Facts Issue Ruling1. Secretary of Justice vs. Lantion GR 139465On June 18, 1999, the Department of Justice received from the Department of Foreign Affairs of the United States requesting for the extradition of Mark Jimenez for various crimes in violation of US laws. In compliance with the related municipal law, specifically Presidential Decree No. 1069 “Prescribing the Procedure for Extradition of Persons Who Have committed Crimes in a Foreign Country” and the established “Extradition Treaty Between the Government of the Philippines and the Government of the United States of America”, the department proceeded with proceeded with the designation of a panel of attorneys to conduct a technical evaluation and assessment as provided for in the presidential decree and the treaty.

The respondent requested for a copy of the official extradition request as well as the documents and papers submitted therein. The petitioner denied the request as it alleges that such information is confidential in nature and that it is premature to provide such document as the process is not a preliminary investigation but a mere evaluation. Therefore, the constitutional rights of the accused are not yet available.

WON, under the Doctrine of Incorporation, International Law prevails over Municipal Law

Under the doctrine of incorporation, rules of international law form part of the law of the land and no further legislative action is needed to make such rules applicable in the domestic sphere. The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever local courts are confronted with situations in which there appears to be a conflict between a rule of international law and the provisions of the local state’s constitution/statute. First, efforts should first be exerted to harmonize them, so as to give effect to both. This is because it is presumed that municipal law was enacted with proper regard for the generally accepted principles of international law in observance of the incorporation clause. However, if the conflict is irreconcilable and a choice has to be made between a rule of international law and municipal law jurisprudence dictates that the municipal courts should uphold municipal law. This is because such courts are organs of municipal law and are accordingly bound by it in all circumstances. The fact that international law was made part of the law of the land does not pertain to or imply the primacy of international law over national/municipal law in the municipal sphere. The doctrine of incorporation, as applied in most countries, decrees that rules of international law are given equal standing with, but are not superior to, national legislative enactments. In case of conflict, the courts should harmonize both laws first and if there exists an unavoidable contradiction between them, the principle of

Lex posterior derogat priori - a treaty may repeal a statute and a statute may repeal a treaty – will apply. But if these laws are found in conflict with the Constitution, these laws must be stricken out as invalid. In states where the constitution is the highest law of the land, such as in ours, both statutes and treaties may be invalidated if they are in conflict with the constitution. Supreme Court has the power to invalidate a treaty.

2. In Re Garcia 2 SCRA 984Arturo E. Garcia has applied for admission to the practice of law in the Philippines without submitting to the required bar examinations. In his verified petition, he avers among others that he is a Filipino citizen born in Bacolod City of Filipino parentage. He finished Bachillerato Superior in Spain. He was allowed to practice law profession in Spain under the provision of the treaty on academic degrees and the exercise of profession between the Republic of the Philippines.

Whether treaty can modify regulations governing admission to the phil. bar.

No. The provision of the treaty on academic degrees between the RP and Spanish state cannot be invoked by the applicant. The said treaty was intended to govern Filipino citizens desiring to practice their profession in Spain. The treaty could not have been intended to modify the laws and regulations governing admission to the practice of law in the Philippines for the reason that the executive may not encroach upon the constitutional prerogative of the Supreme Court to promulgate rules for admission to the practice of the law in the Philippines. The power to repeal, alter or supplement such rules being reserved only to the Congress of the Philippines.

The Treaty on Academic Degrees and the exercise of Professions between the Republic of the Philippines and the Spanish State, is intended to govern the Filipino citizens desiring to practice their profession in Spain, and the citizens of Spain desiring to practice their professions in the Philippines. A Filipino citizen desiring to practice the legal profession in the Philippines, is not entitled to the privileges extended to Spanish nationals desiring to practice in the Philippines.

3. Sison vs Board of Accountancy 85 Philippines Report 276Ferguson is a British subject admitted in the practice of accountancy in the Philippines without examination because there exists a reciprocity between the Philippines and the United Kingdom regarding the practice of accountancy.

While the profession of certified public accountant is not controlled or regulated by the Government of Great Britain, the country of origin of respondent Robert Orr Ferguson, according to the record, said respondent had been admitted in this

Facts Issue Ruling

Subsequently, the Board of Accountancy, upon the examination of the case of those British accountants without examination, came to the conclusion that , there being no law which regulates the practice of accountancy in England, and that the practice of accountancy in England, and that the practice of accountancy in said country being limited only to the members of incorporated private accountant's societies, the certificates issued by the Institutes of chartered accountants and other similar societies in England and Wales cannot be considered on a par with the public accountant's certificates issued by the Philippine Board of Accountancy, which is government entity. In view thereof, the respondent Board of Accountancy "resolved to suspend, . . . the validity of the C.P.A. certificates of the above-mentioned candidates pending the final revocation thereof should they fail to prove to the satisfaction of the Board within sixty days' notice that : (a) Filipinos are allowed to take the professional accountant examination given by the British government, if any, and (b) Filipino certified public accountants can, upon application, be registered as chartered accountants or granted similar degrees by the British Government.

Such action of the Board of Accountancy was based on an opinion rendered by the Secretary of Justice, on October 1, 1946 (Annex A), to the Chartered Accountants in England and Wales does not meet the requirement of section 41 of Rule 123 of the Rules of Court and that the negative statement therein, as quoted above, does not establish the existence of reciprocity, which induced the board to hold that the registration, without examination, of those British subjects as certified public accountants, is in accordance with the provision of section 122 of Act No. 3105 as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 342.

However, the Secretary of justice, answering a query from the Secretary of Finance, in an opinion rendered on February 10, 1947 "on the legality of the suspension or revocation " of the certificates issued to those British subjects as contemplated in resolution No. 5, series of 1946 of the Board of Accountancy, was of the opinion that "the board may not suspend or revoke the certificates previously granted to the ten British accountants herein involved, including respondent Robert Orr Ferguson, because such action is in contravention of section 13 of Act No. 3105 as amended which explicitly provides that the suspension or revocation of the certificate issued under the said Act may be done by the board for unprofessional conduct of the holder or other sufficient cause.

country to the practice of his profession as certified public accountant on the strength of his membership of the Institute of Accountants and Actuaries in Glasgow (England), incorporated by the Royal Charter of 1855. The question of his entitlement to admission to the practice of his profession in this jurisdiction, does not therefore, come under reciprocity, as this principle is known in International Law, but it is included in the meaning of comity, as expressed in the alternative condition of the proviso of the above-quoted section 12 which says: such country or state does not restrict the right of Filipino certified public accountants to practice therein.

International Law is founded largely upon mutuality, reciprocity, and the principle of comity of nations. Comity, in this connection, is neither a matter of absolute obligation on the one hand, nor of mere courtesy and good will on the other; it is the recognition which one nation allows within its territory to the acts of foreign governments and tribunals, having due regard both to the international duty and convenience and the rights of its own citizens or of other persons who are under the protection of its laws. The fact of reciprocity does not necessarily influence the application of the doctrine of comity, although it may do so and has been given consideration in some instances.

The Philippine and the United Kingdom, are bound by a treaty of friendship and commerce, and each nation is represented in the other by corresponding diplomatic envoy. There is no reason whatsoever to doubt the statement and assurance made by the diplomatic representative of the British Government in the Philippines, regarding the practice of the accountancy profession in the United Kingdom and the fact that Filipino certified public accountant will be admitted to practice their profession in the United Kingdom should they choose to do so.

4. Co Kim Cham vs Valdez Tan Keh 75 Phil 131The respondent judge refused to take cognizance of the proceedings in a civil case which were initiated during the Japanese military occupation on the ground that the proclamation issued by General MacArthur that “all laws, regulations and processes of any other government in the Philippines than that of the said Commonwealth are null and void and without legal effect in areas of the Philippines free of enemy occupation and control” had the effect of invalidating and nullifying all judicial proceedings and

1. Whether or not under the rules of international law the judicial acts and proceedings of the courts during a de

1. It is a legal truism in political and international law that all acts and proceedings of the legislative, executive, and judicial departments of a de facto government are good and valid. The doctrine upon this subject is thus summed up by Halleck, in his work on International Law (Vol. 2, p. 444): “The right of one belligerent to occupy and govern the territory of the enemy while in its military possession, is one of the incidents of war, and flows directly from the right to conquer. We, therefore, do not look to the Constitution or political institutions of the

Facts Issue Rulingjudgments of the court of the Philippines during the Japanese military occupation, and that the lower courts have no jurisdiction to take cognizance of and continue judicial proceedings pending in the courts of the defunct Republic of the Philippines in the absence of an enabling law granting such authority.

During the Japanese occupation, no substantial change was effected in the organization and jurisdiction of the different courts that functioned during the Philippine Executive Commission, and in the laws they administered and enforced.

facto government are good and valid.

2. Whether the present courts of the Commonwealth, which were the same court existing prior to, and continued during, the Japanese military occupation of the Philippines, may continue those proceedings pending in said courts at the time the Philippines were reoccupied and liberated by the United States and Filipino forces, and the Commonwealth of the Philippines were re-

conqueror, for authority to establish a government for the territory of the enemy in his possession, during its military occupation, nor for the rules by which the powers of such government are regulated and limited. Such authority and such rules are derived directly from the laws war, as established by the usage of the world, and confirmed by the writings of publicists and decisions of courts — in fine, from the law of nations. . . . The municipal laws of a conquered territory, or the laws which regulate private rights, continue in force during military occupation, excepts so far as they are suspended or changed by the acts of conqueror. He, nevertheless, has all the powers of a de facto government, and can at his pleasure either change the existing laws or make new ones.

According to that well-known principle in international law, the fact that a territory which has been occupied by an enemy comes again into the power of its legitimate government of sovereignty, “does not, except in a very few cases, wipe out the effects of acts done by an invader, which for one reason or another it is within his competence to do. Thus judicial acts done under his control, when they are not of a political complexion, administrative acts so done, to the extent that they take effect during the continuance of his control, and the various acts done during the same time by private persons under the sanction of municipal law, remain good.

That not only judicial but also legislative acts of de facto governments, which are not of a political complexion, are and remain valid after reoccupation of a territory occupied by a belligerent occupant, is confirmed by the Proclamation issued by General Douglas MacArthur on October 23, 1944, which declares null and void all laws, regulations and processes of the governments established in the Philippines during the Japanese occupation, for it would not have been necessary for said proclamation to abrogate them if they were invalid ab initio.

2. YES. Although in theory the authority of the local civil and judicial administration is suspended as a matter of course as soon as military occupation takes place, in practice the invader does not usually take the administration of justice into his own hands, but continues the ordinary courts or tribunals to administer the laws of the country which he is enjoined, unless absolutely prevented, to respect. An Executive Order of President McKinley to the Secretary of War states that “in practice, they (the municipal laws) are not usually abrogated but are allowed to remain in force and to be administered by the ordinary tribunals substantially as they were before the occupation. This enlightened practice is, so far as possible, to be adhered to on the present occasion.” And Taylor in this connection says: “From a theoretical point of view it may be said that the conqueror is armed with the right to substitute his arbitrary will for all preexisting forms of government, legislative, executive and judicial. From the stand-point of actual practice such arbitrary will is restrained by the provision of the law of nations which compels the conqueror to continue local laws and institution so far as military necessity will permit.” Undoubtedly, this practice has been adopted in order that the ordinary pursuits and business of society may not be unnecessarily deranged, inasmuch as belligerent occupation is essentially provisional, and the government established by the occupant of transient character.

If the proceedings pending in the different courts of the Islands prior to the Japanese military occupation had been continued during the Japanese military administration, the Philippine Executive Commission, and the so-called Republic of the Philippines, it stands to reason that the same courts, which had become re-established and conceived of as having in continued existence upon the reoccupation and liberation of

Facts Issue Rulingestablished in the Islands.

the Philippines by virtue of the principle of postliminy, may continue the proceedings in cases then pending in said courts, without necessity of enacting a law conferring jurisdiction upon them to continue said proceedings. As Taylor graphically points out in speaking of said principles “a state or other governmental entity, upon the removal of a foreign military force, resumes its old place with its right and duties substantially unimpaired. Such political resurrection is the result of a law analogous to that which enables elastic bodies to regain their original shape upon removal of the external force, — and subject to the same exception in case of absolute crushing of the whole fibre and content.”

5. Lawyer’s League for Better Philippines vs Pres. Corazon C. Aquino – GR 73748On February 25, 1986, President Corazon Aquino issued Proclamation No. 1 announcing that she and Vice President Laurel were taking power.

On March 25, 1986, Proclamation No.3 was issued providing the basis of the Aquino government assumption of power by stating that the "new government was installed through a direct exercise of the power of the Filipino people assisted by units of the New Armed Forces of the Philippines."

Whether or not the government of Corazon Aquino is legitimate.

Yes. The legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a justiciable matter but belongs to the realm of politics where only the people are the judge. The Court further held that the people have accepted the Aquino government which is in effective control of the entire country. It is not merely a de facto government but in fact and law a de jure government. The community of nations has recognized the legitimacy of the new government.

6. Tanada vs Angara – 277 SCRA 18Petitioners Senators Tañada, et al. questioned the concurrence of the respondent Senators to the WTO agreement that opens access to foreign markets, especially its major trading partners, through the reduction of tariffs on its exports, particularly agricultural and industrial products. Thus, provides new opportunities for the service sector cost and uncertainty associated with exporting and more investment in the country. These are the predicted benefits as reflected in the agreement and as viewed by the signatory Senators, a “free market” espoused by WTO.

Petitioners on the other hand viewed the WTO agreement as one that limits, restricts and impair Philippine economic sovereignty and legislative power. That the Filipino First policy of the Constitution was taken for granted as it gives foreign trading intervention.

Whether or not the sovereignty can be subjected to restrictions and limitations by a treaty?

While sovereignty has traditionally been deemed absolute and all-encompassing on the domestic level, it is however subject to restrictions and limitations voluntarily agreed to by the Philippines, expressly or impliedly, as a member of the family of nations. In its Declaration of Principles and State Policies, the Constitution "adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land, and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity, with all nations." By the doctrine of incorporation, the country is bound by generally accepted principles of international law, which are considered to be automatically part of our own laws. One of the oldest and most fundamental rules in international law is pacta sunt servanda — international agreements must be performed in good faith. "A treaty engagement is not a mere moral obligation but creates a legally binding obligation on the parties . . . A state which has contracted valid international obligations is bound to make in its legislations such modifications as may be necessary to ensure the fulfillment of the obligations undertaken.

7. The Holy See vs Rosario– 238 SCRA 524Petition arose from a controversy over a parcel of land. Lot 5-A, registered under the name Holy See, was contiguous to Lot 5-B and 5-D under the name of Philippine Realty Corporation (PRC). The land was donated by the Archdiocese of Manila to the Papal Nuncio, which represents the Holy See, who exercises sovereignty over the Vatican City, Rome, Italy, for his residence.

Said lots were sold through an agent to Ramon Licup who assigned his rights to respondents Starbright Sales Enterprises, Inc.

When the squatters refuse to vacate the lots, a dispute arose between the two parties because both were unsure whose responsibility was it to evict the squatters from said lots. Respondent Starbright Sales Enterprises Inc. insists that Holy See should clear the property while Holy See says that respondent corporation should do it or the earnest money will be returned. With this, Msgr. Cirilios, the agent,

Whether or not Holy See can invoke sovereign immunity.

In Public International Law, when a state or international agency wishes to plead sovereign or diplomatic immunity in a foreign court, it requests the Foreign Office of the state where it is sued to convey to the court that said defendant is entitled to immunity.

In the Philippines, the practice is for the foreign government or the international organization to first secure an executive endorsement of its claim of sovereign or diplomatic immunity. But how the Philippine Foreign Office conveys its endorsement to the courts varies. In International Catholic Migration Commission v. Calleja, 190 SCRA 130 (1990), the Secretary of Foreign Affairs just sent a letter directly to the Secretary of Labor and Employment, informing the latter that the respondent-employer could not be sued because it enjoyed diplomatic immunity. In World Health Organization v. Aquino, 48 SCRA 242 (1972), the Secretary of Foreign Affairs sent the trial court a telegram to that effect. In Baer v. Tizon, 57 SCRA 1 (1974), the U.S. Embassy asked the Secretary of Foreign

Facts Issue Rulingsubsequently returned the P100,000 earnest money.

The same lots were then sold to Tropicana Properties and Development Corporation.

Starbright Sales Enterprises, Inc. filed a suit for annulment of the sale, specific performance and damages against Msgr. Cirilios, PRC as well as Tropicana Properties and Development Corporation. The Holy See and Msgr. Cirilos moved to dismiss the petition for lack of jurisdiction based on sovereign immunity from suit. RTC denied the motion on ground that petitioner already "shed off" its sovereign immunity by entering into a business contract. The subsequent Motion for Reconsideration was also denied hence this special civil action for certiorari was forwarded to the Supreme Court.

Affairs to request the Solicitor General to make, in behalf of the Commander of the United States Naval Base at Olongapo City, Zambales, a "suggestion" to respondent Judge. The Solicitor General embodied the "suggestion" in a Manifestation and Memorandum as amicus curiae.

In the case at bench, the Department of Foreign Affairs, through the Office of Legal Affairs moved with this Court to be allowed to intervene on the side of petitioner. The Court allowed the said Department to file its memorandum in support of petitioner's claim of sovereign immunity.

In 1929, Italy and the Holy See entered into the Lateran Treaty, where Italy recognized the exclusive dominion and sovereign jurisdiction of the Holy See over the Vatican City. It also recognized the right of the Holy See to receive foreign diplomats, to send its own diplomats to foreign countries, and to enter into treaties according to International Law (Garcia, Questions and Problems In International Law, Public and Private 81 [1948]).

The Lateran Treaty established the statehood of the Vatican City "for the purpose of assuring to the Holy See absolute and visible independence and of guaranteeing to it indisputable sovereignty also in the field of international relations" (O'Connell, I International Law 311 [1965]).

The Vatican City fits into none of the established categories of states, and the attribution to it of "sovereignty" must be made in a sense different from that in which it is applied to other states (Fenwick, International Law 124-125 [1948]; Cruz, International Law 37 [1991]). In a community of national states, the Vatican City represents an entity organized not for political but for ecclesiastical purposes and international objects. Despite its size and object, the Vatican City has an independent government of its own, with the Pope, who is also head of the Roman Catholic Church, as the Holy See or Head of State, in conformity with its traditions, and the demands of its mission in the world. Indeed, the world-wide interests and activities of the Vatican City are such as to make it in a sense an "international state" (Fenwick, supra., 125; Kelsen, Principles of International Law 160 [1956]).

Inasmuch as the Pope prefers to conduct foreign relations and enter into transactions as the Holy See and not in the name of the Vatican City, one can conclude that in the Pope's own view, it is the Holy See that is the international person.

The Republic of the Philippines has accorded the Holy See the status of a foreign sovereign. The Holy See, through its Ambassador, the Papal Nuncio, has had diplomatic representations with the Philippine government since 1957 (Rollo, p. 87). This appears to be the universal practice in international relations.

8. People vs Perfecto 43 Phil 887

Facts Issue RulingThis is a case relating to the loss of some documents which constituted the records of testimony given by witnesses in the Senate investigation of oil companies. The newspaper La Nacion, edited by Mr. Perfecto, published an article about it to the effect that the author or authors of the robbery of the records from the iron safe of the Senate have, perhaps, but followed the example of certain Senators who secured their election through fraud and robbery.

Consequently, the Attorney-General, through a resolution adopted by the Philippine Senate, filed an information alleging that the editorial constituted a violation of article 256 of the Penal Code.

The defendant was found guilty in the municipal court and again in the Court of First Instance of Manila.

Whether or not article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code was abrogated with the change from Spanish to American sovereignty

It is a general principle of the public law that the previous political relations of the ceded region are totally abrogated. All laws, ordinances and regulations in conflict with the political character, institutions and constitution of the new government are at once displaced. Article 256 was enacted to protect Spanish officials which were representatives of the King. Such intent is contradictory to the ideology of the new government where “In the eye of our (American) Constitution and laws, every man is a sovereign, a ruler and a freeman, and has equal rights with every other man”. As such, Article 256 is deemed abrogated and the case is consequently dismissed and judgment reversed.

9. Vilas vs City of Manila 229 Phil 345Prior to the incorporation of the City of Manila under the Republic Act No. 183, petitioner Vilas is the creditor of the City. After the incorporation, Vilas brought an action to recover the sum of money owed to him by the city. The City of Manila that incurred the debts has changed its sovereignty after the cession of the Philippines to the US by the Treaty of Paris and its contention now is founded on the theory that by virtue of the Act No. 183 its liability has been extinguished.

Whether or not the change of the sovereignty extinguishes the previous liability of the City of Manila to its creditor?

No. The mere change of sovereignty of a country does not necessarily dissolve the municipal corporation organized under the former sovereign. The new City of Manila is in a legal sense the successor of the old city. Thus the new city is entitled to all property and property rights of the predecessor corporation including its liabilities. The court held that only the governmental functions that are not compatible with the present sovereignty are suspended. Because the new City of Manila retains its character as the predecessor of the old city it is still liable to the creditors of the old City of Manila.

10. Ichong vs Hernandez 101 Phil 155Lao Ichong is a Chinese businessman who entered the country to take advantage of business opportunities herein abound (then) – particularly in the retail business. For some time he and his fellow Chinese businessmen enjoyed a “monopoly” in the local market in Pasay. Until in June 1954 when Congress passed the RA 1180 or the Retail Trade Nationalization Act the purpose of which is to reserve to Filipinos the right to engage in the retail business. Ichong then petitioned for the nullification of the said Act on the ground that it contravened several treaties concluded by the RP which, according to him, violates the equal protection clause (pacta sund servanda). He said that as a Chinese businessman engaged in the business here in the country who helps in the income generation of the country he should be given equal opportunity.

Whether or not a law may invalidate or supersede treaties or generally accepted principles.

Yes, a law may supersede a treaty or a generally accepted principle. In this case, there is no conflict at all between the raised generally accepted principle and with RA 1180. The equal protection of the law clause “does not demand absolute equality amongst residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced”; and, that the equal protection clause “is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within such class, and reasonable grounds exist for making a distinction between those who fall within such class and those who do not.”

For the sake of argument, even if it would be assumed that a treaty would be in conflict with a statute then the statute must be upheld because it represented an exercise of the police power which, being inherent could not be bargained away or surrendered through the medium of a treaty. Hence, Ichong can no longer assert his right to operate his market stalls in the Pasay city market.

11. US vs Look Chaw 18 Phil 573Between 11 and 12 o'clock a.m. in August 19, 1909, the Port of Cebu and internal revenue agent of Cebu, respectively, went aboard the steamship Erroll to inspect and search its cargo, and found two sacks containing opium. The defendant stated freely and voluntarily that he had bought these sacks of opium in Hong Kong with the intention of selling them as contraband in Mexico or Vera Cruz, and that as his hold had already been searched several times for opium he ordered two other chinamen to keep the sack. All the evidence found properly constitutes corpus delicti.

It was established that the steamship Erroll was of English nationality, that it came from Hong Kong, and that it was

Whether or not courts of local state can exercise its jurisdiction over foreign vessels stationed in its port.

Yes. The Philippine courts have jurisdiction over the matter. The mere possession of a thing of prohibited use in these Islands, aboard a foreign vessel in transit, in any of their ports, does not, as a general rule, constitute a crime triable by the courts of this country, on account of such vessel being considered as an extension of its own nationality. However, the same rule does not apply when the article, whose use is prohibited within the Philippines, in the present case, a can of opium, is landed from the vessel upon the Philippine soil, thus committing an open violation of the penal law in force at the place of the commission of the crime. Only the court established in the said place itself has competent jurisdiction, in the absence of an agreement under an international treaty.

Facts Issue Rulingbound for Mexico, via the call ports in Manila and Cebu.

12. People vs Wong Cheng 46 Phil 729 The appellant, in representation of the Attorney General, filed an appeal that urges the revocation of a demurrer sustained by the Court of First Instance of Manila presented by the defendant. The defendant, accused of having illegally smoked opium aboard the merchant vessel Changsa of English nationality while the said vessel was anchored in Manila Bay, two and a half miles from the shores of the city. In the said demurrer, the defendant contended the lack of jurisdiction of the lower court of the said crime, which resulted to the dismissal of the case.

Whether or not the Philippine courts have jurisdiction over the crime committed aboard merchant vessels anchored in our jurisdictional waters.

Yes. The crime in the case at bar was committed in our internal waters thus the Philippine courts have a right of jurisdiction over the said offense. The Court said that having the opium smoked within our territorial waters even though aboard a foreign merchant ship is a breach of the public order because it causes such drugs to produce pernicious effects within our territory.

13. Asaali vs The Commissioner of Customs 26 SCRA 382In 1950, customs officers intercepted 5 ships owned by Illuh Asaali et al. Said ships were found to be from Borneo and were on their way to a port in Tawi-tawi, Sulu. On board the ships were rattan products and cigarettes. The customs confiscated said items on the ground that Asaali et al do not have the required import permits for the said goods.

Asaali questioned the legality of the seizure as he contended that the customs officers did not intercept them within Philippine waters but rather, they were intercepted in the high seas. Hence, according to Asaali, Philippine import laws have no application to the case at bar.

Whether or not Asaali’s contention is correct.

No. Asaali’s contention is without merit. The Revised Penal Code leaves no doubt as to its applicability and enforceability not only within the Philippines, its interior waters and maritime zone, but also outside of its jurisdiction against those committing offense while on a Philippine ship. The ships intercepted were of Philippine registry.

Further, it has been an establish principle that a state has the right to protect itself and its revenues, a right not limited to its own territory but extending to the high seas. The authority of a nation within its own territory is absolute and exclusive. The seizure of a vessel within the range of its cannon by a foreign force is an invasion of that territory, and is a hostile act which it is its duty to repel. But its power to secure itself from injury may certainly be exercised beyond the limits of its territory.

14. Baer vs Tizon 57 SCRA (1974)Respondent Edgardo Gener, as plaintiff, filed a complaint for injunction with the Court of First Instance of Bataan against petitioner, Donald Baer, Commander of the United States Naval Base in Olongapo.

• He alleged that he was engaged in the business of logging and that the American Naval Base authorities stopped his logging operations.

• He prayed for a writ of preliminary injunction restraining petitioner from interfering with his logging operations.

• A restraining order was issued by respondent Judge

• Counsel for petitioner, upon instructions of the American Ambassador to the Philippines, entered their appearance for the purpose of contesting the jurisdiction of respondent Judge on the ground that the suit was one against a foreign sovereign without its consent.

Whether the contention of the petitioner that the respondent judge acquires no jurisdiction on the ground that the suit was one against a foreign sovereign without its consent

The judgment of the Court cannot be any clearer as to the action against petitioner Donald Baer being against the United States government, and therefore, covered by the principle of state immunity from suit.

Petitioner, as the Commander of the United States Naval Base in Olongapo, does not possess diplomatic immunity. He may therefore be proceeded against in his personal capacity, or when the action taken by him cannot be imputed to the government which he represents.

The solidity of the stand of petitioner is therefore evident. What was sought by private respondent and what was granted by respondent Judge amounted to an interference with the performance of the duties of petitioner in the base area in accordance with the powers possessed by him under the Philippine-American Military Bases Agreement. This point was made clear [in the petition] in these words: 'Assuming, for purposes of argument, that the Philippine Government, through the Bureau of Forestry, possesses the "authority to issue a Timber License to cut logs" inside a military base, the Bases Agreement subjects the exercise of rights under a timber license issued by the Philippine Government to the exercise by the United States of its rights, power and authority of control within the bases; and the findings of the Mutual Defense Board, an agency of both the Philippine and United States Governments, that "continued logging operation by Mr. Gener within the boundaries of the U.S. Naval Base would not be consistent with the security and operation of the Base," is conclusive upon the respondent Judge. ...

The doctrine of state immunity is not limited to cases which would result in a pecuniary charge against the, sovereign or would require the doing of an affirmative act by it. Prevention of a sovereign from doing an affirmative act pertaining directly

Facts Issue Rulingand immediately to the most important public function of any government - defense of the state is - equally as untenable as requiring it to do an affirmative act.

The insuperable obstacle to the jurisdiction of respondent Judge is that a foreign sovereign without its consent is haled into court in connection with acts performed by it pursuant to treaty provisions and thus impressed with a governmental character.

15. Republic of the Philippines vs Guanzon 61 SCRA 360The defendant obtained two (2) loans from the former Bank of Taiwan, Ltd. Secured by a real estate mortgage on the two parcels of land and a Chattel Mortgage on standing crops growing on the same properties. By virtue of Vesting Order No. P-4, and under the authority of the Trading with the Enemy Act, as amended, the USA vested in the Government of the United States the assets in the Philippines of the Bank of Taiwan, Ltd. Pursuant to the Philippine Property Act of 1946, these assets were subsequently transferred to the Republic of the Philippines by the Attorney General of the US under Transfer Agreements and are now administered by the Board of Liquidators.

It thus appears obvious that counsel for appellee lacks awareness of the controlling doctrine announced in the leading case of Brownell, Jr. v. Sun Life Assurance Company, 9 where Justice Labrador explicitly set forth: "This purpose of conveying enemy properties to the Philippines after all claims against them shall have been settled is expressly embodied in the Philippine Property Act of 1946," A brief history of the Philippine Property Act of 1946 is likewise found in his opinion: "On July 3, 1946, the Congress of the United States passed Public Law 485-79th Congress, known as the Philippine Property Act of 1946. Section 3 thereof provides that "The Trading with the Enemy Act of October 6, 1917 (40 Stat. 411), as amended, shall continue in force in the Philippines after July 4, 1946, ... ." To implement the provisions of the act, the President of the United States on July 3, 1946, promulgated Executive Order No. 9747, "continuing the functions of the Alien Property Custodian and the Department of the Treasury in the Philippines." Prior to and preparatory to the approval of said Philippine Property Act of 1946, and agreement was entered into between President Manuel Roxas of the Commonwealth and U.S. Commissioner Paul V. McNutt whereby title to enemy agricultural lands and other properties was to be conveyed by the United States to the Philippines in order to help the rehabilitation of the latter, but that in order to avoid complex legal problems in relation to said enemy properties, the Alien Property Custodian of the United States was to continue operations in the Philippines even after the latter's independence, that he may settle all claims that may exist or arise against the above-mentioned enemy properties, in accordance with the Trading with the Enemy Act of the United States."

Nothing can be clearer, therefore, than that the lower court grievously erred in failing to perceive that precisely the Republic of the Philippines, contrary to its holding, possesses a legal interest over the subject matter of this controversy.

Apparently, the lower court, perhaps taken in by the contention of appellee, could not see its way clear to applying the Philippine Property Act of 1946 enacted by the United States Congress as it was a foreign statute not susceptible to judicial notice. Again, if it were cognizant of the leaning of the above Brownell decision, it would have realized how erroneous such a view is. For, as was made clear in the above decision, there was "conformity to the enactment of the Philippine Property Act of 1946 of the United States [as] announced by President Manuel Roxas in a joint statement signed by him and by Commissioner McNutt Ambassador Romulo also formally expressed the conformity of the Philippine Government to the approval of said act to the American Senate prior to its approval."

16. Guerrero’s Transport Services vs Blaylock Transportation Services Employees Association 71 SCRA 621In 1972, the US Naval Base authorities in Subic conducted a public bidding for a 5-year contract for the right to operate and/or manage the transportation services inside the naval base. This bidding was won by Santiago Guerrero, owner-operator of Guerrero’s Transport Services, Inc. (Guerrero), over Concepcion Blayblock, the then incumbent

Whether or not the said members of the Union were entitled to be reinstated by

YES. Pursuant to Sec. 6 of Art. I of the RP-US Labor Agreement, the US Armed Forces undertook, consistent w/ military requirements, “to provide security for employment, and, in the event certain services are contracted out, the US Armed Forces shall require the contractor or concessioner to give priority consideration to affected employees for employment.

Facts Issue Rulingconcessionaire doing business under the name of Blayblock Transport Services Blayblock. Blayblock’s 395 employees are members of the union BTEA-KILUSAN (the Union).

When Guererro commenced its operations, it refused to employ the members of the Union. Thus, the Union filed a complaint w/ the NLRC against Guerrero to compel it to employ its members, pursuant to Art. 1, Sec. 2 of the RP-US Base Agreement. The case was dismissed by the NLRC upon Guerrero’s MTD on jurisdictional grounds, there being no employer-employee relationship between the parties. Upon appeal, the Sec. of Labor remanded the case to the NLRC. The NLRC issued a Resolution ordering Guererro to “absorb all complainants who filed their applications on or before the deadline” set by Guerrero, except those who may have derogatory records w/ the US Naval Authorities in Subic. The Sec. of Labor affirmed.

Guerrero claims that it substantially complied w/ the decision of the Sec. of Labor affirming the NLRC Resolution, & that any non-compliance was attributable to the individual complainants who failed to submit themselves for processing & examination. The Labor Arbiter ordered the reinstatement of 129 individuals. The Union filed a Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution. The order wasn’t appealed so it was declared final & executory

Subsequently, the parties arrived at a Compromise Agreement wherein they agreed to submit to the Sec. of Labor the determination of members of the Union who shall be reinstated by Guerrero, w/c determination shall be final. The agreement is deemed to have superseded the Resolution of the NLRC. The Sec. of Labor ordered the absorption of 175 members of the Union subject to 2 conditions.

Guerrero.A treaty has 2 aspects — as an international agreement between states, and as municipal law for the people of each state to observe. As part of the municipal law, the aforesaid provision of the treaty enters into and forms part of the contract between Guerrero and the US Naval Base authorities. In view of said stipulation, the new contractor (Guerrero) is, therefore, bound to give “priority” to the employment of the qualified employees of the previous contractor (Blaylock). It is obviously in recognition of such obligation that Guerrero entered into the aforementioned Compromise Agreement.

Under the Compromise Agreement, the parties agreed to submit to the Sec. of Labor the determination as to who of the members of the Union shall be absorbed or employed by Guerrero, and that such determination shall be considered as final. The Sec. of Labor issued an Order directing the NLRC, through Labor Arbiter Francisco de los Reyes, to implement the absorption of the 175 members into Guerrero’s Transport Services, subject to the following conditions:

a) that they were bona fide employees of the Blaylock Transport Service at the time its concession expired; and

b) that they should pass final screening and approval by the appropriate authorities of the U.S. Naval Base concerned.

For this purpose, Guerrero is ordered to submit to and secure from the appropriate authorities of the U.S. naval Base at Subic, Zambales the requisite screening and approval, the names of the members of the Union.

Considering that the Compromise Agreement of the parties is more than a mere contract and has the force and effect of any other judgment, it is, therefore, conclusive upon the parties and their privies. For it is settled that a compromise has, upon the parties, the effect and authority of res judicata and is enforceable by execution upon approval by the court.

17. De Perio-Santos vs Macaraig GR 94070Rosalinda Santos was an ambassadress sent to Geneva for a mission. On her trip, she bought a discounted ticket which provided that she could bring someone with her so she brought with her her adopted daughter. Some of her co-workers complained because they thought that Santos used government fund to finance her daughter’s fare. It was later found out that the cost of the said ticket is actually 50% less than the amount that was given to Santos to be used for her expenses for the trip. Nevertheless, because of her refusal to appear before the disciplinary board, she was found guilty of misconduct. Upon her appeal to the Office of the President and after review, then president Corazon Aquino issued Administrative Order No. 122 which declared Santos guilty of dishonesty. She was then removed from her post and was replaced.

Whether or not Santos should reinstated to her office.

No. Even though the Supreme Court found evidence which showed that Santos was not guilty of misconduct or dishonesty as in fact what she did of securing a ticket which was 50% the cost of what was allotted for her travel expense for tickets and thus was beneficial to the government (for she helped save and lessen the expenses), the SC does not have the power to reverse the recall done to Santos. She cannot be reinstated by the SC to her position for the removal power of the president is solely her prerogative. Further, the position held by Santos is primarily confidential. Her position lasts upon the pleasure of the president. When the pleasure turns into displeasure she is not actually removed from her position or office but rather her term merely expires. Also, her position involves foreign relations which is vested solely in the executive. The SC cannot inquire upon the wisdom or unwisdom of the exercise of such prerogative. Thus, the assignment to and recall from posts of ambassadors are prerogatives of the President, for her to exercise as the exigencies of the foreign service and the interests of the nation may from time to time dictate.

"Considering that the conduct of foreign relations is primarily an executive prerogative, courts may not inquire into the wisdom or unwisdom in the exercise thereof. This is a principle laid down by the courts from time immemorial. The power to conduct foreign policy and its necessary element of assigning the country’s representatives abroad is best addressed to the wisdom of the executive branch and not to be unduly interfered with by the judiciary

Facts Issue Ruling"‘The head of State, as the State’s Chief organ and representative in the totality of its international intercourse, with the consequence that all his legally relevant international acts are considered acts of his state. Such acts comprises chiefly the reception and sending of diplomatic agents and consuls, conclusion of treaties, and recognition of states.

‘The conduct of the external affairs of the State is an executive prerogative. As head of the State, the President deals with foreign states and governments with respect to matters relating to entering into treaties, maintaining diplomatic relations, extending or withholding recognition. Chief Justice Marshall described the President of the United States as the `sole organ of the nation in its external relations and its sole representative with foreign nations.’ This apt description likewise applies to the President of the Philippines.’

18. Reyes vs Bagatsing 125 SCRA 553Retired Justice JBL Reyes in behalf of the members of the Anti-Bases Coalition sought a permit to rally from Luneta Park until the front gate of the US embassy which is less than two blocks apart. The permit has been denied by then Manila mayor Ramon Bagatsing. The mayor claimed that there have been intelligence reports that indicated that the rally would be infiltrated by lawless elements. He also issued City Ordinance No. 7295 to prohibit the staging of rallies within the 500 feet radius of the US embassy. Bagatsing pointed out that it was his intention to provide protection to the US embassy from such lawless elements in pursuant to Art. 22 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. And that under our constitution we “adhere to generally accepted principles of international law”.

Whether or not a treaty may supersede provisions of the Constitution.

The Philippines is a signatory of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations adopted in 1961. It was concurred in by the then Philippine Senate on May 3, 1965 and the instrument of ratification was signed by the President on October 11, 1965, and was thereafter deposited with the Secretary General of the United Nations on November 15. As of that date then, it was binding on the Philippines. The second paragraph of the Article 22 reads: "2. The receiving State is under a special duty to take appropriate steps to protect the premises of the mission against any intrusion or damage and to prevent any disturbance of the peace of the mission or impairment of its dignity. " The Constitution "adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land. ..." To the extent that the Vienna Convention is a restatement of the generally accepted principles of international law, it should be a part of the law of the land. That being the case, if there were a clear and present danger of any intrusion or damage, or disturbance of the peace of the mission, or impairment of its dignity, there would be a justification for the denial of the permit insofar as the terminal point would be the Embassy. Moreover, respondent Mayor relied on Ordinance No. 7295 of the City of Manila prohibiting the holding or staging of rallies or demonstrations within a radius of five hundred (500) feet from any foreign mission or chancery and for other purposes. Unless the ordinance is nullified, or declared ultra vires, its invocation as a defense is understandable but not decisive, in view of the primacy accorded the constitutional rights of free speech and peaceable assembly. Even if shown then to be applicable, that question the confronts this Court.

19. Minucher vs CA GR 97765 (1992) GR 97765Khosrow Minucher is the Labor Attaché of the Embassy of Iran in the Phil. Arthur Scalzo, then connected with the American Embassy in Manila, was introduced to him by Jose Inigo (an informer belonging to the military intelligence community).

Accdg. to Inigo, Scalzo was interested in buying Iranian products like caviar and carpets. Minucher complained to Scalzo about his problems with the American Embassy regarding the expired visas of his wife, Abbas Torabian. Offering help, Scalzo gave Minucher a calling card showing that the former is an agent of the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) assigned to the American Embassy in Manila. As a result, Scalzo expressed his intent to buy caviar and further promised to arrange the renewal of the visas.

Scalzo went to Minucher's residence and asked to be entrusted with Persian silk carpets, for which he had a buyer. The next day, Scalzo returned and claimed that he had already made arrangements with his contacts

Whether or not a complaint for damages be dismissed in the sole basis of a statement complained in a Diplomatic Note.

No. Jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is acquired by either voluntary appearance or by the service of summons. In the case, Scalzo's counsel filed a motion to quash, which, in effect already waived any defect in the service of summons by earlier asking an extension to file time to file an Answer and filing an Answer with Counterclaim.

The complaint for damages cannot be dismissed. Said complaint contains sufficient allegations which indicate that Scalzo committed imputed acts in his personal capacity and outside the scope of his official duties and functions. The TC gave credit to Minucher's theory that he was a victim of frame-up hence, there is a prima facie showing that Scalzo could be held personally liable for his acts. Further, Scalzo did not come forward with evidence to, prove that he acted in his official capacity.

Facts Issue Rulingconcerning the visas and asked for $2,000.

It turned out that Scalzo prepared a plan to frame-up a Minucher and wife for alleged heroin trafficking. Both were falsely arrested and charged with violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act.

Minucher prays for actual and compensatory damages. However, counsel for Scalzo filed a motion to quash summons alleging that the defendant is beyond the processes of the Philippine court for the action for damages is a personal action and that Scalzo is outside the Philippines.

TC denied the motion. CA dismissed the motion for lack of merit on the basis of the erroneous assumption that because of the Diplomatic Note (advising the DFA that Scalzo is a member of the US diplomatic mission investigating Minucher for drug trafficking), Scalzo is clothed with diplomatic immunity.

20. Shauf vs CA 191 SCRA 713Loida Shauf, a Filipino by origin and married to an American who is a member of the US Air Force, was rejected for a position of Guidance Counselor in the Base Education Office at Clark Air Base, for which she is eminently qualified.

By reason of her non-selection, she filed a complaint for damages and an equal employment opportunity complaint against private respondents, Don Detwiler (civillian personnel officer) and Anthony Persi (Education Director), for alleged discrimination by reason of her nationality and sex.

Shauf was offered a temporary position as a temporary Assistant Education Adviser for a 180-day period with the condition that if a vacancy occurs, she will be automatically selected to fill the vacancy. But if no vacancy occurs after 180 days, she will be released but will be selected to fill a future vacancy if she’s available. Shauf accepted the offer. During that time, Mrs. Abalateo’s was about to vacate her position but her appointment was extended thus, Shauf was never appointed to said position. She claims that Abalateo’s stay was extended indefinitely to deny her the appointment as retaliation for the complaint that she filed against Persi who denies the allegation. He claims it was a joint decision of the management & it was in accordance of with the applicable regulation.

Shauf filed for damages and other relief in different venues such as the Civil Service Commission, Appeals Review Board, Philippine RTC. The RTC ruled in favor of Shauf ordering defendants to pay actual damages + attorney’s fees and moral & exemplary damages.

Both parties appealed to the CA. Shauf prayed for the increase of the damages to be collected from defendants. Defendants on the other hand, continued using the defense that they are immune from suit for acts done/statements made by them in performance of their official governmental functions pursuant to RP-US Military Bases Agreement of 1947. They claim that the Philippines does not have jurisdiction over the case because it was under the exclusive jurisdiction of a US District Court. They likewise claim that petitioner failed to exhaust all administrative remedies thus case should be dismissed. CA reversed RTC decision. According to the CA, defendants are immune from suit.

Shauf claims that the respondents are being sued in their private capacity thus this is not a suit against the US

WON private respondents are immune from suit being officers of the US Armed Forces

No, the respondents cannot rely on the US blanket of diplomatic immunity for all its acts or the acts of its agents in the Phils. Respondents are personally liable in indemnifying petitioner Shauf.

While the doctrine of immunity is also applicable to complaints filed against state officials, it only contemplates acts done in their official capacity. This does not cover acts contrary to law & injurious to the rights of the plaintiff. When an official acts in a manner that invades or violates the personal & property rights of another, the aggrieved party may sue the official & such suit will not be a suit against the state. The doctrine of immunity from suit will not apply where the public official is being sued in his private & personal capacity as an ordinary citizen.

The discrimination is very evident. Shauf was not considered for the position even if she was previously employed as a Guidance Counselor at the Clark Airbase. She was not granted an interview. The person appointed was not even qualified for that position and that person kept the position despite orders from the US Civil Service Commission for his removal. Extension of Abalateo’s services is another proof. She was not appointed even if US officials found her highly qualified for the position (letters from the Director of the US Civil Service Commission, Staff Judge Advocate of the Department of Air Force). Shauf has proven that discrimination did occur whereas respondents merely denied allegations.

The US Constitution assures everyone of equality in employment & work opportunities regardless of sex, race, or creed. The Philippine Constitution has a similar provision. Persi & Detwiler violated Shauf’s constitutional right to earn a living, an integral aspect of her right to life. Thus, they should be accountable.

Shauf followed the proper procedure in seeking relief for the defendants’ discriminatory acts. The Department of Air Force in Washington told her that one of her appeal rights would be to file a civil action if a final decision has not been rendered after 180 days from the dated of the initial appeal to the Commission. The appeal was lodged on Sept. 30, 1978 and it has not been decided up to the time SC has decided. Shauf is entitled to choose the remedy, not otherwise prohibited, which will best advance & protect her interests.

Facts Issue Rulinggovernment which would require consent.

21. US vs Ruiz 136 SCRA 487The traditional role of the state immunity exempts a state from being sued in the courts of another state without its consent or waiver. This rule is necessary consequence of the principle of independence and equality of states. However, the rules of international law are not petrified; they are continually and evolving and because the activities of states have multiplied. It has been necessary to distinguish them between sovereign and governmental acts and private, commercial and proprietory acts. The result is that state immunity now extends only to sovereign and governmental acts.

Whether the US naval base in bidding for said contracts exercise governmental functions to be able to invoke state immunity.

The traditional role of the state immunity exempts a state from being sued in the courts of another state without its consent or waiver. This rule is necessary consequence of the principle of independence and equality of states. However, the rules of international law are not petrified; they are continually and evolving and because the activities of states have multiplied. It has been necessary to distinguish them between sovereign and governmental acts and private, commercial and proprietory acts. The result is that state immunity now extends only to sovereign and governmental acts.

22. US vs Guinto 182 SCRA 644These cases have been consolidated because they all involve the doctrine of state immunity. In GR No. 76607, The private respondents are suing several officers of the US Air Force in Clark Air Base in connection with the bidding conducted by them for contracts for barber services inthe said base which was won by a certain Dizon. The respondents wanted to cancel the award to the bid winner because they claimed that Dizon had included in his bid an area not included in the invitation to bid, and subsequently, to conduct a rebidding.

In GR No. 79470, Fabian Genove filed a complaint for damages against petitioners Lamachia, Belsa, Cartalla and Orascion for his dismissal as cook in the US Air Force Recreation Center at Camp John Hay Air Station in Baguio City. It had been ascertained after investigation, from the testimony of Belsa, Cartalla and Orascion, that Genove had poured urine into the soup stock used in cooking the vegetables served to the club customers. Lamachia, as club manager, suspended him and thereafter referred the case to a board of arbitrators conformably to the collective bargaining agreement between the center and its employees. The board unanimously found him guilty and recommended his dismissal. Genove’s reaction was to file his complaint against the individual petitioners.

In GR No. 80018, Luis Bautista, who was employed as a barracks boy in Cano O’ Donnell, an extension of Clark Air Base, was arrested following a buy-bust operation conducted by the individual petitioners who are officers of the US Air Force and special agents of the Air Force Office of Special Investigators. On the basis of the sworn statements made by them, an information for violation of R.A. 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act, was filed against Bautista in the RTC of Tarlac. Said officers testified against him at his trial. Bautista was dismissed from his employment. He then filed a complaint against the individual petitioners claiming that it was because of their acts that he was removed.

In GR No. 80258, a complaint for damages was filed by the private respondents against the herein petitioners (except the US), for injuries sustained by the plaintiffs as a result of the acts of the defendants. There is a conflict of factual allegations here. According to the plaintiffs, the defendants beat them up, handcuffed them and unleashed dogs on them which bit them in several parts of their bodies and caused extensive injuries to them. The defendants deny this and claim that plaintiffs were arrested for theft and were bitten by the dogs because they were struggling and resisting arrest. In a motion to dismiss the complaint, the US and the individually named defendants argued that the suit was in effect a suit against the US, which had not given its consent to be sued.

Whether the defendants were also immune from suit under the RP-US Bases Treaty for acts done by them in the performance of their official duties.

The rule that a State may not be sued without its consent is one of the generally accepted principles of international law that were have adopted as part of the law of our land. Even without such affirmation, we would still be bound by the generally accepted principles of international law under the doctrine of incorporation. Under this doctrine, as accepted by the majority of the states, such principles are deemed incorporated in the law of every civilized state as a condition and consequence of its membership in the society of nations. All states are sovereign equals and cannot assert jurisdiction over one another. While the doctrine appears to prohibit only suits against the state without its consent, it is also applicable to complaints filed against officials of the states for acts allegedly performed by them in the discharge of their duties. The rule is that if the judgment against such officials will require the state itself to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the same, the suit must be regarded as against the state although it has not been formally impleaded

Facts Issue Ruling

23. The Holy See vs Rosario 238 SCRA 524Petitioner is the Holy See who exercises sovereignty over the Vatican City in Rome, Italy, and is represented in the Philippines by the Papal Nuncio; Private respondent, Starbright Sales Enterprises, Inc., is a domestic corporation engaged in the real estate business.

This petition arose from a controversy over a parcel of land consisting of 6,000 square meters located in the Municipality of Paranaque registered in the name of petitioner. Said lot was contiguous with two other lots registered in the name of the Philippine Realty Corporation (PRC).

The three lots were sold to Ramon Licup, through Msgr. Domingo A. Cirilos, Jr., acting as agent to the sellers. Later, Licup assigned his rights to the sale to private respondent.

In view of the refusal of the squatters to vacate the lots sold to private respondent, a dispute arose as to who of the parties has the responsibility of evicting and clearing the land of squatters. Complicating the relations of the parties was the sale by petitioner of Lot 5-A to Tropicana Properties and Development Corporation (Tropicana).

private respondent filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 61, Makati, Metro Manila for annulment of the sale of the three parcels of land, and specific performance and damages against petitioner, represented by the Papal Nuncio, and three other defendants: namely, Msgr. Domingo A. Cirilos, Jr., the PRC and Tropicana, petitioner and Msgr. Cirilos separately moved to dismiss the complaint — petitioner for lack of jurisdiction based on sovereign immunity from suit, and Msgr. Cirilos for being an improper party. An opposition to the motion was filed by private respondent.

the trial court issued an order denying, among others, petitioner’s motion to dismiss after finding that petitioner “shed off [its] sovereign immunity by entering into the business contract in question” Petitioner forthwith elevated the matter to us. In its petition, petitioner invokes the privilege of sovereign immunity only on its own behalf and on behalf of its official representative, the Papal Nuncio.

Whether the Holy See is immune from suit insofar as its business relations regarding selling a lot to a private entity

There are two conflicting concepts of sovereign immunity, each widely held and firmly established. According to the classical or absolute theory, a sovereign cannot, without its consent, be made a respondent in the courts of another sovereign. According to the newer or restrictive theory, the immunity of the sovereign is recognized only with regard to public acts or acts jure imperii of a state, but not with regard to private acts or acts jure gestionis(United States of America v. Ruiz, 136 SCRA 487 [1987]; Coquia and Defensor-Santiago, Public International Law 194 [1984]).

Some states passed legislation to serve as guidelines for the executive or judicial determination when an act may be considered as jure gestionis. The United States passed the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, which defines a commercial activity as "either a regular course of commercial conduct or a particular commercial transaction or act." Furthermore, the law declared that the "commercial character of the activity shall be determined by reference to the nature of the course of conduct or particular transaction or act, rather than by reference to its purpose." The Canadian Parliament enacted in 1982 an Act to Provide For State Immunity in Canadian Courts. The Act defines a "commercial activity" as any particular transaction, act or conduct or any regular course of conduct that by reason of its nature, is of a "commercial character."

The restrictive theory, which is intended to be a solution to the host of problems involving the issue of sovereign immunity, has created problems of its own. Legal treatises and the decisions in countries which follow the restrictive theory have difficulty in characterizing whether a contract of a sovereign state with a private party is an act jure gestionis or an act jure imperii.

The issue of petitioner's non-suability can be determined by the trial court without going to trial in the light of the pleadings, particularly the admission of private respondent. Besides, the privilege of sovereign immunity in this case was sufficiently established by the Memorandum and Certification of the Department of Foreign Affairs. As the department tasked with the conduct of the Philippines' foreign relations (Administrative Code of 1987, Book IV, Title I, Sec. 3), the Department of Foreign Affairs has formally intervened in this case and officially certified that the Embassy of the Holy See is a duly accredited diplomatic mission to the Republic of the Philippines exempt from local jurisdiction and entitled to all the rights, privileges and immunities of a diplomatic mission or embassy in this country (Rollo, pp. 156-157). The determination of the executive arm of government that a state or instrumentality is entitled to sovereign or diplomatic immunity is a political question that is conclusive upon the courts (International Catholic Migration Commission v. Calleja, 190 SCRA 130 [1990]). Where the plea of immunity is recognized and affirmed by the executive branch, it is the duty of the courts to accept this claim so as not to embarrass the executive arm of the government in conducting the country's foreign relations (World Health Organization v. Aquino, 48 SCRA 242 [1972]). As in International Catholic Migration Commission and in World Health Organization, we abide by the certification of the Department of Foreign Affairs.

Private respondent is not left without any legal remedy for the redress of its grievances. Under both Public International Law and Transnational Law, a person who feels aggrieved by the acts of a foreign sovereign can ask his own government to espouse his cause through diplomatic channels.

Facts Issue RulingPrivate respondent can ask the Philippine government, through the Foreign Office, to espouse its claims against the Holy See. Its first task is to persuade the Philippine government to take up with the Holy See the validity of its claims. Of course, the Foreign Office shall first make a determination of the impact of its espousal on the relations between the Philippine government and the Holy See (Young, Remedies of Private Claimants Against Foreign States, Selected Readings on Protection by Law of Private Foreign Investments 905, 919 [1964]). Once the Philippine government decides to espouse the claim, the latter ceases to be a private cause.

24. Syquia vs Lopez 84 Phil 312The plaintiffs named Pedro, Gonzalo, and Leopoldo, all surnamed Syquia, are the undivided joint owners of three apartment buildings situated in the City of Manila known as the North Syquia Apartments, South Syquia Apartments and Michel Apartments.

About the middle of the year 1945, said plaintiffs executed three lease contracts, one for each of the three apartments, in favor of the United States of America at a monthly rental of P1,775 for the North Syquia Apartments, P1,890 for the South Syquia Apartment, and P3,335 for the Michel Apartments. The term or period for the three leases was to be “for the duration of the war and six months thereafter, unless sooner terminated by the United States of America.” The apartment buildings were used for billeting and quartering officers of the U. S. armed forces stationed in the Manila area.

In March 1947, when these court proceedings were commenced, George F. Moore was the Commanding General, United States Army, Philippine Ryukus Command, Manila, and as Commanding General of the U. S. Army in the Manila Theatre, was said to control the occupancy of the said apartment houses and had authority in the name of the United States Government to assign officers of the U. S. Army to said apartments or to order said officers to vacate the same. Erland A. Tillman was the Chief, Real Estate Division, Office of the District Engineers, U. S. Army, Manila, who, under the command of defendant Moore was in direct charge and control of the lease and occupancy of said three apartment buildings. Defendant Moore and Tillman themselves did not occupy any part of the premises in question.

Under the theory that said leases terminated six months after September 2, 1945, when Japan surrendered, plaintiffs sometime in March, 1946, approached the predecessors in office of defendants Moore and Tillman and requested the return of the apartment buildings to them, but were advised that the U. S. Army wanted to continue occupying the premises. On May 11, 1946, said plaintiffs requested the predecessors in office of Moore and Tillman to renegotiate said leases, execute lease contract for a period of three years and to pay a reasonable rental higher than those payable under the old contracts. The predecessors in office of Moore in a letter dated June 6, 1946, refused to execute new leases but advised that “it is contemplated that the United States Army will vacate subject properties prior to 1 February 1947.” Not being in conformity with the continuance of the old leases because of the alleged comparatively low rentals being paid thereunder, plaintiffs formally requested Tillman to cancel said three leases and to release the apartment buildings on June 28, 1946. Tillman refused to comply with the request. Because of the alleged representation and assurance that the U.S.

whether respondents are not individually responsible for the payments of rentals or damages in relation to the occupancy of the houses in question; whether this is a suit against the USA without its consent

Yes. The real party in interest as defendant in the original case is the United States of America. The lessee in each of the three lease agreements was the United States of America and the lease agreement themselves were executed in her name by her officials acting as her agents. The considerations or rentals was always paid by the U. S. Government. The original action in the municipal court was brought on the basis of these three lease contracts and it is obvious in the opinion of the Supreme Court that any back rentals or increased rentals will have to be paid by the U. S. Government not only because, as already stated, the contracts of lease were entered into by such Government but also because the premises were used by officers of her armed forces during the war and immediately after the terminations of hostilities.

The defendants and respondents Moore and Tillman cannot be held individually responsible for the payments of rentals or damages in relation to the occupancy of the apartment houses in question. Both of these army officials had no intervention whatsoever in the execution of the lease agreements nor in the initial occupancy of the premises both of which were effected thru the intervention of and at the instance of their predecessors in office. The original request made by the petitioners for the return of the apartment buildings after the supposed termination of the leases, was made to, and denied not by Moore and Tillman but by their predecessors in office. The notice and decision that the U. S. Army wanted and in fact continued to occupy the premises was made not by Moore and Tillman but by predecessors in office. The refusal to renegotiate the leases as requested by the petitioners was made not by Moore but by his predecessors in office according to the very complaint filed in the municipal court. The assurance that the U. S. Army will vacate the premises prior to February 29, 1947, was also made by the predecessors in office of Moore.

As to the defendant Tillman, according to the complaint he was Chief, Real State Division, Office of the District Engineer, U. S. Army, and was in direct charge and control of the leases and occupancy of the apartment buildings, but he was under the command of defendant Moore, his superior officer. We cannot see how said defendant Tillman in assigning new officers to occupy apartments in the three buildings, in obedience to order or direction from his superior, defendant Moore, could be held personally liable for the payment of rentals or increase thereof, or damages said to have been suffered by the plaintiffs.

With respect to defendant General Moore, when he assumed his command in Manila, these lease agreements had already been negotiated and executed and were in actual operation. The three apartment buildings were occupied by army officers assigned thereto by his predecessors in office. All that he must have done was to assign or billet incoming army officers to apartments as they were vacated by outgoing officers due to changes in station. He found these apartment buildings

Facts Issue RulingGovernment would vacate the premises before February 1, 1947, the plaintiffs took no further steps to secure possession of the buildings and accepted the monthly rentals tendered by the predecessors in office of Moore and Tillman on the basis of a month to month lease subject to cancellation upon thirty days notice. Because of the failure to comply with the alleged representation and assurance that the three apartment buildings will be vacated prior to February 1, 1947, plaintiffs on February 17, 1947, served formal notice upon defendants Moore and Tillman and 64 other army officers or members of the United States Armed Forces who were then occupying apartments in said three buildings, demanding (a) cancellation of said leases; (b) increase in rentals to P300 per month per apartment effective thirty days from notice; (c) execution of new leases for the three or any one or two of the said apartment buildings for a definite term, otherwise, (d) release of said apartment buildings within thirty days of said notice in the event of the failure to comply with the foregoing demands. The thirty-day period having expired without any of the defendants having complied with plaintiffs’ demands, the plaintiffs commenced the present action in the Municipal Court of Manila in the form of an action for unlawful detainer (desahucio) against Moore and Tillman and the 64 persons occupying apartments in the three buildings for the purpose of having them vacate the apartments, each occupants to pay P300 a month for his particular apartment from January 1, 1947 until each of said particular defendant had vacated said apartment; to permit plaintiffs access to said apartment buildings for the purpose of appraising the damages sustained as the result of the occupancy by defendants; that defendants be ordered to pay plaintiffs whatever damages may have been actually caused on said property; and that in the event said occupants are unable to pay said P300 a month and/or the damages sustained by said property, the defendants Moore and Tillman jointly and severally be made to pay said monthly rentals of P300 per month per apartment from January 1, 1947 to March 19, 1947, inclusive, and/or the damages sustained by said apartments, and that defendants Moore and Tillman be permanently enjoined against ordering any additional parties in the future from entering and occupying said premises.

occupied by his government and devoted to the use and occupancy of army officers stationed in Manila under his command, and he had reasons to believe that he could continue holding and using the premises theretofore assigned for that purpose and under contracts previously entered into by his government, as long as and until orders to the contrary were received by him. It is even to be presumed that when demand was made by the plaintiffs for the payment of increased rentals or for vacating the three apartment buildings, defendant Moore, not a lawyer by profession but a soldier, must have consulted and sought the advise of his legal department, and that his action in declining to pay the increased rentals or to eject all his army officers from the three buildings must have been in pursuance to the advice and counsel of his legal division. At least, he was not in a position to pay increased rentals above those set and stipulated in the lease agreements, without the approval of his government, unless he personally assumed financial responsibility therefor. Under these circumstances, neither do we believe nor find that defendant Moore can be held personally liable for the payment of back or increased rentals and alleged damages.

As to the army officers who actually occupied the apartments involved, there is less reason for holding them personally liable for rentals and supposed damages as sought by the plaintiffs. It must be remembered that these army officers when coming to their station in Manila were not given the choice of their dwellings. They were merely assigned quarters in the apartment buildings in question. Said assignments or billets may well be regarded as orders, and all that those officers did was to obey them, and, accordingly, occupied the rooms assigned to them.

On the basis of the foregoing considerations, it can be concluded that the real party defendant in interest is the Government of the United States of America; that any judgment for back or increased rentals or damages will have to be paid not by defendants Moore and Tillman and their 64 co-defendants but by the said U. S. Government. The U. S. Government has not given its consent to the filing of this suit which is essentially against her, though not in name. Moreover, this is not only a case of a citizen filing a suit against his own Government without the latter’s consent but it is of citizen filing an action against a foreign government without said government’s consent.

25. Sanders vs Veridiano 162 SCRA 88Rossi and Wyer were advised that their employment had been converted from permanent full-time to permanent part-time. Their reaction was to protest this conversion and to institute grievance proceedings conformably to the pertinent rules and regulations of the US DoD. Moreau sent to the Chief of Naval Personnel explaining the change of employment status of the two from which Rossi and Wyer filed in the Court of First Instance of Olongapo City a complaint for damages against the herein petitioners claiming that the letters contained libellous imputations against the two. Due to the failure to appear in the court, Moreau and Sanders were declared in default.

Whether the petitioners were performing their official duties when they did the acts for which they have been sued for damages.

It is abundantly clear in the present case that the acts for which the petitioners are being called to account were performed by them in the discharge of their official duties. Sanders, as director of the special services department of NAVSTA, undoubtedly had supervision over its personnel, including the private respondents, and had a hand in their employment, work assignments, discipline, dismissal and other related matters. It is not disputed that the letter he had written was in fact a reply to a request from his superior, the other petitioner, for more information regarding the case of the private respondents. Moreover, even in the absence of such request, he still was within his rights in reacting to the hearing officer's criticism—in effect a direct attack against him—-that Special Services was practicing "an autocratic form of supervision.

There should be no question by now that such complaint cannot prosper unless the government sought to be held ultimately liable has given its consent to' be sued. So we have ruled not only in Baer but in many other decisions where we upheld the doctrine of state immunity as applicable not only to our own government but also to foreign states sought to be subjected to the jurisdiction of our courts.

Facts Issue RulingThe practical justification for the doctrine, as Holmes put it, is that "there can be no legal right against the authority which makes the law on which the right depends. In the case of foreign states, the rule is derived from the principle of the sovereign equality of states which wisely admonishes that par in parem non habet imperium and that a contrary attitude would "unduly vex the peace of nations." Our adherence to this precept is formally expressed in Article II, Section 2, of our Constitution, where we reiterate from our previous charters that the Philippines "adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land.

All this is not to say that in no case may a public officer be sued as such without the previous consent of the state. To be sure, there are a number of well-recognized exceptions. It is clear that a public officer may be sued as such to compel him to do an act required by law, as where, say, a register of deeds refuses to record a deed of sale; or to restrain a Cabinet member, for example, from enforcing a law claimed to be unconstitutional; or to compel the national treasurer to pay damages from an already appropriated assurance fund; or the commissioner of internal revenue to refund tax over-payments from a fund already available for the purpose; or, in general, to secure a judgment that the officer impleaded may satisfy by himself without the government itself having to do a positive act to assist him. We have also held that where the government itself has violated its own laws, the aggrieved party may directly implead the government even without first filing his claim with the Commission on Audit as normally required, as the doctrine of state immunity "cannot be used as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice."

This case must also be distinguished from such decisions as Festejo v. Fernando, where the Court held that a bureau director could be sued for damages on a personal tort committed by him when he acted without or in excess of authority in forcibly taking private property without paying just compensation therefor although he did convert it into a public irrigation canal. It was not necessary to secure the previous consent of the state, nor could it be validly impleaded as a party defendant, as it was not responsible for the defendant's unauthorized act.

The case at bar, to repeat, comes under the rule and not under any of the recognized exceptions. The government of the United States has not given its consent to be sued for the official acts of the petitioners, who cannot satisfy any judgment that may be rendered against them. As it is the American government itself that will have to perform the affirmative act of appropriating the amount that may be adjudged for the private respondents, the complaint must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

26. WHO vs Aquino 48 SCRA 242Dr. Leonce Verstuyft was assigned by WHO to its regional office in Manila as Acting Assistant Director of Health Services. His personal effects, contained in twelve (12) crates, were allowed free entry from duties and taxes. Constabulary Offshore Action Center (COSAC) suspected that the crates “contain large quantities of highly dutiable goods” beyond the official needs of Verstuyft. Upon application of the COSAC officers, Judge Aquino issued a search warrant for the search and seizure of the personal effects of Verstuyft.

Secretary of Foreign Affairs Carlos P. Romulo advised Judge Aquino that Dr. Verstuyft is entitled to immunity from search in respect for his personal baggage as accorded to members of diplomatic missions pursuant to the Host Agreement and requested that the search warrant be suspended. The Solicitor General accordingly joined

Whether or not personal effect of Verstuyft can be exempted from search and seizure under the diplomatic immunity.

Yes. The executive branch of the Phils has expressly recognized that Verstuyft is entitled to diplomatic immunity, pursuant to the provisions of the Host Agreement. The DFA formally advised respondent judge of the Philippine Government's official position. The Solicitor General, as principal law officer of the gorvernment, likewise expressly affirmed said petitioner's right to diplomatic immunity and asked for the quashal of the search warrant.

It is a recognized principle of international law and under our system of separation of powers that diplomatic immunity is essentially a political question and courts should refuse to look beyond a determination by the executive branch of the government, and where the plea of diplomatic immunity is recognized and affirmed by the executive branch of the government as in the case at bar, it is then the duty of the courts to accept the claim of immunity upon appropriate

Facts Issue RulingVerstuyft for the quashal of the search warrant but respondent judge nevertheless summarily denied the quashal. Verstuyft, thus, filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the SC. WHO joined Verstuyft in asserting diplomatic immunity.

suggestion by the principal law officer of the government, the Solicitor General in this case, or other officer acting under his discretion. Courts may not so exercise their jurisdiction by seizure and detention of property, as to embarass the executive arm of the government in conducting foreign relations.

The Court, therefore, holds the respondent judge acted without jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion in not ordering the quashal of the search warrant issued by him in disregard of the diplomatic immunity of petitioner Verstuyft.

27. Minucher vs CA (2003) GR 142396"(T)he doctrine of immunity from suit will not apply and may not be invoked where the public official is being sued in his private and personal capacity as an ordinary citizen. The cloak of protection afforded the officers and agents of the government is removed the moment they are sued in their individual capacity. This situation usually arises where the public official acts without authority or in excess of the powers vested in him. It is a well-settled principle of law that a public official may be liable in his personal private capacity for whatever damage he may have caused by his act done with malice and in bad faith or beyond the scope of his authority and jurisdiction."

A foreign agent, operating within a territory, can be cloaked with immunity from suit but only as long as it can be established that he is acting within the directives of the sending state. The consent of the host state is an indispensable requirement of basic courtesy between the two sovereigns. Guinto and Shauf both involve officers and personnel of the United States, stationed within Philippine territory, under the RP-US Military Bases Agreement. While evidence is wanting to show any similar agreement between the governments of the Philippines and of the United States (for the latter to send its agents and to conduct surveillance and related activities of suspected drug dealers in the Philippines), the consent or imprimatur of the Philippine government to the activities of the United States Drug Enforcement Agency, however, can be gleaned from the facts heretofore elsewhere mentioned. The official exchanges of communication between agencies of the government of the two countries, certifications from officials of both the Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs and the United States Embassy, as well as the participation of members of the Philippine Narcotics Command in the "buy-bust operation" conducted at the residence of Minucher at the behest of Scalzo, may be inadequate to support the "diplomatic status" of the latter but they give enough indication that the Philippine government has given its imprimatur, if not consent, to the activities within Philippine territory of agent Scalzo of the United States Drug Enforcement Agency. The job description of Scalzo has tasked him to conduct surveillance on suspected drug suppliers and, after having ascertained the target, to inform local law enforcers who would then be expected to make the arrest. In conducting surveillance activities on Minucher, later acting as the poseur-buyer during the buy-bust operation, and then becoming a principal witness in the criminal case against Minucher, Scalzo hardly can be said to have acted beyond the scope of his official function or duties.

28. The Republic of Indonesia vs Vinzon GR 154705Petitioner Vinzon entered into a Maintenance Agreement with respondent. The maintenance agreement includes the following specific equipments: air conditioning units, generator sets, electrical facilities, water heaters and water motor pumps. The agreement shall be effective for 4 years.

W/N the CA erred in sustaining the trial court's decision that

The mere entering into a contract by a foreign state with a private party cannot be construed as the ultimate test of whether or not it is an act juri imperii or juri gestionis. Such act is only the start of the inquiry. There is no dispute that the establishment of a diplomatic mission is an act juri imperii. The

Facts Issue Ruling

The new Minister Counsellor allegedly found respondent's work and services unsatisfactory and not in compliance with the standards set in the Agreement. The respondent terminated the agreement with the respondent. The latter claim that it was unlawful and arbitrary. Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss alleging that the Republic of Indonesia, as a foreign state, has sovereign immunity from suit and cannot be sued as party-defendant in the Philippines.

petitioners have waived their immunity from suit by using as its basis the provision in the Maintenance Agreement.

state may enter into contracts with private entities to maintain the premises, furnishings and equipment of the embassy. The Republic of Indonesia is acting in pursuit of a sovereign activity when it entered into a contract with the respondent. The maintenance agreement was entered into by the Republic of Indonesia in the discharge of its governmental functions. It cannot be deemed to have waived its immunity from suit.

29. Liang vs People GR 125865Petitioner is an economist working with the Asian Development Bank (ADB). Sometime in 1994, for allegedly uttering defamatory words against fellow ADB worker Joyce Cabal, he was charged before the MeTC of Mandaluyong City with two counts of oral defamation. Petitioner was arrested by virtue of a warrant issued by the MeTC. After fixing petitioner’s bail, the MeTC released him to the custody of the Security Officer of ADB. The next day, the MeTC judge received an “office of protocol” from the DFA stating that petitioner is covered by immunity from legal process under section 45 of the Agreement between the ADB and the Philippine Government regarding the Headquarters of the ADB in the country. Based on the said protocol communication that petitioner is immune from suit, the MeTC judge without notice to the prosecution dismissed the criminal cases. The latter filed a motion for reconsideration which was opposed by the DFA. When its motion was denied, the prosecution filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus with the RTC of Pasig City which set aside the MeTC rulings and ordered the latter court to enforce the warrant of arrest it earlier issued. After the motion for reconsideration was denied, the petitioner elevated the case to the SC via a petition for review arguing that he is covered by immunity under the Agreement and that no preliminary investigation was held before the criminal case.

Whether or not the petitioner’s case is covered with immunity from legal process with regard to Section 45 of the Agreement between the ADB and the Philippine Gov’t.

NO. The petitioner’s case is not covered by the immunity. Courts cannot blindly adhere to the communication from the DFA that the petitioner is covered by any immunity. It has no binding effect in courts. The court needs to protect the right to due process not only of the accused but also of the prosecution. Secondly, the immunity under Section 45 of the Agreement is not absolute, but subject to the exception that the acts must be done in “official capacity”. Hence, slandering a person could not possibly be covered by the immunity agreement because our laws do not allow the commission of a crime, such as defamation, in the name of official duty.

30. Callado vs IRRI 244 SCRA 211Ernesto Callado, petitioner, was employed as a driver at the IRRI. One day while driving an IRRI vehicle on an official trip to the NAIA and back to the IRRI, petitioner figured in an accident.

Petitioner was informed of the findings of a preliminary investigation conducted by the IRRI's Human Resource Development Department Manager. In view of the findings, he was charged with:(1) Driving an institute vehicle while on official duty under the influence of liquor;(2) Serious misconduct consisting of failure to report to supervisors the failure of the vehicle to start because of a problem with the car battery, and(3) Gross and habitual neglect of duties.

Petitioner submitted his answer and defenses to the charges against him. However, IRRI issued a Notice of Termination to petitioner.

Thereafter, petitioner filed a complaint before the Labor Arbiter for illegal dismissal, illegal suspension and indemnity pay with moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees.

IRRI wrote the Labor Arbiter to inform him that the Institute enjoys immunity from legal process by virtue of Article 3 of Presidential Decree No. 1620, 5 and that it invokes such diplomatic immunity and privileges as an international organization in the instant case filed by petitioner, not having waived the same.

While admitting IRRI's defense of immunity, the Labor

Did the (IRRI) waive its immunity from suit in this dispute which arose from an employer-employee relationship?

No.

P.D. No. 1620, Article 3 provides:Art. 3. Immunity from Legal Process. The Institute shall enjoy immunity from any penal, civil and administrative proceedings, except insofar as that immunity has been expressly waived by the Director-General of the Institute or his authorized representatives.

The SC upholds the constitutionality of the aforequoted law. There is in this case "a categorical recognition by the Executive Branch of the Government that IRRI enjoys immunities accorded to international organizations, which determination has been held to be a political question conclusive upon the Courts in order not to embarass a political department of Government.

It is a recognized principle of international law and under our system of separation of powers that diplomatic immunity is essentially a political question and courts should refuse to look beyond a determination by the executive branch of the government, and where the plea of diplomatic immunity is recognized and affirmed by the executive branch of the government as in the case at bar, it is then the duty of the courts to accept the claim of immunity upon appropriate suggestion by the principal law officer of the government or other officer acting under his direction.

The raison d'etre for these immunities is the assurance of unimpeded performance of their functions by the agencies concerned.

Facts Issue RulingArbiter, nonetheless, cited an Order issued by the Institute to the effect that "in all cases of termination, respondent IRRI waives its immunity," and, accordingly, considered the defense of immunity no longer a legal obstacle in resolving the case.

The NLRC found merit in private respondent's appeal and, finding that IRRI did not waive its immunity, ordered the aforesaid decision of the Labor Arbiter set aside and the complaint dismissed.

In this petition petitioner contends that the immunity of the IRRI as an international organization granted by Article 3 of Presidential Decree No. 1620 may not be invoked in the case at bench inasmuch as it waived the same by virtue of its Memorandum on "Guidelines on the handling of dismissed employees in relation to P.D. 1620."

The grant of immunity to IRRI is clear and unequivocal and an express waiver by its Director-General is the only way by which it may relinquish or abandon this immunity.

In cases involving dismissed employees, the Institute may waive its immunity, signifying that such waiver is discretionary on its part.

31. Lasco vs UN Revolving Fund for National Resouces Exploration 241 SCRA 681Petitioners were dismissed from their employment with private respondent, the United Nations Revolving Fund for Natural Resources Exploration (UNRFNRE), which is a special fund and subsidiary organ of the United Nations. The UNRFNRE is involved in a joint project of the Philippine Government and the United Nations for exploration work in Dinagat Island. Petitioners are the complainants for illegal dismissal and damages. Private respondent alleged that respondent Labor Arbiter had no jurisdiction over its personality since it enjoyed diplomatic immunity.

WON specialized agencies enjoy diplomatic immunity

Petition is dismissed. This is not to say that petitioner have no recourse. Section 31 of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the Specialized Agencies of the United Nations states that ³each specialized agency shall make a provision for appropriate modes of settlement of (a) disputes arising out of contracts or other disputes of private character to which the specialized agency is a party. Private respondent is not engaged in a commercial venture in the Philippines. Its presence is by virtue of a joint project entered into by the Philippine Government and the United Nations for mineral exploration in Dinagat Island

32. International Catholic Migration Commission vs Pura Calleja 190 SCRA 130This is a case of an organization operating in the Philippines subjected to an attempt to organize a labor union among its employees. ICMC or the International Catholic Immigration Commission was one of those accredited by the Philippine Government to operate the refugee processing center in Morong, Bataan. It was incorporated in New York, USA, at the request of the Holy See, as a non-profit agency involved in international humanitarian and voluntary work. It is duly registered with the United Nations Economic and Social Council and enjoys Consultative Status, Category II.

The Trade Union of the Philippines made initial actions, a process called certification election, for recognition of a labor union. The ICMC claims that it is an international organization registered with the United Nations and hence enjoys diplomatic immunity.

The Med-Arbiter in the initial proceeding dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction, however, Director Pura Calleja of the Bureau of Labor Relations ordered the immediate conduct of a certification election. This was the same decision rendered by the Director after ICMC asked for a reconsideration on the basis that it has now been granted diplomatic privileges and immunities as evidenced by Memorandum of Agreement between the Government and ICMC.

This case has also resolved another petition of the same nature, the International Rice Institute. This is why in the ruling of this case, mention of the IRRI case may be made from time to time.

Whether or not the ICMC is subject to the Labor Laws of the Phils and therefore, can be compelled to recognize labor unions and proceed with the certification election.

"Specialized agencies" are international organizations having functions in particular fields. The term appears in Articles 57 and 63 of the Charter of the United Nations:

The Charter, while it invests the United Nations with the general task of promoting progress and international cooperation in economic, social, health, cultural, educational and related matters, contemplates that these tasks will be mainly fulfilled not by organs of the United Nations itself but by autonomous international organizations established by inter-governmental agreements outside the United Nations. There are now many such international agencies having functions in many different fields, e.g. in posts, telecommunications, railways, canals, rivers, sea transport, civil aviation, meteorology, atomic energy, finance, trade, education and culture, health and refugees. Some are virtually world-wide in their membership some are regional or otherwise limited in their membership. The Charter provides that those agencies which have "wide international responsibilities" are to be brought into relationship with the United Nations by agreements entered into between them and the Economic and Social Council, are then to be known as "specialized agencies."

The grant of immunity from local jurisdiction to ICMC and IRRI is clearly necessitated by their international character and respective purposes. The objective is to avoid the danger of partiality and interference by the host country in their internal workings. The exercise of jurisdiction by the Department of Labor in these instances would defeat the very purpose of immunity, which is to shield the affairs of international organizations, in accordance with international practice, from political pressure or control by the host country to the prejudice of member States of the organization, and to ensure the unhampered performance of their functions.

For, ICMC employees are not without recourse whenever there are disputes to be settled. Section 31 of the Convention on the

Facts Issue RulingPrivileges and Immunities of the Specialized Agencies of the United Nations 17 provides that "each specialized agency shall make provision for appropriate modes of settlement of: (a) disputes arising out of contracts or other disputes of private character to which the specialized agency is a party." Moreover, pursuant to Article IV of the Memorandum of Agreement between ICMC the the Philippine Government, whenever there is any abuse of privilege by ICMC, the Government is free to withdraw the privileges and immunities accorded. Thus:

Art. IV. Cooperation with Government Authorities. — 1. The Commission shall cooperate at all times with the appropriate authorities of the Government to ensure the observance of Philippine laws, rules and regulations, facilitate the proper administration of justice and prevent the occurrences of any abuse of the privileges and immunities granted its officials and alien employees in Article III of this Agreement to the Commission.

2.In the event that the Government determines that there has been an abuse of the privileges and immunities granted under this Agreement, consultations shall be held between the Government and the Commission to determine whether any such abuse has occurred and, if so, the Government shall withdraw the privileges and immunities granted the Commission and its officials.

Neither are the employees of IRRI without remedy in case of dispute with management as, in fact, there had been organized a forum for better management-employee relationship as evidenced by the formation of the Council of IRRI Employees and Management (CIEM) wherein "both management and employees were and still are represented for purposes of maintaining mutual and beneficial cooperation between IRRI and its employees." The existence of this Union factually and tellingly belies the argument that Pres. Decree No. 1620, which grants to IRRI the status, privileges and immunities of an international organization, deprives its employees of the right to self-organization.

The immunity granted being "from every form of legal process except in so far as in any particular case they have expressly waived their immunity," it is inaccurate to state that a certification election is beyond the scope of that immunity for the reason that it is not a suit against ICMC. A certification election cannot be viewed as an independent or isolated process. It could tugger off a series of events in the collective bargaining process together with related incidents and/or concerted activities, which could inevitably involve ICMC in the "legal process," which includes "any penal, civil and administrative proceedings." The eventuality of Court litigation is neither remote and from which international organizations are precisely shielded to safeguard them from the disruption of their functions. Clauses on jurisdictional immunity are said to be standard provisions in the constitutions of international Organizations. "The immunity covers the organization concerned, its property and its assets. It is equally applicable to proceedings in personam and proceedings in rem."

33. Southeast Asia Fisheries Development Center vs NLRC 206 SCRA 283Southeast Asian Fisheries Development Center-Aquaculture Department (SEAFDEC-AQD) is a department of an international organization, the Southeast Asian Fisheries Development Center, organized through an agreement entered into in Bangkok, Thailand. Juvenal Lazaga was employed as a Research Associate. Lacanilao in his capacity as Chief of SEAFDEC-AQD sent a notice of termination to private respondent informing him that due to the financial constraints being experienced by the

W/N NLRC has jurisdiction over the case?

No. Southeast Asian Fisheries Development Center-Aquaculture Department (SEAFDEC-AQD) is an international agency beyond the jurisdiction of public respondent NLRC. Being an intergovernmental organization, SEAFDEC including its Departments (AQD), enjoys functional independence and freedom from control of the state in whose territory its office is located.

Facts Issue Rulingdepartment, his services shall be terminated. SEAFDEC-AQD's failure to pay Lazaga his separation pay forced him to file a case with the NLRC. The LA and NLRC ruled in favor of Lazaga. SEAFDEC-AQD claimed that the NLRC has no jurisdiction over the case.

34. DFA vs NLRC GR 113191On 27 January 1993, private respondent Magnayi filed an illegal dismissal case against Asian Development Bank. Two summonses were served, one sent directly to the ADB and the other through the Department of Foreign Affairs. ADB and the DFA notified respondent Labor Arbiter that the ADB, as well as its President and Officers, were covered by an immunity from legal process except for borrowings, guaranties or the sale of securities pursuant to Article 50(1) and Article 55 of the Agreement Establishing the Asian Development Bank (the "Charter") in relation to Section 5 and Section 44 of the Agreement Between The Bank and The Government Of The Philippines Regarding The Bank's Headquarters (the "Headquarters Agreement").

The Labor Arbiter took cognizance of the complaint on the impression that the ADB had waived its diplomatic immunity from suit and, in time, rendered a decision in favor Magnayi. The ADB did not appeal the decision. Instead, on 03 November 1993, the DFA referred the matter to the NLRC; in its referral, the DFA sought a "formal vacation of the void judgment." When DFA failed to obtain a favorable decision from the NLRC, it filed a petition for certiorari.

1. Whether or not ADB is immune from suit

2. Whether or not by entering into service contracts with different private companies, ADB has descended to the level of an ordinary party to a commercial transaction giving rise to a waiver of its immunity from suit

3. Whether or not the DFA has the legal standing to file the present petition

1. Under the Charter and Headquarters Agreement, the ADB enjoys immunity from legal process of every form, except in the specified cases of borrowing and guarantee operations, as well as the purchase, sale and underwriting of securities. The Bank’s officers, on their part, enjoy immunity in respect of all acts performed by them in their official capacity. The Charter and the Headquarters Agreement granting these immunities and privileges are treaty covenants and commitments voluntarily assumed by the Philippine government which must be respected. Being an international organization that has been extended a diplomatic status, the ADB is independent of the municipal law. "One of the basic immunities of an international organization is immunity from local jurisdiction, i.e., that it is immune from the legal writs and processes issued by the tribunals of the country where it is found. The obvious reason for this is that the subjection of such an organization to the authority of the local courts would afford a convenient medium thru which the host government may interfere in their operations or even influence or control its policies and decisions of the organization; besides, such subjection to local jurisdiction would impair the capacity of such body to discharge its responsibilities impartially on behalf of its member-states."

2. No. The ADB didn't descend to the level of an ordinary party to a commercial transaction, which should have constituted a waiver of its immunity from suit, by entering into service contracts with different private companies. “There are two conflicting concepts of sovereign immunity, each widely held and firmly established. According to the classical or absolute theory, a sovereign cannot, without its consent, be made a respondent in the Courts of another sovereign. According to the newer or restrictive theory, the immunity of the sovereign is recognized only with regard to public acts or acts jure imperii of a state, but not with regard to private act or acts jure gestionis. “Certainly, the mere entering into a contract by a foreign state with a private party cannot be the ultimate test. Such an act can only be the start of the inquiry. The logical question is whether the foreign state is engaged in the activity in the regular course of business. If the foreign state is not engaged regularly in a business or trade, the particular act or transaction must then be tested by its nature. If the act is in pursuit of a sovereign activity, or an incident thereof, then it is an act jure imperii, especially when it is not undertaken for gain or profit.”

The service contracts referred to by private respondent have not been intended by the ADB for profit or gain but are official acts over which a waiver of immunity would not attach.

3. Yes. The DFA's function includes, among its other mandates, the determination of persons and institutions covered by diplomatic immunities, a determination which, when challenged, entitles it to seek relief from the court so as not to seriously impair the conduct of the country's foreign relations. The DFA must be allowed to plead its case whenever necessary or advisable to enable it to help keep the credibility of the Philippine government before the international community. When international agreements are concluded, the parties thereto are deemed to have likewise accepted the responsibility of seeing to it that their agreements are duly regarded. In our country, this task falls principally on the DFA as being the highest executive department with the

Facts Issue Rulingcompetence and authority to so act in this aspect of the international arena. In Holy See vs. Hon. Rosario, Jr., this Court has explained the matter in good detail; viz:

"In Public International Law, when a state or international agency wishes to plead sovereign or diplomatic immunity in a foreign court, it requests the Foreign Office of the state where it is sued to convey to the court that said defendant is entitled to immunity.

"In the United States, the procedure followed is the process of 'suggestion,' where the foreign state or the international organization sued in an American court requests the Secretary of State to make a determination as to whether it is entitled to immunity. If the Secretary of State finds that the defendant is immune from suit, he, in turn, asks the Attorney General to submit to the court a 'suggestion' that the defendant is entitled to immunity.

"In the Philippines, the practice is for the foreign government or the international organization to first secure an executive endorsement of its claim of sovereign or diplomatic immunity. But how the Philippine Foreign Office conveys its endorsement to the courts varies. In International Catholic Migration Commission vs. Calleja, 190 SCRA 130 (1990), the Secretary of Foreign Affairs just sent a letter directly to the Secretary of Labor and Employment, informing the latter that the respondent-employer could not be sued because it enjoyed diplomatic immunity. In World Health Organization vs. Aquino, 48 SCRA 242 (1972), the Secretary of Foreign Affairs sent the trial court a telegram to that effect. In Baer vs. Tizon, 57 SCRA 1 (1974), the U.S. Embassy asked the Secretary of Foreign Affairs to request the Solicitor General to make, in behalf of the Commander of the United States Naval Base at Olongapo City, Zambales, a 'suggestion' to respondent Judge. The Solicitor General embodied the 'suggestion' in a manifestation and memorandum as amicus curiae.

"In the case at bench, the Department of Foreign Affairs, through the Office of Legal Affairs moved with this Court to be allowed to intervene on the side of petitioner. The Court allowed the said Department to file its memorandum in support of petitioner's claim of sovereign immunity.

"In some cases, the defense of sovereign immunity was submitted directly to the local courts by the respondents through their private counsels. In cases where the foreign states bypass the Foreign Office, the courts can inquire into the facts and make their own determination as to the nature of the acts and transactions involved."