plas new modular force

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PLA's New Modular Force Structure

(18 Aug 12)

By SinoDefence.com

In order to meet the requirement of fighting and winning local wars underconditions of informationisation set by Chinas military planners, thePeoples Liberation Army (PLA) has been undergoing an overhaul in itsforce structure since the late 1990s, replacing its massive infantry andarmour formations (divisions and regiments) with smaller combined armsmodular forces (brigade and battalions). The aim of the restructure is tobuild a smaller, but more flexible force capable of dealing with diversifiedsecurity threats and accomplishing a wider range of tasks in the modernage. The transformation is also part of the PLAs modernisation effort to

simultaneously encompass mechanisation and informationisation (network-centric warfare).

Close observation of the U.S.-led Operation Enduring Freedom inAfghanistan in 2001 and Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003 made the PLArealise that the warfare of the information age would be asymmetric,nonlinear, and non-contact. Long-range precision strike firepower from air-,land-, and naval platforms could quickly take out enemys key military andpolitical targets, thus paralysing the enemys command and control systemand stopping them from organising any effective resistance. Under such

conditions, the main role of the ground forces is no longer to eliminateenemy forces, but to quickly capture areas of strategic importance and thenput the situation under control.

The existing structure of the PLA ground forces is largely based on theSoviet model it has adopted since the 1950s. The conventional army-division-regiment structure was designed for a mechanised war of theindustrial age, featuring large formations of infantry and armour troopssupported by artillery. However, the 1990s Gulf War and the 2003 invasionof Iraq demonstrated the vulnerability of such a force when facing atechnologically advanced enemy with information dominance. The Iraqi

Army, though equipped with a significant amount of armoured fightingvehicles and artillery, could hardly organise any meaningful resistance onceits C3I system was destroyed and was soon defeated by the coalitionforces from air before even encountering any land battles.


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Large formations of infantry and armoured troops: a scene of the past?(Source: Chinese Internet)

As the first step towards a smaller and more flexible force, in the late1990s, the PLA introduced brigades in its force structure. Headed by asenior colonel, these brigades are composed of several battalion-sizedunits, but with significantly smaller combat service support units thandivisions. Overall, brigades are manned with approximately one-third to half

of the strength of a division of the same arm. By eliminating the regimentlevel headquarters in the chain-of-command, the brigade headquarterswould be directly commanding the tactical units in its operations, resultingin a more efficient and robust command and control system.

Although this new structure seemed to be an ideal solution to PLAsineffectiveness, a key issue was ignored. The existing organisationalstructure of the PLA based on the Soviet model places regiments as thesmallest the smallest units capable of independent operations. Battalions,which were design to only perform a single tactical mission as part of a

regiments tactical operations, did not have headquarters staffs and supportelements like the units of similar size in Western armies. As a result,battalions previously relied on regiment headquarters for orders andinstructions turned to the brigade headquarters for support.

The brigade headquarters soon found itself overloaded by the sheerresponsibility of managing and commanding 7~8 battalion-sized unitswithin its organisation. In some cases, regiments had to be retained as an


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intermediate headquarters between brigade and battalion level. Forexample, all infantry brigades now have an artillery regiment in itsorganisation to manage the two artillery battalions within the brigade. Themarine brigade of the PLA Navy also has an armoured regiment to managethe armoured elements in the brigade. The efficiency of the brigadescommand and control was compromised by this added complexity, makingbrigades enlarged regiments rather than downsized divisions as the PLAhad hoped.

Another problem created by the introduction of brigades is the coordinationbetween brigades and divisions. Since not all divisions were downsized tobrigades, divisions and brigades coexist in many group armies. While bothunits are headed by a senior colonel, the division headquarters givesorders to its subordinated regiments, while brigade headquarters givesorders directly to the battalions, causing confusions and conflictions whenthe two types of units operate together.

It appears that the PLA is now trying to address some of the issues thathave emerged in its restructuring process by creating some independencein battalions and introducing the combined arms approach, wherebyinfantry, armour, artillery, aviation, air defence, and engineers from thesame brigade (or even different brigades or divisions) are grouped intocombined arms battle groups for training and operations. This modularapproach enables battle groups to be structured according to therequirements of the mission and then easily modified in the theatre as the

situation changed.

The PLA Daily (3 Jan 08) reported that during an exercise in late 2007 inthe Beijing Military Region, for the first time a combined arms battalionwas created. The unit was based on a mechanised infantry battalion, butattached with specialised units of reconnaissance, signal intelligence(SIGINT), anti-armour, engineers, and signals. The report claimed that thefirepower of such a unit was several times greater than a conventionalinfantry battalion.

A second report by the Xinhua News Agency (xinhuanet.com, 21 Jan 08)

revealed that a combined arms battalion exercise was carried out in theShenyang Military Region. The battalion was composed of infantry, tank,engineers, chemical defence, missiles, and electronic warfare troops. Thereport also confirmed that the battalion commander, who previously had tocommanded his troops alone, was supported by 6~7 joint operations staffsin his command post during the operation.


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The revised training and operational doctrine of the PLA has replacedbattalion-level tactical training (with homogeneous troop type) in thesyllabus of the training handbook with battalion-level tactical exercise(with combined arms troops). This officially puts battalions as the smallestunits in the ground forces capable of independent operations. Battalioncommanders are also given much greater autonomy in commanding theirsubordinate units and calling for air and artillery support.

Different service arms are being put together to form combined armsbattle groups

(Source: Chinese Internet)

With this new operational model in place, instead of managing threeconventional combat arms regiments and an artillery regiment, a divisionheadquarters now may directly controls 6~9 battalion-sized combined armsbattle groups, whereas a brigade headquarters controls 2~3 of suchgroups. This approach finally brings the operations of divisions andbrigades in line with each other in order to work together seamlessly.

Under the combined arms battle group concept, while units of differentservice arms are still managed according to their administrative structure inbarracks, they are put together to form different types of functional modulesin training and operations. This requires the previous organisation-orientedcommand and control model to be transformed into a function-orientedmodel. So instead of managing subordinated units of different servicearms, headquarters now must manage different functional modules (battlegroups). For example, reconnaissance units of artillery, armour, andinfantry within a division or brigade previously operated separately within


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their own service arms, whereas now in the combined arms battle groupthey are put together to form an ISR (intelligence, surveillance, andreconnaissance) module during training and operations.

In order to support this new operational model, the PLA is building robust

tactical C4ISR networks to connect the headquarters with battle groups. Insome cases, this network is even extended down to an individual tank orarmoured vehicle. This network ensures that the headquarters and battlegroups can not only command their own units, but also command elementsallocated from other units, thus allowing the structure of battle groups to bequickly altered when the situation in the theatre changes. This could pose achallenge to the PLA, since C4ISR equipments used by different servicearms and branches are often incompatible with each other.

Finally, the new operational model also demands greater knowledge and

capabilities in commanding officers and staffs, especially at the battalionlevel. Previously battalion commanders in the PLA simply needed to closelyfollow the orders and instructions from their regiment headquarters. Theyare not used to making decisions independently. Also, most battalioncommanders only possess the operations knowledge of a single servicearms, but they are now asked to command a battle group consisting ofalmost every single services arms in the ground forces. According to a PLAdaily report (25 Apr 08), during a recent exercise in the Shenyang MilitaryRegion, six battalion commanders with outstanding performance recordswere selected to command a combined arms battalion, and their results

were all unsatisfactory.

plas new modular force

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