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Philosophy of SocialScienceA contemPorarY lntroduction

Mark Risjord

ll Routledoef,\ ra¡orarranclícroupNEW YORK AND LONDON

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C o nte nts

lrst of FrguresAcknowledgments

lntroductionl.l What is the Philosophy of Social Science?

The Democratic PeaceAzande WitchcraftFreedom Riders and Free RidersPhilosophy in the Social Sciences

1.2 A Tour of the Philosophical NeighborhoodNormativityNaturalismReductionismExcelsior!

2 Objectivity,Values, and the Possibility of a Social Science2.1 The ldeal ofValue Freedom

The United States CensusDimensions of Value FreedomA Moderate Thesis of Value Freedom

2.2 lmpartiality and Theory ChoiceRisk and ErrorWhat About Objectivity?

2.3 Essentially Contested ldeasValue-Neutrality and Emancipatory ResearchObjection:Values and the Logic of DiscoveryValue Presuppositions and lmplicatures

2.4 Chapter SummaryDiscussion QuestionsFurther Reading

xlilxiv

I

I

234567I

t0t2

t4t4t5t7t920202224242627303t32

viii Contents

3 Theories, lnterpretations, and Concepts3. I Aggression, Violence, and Video Games3.2 Defining Theoretical Concepts

The EmpiricistView of Concepts and Theory StructureRealism, lnstrumentalism, and the Problem

of Construct Validity3.3 lnterpretivism

ldeal Types and VerstehenHermeneutics and MeaningThick Description and its Challenges

3.4 Realism and Social ConceptsSocial ConstructionsRealism about Social KindsLooping Effects


4 lnterpretive Methodology4. I Evidence for lnterpretation

Qualitative Research Methods and Their PresuppositionsAuthority and AuthenticityReflexivity

4.2 Rationalit¡ Explanation, and lnterpret¡ve CharityThe Problem of Apparent lrrationalityRelativism and RationalityThe Principle of Charity

4.3 Cognition, Evolution, and lnterpretationBounded and Unbounded RationalityCognitive Roots of Culturelnterpretation and Cognitive ExplanationThe New Questions of Naturalism


5 Action and Agency5.I Explaining Action

Admiral Tryon and lnstrumental RationalityThe Function of General Laws in HistoryReasons and CausesRe-enactmení Verstehen Revisited

5.2 The Games People PlayRationality and Utility

34353838

40424345464848495t535455

5757576062646466676970727476777878

8l828286889l9494

Games and StrategiesEquilibriaNash Equilibria and the Battle of the Bismarck SeaMultiple Equilibria and Coordination Problems

5.3 AgencyThe Psychological Plausibility of Rational Choice TheoryRational Fools?Game Theory in the Laboratorylnstrumentalism and Structuralism


ó Reductionism: Structures,Agents, and Evolution6.1 Explaining Revolutions6.2 Social Theory and Social Ontology

The lndividualism-Holism DebateDefinition and Theoretical ReductionSupervenienceMethodological Localism

6.3 Agents and Social ExplanationsMethodological lndividualismMicrofoundations and Moderate Explanatory lndividualismAgency and Mechanistic Explanation

6.4 Evolutionary ExplanationsFunctions in Evolutionary PerspectiveSelectionist Explanations of Cooperation and the Evolution

of NormsConsequences of Selectionism for the Social Sciences


7 Social Norms7.I Disenchanting the Social World

ls and OughtNormativismGood Bad Theories

7.2 Norms and Rational ChoicesConventionConventionality and NormativitySocial Norms

7.3 Normativity and PracticeNorms and Practices

Contents ix

9799

t02t04t06t06t07t09t2n4il5il6

il8il8t22t22124t26t28t29129t32t35t37t38

142r45t47t49149

t52t53t53ts4t55t57t58r60r63t67t67

Ì-_

x Contents

Problems for Practice TheorYPractices Without Regularities

7.4 Reductionism and Naturalized NormativityNormativism and HolismNorms, Naturalism, and SupervenienceProspects for Naturalized Normativity


I Intentions, Institutions, and Collective Action8. I Agency and Collective lntentionality

Team ReasoningJoint CommitmentGroup Agency

8.2 Joint lntentionalitYCooperation Again: Ontogeny and DevelopmentPlans and Joint lntentionsWe-intentions and the We-modeActing as a Group Member

8.3 lntentions and lnstitutionsThe Strange Tale of the Druid PennYFunction and Rules in lnstitutionsExplaining Social lnstitutions


9 Causality and Law in the SocialWorld9. I The Democratic Peace Hypothesis9.2 Are There Social Scientifìc Laws?

Characteristics of Natural LawsCreativity and ComplexitY

9.3 Conceptualizing CausationConstant ConiunctionLinear Equation Modeling and Causal RegularitieslnterventionismCapacities and Nomological Engines

9.4 Models and MechanismsSecret Springs and PrinciPlesCorrelations, Black Boxes, and ProcessesMiddle Range Theory and Agent-Based Models


Contents xi

t69t70172t72t74175t77t78t78

r80t8lr8t184t87t89t89t9lt93t95t98t98200202204205206

l0 Methodologies of Causal lnference10. I Bayesian Networks and Causal Modeling

Confounds and Common CausesBayesian lnferenceChallenges to Causal Modeling

10.2 Case Studies and Causal StructureThe ApparentValue of Case StudiesEpistemological Challenges of Case StudiesJustification and Discovery

10.3 ExperimentationWhat Can We Learn From Social Scientifìc Expenimentation?Quasi-Experiments and Randomized Controlled Trials

10.4 Extrapolation and Social EngineeringEvidence-Based PolicyThe FCC AuctionBreaking the Extrapolator's CirclePerformativity and Social Engineering


ReþrencesIndex

23723923924t244246246248250254254256260260262264265267268269

27t286

2082092t22t22132162162172t9222225225226228233234234

Figu res

2.14.t4.25.15.254).4

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6.16.26.36.47.17)7.37.48.19.1

10.110.210.310.410.510.610.7

Type I and Type II Errors'!V'ason Selection TäskSocial Selection TâskSinking of the HMS CamperdnwnFred's Utiliry FunctionThe Simple Card GameThe Prisoner's DilemmaThe P¡isoner's Dilemma (Matrix Form)The Prisoner's Dilemma (Extensive Form)Battle of the Bismarck SeaInside/OutsideStag HuntAllocation Game 1

Allocation Game 2Assurance GameBroken \Øindows TheoryMicrofoundationsEvolutionary FunctionsRed/Blue (Initial Rounds)Red/Blue (Final Round)Clean Up the ParkFollow the Rules to Clean Up the ParkThe Prisonert Dilemma (Team Version)Rasler and Thompson Model of Democratic PeaceDemocracy as a Direct Cause of PeaceThree Causal ModelsIntervening on the EconomyIllustration of the Causal Markov ConditionOffsetting Causal ProcessesCauses of Student AchievemenrConfounded Interventions

22707)85969899

10010110210510511011112013rr34r40162r62165165183229239240242243244257259

Acknowledgments I lntroduction

l. I What is the Philosophy of Social Science?Human llature is a social narure. Because the central questions of philosophyconcern what it means to be human, philosophers have been thinking abo"trhe fundamental characteristics of sociery since antiquiry. In the ninãteenthcentul'y, anthropology, sociology, economics, ancl psychology broke awayfrom philosophy, The cenrral questions of the philòsophy Jf social scieniealise with the birth of these empirical disciplines. \7hilè they clistinguishedthemselves with new methods, their theories were continuous witÌi thoseproposecl by philo_sophels fi'om Plato to MilI.The philosophlt of social scienceexamines some of the-pelennial questions of philosophy by engaging withthe empirical study of human society.

The questions disrinctive of the philosophy of the social sciences areencompassed within three broacl themes: normativiry naturalism, and reduc-tionism. The quesrions of normariviry conðêrñ iËe'place of values in socialsciendfié inquiìy. Social science is closely linked to social policy concerns,sÒ can social scierice be objective? The social sciences also thãor.ize about the

hin human society. Theyns of naturalism concer.nsciences. Must the social

of thé ì'ratural sciences? Ol are theredimensions of human society that

'equire u'ique methocls or kinds of theo-rizing? The questions of leductionism ask how social strucures relate to theindividuals who constitute thern. Do churches have causal powers over andabove those .or.elati,or-rs be explainedin terms of

Ultimatel social sciences are aboutour place in e? How is human narurerelated to non-human nature? \Øhat can we know? Reflection on the socialsciences therefole contlibutes to the fundamental inquir.ies of philosophy.The topics of this ['¡ook a'e commonly discussed in theoretical

"nd -.thoá-ological writing in the social sciencei. The'efo'e, r.eflection on these philo-sophical themes also contlibures to rhe fundamental inquiries of the social

2 lntroduction

sciences. The philosophy of the social sciences is en inherently interdisciplin-

"ry ""i.iiy. lfit.r iåtré *.11, it can advance both philosophy and the social

they give rise.

The Democrotic Peoce

Modern democracy emerged in thecentury with increasingThe republics in Franceinto the hands of electedsiveness of leaders to the will of theImmanuel Kant, in an essay entitled

Now the of its origin'since it a has also the

prospect Peace' Andih. r."ro the consent

oi th. subjects is tequired to 'lrtermine be wer or.rot, ,rothing is morå natural than that the matter*.ií, U.fot.indertaking such a bad busi g war' they

*"rf¿ of necessity be rãsolving to bring f war upontheir countrY.

(Kant 1903 11795), r2r-2)

Kanr,s arqument considers the rational course of action for a group of people

;h;;;:;; ih.-r.I.,.r. Since the costs of war are so high' it would be

irratiJnal for the citizens of a state to vote for war unless the situation was

that while democracies are not less warlike in general, they very rarely go

lntroduction 3

AzandeWttchcroft

Anthropologists have long been fascinated with beliefs about supernaturalagents. It is common for humans to see the world as populated by beingsthat can pass through solid walls or change from human to animal form.Very often, the beließ seem ro fy in the face of simple common sense. Ina famous study of the Azande, an ethnic group of central Africa, E. E. Evans-Pritchard reported practices that seemed rather incoherent ro him. Amongthe Azande, "witches" (Evans-Pritchard's translation) were people who haãthe power to cause misfortune. \Øhen someone suddenly fell ill and died,awitch might be responsible. \Øhen this happened, the familywould demandretribution. f the responsible witch, the Azandehad a practi the basii of the oracles, they wouldperform "ve itch. Incoherencies arise when thereare multiple deaths and multiple oracles. Evans-Pritchard wrote:

If it were known that t d been avenged upon awitch IZ then the whol educed to an absurdirybecause the death or I/

(E"ïìffiilphäo"rîàî!í)'\Øas

IZa witch or not? According to Xs kinsmen he was (because the oraclesaid so), a killed him, According to Izs kinsmenhe was an killed bv witch Z, aJproved by theiroracle and tice, Eváns-Pritchard nàt.r, th. oracles

to waÍ against each other. Indeed the correlation is so strong that some haveproposed this "democratic peace" to be a law of the social sciences.' The democratic peace is one of many cases where philosophical positions¿nd arguments have direcdy inspired social scientific research. You mightthink that this would permanently fix the philosophical assumprions of soðialscientific theories, but it doesnt. Kantt argument, for example, supposesthat the free choices of the citizens determine whether e nation goes ro war.If researchers hewed closely to Kant's presuppositions, they would look atwhy individuals voted or did not vote for war-mongering politicians. Byconrrast, many social scientists have examined whether particular kinds of

or inhibit war. In other words, their philo-osite of Kantt: The causes of war are foundearch tends to be diverse in its assumptions,

even when the question is as focused as the question of why democraciesdo not go to war with each other. Differenr answers appeal to distinctphilosophical commitments. In this domain, the philosophical differencesinclude disputes about whether human events can be explained by causallaws and whether communities exist over-and-above the individuals whocomPose them.

4 lntroduction

Freedom Riders ond Free Riders

\Øhy did Rosa Parks fefuse ro give up_her bus seat to a \white passenger?

\Øh!" the bus driver ordered Rosa Párks and three other Black passengers

to move, the others complied. No doubt they too were fed-up with lawsthat humiliated them. nuì de!'ing the driver's order carried a high risk ofpunishment. Each a strong motivation not to chd''Ï.r,g. th. system of buses-of Montgo{reY-,Alabama'yetif il aåted toge The.Civil Rights Movementof the 1950s anä nly because enough people

revolutions all face the sameeach individual, there are substantialme, everybodY benefits if the sYstemindividual, then, is to sit on the side

ation. If the movement fails, theose who gave uP their seats benefit

from it just as much as Rosa Parks did. Paradoxicall¡ then, social movementsand revãlutions should never get star :ed. Problems of the same form-whatare sometimes called "free riãer" problems-show up in several relds. Ineconomics, it arises as the tragedy of the commons. In anthropology, it is

the puzzle of how human cooPeretion could have evolved.Ai least somedmes, revolutións and social moments succeed, people con-

serve public resources, and we cooPerate altruistically. Free rider problems

[]

lntroduction 5

get solved, but how? A¡swers to this question encompess two deeply differentãonceptions of human nature. The classical liberal view treats humans as

auronomous choosers, each seeking his or her best interest. Community ist are beneficial to therms and laws can sup-\X/hy do people followthe other side of the

philosophical divide, communitarians see humans as fundamentally socialãnd oriented toward each other. Identiry with a group and its norms isintegral to human life. On this side of the issue, questions of agency pushto rhe fore. How can an individual decide that some social norms ere wrong2indact in ways that subvert the dominant cultural ethos? \Øhat force doesa social norm have, and from where does it arise?

Philosophy in the Sociol Sciences

In each of these examples, concepts and questions of longstanding interestto philosophers are close to the surface. In pursuing their questions, socialscientists take positions on matters that have deep roots: conceptions ofhuman agency, rationaliry epistemological justification, value, causarion, andcommunity. The philosophical task is to link the social scientific commir-ments to the larger literature in philosophy. After all, there have been somepretty smart people who have thought about these metters over the last2,000 or so. of issues and the to

uate ofogy ceî

contempofarysocial scientists areThe thinkers who we nowof their time. Today, wetheory that bearsis philosophy in

directly on traditional philosophical questions. Just as therethe social sciences, ls

The ofinto our discussion, something needs to be said

about the As we will discuss one of the lssuesin the ls

lssue lsasa debate over counts as a "science."

seen fractious debatessome eers, speaking of "the philosophy of social science" is

iõT6õus on a limited set of theories, methods, and questions. However, thequestion of how social inquiry is related to natural inquiry is not best

what is and is not science. -Qf¡¡¡¡¡e¡fiq¡s-a¡e

commrtments a

rq qrrñ4ltt14 '-^"ll T

theby demarcating

this

a

ó lntroduction

book, therefore, "social science" will be understood broadly as including allwith

vatlon,causesand express their results.

The question of what counts as a social science has a practical dimensiontoo. 'What fields are included within the domain of the philosophy of thesocial sc logy, sociology, eco-nomics, i.í'pqffiE¿Ëisfq¡y¡ criminology,-educa-tional st broad and inclusiveapproach. There is a set of philosophical questions-to be outlinedpresently-which cut across particular theories and methodologies of all thedisciplines we have mentioned and more. To be sure, there are also philo-sophical issues specific to disciplines. The fields of history, psychology, andeconomics support well developed philosophical literatures. Indeed, the seriesof which this book is a part includes texts on the philosophy of economics(Reiss 2013) and the philosophy of psychology (Bermudez 2005). This textwill cleave to the issues common among all studies of human behavior andsocial interaction.

1.2 ATour of the Philosophical NeighborhoodThe discipline of philosophy is commonly divided into the domains of valuetheor¡ epistemology, and metaphysics. Value theory concerns issues aboutthe source and justification of values, rules, and norms. tVhat makes an actmorally permissible or a painting good? Epistemology concerns humanknowledge. 'What constitutes knowledge and how is knowledge justified?Finall¡ metaphysics asks about the fundamental characteristics of the world.'ùØhat are causes? Are humans free? \Øhat does it mean to be rational? Itshould be clear from the three examples introduced in Section 1.1 that thephilosophy of social science draws on all three of these sub-fields. '$7hat,

then, makes the philosophy of social science distinctive as a domain ofinquiry within philosophy?

The answer provided so far is that the philosophical questions arise outof the practice of a collection of empirical disciplines called "the social sci-ences." So far so good, but is there an¡hing that ties these questions together?I think not, at least, not in any strong sense. Any attempt to strictly demar-cate the philosophy of social science is bound to be overwhelmed withcounter-exarnples. More importantly, such strict discipline would stunt ourinquiries. As you study philosophy you will find that one question leads toanother, sometimes in unexpected ways. The field of philosophy is crisscrossedby intellectual lines of inquiry and the boundaries among domains must

lntroduction 7

rcmziin funy if we are to follow where our investigations lead. That saidthere are some prominent, well-trodden paths to which we will find ourselvesfetufnlng' of social

run this book: normeüvtty,æ-.,'

flormotivìtYIssues about norms, values, and rules enter the social sciences Ìn two ratherdifferentways. On one hand, the norms, values, and rules of specific societiesare pant of what the social sciences study. On the other, there are norms)values, and rules that social scientists recognize and are part of their ownsociety. Let us begin with the second.

The idea that democracies do not wage war on other democracies hasfigured in the rhetoric foreign policy. That socialscience should support is not surprising. Indeed,one might argue that t ctive social programs is toknow how the social world works. This line of thought presupposes thatsocial science and social policy are independent. Some critics have arguedthat the expediencies ofAmerican foreign policy infuenced the social scientificinvestigation of the democratic peace hypothesis. As you might imagine,defining "democracy" and'þeace" is crucial to the research. Critics argue thatthese concepts cÍrnnot be defined in ways that are completely independentof political values. So commitments to how we ought to be conducting ourforeign policy infuence the data and theories on which policy is based. Inthis way social scientists become involved in disputes over social policy, andthey have to defend their results as the results of "objective" inquiry'We will explore several issues surrounding values and objectiviry. Theprimary question concerns ualue freedom, and this will be the topic ofChapter 2. Must social scientific research be conducted without commitmentto ethical or political values? Many philosophers of social science think thatthe answer is "no"; some kind of commitment is always present, even neces-sary. This ans\ryer opens new questions. There are a variery of ways in whichmoral and political values figure in social scientific research. Selecting datato fit a preconceived agenda obviously constitutes a bias and underminesobjectivity. The consequences of other influences are not so obvious. rùØe

need to understand the variety of ways in which science c¿n be valueladen.Then we need to ask If the social sciences are not value-free (in a particularway), can they be objective? This question links the epistemology of thesocial sciences to the question of value freedom. Because of the epistemo-logical dimension of the question of value freedom, we will touch on itagain in Sections 3.4,6.3, and 10.4.

The question of value freedom is made more complicated by the fact thatmany projects in the social sciences are explicitly political. Critical theory,feminist research, and va¡ious forms of participatory action research aim at

I lntroduction lntroduction 9

naturalism. Epistemological forms of naturalism concern issues about theor¡explanetion, and method. In literatule on social scientific methodology oneoften encounters a distinction between "qualitative" and "quantitative" research.

Qualitative research uses interviews, participant observation, focus groups, andsimilar methods. It expresses its research results in narrative form, often relyingon illustrative cases and analyzing long passages of text. Quantitative researchrelies on methods that measule in some way, perhaps through surveys orexperiments. l_t aims to uncover correlatio¡s ao.d causes, and ir ¡nay rely onmathematically formulared models, \X/hen this distinction is introduceäJÀ themèthodology literarure, it is usually insisted that qualitative researih is. deeplydifferent fi'om quantitative research. Authors who take this position are the-re-fore adopting.sqme folm of epister¡ological anti-naturalism.

Metaphysical naturalists hold that humans àre part of thè natural world,and therefore they must be understood in terms of the same òauses andmechanisms that animate all other creatures. Those who oppose metaphysicalnaturalism argue that humans or human societies are distinctive in somedeep way. The arch anti-narurâlist of a meraphysical stripe would be RenéDescartes, since he held that human minds were a non-physical sort ofsubstance. lü/hat makes us human is literally not part of the natural wodd.In contemporary social science, evolutionaly and psychological approacheshave recently taken on a new importance, These are typically naturalistic inthe metaphysical sense, Evolutionary explanations of how cooperation couldarise, for example, tleat human beings as sharing most rrairs with otheranimals. The challenge is to explain how our specific traits, like altruistic

selection. At the deepest level, the disputebout whether human neture is part of the

Naturalism is best understood as a nexus of closely related philosophicaldebates, The real work of answering the question-should social scientifictheories/methods/ontologies be like the natural sciences?-is calried our era much lower level of abstraction. Several issues to be discussed in laterchapters thus fall within the theme of naturalism.

A pair of questions forms the core of the debate over epistemic natural-

analyses. This debate will be the main topic of Chapter 3, and it will arise

values, nofms, and rules operative in human societies. In the discussion offree riders, above, 1Me saw some of the ways that the social sciences ofteninvoke norms in their theories. Rosa Parks thought that racial segregation

Parks was secretary of the Montgoquickly organized the bus boycott ioften makes appeal to notms, rules,vidual ection and social-level eventsIn so doing, they must make metaphysical commitments about what nolmsare and hów they are related to individual and group adion. These arefundamental questions of value theory. Chapter 7 is devoted to these issues,and they are also discussed in Sections 6.4 and B'3.

Noturolism

Perhaps the distinctive question of the philosophy of social science is whetherand h-ow the social sciences differ from the natural sciences. The sciences areparadigms of empirical knowledge, both of what can be known and how itihoulJbe established. Not all sciences are equal. Alchemy and astrology wereonce proclaimed "sciences," butOn the other hand, physics,taken as a model for scientific knowscience is like natural science has therthe social sciences since their inception. "Naturalisrri' is the name for a varieryof views holding that the social sciences should be like the natural sciencesin some important way. Those who think that the social sciences need adistinctive method, form of theorizing, or ontology are-you guessed it-anti-naturalists. Unfortunatel¡ the term is used in a variety of ways. It willtherefore be useful to engage in a little bit of stipulative definition.

Since the issues debateã èo1.t " wide variety of topics, it will be useful atthe outset to distinguish epistemological naturalism from metaphysical

l0 lntroduction

Reductionism

again in Chapter 5. The "qu d above, weredËveloped to ãttd orrt how his \'/ere thinking

"borrt ihei. situation. In Chapt e epistemology

of these methods.

that purport to solve this epistemological problem. Chapter 10 will evaluateformal techniques of causal modeling, case studies-, and experimentetion.

A final broàd irr.r. that invokes the theme of naturalism is the role of

be primarily devoted to this issue, rhough ir will arise in chapter 4, sec-tion 5.1, and Section 8.3 as well.

everfhing ultimately reduce to physics? These are the questions of reduc-tionism, Like naturalism, reductionism is a theme that encompasses severalissues, and like naturalism it comes in both epistemological and metaphysicalvarieties. The difference between the varieties depends on how "reàuce" isto be understood. Some have held that reduction is a relationship betweentheories. Epistemological reductionism holds that theories at o.tè level canbe replaced by theories at a lower level. Ever¡hing explicable by sociology,for example, is ultimately explicable in terms of psychólogy. (One need nãtcontinue, of course; there may be reasons why psychology does not reduceto biology.) Metaphysical claims about reduction, on the oiher hand, contendthat entities, properties, processes, or events et one level are nothing butobjects at another. Minds do not exist, the reductionist might sa¡-onlybrains. Like the distinction between epistemological and metaphysical natu-ralism, it is possible to adopt (anti-)reductionism of both flavors. It is alsopossible to be one sort of reductionist without being the other. 'We willencounter a number of philosophers and social scientists who accepr ametaphysical reductionism but do not think that theories of the socialsci-ences could be replaced by psychology.

The themes of reductionism and naturalism overlap, but they are notcoextensive. _Many who argue for reductionism (either epistemological ormetaph¡ical) are motivated by naturalistic commitments. That is, oné mightargue that because there is one, causally connected wodd and humans arepart of it (metaphysical naturalism), social and psychological properties mustreduce to physical properties. As a rough generalization, it is pr.obably fairto say that all reductionists are naturalists. But the converse is not true: notall naturalists are reductionists. It could be that the natural wodd containsavaiety of fundamental kinds of things which ere not all reducible ro somesubsÍate, and at the same time the social and natural sciences need to usethe same theory structures and methodologies, Once again, it is difficult toresolve the issues when they are considered at this abstiact level. The broadtheme of reductionism gets substance from several specific issues in thephilosophy of social science.

Students of the social sciences are likely to encounrer the phrase "merh-odological individualism'in the course of their studies. It is thi requirementthat social theories must explain social events in rerms of the choicås, beliefs,and attitudes of indcally reductionist thism are often a mixChapter 6 will bequestion is whether churches, schools, armies, and so on are things that existover and above the individuals. The reductionist regards a social movementor a democratic nation as nothing more than parterns of individual actions.Game theory has been a particularly powerfùl tool for analyzing the waythat group properties could emerge fiom individual choices. slctio-.-n 5.2 wiilPresent a very brief primer on decision theory and game theor¡ and we will

lntroduction I I

12 lntroduction lntroduction l3

examine these tools and their application throughout the sections that invokereductionist themes.

Methodological individualism reduces social-level objects to individualchoice a.rd a"iion, Most who advocate this solt of rectuctionism do not goon to explain individual choices in terms oplopertiei. This raises the question of whetherh* " l¿nd of explanatory pliority. A numbein the social sciences have added new dimentheory is a par.adigmaric form of individualism insofar as it assume$ thatin ursue actions with t workin s has revealecl striki fail tosa \Øe will consider ho theorYin Section 5.3, These experiments are consonant with much work in cogni-tive psychologywhich seems to explin terms of sub-conscious, or better,discovered by contemporaly cognitivbe examples of "sub-pelsonal" plocewill discuss theories of the evolutioncultural evolution by selective forces acting on human gfoups. This familyof empirical theories suggests a pictule whele the level of agency (belief,intention, choice) is eliminated and leplaced by sub-personal cognitivecapacities and super-personal social pattetns. Not exactly your father's reduc-tionism, but spooþ nonetheless.

cannor be identified with a parrern of behaviot'. In Chapter.T, we willexamine some social scientifiC and philosophical attempts to clo so. Jointactions are things that a single p"rro.r cannot do alone, stLch as sing a^duetor. defeat Napolãons "t-y, Ll the last two decacles, rhele has been a flurryof work in philosophy ó.t the quesrion of whether joirrt actions can be

explained or',,.,derstood as an "ggt.g"t. of inclividual intentional actions,

or'whether there is some solt of ¡oi"t intentionality. This issue of socialontology will be the topic of Chapter' 8'

Excelsior!

This book is or.iented towalcl both students of the social sciences ancl students

theoletical and methodological litelature of your discipline. Ask: \Øhat is atstake fol my field when this question is answered on. *ay or another? Ifyou are a philosophy major', you will heal echoes fi.om your. other coursesând readings,. Use rhese argumenrs, concepts, and positions to critique,elaborate, and nuance the alguments in the rexr. Lisren also for rerrerbêra-dons back from the social sciences. As algued above, the social sciences havesomedring to contribute to philosophyt ancient questions about the humancondition,

Vhile this text is selÊsufficient, I have assumed that you will r.ead it alongwith some of the plimary litelature in the field. \Øriting a philosophy text-book is a bit lil<e being a tour guide, ancl I want yorl to gei off thá bus andexplole on youl own. \Øittgensrein once likened language to "an ancientcity: a maze of little streets and squares, of old and new houses, and ofhouses with additions fi'om various peliods" (\üfittgenstei n 1953, Section 18).Intellectual clomains ale like ciries too, and in giving you a rour I have tr.iedto find a path that both explores the importanr monuments and makes thewhole city plan intelligible. The text will outline some of the importantarguments and debates, and theleby pr.ovicle some conrexr as you reãd .on-remporary conuibutions and hisrorically impolranr literature.

Each chap-tel will include some advice about further leading. In acldition,a number of general collections on the philosophy of social sciences havebeen published in the last decade. The following collections include synopticessays that go into more detail on rhe topics of this text: Jar.vie and Zamora-Bonilla, The SAGE Handbooþ of The Philosophy of the Social Sciences (2011),Kaldis, The Encyclopedia of Philosoplry ønd the Social Sciences (2013), Kincaid,The Oxþrd Handbooþ of Philosophy of Social Science (20t2), Outhwaite andTurner, Tlte SAGE Handbooþ of Social Science Methodology Q007), Tur.nerand Risjold, Philosophlt of Anthropology and Sociologlt (2006), and Turnerand Roth, The Bkcþwell Guide to the Pltilosophlt of the Sociøl Sciences (2003).

philosophy of social - courses · philosophy of social science : a contemporary introduction / by...

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