phronesis volume 12 issue 2 1967 [doi 10.2307%2f4181798] j. r. trevaskis -- division and its...

Division and Its Relation to Dialectic and Ontology in PlatoAuthor(s): J. R. TrevaskisSource: Phronesis, Vol. 12, No. 2 (1967), pp. 118-129Published by: BRILLStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4181798 .Accessed: 17/08/2013 18:58

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Division and its Relation to Dialectic and Ontology in Plato

J. R. TREVASKIS

The formal divisional exercises which we meet above all in the Sophist may strike the reader as tedious. Yet it is usually said that Plato lays great store by Division as a method of philosophy,

one, moreover, to which he gives the title of 'dialectic' and which reveals the real structure of Ideas.

I wish to discuss how far the method is to be identified with dialectic, what relation, if any, it bears to Plato's ontology, and what Plato hopes for from it. I shall be mainly concerned with Phaedrus, Sophist and Statesman, having discussed the Philebus on a previous occasion (Phronesis 5,1 [1960], 39-44).

1. How far is Division to be identified with dialectic?

It is usual to see the first announcement of the method in the Phaedrus.' One thing that may be noted at once is that the Phaedrus example is not dichotomic, not, at least, in the manner of the divisional schemes of the Sophist: the method briefly illustrated at Phaedrus 265 d ff. does not involve the successive rejection of one side of a single column of dichotomies. The Phaedrus example involves the division of the concept 'irrationality' into 'human' and 'divine'; and each of these two subdivisions is pursued, at all events according to the theoretical summary of 266a, until it yields its quarry.

Socrates declares himself (266b3) enamoured of the method, and a disciple of its successful practitioners. Furthermore, he says, he calls such persons, whether rightly or not, &Lx?cXeLxoL. A moment later (c8) his respondent remarks (without strict accuracy) that in his opinion I 265dff., resumed briefly at 277b. D. J. Allan, it is true, has said: "I should be prepared to maintain that the reference to division and collection in the Phaedrus presupposes the fuiller account of these processes in the Sophist..." (Philosoph1y XXVIII [1953] 365). But, as will be seen, no fuller account of collection and divisioin is, in my opinion, given in the Sophist. Both dialogues give a certain amount of explanation of the method, the Phaedrus here at 265dff., the Sophist at 218dff. (the illustrative example of the Angler). Neither presupposes the other.

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Socrates was right to call the method 8LX3XTrXOV. Thus we have the position that Plato here in the Phaedrus is prepared to call both the method and its practitioners 8Lockx'cxo.

What exactly are we to understand him to mean by this adjective here? Does he, for example, mean that he calls successful practitioners of the method 'practitioners of dialectic'? and does he therefore equate the method with 'dialectic'? The answer to these questions seems to be 'no': if Socrates is able to express doubt whether or not he is justified in calling the method's successful users 8Lt-XOL, and if Phaedrus is able to express approval of the method's being called 8LixrXtlXOV (and hence acknowledgement that the question admits of doubt), the method cannot itself be equated with 8?xW%rLx' in Plato's mind. Dialectic must be taken to have an independent meaning for Plato, over and above the method of Division.

In so far as Socrates's doubt is seriously felt by him, it reflects, then, his realisation that he may be mistaken about the method's dialectical nature, that is to say, about its being the best one for his purpose, that of enquiry into Ideas.2 At 266c8, where the method is called 8&aXewt- x6v, what Plato intends would seem to be 'appropriate to philosophical discussion'.3 And if we are looking for a single adjective to cover the word as applied both to practitioners and method here, 'philosophical' is perhaps the best available. At all events, we cannot argue from the Phaedrus that dialectic and the method of Division are to be equated.

When we turn to the Sophist we find seven dichotomic divisions concerned with defining the sophist, and a section (253d-e) which Cormford declares4 to be a r6sum6 of Collection and Division. Perhaps the first question which we should ask is whether we are meant by Plato to consider Division as outlined in the Phaedrus and as practised in the Sophist to be essentially one and the same method. Plato does not tell us explicitly, but, in view of the similar terminology employed in the two dialogues, it would be implausible to maintain that the two methods are to be distinguished.

It looks, therefore, from this brief glance at the Phaedrus and the Sophist as though Cornford rnight be right when he says: "The method of Division may be used for two distinct objects: (1) the classification of all the species falling under a genus in a complete table, or (2) the 2 Cf. Hackforth, Plato's Phaedrus, p. 134, n. 4. 3 Cf. Richard Robinson, Plato's Earlier Dialectic2, pp. 69ff. and Hackforth, p. 135 init. 4Plato's Theory of Knowledge, p. 264 init.

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definition of a single species only."5 For all that, Comford's object no. (1) could not be fully justified from the Phaedrus. It is not there envisaged that the whole articulation of ,uavEcx has been laid bare, only sufficient for the purpose of distinguishing the two sorts of love. Nonetheless there would seem to be nothing in principle to prevent the method's being used for the division of a genus into all its species; and Plato probably made few bones about the sort of distinction drawn by Cornford. The essential thing about the method was that it worked by dividing concepts.

At Sophist 253 d 1-3 we hear of a aLOCXSXCLX a'MrG rn which enables its possessor xm'toc y'v- 8cxLpeSaOac. Is this process the method of Division? I do not think so. And if such a doubt is justified, the passage lends no support to the identification of the method of Division with dialectic.

253dl-e2 may be translated as follcws:

Elean: To distinguish between concepts, and not think that one is another and vice versa, falls under dialectic, shall we not agree?

Theaetetus: Yes. Elean: Well, a man who can make such distinctions readily perceives

a single Idea extended over the whole field of many instances, though each instance is quite separate, and many different Ideas embraced from without by a single Idea; and, again, a single Idea linked in a unity extending over many whole Ideas, and many Ideas completely separate and distinct. This is to know how to determine by their class- membership to what extent things can and cannot combine.

Cornford believes that the Elean's longer utterance refers to Collection and Division, the first half of the main sentence referring to Collection and the second half to Division, though Cornford is clearly uneasy about the second half.6 Most readers will probably share Cornford's uneasiness, I think, particularly over the words xod. no&aq X(OPLq 7r0V'rn &LG)oatesvOC4 (253d9).

If the words of d8-9 ("and, again, a single Idea linked in a unity extending over many whole Ideas") refer, as they seem to do, to the relation of a generic Idea to subordinate Ideas, then the words of d9 ("and many Ideas completely separate and distinct") follow oddly if 6 p. 171. The Phaedrus might then be taken to exemplify object (1), and the Sophist object (2). 6 p. 267. The second half is "less easy to interpret". It "appears to describe" Division.

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they refer, as Comford would have it, to those same subordinate Ideas. One would expect, from the whole shape of the sentence, that these words referred to some different group of Ideas.

I believe that the words do refer to a different group of Ideas and that we should hesitate before supposing that 253d is a summary of Collection and Division. Two further reasons may be advanced to support such hesitation:

1. The Elean claims at 253c6-9 that we have "chanced upon" the area of the philosopher's ability in our desideration of a skill that shall empower a man to judge "which concepts go with which and which do not" (bll-cl). We have unexpectedly arrived, that is to say, upon a new scene. The philosopher's ability, then, which the Elean goes on to describe at dl ff., must surely be something different, not simply the technique of Division which Theaetetus and the Elean have tried six times already in the dialogue. As is said at e8-9, we can look for the philosopher in this area now or later. On Cornford's view we have explored that area already.

2. How odd it would be for Plato to have employed the method six times in the dialogue already, and then, and not till then, described it, without any reference to its previous use. The atmosphere of the passage, on the contrary, is one in which we are dealing with something de novo.

The argument of 252 e-253 e seems to me to go like this: some terms or concepts go together so as to produce true7 statements, some do not. It is like what happens with the letters of the alphabet or with musical notes: only certain combinations succeed. But in order to decide which these alphabetical or musical combinations are, a man needs to be literate, or, in the other case, a trained musician. Similarly, a man who wishes to demonstrate which concepts are congruent and which are niot, and whether there are uniting concepts which make combinations possible and other concepts which cause disjunction in statements in which concepts are disjoined, will need a particular type of knowledge, indeed the supreme type of knowledge. In fact, such a man will need to be a philosopher; for the ability to discriminate concepts falls under dialectic, which the philosopher alone can practise. The possessor of the ability to distinguish concepts can recognize the class-concept lying

7 It is important to be clear that wve are concerned with true statements, not statements that are merely formally legitimate like 'grass is black'. Plato tells us at 252d6-10 that a statement which won't do is 'change rests'; yet this statement is of entirely legitimate form. It simply happens to be false.

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behind a group of related individuals, and the generic concept lying behind a group of related concepts. Again, he can recognize when a number of concepts can be unified under one generic concept, and when a number of concepts are in no way related to each other. This dialectical ability is the capacity to understand conceptual relations8 correctly.

One could, I think, paraphrase the argument of the section as follows: a person who is to say what letters make words and what do not, must possess the skill denoted by the term 'literacy'; literacy being the basic underlying knowledge of which spelling, in any particular instance, will be merely an application. Similarly musicianslhip underlies any individual composition: "the skill conveying the knowledge which sounds combine and which do not" (253b2-3) is the 'underlying' skill of musicianship possessed by the pLouacxo'. In the same way a particular type of knowledge (b9) underlies the correct combination of concepts and the correct recognition of manipulatory, as distinct from manip- ulated, concepts. The knowledge referred to at 253b9 and c4-5 is to be distinguished from the particular applications described at b 10-c 3. In order to know which concepts can go with which, and to distinguish the different functions performed by different concepts, we must know all about concepts, must have the basic knowledge about concepts which Plato at 253d2-3 calls 'dialectic'. The literate man, then, will be able to spell; the musician will be able to compose; the dialectician will be able to see the correct relationships between concepts.

Before leaving the passage I should like to discuss a little further the lines 253 d5-9. They fall naturally into two sections, the first ending at 7CCPLSXOX[1VOM (d8). It seems fairly clear that the two parts of this first section refer respectively to (a) the relation of an Idea to its particular instances" (b) the relation of a number of related Ideas to their generic Idea. The two parts of the first section are juxtaposed antithetically: ,uv.... 8x =to?v and 7ro'... Utro6 xl. The second section also, I think, contains an antithesis, this time between a unified many and

8 Does gxma-xm at e 1 refer to particulars or to y6vj ? I think it refers to both, and that the relations which Plato has in mind include those of particulars to one another and of concepts to one another. 9 Mr. W. G. Runciman appears to be correct in his view (Plato's Later Episte- mology, p. 62), as against Cornford's, that iroXX&v at 253d6 refers to particulars, not Ideas. Cornford, however, will not have been guilty of a mere grammatical error. Cf. PTK 189, n. 2 where he shows that he recognizes as neuter a word he translates as though it were feminine.

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an ununified many: [LUrov... aL'... 7rto?Xv and 7toX?Oc XCP'Lp. The first section spoke of the dialectician's ability to classify related particulars and concepts; the second, I think, speaks of his ability to distinguish between those groups of concepts which are related and those which are not.10

But however that may be, the lines cannot, it seems to me, be satisfactorily interpreted as a summary of Collection and Division. The first section, it is true, could represent Collection; but the second section simply will not naturally fit Division. Perhaps the words 70o xcxt yzvi aLOCLpELOOCL of 253 dl have misled readers so as to expect a description of Division. Yet the immediately following words (dl-2) could hardly be taken to support that expectation. They support, rather, the meaning 'to distinguish between concepts' for the words just quoted.

I conclude therefore that dialectic, as briefly characterized at 253 d 1-9, is not to be equated with the method of Division. The lines, together with their immediate context, only claim that Ideas are the touchstone by knowledge of which one may avoid confusion and achieve precision in philosophic debate."

2. The relation, i/ any, between Division and Plato's ontology

This is a question on which opinions are divided ;12 but it is usually assumed that Division is essentially concerned with Ideas. According to Cornford, for instance, "The task of philosophy is regarded in the Sophist as mainly analytical - the mapping out of the realm of Forms in all its articulations by Division".'3

Hackforth, in his Additional Note on Collection,'4 has already argued against "what is, I think, the commonly accepted view, that Collection is... always Collection of kinds (species)..." I wish to attempt something of the same sort so far as Division is concemed, and to argue

10 I thus partially agree with A. E. Taylor (Plato, the Sophist and the Statesman, p. 157) who believes that "the two problems mentioned in the second part of the sentence are meant to be distinguished from those spoken of in its first half." The details of Taylor's interpretation, however, I do not find convincing. II Similarly, the theory of Ideas would, in Plato's opinion, answer the problem of predication posed at 251 a-c, the beginning of this whole portion of the dialogue. 12 Cf. Ross, Plato's Theory of Ideas, p. 239 fin. 13 PTK 183. 14 Plato's Examination of Pleasure, p. 142.

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against the view that Division is concerned only with species or Ideas. The first passage one might turn to in such a discussion of Divisioni

is Phaedrus 265-6. Yet no certain light on our problem is, I think, to be derived from it. Admittedly pavtcx and the types of it distinguished in Socrates's two speeches may be presumed to be Ideas. But this is of little help towards determining whether we must always expect to find Ideas reflected in divisional schemes. It is true that we are counselled xan' etan a8.TpCV xaTJ &pOpa h 7riuxev (265e 1-2); but we can certainly place no reliance whatever on Plato's use of the term el8oq, which varies in meaning from one context to another. It may, but it equally may not, designate an Idea. Nor, I think, is xcx-r' &pOpx 7;recux.v any more to be relied on. A division of a genus into its constituent species is doubtless xOCT' &pOpx. But I fancy that Plato would recognize other 'natural' divisions within a class which were not to be identified with Ideas.'5

Before leaving the Phaedrus, however, I should like to draw attention to the passage at 269cff. where Socrates says that the orator should discriminate the different types of soul and fit to them different types of address. The orator must know fuxn 6ac C87 ?XtL... TOUTVa 8 8 ou& , 8py??vwv, X?'y&v oK t6ax xai rosa scv s8N, e oL6V8 yx%ov (271 d 1-5). Thus +uyx' which we know (e.g. fronm the Phaedrus Mytlh) Plato does not regard as an Idea, is subject to &LaLpeatq into et8j. Indeed Hackforth does not blink the fact, but says in his commentary on p. 151: "The upshot is that we are back again at dialectic"' as the right ,uCsOoao; for the orator: he must discern 4u ' as at once a One and a Many". It seems to me that we have a prima facie case here of Division applied outside the scheme of Ideas, and that the case needs answering by anyone who holds that Division is essentially conicerned withi Ideas.

It may be urged, conceivably, that the &a(peaLq of Phaedrus 271 d is not that of 265eff., but is a mere casual distinction of types of mind. And even though this would, in my opinion, carry little convictioni, we may perhaps move on now to the Sophist where there can be no doubt that we have seven schemes of Division. An important point for us to recall at the outset is that we have argued that Sophist 253d is not

15 Cf. n. 24 (p. 128) below. 16 By which term Hackforth intends the method of Collection and Divisioni: cf. Plato's Phaedrus, p. 134.

For the irreducibility of Soul and the Ideas cf. G. C. Field, The Philosophy of Plato, p. 131: '"The Forms are not souls, and Soul is not a Form, and neither is 'made' by or dependent for its existence on the other."

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concerned merely with Division, but with the whole inter-relationship or, where appropriate, lack of inter-relationship, between Ideas. Now it is as plain as anything ever is in Plato, particularly from the words

136xv Ls &a 7MOX,E)v, SoV exoarou zeLyzvOU X()plq, 7r&VWrf 8LCXr?VTLe'V, together with the fact that the context is concerned with a a.)cexrtx' E7rLG7tWL, that 253d is concemed with Ideas. So long, therefore, as 253d was thought to be a summary of the method of Division, there was a strong incentive to suppose that the method of Division was essentially concerned with Ideas. The equation, too, of the method of Division with 'dialectic' was a similar incentive, and we have seen reason to abandon that equation also. We are therefore free to look at the seven Divisions by themselves and to try to determine from them whether they are concerned exclusively with Ideas.

A question we are bound to ask ourselves at the beginning is whether Plato posited an Idea of sophistry. He does not seem to make it clear one way or the other. Cornford might appear to suppose there is such an Idea when he says at p. 170: "The purpose of the dialogue is to define 'the Sophist'. Here, at the threshold, we cross the boundary between the sensible world, to which the Theaetetus was confined, and the world of Forms." Yet at p. 173 he is able to say: "Sophistry is the false counterfeit of philosophy and of statesmanship and has its being in the world of eidola that is neither real nor totally unreal." This sounds very unlike an Idea. And, whatever conclusion one comes to about 'sophistry', what is one to make of the intermediate classes revealed in the course of the Divisions? We may perhaps set aside for this purpose the first six Divisions which, in Cornford's opinion, are not definitions of 'the Sophist', but "analytical descriptions of easily recognisable classes to whom the name had been attached" (p. 187). But the seventh cannot evade being taken for a definition of 'the Sophist', and, in Cornford's translation, it runs in part as follows: "The art of contradiction-making, descended from an insincere kind of conceited mimicry, of the semblance-making breed, derived from image-making..." (p. 331). Are we to believe, then, that Plato posited an Idea of 'semblance-production by ignorant mimicry"7 (;u(i>nat

oootO,vqrLxm), 267e 1)? I find it difficult to believe that he did.'8 17 Cf. the final Table of Division, PTK 324. "8 Cf. Philebus 48cff. where 'self-ignorance' is divided into three, and one of the resultant concepts, 'imaginary wisdom' (8o,oaocptx, 49d11), is further sub- divided, according as it is entertained by the weak or the strong. Can we regard either of these subdivisions as the name of an Idea?

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Certainly when Plato gives us unequivocal instances of Ideas they bear no resemblance to classes of this sort, but instead have simple names like 'just', 'equal', 'man' or 'table'. Yet if 'semblance-production by ignorant mimicry' does not represent an Idea, we are at once relieved of any need to regard Division as essentially concerned with Ideas.

When the question of the population of the world of Ideas arises, recourse is commonly had to Rep. X, 596a, where Socrates is made to say: "we are accustomed to posit19 a single, Idea for each group of individuals to which we give the same name". Yet, even taking the usual view of that passage's meaning, it cannot be relied on to represent Plato's settled opinion: for such an opinion is in effect rejected at Statesman 262d3-6 where those are adversely criticized who think that 'non-Greek' "must constitute one real class because they have a common name 'barbarian' to attach to it".20 Thus the mere existence of a common name is no guarantee that there exists an Idea with that same name.

The Statesmian represents itself as a continuation of the Sophist, and little fresh light on our problem can perhaps be expected from its dichotomies. But it is well recognized that it is in the Statesman in particular that we are given advice on right and wrong modes of employment of Division; and from them we may hope to derive a certain amount of enlightenment. Not that we can get much help from 262b: T'O popOq czo e8oq exye'. This gets us no further than Phaedrus 265el. Nor, I think, areroc TC&V 7r('VCvOv a'LOZELOC of 278d any more helpful: if we are debating whether the "universal alphabet of things",21 that is to say, the components of definitions by Division, are invariably to be considered to be Ideas, we must try to determine the questioni by an inspection of the components of divisional definitions. We cannot, that is to say, argue from the words Ot& -)5v 7rx&v-v ar'oLxZex to what they 'must' stand for. Again, the etan, jiepri and yevj of 285a-b seem as ambiguous as before.

There is one passage in the Statesman, however, wlhich does, I think, cast light on the problem whether Division always reveals a patterni of Ideas. This is the passage briefly referred to above where we are

19 A. C. Lloyd suggests in CQ N.S. II, 1-2 (1952), 106, n. 1 that our hypothesis is merely provisional. But it would seem unwise to build much on the word TLOCCOOL. 20 J. B. Skemp, Plato's Statesman, p. 132. 21 Taylor, Plato, the Sophist and the Statesman, pp. 288-289.

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counselled against a Division of the term Man into Greek and Bar- barian (262dff.). It would be better and a truer bisection to divide mankind into male and female.

Three points may be observed from this example: 1. We have a clear case here of Division proceeding below the in/ima

species Man. It is commonly said22 that Division stops at the in/ima species. Plato's own expression in the Phaedrus is ?LCpr. -TOU w-pi-qrou (277b7) 'to the limit of division', and in the Sophist &'To[oV 7U&V (229 d5-6) 'at the limit of divisibility', neither of which expressions seems to have any necessary connotation of species, whether in/ima or not. It seems that we have no warrant for attributing the anachronistic expression in/ima species to the lower limit of Platonic Division, and that we should not do so.

2. Plato seems to have no objection to Hellenic, Lydian etc. as subdivisions of mankind. His objection is to Hellenic etc. versus the rest, because in such a split only one side (Hellenic etc.) is a y6vo4 as well as a p?poq (262e6-263a1). So we have a case here in Division of a sub- division (Hellenic etc.) of which Plato approves, but which does not reflect an Idea: for it is hardly conceivable that Plato would have supposed the superficial differences represented by human racial groups and sub-groups to be based on separate Ideas.

3. The division of human beings into men and women does not support the view of the correct method of Division held by, for example, Hackforth (PEP 24-25) in his discussion of Plato's example of Division taken from musical notes and scales (Philebus 17bff.). Hackforth objects to Plato's example: "The terms 'high', 'low' and 'level' are not the names of species of sound, which can be further divided into sub-species. ."23 We might be similarly tempted to object that the species 'human being', which contains both male and female, is not divided by Plato into sub-species (e.g. European, Asiatic etc.) themselves containing both male and female, and further divided into sub-sub-species (Hellenic etc.) also containing both male and female. Instead (we might continue) Plato comes to a halt with his arbitrary division into the two sexes, a division which is not distinctively human. Yet Plato clearly tells us that he approves such a division. Once again

22 E.g. by Hackforth, Plato's Phaedrus, p. 132, n. 4; PEP 24-26. Cf. Cornford, PTK 186: "The method of Division exhibits ... indivisible species at the bottom." 23 Hackforth similarly objects at PEP 114 to "a classification of arts or sciences which are not, in fact, co-ordinate species of a genus, but whose relation is one of greater or less approximation to truth (&O?xi,Lm) or precision (&xppertoc)".

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it seems that we should abandon any preconception in favour of 'specific' differentiae. Plato is willing to see different criteria observed in different divisions, even where the same class is to be divided. This is what we have found with the class Man, where Plato seems willing to approve a division either by sex or by race,24 so long as genuine yevl and not mere ,ukp] are come by.

From this review of Plato's use of the method of Division and of his comments on its correct use, I think we may conclude, in opposition to the generally held view, that Division is not essentially concerned with the splitting of a genus into its constituent species (although of course it may do this); that it need not stop at the in/ima species; that it is not essentially concerned with Ideas (though of course it may produce class-names which are the names of Ideas) and does not aim to produce an 'ontological map'. The seven divisions of the Sophist, indeed, seem to have little concern with Ideas.

3. What does Plato hope for Irom the method of Division?

It is commonly claimed that Division aims to reveal a real structure of Ideas. Hackforth, for example, says (PEP 21): "the right number [of classes], which the philosopher aims at finding, corresponds to the Forms really existing... that is why dialectical method is 'quite easy to indicate, but very far from easy to employ'."

Now that we have seen reason to differ from this view, we must revise our estimate of Plato's hopes of the method. The method's use, in the Sophist above all, is to describe by a process of elimiination; or, again, to elicit different meanings of ambiguous terms, of which we may take as an example 'love' in the Phaedrus. Of these two uses the second is by far the more important: the first is largely satirical, and the formal dichotomies of the Sophist and the Statesman have long been recognized as only half-serious. But the second use, the eliciting of different meanings of ambiguous terms, is of extreme importance and Plato brings it to our notice a number of times: as he says in the Phaedrus, words like 'just' and 'good' are disputed terms: they mean different things to different persons; 'love' is similarly a disputed term which requires definition (263a-d), a process which Plato ac- commodates to a divisional scheme at 265dff.; or as at Sophist 218c 24 Such a division by race would, it seems to me, be xocT' &pOpca f 7r6cuzev equally with a division by sex. Yet only the latter division would reflect a structure of Ideas.

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the word 'sophist' is in need of explication so as to make sure that it means the same thing to both speakers, a process which formally occupies the seven divisions of the dialogue.

But, over and above this important use, there is a third which is clearly supereminent. It is referred to in essence at Phaedrus 266b where Socrates justifies his enthusiasm for the method of Division by its conferring on him the ability 'to speak and to think'. This benefit is only fully explained, I think, at Statesman 285d, where the Elean is made to suggest that their chief aim in their present discussion is not to define the statesman but to improve their general powers of philosophical discussion (ro5 7tcepL 7nav'7oc &LocXrcLXWrpOLq yLyVea0oL, d5-6). In this way they will train their minds and make them better able to apprehend Ideas, which is the end of all their discussions (286a4-7).

The method is thus a practice routine in philosophy.25 We need neither be surprised at its dullness compared with the flights of Plato's imagination elsewhere, nor expect any direct philosophical results from it. It proceeds by an oblique, not a direct, path towards Plato's goal of the Idea.

University of Adelaide

25 This conclusion therefore bears some resemblance to Prof. Cherniss's view which does not see Division as providing an 'ontological map' (cf. ACPA 46: "The schemata of diaeresis for Plato, then, do not portray the relational arrangements of the world of ideas but rather are instruments of analysis.") Cherniss, however, believes that when Plato counsels sZ ,ukpoq &t el8oq 'XrTCo he intends by cl8oq an Idea (cf. ACPA 252 and 264). It does appear, therefore, that in Cherniss's view Division is very closely concerned with Ideas.

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Article Contentsp. 118p. 119p. 120p. 121p. 122p. 123p. 124p. 125p. 126p. 127p. 128p. 129

Issue Table of ContentsPhronesis, Vol. 12, No. 2 (1967), pp. 91-162Front MatterParmenides' Sail and Dionysodorus' Ox [pp. 91-98]Der Logosbegriff bei Heraklit und Parmenides [pp. 99-117]Division and Its Relation to Dialectic and Ontology in Plato [pp. 118-129]Plato's Analysis [pp. 130-146]Soul and Immortality in "Republic" X [pp. 147-151]Chrysippus: On the Criteria for the Truth of a Conditional Proposition [pp. 152-161]Back Matter

phronesis volume 12 issue 2 1967 [doi 10.2307%2f4181798] j. r. trevaskis -- division and its...

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