plato lecture 1 politics in ancient athens: the birth of...

Plato Lecture 1

Politics in Ancient Athens: The Birth of Democracy:

The Ancient Greeks invented the idea and the practice of democracy. Of course, they invented the

word too: ―the rule of the people‖. The classical origin of democracy as an idea and as a form of

government is in Athens in the 5th

and 4th

centuries B.C.

Some ancient Greek societies had a sort of democratic political system and thought democracy was

a ―good thing‖. But for 2,000 years or so after that, most societies in the world were not democratic at all,

and most people who thought about it believed democracy to be a ―bad thing‖. The main figures to discuss

the theory of democracy—for our purposes—Plato and Aristotle—were anti-democratic thinkers.

The Polis.

Athens, like other Greek towns, was an independent city-state, the Greek world for this is

Polis. The central unit of government was very small, so that every full-

fledged member could participate in its affairs.

In the fourth century B.C., there were huge empires in Persia and Egypt, but in Greece there was a

distinctive type of small institution with an accompanying strong sense of community. This was the polis.

The Greek word ―polis‖ is the root of our words ―politics‖, ―political‖, ―politician‖, ―policy‖,

―police‖,…and ―polo‖. (Actually, that last one probably comes from ―pulu‖, the Tibetan word for ―ball‖).

The best translation for ―polis‖ is ―city-state‖.

Compared to modern nation-states, the average Greek polis was small. Athens, for instance, one of

the biggest of the ancient Greek city-states, had approximately 40,000 citizens as part of a total human

population of about 300,000 (including women, children, foreign residents, and slaves). So, the absolute

numbers were roughly the same as London, Ontario today, although the entire citizen-population could fit

into the TD Waterhouse Stadium.

Some of these citizens were very wealthy; others were poor peasants. The society was

characterized by significant equality before the law as well as considerable freedom of speech. Every

citizen had the right to address the ecclesia, that is, the assembly of all citizens, which met around 40 times

a year for 12 hour sessions in which citizens raised their hands to vote. In addition to this ecclesia, there

was also a Council of 500 people, chosen by lot, with a regularly rotating membership, and which prepared

the issues to be discussed in the assembly.

The other important institution was the courts, whose juries were chosen by lot, usually numbering

around 500. (At Socrates‘ trial, there were 200 jurors). These were not only regular juries as we know

them; they also reviewed the work of the Assembly.

Athenian Democracy.

Greek democracy was direct and participatory. The Assembly and juries were open to all citizens,

and attendance at them was paid. Athenian democracy was both more and less democratic than today‘s

democracies. It was more democratic in that all citizens took a direct part in the main decisions affecting

them—this is direct democracy—whereas today‘s democracies are indirect or representative, that is, the

citizens stand at some distance from the decisions made, say, in a parliament or Congress, where decisions

are made by representatives.

Direct democracy requires a citizen-body small enough to meet in one place, and where each citizen

has enough time free of other responsibilities to enable them to deal properly with arguments for and

against proposed policies.

But Athenian democracy was less democratic than modern democracies in that it restricted

citizenship to free-born males: women, slaves and resident foreigners were excluded. These groups did the

productive work that enabled the citizens to have the time to participate in political activity. Women in

Athens had little in the way of legal rights, and were more or less confined to their homes: their most

important job was to produce male children who would become future citizens and property owners.

Until the twentieth century, modern democracies also excluded many potential citizens: women, the

unpropertied, and so on, did not even get the vote until quite recently. And even today, many adult

residents of countries are excluded from political participation, even though they contribute hugely to the

productivity of the economy. (Think of the ―illegal aliens‖ in California and elsewhere in the developed

countries). Religion was the state religion. Also, the ―political‖ and the ―social‖ were not very sharply

distinguished, so that the Olympics involved representatives from the different cities.

Some Greek city-states were tyrannies, some were oligarchies (Sparta is the most notable oligarchy;

it fought and defeated Athens, the greatest democracy, in the Peloponnesian War of 431-404 B.C). But in

all cases, public and private affairs were mingled together. It was the role of the state to provide for the

moral education of its citizens.

Our first theorist, Plato, was no democrat. He didn‘t much value liberty, thought equality was only

valuable if it was amongst equals, and valued solidarity but thought it was best achieved by a kind of social

unity in which democratic equality is specifically ruled out.

Socrates (469-399 B.C).

Socrates is the central figure in most of the Platonic dialogues. He was an Athenian, born in 469

BC. He is reported to have been fairly funny looking, with a snub nose and big bulging eyes, and he could

hold his liquor better than most.

Amazingly, Socrates wrote nothing. For us, he speaks in the works written by one of his followers,

Plato. Socrates didn‘t subscribe to any particular philosophical or theoretical doctrine. (In the Republic,

Socrates does offer some positive doctrines, but it‘s generally agreed that these theories are Plato‘s

invention rather than Socrates‘ own views. The Socrates of The Republic, Book I, is probably pretty close

to the real Socrates). He cross-examined his fellow Athenians about their moral and political assumptions,

and he made a lot of people angry (largely by questioning their confidently held but poorly thought-out

beliefs). He seemed concerned most of all to follow an argument wherever it might lead. This attitude

reflected his deep commitment to discovering the truth, whatever it might be.

The Oracle at Delphi, a significant religious authority, called Socrates the wisest man in Greece.

Since Socrates claimed to know that he wasn‘t wise, he sought out men with reputations for wisdom, but he

found—after pestering them and exposing their confused thinking—that none of these people knew what

they thought they knew. Socrates therefore took his own wisdom to consist in this: ―…I don‘t think that I

know things I don‘t know‖ (Apology, 21d). Socrates made questioning, philosophical activity his life‘s

work: as Socrates himself puts it: ―…the unexamined life is not worth living for a human being‖ (Apology,

38a). He wanted to discover the truth by appealing to argument rather than traditional authority.

He was tried for corrupting the youth and not believing in the city‘s gods, and he was convicted and

sentenced to deal. (On this, see the Apology, Crito, and Phaedo, in The Trial and Death of Socrates).

Plato Lecture 2

Life of Plato (427-347 B.C).

Plato was born into an aristocratic Athenian family in 427 B.C, when Socrates was 42 years old. At

the age of 20, Plato joined the group of people who followed Socrates around; the years he spent as a

follower of Socrates had a huge influence on Plato‘s subsequent development. There were no universities

in those days, so obtaining a higher education involved associating with sophists (itinerant teachers).

As we know, ancient Athens was a democracy. At the end of the Peloponnesian War (404 B.C),

that democracy was overthrown by a group of conservatives, including two of Plato‘s relatives, who ruled

as the Thirty Tyrants for nine months. When the democracy was restored, it was a vengeful democracy,

and in 399 B.C Socrates—associate of some of the tyrants—was tried and sentenced to death for corrupting

the youth and not believing in the Athenian Gods. This must have had an enormous impact on the young

Plato.

A few years later, Plato founded the Academy, and institution resembling a modern research

center. (Our word ―academic‖ comes down to us by way of the influence of the Academy as the first of its

kind in European cultural history). Plato remained head of the Academy until he died in 347 B.C.

Plato is one of the finest writers of Greek prose, and he is considered to be among the greatest

philosophers who have ever lived. His works are all in dialogue form, conversations, that is, between two

or more people.

Overview of The Republic.

Here is a very rough outline of the main topics covered in The Republic. The dialogue begins by

addressing a question, ―What is justice?‖ Several participants try to answer the question, but Socrates tries

to show them that their views are inadequate. After a heated discussion with Thrasymachus, Socrates then

spends the remainder of the dialogue setting out his own answer to this question and the related one, ―Why

be just?‖

The account describes how justice is harmony between parts of the soul (or person) and—

analogously—between classes of people in the city or polis, with each part or class fulfilling its proper

role. A well-ordered soul or city is a happy soul or city, so justice is conducive to happiness (So, everyone

has a reason to be just).

The just polis is ruled by philosopher-kings. Philosophers are those who possess knowledge of the

Forms, and only a select few are capable of possessing knowledge in this sense. The best form of state,

therefore, will be a form of ―rule by the best‖ rather than ―rule by the many‖. Plato rejects democracy,

therefore, in part because it is an unjust form of rule.

Here is a tip: to get an overview of the Republic, try reading Reeve‘s short introductions to each of

the ten books or chapters in the Hackett edition. It‘s certainly no substitute for reading Plato, but it will

give you some sense of the bigger picture.

By the way, you should know about Stephanus Numbers and Letters. These are the traditional

means of identifying passages in Plato. Their origin is a scholarly edition of Plato‘s collected works (the

Republic runs from 327a-621d).

Plato Lecture 3

Glaucon and the Conventional Origins of Justice.

Reading: Book 2, 358b-362C (pp.34-38 in Grube/Reeve translation, Hackett).

In Book2, Glaucon makes a distinction between three kinds of goods, and links this distinction to a

challenge to Socrates.

The three kinds of goods are as follows:

1) Goods we desire for their own sake (―harmless pleasures‖—Grube/Reeve translation). Modern

example? Watching a good movie;

2) Goods we like both for their own sake and for their consequences (―…knowing…and seeing,

and being health‖);

3) Goods that are burdensome but ultimately beneficial, and which we therefore desire only for the

results they bring (Examples: going to the doctor, working out, doing a job just to make

money—note that these are Plato‘s examples at 357c).

Glaucon challenges Socrates to show that justice is to be preferred to injustice. If justice is

to be recommended, it‘s because it‘s either good in itself and for its consequences, or good only for its

consequences. Socrates says that justice fits into category 2): justice is akin to health (in fact, in Book 4,

he likens it to mental health). Glaucon points out that the common view puts justice into category 3, and

he wants to hear Socrates‘ reply to Glaucon‘s argument that justice is good only for its consequences.

Socrates says that justice is valuable both for itself and for its consequences, but (according to

Glaucon) most people think you should be just only for popularity and reputation, that is, only for its

consequences. After all, it‘s burdensome to be just.

According to Glaucon, justice is a compromise between the natural good of doing injustice and

the natural evil of suffering injustice. The evil is much worse than the good here, so people agree not to do

injustice so that they won‘t be a victim of it (358e-359a). The best state of affairs is to do injustice without

paying the penalty; the worst is to suffer injustice without being able to take revenge: people value justice

because they‘re unable to do injustice with impunity.

So Glaucon is arguing that the rules of justice arise from agreements between people, each

pursuing their own interests (358e-359b). Justice is valued only for its consequences: anyone who could

get away with violating the rules of justice would do so (as did the ancestor of Gyges with his invisibility

ring) (359b-360d). In other words, if they had the power to be unjust without getting caught, then they

would be unjust. Because people believe that the only reason to be just is to avoid suffering the socially

imposed consequences of getting caught acting unjustly, everyone would behave unjustly if they had the

magic ring (since they could guarantee not being caught).

It‘s natural for us to try to dominate others; but if everyone acted in this natural way, we‘re all

in danger of being exploited, so we have agreed to outlaw it: justice is based on convention, on a social

contract. As Plato memorably puts it, ―nature is forced by law into the perversion of treating fairness with

respect‖ (359c, Reeve translation). It benefits all of us to have rules of justice restraining our conduct, but

the best state of affairs is where everyone else abides by those rules while I violate them and get away with

it.

At 360e-362c, Glaucon asks us to compare the lives of two hypothetical people:

1) the just man who is universally believed to be unjust, and

2) the unjust man with a great reputation for being just.

The second man becomes rich, powerful, and well thought-of. The first person will be

―whipped, stretched on a rack, chained, blinded with fire, and, at the end, when he has suffered every kind

of evil, he‘ll be impaled, and will realize then that one shouldn‘t want to be just but to be believed to be just

(361e). In short, what matters is not whether you‘re just but rather whether you have a reputation for being

just. It‘s important only to seem to be just (361e). Glaucon wants Socrates to show that person 1) is

happier than person 2), which doesn‘t look easy.

Adeimantus adds that common opinion also maintains that it is a reputation for justice that

matters rather than being just (362e-363a).

The poets too (Homer, Hesiod) claim that ―justice and moderation are fine things, but hard and

onerous, while licentiousness and injustice are sweet and easy to acquire and are shameful only in opinion

and law‖ (363e-364a). So why should we be just when we can act unjustly with impunity?

Adeimantus challenges Socrates to offer an argument showing injustice to be the worst thing a

soul can have in it (366e), to show what justice and injustice do to those who possess them (367b), and to

explain what are the intrinsic benefits of justice to its possessor (367d).

The rest of the Republic constitutes Plato‘s reply.

The First Cities, The Naturalness of Justice (and the analogy between City and Soul).

From 368 (middle of Book 2) through to near the end of Book 4, Socrates tries to show that a just

soul that leads to just conduct also leads to a happier person. Since there‘s justice not only in the individual

soul but also in the city, Socrates proposes to focus first on the city and then on the individual (368)—the

theory of the Forms implies that the character or idea of justice will be the same in each case, and it is

easier to see bigger things than it is smaller ones.

Socrates aims to give an account of justice in the human soul, but he begins by saying that justice in

the individual is small and therefore hard to detect, and for that reason we should begin by investigating

justice in the city (368c-d). So he starts by describing the just city, that is, by giving Plato‘s political ideal.

Books 5 to 7 constitute a further development of some parts of the just city, and they include an

account of the most famous elements of Platonic metaphysics, i.e., his account of the nature of reality. In

Book 8, Plato eventually gets back to his argument that justice is better than injustice.

At this stage, in Book 2, we get the beginnings of parallel accounts of justice in the city and in the

human soul or personality. So, for Plato, there are important links between the individual and society.

People can be just only if they are raised in a just society: a just polis is a necessary condition for justice in

the soul.

Recall that the central questions of the Republic are: What is justice? How does it pay? How can we

make people just? Glaucon‘s story about the origins of justice stressed the conventional character of

justice, the idea that human societies are based on a consciously conceived compromise amongst people.

Socrates now offers an alternative history, aimed at showing that society and justice are natural, not

conventional. Again, the distinction is between a naturalistic account (described in terms of our needs and

lack of self-sufficiency) and an account of justice as artificial or conventional (something we created to

protect ourselves from being harmed by others).

On this alternative story, ―a city comes to be because none of us is self-sufficient‖ (369b).

Moreover, we all have basic needs for food, shelter, and clothing. We form communities to satisfy these

needs. We need farmers, builders, weavers, and cobblers: in short, there arises a division of labour (369d).

This division of labour is helped by the fact that we each have different natures, and we are naturally suited

to different tasks (370a). Each person should do the one task for which they are best suited, because that‘s

more efficient (370c). One person cannot do many jobs well (374a).

The principle of the division of labour is crucial to Plato‘s argument. Adeimantus says that justice

is to be found in the mutual dependence of the citizens on one another (372 a). Justice itself is each class of

person doing its own task.

The first city constitutes the original pattern of justice (443c) because in it everyone benefits

reciprocally from the division of labour and the exchange of goods and services (the division of labour

maximizes efficiency because it enables each individual to focus their activities on the work for which

they‘re naturally best suited).

Glaucon says that the first city is a ―city for pigs‖ (372d), not human beings. Socrates says that the

true city is a healthy one, but he‘ll go on to describe the sick city, the luxurious city. In addition to the

necessities already mentioned, the second city provides all the luxuries (from hookers, to perfume, to gold

(372e-373a)). Clearly, Plato frowns on the pursuit of luxuries, and later he creates a class of philosopher-

rulers who restrict the masses‘ desires for luxury.

If people are going to eat meat, they‘ll need more cattle, and therefore more land. Consequently,

we‘ll have to attack our neighbours to get their land; and they‘ll have to do the same. This is the story of

the origins of war. And since people are suited only to particular tasks, we‘ll need an army of professional

soldiers (373c-374a). Note that all of this stems from going beyond what we need to live well. It comes

from having adopted a misguided goal: ―the endless acquisition of money‖ (373d).

From 376c-412a, Plato changes tack: here we have his account of the guardians‘ early education.

At 412, the guardians are subdivided into two classes (see also 414b): the best are the rulers; the

others are their auxiliaries.

Tripartite Conception of the City (Book 3, 412ff).

The city is made up of three classes, each with its own function: first, the guardians, the ruling class,

rulers, philosopher-kings and queens; second, the auxiliaries (414b), the military class, who obey the rulers‘

orders and defend the city from its enemies (both internal and external)—the rulers and auxiliaries together

are referred to as the guardians; third, the farmers, traders, and craftsmen: the producers, the economic

class.

Plato describes in detail the city‘s educational system which, if it performs as it should, will ensure

that the auxiliaries remain loyal to the rulers and that the rulers make decisions in the common interest.

In order to get everyone to go along with this arrangement, the people should be told a myth, the

myth of the metals (414b-415c): your memory of your upbringing is a dream; the reality is that we were all

nurtured by mother-earth, and then we sprang up like mushrooms when she decided we were ready. So

we‘re all brothers, all children of the earth. And those who are fit to rule have gold mixed into them,

because they are the most valuable; silver is mixed in with the auxiliaries, and iron and bronze with the

farmers and craftsmen.

The main thing the rulers should guard against is the mixture of the metals in the souls of the next

generation (415b). (Later, at 546e-547a, Plato says that the intermixing of iron with silver and bronze with

gold leads to unharmonious inequality and war).

Of course, this myth is false. But it expresses Plato‘s ideal city: a human nature-based class system,

a strong sense of community across all three classes, and a ruling class which aims to preserve this

community and the accompanying class system. So we have the nature-based class system and social unity

based on a sense of community.

While this is anti-democratic, since the ruling class alone has a say in decision-making, it

nonetheless stresses social unity, so Plato would reject societies like the one described by Thrasymachus in

Book 1, that is, a class system where the lowers classes are exploited by the rulers. Plato thinks that the

greatest evil for a city is whatever destroys its unity (462a-b).

The guardians‘ function is to see to it that citizens do not want to harm the state and that external

enemies won‘t be able to harm it (414b). They do this by controlling education and reproduction, and by

preserving social unity.

Won‘t the guardians exploit the others? No, says Plato, because they cannot possess private

property beyond what‘s necessary (416d-e and 464 b-c). They‘ll live in common and believe that they

don‘t need ―human gold‖ because they already have divine silver and gold in their souls (416e).

Adeimantus asks: Won‘t the guardians then be unhappy? (419a) Socrates: They probably will be

happy (since they don‘t value mere material wealth very much), but in a way, this issue is besides the point,

since the aim is to make the whole city happy, not just one class (420b). And the guardians will be happy

because they preserve the whole city (465d).

Does this mean that Plato thinks we should aim at the happiness of the whole polis in the sense of a

―super-individual‖, distinct from and morally superior to the individuals who make it up? (See Karl Popper,

The Open Society and Its Enemies, p.76). No, says Gregory Vlastos (1977, 14ff). Accoding to Vlastos,

Plato is concerned to promote the happiness of the whole polis, as against the happiness of a particular

group within the polis: he never pits ―the whole polis‖ against ―all of the people within the polis‖ (Vlastos,

1977, p.15).

Wisdom, Courage, Moderation, and Justice.

The city is wise, courageous, moderate, and just.

The city is wise because the rulers (the smallest class, who possess wisdom) rule intelligently with

regard to the internal and external affairs of the city (428c-429a).

The city is courageous because its auxiliaries are brave; they will maintain their views about right

and wrong despite the temptations of power. The soldier class preserves true beliefs about what is to be

feared (429b and 430b).

The city is moderate because all three classes willingly accept their role in the community.

Moderation is ―a kind of harmony‖ (431e), it is ―agreement between the naturally worse and the naturally

better as to which of the two should rule‖ (432a). Again, it is moderate because the proper desires of the

superior few control the desires of the inferior many; the better class rules the city in the interests of

everyone (430d-432a).

The fourth and final virtue is justice, which is ―doings one‘s own work and not meddling with what

isn‘t one‘s own‖ (433a-b). Justice is everyone doing the job for which he‘s naturally best suited (433a).

Justice is the having and doing of one‘s own (433e-434a).

Justice is found where the money-making, auxiliary, and guardian classes each do their own work in

the city (434c).

Plato is not claiming that each individual should do the task for which he is best suited; he is saying

that class members should perform the tasks of this class. When important decisions are at issue, they

should be made by the philosopher-rulers whose role it is to consider the common interest. Injustice, on the

other hand, is meddling and exchange between the three classes (434b-c).

So, that‘s Plato‘s theory of justice in the state (the first part of his reply to Glaucon). He still needs

to give an account of justice in the individual.

The Greek work ―dikaiosune‖ doesn‘t translate precisely into our word ―justice‖. So is Plato

correctly regarded as having given us what we would call a theory of social justice? (See Vlastos, 1977, for

a defence of the claim that Plato is in fact offering a theory of what we could call social justice).

Tripartite Conception of the Soul, and Justice in the Individual.

The has parts and justice is each part doing its proper work: see especially Plato, Republic Book IV,

435c-442d (pp.110-18 in Hackett edition). Justice in the individual, for Plato, is ―psychic harmony‖, or

mental health.

The three parts are Desire, Spirit (Emotion), and Reason. Plato tries to show that there are three

parts of the soul by showing how inner mental conflict exists. Something and its contradictory cannot both

be true at the same time and in the same respect.

Plato is arguing for the claim that the soul has three parts or elements: reason, spirit, and appetite.

Immediately following this discussion, he repeats the soul-city analogy, claiming that justice in the soul

consists in rule by the rational part (as justice in the city consists in rule by philosophers, the lovers of

wisdom in whom reason rules).

There seem to be three distinct arguments here; when combined they amount to the claim that the

soul has three elements. All of the reasoning here depends, in part, on the principle of non-contradiction,

namely, that the same thing cannot display opposite characteristics at the same time, in relation to the same

thing (436b). For instance, someone cannot be both at rest and in motion in the same respect, at the same

time. Thus, if she is standing still but moving her arms, she is not both standing still and moving in the

same respect, since she is stationary (her feet are not moving) while her arms move.

Applying this principle to the case of the human person or soul, Plato points to familiar instances of

inner psychological conflicts to show, in each case, that there must be distinct elements at work within us.

The first argument is designed to show that reason is distinct from appetite or desire. If a human person is

a simple unity, then he cannot be both attracted and repelled by the same thing at the very same time. I

want a drink because I‘m parched: my appetites crave satisfaction in this way. But at the same time I might

believe that the glass in front of me contains polluted water that would make me ill. Hence, reasons Plato,

there must be something in me (my appetite) bidding me to drink while something else in me (my reason)

forbids me to do so (439c). Therefore, our soul contains a rational, calculating part, and an appetitive,

lusting, pleasure-seeking, irrational part (439d).

The logical principle of non-contradiction, used as a premise in this argument, is an extremely

plausible claim. It therefore constitutes a very solid supporting reason (when combined with other such

reasons). But is it the case that I simultaneously want and do not want to drink water that I believe to be

poisoned? One might say that what is actually happening is that I flip-flop back and forth, now wanting it,

now shunning it. If that is the case, the non-contradiction principle is no help to us here. On the other

hand, Plato might reply that this flip-flopping shows that there are soul parts because the reasons why we

experience both desire and aversion are different types of reasons. That is, the desire is purely concerned to

quench a thirst, while the aversion involves a chain of reasoning, say, about the polluted well from which

the water was taken. And it makes no sense to relate the latter sorts of reasons to someone considered

purely as a thirsty person.

Plato then argues that there is a spirited part of our souls, distinct from the appetitive part (439-40).

He uses the example of Leontius, who wants to look at a pile of decaying corpses (just for the thrill of it!)

but who feels ashamed of himself for having such a desire (after all, it shows disrespect for the dead).

Leontius‘s lowly appetites, in this case especially his sexual desires (see Reeve‘s footnote at 440a),

overpower his desire to act in accordance with the dignity of the dead, so he gets angry at himself. He both

wants to look (appetite) and doesn‘t want to look; when he does look, his spirited part becomes angry that

he has given in to his lustful cravings. In other cases, too, reason and appetite are in conflict while the

spirited element comes to reason‘s aid.

Even if we accept that there is a spirited element distinct from the appetitive one, we might question

the claim that spirit (emotion) always sides with reason against appetite. Aren‘t there cases in which we

might be angry with ourselves for acting with too much regard for long-term consequences, rather than

―giving in‖ to our appetites? If that reply is not persuasive, consider the claim that our emotional side

contains its own type of rationality. For instance, there are circumstances where becoming angry is the

rational thing to do (say, where someone has shown serious disrespect and violated the basic rights of

another person). In support of Plato here, one might argue that the so-called ―rationality of emotion‖ is

undeniable, yet that this is simply another way of saying that emotion is reason‘s ally: ―it is rational to

become angry in some circumstances‖ is just another way of saying that ―reason demands, in this case, that

one get angry‖.

The third argument maintains that reason is distinct from spirit. The simple supporting reason,

along with the non-contradiction principle, points to children, who possess spirit from birth but who

develop reason (if at all) only later (441a). One might worry here about Plato‘s claim that reasoning

abilities exist from the start, that is, the fact that these capacities develop over time does not entail that they

do not exist at birth. Moreover, one could argue that a person‘s noble emotions develop over time, that is,

the depth of one‘s courage or pride or indignation is in part a function of one‘s maturity. Plato might

respond by noting that these emotions are nonetheless qualitatively different from the kind of rational

calculation of interests associated with the rational part of the soul.

Justice in the Individual.

The just man doesn‘t let the parts of his soul interfere with each other or usurp each other‘s

functions. He has set his own life in order; he is his own master.

Reason is the seat of wisdom (441c), thumos is where we get our courage (441d), and moderation is

all three parts agreeing that reason should rule (442c-d).

A person with a properly ordered, that is, just soul, won‘t do anything regarded as unjust. This will

be the case as long as no parts of the soul meddle in each other‘s business (443d-444a). No meddling!

Unjust actions stem from one‘s soul being dominated by one‘s appetites. So anyone would realize

that being just is good in itself, because it is the condition of being mentally healthy. Justice is good for the

just person, not merely instrumentally or merely for others. The account is still incomplete, however,

because Plato hasn‘t yet told us the content of the knowledge possessed by the rational part of the soul:

what is it that is known?

Justice ―isn‘t concerned with someone doing his own externally, but with what is inside him, with

what is truly himself and his own. One who just does not allow any part of himself to do the work of

another part or allow the various classes within him to meddle with each other‖ (443c-d).

According to the traditional view, justice means not violating the rules, not taking unfair advantage

of other people, not cheating, and so on. Justice is understood in terms of what one should or should not

do. For Plato, however, justice has to do with the order or arrangement of one‘s soul. How much does it

matter that these are two different senses of justice?

Hobbes Human Nature

Reading: Leviathan Chapters 1-13; 17; Review and Conclusion

Hobbes‘s treatment of human nature is important to his argument. He will argue that in situations without

government, police and the rule of law people would find themselves in such a miserable condition that

they would create a political order which solved the problems that this condition generated. One important

consideration here is what people are like. Some people suggest that Hobbes has a dim view of human

nature, that he considers all people to be evil or entirely self-promoting and desirous of wealth and power.

To begin, consider the following passages: Ch. 13, Par. 10; Review and Conclusion, par.1-4; Ch. 17, par. 1-

12.

Virtual Seminar Questions: • Is Hobbes consistent here in how he portrays humanity?

• (Ch.1-4): How does Hobbes understand sense, memory, and imagination?

• (Ch.6): How does Hobbes understand voluntary motion and the will? (Keep in mind the definition he

earlier gives of imagination.) Do you agree with him? The full implications of these definitions

come later. See for example, Chapter 21 and the discussion of freedom.

Notice that desire and aversion are the key passions in everyone. We are either motivated toward things or

away from things or are indifferent and neither love nor hate particular things. In his mechanical portrayal

of human behaviour, the things we love quite literally move us, they ―corroborate our vital motion‖, they

give us a buzz. Hobbes doesn‘t tell us here what are the objects of our desire or aversion – and they differ

in different people – but he does say that the terminology of good and evil are subjectively attached to the

things we either desire or hate. This is in contrast to an objective science of virtue and good which he

elaborates in Ch. 14-15 (see especially Ch. 15, par.40.) and to which we will return in looking at his

treatment of morality.

Notice also the fact that among the passions of humankind which Hobbes elaborates are passions usually

associated with a positive view of human nature: for example, par. 22: ‗desire of good to another,

BENEVOLENCE, GOOD WILL, CHARITY. If to man generally, GOOD NATURE.‘

Everyone necessarily acts to pursue an apparent future good; but what we take to be good can be – as in the

case of Sydney Godolphin to whom Leviathan is dedicated – altruistic actions toward others. There are also

some people who are motivated by the passion of curiosity and the pleasure of learning and knowledge – a

pleasure, Hobbes tells us, which ―exceedeth the short vehemence of any carnal pleasure.‖

In Ch. 10, par. 1 Hobbes tells us that the ‗power of a man … is his present means to obtain some future

apparent good.‖ When he subsequently points out that everyone is generally inclined to a ‗perpetual and

restless power after power that ceaseth only in death‖, I don‘t think he is ruling out people like Sydney

Godolphin or Sister Theresa. Of course, nasty and selfish people will have a steady desire for power after

power after power in order to achieve what they take to be their ‗apparent future good‘. Yet, even altruists

need ―power‖ in order to achieve their ends; indeed, altruists like Sister Theresa need a steady progression

of powers in order to achieve their particular sense of ‗felicity‘. They won‘t be able to rest contentedly after

only one act of selfless generosity.

The things we desire have implications for our interpersonal relationships. Consider, for example, Ch. 11,

par. 3-6.

Virtual Seminar Questions: Explain Hobbes‘s position in the above passage (11;3-6)

***

The State of Nature as a State of War and Enmity Give special consideration to chapter 13; in it Hobbes reveals a critical feature of his argument, the state of

nature, or the natural condition of mankind. Hobbes will argue that the natural human condition –with

neither laws in place nor police to enforce compliance - would be a state of war. Life would be, ‗solitary,

poor, nasty, brutish and short‘. Given the compelling reality of that situation, people would necessarily

extricate themselves by devising a very particular kind of political solution. That solution is the Leviathan –

the artifice designed to address the problems of anarchy. But for Hobbes‘s argument regarding political

authority to be convincing, we need to examine his portrayal of the state of nature.

Virtual Seminar Questions: • Explain what Hobbes takes to be the inevitable causes of war in the natural condition of humankind.

Hobbes Natural Right and Natural Law

Reading: Leviathan, Chapters 14, 15, 31

Chapter 14 introduces a new kind of discourse to the work. Up until now Hobbes has largely been making

empirical claims. That is to say that he has been talking about the way things are or would be in given

situations: this is what science is, this is what humans are like, this is what the natural condition of humans

would be like, and so on. We might want to distinguish among the kinds of empirical claims he makes but

generally what they are not are normative claims. That is, they do not specify what ought to be the case in a

moral sense.

But here in chapter 14 we see the language of rights which is not about what people happen to do; rather, it

is about what they can be said to be entitled to do, what they are morally permitted to do. We see also the

language of natural law which suggests what people are obliged to do or even (although as we‘ll see, this is

problematic given the details of Hobbes‘s argument) morally required to do.

A lot of questions arise: where exactly do these normative claims come from? What argument or evidence

is used to sustain them?

It‘s a good idea to approach these issues with some attention to your own moral positions in order to start

the job of criticism. What do you understand by a right, if you accept such a notion? What is the basis of

moral obligation in your understanding? By trying to clarify your own position you will better be able to

address the claims that Hobbes is making.

Virtual Seminar Questions: Answer the following questions with regard to Hobbes‘s notion of a right of nature:

• What exactly is the ‗right of nature‘ for Hobbes?

• Are there any limits to that right?

• Do people have to respect the rights of others?

• What considerations do you think lead to this definition of right for Hobbes?

The Laws of Nature Natural Law argument had a long tradition in Christian thought prior to Hobbes. In most previous instances

the underlying assumption was that God, who ruled the world, gave legislation to people in two ways. One

was the way of revelation (ie the Bible) to those fortunate enough to receive it; this was called Divine

Positive Law. But what of those who did not receive revelation? The assumption here was that everyone,

believer or not, was obliged to act morally and the specific requirements of morality were available through

the medium of reason. What reason suggests, God commands.

Here in chapter 14 and 15 Hobbes‘s natural law argument invokes reason by way of devising a rational

solution to the problems of the state of nature-war. Some have portrayed the argument as a kind of game

theory model: what should a rational actor do if faced with the given situation of conflict that Hobbes

describes?

Virtual Seminar Questions:

• Make a [very] brief list of Hobbes‘s laws of nature. How would you characterize them generally?

• Do you agree with what Hobbes puts forward as the rational thing to do in the situation he describes?

Why or why not?

When you examine the specific details of Hobbes‘s Natural Law argument[s] in chapter 14, work out as

well an answer to the following more general questions:

• What is the basis of our obligation to follow natural law? (see especially Ch. 15, par. 36-38 and 40-41)

• Should we call the obligation involved in ‗doing what is necessary to conserve and defend ourselves‘ a

case of moral obligation?

• Is belief in God required to make the argument work? (see Ch. 31, and especially par. 5 and 40)

Hobbes Justice, Obligation and Contract

Reading: Leviathan, Chapters 14, 15

Contracts are important in Hobbes‘s argument:

· They are the means whereby people extricate themselves from the danger and

misery of the state of nature.

· They are the procedure by means of which obligations arise to other people.

· They lead to the principal understanding of justice

Commentators have noted the close connection between the concept of contract and that of freedom.

Usually, although Hobbes is something of an exception here, a contract is only deemed valid if people

freely enter into it. Duress, for example, is commonly understood to render a contract void. If I take a gun

to your head and suggest that you might want to trade your BMW for my loonie, most would say that this

would not be a free choice and any contract/agreement would be null and void.

By making the political order a creature of contract, Hobbes and the other contract theorists seem to imply

that the structure of our lives together is open to choice, an opportunity for the exercise of freedom. Notice

how this emphasis on freedom differs from Plato and Aristotle where the emphasis was more on

discovering the rational solution to politics and less on the issue of human choice.


• Explain the different kinds of contract in Hobbes‘s view; what, in particular, is a covenant of mutual

trust?

• Are there, on Hobbes‘s view, any valid contracts possible in the condition of nature? (Consider

especially Ch. 14, par. 27; Ch. 15 par. 1-5)

Obligation Note Hobbes‘s treatment of obligation in Ch.14, par.7. Political obligation for Hobbes – and this is a

common feature of modern political thought – arises from the choices we make. We are not born into our

obligations; they do not rest on the assumed inequality of humankind; there is not some natural aristocracy

which merits our obligation. If we are obliged to other people, we‘ve somehow agreed to it.

There is an additional treatment of obligation (natural as opposed to artificial obligation) which Hobbes

elaborates and which arises only in the relation between God and humankind. See Ch. 31, par. 5.

Virtual Seminar Question:

• Hobbes says that obligations arise from contract; and that we are obliged to enter into contracts with

others in order to create a sovereign. If obligations arise from contracts how does he explain our

obligation to enter into contracts?

Justice

Contracts also lead Hobbes to the concept of justice and this too is a peculiarly modern approach and

prominent, with various modifications, in many liberal understandings of justice. To get a good sense of the

point of Hobbes‘s position, consider the following question (suggested by Robert Nozick):

Is it just that Tiger Woods earns a gazillion dollars a year playing golf when a nurse barely

earns a living wage or when there are starving children whose basic needs are unmet?

Hobbes would say that justice occurs when valid contracts are honoured. If Tiger got what he contracted to

get, there can be no complaint about justice. Your just desserts are those you manage to negotiate. (Ch. 15,

par. 14): ―The value of all things contracted for, is measured by the appetite of the contractors”. (Although

note what he says immediately following about equity.)

Virtual Seminar Question:

It is not unjust, it would seem on Hobbes‘s view, that Tiger is extraordinarily well paid. How might Hobbes

approach the obligations we might nevertheless have toward the less fortunate? (Hint: keep in mind our

obligations to Natural Law and the logic of Hobbes‘s Natural Law arguments.)

Hobbes Authority and Sovereignty

Reading: Leviathan, Chapters 16 -31, especially 16-21; 27-30 [80pgs]

In Chapters16 and 17 Hobbes contends that the basis of sovereignty is the voluntary act (rather, the acts of

the many people in the yet-to-be community) of authorization which takes place in creating the sovereign.

One thing to consider in assessing Hobbes‘s position is the extent to which voluntary choice is

operationalized. Another thing to consider is the extent to which rational people would devise the sort of

political structures which Hobbes outlines. As we will see Locke did not think so, nor did Rousseau.

It is worth noting that Hobbes lived through a very difficult civil war in England and it may well have been

that experience which informed his political preferences. His greatest concern seems to have been anarchy;

hence, his desire to curtail the possibilities of civil strife.


• Explain the details of creating sovereignty by ―institution‖; why does Hobbes say that the Sovereign can

‗do no injury‘ to any of his/her subjects?

• How does sovereignty by acquisition differ from sovereignty by institution; is Hobbes warranted in

saying that both would be voluntarily chosen?

• Specify the powers over which the sovereign has authority? What limits or restraint applies to the

sovereign?

Explain the point of Ch.27, par. 28; and Ch. 26, par.24. What bearing do these passages have on Hobbes‘s

understanding of sovereignty?

Hobbes Freedom and Other Things

Reading: Ch. 6 [review]; Ch.21; Ch.24

Freedom In chapter 6 we saw that Hobbes explains the voluntary motion of human beings as motion which involves

the imagination. What we call endeavour is the interior beginning of the motion within us, but no motion is

self-caused and so, in effect, to endeavour is to be moved by something. Since the imagination is itself a

motion caused by other motions outside the body, this means that humans have no free will.

Hobbes nevertheless has much to say about freedom. What is his definition of freedom?

Virtual Seminar Questions: • Given his definition of freedom, in what sense are people free in the state of nature?

• Explain the point of Chapter 21, paragraphs 4-6.

• What liberties do subjects have against the sovereign?

• Explain the point of Ch. 21, par19.

Property Locke has much to say about property and in order to appreciate what is distinctive to his view it is worth

examining Hobbes‘s position. See Chapter 24

Virtual Seminar Question: • Explain Hobbes‘s understanding of property. Why and in what sense is there no property in the state of

nature?

John Locke State of Nature

Reading: • Macpherson‘s Introduction to the Hackett edition of the Second Treatise of Government

• Second Treatise, Ch. 1-6

Locke‘s argument is structured in a very similar way to that of Hobbes in Leviathan. Both men invoke a

‗state of nature‘ prior to or independent of formal government, invest it with certain assumptions and then

specify a set of political institutions which would solve the problems to be found there. For Hobbes, as we

saw, the principal problem of the natural condition was anarchy; the solution was a virtually absolute

sovereign. We might say that Hobbes‘s solution is Locke‘s problem. His concern is with tyranny and his

solution is to limit government according to the views of the majority of the community. We want to

examine and asses the arguments which bring him to that conclusion.

Chapter 1, summarizes Locke‘s argument in the First Treatise of Government against Robert Filmer‘s

position in a book called Patriarcha. Filmer had argued that political authority came by direct gift from

God to Adam and through Adam‘s successors to current monarchs; and, that the nature of political

authority was modeled on the kind of absolute and unquestionable rule that a [obviously very patriarchal]

father has within a family. Locke would contest both claims and the Second Treatise is his ‗essay

concerning the true original, extent and end of civil government.‘ He begins by clarifying the details of

what he takes to be the ‗state of nature‘.

Virtual Seminar Questions: • Explain what Locke means by ‗freedom‘ and ‗equality‘ [in addition to ch. 2, see paragraphs 54 and 57-

63]. How does Locke‘s position here compare with Hobbes?

• Explain the argument contained in the quotation from Richard Hooker which Locke cites in paragraph 5

as an example of a natural law argument.

• Explain the basis of his own natural law argument in par. 6.

• How does Locke distinguish the State of Nature from the State of War? (note as well par. 123: does this

suggest a ‗kinder gentler view of human nature?)

Locke Property

Reading: Second Treatise, ch. 5

One particular aspect of Locke‘s natural law argument is his treatment of property. Unlike Hobbes, he will

contend that property rules and rights are present in the state of nature. When governments are created they

will have the duty to protect and regulate those rights and Locke wants to emphasize the point that

governments neither create property rights nor are they entitled to deprive citizens of those rights

arbitrarily.


• Explain Locke‘s treatment of property in ch. 5.

• What is the basis of the right to property and how is it limited?

• Explain the significance of money to his argument.

• Is Locke justified in saying that ‗the turfs my servant has cut…become my property‘? [par.28]

• Does Locke‘s natural law argument necessitate private property and a capitalist market economy?

[consider his core natural law argument in par. 6]

• Explain the point of par. 120 and 134: do individual property rights take precedence over the interests of

the majority of the community?

Locke Paternal/Parental vs Political Power

Reading: Chapters 6-11

Robert Filmer had explained political authority through the model of the paternal authority of the

(obviously very patriarchal) family. Politics was like a family and the patriarch ruled unchallenged. Locke

as we‘ve seen wants to undermine that position. If it were to prevail there would be no basis for removing a

tyrannical ruler and no sense in which government would be accountable to the people. But Locke has a

problem; he is aware that, historically, ‗the father of the family…[did frequently become, as well] the

prince…‘ [par.74]; hence, the importance to his argument of clarifying the distinction between paternal and

political power. Do you think he is successful in establishing this distinction through his arguments? Are

historical facts pertinent to his argument?

Virtual Seminar Questions: • Explain Locke‘s distinction between paternal and political power. Should we construe Locke as a

feminist for treating paternal power as parental power?

• Explain the point of paragraphs 90-91. How does Locke differ from Hobbes here?

• What does Locke understand by a community aka commonwealth aka political society?

• Why do people form political societies? Compare Locke to Hobbes on this point.

• What does Locke mean by absolute, arbitrary government and what is wrong with it?

• What limits ought to apply to any government entrusted with political power?

Locke Political Institutions

Reading: Ch. 10, 12-15

From what Locke says in chapter 10 it would seem that there is more than one correct form of political

order and the majority of a community can specify a variety of legitimate forms of government. There is in

effect a two stage process to the formation of political institutions; something noticeably lacking in

Hobbes‘s formulation. Hobbes had said that there was no community prior to the creation of a sovereign;

hence, there was no community which could reconsider its choice of government. This is precisely what

Locke wants to amend; he wants to insist that government is a fiduciary trust and if the trust is abused by a

given ruler, it can be reassigned. In effect, Locke wants to establish a principle of popular accountability

which Hobbes thought would make political life impossible.


• Explain the various powers of the commonwealth [ch.12-13] and the relations among them. How do

these align with the political institutions of Canada?

• Explain what Locke means by prerogative. Has he reintroduced an arbitrary element to political rule?

• Explain the distinctions between paternal, political and despotical power. Is Locke‘s explanation of the

right to enslave others sufficient to justify the practice of slavery in the 17C – a practice which

some commentators have said Locke exploited. [see also ch. 4]

Locke Revolution

Reading: Ch. 16-19

Hobbes had argued that the fear that drives us into the institution of sovereignty is no different than the fear

which drives us to accept the rule of a conqueror who subjugates our country. Contracts entered into under

duress and due to fear are, he insists, still obligatory. He would say that they are voluntary since we could

have chosen to die instead. Locke was very much not impressed with this argument. Although not

published until the 1690s, Locke‘s Two Treatises of Government were written earlier and designed to

provide support for action against a ruler, James II, who had, on Locke‘s view, abused his trust.

Virtual Seminar Questions: • Explain Locke‘s treatment of conquest. How is it limited? How might Locke‘s argument apply to the

European conquest of territory in the Americas in the 17C?

• How does Locke distinguish between usurpation and tyranny?

What does Locke say about an individual right of resistance?

Rousseau The Discourse on the Origin of Inequality

Reading: The Discourse on Inequality: Dedication, Preface and Part One

Jean-Jacques Rousseau wrote a century or so after Hobbes and Locke and, like them, he is a contract

theorist. He is also very much an advocate of human freedom although in a way that moves beyond the

concerns of these predecessors in the social contract tradition. For Hobbes, the problem of freedom was

that of removing the obstacles to our private pursuit of felicity; his solution was a virtually absolute

sovereign to enforce the law and keep people to the observance of their contracts. For Locke the problem

for human freedom was the danger of tyranny and the unwelcome prospect of a ruler making off with our

hard earned property. His solution was to incorporate principles and institutions which would limit the

exercise of political power and render government accountable to the majority of the community. For both,

the domain of freedom is the private realm, the freedom to sow, to reap, to harvest, to build, to contract, to

trade and so on. For neither, is it necessary that citizens participate in government or lawmaking in order to

express their freedom. As we will see this is one of the important differences in how Rousseau envisions a

social contract.

The first work of Rousseau we will examine is the Discourse on the Origin of Inequality, (frequently called

the ‗Second Discourse‘) an essay submitted in a competition to the Academy of Dijon. The full title raised

the question not only of the origin of inequality among men but also of its possible justification in natural

law. In the course of his response Rousseau also takes us back to a state of nature – although one far more

primitive than envisioned by Hobbes or Locke. Rousseau also sets up a set of problems for human freedom

and well being in his state of nature, but he fails to provide much in the way of a solution. The social

contract he discusses in this work is more of a disingenuous ploy on the part of the rich and powerful to

consolidate their obviously illegitimate superiority [read: inequality] over the weak.


• Describe the earliest version of Rousseau‘s natural man in the Second Discourse. In what sense is he

free? In what sense is he a moral agent?

• How does Rousseau‘s state of nature differ from that of Hobbes and Locke?

Rousseau Discourse on Inequality (continued)

Reading: Discourse on Inequality, Part 2

Rousseau‘s natural state undergoes a number of transformations along with the human beings who inhabit

it. This historicity - if we can call it that - is predicated upon a principle of what he calls, with some irony,

perfectibility. The ironic aspect emerges when we consider that many of the transformations are

deteriorations. Although Rousseau does not counsel a return to the state of nature [in The Social Contract

he calls the natural man a ‗stupid, short sighted animal‘ Bk I,8] there is certainly some obvious praise for

the natural man [he never talks of the natural woman] who loses a good deal of independence in the course

of socialization. The loss of independence entails, obviously, dependence and that comes to sound a lot like

the loss of freedom even if, as in the case of family life, there are benefits that come with it.

If another sense of freedom is getting what you want then there is also a kind of freedom involved in

limiting your desires; if you don‘t want a Mercedes-Benz your freedom is not curtailed by not getting one.

Natural man who has few desires is rarely frustrated in getting what he wants and, lacking pride, is able to

move on to other choices if the first choice is blocked by others.

―Civilized‖ man, on the other hand, experiences much pain at the mere perception of contempt and much

incomplete satisfaction at the lack of what he certainly does not need. Perfectibility, in other words, leads to

a kind of slavery to an inauthentic self, living in accordance with norms established by others and

desperately ‗needing‘ things which it does not need and is blocked from getting. As Janis Joplin puts it: ‗Oh

Lord, won‘t you buy me a Mercedes-Benz; my friends all have Porsches, I must make amends…‘


How does Rousseau explain the rise of conjugal and paternal love and family feeling?

How does Rousseau explain the rise of jealousy and egotism?

How does Rousseau‘s treatment of property differ from that of Locke?

How does he depict the origin of political societies?

Rousseau The Social Contract (i)

Reading: The Social Contract, Bk 1

The Discourse on the Origin of Inequality does not, I think, provide a clear solution to the problem of

political order. Rousseau suggests that government should rest on a contract between people and ‗chiefs‘

but that this would likely lead to chaos unless religion was not ‗expediently‘ invoked to prevent the

resistance to the abuse of political power. Since he doesn‘t clarify the nature of popular sovereignty,

Rousseau comes across a bit like a cynical Lockean.

The Social Contract is a much more confident claim about political legitimacy. Its focus is less upon the

contract between people and ruler and more upon the agreement ‗by which a people is a people‘. Rousseau

believes he has found a ―legitimate and reliable rule of administration in the civil order‖. We‘ll have to

consider whether his confidence is justified.


• I-2 (Book One, chapter 2): Compare the first and last paragraphs of this chapter to Locke‘s argument in

the Second Treatise.

• I-6: How does Rousseau frame the problem to be solved?

• Is Rousseau justified in saying that the total surrender of the rights of each is ‗equal‘?

• What does Rousseau understand by sovereignty; how is it distinguished from government?

• Explain the distinction between possession and ownership. How does Rousseau‘s treatment of property

differ from that of Locke?

• Explain the distinction between natural freedom and civil freedom. What does Rousseau mean by saying

that people ‗shall be forced to be free‘?

What does Rousseau mean by moral equality?

J. S. Mill On Liberty

Reading: On Liberty, Chapters 1-3

John Stuart Mill‘s argument in On Liberty is considerably different from the arguments we‘ve seen in the

social contract theorists, Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau. For one thing Mill specifically criticizes contract

theory [see chapter 4] as a way of grounding our obligations to society. Also, Mill begins with the very

assumption that Locke and, to some extent, Rousseau sought to achieve: the assumption that governments

had become accountable and responsive to the will of the majority.

For Mill this created a new problem, a problem he calls – following de Tocqueville – the tyranny of the

majority.

Freedom was threatened, Mill thought, because of the pressure to conform to society. Somewhat like Plato

in The Republic, he feared that the mediocre many would dominate the creative few. The purpose of On

Liberty, therefore, is

· to explain the reasons for individual freedom, and

· to clarify the domain of personal liberty as against the justifiable sphere of social

and legal control.

Reasons for Individual Freedom REJECTED

Some might contend that the case for individual liberty is simply and intuitively obvious. Consider Mill‘s

response to this ‗moral intuititonist‘ position: On Liberty, [Penguin], ch. 1 p. 63-67: paragraph beginning,

―But though this proposition…‖ See also, ch. 4, [Penguin p.152]: ―These teach that things are right

because they are right; because we feel them to be so….‖

Others might say that individual liberty is a matter of rights; people‘s liberty ought to be respected because,

quite simply, they have a right to it. Consider Mill‘s response: On Liberty, [Penguin] ch. 1, p.69, paragraph

beginning, ―It is proper to state that I forego…‖

(A) Virtual seminar Questions: • Explain and assess Mill‘s position in the above quotations.

• See ch. 4, paragraph (3), beginning ‗Though society is not founded on a contract…‘ Has Mill

inconsistently reintroduced a rights based argument?

Reasons for Individual Liberty, Pursued

Mill is, of course, a utilitarian. As he indicates in the passage above, the reasons in support of any and all

ethical questions must appeal to ‗utility‘, to human happiness. Note this passage from his essay on

Utilitarianism:

The creed which accepts as the foundation of morals – utility – or the greatest happiness

principle, holds that actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong

as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness. By happiness is intended pleasure and the

absence of pain; by unhappiness, pain and the privation of pleasure.

But what exactly is ‗utility‘? Whatever utility and utilitarianism might have meant to other Utilitarians like

Jeremy Bentham or James Mill (father of J. S.) it quickly becomes clear that utility for J. S. Mill cannot

mean the numbers game of counting subjective preferences. If it did, the majority would always win and

individual liberty to challenge the majority would always lose.

Although it is not elaborated fully in On Liberty, I think Mill would refine the otherwise imprecise concept

of utility in the following ways:

• Whereas Bentham had famously remarked that ‗pushpin is as good as poetry‘ – suggesting that any

given pleasure is as valid as any other – Mill would say that pleasures should be qualitatively

distinguished: some are simply better than others.

• Moreover, the pursuit of what are commonly deemed pleasures may lead to some happiness, but Mill

would add that humans can resist the seduction of pleasure for higher ends: ―The conscious ability

to do without happiness gives the best prospect of realizing such happiness as is attainable.‖

• Mill would also say that people can be distinguished by the kinds of pleasures which they pursue; and,

much like Plato, Mill seems to suggest that some ways of living are objectively better than others:

―It is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; better to be Socrates dissatisfied

than a fool satisfied. And if the fool, or the pig, are of a different opinion, it is because they only

know their own side of the question.‖

{the above citations are from chapter 2 of Mill‘s essay, Utilitarianism.}

In On Liberty Mill says that utility will be understood ‘in the largest sense, grounded on the permanent

interests of man as a progressive being’. [ch.1, Penguin, p.70]

So now the issue is, what are ‗the permanent interests of man as a progressive being‘? Mill gives two main

arguments which give shape to this phrase, ‗the permanent interests of man as a progressive being‘:

• one is based on truth promotion and progress in Chapter 2.

• the other is based on the assumed ideal model of human existence: the autonomous individual in Chapter

3.

(B) Virtual Seminar Questions: • Explain the ‗utility‘ of freedom of thought and discussion in chapter 2. Why does Mill think it is good to

protect this freedom?

• Should racist speech be protected according to Mill‘s argument?

• Explain the supporting argumentation to Mill‘s claim in chapter 3 that,

i. ―Where not the person’s own character but the traditions or

customs of other people are the rule of conduct, there is wanting one of

the principal ingredients of human happiness, and quite the chief

ingredient of individual and social progress.” [Penguin p.120]

4. Is Mill correct in this claim? Must we say about cultures which encourage deference and the value of

tradition, that they are deficient with regard to human happiness?


Reading: On Liberty, Ch.1, 3, 4

We‘ve seen that Mill defends individual liberty on grounds of utility and that utility for Mill means

something quite specific: truth promotion, social progress, individual autonomy. But, Mill is very much

also a supporter of social life. How are we to draw the proper boundary between the domain of the

individual and the domain of society?


Consider the following passages:

• Chapter 4, the two paragraphs beginning, ―Though society is not founded on a contract… what they

deem his good.‖ [Penguin, p.141-3] And, Chapter 1, passage beginning ―There are also many

positive acts for the benefit…for not doing.‖ [Penguin p. 70] Explain Mill‘s point here? Does this

provide a plausible boundary

• Chapter 1, paragraph beginning ―The object of this essay…the individual is sovereign.‖ Explain Mill‘s

point here. Should we avoid interfering with heroin addicts in their pursuit of pleasure?

• Chapter 4, the 2 paragraphs beginning ―What I contend for…which we allow to him in his.‖ [Penguin

p.145-6] Explain Mill‘s point here; what is the distinction between ‗self-regarding faults‘ and

‗immoralities‘?

• Chapter 4, [Penguin, p. 148-150] the two paragraphs beginning, ―I fully admit that the mischief which a

person does…‖: Explain Mill‘s point here. What does he mean by ‗contingent or constructive

injury?

Chapter 3, paragraph one: given what Mill says here about time and place restrictions on expressions of

individual liberty, do you think his argument would support a gay pride parade where the ambient majority

felt offended?


Reading: Chapter 4, 5

Mill‘s argument in On Liberty raises many interesting questions with regard to possible applications.

Current public debates around issues like the legalization of marijuana or censorship or compulsory seat

belt legislation very often invoke Mill‘s arguments – sometimes on different sides of the same issue. Mill

himself considers a number of particular applications of the argument in On Liberty. When assessing the

following applications of the principle of individual liberty keep in mind the specific grounds he establishes

to support the principle (truth, progress, individuality) and the specific domain of self-regarding concerns

where he considers it to be applicable.


Free Trade Mill claims that the ‗principle of individual liberty is not involved in the doctrine of free trade‘ [ch.5,

Penguin, p. 164]. What does he mean by this and is he justified in making this claim?

‘Preappointed Evidence’ Mill argues that, instead of prohibiting articles which might be - but need not be - used for crimes, society

might require a registry of dangerous materials so as not to restrict the innocent buyer. Is this an appropriate

public policy? Would Mill support the NRA in resisting gun control?

Restraint and Danger Assess Mill‘s position in the following example:

If either a public officer or anyone else saw a person attempting to cross a bridge which had

been ascertained to be unsafe, and there were no time to warn him of his danger, they might

seize him and turn him back, without any real infringement of his liberty; for liberty consists in

doing what one desires, and he does not desire to fall into the river. [ch.5, Penguin 166]

Mill follows this example with the point that in cases where individuals incur what is only a possible risk of

injury (not a virtual certainty as in the bridge crossing case) they may legitimately warned but not

prevented from incurring the risk.

Drug Abuse Assess Mill‘s position on the treatment of those who consume alcohol immodestly: ch. 5, Penguin p. 167.

And what of those who advise others to engage in unwholesome behavior?

Slavery See ch. 5, Penguin p.172-3: Is Mill inconsistent to prohibit voluntary contracts of slavery?

Marriage Assess Mill‘s argument in support of the position in the following passage:

The laws which… forbid marriage unless the parties can show that they have the means of

supporting a family do not exceed the legitimate powers of the State and …are not

objectionable violations of liberty. [ch. 5, Penguin, p.179]

plato lecture 1 politics in ancient athens: the birth of...

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