philosophy now - march 2016.pdf

7/25/2019 Philosophy Now - March 2016.pdf

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ISSUE 112 FEBRUARY / MARCH 2016 UK 3.75 USA $7.99 CANADA $8.99

PhilosophyNowa m a g a z i n e o f i d e a s

Leibnizand hisastoundinginfinitemechanism!

Altruism

Is it evenpossible?

WHAT NIETZSCHE DID TO DALI


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Leavitt bulldozes various philosophicalconstructs, then merrily guides us through the

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February/March 2016 PhilosophyNow 3

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I S S N 0 9 6 1 - 5 9 0

Back Issues p.52Subscriptions p.53

FreeWillPages 6-17

EDITORIAL, NEWS & INTERVIEWS4 F eel F ree to D isagree Grant Bartley

5 N ews in Brief

28 Interview:D .D . R aphael (1916-2015)

Gideon Calder chatted with the ethicist shortly before his death

38 E xistential C omics

Corey M ohler records the batt les ofJeremy Bentham

FREE WILL6 F ree W ill Is An Illusion,B ut Freedom Isnt

Ching-Hung W oo explains the compatibilist account ofchoice

8 T he N ew Argument About Freedom

Natasha Gilbert says its not just about how determined we are

10 T he B rains R isk/R eward System M akes O ur D ecisions

Graham Boyd says i t i snt up to us

13 Akrasia:W hy D o W e Act Against O ur B etter Judgement?

George Singleton worries why we do what we know is wrong15 R eclaiming F reedom

Steve Taylor defends a common-sense idea offree wi ll

OTHER ARTICLES18 L eibniz and the Infinite M echanism

Audrey Borowski tells us about Leibnizs biology

20 H erder and H uman Identity

Brian King says to understand the herd, you need a Herder!

23 H ow N ietzsche Inspired D al

M agdalena Scholle on ideas and moustaches

26 Justifying O ur M oral Judgments

Thomas Dabay derives a way ofdoing so from Hume & Kant30 W hy Self-Interest M akes R elationships V aluable

Daniel Tippens tells you how to be good to yourselfthrough others

REVIEWS44 B ook:The M ost Good You Can Do by P eter Singer

reviewed by Joel M arks

46 B ook:Does Altr uism Exist?by D avid Sloan W ilson

reviewed by W illiam Irwin

48 Film:Good W ill Hunting

Tams Szabados existential ly analyses a moving encounter

REGULARS

34 P hilosophy T hen:Eastern PromisesPeter Adamson looks at the ideas ofancient India

35 B riefL ives:Colin W ilson

Vaughan Rapatahana on the life ofa unique mind

40 L etters to the E ditor

50 T allis in W onderland:W hat A Possessive!

Raymond Tall is ponders a peculiarity ofpersonhood

POETRY & FICTION F ree?

Peter Duffskewers the problem offree will in a single stanza

54 ... as it was determined to be so.

Short story by Kevin Heinrich

Altruism, or not?

Self-interest, p.30Books, p.46

Nietzsche & DalPage 23

BRAINCOGSISTOCK.COM/WILDPIXEL


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4 Philosophy Now F e b r u a r y M a r c h 2 0 1 6

FeelFree To Differsplendid example in some detail in his intriguing essay.

T here is no doubt that many of these softer versions of

determinism are correct, to various degrees: the interesting

debate concerns to what degrees, and so to what extent we can

escape, for example, the chains of our D N A. Even the most

ardent libertarian agrees that there are constraints on our

freedom. W hat makes them libertarians is their insistence that

the limitations dont deny some space for true, not physically

determined, conscious choice between options.

I think there are two major problems for hard determinists

(and so also for compatibilists) to address. Firstly, How do you

justify your assum ption that causation isonly physical,n otalso m ental?

T he idea that minds cant choose is so far only an assertion by

determinists, and one thats not justified in experience (and so isnot empirically sound), since all our experience of willing

informs us that we do make choices, and that we do so effec-

tively. So what sound basis exists for saying we dont choose?

T he second problem is: Why w ould consciousnessevolve ifit

doesnt do anything? On a more rigid determinism, our

conscious states and our actions are the results of automatic

brain activity; so our actions would be the same with just the

brain activity and without the consciousness. H owever,

consciousness is an expensive luxury, being created through

specially-evolved, dedicated and energy-hungry brain areas (eg

V 4-V 6 for colour vision). C onsciousness is evidently not just a

fortuitous free side-effect of other brain activity, as some deter-

minists misrepresent it. So why evolve it?

I m not convinced that determinists can answer either of

these questions adequately. B ut there are major problems for

the libertarian too. C hoice is primarily about the minds

content: its primarily the choice to think one thought one

set of mental contents rather than another (this is true even

when choosing to act). W e now have irrefutable neurological

reasons to believe that brains produce (or channel)

consciousness. T herefore, if libertarianism is true (as I choose

to believe), then any choicesm ade by a m ind m ust also be a choice

ofthe brain state underpinning the m ind state chosen. In other

words, in choosing our mental contents, we must also choose

the brain state responsible for the generation of those mentalcontents! So if there is free will, then there must be some way

for a mind to direct the state of its brain, like a sort of local

mind-over-matter. Its difficult to see how this could happen.

(I personally think that the power of wil l operates through our

choices being indirect observations of our brain states in a

quantum manner. B ut thats a story for another time.)

Enjoy this investigation of this fundamental aspect of human

existence. I think the question of choice boils down to the

question, can we make decisions in our minds that influence the

state of our brains? I suggest that we do not know precisely

enough how consciousness is generated by brain activity to

answer that question authoritatively, yet. G rant B artley

Welcome to our issue on free will. D id you choose to read

this? Im not asking out of mere politeness or aston-

ishment; the question, Isconsciouschoice real? is right at

the core of a tangle of philosophical problems around free will.

I f the answer is yes, you do choose, then your mind can decide

what to think, and how you subsequently act, whether by

speaking, or throwing a ball, or reading an editorial. T hat

question is utterly different from the free will question that

vexes theologians: Are we free if G od already knows everything

well do? It is entirely consistent to say that we do choose, but

G od knows what were going to choose. T hat would mean we

have free will in one core way concerning choice but not in

another way concerning, lets call it, our predictability. For

this issues theme were interested specifically in issuessurrounding the power of choice.

T here are three main positions concerning choice: libertari-

anism ,determ inism ,and com patibilism . Take your pick!

Libertarian ism is the belief that we make deliberated choices,

which, through our brains, affect the material world, and that

ultimately these choices are not absolutely determined by

anything beyond the mind making them. Determ inism is the

belief that all our choices are determined by factors beyond

our conscious control. T he strong position says that through

the brains processing of responses to environmental infor-

mation, one brain state automatically causes a subsequent brain

state, and conscious experience itself has no influence on the

physical activities of the brain or the rest of the body.

C om patibilism is an attempt to combine determinism with

moral responsibility (it therefore presupposes determinism).

V ersions vary, but the basic idea is that we simultaneously both

are determined and somehow choose.

D eterminism itself comes in different flavours. Hard deter-

m inism of the most absolute sort is the theory that the entire

history of the universe was already fixed from its very

beginning by the setting of the laws of nature and the original

states of the matter in it. T his is no longer tenable due to the

intrinsic indeterm inacy the random behaviour at the heart

of matter that is explored in quantum physics. B ut physics

does apparently allow a somewhat less absolute determinism the idea that the behaviour of the world is determined by

previous physical activities, but with some randomness as to

what the particular outcomes will be. So a quantum deter-

minist could defend an indeterministic determinism!

T here are also softer determinisms. T hese say that we are

very heavily influenced in our choices by factors beyond our

control (and which we are often unaware of). O ne such soft

determinism is genetic determinism, which says that who you

become and what you do is inescapably influenced by your

genetic make-up. I n his article in this issue, psychologist Steve

Taylor lists several types of soft determinism before

attempting to refute them; and Graham B oyd explores one

E ditorial


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Euthanasia for Children?Passive euthanasia, withdrawing or

withholding treatment with the effect ofhastening a patients death, has long beenlegal in C anada. Active euthanasia, takingpositive measures to bring about a patientsdeath, will soon also be legal as per a deci-sion of the Supreme C ourt of C anada inFebruary 2 15 . A new public debate hasemerged in the wake of this step: Should

the right to ask for ones own life to beterminated to be extended to children too?I t is not as strange a thought as it may

seem: in the N etherlands euthanasia islawful for patients over the age of 12 , inB elgium for terminally i ll children of anyage if they are experiencing constant andunbearable suffering. T he consent ofparents and doctors is, of course, needed.D r E duard V erhagen is a lawyer and themedical director at the department ofpaediatrics at the U niversity M edicalC enter G roningen. H e argues that most

children with a life-limiting illness, beforethey have even entered the terminal phase,have made decisions about their treat-ment, and about their lives 3 , 4 or 5times. A C anadian provincial-terri torialadvisory panel has now argued that accessto doctor-assisted dying should not behindered by the imposition of arbitraryage limits.

Arthur C aplan, head of medical ethicsat N ew York U niversitys L angoneM edical C enter comments: Setting theprecedent that the state is going to tolerate

killing children, even mature minors, isvery, very dangerous I ts the slipperyslope argument, and this is a slope I worryabout. Sometimes I dont, but this one Ido. T here is also serious opposition frommedical practitioners: M ost of our fight isabout kids that want to live ... not most ofour fight, all of our fight is about that, andhow to do it with as minimal suffering aspossible, says D r Stephen L iben, directorof the M ontreal C hildrens H ospital pedi-atric palliative care programme. T he lastthing I need as a pall iative care physician

for children is a euthanasia law.

Traditional Japanese Ethics ReturnsJapanese Prime M inister Shinzo Abe has

taken steps to make traditional J apaneseethics a formal school subject from 2 18 .Japanese conservatives are on a quest torestore the values they say were rooted outduring the U S occupation after W orld W arI I . Part of an ongoing debate over nationalvalues and identity, the new teaching plansreflect their concern that Japanese people,

especially the young, hold their owncountry and its history in low regard due toan over-emphasis in lessons on Japanswartime aggressions.

T he foundations of the new ethicssyllabus will be the Imperial R escript onEducation signed by the Emperor M eiji in18 9 . T his document, once treated assacred by Japanese schools, stresses thedevelopment of a range of social virtuesincluding filial piety and loyalty to the state.T he guidelines are now being worked intotextbooks, ready to be used in new ethics

classes taught in elementary and middleschools starting in 2 18 .

Nadine and EdgarM eet N adine, an emotionally intelligent

robot employed as a receptionist atN anyang T echnological U niversity inSingapore. She has her own personality,talks and behaves like a human, andexpresses emotions and change of moods asappropriate to topic and tone of the situa-tion. She can recognise people shes metbefore and remember what was said during

previous conversations. T his is somewhatlike a real companion that is always withyou and conscious of what is happening,N adia T halmann, a robotics professorN T U s School of C omputer Engineering,argues in a press release. So in future,these socially intelligent robots could belike C -3 PO , the iconic golden droid fromStar Wars, with knowledge of language andetiquette.

N ow meet Edgar, a tele-presence robotconstructed by the same team as N adine atN T U . H e can emulate the movements of

his human user in real time. U sing a

U niversity sc raps philosophy exam s

Ethics teaching the M eiji way

C anadians consider euthanasia for children

N ew s reports by Anja Steinbauer.

Newswebcam, he can be controlled fromanywhere in the world. H e can interactwith humans, sociably smiling and sayinghello and read a programmed script. T elepresence provides an additionaldimension to mobility, says engineeringprofessor G erald Seet. T he user mayproject his or her physical presence at oneor more locations simultaneously, meaningthat geography is no longer an obstacle.

No More Exams!In a radical move, the U niversity of

Essex is scrapping all philosophy exams: In the advanced study of a subject likephilosophy, we need to test students abilityto think in an original and creative way,rather than simply their power of recall ,argues Professor Fabian Freyenhagen,head of the universitys School of Philos-ophy in an article in The G uardian news-paper. Instead of cramming for exams,students will take extra modules in the

summer term to pursue philosophical ques-tions in greater depth. T hey will demon-strate their learning through assessedcoursework; tests on unseen questions willstill be used in a few contexts, such asassessing logic skills.

P h ilo s o phy No w FestivalW ed like to offer our deepes t thanks to all the

speakers,volunteers and members ofthe public

wh o took part in the 3rd Philosophy N ow F estival

on 21 N ovember 201 5. Theres a picture gallery

in the photos sec tion ofour Fac ebook page at:

https://facebook.com/philosophynow and we areuploading videos to our YouTube channel.


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6 PhilosophyNow F e b r u a r y M a r c h 2 0 1 6

from m any possible outcom es to o ne actualo utcom e takes place

purely by chance.T he statisticald istribution for such chance

events follow s strictrules,butthe o utcom e o fan individu al

chan ce eventis unpredictable and cann ot be con trolled by w ill.

Thus any decision is either the predictable resultofearlier causes

(w hich m ay includ e quantum chance events)and is no tfree from

determ inism ,or is itselfa qu antum chan ce event and is not

w illed.E ither w ay,the free w illw e com m on ly take for granted is

absent.Whatthen is the freedom to cho ose thatw e so cherish

and w hich politicians like to invoke at every opportunity?

Choice UnderDeterm inism

In order to focus on the essen tialissues,let us put chance

events aside,since,as w e have seen,qu antum rand om ness do esnot rescue free w ill.In this sim plified context,lets try to see

w hether our subjective feeling of freedom can

be reconciled w ith ph ysicald eterm inism .

One thing w e cant avoid noticing is thatw e

have the experience of m aking choices.In fact,

each cho ice consists of tw o stages.In stage one

w e conceive alternatives,an d in stage tw o w e are

aw are that w e have picked on e ofthem .Often

the option picked is the one w hose conse-

quences w e prefer over the con sequences of its

alternatives,b ut the com parison ofcon se-

quences is notalw ays don e con sciously.Fu rther-

m ore,bo th gen etic predispo sition s and past

exp erien ces play a role in form ing an individuals

preferences,so the cau sative factors leading to

the m aking of a cho ice are com plex.Th e con -

clusion is thatalthou gh w e do experience

choice-m aking thattransition from stage one

to stage tw o this doesntim ply the absence of

determ ining causative factors.We also have the

im pression that w e could h ave cho sen differ-

ently.B ut on ce a choice has been m ade,w hat

sense is there to this idea? T hatis,although a

decision-m aker faced w ith the sam e setofalter-

natives again m ay m ake a differentselection the

second tim e,thatw ou ld b e because the overall

situation,including the state of brain and m ind,

has chang ed.B ut on ce again,this choice is the

result ofprevious causes.Hence the existence of

free w illin the sense ofan autonom ou s force at

the very m om ent of decision un constrained by

past causes,is notrequ ired to exp lain o ur actual

experience ofchoo sing.Our experience of

choice-m aking is perfectly com patible w ith

determ inism ifw e accept thatthe transition

from stage on e to stage tw o thatis,from m ul-

tiple possible options to the one actually ch osen

We com m on ly think it ob viou s that a person facing

m ultiple alternatives can ch oo se any of them ,an d

that the ou tcom e is decided by free w illat the

m om ent of decision ,rather than b eing already determ ined b y

earlier causes.Allthe even ts in the w orld,h ow ever,o bey the

law of ph ysics,includ ing those that happ en inside a b rain.Ifall

events in the brain unfold according to classicalphysics,then

free w illin the ab ove sense d oes not exist.T his is becau se clas-

sicalphysics is determ inistic:the state of the w orld at an y

m om ent is the inevitable con sequen ce of its state atan earlier

m om ent.H ence the alternatives are on ly apparently availab le to

the d ecision-m aker,as in fact only a single alternative is des-

tined to b e the on e cho sen.

In quantum physics the so-called p robability am plitudeevolves according to determ inistic law s butthe transform ation

Free W illIs An Illusion,

But Freedom IsntChing-Hung W oo sa ys free dom is c ompa tible w ith choices be ing de termined.

No t W ha t Th e y Se e m

by Danelle Hellen Gallo

GRAPHIC

DANELLEHELLEN

GALLO

2016

PLEASEVISIT

W

W

W

.ARTBYDANELLE.WEEBLY.COM

r e e W ill


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February/March 2016 PhilosophyNow

is, like any other kind of event in the world, the result of previ-

ous causes.

Once choice is properly understood in this way as being

causally, physically determined we can proceed to consider

the notion of free choice in wider ways. I f a man holds a gun to

my head and demands my wallet, and I choose to obey him

rather than to try and fight, thats a coerced choice. I n con-

trast with this, we can say that a free choice is one that is not

coerced. U ltimately, freedom in this sense depends on theabsence of conflict between the choice-makers nature, charac-

ter, or core desires and the intended consequences of their

actions. Since we are not averse to admitting that our nature is

the result of our genetic predispositions and our past circum-

stances, this notion of freedom can readily coexist with the

hidden operation of physical determinism, and also with the

fuller scientific worldview where physical determinism is sup-

plemented by quantum randomness.

Compatibilism & Moral ResponsibilityStill, how can I be respon siblefor the consequences of such

free choices, when the chains of events that cause them weredetermined outside myself, beginning long ago? T he answer is

hinted at in the word responsible. T he president of a nation

may take responsibility for his administrations bad handling of

relief work after a natural disaster, for example, even though he

was not personally involved in any of the snafus occurring at the

operational level. Analogously, although many aspects of my

being pull me in different directions and argue with one another

during the making of a difficult decision, there is a relatively

stable center that I identify as my self, and this recognition means

that I can take or own the responsibility for each decision thats

made by me, even through or after the competition of all these

factors. T his is an appropriate expediency, since the detailed

tracing of all the responsible factors is practically impossible.

T he nature of the self is obviously complex. Some people

have a narrow sense, and some an expansive sense, of the

responsible self, and even the same persons self-perception may

change over time. Or for example, a drug addict caught in a

crime may claim M y habit made me do it! In so saying hes

treating his habit as if its not a part of him. H owever, in ponder-

ing his responsibility, the jury ought to take into consideration

whether his habit was formed with his knowledge or without it

(it might sometimes be a result of taking medicine his doctor

prescribed). In other words, the jury should assign responsibility

for the crime not just on the basis of whether the recent crimi-

nal act was itself a completely uncoerced choice, but also on

whether some past free acts of the accused contributed to him

being in a state where he committed the present crime.

In contrast to this addict, some people discover room for

freedom that is, for choices compatible with their nature

even when theyre under strong coercion. W hen H enry D avid

T horeau was jailed for refusing to pay the poll tax, he felt hewas still free because his mind could go anywhere, and, as he

observed dryly, his mind constituted all that was dangerous.

And J ean-Paul Sartre claimed that Frenchmen were never

freer than when France was under the N azi occupation. H ow

so? W ell, the occupation created opportunities for defiance,

and whether to risk defiance or not is a significant choice;

hence Frenchmen were freer in the sense of possessing a

richer menu of significant choices. T he wiggle room allowed

under coercion, however, is not always large enough for a

choice to be meaningfully called free. Sophies choice, in

W illiam Styrons novel of that title, was to sacrifice one of her

children or the other to the gas chamber. R easonable people

would regard the alternatives offered to her by the N azi doctoras not much of a choice at all, and absolve Sophie of any

responsibility for the death of the non-chosen child.

Adopting the absence of coercion instead of the absence of

determinism as the essence of freedom gets us out of a conflict

with the prevalent scientific worldview. N onetheless, this

notion still captures the importance of freedom as a condi-

tion that enables a person to be true to himself, and also as a

criterion for judging whether it is fair to hold a person respon-

sible for their actions.

PROF. CHING-HUNG WOO 2016

The late C hing-Hung Woo w as for m any yearsP rofessor ofP hysics

at the Un iversity ofMaryland.

In X anadu did Kubla Khan a stately pleasure dome decree...

Samuel Taylor Coleridge became addicted to laudanum (opium dissolved

in alcohol) as a result of being prescribed it by his doctor for toothache.

So was he entirely responsible for this poem written under its influence?

Free?

Are c hoice s free ly ma de jus t a s it s ee ms

Or do the atom s c hoose for us inste ad?

Do pe ople jus t re sp ond or inte rvene ?

By choice illusions are w e e ac h misled?

Ifnow Ichoos e to w ork ins te ad ofplay

Is tha t bec aus e tha t impulse is m ore s trong?Else w hat de cides w hich impulse will hold swa y?

Are w e the move rs or jus t move d a long?

And w hen d ec idedly Iam resolved

To take s ome course ofac tion come wha t may

Wa s Iobs e rving or w as Iinvolved

In tha t de cision in the prope r wa y?

Despite the doubts , Imus t be lieve I'm fre e

Acce pting that Iam too nea r to se e.

PETER DUFF 2016

Peter Du ffisa solicitor w ith a sm allpractice in B lackrock,

C oun ty Du blin.For m ore,visit hisdaily poem site at

dailypoem.net/index.php/about-daily-poem/.

Fre e Will


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8 Philosophy Now F e b r u a r y M a r c h 2 0 1 6

scious fashion. B ut for this to be the case, one would have to

exist prior to that choice, with a certain set of preferences

about how to choose ones preferences in a reasoned and con-

scious fashion. And so it goes on. I t seems then that being the

sort of person one is, having the desires and beliefs one does, is

something over which we cannot have ultimate control its

only the result of our upbringing, etc. And ones life and all one

does is an unfolding of non-self-chosen preferences. So ulti-

mately speaking, one is not free in any meaningful sense.

D eterminism is not the problem with responsibil ity, then;

rather, its the incoherence of the libertarian quest. As Strawsonsays, True self-determination is impossible because it requires

the actual completion of an infinite regress of choices and prin-

ciples of choice (Freedom and B elief, 19 8 6 , p.2 9 ) .

W hat is striking about this is that since the argument didnt

appeal to determinism, it seems that the problem that has been

the bane of the free wil l debate can be dispensed with. T his

realisation opens up a whole new avenue of investigation.

D eterminism is moot, but this does not mean that the issue of

moral responsibility is also dispensed with. R ather the question

becomes something like I s moral responsibility compatible

with the ultimate absence of libertarian free wil l?

Strawsons approach to this question is to take the same line

as the hard determinist: he concludes that moral responsibility

is impossible, and hence that it would be wrong to praise or

blame anyone on account of his or her actions. In response,

Professor Saul Smilansky, author of Free Willand Illusion

(2 0 0 0 ), claims that Strawson demonstrates the impossibility of

libertarian free wil l, but not of moral responsibil ity; even

though libertarianism is incoherent so that ultimate responsi-

bility eludes us, there still remains the real and important com-

patibilist sense in which we are free to act and so can take

responsibility for our actions. For the compatibilist, distin-

guishing between an action that was coerced and one that was

conducted with autonomy is relevant to the way we should

treat the agent. C onsider Adam, B eryl and C heryl. Adam stealssomething whilst B eryl does not. C heryl also steals, but is a

kleptomaniac. T he hard determinist perspective hold all

There has been a recent surge of interest in the old

problem of free will. B ut away from time-worn

debates over the questions Are we free? and Are

we morally responsible? some fresh waters are at

last in reach. As I will show, some progress can be made here

by putting the age-old problem of determinism aside and by

giving up the libertarian ghost. T his will leave us open to

asking new, clear and sensible questions in a debate that is

surely close to everyones heart.

Traditionally, conflicting positions on free will have

diverged and defined themselves according to the question:Are free will and moral responsibility compatible with deter-

minism? I t does seem that we are free to act, if our choice is

not the result of external coercion and reflects our own desires,

beliefs and deliberations. T his is enough for compatibilists to

grant us moral responsibility for these actions and declare that

free will is compatible with determinism.

H owever libertarians are steadfast in their plea for persons

to be truly deserving of praise and blame. If determinism is

true then the situations in which we make our choices, and the

desires and beliefs upon which we base them, are the inevitable

result of chains of cause and effect starting long before our

births. So in what sense can we be truly responsible for them?

To secure the libertarian quest for moral responsibility it is

required that a person is self-determined, rather than merely

not physically determined by something else or the result of

chance. B ut as Galen Strawson has demonstrated, any

attempts at establishing this will lead to a self-defeating infi-

nite regress.

C onsider that a choice or free action must be done for a

reason to be non-arbitrary. T he reason can be in the form of

principles, preferences or values. B ut if someone is responsible

for their actions, they must act in accordance with principles,

preferences or values they themselves have freely chosen: that

is, one must be responsible for the preferences upon which

one acts. T he question must then arise, where do these prefer-ences come from? In order to be responsible for our prefer-

ences, etc, they too must be chosen in a reasoned and con-

The New Argum ent

AboutFreedomNatasha Gilbertsays out with the old arguments,and in with the new.

True self-determ ination is im possible because itrequires

the actualcom pletion ofan infinite regress ofchoices

and principles ofchoice.

Galen Straw son,Free dom a nd Bel ief

Free Will


9/56


morally equal as morally unresponsible. From the compati-

bilist perspective, however, since both Adam and B eryl were

able to resist, yet only B eryl did, there are grounds for holding

Adam responsible. However, since C heryl is a born kleptoma-

niac, we have reason to distinguish her from Adam. D espite

some potential ultimate injustice in holding Adam responsible

and punishing him, to hold C heryl responsible and punish her

would be much more unjust. I n fact, the failure of hard deter-

minism in distinguishing between such cases shows its inade-

quacy.I t has been shown that determinism need no longer be our

main concern in considering moral responsibility, since the

problem over it arises whether determinism is true or false.

T he futile search for l ibertarian free wil l can also at last be laid

to rest. I have tentatively suggested what seems the most fruit-

ful avenue of investigation from this point: this is also Smilan-

skys suggestion, to start from the collapse that results from

the realization of the absence of libertarian free will and its

implications, and then reconstruct the free will related concep-

tual world on the basis of the shallower compatibilist

resources (from a personal correspondence).

A revolution is occurring in the debate on free will that

requires the renouncement of instinctively-held ideals and

beliefs. T he first step is to renounce the idea that the central

problem concerns determinism. T his will in turn pave the way

for the truth about libertarianism to be seen. G iving up liber-

tarianism, however, isnt a step to be taken lightly, since it

encapsulates the kind of freedom we normatively think we

have and need. T he greatest obstacle therefore, is going to be

whether people can live with the truth concerning free will.

NATASHA GILBERT 2016

Natasha G ilbertisa freelance journ alist.She has an MSc in the

P hilosophy ofScience from the London SchoolofEconom ics.

G alen Strawson, (19 8 6 ) Freedom and B elief, Oxford U niversity Press.

I SB N -13 : 9 78 - 0 19 9 2 475 0 9

Saul Smilansky, (2 0 0 0 ) Free Willan d Illusion, O xford U niversity Press,

I SB N -13 : 9 78 - 0 19 8 2 5 0 18 0

Finding out more

Free W ill


10/56

rational,slow,and controlled system ofthought,where we

reason through ouroptions. (Form ore aboutthese systemsof

thought,seeT hin k in g F a s a n d S lo ,DanielKahnem an,2011.)

Tucked away in the centre ofthe brain,System 1 m onitors

the environm entone way oranotherto m inim ize risk to sur-

vivaland m axim ize reward. Feedback continually updatesthe

system aboutthe environm ent. The em otionalresponse system

evaluatesallthe incom ing sensory inform ation,and then scores

itfora winner-takes-allcom petition to decide on the best

response. My contention in thisarticle isthatSystem 1 inter-

acting with incom ing sensory inform ation runseverything.

There isno room forany hom unculushere.

The detailsofthe processare intriguing. Allincom ing sense

data are converted into a com m on cerebralcurrency,placedinto context,assessed fortheirpredicted risk orreward value in

the em otionalbrain,and the likely errorofthatassessm ent. T he

resultsare then ranked in whatI have dubbed em otion scores,to

allow disparate information to be com pared untila successful

com petitorforstim ulating a response em ergeswithin the

system . Thisdecision and choice mechanism isquantitatively

quite precise (see m y O n S t r e ssD is a s a n d E v olu t io : A U n ifyin g

T h o y ,2012,to see justhow precise:e p in tsu t a s ed u .a u / 1 2 6 7 1 / ).

Nota bad start?Then welcom e to the world ofSystem 1.

Butofcourse you willnow go and spoilthingsby asking:

W hataboutthe capacity forrationalthought?Can thatbe

accom m odated within thisway ofthinking?

W ell,actually,yesitcan,butin a rathercom plex way.

T h e R a t ion a l B r a i n

Itisnow clearthatthe two system sfordecision-m aking in

m an operate so-called dualprocessm onitoring(see for

instance De Neysand G lum icic in C o n it io Vol. 106,2008). I

see the m echanism forthisdualprocessing being asfollows. If

atany tim e a certain threshold foralerting System 1 isnot

exceeded,judgem entiswithheld,and the m ore deliberative,

rationalSystem 2 m ay com e into play. Nonetheless,the intu-

itive,em otionalsystem stilltendsto strongly dom inate. De

Neysand G lum icic have found thatsubjectsstruggle to over-

ride the instinctive em otionalrisk/reward brain responses,since

rationalthoughtoptionsoften do notreceive enough cerebral

weightto prevailoverthe choicesofthe em otionalbrain.

My suggestion forhow to understand thatisasfollows. The

em otionalbrain alwaysharveststhe bestoption forresponse as

the one having the highestrisk/reward em otion score,w he t h r

t his s o e is d e r iv e d p im a r ily f r o t h e m o io a l b r a in o in d ir e c t ly

v ia t h r a t io a l b r a in . Ifnothing above a certain threshold ispro-

duced from the prim ary analysisofthe incom ing sensory infor-

m ation by the em otionalsystem ,then analysisisswitched to the

slowerdeliberationsofthe rationalsystem . But and heresthe

rub the eventualrisk/reward score calculated isnotestim ated

prim arily through a rationalranking,butrather,isbased on the

Recently I wastrying to explain to an intelligentwom an the problem of

trying to understand how itiswe perceive anything atall,and I wasnot

having any success. She could notsee why there wasa problem . Finally in

despairI asked herhow she herselfthoughtshe saw the world. She replied

thatshe probably had som ewhere in herhead som ething like a little televi-

sion set. So who,I asked islooking atit?She now saw the problem

im m ediately. F.H . Crick,in S c ie n t if ic A m e r ic a n ,1979

The firstquestion to be answered is:W ho orwhatisrun-

ning the show?In Part1 I willattemptto explain

hum an decision-m aking withoutthe need fora hidden

hom unculus. Part2 willthen go on to look athow the brain can

operate within thisenvironm entto generate the im pression of

an individualbeing driven by a highly consciousself.The argum entsoverwhathasbecom e known asthe m ind-

body problem go back atleastto Ren DescartesSeventeenth

Century dualistview thattheresm ind stuffand body stuff

and the two are quite separate,the m ind stuffbeing ethereal.

In the face ofallthe neuroscience data accum ulated since

Descartestim e,I view thisasa truly em barrassing stance to

take in the Twenty-FirstCentury,so the firstpartofthisarti-

cle willbe concerned with seeing ifwe can getaround it. I

think we can. My approach isa tad autocratic and the conclu-

sion equally radical,so be warned.

Letslook firstlook athow the brain m akesitsdecisions.

P a r t 1 : D E C I S I O NS

There are two m ajorwaysofprocessing inform ation facili-

tated by the hum an brain. I hold thatalldecisionsare m ade by a

risk/reward com parison ofthe incom ing sensory inform ation

within the em otionalbrain (System 1 thinking)ratherthan

within the rationalbrain (System 2 thinking). System 1,the

em otionalsystem forprocessing sensory inform ation and gen-

erating responsesto itaccording to a risk orreward weighting,

isautom atic,intuitive,and fast,even im pulsive. System 2 isthe

1 0 Philosophy ow February/March 2016

T h e B r a i n s R i s k / R e w a r d S y s t e m M a k e s O u r C h oic e s

Not U sG r a h a m W B oy d argues

that choice is an illusion.

B A S E ju m p i n g :

T h e e m ot ion a l b r a i n i n a c t ion

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Fre e Will


11/56

risk/reward value ofthatresponse to thee m oio a l brain. More-

over,because ofthe way the brain works,the emotionalscore of

rationaldeliberationsislikely to often be lessthan rating from

any analysisprim arily through the em otionalsystem . In effect

then:R a t io a l op io s a r e c hos n if a n d o ly if t h e m o io s o e s t h y

e v o e in t h e v a lu a t io o t h e m o io a l b r a in a r e hig h e n o g h tob e a t

t h s o e s o a n y m o e in t u it iv e c o p t it o r e spo s s.

The situation here iscom plex. Ittakestim e and trouble to

allocate em otionalrisk/reward scoresto rationalsystem

response optionsso thatthey can com pete in the em otional

brain. Actually,given the m agnitude and com plexity ofthe task

involved,the wonderisthatrationaloptionseverm anage to get

converted into having com petitive em otionalrisk/reward scores

atall. Allthatthe rationalsystem would have to go on would be

pastexperience;and atbest,thatwould m erely be analogousto

any presentsituation ratherthan precisely the sam e m eaning

thatthe processofconverting rationaloptionsto em otional

risk/reward optionswilloften lead to an underestim ation of

theirpersuasiveness. By contrast,the em otionalbrain hasan

innate strength and createscorrespondingly strong options

because ofitslong evolutionary history ofdevelopm entto aidsurvival. Thissystem isnoteasily overcom e. Thiswould

explain why deliberationsaboutr a t io a l optionsoften carry less

weight. In effect,System 2 isgenerally lessassertive. Itisalso

circum spect,and lazy (see Kahnem an,p.44).

The upshotofallthisisthatifany assessm entofany situation

by the em otionalbrain scoresabove threshold atfirstpass,it

decidesthe response withoutdeliberation being required. Butif

not,an option on the sam e inform ation through the r a t io a l

m ode ofthoughtcan stilloccasionally win on being converted

back to a em otionalbrain score. Itsem otionalscore can im prove

with experience and training to eventually prevailin specific

cases. Thisiswhatlearning logic isallabout. Forexam ple,once

ithaslearned the value ofVenn diagram sin solving som e logic

problem s,the rationalbrain can use Venn diagram thinking in

others. So the rationalbrain m ay be lessassertive,butaspectsof

itm ay be m ore trainable than em otionalbrain processes,caus-

ing them to eventually dom inate and be preferred in particular

cases. HoweverI hold that,in the end,they willbe usefulin

reaching decisionsonly ifthey have enough appealin the em o-

tionalbrain to outbid theirm ore intuitive rivals. Putanother

way whetherwe like itornot,we choose rationaloptionsonly

insofarasthey are judged to be potentially m ore em otionally

rewarding than theirintuitive rivals in essence,only ifour

rationaldeliberationsfeelbetter. (O fcourse,rationaloptions

can be ofvalue in m aking decisionseven when they m erelyin f o m the intuitive decision-making process.)

Letstake a breath,because thispointaboutthe em otion

scoring ofrationaloptionsisnoteasy,and I wantto m ake sure

itisgrasped. The whole em otion scoring system Ive described

I see asbeing eventually based entirely on the long-established

evolutionarily-derived intuitive,risk-reward em otionalinfor-

m ation-processing system 1. Everything would be a lotsim pler

ifoptionscould be ranked fortheirrationality,and then

allowed to com pete directly with intuitive optionsfrom the

em otionalsystem . Butthatisnothow itworks:the only scor-

ing system available isthatbased on the em otionalresponses

evoked within the risk/reward system ,so optionsarising from

the rationalsystem need to have theirrationalscoresconverted

to em otionalscoresbefore they can com pete. In the situations

described,they occasionally do;butoverall,the em otionaltail

wagsthe rationaldog (Kahnem an,p.140). Incidentally,there

isno reason to think thatany ofthisevaluation need be carried

outata consciouslevel.

A u t on om y of D e c i s ion - M a k i n g

Allthisbearsdirectly on the question:Can the whole

system run autonom ously thatis,with ourresponses,even

ourthoughts,being determ ined e n t ir e ly by the sensory input

interacting with the em otionalbrain?

Indeed itcan. The brain hasno need ofany hom unculusor

remote-controltelevision viewerto drive it. And thatisby far

and away the m ostim portantconclusion I have to offerhere.So how com e italllooksso m uch otherwise so m uch asif

we are in controlofourreactionsasconsciousselves?Letm e

now try to convince you thatthe selfisan artificialconstruct

thatself-consciousnessisthe productofthe brain interacting

with incom ing inform ation in the way Ive justdiscussed,and

thatallthistogethergivesthe false im pression ofprim ary con-

sciousnesswith an active selfin charge.

P a r t 2 : C O NS C I O U S NE S S A ND T H E S E L F

Following Benjam in Libetssem inalstudies(originally pub-

lished in B e ha v io a l B r a in S c ie n c esVol.8,1985),itisclearthat

February/March 2016 PhilosophyNow 1 1

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JACK

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2016

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Fre e Will


12/56

consciousnessislate on the scene ofany brain activity. This

m eansthatconsciousnessisan epiphenom enon:itisproducedby brain activity,butdoesnotitselfinfluence brain activity.

G iven this,I suggestthatfinaldecisionsfrom the brain are

sim ply f e d in t oa constructwe callthe self.

Allgetsa bitcom plicated here,so letslook atthe selffirst.

T h e S e l f

There are generally held to be two sortsofselves:the

bodily self,orself-as-object;and the first-person self,the

innerI,the 'self-as-subject supposedly the selfin active

charge ofeverything m eaning thatthe individualexperiences

thatthe highestlinguistic deliberationsofthe brain are

referred foroutputto thisinnerself-constructasifto an

active self-as-subject. However,I suggestthatthisfirstperson

self-as-subjectconstructisnotatallactively in charge ofvoli-

tion,attention and decision-making in the way we experience

and so profoundly believe itto be. Instead,culture,especially

language,play a large partboth in thisselfsdevelopm entand

in ourillusion thatithascontrol.

The way I see everything developing isasfollows.

Asthe child m aturesand getsa grasp oflanguage,society

expectsherto be accountable forheractions a controlling

self-as-subject.Butthere isno such active selfcontrolling

everything:the brainsconsciousoutputisdetermined entirely

by the com petitive risk/reward em otion-scoring system (s)I

described. Above this,there rem ainsonly the individualwithherpassive innerself-construct thatisherexperience of

being a selfthathasbeen created through otherbrain activity.

Nonetheless,given socialpressure,the child m ustrespond

appropriately. She doesso in the only way she can by

unwittingly allowing herpassive innerself-constructbe

form ed a sif itwere the active selfin charge. Again though,the

apparently active nature ofthisnewly deem ed self-as-subject

isillusory. There isno inneractive selfdriving thoughtand

behaviour justa passive innerself-constructto which allof

the higherbrainslanguage-based output(including rational

choice)isreferred forownershipto m ake itseem thatthere

is,and in the processsatisfy socialexpectations.

S e l f - C on s c iou s n e s s

From thisI also suggestthatthe acquisition oflanguage

skillsisvitalforestablishing yetanotherlayerofhigherhum an

brain functioning self-consciousness.

Fora hum an being to achieve herm axim um potential

awarenessofthe outside world,she m ustlearn the language

skillsofherculturalgroup. T hisgiveshera highly sophisti-

cated m eansofprocessing inform ation to understand and

describe the world including nam esforvariousentitiesand a

grasp ofthe value ofm odelsand m etaphorsin com ing to term s

with difficultnew concepts.

O nce the sense ofself-as-subjecthasbeen constructed,the

individualisin possession ofa robust(iffalse)sense ofan

active innerI. Itthen becom esnaturalforthisconstructto

appearto own the language-based higherbrain outputtoo. I

suggestthatwhen thishappens,thatbrainsoutputbecom es

whatwe callself-consciousand the illusion iscom plete:it

then appearscertain to usthatwe are a true active innerselfin

charge ofthe stream ofconsciousness the very hom unculus

watching and controlling the television screen. Self-conscious-

nessisthusseen here asbeing essentially an em ergentfeatureofthe grounding ofalllanguage-based higher-brain outputin

the self-as-subject. Itisa state ofawarenessofthe world so

heightened overthatofnon-linguistic creaturesthatitis

deem ed to warrantthe distinctterm self-consciousness. The

m ore thatsociety and the world are experienced and learned

overtim e via such com m unication,the m ore self-conscious-

nesseach individualattains. Yetfrom thisperspective,neither

self-consciousnessnorthe self-as-subjectplaysany role in the

creation ofthought. They are entirely secondary,non-causal

phenom ena resulting from higherbrain activity the effect

and notthe cause ofthe way the world becomesknown,of

how the individualcom esto be with knowledge(con-scious).

Allthisisnotto say thatthose withoutlanguage are notcon-

sciousin som e way. ItsjustthatI see self-consciousnessasa state

ofawarenessso heightened by language thatitdeservesto be

distinguished from it. By thisreckoning,anim alawarenesscould

include a lowerlevelofconsciousness. Also,the m ore com m uni-

cation an individualm asters,the m ore awareness-and eventu-

ally self-consciousness isattained. Itsalla m atterofdegree.

These,then,are m y views.

Challenging?W ell,thatsthe whole point.

C on c l u s i on

The brain m akesitsdecisionsvia itsem otion-scoring

risk/reward system interacting with sensory inputfrom theenvironm ent,with itsoutputsbeing m uch lessrationalthan we

think. Inputsfrom the rationalsystem occasionally receive suf-

ficiently high em otion scoresto successfully com pete. This

system hasno need ofany m ysteriousCartesian m ind to drive

it. The selfand self-consciousnessare both passive constructs,

although societysinteraction with the individualdeterm ines

thatthey com e to be viewed otherwise. So thatsit allwith

apologiesto Descartes,ofcourse.

P R O F . G R A H A M W . B O Y D 2 0 1 6

T he la t e G r a ha m B oyd w a s E m e r it u s Pr o e sso o M e d ic in e a t the

U n iv e r sit y o T a s a n ia , a n d a n H o o a r y R e s a r ch F e llo in t he

D e p r t m e n t o M e d ic in e a t the U n iv e r sity o W e s e r n A u s r a lia .


MIND

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ETER

PULLEN

2016PLEASE

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T h e e m ot ion a l a n d t h e

r a t ion a l m i n d i n d e b a t e

Fre e Will


13/56


I t is natural, Aristotle argues, for humans to acknowledge

akrasia. I ndeed, he argues for two different kinds of akrasia.

T he first is motivated by impetuosity, or more specifically, pas-

sion, which can cause a lapse in reason allowing a person to be

led away from what they (still) believe to be good actions.

T his analysis seems more reasonable than Platos approach,

as it explains many scenarios, such as the heroin example: the

intense pleasure brought about by such substances can cause a

lapse in reason. H owever, examples of suchakrasia

are by nomeans limited to addiction, or even pleasure. O ther types of

passion, such as anger, can also hinder our judgement.

C onsider a heated argument. T hings are often said in the

heat of the moment that are clearly not fully thought through:

those involved might digress into petty insults, and go too far.

In this case, the person is so blinded by anger that they act

without a reasonable consideration of the consequences of what

theyre doing the insult is swiftly pushed out of ones mouth

by ones ego, rather than being properly assessed by ones super-

ego, we might say. In his Nichom achean Ethics(3 5 0 B C E ), Aris-

totle compares these instances to hasty servants who run out

before they have heard the whole of what one says, and then

muddle the order. T he servants do not properly evaluate theiraction they simply do it without stopping to think.

In her Essayson AristotlesEthics(19 9 2 ), Am lie R orty exam-

ines the extent to which these ideas are similar or dissimilar to

the Platonic/Socratic perspective. I n R ortys view, Aristotle

stands the Socratic diagnosis of akratic ignorance on its head.

She says that rather than a person being misled by pleasure

into ignorance of whats good, Aristotle contends that a

persons ignorance causes them to be misled by pleasure. Per-

haps it is no surprise that Aristotle therefore reaches the oppo-

site conclusion that akrasia does, in fact, exist.

T he second type of akrasia Aristotle details is caused by

w eakness. I n contrast to the passionate person, the weak person

Almost all heavy smokers are well aware of the likely

consequences of their tobacco tendencies. M any even

concede that it would be best to give up the habit. Still,

a large proportion of these people cannot help but continue to

smoke, in spite of their better judgement. B etween puffs of

nicotine and regret, they may ask themselves, W hy do I con-

tinue to smoke when I know it would be better not to? One

response to this question although not one in everyday terms

is that smoking is an akraticaction. Akrasia comes from the

G reek for lacking control of oneself, and it means to act

against ones better judgement.

The Platonic/Socratic ResponsePlatos dialogue P rotagorasaddresses a more general incarna-

tion of the smokers question. T here Platos spokesman Socrates

asks, if one judges a certain behaviour to be the best course of

action, why would one do anything else? T he conclusion that

Socrates draws is that people will only ever choose the perceived

best course of action, since no-one goes wil lingly towards the

bad. T hat is to say, for Socrates, akrasia does not exist. R ather

wrongdoing stems from ignorance of what exactly is good, not

someone consciously doing what they know to be wrong. So his

view is that if someone actually believed that they should stop

smoking, they would do so with ease. Socrates does allow that

the person who apparently acts against their better judgement

will say that its because theyre overcome by the pleasure their

action provides. Yet to him this is a self-contradiction, since

their argument actually translates into: I knew that act was bad,

but I was overcome by my perceiving the good of it.

Socrates argument here fatally relies upon the acceptance

of a fairly large false assumption: that goodness and pleasure

are the same. H is argument cannot work if one rejects the

notion that goodness and pleasure are interchangeable.

L et us spare smokers the limelight briefly, and turn to the

example of the heroin addict. H eroin provides the user with

enormous amounts of pleasure; but this is not the same asheroin addiction being good. R egardless of the pleasure

induced, can abuse of a substance that results in such a high

likelihood of death by overdosing, or choking on ones vomit,

or through severe damage to ones veins, ever be considered

good? W hilst there may be no definitive philosophical answer

to this, it makes Socrates/Platos viewpoint questionable, at

the very least.

Aristotles ResponseAristotle disagrees with Plato about akrasia. H e takes an

approach more in line with actual experience than his teachers

purely theoretical angle.

AkrasiaWhy Do We Act Against Our Better Judgement?

George Singleton a sks w hy w e splash out on luxurie s w orth a months incom e,

s truggle to g ive up smoking, and resort to below-the-be lt insults in hea ted a rgume nts.

Fre e Will


14/56


15/56


fore unchosen desire to increase our reproductive success, or

else is the instinctive result of traits selected and developed in

our ancestors because they provided some survival advantage.

So the reason why some of us feel driven to gain success in

fields like politics and creativity, is because success makes us

more attractive to the opposite sex, and so increases our repro-

ductive possibilities; or, for example, according to Steven

Pinker, the reason we find lush countryside landscapes beautiful

is because for our ancestors such vistas represented a plentiful

supply of resources to foster their survival, so nature selected

those who were drawn to such landscapes.

In much neuroscience, brain activity that is, the behaviour

of neuronal networks and brain chemicals play a similar

causal role to genes. Your moods, your desires, and yourbehaviour, are determined by the levels of various brain chemi-

cals such as serotonin or dopamine, or by the automatic activa-

tion of neuronal networks which predispose you to certain

traits or impulses. If you feel depressed, its because of a low

level of serotonin. I f you are psychopathic, its because areas of

your ventromedial prefrontal cortex are less active than

normal. I f you are a B orn Again C hristian, its because you

have a smaller than normal hippocampus. (T he latter two are

actual neuroscientific hypotheses.)

T hese versions of both contemporary gene theory and neu-

roscience are what might be called cant help approaches: we

cant help being depressive, psychopathic, religious, racist,

polygamous (if you are a male), and so forth, because our genes

have programmed us to be so, or because we have been biolog-

ically burdened with the brain chemistry or neural networks

associated with that behaviour.

Harnessing Free WillW hat is the root of these assaults on our autonomy? W hy

do intellectuals and scientists feel such a strong impulse to

show us that we are powerless, controlled by forces beyond our

own control?

Perhaps its an unconscious desire to abdicate responsibility.

Perhaps the modern world has become so complex and stress-

ful that scientists and philosophers feel an impulse to retreatfrom responsibility, to pretend that we have no control over

the chaos. I wouldnt go so far myself, but a conspiracy theorist

might argue (and some already have) that this autonomy-denial

is a form of oppression an attempt by the intellectual elite to

keep us down, convincing us that we are powerless so that we

wont challenge their authority. M ore rationally, the rash of

free will denial may be related to the desire to prove that there

is no self. Free will is, of course, one of the strongest features

of the self. I f you believe that inside our mental space there is

no one there that our sense of self is just an illusion, which

itself is a mere side-effect of neurological processes then you

have to believe that the selfs free will is an illusion, too.

One of the main trends of recent academic culture has

been to take freedom and autonomy away from human

beings. I dont mean that professors armed with guns

have been locking up their intellectual opponents; I mean that

from sociology to philosophy, from psychology to neuro-

science, a common theme has been to try to show that our free

will is either severely limited or non-existent, and that we have

much less control over our own lives than wed like to believe.

I t was one of the central beliefs of behaviourist psychology.

You might feelas if you are free, making your own decisions

and choices, but in reality everything you do, or think, or feel,

is the result of environmental influences. Your behaviour is just

the output or response to the input or stimuli which your

brain has absorbed and processed. Freudian psychology alsoemphasized the lack of free wil l. I t suggested that your con-

scious self is just one small facet of your whole psyche the tip

of the iceberg and that its activity is determined by your

unconscious mind, which includes instinctive and other auto-

matic biological drives beyond your conscious control

B y contrast, existentialist philosophy and humanistic psy-

chology emphasised human autonomy, asserting that choice is

one of the defining characteristics of human life, even if it isnt

necessarily a positive faculty. According to S ren K ierkegaard,

the sheer extent of our freedom may induce a state of disorien-

tation and dread, and we make our choices in fear and trem-

bling. Similarly, Jean-Paul Sartre believed that the freedom to

choose courses of action without fully controlling or even

knowing their consequences contributed to human anxiety. I n

his famous phrase, we are condemned to be free. And in reac-

tion to behaviourism and Freudian psychology, humanistic psy-

chologists such as Abraham M aslow and C arl R ogers asserted

that human behaviour is not necessarily determined by our past

and present experiences, since we always have the capacity to

make choices based on our assessments of current situations.

H owever, in sociology, there was a movement towards the

denial of autonomy. T heorists argued that your sense of self is a

social construction and that people are necessarily formed and

exist inside a nexus of social influences which determine their

lives. L inguistic theorists also argued that our view of reality iscreated through and limited by our language. W e cannot see

beyond the assumptions in the framework of the semantic and

grammatical structures we have absorbed from our parents and

our cultures.

Gene Theory & NeuroscienceM odern genetics and neuroscience often deny our autonomy

in a much more direct way. According to geneticists such as

R ichard D awkins, we our bodies and minds exist as carriers

for our genes, to enable them to survive and replicate. Every-

thing we do is determined by and is on behalf of our genes. Our

behaviour is either the result of our own instinctive and there-

Reclaiming FreedomSteve Taylorsays of determinism:Irefute it thus!

Free Will


16/56

16 PhilosophyNow F e b r u a r y M a r c h 2 0 1 6

Yet no matter what the motivation, one is tempted to reply

to these assaults on free will in the same way that the eigh-

teenth century author D octor Johnson responded to George

B erkeleys arguments that matter was a mental phenomenon:

he shouted I refute it thus! as he kicked a stone. Johnson

could have used the same method to illustrate the denial of

determinism and his capacity for free will . I ts difficult for

anyone to persuasively argue that we dont have free will when

our everyday experience is that there are always a variety ofchoices of thoughts and actions in front of us, like a pack of

cards spread for us to pick from, and we feel we have the free-

dom to choose any of them, and to change our minds at any

point. After all, whenever you read a book or listen to a lecture

claiming that there is no such thing as free will, youre free to

close the book, or to throw a rotten tomato at the lecturer.

One of the problems is that scientists, and philosophers,

often tend towards absolutism. Geneticists may argue that

behaviour is com pletely determined by our genes; neuroscien-

tists that behaviour is com pletely determined by brain activity;

social constructionists and behaviourists may argue that social

and environmental forcescom pletely determine our behaviour,and so forth. B ut in my view, its more sensible to be democra-

tic than absolutist: its likely that all of these factors have som e

influence on our behaviour. T hey all affect us to some degree.

B ut none of them individually, nor all of them together, are

completely dominant.

I believe the same is true of free wil l. T he conscious self is

not an authoritarian dictator; but it isnt a slave either. R ather,

our free will is another factor or force amongst this chaotic

coalition of influences. T he upshot of that is that no matter

what social and environmental forces influence me, no matter

what genes or brain structure I ve inherited from my parents,

I m in here too, and I can decide whether to kick the stone or

not, and, generally speaking, how I react to the world.

Freedom Strikes Back

Interestingly, some popular neuroscientific ideas about the

limitations of free wil l are being contradicted by neuroscience

itself. For instance, recent research has shown that rather than

being fixed, our brain structure is very flexible, and continuallychanging: the brain is not hard-wired but soft-wired. T he rela-

tively new field of neuroplasticity shows that practicing habits

or behaviours brings real physical changes to the parts of the

brain associated with those activities. For example, if you begin

to learn to play the piano, you will develop more neural con-

nections, and perhaps, through the process of neurogenesis,

even more brain cells themselves, in the parts of the brain asso-

ciated with motor activity the motor cortex and cerebellum

and musical perception in the temporal lobes. O r if you medi-

tate regularly for years, you will develop more gray matter in

the areas associated with attention, concentration and compas-

sion in the frontal lobes. So in this sense, rather than beingcompletely controlled by our brains, we have control over them .

R igid determinism in gene theory is similarly contradicted

by recent findings in genetics. T he field of epigeneticsshows

that the genetic structures we inherit from our parents dont

remain fixed throughout our lives either, but are altered by our

life experiences, so that the biology we pass on to our children

will be different from that we inherited. For example, experi-

ments training mice to develop an aversion to a particular

smell have shown that this aversion was genetically passed

down to their offspring, who became two hundred times more

sensitive to the smell than other mice. T his new behaviour is

reflected in changes to both the genes and brain structure of

the mice. Similarly, in human beings, studies show that twins

exposed to very different environments and experiences show

striking differences in their D N A in later life. Or, in a Swedish

study of the descendants of a population which endured

famine in the N ineteenth C entury, it was found that the men

had inherited a much stronger than normal resistance to car-

diovascular disease, whilst those women descended from

women who had been exposed to the famine while in the

womb had a shorter than average life span.

One application of these findings would be to actively take

responsibility for our genes, knowing that the health and well-

being of our descendants depends on them. W e could make a

conscious effort to live positively, to be free of trauma andstress, and undergo as many positive and rich experiences as

possible, to ensure that the genetic inheritance we pass on is as

ideal as possible. I t could be said that we have the capacity to

control our genes rather than them just controlling us.

Increasing Free W ill

I would argue that one of the most important tasks of our

lives is to develop more free wil l and autonomy. I n fact, a pri-

mary way to develop positively and begin to live more mean-

ingfully is to transcend the influences of our environment to

become more oriented towards who we authentically are.

As humanistic psychology suggests, we have innate poten-

Free W ill


17/56


tials and characteristics that are independent of external factors,

even if this aspect of us may be so obscured from us that we can

barely see it. To humanistic psychology, our task is to allow that

part of us to express itself more fully which often means over-riding adverse cultural and social influences. T he same thinking

applies to genes and brain chemistry too. T hey may predispose

us to certain types of behaviour, but we can resist those influ-

ences, to control and even re-mould our behaviour. I ts by no

means easy, but we can overcome our programming. W e dont

have to blindly follow the environmental, genetic and neuro-

logical instructions we were born with. W e can with resolve

increase the quotient of autonomy with which we were born, to

the extent that it becomes more powerful than our genetics,

neurology, or the environment. (Strangely, despite his other-

wise apparently rigid genetic determinism, D awkins agrees with

this assessment of our potential, stating that humans are the only

beings who have the power to ignore the dictates of their genes.)

Paths To AutonomyPerhaps many people do seem to be largely the products of

their environments and biological inheritance. B ut I would

argue that whatever the term greatness means, it is usually

manifested by those who have exercised their autonomy to a

considerable degree, to significantly free themselves from exter-

nal influences. T hese are usually people who have used their

strong wil l-power to harness their autonomy and self-discipline

to expand themselves and develop a high level of skill and

expertise, to actualise their innate potential, and so become

more than the sum of their influences.

In a sense, this is only an extension of what every human

being ideally does as they move from childhood to adulthood: to

develop more self-control and autonomy. As we move through

childhood, with the help of our parents, we hopefully begin to

control our impulses and desires. For example, we learn that we

cant have everything exactly when we want it, and so learn to

delay gratification, developing self-control. As we need less care

and attention from our parents, we exercise more autonomy,

learn to make more decisions for ourselves and to follow ourown interests and goals. In this sense, human development is a

process of becoming less bound by biological and environmental

influences and gain more free will and autonomy. And ideally,

this process should continue throughout our lives.

Spiritual development can also be seen as a process of gaining

increased autonomy. For example, many Eastern spiritual tradi-

tions, such as B uddhism or yoga, place great emphasis on self-

discipline and self-control: control of our own behaviour, so that

we no longer cause harm to others; control of our desires, so

that we no longer lust after physical pleasures; control of our

thoughts, so that we can quieten the mind through meditation,

and so on. I n some traditions, spiritual development is seen asa process of taming the body and mind, and this is, of course,

only possible through intense self-discipline, requiring self-

control. Although it can sometimes occur suddenly and spon-

taneously, the deep serenity and intensified awareness of spiri-

tual awakening is usually the culmination of a long process of

increasing our innate quotient of personal freedom to the

point where our minds become the dominant influence. W hen

spiritually awakened people are referred to as masters, this

could easily refer to them as being masters of themselves.

In W estern philosophy, Friedrich N ietzsche meant some-

thing similar with his concept of self-overcoming. N ietszche

spoke disparagingly of the U ltimate M an, who is completely

satisfied with himself as he is and strives only to make his life

as comfortable and pleasurable as possible. B ut in reality, says

N ietzsche, human nature is not fixed or finished. H uman

beings are part of an evolutionary process not a goal, but a

bridge a rope fastened between animal and Superman

(Thu sSpake Z arathustra, 18 9 1). T he potential Superman is the

human being who is not self-satisfied, who has the urge to

overcome himself. For him, life is an attempt at bridging the

gulf between animal and superman.

Liberating FreedomW e all possess a degree of freedom, and we all have the

capacity to extend the degree of freedom were bequeathed to become less dominated by our genes, our brain chemistry,

and the society and wider environment into which were born.

W e are all potentially much more powerful than we have been

led to believe, even to the extent of being able to alter or even

control the forces that have been supposed to completely con-

trol us. And to a large extent our well-being, our achievements

and our sense of meaning in life depend on this. T he more you

exercise and increase your freedom, the more meaningful and

fulfill ing your life will be.

DR STEVE TAY LOR 2016

Steve Taylor isa Senior Lecturer in P sychology at LeedsB eckett

University,U K.

Find freedom in and

through your mind

Fre e Will


18/56

verse and are preserved foralleternity. I n a passage which m ay

provide uswith som e solace,Leibniz elaborated thatA natural

m achine can neverbe absolutely destroyed justasitcan never

absolutely begin,butitonly decreasesorincreases,enfoldsor

unfolds,alwayspreserving in itselfsom e degree oflife [ it a lit a s]

or,ifyou prefer,som e degree ofprim itive activity [ ct u osita s]

( n B o y a n d F o c e , A g a in s the C a r t e sia n s,1702).

Crucially,Leibnizstheory oforganism providesuswith an

insightinto the kind ofparadoxicalinfinity which drove

m uch ofhisthoughtprocess,and which he deployed

throughouthissystem . From hislinguistic investi-

gationsto hishistory ofthe Earth,infinity for

Leibniz isneverabstractorquantitative,butthor-

oughly em bodied,continuous,and infinitely

nested (exceptin hism athem aticalinvestigations,

where he intentionally adoptsa fictitiousreadingofinfinity forpracticalpurposes). In itsincarnation

in thisway,infinity cannotbe disassociated from

som e kind ofunity. AsLeibniz him selfoften conceded,

My m editationsturn on two things,nam ely unity and

infinity. Indeed,within divinely-inspired reality,the connec-

tion between infinity and unity wasnotone ofsim ple

dichotom y,butofinterdependence and variety. Indeed,even so-

called finitehum an creatureswere infinite in theirown way.

Leibnizstheory oforganism isalso em blem atic ofhis

broaderm o u sop r a n d i,which involved shunning radicaldistinc-

tionsin favourofsubtle variations. Farfrom rejecting m echa-

nism outofhand,Leibniz co-opted it,reworking itto suithis

own purposes. Forhim ,organism referred to an organizational

principle ratherthan a particularily biologicalsortofstuff:

O rganism ,thatisto say orderand artifice,issom ething essen-

tialto m atter,produced and arranged by the sovereign wisdom .

(Leibniz,Philosophica l L e t t e r s,volIII,ed C.I . G erhardt,p.340).

Living beingswere thussubjected to a particularvariety of

m echanism ,which unfolded infinitely and dynam ically. Ulti-

m ately,in the infinite subtlety oftheirartifice, natural

m achineswere borne outofdivine wisdom ,which itselfwassep-

arated from usby an im m ense distance ( e w S ys e m o N a t u r e ).

Leibnizsunderstanding oforganism would be echoed m any

yearslaterby the physicistErwin Schrdingerin the finalsec-

tion ofhisfamous1944 essay,W ha t is L if e ? ,which addressedThe Relation between Clockwork and O rganism :

Itneedsno poetic im agination butonly clearand soberscientific reflec-

tion to recognize thatwe are here obviously faced with eventswhose regu-

larand lawfulunfolding isguided by a m echanism producing events

which are a paragon oforderliness. W hetherwe find itastonishing or

whetherwe find itquite plausible thata sm allbuthighly organized group

ofatom sbe capable ofacting in thism anner,the situation isunprece-

dented;itisunknown anywhere else exceptin living m atter.

A U D R E Y B O R O W S K I 2 0 1 6

A u d r e y B o o s i g r a d u a t e d f r o O x f o d a n d is d oin g a PhD in the

H is o y o I d e a s S he s in t e r e s e d in t he his o y o lin g u is ic t ho g ht .

Farfrom shunning the infinite ashisphilosophicalprede-

cessorsPascaland Descarteshad done,G ottfried W il-

helm Leibniz (1646-1716)em braced and celebrated it,

seeing itasa m ark ofthe divine. According to him ,the infinite

permeated reality,in the m icroscopic aswellasin the infinitely

large,in such a m annerthatevery particle ofthe universe

containsa world ofan infinity ofcreatures (Leibniz,C olle c t e d

P p r sa n d L e tt e r s,Series6,Volum e 4,1647-8).

Leibniz waswriting ata tim e ofintellectual

upheaval. The early Seventeenth Century had

ushered in an era ofscientific discoveriesand

innovations an era in which m e cha n is ,as

exem plified by c lo k w o k ,had emerged asthe

privileged conceptualtoolthrough which to

elucidate and grasp the cosm os,the state,

and even the hum an body. T he applicationofthism echanized world picture to life was

pioneered by Ren D escartes,who in hisT r e a -

t is o M a n of1637 effectively equated living

bodiesto com plex autom ata. D escartescould see

no difference between the m achinesbuiltby artisans

and the variousbodiescom posed by nature alone. (p.50).

Leibniz feltthatthe m odernshad erred in ascribing this

godlessm odelto life itself. He setoutto restore the unique-

nessoflife by positing thatin f in ity wasitsdefining feature. For

Leibniz,even in theirsm allestpartsorganism swere m achines

and therefore were m achinesa d in f in it u m ,akin to onions

thatcould neverbe com pletely peeled. O rganism spreserved

theirinfinitely nested m echanicalstructure,and always

rem ained the same m achine throughoutthe variouschanges

they underwent,being m erely transform ed through different

enfoldings. (Leibniz,N e w S ys e m o N a t u r e ,1695). Moreover,

only the particularkind ofinfinity displayed by naturalorgan-

ism syielded true unity which unity in turn endowed them

with sensation,perception and consciousness(Letterto Sophie

and Elizabeth Charlotte,November1696). Each wasanim ated

by an alwayssubsisting unity (ib id a prim itive com m unica-

tionsnetwork which also expressed the activity ofallthe

m achinesnested in it,unfolding in concertwith them . W ithin

thism echanism ,both m aterialand spiritualrealm sdeveloped

in perfectcorrespondence whilstneverdirectly interacting,in

pre-established harmony. By contrast,even the m ostartfully

assem bled artificialm achine could neverhope to overcom e its

essentialstate ofbeing aggregated from parts. So m ore than

three centuriesbefore debatessurrounding artificialintelli-

gence,Leibniz had already warned ofthe inherently noncon-

sciousnature ofartificialm achines:although they m ight

behave asifanim ated by a unifying spiritualforce,they would

stillbe essentially soulless.

The infinitely entangled structure ofnaturalm achinesalso

foundstheirindestructibility. Birth and death em erge asm ere

developm entsand envelopm entsofa vastliving m achinery

which,while im perceptible to us,radiate throughoutthe uni-


L e i b n i z t h e In f in it e M e c h a n is m of L i f e

A u d r e y B or ows k i peers into the infinity inside all organisms,including us.

L e i b n iz


19/56



20/56

valuesto us. Becom ing som eone isprincipally (butnotonly)a

collectivistthing;asKwam e Appiah says,the individualiden-

tity islikely to have whatH erderwould have seen asa national

identity asa com ponentofitscollective dim ension ( h E thicso

I d e n t it y ,2005). So although Herderdoessee thateach person

hasan originalway ofbeing hum an and thathe oughtto be true

to him self(a basic existentialistidea),he also seesthatan essen-

tialpartofa personsidentity ishanded down to him through his

culture,and istherefore nota m atterofchoice.

ForHerder,each nation isseparate,distinguished by cli-

m ate,education,custom ,tradition,and heredity. He claim s

thatProvidence wonderfully separated nationalitiesnotonly

by woodsand m ountains,seasand deserts,riversand clim ates,

butm ore particularly by languages,inclinationsand charac-

ters. He emphasized the im portance ofnationalculture in theform ation ofonesidentity and nature by saying,he thathas

losthispatriotic spirithaslosthim selfand the whole world

abouthim self whilstteaching thatin a certain sense every

hum an perfection isnational.

So forH erder,becom ing som eone involvesa person grow-

ing and learning to fully identify with hisorherculture and

values. Thatisa large partofa personstruenature. He

attachesgreatim portance to culture and also nationalidentity,

astransm itted through language thatm ostbasic and essential

ofallhum an capacities.

The processofpassing on valuesoccursin fam iliesatfirst.

By teaching children language,a fam ilysm annerofthinking

and setofvaluesare developed and preserved in them . Then

valuesare passed on through largerunitssuch asschools,and

eventually through societiesornations,the largestunitsthat

identify with the language. Each com m unity ornation hasits

own language,unique tradition and history,which shapesthe

livesand values,the artand ideas,the activitiesand leisure pur-

suitsofitsinhabitants itsculture and m akesthem the

people they are givesthem theiridentity.

To a certain extentH erderisanticipating the Sapir-W horf

hypothesisthatlanguage determ inesthoughtand behaviour. In

1929 Edward Sapirsaid,T he factofthe matteristhatthe

realworldisto a large extentunconsciously builtupon the

language habitsofthe group. N o two languagesare eversuffi-ciently sim ilarto be considered asrepresenting the sam e social

reality. The worldsin which differentsocietieslive are distinct

worlds,notm erely the sam e world with differentlabels

attached... W e see and hearand otherwise experience very

largely aswe do because the language habitsofourcom m unity

predispose certain choicesofinterpretation. (From a 1929

article entitled The StatusofLinguisticsasa Sciencein L a n -

g u a g e Vol5,No 4). Thism ould theoryoflanguage doesnot

justsay thatourthoughtsare determ ined by ourlanguage,but

thatourvery culture,valuesand waysofperceiving the world

are m oulded by the language in which we learn them ,and that

ourability to think outside the culture istherefore lim ited,if

O

ne question abouthum an nature iswhetheritisthe

sam e forallpeople atalltim es,orwhetheritisfunda-

m entally differentin differentculturesorhistorical

periods. The argum entthatitiseverywhere the same is

im plicitin the evolutionary view,since we allshare com m on

ancestors;butithasa longerpedigree than that. Platos

accountofthe soulassum esthatitappliesto allm en;H um e

believed thatmankind isso

philosophy now - march 2016.pdf

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