being one of a kind: it could not have a nature of its own, since

speaking of a nature then implies speaking of a kind of beingwhich would then imply eithersubstance, quantity, quality, etc. As a result, speaking of an abstract one as the first principle for all

beings could not be possible, contrary to the Platonist position that Aristotle argues against.23

Returning to the question of how the unmoved mover is simple, on this understanding that

simplicity is an attribute of being one of a particular kind, the unmoved mover being completely in act

directly implies that it must also be completely simple. Simplicity, contrariwise, then implies being

completely in act and lacking potentiality, where multiplicity would introduce the potential to be or act

otherwise. As we will eventually see, the activity of thinking constitutes the actuality of the unmoved

mover which has itself as the object of its thinking. This implies that there is no potentiality in the

unmoved mover thinking otherwise or in a different way, so that as a divine intellect it must also be

absolutely simple insofar as is the first of all beings and completely in act as the activity of thinking.24


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23Aristotle makes mention of Platos One and dyad as the two principles for the forms and matter, respectively,inMetaph.R.6 988d8-16, a position which Aristotle seems implicitly to attack here. Cf. Menn, Iota and the

Attributes of Being, 4: In the context of the larger argument, the contribution of Iota 1-2 is to show that there isno one-itself but only, in each genus, an appropriate unit inseparable from the genus, and therefore that the one is

not an "#$%in the strict sense; likewise the contribution of Iota 3-4 is to show that there can be no otherness ordifference or contraries apart from some genus, so that none of these things can be "#$%in the strict sense.

24OMeara 70-1 references this kind of priority of being for the unmoved mover: Thus the order of priority bynature and being, both in Plato and in Aristotle, implies much more than a relation of non-reciprocal dependence:this relation involves also an order of perfection of existence, of knowledge and of value. And, as Aristotlesuggests in chapter 11 of MetaphysicsV, other kinds of priority can be related back to the central order of priorityby nature and being. Menn, Iota and the Attributes of Being, 21 also confirms this observation commenting on

Metaph. 1072a34-35: The implication is that one does not signify the thing itself in a certain state, but rathersignifies a relation, since being a measure is being in a certain relation to the things measured. So being one iscertainly not the .H)A(of the "#$%that moves the heavens. The S@)A(of the "#$%will not be simplicityeither, because simplicity, while non- relational, is privative, a lack of composition; rather, the S@)A(of the "#$%

will be 8+9#:;1((!6 1071b19-20), and a particular kind of 8+9#:;1((it is +T


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1.3 Plotinus on Unity as the First Principle

Considering Plotinus next, in order to understand his position on the duality of the divine intellect it

will help to consider what he requires of the first principle being absolutely simple. While Aristotle sees

simplicity as indicating a things nature, and that subsequently the highest, most active being is what ismost simple, Plotinus sees that simplicity, or unity, is something prior to all the kinds of being, eventually

leading up to a first principle which is absolute unity. The premise behind this can be first seen inEnn.

VI.9.1, where Plotinus sees that all beings possess unity as a distinct characteristic which holds together

their being and existence:

It is by the one that all beings are beings, both those which are primarilybeings and thosewhich are in any sense said to be among beings. For what could anything be if it was notone? For if things are deprived of the one which is predicated of them they are notthose things. For an army does not exist if it is not one, nor a chorus or a flock if they

are not one. But neither can a house or a ship exist if they do not have their one, sincethe house is one and so is the ship, and if they lose it the house is no longer a house northe ship a ship. (Enn.VI.9.1.1-8)

For Plotinus, all beings are characterized by a prior unity which holds their being together. The being of

the army is held together, for instance, if the various soldiers which constitute the army are brought

together into one common grouping. The groups participants would otherwise disperse without the

unity characteristic of the army which brings together the multiplicity of the soldiers into one. This may

also be seen to be the case with the examples of the house and the ship, which are even more

characteristically one and united compared to the army. We may also see similarities here to Aristotle

linking simplicity with a things nature, which Aristotle called one in a primary sense, in seeing the unity

of a particular house together with its account or nature of being a house. What is notably different in

Plotinus account is his emphasis on unity by itself as the basis of a things existence: although the army,

house, and ship have their respective accounts in being of that kind, which Aristotle might say is their

one, Plotinus lays emphasis on the one in each case as a kind of distinct, prior principle which makes

possible their existence. The world soul is an example of this, which for Plotinus is responsible for the

rational organization of the universe and not simply for that of animate bodies.25Although the world

souls nature may be defined by its various powers under its one nature as soul, something else prior

must impart that unity, or one, to the world soul in keeping it in existence. 26


14

25OMeara 18-9.

26Enn.VI.9.1.39-43: and then the soul is many, even the soul which is one, even if it is not composed from

parts; for there are very many powers in it, reasoning, desiring, apprehending, which are held together by the oneas by a bond. So the soul brings the one to other things being also itself one by something else: it too experiencesthis unity by the act of another.


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Because Plotinus considers unity as something prior which forms the ground of existence for things,

we may consider this to be what Dominic OMeara calls the principle of prior simplicity: the idea that

everything made up of parts, every composite thing, depends and derives in some way from what is not

composite, what is simple.27This is further elaborated by Plotinus inEnn.V.4.1:

For there must be something simple before all things, and this must be other than all thethings which come after it, existing by itself, not mixed with the things which derive fromit, and all the same able to be present in a different way to these other things, being reallyone, and not a different being and then one; it is false even to say of it that it is one, andthere is no concept or knowledge of it; it is indeed also said to be beyond being. For ifit is not to be simple, outside all coincidence and composition and really one, it could notbe a first principle; and it is the most self-sufficient, because it is simple and the first ofall: for that which is not the first needs that which is before it, and what is not simple isin need of its simple components so that it can come into existence from them. (Enn.V.4.1.5-15)

One can see a certain similarity to Aristotles understanding that there is a causal dependence on the

highest kind of being for all beings, which for Aristotle is the unmoved mover. So likewise here, a prior

principle which is absolutely simple must exist which is responsible for the existence of all things.28

What Plotinus calls the One must then be the first principle ("#$%) from which all things ultimately

derive their existence.29Also as with Aristotles unmoved mover, the One functions as a final cause, 30

however since it is the source of unity and imparts that unity to other beings, the One is also more

directly an efficient cause.31Although closer to being an efficient cause compared to Aristotles unmoved

mover, but unlike theexample of the doctor imparting health to the patient, the One is a cause of unity

in a distributed way through its direct production of Intellect, followed by the subsequent productions

of the world soul from Intellect and matter from the world soul.32Plotinus also differs from Aristotles


15

27OMeara 44.

28OMeara 45.

29Enn.VI.8.8.8-9: for all noble and majestic things come after it. For he [the One] himself is the origin ("#$%)of these; yet, all the same, in another way not their origin ("#$%). As to why Intellect is not identical with

Plotinus One will be further shown ahead with the requirement for differentiation and distinction of some kindin Intellect.

30The Ones final causality can be seen in 1) the souls desire for participation in the intelligible realm andultimately union with the One (Enn.VI.7.20.14-20, IV.8.1.1-7), and 2) Intellects thinking on itself, which forPlotinus implies desire for the Good insofar as thinking implies movement (Enn.V.6.5); thinking as a kind ofmovement is discussed below in Ch. 2.4, pp. 28-30. Further discussion in Bussanich 51-7.

31As Bussanich 46 notes: To the Ones efficient causality can be applied the counterfactual conditional: withoutthe cause the effect would not have occurred (IIL8.10.I-2, IV.8.6.I-3, V.5.9.1-4). Most importantly, the simple andnoncomposite One is conceived as the cause of the existence of all complex and composite things (III.8.11.40; V.2.1.7-8, 13-14; V.3.15.28-30, 17.12; V .5.5.5-7; VI.6.13.50; VI.7.32.2; VI.8.19.12- 20). It is the cause both of thingscoming into existence and of their being sustained in existence by continuous participation in the One (V.3.15.12,

17.8-9; VI.7.23.20-4, 42.11).

32Enn.V.2.1.8-18. See OMeara 60-8, n. 33 below.


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understanding of efficient causality with his theory of two acts: for Plotinus, all things are characterized

by an internal activity constituting their being and a subsequent external activity productive of another

being.33Thus in the case of the One, although unlike any being, its production of Intellect through its

external activity is a natural outcome of it possessing a kind of internal activity constituting its being

although in a way that still denies any multiplicity.

We may also note in the passage above that, because the One is absolutely simple and without

complexity, Plotinus stipulates that it must be beyond being, which implies that there is no concept or

knowledge of it, since our language, in implying concepts of being, also implies multiplicity. Yet what

enables Plotinus to consider the existence of a principle of unity over and above all being? In Aristotles

case, the unmoved mover as the highest, most active kind of being is consequently the most simple on

his understanding. For Plotinus, however, this is not enough: because all beings are kept in existence by

some prior cause which is more unified and one, this must eventually lead to a first principle which is

absolutely one and without any multiplicityultimately something beyond any kind of being. This

understanding is considered in a thought-experiment inEnn.VI.9.2, where Plotinus supposes otherwise

that the one and substance are the same:

Is it, then, true that for each of the things which are one as parts its substance and itsone are not the same thing, but for being and substance as a whole substance and beingand one are the same thing? So that anyone who has discovered being has discovered theone, and substance itself is the one itself: for example if intellect is substance, intellect is

also the one since it is primarily being and primarily one, and as it gives the other things ashare in being, so in the same measure it also gives them a share in the one. (Enn.VI.9.2.1-8)

Here, Plotinus puts forward the hypothesis that substance and being taken as a whole (whether in

account or nature, for instance) are equivalent with being the one. If this is the case, then if we go

towards what is primary beingultimately Plotinus Intellect as the highest beingwe will also come

across the one itself.34Continuing with the analysis, Plotinus finds reasons to question identifying unity

with substance and being in his thought-experiment:


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33Enn.V.4.2.27-39, esp.: In each and every thing there is an activity which belongs to substance and one whichgoes out from substance; and that which belongs to substance is the active actuality (8+9#:;1() which is eachparticular thing, and the other activity derives from that first one, and must in everything be a consequence of it,different form the thing itself. See Bradshaw 74-8, OMeara 62-5, Bussanich 46-51 for general considerations ofthe Plotinus theory of emanation (or two acts). Bussanich 48 also nicely sums up the difference of the Onesefficient causality from Aristotle: Plotinus employs the physical model of property-transmission to explain thefirst stage of the Ones generation of Intellect: the procession of potential Intellect. Aristotle's first principle, thePrime Mover, can not be the universal efficient cause because its actuality cannot be directed outside itself. But itsfinal causality determines the structure of the second stage, the change from potential to actual Intellect: on thecognitive model the mind actually thinks when actualized by the object of thought and desire.

34

As with Aristotles divine intellect, Plotinus Intellect is responsible for the existence of things, although unlikeAristotle, it thinks the forms which are distributed to all beings through the mediation of the world soulthusbeing more responsible for the being of all things as the source of the forms. Discussed further on pp. 25-7.


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For what can anyone say that [the one] is besides being and intellect? (1) For it is either(a) the same as beingfor man and one man are the same thing or (b) it is like a kindof number of the individual; you say one of a thing alone just as you say two things.(2) Now if number belongs to the real beings, it is clear that so does the one; and wemust investigate what it is. (3b) But if numbering is an activity of soul going through

things one after another, the one would not be anything factual. (3a) But our argumentsaid that if an individual thing loses its one it will not exist at all. We must therefore see ifthe individual one and individual being are the same thing, and universal being and theuniversal one. But if the being of the individual is a multiplicity, but it is impossible forthe one to be a multiplicity, they will be different from each other. At any rate, man andliving being and rational are many parts and these many are bound together by the one.Man and one are therefore different, and one has parts and the other is partless. (Enn.

VI.9.2.8-21)

In (1), Plotinus begins by considering the one either as (1a) the same as being or as (1b) a number.

Numbering, however, is consequent on real beings, where one counts from a number of beings, so the

one as a number must also be consequent on being (2). If however the one is a number on this

reckoning, it is impossible to see what the one is by itself when it is just like any other number in the

souls going through things one after another, which implies it could not be a number in this sense (3b).

The next step is to consider the one as equivalent to being, however this is already a problem: if we

take away a things one or unity, we also take away its being, as implied earlier (3a). 35The consequences

for this are bourne out in seeing that multiplicity characterizes both the individual and the universal,

either in the individual possessing multiple parts and powers, or in the universal possessing various

definitions (such as man implying living being and rational). As we saw earlier, the one must then besomething prior to beings and absolutely partless and thus beyond all being in theform of the One. As

we will eventually see, even Intellect which was characterized as primary being and primarily one could

not be the unqualified One since it is a multiplicity of some kind.

Compared to Aristotle, Plotinus goes much further in emphasizing the first principles simplicity

above and beyond any positive kind of being. Exact description is then impossible, since Plotinus One

is always beyond comparison with any being; even to refer to it as the One is to speak in an improper

way, since this only indicates that something beyond description is the first principle of all beings. Animportant factor to consider in Plotinus account is that any implication of multiplicity, even if a being

like Intellect is completely in act and without potentiality, necessitates that the One must lie beyond that

being. The admission of differentiation in Intellects activity of thinking for Plotinus will eventually be

seen to reinforce why it must be a multiplicity and not the first principle.


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35This can already be seen in the army, house, ship examples inEnn. VI.9.1.1-8.


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1.4 Conclusion: Comparing the Unmoved Mover and the One

Having seen Aristotles and Plotinus conceptions of the first principle and its simplicity, we must see

how much each accounts for the existence and being of all things. One conclusion to Aristotles

unmoved mover as the first principle is that it primarily serves as a final cause: the second kind ofsubstance, that which is eternal and imperishable, imitates the eternal activity of the unmoved mover in

its eternal motion, which in turn functions as the cause of coming-to-be and corruption in perishable

substances.36The unmoved movers simplicity is a consequence of it being the most active and complete

kind of substance, and thus the highest kind of being. Yet, unlike Plotinus, a beings one for Aristotle is

synonymous with its nature: because substance is the first, primary kind of being, the existence of

substance is explainable according to its form or nature, without reference to a prior unity. As we saw

with Plotinus, on the other hand, a things existence must ultimately be grounded on a prior, more

simple principle which eventually leads to the One. The nature or form of something is not enough to

explain that things existence without unity being imparted to it from some prior being, on this

reckoning.

Already we can see that Plotinus One does more in explaining the existence of all beings as both an

efficient cause and a final cause for all beings. By being the ultimate source of unity and in imparting

unity to subsequent beings through its production of Intellect, the latters production of the world soul,

and ultimately the latters production of matter, the One plays a more direct cause of the existence of all

things.37Aristotles unmoved mover only explains how all beings are kept in existence through either

their continuous motion as the eternal heavenly bodies, or through their continuous coming-to-be or

passing away as perishable substances of a certain nature. While Aristotles first principle only accounts

for final causality in the latter case, Plotinus first principle accounts for both final and efficient causality.

On this understanding, Plotinus positing unity as a distinct factor in a things existence goes further than

Aristotle who sees simplicity, or unity, as referring to a things nature.

The role that Plotinus One plays in being the source of unity, and subsequently in being absolutely

simple and without any distinction, will influence how Plotinus sees Intellect as not being simple.

Although Intellect is completely active like Aristotles divine intellect, Plotinus sees a necessity to

introduce differentiation within Intellects activity which makes possible its thinking on itself. For

Aristotle, by contrast, the unmoved mover being in complete activity denies any possibility for

differentiation, since differentiation implies potentiality in Aristotles ontology. Because of this,

Aristotles divine intellect must be completely simple on his understanding, since it is completely in act.


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36

Metaph.!.6.1072a7-18.37Enn.V.2.1.


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However, as will be seen in Chapter 3, there is a crucial difficulty in the divine intellect thinking on itself

if differentiation of some sort is denied. In the end, what can be seen between Plotinus and Aristotle is

that there is an equal emphasis on simplicity as an essential factor for the first principle; but the

characterization of simplicity as equivalent to activity, or as beyond being, factors into whether the first

principle is an intellect, for Aristotle, or beyond intellect, for Plotinus.


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Chapter 2:

Divine Intellect and Self-Thinkings Unity or Duality for Aristotle and Plotinus

Having considered unity and the nature of the first principle for both Aristotle and

Plotinus, we must next look at how both conceive of the divine intellect. Both see thatthe divine intellect functions as a principle of beings, but both differ on whether it is thefirst principle. Aristotles conception of the unmoved mover as the divine intellect willfirst be considered (2.1), and its relation to human intellect will be factored in (2.2).Plotinus understanding of the divine intellect with his Intellect as related to, and distinctfrom, the rational soul will also be considered (2.3). Finally Intellects necessitated dualityfor Plotinus will be considered (2.4).

2.1 Aristotle on the Unmoved Mover as Divine Intellect

Recalling the conclusion of Metaph.!.6 that the unmoved mover must be completely in act and not

imply any potency,38Aristotle uses this to show in !.7 that the unmoved mover causes motion by being

an object of thought and desirethus moving as a final cause.39As we saw in Ch. 1.1, the unmoved

mover being an object of thought comes about as a result of it being completely in act and the first and

best of all kinds of being. A subsequent conclusion from this is that the activity which constitutes the

actuality of the unmoved mover must be that of thinking. We see the premises for this built in the

following:

(1) And its life is such as the best which we enjoy, and enjoy for but a short time. For it is

ever in this state (which we cannot be), since its actuality is also pleasure. (And thereforewaking, perception, and thinking are most pleasant, and hopes and memories are so

because of their reference to these.) (2) And thought (>+T+T


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implying potentiality.41Because the mind thinks its object in act, it also indirectly thinks itself, since it

also becomes the object of thought in act when it thinksthus it shares the nature of the object of

thought. And in (3), while the mind normally has the ability to think its object, it is only fully active

when it has that object in act. This brings about the conclusion in (4) that the unmoved mover has the

best life as an intellect which thinks its object which it has identified with itself, and since it was shown

to be always in act at the beginning, the unmoved mover must then always be actively thinking its object

which is indirectly, if not directly, itself.

In premise (1), although it is not immediately clear how pleasure is linked to actuality, let alone the

kind of pleasure we enjoy in moments, we can see that the argument follows from Aristotles discussion

on pleasure inNicomachean EthicsX.4 as naturally complementing the best activity of a given sense in

relation to its object,42particularly so in the case of contemplation with its object of thought.43We also

see inOn the SoulIII.5 that the intellect which brings potential objects of thought into act is of its own

nature complete activity.44Since this kind of intellect is completeactivity, it would then make sense that

exercising it would bring about the highest pleasure, seeing thatpleasure is relative to the kind of activity

exercised. Because the unmoved mover is always in actor rather is, essentially, activitywe can see an

implicit link between its being completely in act and the nature of this act being the activity of intellect

which then implies the conclusion of premise (1), that it has the best and most pleasant life.

While Aristotle concludes that the unmoved mover as intellect is most active and complete by always

thinking its object, he does not yet make clear the direct object of thought, although implying that the

unmoved mover has itself at least as an indirect object. Aristotle raises this question inMetaph. !.9,

where he rules out the unmoved mover thinking either nothing45or something else less divine than

itself.46This leads to Aristotles conclusion that it must unchangeably think what is most divinewhich

is itself asthe activity of thought:


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41On the SoulIII.5 430a17-19.

42NE X.4 1174b15-20: Since every sense is active in relation to its object it follows that in the case of eachsense the best activity is that of the best-conditioned organ in relation to the finest of its objects. And this activity

will be the most complete and pleasant.

43NEX.4 1174b32-35: Pleasure completes the activity not as the corresponding permanent state does, by itsimmanence, but as an end which supervenes as the bloom of youth does on those in the flower of their age. Solong, then, as both the intelligible or sensible object and the discriminating or contemplative faculty are as theyshould be, the pleasure will be involved in the activity.

44On the Soul III.5 430a17-18.

45Metaph. 1074b17-18.

46Metaph.1074b18-21.


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Evidently, then, it thinks that which is most divine and precious, and it does not change;for change would be change for the worse, and this would be already a movement. First,then, if it is not the act of thinking but a capacity, it would be reasonable to suppose thatthe continuity of its thinking is wearisome to it. Secondly, there would evidently besomething else more precious than thought, viz. that which is thought. For both thinking

and theact of thought will belong even to one who has the worst of thoughts. Thereforeif thisought to be avoided (and it ought, for there are even some things which it is betternot to see than to see), the act of thinking cannot be the best of things. (3) Therefore itmust be itself that thought thinks (since it is the most excellent of things), and itsthinking is a thinking on thinking (0(5 V)31+> +T


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and object of its thinking by comparing this with, and distinguishing from, the case of human

intellection in Aristotles understanding.

2.2 Human and Divine Intellection Compared

In On the Soul III.4-5, Aristotle lays out his understanding of the intellect as a power of the rational

soul. In III.4, one key characteristic of the intellect is its ability to take on any of its objects without

being them, while the intellect must also become in some sense identical with each of its objects for

thinking to be possible.49Aristotle eventually expands this sense of the intellects potentiality to think

anything to include: a) the aforementioned pure potentiality of the intellect to become any object of

thought without yet thinking that object, and b) the kind of potentiality whereby intellect has already

become and thought its object of thought, like a scientist who, while not actively thinking about his field

at the moment, can easily think that which he has already come to know. 50The element of the intellect

responsible for bringing objects of thought to act, discussed in III.5, must then itself be purely active:

And in fact thought (+.NG), as we have described it, is what it is by virtue of becomingall things, while there is another which is what it is by virtue of making all things: this is asort of positive state like light; for in a sense light makes potential colours into actualcolours. Thought in this sense of it is separable, impassible, unmixed, since it is in its essentialnature activity (for always the active is superior to the passive factor, the originating forceto the matter). Actual knowledge is identical with its object (On the Soul 430a14-20)

The active intellectthat which is it what it is by virtue of making all thingsplays the same role thatlight does, insofar as light for Aristotle is the actuality of the transparent which in turn brings colour as a

sensible quality into act.51The transparent in this context, for Aristotle, is the medium by which the

sensible colour of something is communicated to sight.52So when, for instance, light illumines a room

with white walls, the whiteness of the walls is brought into full act through the transparent which is,


23

49On the Soul 429a14-18: The thinking part of the soul must therefore be, while impassible, capable of receivingthe form of an object; that is, must be potentially identical in character with its object without being the object.

Thought must be related to what is thinkable, as sense is to what is sensible.50On the Soul 429b5-9: When thought has become each thing in the way in which a man who actually knows issaid to do so (this happenswhen he is now able to exercise the power on his own initiative), its condition is stillone of potentiality, but in a different sense from the potentiality which preceded the acquisition of knowledge bylearning or discovery: and thought is then able to think itself. The distinction between the two senses ofpotentiality is an implicit reference to first and second potentiality, discussed further in On the Soul II.5417b30-418a2, where Aristotle distinguishes between the two senses like comparing the potentiality of a boybecoming a general with that of a man.

51On the Soul II.5 418b9-14. Wedin 141 notes that light for Aristotle is to be taken as a disposition and an activity:Light, I suggest, is strictly an activity, but one that might be called a dispositional activity. While it does not occur

without some colour, it need not occur as any given colour. Rather it is an activity which, while active, is

disposed to take different manifestations, and must manifest some colour.

52On the Soul II.5 418b4-8.


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itself, brought to act by the light. Thus in the analogous case of the intellect, the active intellects

presence brings the object of thought, which is potentially present, into act in the intellect. Yet we

should also bear in mind that, once the active intellect brings the object of thought into act, the intellect

in this instance becomes identical with the object of thought which is also in actthus the statement

that actual knowledge is identical with its object. Before this identity happens, however, the object of

thought exists separately as a mere potentiality to be thought and brought into act through the active

intellect.

Having looked at Aristotles account of human intellect in On the Soul, we should now see how this

conception of the human intellect compares with the divine intellect of Metaph.!.7, 9. It was already

mentioned from !.9 that the unmoved mover is completely in act and, as a consequence of this, thinks

directly on itself as the activity of thinking. An immediate difference here is that the divine intellect doesnot possess the capacity to think of any mere object of thought as the human intellect, so in this sense it

always has the active intellect component that we have, which we only exercise at certain moments in

our case. Its object of thought is always identical with itself, however, and in this it is not bringing its

objectwhich is itselfout of potentiality into actuality but is always active with itself as the

simultaneous object.

What of the subject-object distinction that we see with the human intellect? As we see inMetaph.!.

9, the distinction is one which ultimately does not exist for the divine intellect:

in the theoretical sciences the formula or the act of thinking, is the object [ofthought]. As, then, thought and the object of thought are not different in the case ofthings that have not matter, they will be the same, i.e. the thinking will be one with theobject of its thought. (Metaph.!.9 1275a2-4)

The subject-object distinction thus only exists in the human intellect, since it is abstracting and bringing

to act objects of thought which exist in potentiality in material things.53Because the divine intellect does

not have to do that for itself, since it is always in act and thus without matter or potentiality, the

distinction in the act of thinking disappears. We could say that a notional distinction exists in our

distinguishing the divine intellect, as a subject, thinking itself as the object of its own activity, but this

distinction does not exist within the divine intellect itself. Once again, it already becomes clear of the

degree to which Aristotles divine intellect is simple in its activity of thinking itself.


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53

On the Soul III.4 430a6-9: In the case of those which contain matter each of the objects of thought is onlypotentially present. It follows that while they will not have thought in them (for thought (X+.NG) is a potentialityof them only in so far as they are capable of being disengaged from matter) thought may yet be thinkable.


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2.3 Plotinus on Intellect

Turning now to Plotinus, we should first consider how he gets to the entity of Intellect as a principle

of reality in a roughly similar role to Aristotles divine intellect, from his conception of the souls relation

to intellection and the forms. An inkling into the souls connection and reliance on Intellect may befound inEnn.V.9.3, where Plotinus picks up on the theme of being as multiple and on the necessity for

a principle which imparts unity and existence to beings.54Considering natural things and the universe in

general, Plotinus then looks into that which brings together the matter into its unified formin the case

of man, for instance, it is the soul which brings together the multiple elements of the body into one

form.55However, Plotinus asks where the soul gets its form by which it molds and unites the matter.

Recalling that Plotinus sees soul as a general principle organizing all material entities and not simply as a

principle of living beings,56we next see that Intellect must be the prior cause of the forms from which

soul itself imposes forms on things:

then again that soul gives to the four elements the form of the universe, but Intellectprovides it with the forming principles, as in the souls of artists the forming principlesfor their activities come from their arts; and that one intellect is like the form of the soul,the one which pertains to its shape, but the other is the one which provides the shape,like the maker of the statue in whom everything that he gives exists. The things whichIntellect gives to the soul are near to truth; but those which body receives are alreadyimages and imitations. (Enn. V.9.3.30-37)

In imagery quite familiar from Aristotles example of the sculptor forming the bronze into a statue,57

Plotinus sees that soul is what is responsible for bringing form onto the four elements with various

physical compounds. Yet the soul by itself does not possess the forms, but rather there must be another

principle, Intellect, which informs the soul with the intelligible forms, or the forming principles.58Yet

why not suppose the soul to be the source of the forms? For Plotinus, soul is a thing subject to

affections and is also in the universe, since it informs and imparts the forms on to physical bodies.59We

can see this encapsulated inwhat Plotinus next says: For if what is in the universe is what is in body and


25

54Enn.V.9.3.9-11.

55Enn.V.9.3.15-21: And again you will be able to resolve the things put together by nature, those of them whichare multiple compounds and are called compositions, into the form imposed on all the elements of thecomposition: man, for instance, into soul and body, and the body into the four elements. And when you havefound that each of the elements is a compound of matter andwhat forms itfor the matter of the elements isitself formlessyou will enquire from where the form comes to the matter.

56OMeara 18-19.

57Physics II.3 195a5-8.

58OMeara 34-35, esp.: The wisdom shown by soul, Plotinus argues, in its ordering of things is not one belonging

by nature to soul. Soul is informed with this wisdom: soul can acquire and can lose it.

59Enn.V.9.4.13-16.


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matter, nothing will remain the same: so that man and the other rational forming principles will not be

eternal or the same (Enn. V.9.4.17-18). Intellect, then, must be outside the universe as the provider of

the forms which never change, so it must, itself, not be subject to change and time.60In asserting that

Intellect is the source of the forms, Plotinus is understanding the intellect rather differently from

Aristotle, who takes the intellect to abstract forms that exist in potentiality in material things, in the case

of human thinking, or to merely think the activity of thinking itself, in the case of divine thinking. In

Plotinus case, Intellect stands as a rational representation of the forms which fully exist in its thinking,

while the forms in matter exist as images of those which are actually thought by Intellect.

Plotinus further illustrates the existence of the separate, distinct Intellect inEnn.V.3.3 with the

human soul in discursive reasoning: just as sense perception conveys objects to us, so also does Intellect

convey the intelligible objects to us by which we have knowledge when we think on things discursively.61

Thus Plotinus words: [Intellect] is separate because it itself does not incline towards us, but we rather

look up towards it. Sense-perception is our messenger, but Intellect is our king (Enn.V.3.44-46). An

example of this is if, through various sense-perceptions of ducks, for instance, someone were to intuit

an essential property of ducks as two-footed, one would get this property from Intellect imprinting the

essence or form of duck on the reasoning part of thehuman soul from which one might infer the

essential property of being two-footed. Our reasoning in the human soul would place one intuition

received from Intellect together with another, while Intellect perceives all forms together without the

discursive manner by which we come to think things.62

Because Intellect functions as a source of the forms, we should inquire into how Intellect contains

and thinks the forms in Plotinus system. It was established earlier that Intellect, being outside the

universe and therefore eternal, must somehow possess the forms in being a source of them for the soul.

Like Aristotle, Plotinus asserts that Intellect must always be in act through its activity of thinking, and it

must not imply potentiality in such a way that it is not at some point in being: it must be the constant,


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60A source for this argument can be found in Alcinous Didaskalikos, inAlcinous: The Handbook of PlatonismIX.2-3,esp. IX.3.32-39: Whether God is an intellect or is possessed of intellect, he has thoughts, and these are eternaland unchanging; and if this is the case, forms exist. For if matter is unmeasured in its own right, it needs toreceive measures from something else superior to it and immaterial. But the former is true; therefore so is thelatter; and if this is the case, the forms exist as a type of immaterial measure.

61Enn.V.3.3.34-46.

62

Emilsson 183-184, esp.: The souls relation to Intellect is typically described by means of visual imagery: thesoul sees the Intellect and absorbs the content of what it sees. It cannot, however, absorb it all at once. It has todo it successively. This is why it is called discursive.


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eternal source and cause of the forms.63On account of this, Intellects thought must also not be subject

to changing in such a way that it brings the forms out of potentiality and into being, since this would

otherwise imply that something else must be the provider of the forms. Thus, it must always have the

forms with itself,64and in this it must always think them unchangeably and at once. In thinking the

forms which are in it, Intellect must then think itself, but it must think itself in such a way that it also

thinks the forms as one with itself and not as different or distinct from itself, otherwise implying the

earlier problem of change and potentiality.65Already we can see that Plotinus will need to work out a

way for Intellect to think itself in a way which does not imply potentiality but rather actuality, while it

must think on itself in a way which implies the multiplicity of the forms within it. Ultimately, this

question will be answered when Plotinus can explain how Intellect thinks itself in such a way that it

differentiates itself as subject and object in its thinking while still being one. This explanation we next

turn to.

2.4 Plotinus on the Necessity for Intellects Duality

Given the question of how Intellect thinks itself, we see an elaboration on the nature of Intellects

thinking inEnn.V.3.5:

If then [intellect] is active actuality (;Y ./+8+9#:;1(), and the first active actuality andthe fairest, it is the first intellection and substantial intellection: for it is the truest; but anintellection of this kind which is primary and primarily intellective will be the first

Intellect; for this Intellect is not potential, nor is it one and its intellection another: for inthis way again its substantiality would be potential. If then it is actuality and its substanceis actuality, it is one and the same with its actuality; but being and the intelligible are alsoone with the actuality. All together are one, Intellect, intellection, the intelligible. Iftherefore Intellects intellection is the intelligible, and the intelligible is itself, it will itselfthink itself: for it will think with the intellection which it is itself and will think theintelligible, which it is itself (+.E);1 :6#3Z+.E);1, [';#\+(H3TG, 0(5 +.E);1 32+.


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In the first half of the passage, Plotinus reaffirms that Intellect, which is the first of all beings and in

complete act or active actuality (8+9#:;1(),66is unable to be potential or have itself as one and its

intellection another, which would imply compromising being in act. Its activity must be self-directed: it

must think itself as the most active and intelligible of beings. However in the later half, Plotinus says thatit must think with the intellection which is itself (+.E);1:6#3Z+.E);1),67indicating the simultaneity

in which which it uses its own activity to think on itself as the intelligible object of its thought. Yet why

word it in such a way that it thinks with itself? This is a different way of describing how Intellect thinks

itself compared to Aristotle, for whom the divine intellect fully thinks in being simultaneously identical

to itself as the object of thought in act. The description of thinking with itself rather seems to add a

kind of differentiation to the process of thought for Plotinus. We get a clue to why Plotinus adds this

attribute to thinking with his statement on the necessary duality of Intellect thinking on itself:[Intellect] must therefore be one and a pairbut if it is, on the other hand, one andnot two, it will have nothing to think: so that it will not even be a thinking principle. Itmust, then, be simple and not simple. (Enn.V.6.1.13-15)

If any meaningful thought is to happen for Plotinus, there has to be a distinction of some kind between

the subject and object of thought. This much is admitted later inEnn.VI.7.40, when Plotinus states

generally: It is necessary to know and understand that all thinking comes from something and is of

something (5-6). Unlike Aristotle who sees that distinction between the subject and object of thought

does not apply in the case of things that have not matter (Metaph.!.9 1275a3), Plotinus makes theunqualified statement that a subject-object distinction must exist in all thinking. Thus, for Plotinus it is

not enough that Intellect is identical to itself as the object of thought in its activity, but rather Intellect

must have a way to internally differentiate itself as the subject and object of its own thinking.

While we have seen the necessity that Intellects thinking must be eternal, active, and therefore not

change, how is it possible for Intellect to differentiate itself in its thinking on itself? Recalling that

thinking is completely active for Aristotle, activity (8+9#:;1(), as opposed to motion (0A+


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implies going from a potential to an actual, complete state.68Aristotles divine intellect on this

understanding merely has itself in a state of activity in being identical to itself as the object of thought.

Plotinus, on the other hand, imports a kind of movement into Intellects activity to explain the

possibility for thought inEnn.VI.7.13:

but if [Intellect] was not in every way and for ever varied, in so far as it was not varied,Intellect would stand still. But if it stands still, it does not think; so that if it came to astandstill, it has not thought; but if this is so, it does not even exist. It is, then, thought;that is, all movement filling all substance (Enn.VI.7.13.38-42)

Covering cases where Intellect first thinks itself, and where, in thinking itself, it also thinks the forms,

Intellect is then varied in its thinking, so that if one denied variance, there would be no thought. But on

this picture, if there is variance and if Intellect is active, it must have movement in continually thinking

through the multiple intelligibles that it contains in itself, although in an undivided, non-discursive way

which might imply potentiality.69

Yet given Aristotles distinction between motion and activity, how does Plotinus maintain that there

is movement in Intellect which is otherwise pure active actuality? Unlike Aristotle, Plotinus maintains

that motion is a species of activity: it is not simply the indication of a being going from potentiality to

actuality but rather the particular manifestation of a substance as complete and in act:

For if movement is the activity of substance, and being and the primary generaaltogether are actively actual, movement could not be something incidental, but, beingthe activity of what is actively actual ("KKC8+9#:;1(./)( 8+;#:;A]), could not anylonger be called something which contributes to the completion of substance, but issubstance itself. (Enn.VI.2.15.8-10)

Plotinus modifies motion to mean that it is in some sense the substance itself in its completed state,

while it is a resulting activity of the substances active actuality. Movement does not then change a

things being in bringing it froma potential to an actual state but rather functions as a property of its

actuality.70This gives Plotinus justification to use motion in his account of thinking for Intellect, while it

still affirms the actuality of Intellect and negates potentiality being in it.

Although movement is one feature making possible Intellects internal differentiation in its thinking,

implied in the mention of being and the primary genera is Plotinus use of the five great

kinds (,9:1)3(:;+E) of Platos Sophistthat which is (being), change (or movement), rest, the


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68PhysicsIII.2 201b31-33.

69Emilsson 187-8. Emilsson 177-9 also points to the example of Egyptian likenesses on temple walls inEnn.V.8.6 (On Intelligible Beauty) as an overview of how Plotinus may imagine non-discursive thought in relation todiscursive thought in most human thinking when considering Intellects non-discursive thinking of itself.

70

Enn.VI.2.7.25-26, particularly where Plotinus points out that movement appears in the sphere of being, notas changing the nature of being, but rather in being as if makingit perfect. Also see Emilsson 34-8 onPlotinus response to Aristotle with his own understanding of motion in relation to activity (8+9#:;1().


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different, and the same.71Plotinus uses the great kinds to account for the other aspects of Intellects

differentiation while also accounting for its unity. Alongside the existence of movement, Intellects being

must be balanced by the presence of rest as another distinct aspect of Intellects actuality, since Intellect

does not change in its substance.72Difference must also exist if these first two aspects, movement and

rest, exist in distinct ways in Intellect, while sameness must also exist insofar as there is the unity of

Intellects substance in spite of the existence of difference.73Being thus also arises as another essential

aspect, since it is existing in the same state and in the same way and having a single definition.74In

Plotinus words, understanding the existence of the five kinds simultaneously existing within Intellects

actuality explains how Intellect can be a one-many (M+'.KK )that is, how it can ultimately be a

qualified simple activity while being multiple in the various real distinctions that exist within its one

activity.75

In seeing the five great kinds at work, we can then return to looking at exactly how Intellect comes

to think itself. Putting together Intellects internal differentiation with seeing that it is one and the same

with its actuality; but being and the intelligible are also one with the actuality (Enn.V.3.5.41-42), we can

see this combination elaborated inEnn.V.3.6:

For in seeing the real beings it saw itself, and in seeing, it was in act, and its actuality wasitself: for intellect and intellection are one; and it thinks as a whole with the whole ofitself and not one part of itself with another. (Enn.V.3.6.6-8)

Re-iterating the point that Intellect is pure activity, we are reminded that Intellects activity of thinking isone with itself as its own object of thought, so intellect and intellection are one. Because all thinking

necessitates a subject-object distinction for Plotinus, Intellects thinking or seeing is then on itself as a

distinct objectbut in such a way that it is thinking itself as a whole withitself already as a whole. Unlike

how we might think of thinking as involving discrete parts between one part knowing another distinct


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71Sophist 254b-e. See Crystal 194-6 for further discussion of Plotinus use of the great kinds in Intellect.

72Enn.VI.2.7.26-28.

73Enn.VI.2.8.35-38.

74Enn.VI.2.7.30-31.

75Enn.VI.2.15.12-16: For being is not first being and then in movement, nor is it first being and then at rest; nor

is rest a passive affection of it; and same and other do not come after it, because it did not become manyafterwards, but was what itwas, one-many; but if it is many, it is also otherness, and if it is one-many, it is alsosameness. And these are enough for its substance. Also cf. Crystal 194-6.


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part, this is not the case for Intellect: because it thinks as a whole and not in a discrete manner, its

thinking could not possibly be in a part-part relationship, but rather in a whole-whole relationship.76

Plotinus elucidates this in discussing the analogy of light in the physical world and how that might

apply in the intelligible world:

For here below also sight, since it is light, or rather united with light, sees light: for it seescolours; but in the intelligible world seeing is not through another [medium], but throughitself, because it is not [directed] outside. Intellect sees one light with another, notthrough another (_KK`./+aW35 _KK.a*G X#b, .H=1C_KK.@). Light then seesanother light: it therefore itself sees itself. (Enn.V.3.8.20-24)

In the physical world, then, the object of sight is the colour, and it is through the medium of light,

which is separate and distinct, that sight sees colour.77In the intelligible world, because there is no

substantial distinction between the intelligibles and Intellect, and because there is no distinction between

Intellect and its thinking or seeing, Intellect then sees itself through the medium which is itself. In

other words: Intellect as the subject of thought (I1) thinks itself asthe object of thought (I2) through the

activity of its thinking.78There is, then, a distinction between the states of Intellects thinking (I1 and I2),

while the states refer back to the one, same activity of Intellect. As seen earlier, Intellect differentiates

itself in thinking on itself through the five great kinds of being, particularly movement, that exist

within it, while it remains one in its activity and thus one in its substance. This makes it possible for

Plotinus to say that Intellect thinks itself as one being, while a connotational but real distinction exists in

Intellect differentiating itself as the subject and object of its own thinking. The ultimate conclusion tothis is that Plotinus Intellect, compared to Aristotles divine intellect, is qualifiedly simple as a one-

many (M+'.KK ) but not absolute simple in the way that Aristotles divine intellect is. It remains for us


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76Crystal 192-4, 196-201, shows how Plotinus, here, is implicitly responding to Sextus Empiricus, who raises areductio ad absurdumargument against self-thinking according to part apprehending part or whole apprehending

whole, where the absurdity in the latter for Sextus lies in the simple identity of subject and object: For if as awhole it apprehends itself, it will be as a whole apprehension and apprehending, and the apprehending subjectbeing the whole, the apprehending object will no longer beanything; If as a whole, the object sought will be

nothing (Sextus Empiricus,Adversus Mathematicos, VII 311-312, in Crystal 193).

77One can already see a strong familiarity to Aristotles light analogy in On the Soul III.5 and the discussion of lightand colour in On the Soul II.5 (418b9-14), although Plotinus describes light as being, itself, the mediumnot justthe actuality of the transparent medium for Aristotle. See Crystal 201-3 for further discussion on the light analogyin Plotinus and its relation to the intelligible world.

78Crystal 203, on the question of how to understand with in Intellect seeing withitself: I understand the withto mean that the intellect itself, in addition to being the first light (a*G), i.e. the intellectual subject, is the otherlight (_KK`aW3A) qua+T


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to us see the consequences for this and to consider which account better appropriates the nature of the

divine intellect either as absolutely simple or as a duality.


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Chapter 3:

Comparing Divine Intellects Self-Thinking and Simplicity

Between Aristotle and Plotinus

Having considered Aristotle and Plotinus on their understanding of the simplicity, orduality, of the divine intellect, we must next determine who offers a more coherentaccount. The general question of the necessity for a subject-object distinction will bediscussed first, in which problemswith Aristotles account will be outlined in comparisonto Plotinus (3.1). A reconsideration of Aristotles account will consider whether thedivine intellects properties of thinking are essentially different from that of humanthinking (3.2). Finally, in seeing that all thinking necessitates some form of a subject-object distinction, Plotinus metaphysics which allow for a distinction while holding toIntellects actuality will show that his account of the divine intellect as a duality isjustified over Aristotles account (3.3).

3.1 The Epistemological Necessity for Identity and Distinction

One common point that has been present in the discussion of intellection and thought is the

relation between subject and object of thought. A general agreement between Plotinus and Aristotle

seems to be that this relation should involve some sense of identity, while at least Plotinus sees that a

simultaneous distinction is a necessary condition for thought to be possible. Both would at least agree

that in the case of objects external to the intellect distinction necessarily exists, while some form of

identity of the object with the subject must exist for understanding to happen. When it comes to

intellect directly thinking itself, there is the question of whether this subject-object distinction should

exist. In considering a strict logical form of identitye.g., x is xa danger exists that mere identity

without distinction in thinking implies triviality and would undermine intellection in general, especially in

the case of self-intellection. Both some form of identity and distinction must be maintained, as Ian

Crystal notes:

From a causal point of view, intelligent subjects, inasmuch as they are the subject of theintellectual activity, have the capacity to undergo a specific sort of affection. The subjectis acted upon. Intelligent objects, by contrast, are not affected but rather bring about an

affection in the subject. Thus, self-intellection requires that there be some sort ofdifferentiation between that which thinks and that which is thought. It also ent

plotinus and aristotle on the simplicity of the divine intellect

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