philosophy of mind - dualism - non-cartesian dualism
DESCRIPTION
pdfTRANSCRIPT
Philosophy of MindIntroduction Dualism Behaviourism Identity Theory Functionalism DennettEliminativism Idealism Personal Identity Other Minds Reading List Links
Dualism: Introduction
Substance Dualism
Interactionism
Occasionalism
Double Aspect Theory
Psychophysical Parallelism
Other Forms of Dualism: Platonism
Epiphenomenalism
NonCartesian Dualism
Summary
Further Reading
Assignment
NonCartesian Dualism
Whilst all of the theories looked at so far present different picturesof dualism, they at least have one thing in common in that theytreat mental events as nonphysical. In other words, they mentalevents exist as a completely separate substance (Cartesianism,Occasionalism, Parallelism and Platonism), a byproduct of physicalsubstance (Epiphenomenalism) or the property of some otherintermediate substance (Double Aspect theory). As such, all of theabove theories represent modifications of Cartesian dualism.However, there remain other theories that, whilst being dualistic,present a different view of the substances or properties involved inthe relation of mind and body.
An example of such a theory is that of the philosopher E. J. Lowewho attempts to show in what way a nonCartesian dualism canexist. He does this by redefining the nature of the mental, arguingthat the concept of an immaterial substance does not make sense(for traditional reasons problem of interaction, etc.).
However, to understand the rest of the theory it is necessary toanalyse the concepts of "self" and "identity". Let us, for instance,take the idea of a car. I may replace certain engine parts, wheels,etc., and yet still say that it is the same car as it was. The collectionof parts that make up the car may have changed slightly, but thecar is still a car. On the other hand, if take all of the original partsand make a completely different type of machine out of it such asa petroldriven electricity generator although the parts are exactlythe same, the car no longer exists. Therefore, Lowe concludes, thething that gives something its "identity" or "self" is not collection ofparts or any one part of which it is made up.
When we relate these ideas to the concept of an individual, wediscover that similar analogies can be drawn. A person is not themere collection of limbs and organs that constitute it, nor is it asingle part such as the brain. Therefore, the person or self,although it is material in that it relies on the existence of a body is not identical with it.
This rather subtle and ingenious form of dualism is quite a long wayfrom that of Descartes and Plato.
Firstly, the notion of self is not independent of the physical body andalthough Lowe might call the self a material substance, it is only inas much as it is another way of looking at the physical (i.e. there isno special independent substance or material soul).
Secondly, this notion of dualism seems to deny the possibility ofimmortality or existence of the self before or after birth ideas thatwere so important to Descartes and Plato.
Thirdly, this theory seems to imply a form of determinism in that,since there is no overriding centre of decision making such as themind or the "I" the material self is open to the same materialinfluences as any other material substance (and therefore arguablydetermined by them). Lowe's counterargument to this tries to showthat it is possible that the will is a complex interaction of social andphysical processes whereby no one cause is responsible for events.So, because the self contains all of these "parts" social, physical,mental, emotional, etc. decisions and actions are brought about bythe arrangement of these parts in a certain way (in the same waythat a spider's web allows the spider to move by both restricting andfacilitating its movements).