physician financial incentives and cesarean section delivery gruber and owings

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Physician Financial Incentives and Cesarean Section Delivery Gruber and Owings

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Physician Financial Incentives and Cesarean Section Delivery Gruber and Owings. Problem of Testing PID. Problem of Testing PID. Using fee changes: Identification problem: it can’t identify supply response When fee goes up demand less - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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Page 1: Physician Financial Incentives and Cesarean Section Delivery Gruber and Owings

Physician Financial Incentives and Cesarean

Section Delivery

Gruber and Owings

Page 2: Physician Financial Incentives and Cesarean Section Delivery Gruber and Owings

Problem of Testing PID

Page 3: Physician Financial Incentives and Cesarean Section Delivery Gruber and Owings

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Problem of Testing PID Using fee changes:

Identification problem: it can’t identify supply response

When fee goes up demand less supply more (subs. effect) / supply less

(income effect)

Page 4: Physician Financial Incentives and Cesarean Section Delivery Gruber and Owings

Problem of Testing PID Using ob/gyns density:

Omitted variable problem: COV(X,U) ≠0 Y = XB + U(c-section) (density) (local coinsurance rate)

Page 5: Physician Financial Incentives and Cesarean Section Delivery Gruber and Owings

生產方式 自然產自然產是指在不使用器械或開刀的情況下,產婦經由陰道生產分娩胎兒的方式,也就是將懷孕的產物(包括胎兒、羊水、胎盤及胎膜)剝離子宮而經陰道娩出的過程。 剖腹產剖腹產是婦科常見的分娩手術,以手術方式切開腹壁和子宮壁,將體重達到 500 克以上的胎兒娩出,並且於胎兒取出後,直接清理子宮內胎盤及胎膜等,術後縫合傷口。

Page 6: Physician Financial Incentives and Cesarean Section Delivery Gruber and Owings

選用剖腹產原因 骨盆狹小、胎兒過大 胎兒窘迫 前置胎盤 胎位不正(尤其為初產婦 ) 胎盤早期剝離 臍帶脫出 引產失敗(即生產過程中難產)

Page 7: Physician Financial Incentives and Cesarean Section Delivery Gruber and Owings

自然產、剖腹產優缺點 自然產自然產的子宮感染機率、傷口感染機率、嚴重出血機率、泌尿道感染機率皆較低;產後恢復快,產後改善痛經效果好。 剖腹產剖腹產將來引起尿失禁、骨盆腔損傷的機率低。

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Page 9: Physician Financial Incentives and Cesarean Section Delivery Gruber and Owings

各國剖腹產率 台灣:過去十年來介於 32-34% 間 世界各國

美國: 24.4% ( 2001 ); 30﹪( 2006 ) 英國: 22.6% ( 2001 ); 23.3﹪( 2006 ) 法國: 17.8 % ( 2001 ) 日本: 21.4% ( 2005 ) 韓國: 39.5% ( 2001 ); 35.2﹪( 2006 ) 最高的幾個國家:阿根廷約六成,中國大陸約五成

WHO 1985 年建議剖腹產率介於 10 ~ 15% ,但目前世界各國的剖腹產率大多高於這個水準

Page 10: Physician Financial Incentives and Cesarean Section Delivery Gruber and Owings

Cesarean delivery in the US There is no consensus view as to the

cause of this rapid increase in cesarean utilization.

The most frequently cited explanation is the introduction of technologies for diagnosing fetal distress.

Another important cause of c-section adoption was thought to be the legal environment.

Page 11: Physician Financial Incentives and Cesarean Section Delivery Gruber and Owings

自然產 剖腹產 自選剖腹 自然產 剖腹產 自選剖腹

1998 64.68 32.76 1.70 253,600

1999 | | | 64.89 32.48 1.68 267,218

2000 17,420 32,330 17,420 64.35 32.48 1.99 286,714

2001 17,910 33,280 17,910 64.59 32.09 2.37 245,271

2002 | | | 64.60 32.03 2.47 237,055

2003 65.36 31.45 2.23 222,364

2004 18,268 33,969 18,268 66.23 30.97 1.73 214,541

2005 33,969 33,969 33,969 65.55 31.69 1.67 204,406

2006 36,086 36,086 15,188 65.13 31.90 1.93 202,764

2007 | | | 64.26 32.64 2.15 200,384

a. 不同院所層級的生產給付點數有所差異,本表僅列出醫學中心支付點數。

b. 2003 4 VBAC自 年 月起,新增剖腹產後自然產( )論病例計酬項目,比照剖腹產支付點數。

表1. 歷年生產案件和健保支付點數a,b

年度支付點數 申請案件佔率

案件數

資料來源:根據中央健康保險局支付標準歷年公告加以彙整。

Page 12: Physician Financial Incentives and Cesarean Section Delivery Gruber and Owings

26.00%

27.00%

28.00%

29.00%

30.00%

31.00%

32.00%

33.00%

34.00%

35.00%

36.00%

1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007

圖1:歷年生產案件剖腹產率變化

剖腹產(全部) 剖腹產(首胎)

Page 13: Physician Financial Incentives and Cesarean Section Delivery Gruber and Owings

Financial incentives for cesarean delivery But, why the cesarean delivery

reimburses more then normal childbirth?

The reason1. Cesarean delivery is more difficult then

vaginal delivery.2. Cesarean delivery is much more

efficient.3. Cesarean delivery is also more costly

than vaginal childbirth.

Page 14: Physician Financial Incentives and Cesarean Section Delivery Gruber and Owings

Research Question They exploit a plausibly exogenous

change in the financial environment facing obstetrician/gynecologists during the 1970s: declining fertility in the United States.

The interest question is: In states where fertility was falling the most, did cesarean delivery rise the most?

Page 15: Physician Financial Incentives and Cesarean Section Delivery Gruber and Owings

The Model (McGuire and Pauly)

Page 16: Physician Financial Incentives and Cesarean Section Delivery Gruber and Owings
Page 17: Physician Financial Incentives and Cesarean Section Delivery Gruber and Owings

The data The data source is the National Hospital

Discharge Survey (NHDS) conducted annually since 1965 by the National Center of Health Statistics (NCHS).

This is a nationally representative survey of over 400 hospitals, and it contains information on approximately 200,000 discharges in each year.

Page 18: Physician Financial Incentives and Cesarean Section Delivery Gruber and Owings

The data The survey collects information on some

limited demographic characteristics of the patient, features of the hospital, primary and secondary diagnoses, and primary and secondary procedure use.

The authors use information on patients with a primary diagnosis of childbirth in the years 1970-1982.

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Estimation Model

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Basic results A 10% increase in the ob/gyn density

raises the probability of a c-section by 0.6%

A 10% fall in the fertility rate raises the probability of a c-section by 0.97%

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How large are these effects?10% decline in fertility rate 5% drop in income

1% rise in c-section usage 1.68 more c-section per ob/gyns per year ($943 ≒0.5% increase in income)

The c-section offsets only a very small part of the negative income shock facing ob/gyns

Page 27: Physician Financial Incentives and Cesarean Section Delivery Gruber and Owings

Specification checks The CS is correlation with the riskiness of

birth

The CS is correlation with the birth order.

The CS is could be a function of changing insurance coverage of mothers.

Page 28: Physician Financial Incentives and Cesarean Section Delivery Gruber and Owings

Specification checks

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Specification Checks After including birth severity controls, the

coefficient on fertility is unchanged Including birth order information has

little effect on the results Even excluding 5 outlying states, the

correlation between fertility and c-section remains robust

The inducement effect is higher for private insured women than uninsured (1.15% vs 0.65%)

Page 32: Physician Financial Incentives and Cesarean Section Delivery Gruber and Owings

Asymmetric Response?

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