philosophy of education a beginners guide

8/12/2019 Philosophy of Education a Beginners Guide

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Philosophy of Education:

A (Rather Unusual) Beginners Guide

John Clark

2012


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Publication information page


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ContentsIntroduction ..................................................................................................................................................... 1

Chapter One ............................................................... ................................................................. ...................... 3

Philosophys First Problem What is Philosophy? ........................................................... ........... 3

Chapter Two .............................................................. ................................................................. ...................... 6

A Short History of Philosophy .............................................................................................................. 6

Chapter Three ........................................................... ................................................................. .................... 14

Philosophy of Education: Past, Present, Future. ........................................................................ 14

Chapter Four ............................................................. ................................................................. .................... 20

Philosophy of Education in New Zealand ............................................ .......................................... 20

Chapter Five ......................................................................... .............................................................. ............ 24

One Philosophers Views on Education .......................................................................................... 24

Chapter Six ...................................................... ................................................................. ............................... 35

A Philosophical Journey ......................................................... .............................................................. . 35

Chapter Seven ........................................................... ................................................................. .................... 42

Philosophy of Education Resources ....................................................... .......................................... 42

References ................................................................. ............................................................... ...................... 48


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Philosophy of Education A Beginners Guide 1

Introduction

Education is what goes on in schools and classrooms, in families and in a host of other

social institutions. The study of education explores what education is all about, and

involves standing back from educational policies, processes and practices to think more

deeply about them and subject them to serious and systematic critique. This requires

the development of theories to explain how things are and why, as well as offering

alternative points of view about how things ought to be and why. What emerges is a

range of theories, sometimes complementary and other times in conflict, which help us

both to understand education in new ways and also at times to confuse us. It is

important, then, that those who study education have a sound grasp of the various

theories which have been generated about education. To start with, where do our

educational theories come from?

Our theories about education rarely arise from within the study of education

itself but more often than not draw off other disciplines to inform our thinking about

education. The foundation disciplines include the following: history of education,

philosophy of education, psychology of education and sociology of education. Each

discipline contributes to how we think about education and taken together they provide

an evolving body of theory which helps to illuminate the past, inform us about the

present, and give guidance for the future.

This book provides a brief introduction to one of the foundation disciplines of

education philosophy. It does not offer a comprehensive coverage of the many key

educational concepts and ideas as other student texts in philosophy of education seek to

do. Since philosophy of education does not sit in an intellectual vacuum but is firmly

located in its parent discipline of philosophy and draws heavily from the more general

work of philosophers working in other branches of philosophy, then it is important that

students in philosophy of education have an understanding of the wider philosophical

traditions within which their studies are located. So, we begin with a brief discussion of

philosophys first question: What is philosophy? In addressing the question it quicklybecomes clear that there is no one simple answer universally accepted by philosophers,

but rather there are a variety of different views. And what goes for this question goes

for all the other questions of philosophy as well. This is followed by a very short romp

through the history of philosophy from the ancient times to the present and is very

much a faces and places approach with only the briefest discussion of the thought of

selected great thinkers in philosophy but it will go some way towards introducing those

studying philosophy of education to those who have left their mark on the growth and

development of philosophy.

While the first two chapters are primarily about philosophy, the following two

chapters (three and four) focus much more on philosophy of education itself. A broad


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overview of the field is explored by looking at its past, present and future within a wider

international context. Although philosophy of education is often associated more

directly with work in the English-speaking world, especially Australia, Canada, New

Zealand, Great Britain and the United States of America, it is now very much established

on the global scene and philosophers are to be found in many countries across all of the

worlds continents. Philosophy of education in New Zealand is part of this international

movement and draws from and contributes to the philosophy of education community

which provides and supports the fields literature and professional activities.

The next two chapters (five and six) are of a more personal nature and may be of

more interest to some readers than others. They set out one philosopher of educations

philosophical position and the intellectual journey taken to get there my own. Written

primarily for students who take my courses in philosophy of education, the

autobiographical account gives philosophy of education a bit more of a human face.

The final chapter (seven) provides students with some additional resources

which should help them to acquire a deeper and better understanding of philosophy of

education.


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Chapter One

Philosophys First Problem What is Philosophy?

What is philosophy? This is philosophys first question and, being a philosophical one,

requires a philosophical answer. Immediately we strike a paradox. To be able to

answer the question we need to do some philosophy but how can we do philosophy if

we do not know what philosophy is? Before we ponder how to extract ourselves from

this apparent impasse, we might think that similar sorts of questions could offer a way

out. So, we might think about such questions as What is physics? or What is

geography? But we soon conclude that these questions are not answered by doing

physics or geography. One would not be able to give an account of what physics is by

setting up an elaborate laboratory experiment or describe the nature of geography by

exploring landscapes. Any answer would be conceptual in nature, probably

philosophical, but not empirical. One way forward is to note that the question What is

philosophy? elicits no agreed upon answer. On the contrary, as is usually the way with

philosophical questions, multiple answers have been produced, often in conflict with

one another. We might very quickly come to the view that there is very little

philosophical agreement on anything at all, and perhaps this is about the only thing that

philosophers do agree on!

Several meanings of philosophy can be put to one side reasonably quickly,

especially those conveyed by such expressions as Ones philosophy of life or Being

philosophical about things. We all have a view of who we are and our place in the

world, and some more than others are stoical or resigned in their views. Philosophy, as

an intellectual activity, is something different.

One place to start is with the origins of the word philosophy. From the ancient

Greek usage of philo and sophy comes the love of wisdom. There is some merit in

this, but not too much. Socrates, one of the wisest of men, held himself to be the least

wise of men. And much philosophy has failed to exhibit much wisdom. Yet the

connection to wisdom remains an important characteristic of philosophy for it goessome way towards defining what philosophy is.

Another way of perhaps getting a little clearer about what philosophy is might be

found in the debate in the latter half of the 20thCentury over philosophical puzzles and

philosophical problems. Wittgenstein held that philosophy deals with linguistic puzzles

such that philosophical questions arise out of our use of language. Popper, on the other

hand, was firm in his view that philosophy addresses real problems, that philosophical

questions are located in the empirical world. Wittgenstein and Popper met once, in

1946 at Cambridge University, with their disagreement captured in the waving of a

poker (Edmonds & Eidinow, 2001). Munz (1985), a student of both Popper (at the

University of Canterbury) and Wittgenstein (at the University of Cambridge) who


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witnessed the event, later attempted a rapprochement of their views. This dispute over

puzzles and problems introduces a further thought about what philosophy is.

Philosophy is about language but it is not philology (the study of linguistics) for it is the

concepts which the words convey about the world which are important, not the words

themselves. Philosophy has an interest in the relation between language and the world,

of using language to understand the world. Getting clear about education, for example,

is not enough; nor is being able to offer a compelling justification of education sufficient.

Judgements are also to be made about educational practices in institutions and by

nation states. So, philosophy is not just descriptive (as science is) but is also normative

(concerned with arguments about what is good, right, true, worthwhile, ought to be, and

so on e.g., What is it to be an educated person? What are the qualities of being

educated? Why do some activities have educational value and others not?).

This normative aspects leads to another feature of philosophy. Whereas

empirical studies tend to ask questions we dont know the answers to, so investigators

do original explorations, experiments and the like (and students read what scientists

have discovered), philosophy tends to work somewhat differently. When tackling a

philosophical problem, philosophers usually have a pretty good idea of the sort of

answer they are going to give in advance of setting out their answer in full, for

philosophy is about developing a reasoned argument to support or justify a conclusion,

and unless one has a reasonably clear idea of the conclusion then one is hardly in a

position to develop an argument whose premises entail the conclusion.

There is another way of seeing how philosophy has developed, one summarised

as the isms approach. To answer philosophical questions, different philosophical

traditions have emerged, each developing its own particular take on things. So, for

example, we have positivism, empiricism, idealism, rationalism, relativism, Marxism,

pragmatism, existentialism, postmodernism and the like, all vying for a place in the

philosophical sun. A comparative study of these philosophical traditions will give a

good understanding of the complexity of philosophy; whether it will lead to a better

understanding of philosophy, or doing philosophy, is less clear. Having a general

understanding of these philosophical traditions will, however, provide further insight

into the philosophical writings of particular philosophers who work within thesetraditions.

Finally, a mapping out of the branches and fields of philosophy might add to a

picture of what philosophy is. The branches of philosophy include:

ontology what we say there is, and what the world consists of, in the mostgeneral sense. This includes questions about physical reality (is there a real

world); metaphysical qualities (are their minds, gods, souls, time) as well as

numbers, and whatever else we posit exists.


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epistemology our theories of the world. This includes questions about thenature and possibility of knowledge of the world, the truth value of what we say,

and how we might acquire and justify knowledge as well as our beliefs.

ethics - what is good, right or proper, what we ought or ought not to do, and why.This includes questions about the basis of ethical judgements and actions and

pursuit of the good life.

logic the analysis of arguments, to establish the validity of the premises and theentailment of the conclusion. The chain of reasoning from a set of premises to a

conclusion can be analysed by propositional logic (sentences) or symbolic logic

(algebraic formulations).

Fields of philosophy are probably as broad as the nature of enquiry itself, but forsimplicity the following are a good representation:

o Philosophy of scienceo Philosophy of social scienceo Philosophy of mindo Feminist philosophyo Political philosophyo Social philosophyo Aesthetics, and, of course,o Philosophy of education.

And if you think this pretty well exhausts the list of possibilities you are very much

mistaken, as the following Wiley-Blackwell Philosophy For Everyone book titles

indicate:

Beer: The Unexamined Beer Isnt Worth Drinking

Cannabis: What Were We Just Thinking About?

Coffee: Grounds for Debate

Food: Eat, Think and be Merry

Dating: Flirting With Big Ideas

Gardening: Cultivating WisdomPorn: How to Think With Kink

Whiskey: A Small Batch of Spirited Ideas

Yoga: Bending Mind and Body


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Chapter Two

A Short History of Philosophy

Quite when philosophy started is lost in the mists of time. However, a good starting

point is the ancient Greeks whose thinking has had such a profound influence on

subsequent philosophical thought, right up to the present day. What follows is no more

than a very brief outline of the philosophical ideas of a selection of the most influential

western philosophers. They have been chosen to highlight some of the major

philosophical achievements in order to locate contemporary philosophy of education

within a long and rich tradition of philosophy.

Thales of Miletus (620-540B): One of the earliest philosophers, he rejected the

authority of Homerian gods, relying instead on observation. It was this sort of approach

which later set science on its way. Ontologically, Thales held that the fundamental

nature of the world is water upon which the earth, as a disk, floats.

Pythagoras (570-500BC): Best known for his mathematical discoveries and the

theorem which bears his name, Pythagoras held that the universe could be explained in

mathematical terms. 10 is the perfect number. He is also credited with discovering that

the morning star and the evening star are the same thing (Venus), a much used example

in philosophical discussion of meaning and reference (the terms morning star and

evening star have different meanings even though they refer to the same thing).

Heraclitus (535-480BC): The world is in a constant state of flux, or becoming. Fire is

the primary element which controls earth and water. With humans, those who are

weak possess watery elements such as stupidity and vice, while virtuous people survive

their physical body and become fire.

Parmenides (510-440BC): Explored a number of ideas which still puzzle philosopherstoday. He drew a distinction between the world as it is and the world as we perceive it.

The world as it is, is unchanging (contrary to Heraclitus); it is our ideas about the world

which change. Sense experience is misleading, so reason alone can lead us to the truth.

Zeno (490-425BC): A student of Parmenides, Zeno is best known for his paradoxes

designed to deny the ideas of the plurality of things and of motion. His most famous

paradoxes include:

the arrow when flying through the air, at any one moment is it moving or atrest? It cannot move at an instant so must be at rest.


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the heap one grain of sand does not make a heap. Adding a grain does notmake a heap. Adding another and another ad infinitum does not make a heap, so

it is impossible to make a heap by adding a grain.

Socrates (470-399BC): Perhaps the first of the great philosophers, Socrates gave his

name to his method. As captured in Platos dialogues, Socrates asked questions and

subjected the views of others to rigorous criticism. He would ask others to define a

word and then through reasoned argument show that the definition led to a paradox or

absurdity. He was accused of corrupting the youth of Athens; his speeches at his trial

and death are contained in Platos Apology, Crito and Phaedo. His maxim, the

unexamined life is not worth living, has guided philosophy ever since.

Plato (428-348BC): A student of Socrates, who founded the Academy, a fore-runner of

the later university. Plato presented his ideas as dialogues, with Socrates as the central

character. We can only have knowledge of eternal and unchanging things; of everyday

things which change we can only have true belief. To understand our sensory

experience of the world we must have some knowledge of the eternal forms which

provide the perfect and unchanging ideas of things of which the things in the world are

imperfect parallels. The Forms can be experienced only through reason. Best known

for The Republic,with its focus on justice where in a utopian society philosopher-kings

(gold) rule, soldiers (silver) guard and common folk or artisans (bronze) produce. The

good of the whole over-rides individual freedom and rights.

Aristotle (384-322BC): A student of Platos, Aristotle founded the Lyceum. He wrote on

a wide range of subjects biology, psychology, ethics, physics, politics, and metaphysics

and in them sought as much precision as each subject would allow. Unlike Plato, he

placed great weight on observation rather than relying on reason alone. Aristotle

identified four types of cause: of a statue, what is it made of (marble material cause),

what sort of thing is it (a statue formal cause), who made it what it is (sculptor

efficient cause), and what is it for (decoration final cause). In his Nicomachean Ethics,

Aristotle emphasised the excellence of human virtues and the choosing of the meanbetween two extremes (foolhardy rashness and cowardice). The good life requires

friendship, fellowship with equals, and sometimes self-sacrifice. He was one of the first

to formalise the rules of logic, especially deduction, or what it is for a conclusion to

follow from the premises, this giving rise to the syllogism: for example, all men are

mortal, Socrates is a man, and therefore Socrates is mortal.

(And so we leave the ancient Greeks, arriving in the medieval era, where religion and

theology were to impact greatly on philosophical thought).


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St. Anselm (1033-1109): Born in Italian Piedmont, Anselm was a monk in France who

eventually became Archbishop of Canterbury. Influenced by the rediscovery of the

writings of Plato and Aristotle, Anselm set out to justify the existence of God based on

rational argument rather than by appealing to scripture or doctrine. The ontological

argument for the existence of God attempted to show that the existence of God follows

logically from the concept of God - that is, it is a contradiction to deny the existence of

God, for once we understand the concept of God then to deny Gods existence is to

commit a logical fallacy. Anselms argument is clever in its simplicity, but critics find it

problematic. The ontological argument is still used to justify Gods existence.

St. Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274): Aquinas set out to reconcile philosophy and religion.

Persuaded by the correctness of Aristotelian philosophy he tended to locate

disagreement in misinterpretation of biblical text. Embraced by the Catholic Church,

Aquinas produced five proofs for Gods existence. First, things change but do not

change by themselves but rely on something else to cause the change, ad infinitum.

There must be something which is the cause of change but itself does not change God.

Second, causes operate in series but there must be a first cause God. Third, all things

come and go, in which case there would have been a time when nothing existed. If this

is the case nothing could come into existence. Therefore something has always existed

God. Fourth, there must be some good thing which brings about other good things

God. Fifth, all things are directed at some ultimate end but this implies some entity

directing that purpose

God.

William of Occam (c1285-1349): Against Aquinas, Occam argued in favour of the

separation of church and state. However, he is best known for his support of

nominalism, or the denial of universals. Concepts such as redness are inventions of

human understanding all we have are red things. Occam applied his logic to

metaphysical concepts like time and soul. Occams razor is a methodological

principle: entities are not to be multiplied beyond necessity. If we can explain human

behaviour by brain states why posit mental states?

(Medieval philosophy came to an end with the Renaissance and the rise of science. This

marked the beginning of what is now called modern philosophy).

Francis Bacon (1561-1626): Bacon was critical of traditional metaphysicians who held

that knowledge could be gained by examining the meaning of words and of empiricists

who thought that if they collected enough data they could generate empirical

hypotheses. Recognising that induction is no guarantee of predicting future events,

Bacon settled on the search for negative examples rather than confirming ones. He

identified false idols which obstruct science. The idols of the tribe we see the world

through our own eyes (theories) and so can be wrong. The idols of the cave we make


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errors based on our biases, preferences and misconceptions. The idols of the

marketplace language can deceive us, for while we have words for things this is no

guarantee such things exist. Finally, the idols of the theatre previous philosophical

systems are no better than theatrical performances as guides to truth. Science was on

its way.

Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679): Influenced by the idea that the natural sciences might be

underpinned by laws of nature, Hobbes sought to apply this to the realm of human

affairs, particularly politics. The natural state of humans is one of conflict our lives

would be solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short! Accordingly we require a social

covenant with order imposed by an absolute power. In Leviathan, Hobbes explores

three laws of human nature: we desire peace rather than living in a state of nature, to

achieve peace we must give up a share of our freedom for equal freedom for all, and we

must keep to our social contract, with the absolute power of the monarch ensuing this.

Ruling monarchs have gone but social contracts remain.

Descartes (1596-1650): In physics, Descartes discovered the law of refraction in optics;

in mathematics, he introduced many conventions still in use, such as indices to indicate

powers 23; but it is his philosophical work which brought philosophy into the modern

era and broke with the past. Descartes adopted a sceptical approach to knowledge. He

sought the same degree of certainty as mathematics provides, but instead of accepting

beliefs he employed the method of doubt. He rejected any belief open to doubt, looking

for one belief which is beyond doubt. Our senses can be deceptive. One might be

dreaming. A malicious demon might be confusing us. One belief remains, summed up in

his famous expression cogito ergo sum I think, therefore I am. On the basis of this

does Descartes rebuild a series of true beliefs? From this emerges Cartesian dualism

the mind and the body are distinct things, for the mind thinks and the body occupies

space. How the two interact is never made clear, and remains a deeply troubling

philosophical problem, as does the problem of scepticism.

John Locke (1632-1704): Deeply influenced by the scientific work of Robert Boyle andIsaac Newton, Locke rejected the rationalism of Descartes and others, and instead of

relying on reason argued that ideas are not innate but acquired through experience. We

are born with a blank mind (tabula rasa) and experience alone is the source of our ideas,

although reflection on these may produce new ideas. There are simple ideas singular

impressions and complex ideas comprised of simple ideas, (horse + cone = unicorn).

Locke also distinguished between the primary and secondary properties of things.

Primary properties are inherent in all subjects solidity, shape, motion or at rest, etc.

Secondary properties are those produced in our minds taste, smell and colour. This

empiricist approach was to have far-reaching consequences for philosophy.


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must conform to our conceptual categories, our knowledge of objects is the knowledge

of appearances. Hence Kant distinguished between the noumenal (things-in-

themselves) and the phenomenal (things as they appear to us). We cannot know things-

in-themselves, but only by their appearances. In ethics, for Kant, doing the right thing is

a matter of doing ones duty according to the moral law which must be categorical do

this or dont do that. Hence his categorical imperative: Act only on that maxim

whereby you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law. Keep

promises, for if everyone gave false promises promising would not be possible.

George Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831): Hegel responded to Kants

transcendental idealism which left the gap between appearance and reality wide open;

a situation he found untenable. He proposed a notion of absolute truth uncovered

through the evolution of ideas. His method embodies the dialectic. A thesis, taken to be

true, produces a contrary view, the antithesis. Their incompatibility leads to a new

position, the synthesis, which in turn becomes a new thesis and so the dialectic

continues. Hegels account of truth is not concerned with a match between words and

things (correspondence) but with the completeness of ideas (coherence).

John Stuart Mill (1806-1873): Although he wrote important books on logic and

scientific method, Mill is perhaps best known for his defence of utilitarianism and

liberty. In ethics, the Greatest Happiness Principle applies; actions are right if they

tend to promote happiness and wrong if they tend to produce unhappiness and pain.

On some occasions an act may produce considerable pleasure and at other times little;

some pleasures are of greater value than others: it is better to be a human being

dissatisfied then a pig satisfied; better to be a Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied.

His essay On Liberty champions individual freedom over the power of the state in

thought, word and deed: the only purpose for which power can rightfully be exercised

over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others.

His own good, either physical or moral, is not sufficient warrant.

Gottlob Frege (1848-1925): Best known for his work in logic and philosophy ofmathematics, Frege replaced Aristotelian logic based on syllogisms with the

quantification of language. Using the model of mathematical equations, parts of

sentences are reduced to functions and expressed in symbolic form. He drew an

important distinction between the reference and the meaning of an expression; the

author of On Liberty and the son of James Mill refer to the same person but express

different ideas or have different meanings.

Bertrand Russell (1872-1970): Influenced by Frege, Russell set out to show how

mathematics is grounded in logic. He was particularly concerned with semantic

problems of meaning and reference whether to call a sentence true or false when it


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does not refer. For example, The present king of France is bald. There is no present

king of France so is the sentence true, false or meaningless. Russells solution was to say

such a claim is a conjunction of three separate claims: there is some person who is the

king of France, there is only one such person, and that person is bald. The first claim is

false; since a conjunction of claims is false if one of the claims is false then the whole

conjunction is false. Thus we can speak meaningfully of non-existent things. This set

the foundation for the logical analysis of language and its relation to the world.

Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951): Influenced by Russell and Frege, Wittgensteins

Tractatus sets out a picture theory of meaning. The world is made up of atomic facts

and propositions are logical pictures of these facts. The underlying logical structure of

sentences mirrors the structure of the world. Later, in Philosophical Investigations,

Wittgenstein offered a very different account of language, thought and reality.

Language has many functions to state, promise, question, etc. We employ words, like

tools, for many different purposes. We engage in different language games linked to

different activities or forms of life. The meanings of words are given in the context of

their use rather than in isolation. Both books were to have a major impact on

philosophy.

Moritz Schlick (1882-1936): Although not a major philosopher, Schlick was the founder

of the Vienna Circle and with Rudolph Carnap and others established an influential line

of philosophy

logical positivism. Adopting Humes distinction between analytic truths

(true by definition mathematics) and synthetic truths (true by experience - science),

then in science sentences are true only if there is some method of verifying them, hence

the verification principle. Meaningless statements can never be confirmed (ethics,

metaphysics, religion), giving rise to the emotive theory of ethics and aesthetics (I

like...). One problem is that the verification principle itself is neither analytic nor

synthetic, and so must be meaningless. Further, Quines attack on the divide between

the analytic and synthetic there isnt one, - reduced logical positivisms philosophical

life, with Popper claiming to have put logical positivism to its death!

Karl Popper (1902-1994): The clash between Popper and Wittgenstein was not just

about the waving of a poker but was a fundamental difference over the nature of

philosophy. For Wittgenstein, philosophical puzzles rooted in language were of central

concern; for Popper, philosophical work lay in real philosophical problems such as

induction. In The Open Society and its Enemies, Popper defended freedom and the open

society against authoritarian rule (Plato, Marx), but he is best known for his philosophy

of science. With Hume, he argued that induction can never provide enough empirical

evidence to confirm a theory, but one counter example can falsify a theory. Hence he

advocated bold conjectures which are subject to falsification.


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W. V. Quine (1908-2000): Committed to science as the arbiter of truth about the world,

Quines empiricism did not extend to the Kantian/ positivist analytic/synthetic

distinction, nor to the primacy of sensory experience. Using the metaphor of a web,

Quine advocated holism to deny that analytic and synthetic sentences can be neatly

separated. While, with Popper, he held to falsification he also noted that it is a

conjunction of sentences which imply an observation sentence and so it is open to

judgement as to which statement to reject. Consistent with his empiricism he sought to

naturalize epistemology by reducing it to a normative psychology.

Michel Foucault (1926-1984): The founder of postmodernism, Foucault set out to show

how power and knowledge interact to bring about the knowing subject or the self. He

demonstrated how the categorization of people with particular selves or identities lead

to different institutional practices (mental insanity, criminals), and how power is used

to coerce and produce knowing subjects, which he called bio-power. Use is made of

Wittgensteins language games (e.g. by Lyotard) and this has led to criticism over the

relativism of postmodernism (all views are equally valid or true since there are no

criteria for judging their truth or falsity).

And all the others: There are many other philosophers, ancient and modern, eastern

and western and all points between, who could be included but were not. To name but

a few: Spinoza, Leibniz, Bentham, Kierkegaard, Marx, Peirce, Nietzsche, Husserl,

Heidegger, Sartre, Rawls, Kuhn and.....

For a good lay-persons introduction to the history of philosophy and its great thinkers,

the following books (with photos and text) are worth perusing:

King, P. (2004) One Hundred Philosophers. Hove, UK: Apple Press.

Stokes, P. (2004) Philosophy 100 Essential Thinkers. London: Arcturus Publishing Ltd.

Strongroom, J. & Garvey, J. (2005) The Great Philosophers. London: Arcturus PublishingLtd.

And if you really must, there is a cartoon book:

Osborne, R. (1992) Philosophy for Beginners. New York: Writers and Readers

Publishing Inc.


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Chapter Three

Philosophy of Education: Past, Present, Future.

Quite when philosophy of education began is not all that clear, but Socrates, Plato and

Aristotle were certainly among the earliest thinkers, in three important ways. First,

Socrates gave his name to a pedagogical method which is still used today, or at least is

still referred to. The asking of a series of questions based on a students responses is

found in Platos dialogues, especially Meno where a young boy is questioned by the

master. Second, Plato was a student of Socrates and founded the Academy which taught

a wide range of subjects. Aristotle entered Platos Academy and later found the Lyceum.

(Both Dewey and Russell founded schools while at one point in their lives both Popper

and Wittgenstein were school teachers). Third, all three of them had important things

to say about society, young people and their learning. For example, Platos Republic

explores the role of philosopher-kings, guardians and the artisans who produce, along

with the training required for each position.

John Locke had a significant impact on educational thinking. He argued that we

are not born with innate ideas, but rather that each one of us is born with a blank slate

(what he called tabula rasa) upon which experience is written. In other words, while

we possess the innate ability to reason, the source of our knowledge is what we observe

through our senses; however, we can use our reason to go beyond our sensory

experience (from our experience of horses and cones we can have the concept of a

unicorn). Lockes empiricism generated a particular set of educational insights, such as

exposing children to sensory experience, and a wide range of it, in order to develop and

extend their knowledge. Certain pedagogical procedures were also implied if children

had blank slates or were empty vessels then it is the job of the teacher to fill these up

with instruction. This is a very teacher-centred or subject-centred approach to school

now associated with a traditional model of teaching.

David Hume, as a precursor to the logical positivism advocated by Schlick,

Carnap, Ayer and others in the 1930s, had a marked impact on philosophy of education.The distinction between analytic (true by definition) and synthetic (true by

observational evidence) statements not only shaped the character of educational

research (only science counts) but was also introduced into philosophy of education by

OConnor (1957). Another of Humes ideas to influence this field was his distinction

between is and ought: one cannot derive a prescription from a description even though

ought implies can.

Rousseau, a contemporary of Hume, provided us with a rather different picture

of educating the young. His novel, Emile, set out his educational theories which

advocated a much more liberal, child-centred approach to schooling. Starting from the

premise that children are born free but society places them in chains, Rousseau


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narrated Emiles education at the hands of a tutor in isolation from the corrupting

influences of society. Rousseaus influence was particularly evident in the educational

theories of Froebel and Pestalozzi, well captured in the kindergarten (childrens garden)

where children are encouraged to grow at their own pace according to their particular

needs and interests. A philosopher of education who, in recent times, advanced a vision

of child-centred education is P. S. Wilson.

But it was John Dewey who did so much to set philosophy of education on its

twentieth century path. Influenced by pragmatism (loosely, something is true if it

works); Dewey linked education to science in a particular way. Education is about

growth, but not just any old growth. Our experience is to be guided by thinking directed

at the canons of scientific method to solve problems we need to clearly formulate the

question and be able to generate solutions which will work. This can only occur within a

democratic school and society which permit debate over ideas and possibilities. Dewey

put his views into practice, starting up an experimental school in Chicago with a

curriculum built around children experiencing the world in a spirit of inquiry and

democratic participation.

However, post-World War Two witnessed a surge of academic interest in

philosophy of education, the development of which somewhat resembles an hour glass

of pluralism, monism, pluralism.

Isms

In the 1950s and early 1960s, philosophy of education was characterised by pluralism

on two fronts. One approach was that of isms which were explored for their

implication for education. So books were written and courses taught where the key

ideas of, for example, realism, idealism, rationalism, Marxism, pragmatism and the like

were mined for insights which could provide teachers with guidance for their classroom

practice. How they were to select from the competing isms was never made clear. The

philosophical ideas were usually taken for granted and guides for practice squeezed

from them. While the reader was certainly introduced to a wide range of philosophical

traditions, there was very little doing philosophy. A second approach was to introducethe reader to a variety of great thinkers on education who were also widely respected

for their philosophical scholarship. These included Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas,

Locke, Rousseau and Dewey amongst many others. More often than not their ideas were

laid out in systematic ways to indicate the implications for educational practice. There is

still much to learn from studying the works of the great thinkers on education but the

history of educational ideas once more falls short of doing philosophy.


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Ordinary Language

The early 1960s marked a change of direction in philosophy of education. Influenced by

the likes of Harry Broudy (University of Illinois at Urbana Champaign), Richard Peters

(University of London Institute of Education) and Israel Scheffler (Harvard University),

philosophy of education took a linguistic turn. Developments in philosophy were

adopted by philosophers of education: the work of Wittgenstein (University of

Cambridge) and Austin and Ryle (University of Oxford) promoted ordinary language

analysis to examine the concepts captured by the words of everyday talk. So, when we

use such words as education or teaching we need to get clearer about their meaning

by clarifying the necessary and sufficient conditions for their use. Consider a simple

example, the mathematical word square. A mathematical shape is a square if it

possesses all of the following characteristics - four straight lines of equal length which

are closed with four internal right angles. Similarly, for something to count as education,

what must it possess? Now, with education it is notquite so clear-cut since people are

inclined to disagree over what is required for something to be educational.

On this account of philosophy, philosophy is a second-order activity. Things such

as science, politics, art, education and the like are first-order activities that people

engage in. So, a teacher might be teaching children about a poem. The philosopher asks,

What is teaching? in order to clarify the concept of teaching and may want to

distinguish teaching from other related concepts such as conditioning, indoctrination,

instruction and the like. This way of doing philosophy is very much characterised by the

expression talk about talk and while there is value in gaining conceptual clarity there is

more to philosophy than conceptual clarification alone.

By simply analysing language and the meanings of words, philosophy leaves

everything as it is (Wittgenstein). But then philosophers can say very little about

practice. A useful parallel can be found in ethics. Meta-ethics examines the meanings of

ethical words such as good and ought. However, people seek guidance on what things

are good and make judgements about what they ought to do, and here normative ethics

comes to the fore. Similarly, talk about the meanings of words such as education and

teaching, interesting as it may be, has little practical use unless it is employed in thecontext of improving policy and practice.

This was also a time of great enthusiasm in philosophy of education.

Philosophers of education were appointed to university positions, increasing numbers

of students took courses in the subject, learned societies were formed (Philosophy of

Education Society of Australasia), new journals were established (Educational

Philosophy and Theory) and a raft of books were published. In a very real sense, the

social and institutional base of philosophy of education was firmly established as a

global enterprise.


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Reaction

By 1970 reaction to conceptual analysis, particularly the work of Hirst and Peters and

their colleagues at the London Institute of Education, had well and truly set in. Critical

literature began to appear in journals and books and at conferences. In the United

Kingdom, Robin Barrow grounded his work in utilitarianism; in Australia, Kevin Harris

and Michael Matthews adopted a strong Marxist line while Colin Evers and Jim Walker

were influenced by Quine. Later, other positions emerged, notably postmodernism and

feminism.

The growth of philosophical pluralism has had two important consequences, one

good and the other perhaps less so. On the positive side, philosophy of education has

certainly benefited from the rich insights on offer from within the various philosophical

traditions. Different ways of seeing things can help us to conceptualise educational

policies and practices in novel directions. Marxist critiques drew attention to the need

to locate philosophical discussion in the concrete social conditions of schooling; the

postmodern challenge alerted us to the social context of the knowing self.

The downside of all of this is the fracturing of the field into competing camps

with a measure of incommensurability. Conceptual analysts, Marxists, postmodernists,

neurophilosophers and so on often fail to understand what their colleagues in other

traditions are doing and why. The splits are often most evident at conferences where

those attending tend to go to papers which best match their own perspectives.

The increasingly diverse range of topics written about, while welcome as a

broadening of the field, should also alert us to a slightly troubling point. Who do

philosophers of education write for, or, who is their audience? To be sure, sometimes it

is directed at practitioners and policy-makers in an effort to confront them with

challenges to policies and practices. However, often it is directed towards fellow

philosophers, and sometimes in a style that is difficult for others to understand. Some

topics are clearly enough central to education but some are at the very edge of

educational relevance and interest.

The Future?

The social location of philosophy of education has waxed and waned in different ways.

Philosophy of education societies continue to flourish the Philosophy of Education

Society in the US, the Philosophy of Education Society of Australasia and the Philosophy

of Education Society of Great Britain all hold annual conferences and publish reputable

journals, respectively Educational Theory, Educational Philosophy and Theory and the

Journal of Philosophy of Education. Other societies and journals also exist. The Canadian

Philosophy of Education Society meets regularly and publishes Paideusis while the

International Network of Philosophers of Education holds conferences around the

world every two years and supports Ethics and Education. Then there are the


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philosophy of education streams at the annual conferences of the American Educational

Research Association, British Educational Research Association and the European

Educational Research Association. So, there is plenty going on for those interested in

philosophy of education.

Institutionally, the future of philosophy of education may be less secure. There

have been times when some universities had a host of philosophers of education. Now,

some have a few (University of London Institute of Education and University of Illinois

at Urbana Champaign), more have perhaps one, or two if they are lucky, and many more

have none at all. As philosophers of education depart through retirement or promotion

their positions are either not replaced or if they are then they are occupied by non-

philosophers. The declining numbers herald a slow death of the academic community of

philosophers of education in the universities. But there is also some good news.

Over the years, philosophers of education have occupied senior academic positions

where they have exercised leadership and influenced decision-making.

What the future holds for philosophy of education remains to be seen. Hopefully

it will survive as an academic discipline in the universities and as a learned activity for a

long time to come. It deserves to.

Literature

There are a number of reviews of philosophy of education, now largely out-of-date but

of considerable historical interest, which are worth reading for a deeper understanding

of the growth and development of the discipline around the world.

Aspin, D. (1982) Philosophy of education. In Cohen, L., Thomas, J. & Manion, L. (eds)

Educational Research and Development in Britain 1970-1980.Windsor: NFER. 1-

18.

Crittenden, B. (1987) Philosophy of education in Australia. In Keeves, J. (ed) Australian

Education: Review of Recent Research. Sydney: Allen &Unwin. 3-28.

Dearden, R. (1984) Philosophy of education 1952-1982. In Dearden, R. Teaching and

Practice in Education. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. 22-36.

Ericson, D. (1992) Philosophical issues in education. Encyclopaedia of Educational

Research. (6 ed). New York: Macmillan. 1002-1007.

Harris, K. (1988) Dismantling a deconstructivist history of philosophy of education.

Educational Philosophy and Theory. 20(1), 50-58.


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Hayden, G. (1998) 50 Years of Philosophy of Education: Progress and Prospects. London:

University of London Institute of Education.

Hirst, P. (1982) Philosophy of education: the significance of the sixties. Educational

Analysis. 4(1), 5-10.

Kaminsky, J. (1986) The first 600 months of philosophy of education 1935-1985: a

deconstructivist history. Educational Philosophy and Theory. 18(2), 42-48.

Kaminsky, J. (1988) Philosophy of education in Australasia: a definition and a history.


Kamisky, J (1993) A New History of Educational Philosophy. Westport, CT: Greenwood

Press.

Peters, R. (1983) Philosophy of education. In Hirst, P. (ed) Educational Theory and Its

Foundation Disciplines. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. 30-61.

Phillips. D. (1985) Philosophy of education. In Husen, T. & Postlewaite, N. (eds)

International Encyclopaedia of Education. (vol 7) Oxford: Pergamon Press. 3859-

3877.

For more recent reviews:

Noddings, N. (2009) Philosophy of education. Encyclopaedia of the Social and Cultural

Foundations of Education.New York: Sage.

Phillips, D. (2008) Philosophy of education. Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy.

Stanford, CA: Stanford University.


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Philosophical Traditions

What is evident from the literature is the wide range of philosophical traditions which

have shaped philosophy of education in New Zealand. Some of these are broad

movements (eg analytic, postmodernism) while others are more closely aligned to

particular philosophers such as Freire, Quine and Wittgenstein. These various strands

all contribute to the rich tapestry of philosophical thought about education in New

Zealand which in many ways is a microcosm of the wider international philosophical

landscape.

Analytic Philosophy

If we take as our starting point the appointments of Stuart Ainsworth, Jim Marshall and

Ivan Snook to lectureships in Education at the Universities of Waikato, Auckland and

Canterbury respectively in the late 1960s, then the first tradition to make its mark in

New Zealand was analytic philosophy of education. Early on, they analysed a variety of

concepts such as needs, education and indoctrination. Later, they broadened the

philosophical scope of their work. While the narrow approach of conceptual analysis

has long been left behind, there remains a place for sound analytic work in philosophy.

Scientific Philosophy

One form of analytic philosophy, broadly conceived, which continues to have an

influence is scientific philosophy (for want of a better name). The early work of Brian

Haig at Canterbury and Michael Matthews at Auckland has been continued by John

Clark at Massey. The general thrust of this philosophical tradition is rooted in realist

philosophy of science, particularly the work of Popper and Quine. Rejected is

constructivism (we construct reality so that what exists is what we say exists) and

relativism (since there can be no independent and objective access to reality against

which to assess the truth or falsity of rival theories then all theories are equally true orvalid).

The idea that science is a first-order activity while philosophy is a second-order

activity which takes a conceptual scalpel to scientific concepts is also rejected. They are

held to be continuous science is subject to philosophical scrutiny, and rightly so:

philosophy is limited by the constraints of empirical reality. Philosophical talk of

education cannot ignore the empirical side of schooling including internal processes and

external forces.


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Marxism/Critical Theory

Marxist philosophy of education never gained a foot-hold in New Zealand as it

did in Australia. But a neo-Marxist form did, at least for a while, when John Codd

(Massey) adopted Jurgen Habermass critical theory to develop his critique of

assessment and administration/leadership by building on Habermass account of the

three human interests which give rise to three forms of knowledge. There is the human

interest to control our environment which gives rise to empirical science, there is a

normative human interest which gives rise to interpretation and there is an

emancipatory human interest leading to enlightenment and the use of power to secure

freedom.

Although Habermasian critical theory has waned, at least in philosophy of

education in New Zealand, a residual effect remains. There is a general acceptance that

education ought to be geared to social justice and human betterment. Peter Roberts

(Canterbury) has a particular interest in the work of Paulo Freire while Deb Hill

(Canterbury) has been very much influenced by the thinking of Antonio Gramsci.

Postmodernism

Like other philosophical traditions, postmodernism is not all that easy to define. The

term is used here to capture a broad canvas of philosophical thought with its origins in

European intellectual engagement. Although postmodernism is sometimes linked to

Lyotards analysis of knowledge and thepostmodern condition, it is far wider in scope

than this. Three philosophers of education, all associated with the University of

Auckland, have made and continue to make major contributions to postmodern

philosophy of education in New Zealand. The collaborative work of Jim Marshall and

Michael Peters has influenced the work of Peter Fitzsimmons, amongst others.

Other Influences

A number of other philosophers have influenced the thinking of various New Zealand

philosophers of education. John Rawlss Theory of Justicewas important to the work of

Graham Oliver (Waikato) while Popper shaped the writing of David Corson (Massey).

Wittgenstein played a central role in the work of Jim Marshall and Michael Peters while

Nietzsche, Heidigger and Focault loom large in the thinking of Robin Small (Auckland)

and Robert Shaw (Open Polytec).


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Chapter Five

One Philosophers Views on Education

What philosophers have to say about education, and how they say it, will depend very

much on which aspects of education interest them the most and the philosophical

approach they take towards things educational. There are so many aspects of education

of interest to philosophers, too many for any one philosopher to work on them all.

Hence, like all other academics, philosophers of education make choices about what

they will invest their research time and effort in, and upon this they proceed to build a

research career.

Many academics, especially those who undertake empirical research, tend to

concentrate on a particular topic and study it in considerable depth. So, for example, an

education researcher may have an interest in how children learn to read, why some

children have great difficulty learning to read, and what can be done to help them learn

to read. With this focus, publications largely consist of detailed studies into these

related aspects of the problem.

Philosophers tend to have a rather wider focus, drawing off their intellectual

skills to address a range of questions, problems and issues. Sometimes these are tackled

in a very systematic way so that the publications all contribute to the development of a

distinct philosophical system, as is the case with Quine. Others, with a less systematic

outlook, may use their philosophical skills to explore things that interest them at the

time with no thought being given to their being part of a larger system of thought.

My own philosophical work is a bit of both. My primary philosophical interest,

ever since my postgraduate days, has been and remains epistemology or the theory of

knowledge. Secondary interests include ethics and social philosophy. They have been

put to work on a wide range of educational concerns including administration,

curriculum, policy and research. Below is a reasonably complete list of my publications

for the reader interested in finding out a little bit more about what I think on a number

of educational concerns.

What I think

My thoughts on education can be gleaned from reading my publications listed below.

What I think on the various issues will become clear enough. What is less evident is my

underlying philosophical position. It can be captured by the expression holistic

eliminative materialism.

Holism: following Quine, from our sensory experience we posit things external to our

bodily sensations to account for them. What caused my retina to react and my ear


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membrane to vibrate? Close to home, we posit light rays and sound waves while further

out we posit objects deemed to exist as causes of our sensations. So our ontology takes

shape as we acquire concepts of, for example, tables and chairs, cats and dogs and then

more complex things like gravity and magnetism, black holes and molecules, and so on.

We make ontological claims about the world as to what exists and what does not. And so

we construct our sprawling and evolving theory of the world made up of our statements

about what is real; it is more like a spiders web or a fishermans net, hence holistic, than

like the pillars of an ancient temple of distinct types of theory. We put bits of our theory

to the test, seeking out empirical evidence relevant to our claims. Sometimes the

evidence we gather supports our theories, other times it does not. When it does not, we

can do one of two things. Retain the theory and reject the evidence or accept the

evidence and reject some part of our theory.

Normally, we would need very good reasons to follow the first path. We can be

mistaken in our simple observations (influence of drugs, misperception) and in more

complex empirical data gathering using instruments (telescope, MRI scan) but more

often than not our everyday observations are pretty reliable (it is raining or not

raining). If we accept the evidence then we need to adjust our theoretical account in

some way to accommodate the recalcitrant evidence by either revising or rejecting the

particular theory being tested or some part of the supporting theory and replacing it

with a theory which allows us to explain the anomaly. A simple enough example will

illustrate the point. A young child learns that fish live in the sea a shark is a fish, so too

is a flounder. Then the child says a whale is a fish and is surprised when told it is not.

Like the shark the whale swims in the sea, has a fish shape and is to all appearances a

fish. The anomaly needs to be resolved and if a whale is not a fish then what is it? Now

the child learns some new concepts to add to her conceptual framework such as some

creatures, being warm-blooded, are mammals and that the child herself is also a

mammal and so, despite a physical fish-like appearance whales are biologically closer to

humans than fish.

There is more. All we have are our theories; those we take to be true, those we

take to be false, and those yet to be determined. What makes a claim or a sentence or a

statement true is a matter of ontology. A claim, sentence or statement is true if theworld is as the sentence says it is and false if the world is other than what we say it is.

Truth, then, is a property of sentences. To use Tarskis (1983) example:

Snow is white is true if and only if snow is white.

To find out whether the sentence snow is white is true or not we need to undertake

empirical observations of snow and if our observations of snow are such that it is white

then we take our claim to be true.


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Eliminative Materialism: this is a more controversial philosophical view. Some people

prefer an ontology akin desert landscapes; the fewer things the better to account for our

experience. Others prefer an ontology akin luxuriant jungle; more is better. The former

may limit their ontology to physical things while the latter feel much more at home with

additional metaphysical things. The physicalist, for example, claims that the only things

in the world are physical or material things (although numbers do present a bit of a

problem but can be dealt with as abstract entities). So, speaking of ourselves, all we

consist of are bodies with brains and nothing else. Explanations of what we are, what

we do and why we do things must be couched in terms of physical theories about brains

and brain states, and nothing more. Others accept that we have bodies and brains but

also posit metaphysical entities such as minds and mental states (and some add souls

and spirits) to account for who we are, what we do and why. Hence the language of folk

psychology, where people adopt attitudes to the propositions they hold; so we have, for

example, I believethat it will rain or Ihope that it will rain or I knowthat it will rain or I

expectthat it will rain, and so on. And there are many other similar terms such as I wish,

want, desire and intend. In my view, these terms do no useful explanatory work since

they are like the word unicorn they refer to nothing for, just as there are no unicorns

in the world (apart from appearing in childrens story books) so too we do not possess

minds and mental states so the words are fictions. If we really want to adequately

explain ourselves then let the metaphysics go and keep to the physical. We have

eliminated the concepts of folk physics, folk chemistry and folk biology in favour of

scientific physics, chemistry and biology. Folk psychology will progressively be replaced

by the theories of the neurosciences and we will one day come to talk about ourselves in

very different ways and look upon our current folk psychology as quite odd. The more

we learn about the brain the closer we will come to learning about ourselves. Such is the

role of neurophilosophy where what we say philosophically about the world and

especially ourselves, must be constrained by what the neurosciences tell us about

ourselves. So, I dispense with terms such as knowledge and belief, knowing and

believing; what is retained is our theories for which we seek evidence for their truth or

falsity and this work is done by the brain.

Authored Books

Adams, P., Clark, J.A., Codd, J., ONeill, A-M., Openshaw, R. & Waitere-Ang, H. (2000)

Society and Education in Aotearoa New Zealand. Palmerston North: Dunmore

Press

Clark, J.A. (1997) Educational Research: Philosophy, Politics, Ethics. Palmerston North:

ERDC Press


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Codd, J., Brown, M., Clark, J.A., ONeill, H., ONeill, J., Waitere-Ang, H. & Zepke, N. (2002)

Review of Future-focused Research on Teaching and Learning. Wellington:

Ministry of Education

Edited Books

ONeill, A-M., Clark, J.A. & Openshaw, R. (eds) (2004) Reshaping Culture, Knowledge and

Learning: Policy and Content in the New Zealand Curriculum Framework.

Palmerston North: Dunmore Press

Openshaw, R. & Clark, J.A. (eds) (2012) Critic and Conscience: Essays on Education in

Memory of John Codd and Roy Nash. Wellington: NZCER

Book Chapters

Clark, J.A. & Jordan, B. (2005) The ethics of teachers relationships with parents and

other professionals. In Adams, P., Scrivens, C & Vossler, C. (eds) Teachers Work

in Aotearoa New Zealand. Southbank, Vic., Australia: Thompson Press. 235-243

Clark, J.A. (1985) Competing claims, decision-making and administrative action. In L.

Rattray-Wood (ed) Critical Practice in Educational Administration. Geelong,

Australia: Deakin University Press. 18-32

Clark, J.A. (2001) Ethical issues in managing teacher performance. In J. West-Burnham, I.

Bradbury & J. ONeill (eds) Performance Management in Schools. London:

Pearson education. 64-81

Clark, J.A. (2004) Constructivism: an inadequate philosophy for the science curriculum.

In ONeill, A-M., Clark, J.A. & Openshaw, R. (eds) (2004) Reshaping Culture,

Knowledge and Learning: Policy and Content in the New Zealand Curriculum

Framework. Palmerston North: Dunmore Press. 161-175

Clark, J.A. (2004) Rigorous eclecticism: the Ministry of Educations bizarre philosophy of

the curriculum. In ONeill, A-M., Clark, J.A. & Openshaw, R. (eds) (2004)

Reshaping Culture, Knowledge and Learning: Policy and Content in the New

Zealand Curriculum Framework. Palmerston North: Dunmore Press. 127-139

Clark, J.A. (2005) Tensions in teacher-student relationships. In Adams, P., Scrivens, C &

Vossler, C. (eds) Teachers Work in Aotearoa New Zealand. Southbank, Vic.,

Australia: Thompson Press. 226-234


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Clark, J.A. (2005) The aims and functions of education in Aotearoa New Zealand. I

Adams, P., Openshaw, R. & Hamer, J. (eds) Education and Society in Aotearoa

New Zealand. (2 ed) Southbank, Vic., Australia: Thompson Press. 130-154

Clark, J.A. (2005) The ethics of teacher-student relationships. In Adams, P., Scrivens, C &



Clark, J.A. (2005) The ethics of teaching. In Adams, P., Scrivens, C & Vossler, C. (eds)

Teachers Work in Aotearoa New Zealand. Southbank, Vic., Australia: Thompson

Press. 60-70

Clark, J.A. (2006) Dogmas of ethnicity. In Rata, E. & Openshaw, R. (eds) Public Policy and

Ethnicity: The Politics of Ethnic Boundary Making. Basingstoke: Palgrave

Macmillan. 170-184

Clark, J.A. (2006) The academic game. In Adams, P., Openshaw, R. & Trembath, V. (eds)

Score More: Essential Academic Skills for Tertiary Education. Southbank, Vic.,


Clark, J.A. (2007) The problem of truth in educational research: the case of the Rigoberta

Menchu controversy. In Nozaki, Y. (ed) Comparative Minds, Critical Visions. (vol2) Buffalo, NY: State University of New York at Buffalo. 6-11

Clark, J.A. (2010) Philosophy of education in New Zealand. In Oppy, G. (ed) A Companion

to Philosophy in Australasia. Melbourne: Monash Press

Clark, J.A. (2010) Privatisation. In Thrupp, M. & Irwin, R. (eds) Another Decade of New

Zealand Education Policy: Where to Now? Hamilton: University of Waikato. 201-

214.

Clark, J.A. (2012) Roy Nashs Structure-Disposition-Practice model to causally explain

inequalities in school achievement: Adding a neourophilosophical theory of

learning. In Openshaw, R. & Clark, J.A. (eds) Critic and Conscience: Essays on

Education in Memory of John Codd and Roy Nash. Wellington: NZCER

Jordan, B. & Clark, J.A. (2005) Ethics and issues of pedagogy. In Adams, P., Scrivens, C &




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ONeill, A-M., Clark, J.A. & Openshaw, R. (2004) Mapping the field; an introduction to

curriculum politics. In ONeill, A-M., Clark, J.A. & Openshaw, R. (eds) (2004)

Reshaping Culture, Knowledge and Learning: Policy and Content in the New

Zealand Curriculum Framework. Palmerston North: Dunmore Press. 25-46

Openshaw, R., Clark, J.A., Hamer, J. &Waitere-Ang, H. (2005) Contesting the curriculum

in Aotearoa New Zealand. In Adams, P., Scrivens, C & Vossler, C. (eds) Teachers

Work in Aotearoa New Zealand. Southbank, Vic., Australia: Thompson Press.

187-224

Refereed Journal Articles

Clark, J.A. (1981) Three perspectives on educational research. Delta 29, 17-26.

Clark, J.A. & Freeman, H. (1979) Clark, J.A. & Freeman, H. (1979) Michael Youngs

sociology of knowledge: epistemological sense or non-sense? Journal of Further

and Higher Education 3(1), 3-17

Clark, J.A. & Freeman, H. (1979) Michael Youngs sociology of knowledge: criticisms of

the philosophers of education reconsidered. Journal of Further and Higher

Education. 3(2), 11-23

Clark, J.A. (1982) Philosophy of Education in New Zealand: retrospect and prospect.

New Zealand Journal of Educational Studies. 17(2), 103-118.

Clark, J.A. (1983) Towards a critical theory of educational administration. New Zealand

Educational Administration Journal. 11, 23-26.

Clark, J.A. (1985) Willower on philosophy. Educational Administration Quarterly. 21(1),

119-122.

Clark, J.A. (1987) Is there a place for craft theory in educational administration? Yes,

but not in the way Battersby suggests. Educational Management and

Administration. 16(1), 65-68.

Clark, J.A. (1989) Absolutism and science in educational administration. Interchange.

20(3), 68-73.

Clark, J.A. (1990) Conceptual and empirical truth: Some brief comments on Wilsons

notes for researchers. Educational Research. 32(3), 197-199.


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Clark, J.A. (1992) MORSTs Glossary of Scientific Terms: A bad case of conceptual

confusion. New Zealand Science Review. 49(1), 9-12.

Clark, J.A. (1993) The new philosophy of science and educational research. Australian

Educational Researcher. 20(2), 15-22.

Clark, J.A. (1993) The theory movement in educational administration and the

administrative reform of New Zealand education: Are there parallels to be

drawn? Educational Philosophy and Theory. 25(2), 21-30.

Clark, J.A. (1994) Educational research and the testing of empirical theories.

Scandinavian Journal of Educational Research. 38(2), 123-127.

Clark, J.A. (1994) Objectivity, subjectivity and relativism in educational research.

Curriculum Inquiry. 24(1), 81-94.

Clark, J.A. (1995) Beyond the bounds of reason. Curriculum Inquiry. 25(3), 331-339.

Clark, J.A. (1996/7) Constructivism and the New Zealand science curriculum. Delta.

48(2)/49(1), 173-186.

Clark, J.A. (1998) Education as a public good or in the public good? Implications for

social justice. Delta. 50(1), 3-16.

Clark, J.A. (1998) EROs The Capable Teacher: An inadequate model for teacher

education. Delta. 50(2), 187-200.

Clark, J.A. (1999) The strange case of the Ministry of Educations mysterious philosophy

of the curriculum. Delta. 51(2), 41-53

Clark, J.A. (2000) Boards of trustees and school principals: A flawed policy-managementrelationship. Directions. 22(1), 85-96.

Clark, J.A. (2000) Hypothetico-deduction and educational research. Educational

Research. 42(2), 183-191.

Clark, J.A. (2000) In defence of childrens rights. Social Work Now. 16, 13-18.

Clark, J.A. (2000) The Tooley Report on educational research: Two philosophical

objections. Educational Philosophy and Theory. 32(2), 249-252.


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Clark, J.A. (2001) Against the parental right to use corporal punishment to discipline

children: Implications for early childhood and primary school teachers. New

Zealand Research in Early Childhood Education. 492), 177-188

Clark, J.A. (2001) Sex education in the New Zealand primary school: A tangled skein of

morality, religion, politics and the law. Sex Education. 1(1), 23-30.

Clark, J.A. (2001) Values education in New Zealand: Past, present and future. Delta.

52(1), 71-75.

Clark, J.A. (2002) Cultural sensitivity and educational research. New Zealand Journal of

Educational Studies. 37(1), 93-99.

Clark, J.A. (2002) The Education Review Office report on teacher education in New

Zealand: A critical response in light of its endorsement by the Education and

Science Select Committee. New Zealand Journal of Adult Learning. 30(2), 75-89.

Clark, J.A. (2003) Educational myths as a framework for educational policy: towards a

new myth. New Zealand Annual Review of Education. 13, 5-19.

Clark, J.A. (2004) Against the corporal punishment of children. Cambridge Journal of

Education. 34(3), 363-371.

Clark, J.A. (2004) Beebys intellectual legacy. Delta. 56(1), 5-11

Clark, J.A. (2004) Enterprise education, or indoctrination? New Zealand Journal of

Educational Studies. 39(2), 321-332.

Clark, J.A. (2004) Its about time that teacher education began to critically examine the

school curriculum: against philosophical naivete and political conservativism.

ACCESS 23(1), 35-42.

Clark, J.A. (2004) PIRLS: explaining and closing the gaps in reading achievement. Delta.

56(2), 3-7.

Clark, J.A. (2004) Teaching and research: the Canterbury Declaration and Poppers

legacy for teacher education. New Zealand Annual Review of Education. 14, 111-

129.

Clark, J.A. (2004) The Curriculum Stocktake report: a philosophical critique. Teachers

and Curriculum. 7, 73-78.


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Clark, J.A. (2004) The ethics of teaching and the teaching of ethics. New Zealand Journal

of Teachers Work. 1 (2), 80-84.

Clark, J.A. (2005) Curriculum studies in initial teacher education: the importance of

holism and project 2061. Curriculum Journal. 16(4), 509-521.

Clark, J.A. (2005) Explaining learning: from analysis to paralysis to hippocampus.


Clark, J.A. (2006) Michael Peters Lyotardian account of postmodernism and education:

epistemic problems and naturalistic solutions. Educational Philosophy and

Theory. 38(3), 391-405

Clark, J.A. (2006) Philosophy of education in todays world and tomorrows: A view from

Down Under. Paideusis. 15(1), 21-30

Clark, J.A. (2006) Privatising education and the voucher as a mechanism for resourcing

schools: implications for teachers and principals. Delta. 58(1), 57-79

Clark, J.A. (2006) Social justice, education and schooling: some philosophical issues in

educational policy. British Journal of Educational Studies. 54(3), 272-287

Clark, J.A. (2006) The gap between the highest and lowest school achievers:

Philosophical arguments for downplaying teacher expectation theory. New

Zealand Journal of Educational Studies. 41(2), 367-382.

Clark, J.A. (2007) The problem of truth in educational research: the case of the Rigoberta

Menchu controversy. 34(1), Australian Educational Researcher, 1-15.

Clark, J.A. (2008) Ethical issues for an editorial board: Kairaranga. Kairaranga. 9(2), 47-51

Clark, J.A. (2008) Moral education in Asia: pressures, contradictions and future

directions. New Zealand Journal of Teachers Work. 4(2), 105-110

Clark, J.A. (2008) Social justice and moral education in China. New Zealand Journal of

Teachers Work. 5(1), 44-53

Clark, J.A. (2009) Leaning tower of PESA. Educational Philosophy and Theory. 41(7),

808-810


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Clark, J.A. (2010) National standards: are they up to standard? New Zealand Journal of

Teachers Work. 7(1), 15-28

Clark, J.A. (2010) National standards: the public debate what was it all about? New

Zealand Journal of Teachers Work. 7(2), 106-124

Clark, J.A. (2011) Explaining differences in school achievement: A commentary from the

neurozone. New Zealand Journal of Educational Studies. 46(2), 89-94

Eley, E. & Clark, J.A. (1999) Vouchers and the privatisation of New Zealand education.

Waikato Journal of Education. 5, 3-12.

Snook, I., ONeill, J., Clark, J., ONeill, A-M. & Harker, R. (2010) Critic and conscience of

society: A reply to John Hattie. New Zealand Journal of Educational Studies.

45(2), 93-98

Snook, I., ONeill, J., Clark, J.A., ONeill, A-M, & Openshaw, R. (2009) Invisible learnings? A

commentary on John Hatties book Visible Learning: A Synthesis of Over 800

Meta-analyses Relating to Achievement. New Zealand Journal of Educational

Studies. 44(1), 93-106

Responses to my Refereed Journal Articles

Barone, T. (1994) Different forms of life: A reply to Clark. Curriculum Inquiry. 24(1), 99-

104.

Chamberlain, M (2004) New Zealand curriculum Te Anga Marantanga o Aotearoa

project: a response to Clark. Teachers and Curriculum. 7, 79-80

Eisner, E (1994) Response to Professor Clark. Curriculum Inquiry. 24(1), 95-98.

Grace, G. (1998) Education and the public good question: A response to John Clarks

paper. Delta. 50(1), 17-20.

McGee, C. (2004) Curriculum revision critique: a response to Clark. Teachers and

Curriculum. 7, 81-83.

Peters, M. (2006) Je mexcuse, Monsieur Lyotard: response to Clark. Educational

Philosophy and Theory. 38(3), 407-410.


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Tooley, J. (1998) Review of John Clarks paper: Education as a public good or in the

public good? Implications for social justice. Delta. 50(1), 21-26.

Willower, D. (1985) Towards philosophic choice. Educational Administration Quarterly.

21(1), 23-127.

Wilson, J. (1990) Conceptual and empirical truth: A reply to Best and Clark. Educational

Researcher. 32(3), 200-201.

Non-Refereed Journal Articles

Clark, J.A. & Snook, I (1992) The universities view of research priorities. Input. 14(1), 1-

3

Clark, J.A. (1994) The new right and educational research. Input. 16(2), 1-8.

Clark, J.A. (1996) Creation versus evolution: Competing theories in the science

curriculum? New Zealand Science Teacher. 81, 26-29

Clark, J.A. (1999) The Tooley Report on educational research: Implications for New

Zealand. Input. 21(2), 3-4

Clark, J.A. (2000) Values education and the right to criticise other cultures values . New

Zealand Journal of Social Studies. 9(2), 22-26.

Eley, E. & Clark, J.A. (1999) Educational vouchers and the privatisation of state schools.

New Zealand Principal. 14(2), 18-22.

McKenzie, J & Clark, J.A. (2003) The ethics of the teacher-pupil relationships. New

Zealand Principal. 18(2), 26-30


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Chapter Six

A Philosophical Journey

It is unusual for introductory books on academic subjects to have a chapter devoted to

the authors intellectual life. I have done so for two reasons. First, it begins to explain

why I hold the views that I do, by discussing the seminal experiences which have shaped

my philosophical journey. Second, the intellectual life is a rewarding one and in

recounting my philosophical journey, perhaps there will be a reader or two who, as I

followed in the footsteps of others, they too will follow in mine, by taking up an

academic career in a university. Third, what was available to me is available to others;

it is a matter of some planning, taking opportunities and having a bit of luck.

Early Years

I suppose that I asked philosophical questions when I was young, as children do, but I

have no recollection of doing so. No doubt my parents, like many parents, were not

quite sure how to answer such questions anyway. That they had some views on the

nature of the world they lived in, possessed some understanding of it, and lived in

accordance with a set of ethical convictions, was evident in the family environment I

was brought up in. These were passed on to me; some remain to this day while others

were cast off. Young children often ask Why? questions about all manner of things,

sometimes out of curiosity and other times for their nuisance value. I was no different, I

suspect, but since my philosophical interest did not come until later in my life I can only

conclude that the answers to my questions satisfied me at the time. Perhaps this

reflected what New Zealand was like at the time: Gods own country was a very

conforming place to live in.

Schooling

As I recall, I liked my years of schooling. My father worked in a bank so we moved

around the country on a regular basis and so I attended a number of schools. The first

was Patea Primary. Patea was, during the mid 1950s, a flourishing small Taranaki town,

but sadly no longer is. We lived at the back of the school so I was never late for class.

Then it was on to Te Aroha Primary School for most of my primary schooling until my

final year which was spent at Wanganui Intermediate School. And then to five years as a

boarder at New Plymouth Boys High School. This transition through three different

types of schools in three successive years left a lasting impression on me about

schooling, education and wider social/political matters which had a significant impact

on my subsequent intellectual journey.


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What I learned at school was marked by a breadth of learning and a love of

learning. The primary school curriculum included all of the traditional curriculum plus

more we had class gardens and time devoted to their tending, nature rambles opened

our eyes to the world around us, and at a time pre-TV there were games, library visits

and much make believe fun. Out of all of this, through my secondary schooling anduniversity education, I benefitted from a broad curriculum which gave me a rather

liberal view of life. English, geography, psychology and the like opened up to me realms

philosophy of education a beginners guide

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