philosophy and the brain sciences

8/3/2019 Philosophy and the Brain Sciences

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Iri, Iss 2036-3257, I, 2 October 2009, p. 353-374

© Firenze Univerity Pre

Philosophy and the Brain Sciences1

P Mhm and Ju sm

Abstract: What are the dierences between philosophy and science, or between the methods o philoso-

phy and the methods o sc ience? Unlike some philosophers we do not fnd philosophy and the methods o

philosophy to be sui generis. Science, and in particular neuroscience, has much to tell us about the nature

o the world and the concepts that we must use to understand and explain it. Yet science cannot unction

well without reective analysis o the concepts, methods, and practices that constitute it. For example,

experimental methods and their resulting empirical data are essential or understanding the world, yet such

data is not a-conceptual. Understanding how and what theoretical assumptions, conceptual assumptions,

and practical knowledge guide the use o experimental methods is relevant to understanding the results

o that use. In this way, philosophy – whether done by philosophers or scientists – has a role to play in

understanding the world. Neuroscience is typically individualistic in ocus; nonetheless, the mechanisms

o learning and linguistic ability that some neuroscientists study also have a role to play in understanding

communication. Philosophy cannot oer adequate understanding, even conceptual clarity, in isolation

rom empirical investigation. Yet, this does not require that science or scientifc concepts will replace or

reduce philosophical concepts, let alone those o ordinary language.

Te exciteent rronding advance in te brain cience over te pat ev-

eral decade a worked it way into piloopy. Piloopy of nerocience

i a growing eld. However, bondary dipte over te natre of piloopy

and cience ave arien, often nder te gie of trying to etabli te natre

of te ind/brain relation. In ti eay we will explore c dipte by

contrating two recent book. In Philosophical Foundations o Neuroscience 2 M.

R. Bennett and P. M. s. Hacker arge, in neo-Wittgenteinian anner, tat

piloopy and piloopical proble are independent fro nerocience,

wile Patricia Crcland, Brain-Wise: Studies in Neurophilosophy,3 clai tat

nerocience i or bet bet for anwering oe perennial piloopical qe-

tion abot te ind. We are not attepting to review tee book, bt to

e te to ow tat ti tenion i not neceary, tat piloopy a a role

1 Te ator wi to tank Edoard Macery and Lia Obeck for teir elpfl coent.2 M. R. Bennett, and P. M. s. Hacker, Philosophical Foundations o Neuroscience , Oxford: Bail

Blackwell, 2003.3 P. Crcland, Brain-wise: Studies in Neurophilosophy, Cabridge, MA: MIT Pre, 2002.



354 Peter Macaer and Jtin syta

to play in cientic work jt a cience a a role to play in explaining pe-

noena tat concern . Tat i, we ope to redirect te diviive qetion

abot te natre of ind and world fond in tee work to a ore inclive

treatent of te natre of explanation.

Tere i oeting ligtly ileading in te title of Bennett and Hacker’Philosophical Foundations o Neuroscience . Tey do not deal wit any ipor-

tant apect of nerocience or c of wat fall nder piloopy of

nerocience,4 and te fondational clai tey invetigate ave trict pilo-

opical biae. Tey write tat, “nerocientit are aware of te fact tat

te proble wit wic tey are trggling are not nrelated to reection

of pilooper on te natre of ind and ental penoena.”5 Bt, te

blk of te proble tat nerocientit are trggling wit are not nder-

taken wit an eye toward c connection; ot nerocience, even cogni-

tive nerocience, doe not directly deal wit te natre of ind or peron.

Wat Bennett and Hacker dic i te relevance of nerocience to tra-

ditional proble in piloopy of ind wit an epai on debnking

toe nerocientit wo clai, tey ay, tat it i “tie for piloopy to

tep aide and let cience ave it trn.”6 A c, teir critiqe can be readily

applied to neropiloopy a articlated by Patricia Crcland.7 Againt

c an approac, Bennett and Hacker repeatedly gget tat te proble

of relating ind and brain are conceptal (i.e. piloopical), not epirical

(i.e. cientic). For te, piloopy (and ore pecically teir verion of

analytic lingitic piloopy) i “above all a conceptal invetigation”:

It province i not te doain of epirical trt or faleood, bt te doain

of ene and nonene. It invetigate and decribe te bond of ene: tat i,

te liit of wat can coerently be togt and aid. It detrctive tak i te

critici of trangreion of te bond of ene.8

Fro ti perpective tey arge tat vario tateent in nerocience/

piloopy of ind trangre te bond of ene. soe priary tee are

4 For exaple, nerocience, a a cience, raie all of te proble abot explanation, evidence,

role of experient, dicovery of ecani, etc. tat all cience ave. Tat i, te baic ie in

piloopy of cience ay be raied pecically abot nerocience. In fact, we will arge tat

c of te debate abot te relation of nerocience to piloopy of ind depend pon ow

one view piloopy. see, e.g., any of te article in P. Macaer, P. McLaglin, and R. Gr

(ed.), Theory and Method in the Neurosciences, Pittbrg: Univerity of Pittbrg Pre, 2001.5 Bennett and Hacker, Philosophical Foundations o Neuroscience , p. 396.6 Ibid., p. 3977 P. Crcland,Neurophilosophy: Toward a Unifed Science o the Mind-Brain, Cabridge, MA: MIT

Pre, 1986; Crcland, Brain-wise .8 Bennett and Hacker, Philosophical Foundations, p. 399.



355Piloopy and te Brain science

wat Bennett and Hacker ter “te ereological fallacy in nerocience”

(i.e., tat brain part are not ind or peron part), te iapplication of

peron-level pycological predicate to te brain or it part, and ow to talk

enibly abot “concio experience, ental tate and qalia.”

Patricia Crcland nicely tand a a contrating exeplar ince e lookto nerocience for anwer to qetion in te piloopy of ind. In er

textbook on neropiloopy9 e point in ti direction altog e ie

away fro te extree poition of cience no-piloopy-neceary tat

Bennett and Hacker target. onetele, e old p nerocience a te

rote tat progre in piloopy of ind will take. Crcland write:

eropiloopy arie ot of te recognition tat at long lat, te brain ci-

ence and teir adjnct tecnology are ciently advanced tat real progre

can be ade in ndertanding te ind-brain. More braly, it predict tatpiloopy of ind condcted wit no ndertanding of neron and te brain

i likely to be terile. eropiloopy, a a relt, foce on proble at te

interection of a greening nerocience and a graying piloopy.10

Were Bennett and Hacker ee pilooper a being in te bine of clear-

ing p conceptal confion, inclding toe tat ave crept into te ci-

ence, Crcland gget tat cientic relt will provide, or inially

t be ed to infor, anwer to traditional piloopical qetion abot

concione, elfood, and free will.11

Wile Crcland treat tee a real proble in need of epirical data

for reoltion, Bennett and Hacker take te to reect conceptal confion

tat are not illinated by experiental etod.12 ot rpriingly, Bennett

and Hacker’ etod follow Wittgentein’ lingitic trn. Reecting on

teir etodology, tey write: “Believing tat etod are vindicated by

teir prodct, we ave preferred to apply te etod of connective analyi

to te conceptal proble tat caracterize nerocience at te point were

it abt on pycology.”13

Te baic proble tat need to be addreed, and we all coentpon it trogot ti eay, i wat are te dierence between piloopy

and cience, or between te etod of piloopy and te etod of ci-

ence. Unlike Bennett and Hacker we do not nd piloopy and te et-

9 Crcland, Brain-wise .10 Ibid., p. 3.11 Ibid., p. vii.12 see L. Wittgentein, Philosophical Investigations, Third Edition, ew Jerey: Prentice Hall, 1958,

part II p. xiv.13 Bennett and Hacker,Philosophical Foundations, p. 378.




od of piloopy to be sui generis. science, and in particlar nerocience,

a c to tell abot te natre of te world and te concept we t

e to ndertand, explain, and fnction in te world. Yet cience cannot

fnction well witot reective analyi of te concept, etod and prac-

tice tat contitte it. For exaple, experiental etod and teir relt-ing epirical data are eential for ndertanding te world, yet c data i

not a-conceptal. Undertanding ow and wat teoretical and conceptal

aption and practical knowledge gide te e of experiental etod

i relevant to ndertanding teir relt and aeing teir validity. In ti

way, piloopy, weter done by pilooper or cientit, a a role to play

in ndertanding te world.

Wile Bennett and Hacker acknowledge te relevance of piloopy to ci-

ence, noting, for exaple, tat “wen epirical proble are addreed witot

adeqate conceptal clarity, iconceived qetion are bond to be raied,”14

tey are far le genero concerning te revere direction of inence:

Conceptal qetion antecede atter of trt and faleood […] Tey deter-

ine not wat i epirically tre or fale, bt rater wat doe and doe not

ake ene. Hence conceptal qetion are not aenable to cientic inveti-

gation and experientation or to cientic teorizing.15

Ti view of piloopy, owever, cannot be fllled by Bennett and Hacker’

fait in wat tey call “connective analyi.” In fact, even teir giding prin-ciple – tat “te eaning of word are deterined by teir rle-governed

e, and tey are given by wat are accepted a correct explanation of ean-

ing by te conity of peaker”16 – belie c a clear piloopy-cience

eparation. Dearcating conitie of peaker and deterining wat

tey accept a correct explanation of eaning wold ee to reqire oe

epirical invetigation, nle tere i oe yterio a priori way of deter-

ining wo contitte te relevant conitie, wat e are accepted,

and wat te norative criteria of acceptable age are. sc qetion are

related to ociology, ocio-lingitic and ocial pycology ot directly.Conication i obvioly interperonal and ocial; bt, ti doe not ean

tat it i not illinated by epirical invetigation.17 erocience i typi-

14 Ibid., p. 2.15 Ibid., p. 2.16 Ibid., p. 382.17 For exaple, ee J. Weinberg, s. icol, and s. stic, “orativity and Epiteic Illion,”

Philosophical Topics, 29 (2001), pp. 429-460; E. Macery, R. Mallon, s. icol, and s. stic,

“seantic, Cro-cltral style,” Cognition, 92 (2004), pp. B1-B12. More pecically, epiricalrelt by J. Knobe and J. Prinz, “Intition abot Concione: Experiental stdie,”




cally individalitic in foc; nonetele, te ecani of learning and

lingitic ability tat oe nerocientit tdy alo ave a role to play in

ndertanding conication. Piloopy cannot oer adeqate nder-

tanding, even conceptal clarity, in iolation fro epirical invetigation.

Yet, ti doe not reqire tat cience or cientic concept will replace or redce piloopy, let alone de-trone ordinary langage.

We begin by conidering Bennett and Hacker’ e of teir piloopical

doga, coparing it to tat of Wittgentein in i Philosophical Investigations,

wic tey take a te bai for teir treatent of te prported ereo-

logical fallacy in nerocience and te o-called proble of concione.

We will ten briey invetigate te contrating treatent given by Patricia

Crcland. We conclde wit a coparion of teir repective view on

redction in nerocience and oe general reark concerning te interplay

between te brain cience and piloopy.

1. The So-called Mereological Fallacy

Bennett and Hacker’ ain clai concern te logic of pycological predi-

cate. Tey aert:

Te organ of an anial are part of te anial, and pycological predicate

are acribable to te wole anial not to it contitent part. Mereology i telogic of part/wole relation. Te nerocientit’ itake of acribing to te

contitent parts of an anial attribte tat logically apply only to te whole

anial we all call “te ereological fallacy” in nerocience.18

Ti ppoed itake i aply illtrated wit exaple of pycological

predicate being applied to te brain. Certainly oe of ti age ee, at

te very leat, incatio. Bennett and Hacker, owever, treat it a epecially

grievo, carging tat “ti application of pycological predicate to te

brain ake no ene.”19 Tey contine: “The brain is not a logically appropriate subject or psychological predicates. Only a an being and wat behaves like one

can intelligibly and literally be aid to ee or be blind, ear or be deaf, ak

Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 7 (2008), pp. 67-85, and J. syta and E. Macery, “Two

Conception of sbjective Experience,”Philosophical Studies, (fortcoing), indicate tat conter

Bennett and Hacker (ee section 1), oe conitie of peaker readily apply pycological

predicate to entitie tat are not wole anial.18 Bennett and Hacker,Philosophical Foundations, p. 73.19 Ibid., p. 72.




qetion or refrain fro aking.”20 Te qetion i wy c age i o nto-

ward and weter it i in principle – not in any pecic intance – nonene?

Unfortnately, little in te way of actal argent i given for ti retric-

tion of pycological predicate to wole anial. Tat te eaning of py-

cological predicate are enible wen applied to wole, and tat, terefore,applying c ter to part i to peak nonene, ppoedly follow fro

connective analyi and te principle tat “te eaning of word are deter-

ined by teir rle-governed e.”21 Aing tere to be c rle of e,

connective analyi ten extrapolate to wat cobination of word do or

do not ake ene. T, “an ee” ake ene, wile “brain ee” doe

not. On te face of it, owever, a tateent c a “brain ee” doe not

appear to be nonenical. Frter, it i not clear wy “wole anial ee” i

enible. We are not told wat seeing conit in c tat oe cobination

are illicit. srely in oe cae etonyy, weter intended or not, i a per-

fectly good trope.

Bennett and Hacker’ priary pport i drawn fro Wittgentein’

Philosophical Investigations22 and i ileadingly iolated fro it context.

Tey write:

Wittgentein ade a profond reark tat bear directly on or concern.

“Only of a an being can one ay: It a enation; it ee, i blind; ear,

i deaf; i concio or nconcio.” Ti epitoize te conclion we all

reac in or invetigation.23

Depite te trengt of te langage of §281, owever, Wittgentein did

not old tat secondary application of pycological predicate to ting tat

do not beave like an being are nonenical. Rater, i point wa tat

or primary e of c ter i applied to an beavior. A c, in §282,

e oered a contrat cla for i tateent tat wa rater dierent fro te

part/wole ditinction:

We do indeed ay of an inaniate ting tat it i in pain: wen playing witdoll for exaple. Bt ti e of te concept of pain i a econdary one. Iagine

a cae in wic people acribed pain only to inaniate ting; pitied only doll!

sc pain acription to doll are not nonsensical . Wile te econdary exten-

ion preppoe te priary age, it doe not follow tat te extenion i

20 Ibid., p. 72.21 Ibid., p. 382.22 Wittgentein, Philosophical Investigations, §281.23 Bennett and Hacker, Philosophical Foundations, p. 71.




eaningle. It appear dobtfl tat pycological attribtion to brain wold

be nonenical, bt te qetion reain a to weter tey are inforative. 24

Wittgentein epaized beavior and drew a contrat wit inaniate

ting tat do not beave. Brain, owever, are not inaniate, not clearly

witot beavior. Rogly, brain receive inpt tat lead to erie of nero-nal ring, wic activate frter otpt. sc neronal activity ay warrant

treating c ring a a beavior. T, one way to ake ene of attribtion

of pycological predicate to brain wold be to conider teir application

to brain beavior. If pycological predicate ay be ed to decribe brain

beavior, ten c e are not nonenical, and ay be inforative in a way

tat te attribtion of te ae predicate to doll i not.25

For exaple, if we are concerned wit edge-detecting cell in te vial

cortex, we igt ay tat a cell aw an edge in te preented vial til

wen it re, and tat it did not ee te edge if it did not re. Te cell exib-

iting te appropriate repone i enog to ake te econdary application

of te pycological predicate ndertandable. Bennett and Hacker write tat

in or priary application “we ay of an anial or a an being tat tey

perceive oeting in teir eld of perception if, for exaple, tey repond

to wat i viible (or adible, etc.) in appropriate way.”26 Te application of

“ee” to te edge-detector cell follow ti directly, taking into accont te

type of repone open to cell and ow tey are related to cae of beavior.

Wile it i nclear exactly wat Bennett and Hacker ean by “appropriate,”

ere, te edge-detector cell can be aid to beave appropriately in tat it reli-

ably repond to edge and in doing o to beave appropriately wit repect to

te larger yte of wic it i a fnctional part. A J. J. Gibon 27 owed,

edge-detection i related to an’ ability to perfor vially gided ove-

ent in a pyical environent.

24 Anoter general point ade repeatedly by Wittgentein, bt rnning contrary to Bennett

and Hacker’ work, i tat or age i eldo clearly and trictly bonded. Were Bennett and

Hacker old te eaning of ter to be deterined by teir rle-governed e, Wittgenteincallenged ti, arging tat eaning are not typically xed and, a e pt in §69, tat a ter’

e i “not everywere circcribed by rle.” Blntly, we nd wit Wittgentein, pace Bennett

and Hacker, tat ene and nonene are not o ct and dry in natral langage. Teir approac, in

Wittgentein’ word in §81, i “to tink tat if anyone tter a entence and ean or ndertand

it e i operating a calcl according to denite rle.” Wittgentein’ later work, inclding te

Investigations, denied te validity of c a conception, depite i earlier attraction to it.25 We are aware tat tere i a ditinction between beavior and action tat ay be drawn. Bt

ally te ditinction depend on attribtion of intention, and we are not re tat intention

ay not be acribed to brain part a repreentation. so for or prpoe, beavior and action

are wat ting do, te activitie tey engage in.26 Bennett and Hacker,Philosophical Foundations, p. 81.27 J. J. Gibon, The Senses Considered as Perceptual Systems, Boton: Hogton-Miin, 1966.




In ti way, pycological acription to neron or te brain alo can be

inforative on a deeper level tan a ere decription of teir iedi-

ate beavior. Perap te ot baic fondation of nerocience i tat te

beavior of neron and brain yte cae overt anial beavior. Mot

nerocientit eek to explain te penoena tey are intereted in by di-covering and elaborating te neral and yteic ecani reponible for

oe cognitive beavior tat i validly related to te beavior experientally

teted.28 Many application of pycological predicate to te brain iply

iolate te neral ecani togt to explain anial beavior. Te parts

tat nerocientit deal wit (neron, cell, yte, etc.) exibit beavior

or activitie (ring, polarizing, activating, etc.) tat are caally related to te

beavior of whole organi.

It i conventional, in bot broad and retricted conitie of peaker,

to apply predicate for te wole to te part reponible for te abilitie being

predicated. Ti i a for of etonyy. It i not at all incopreenible or

nonenical, for exaple, to ay tat y car engine i powerfl, even tog

we ean tat te car a a wole i powerfl. Te engine i powerfl becae

it i fnctionally relevant to te ability of te car to acieve ig peed.

Wen propertie of te coponent are part of te explanation of te rel-

evant ability of te wole, it i often eaningfl to apply te predicate to te

coponent. Likewie, te application of pycological predicate to te brain

can play a role in explaining te abilitie tat or ctoary application to

an reect by drawing link between te activitie of te brain and te

abilitie of te an tat tey enable.

sc linking, or bridging, of explanation will be diced in te nal

ection of ti eay. Here it i cient to note tat if te link i provided by a

ecani (if te e of “brain eeing” fall witin an articlation of neral

ecani by wic an ee), ten noting illicit appear to be going

on. It i qite legitiate to ake inference c a, e.g., “He can’t ee, tere-

fore tere igt be oeting wrong wit te optic nerve.” onetele,

te application of pycological predicate to part of a an toce on anber of piloopical ie. Wile a erie of neron igt be caally

and fnctionally relevant to or ability to ee, tere reain te teptation

to ay tat te neron do not trly see . Even wen a neron yteatically

repond to vial ce, and it doing o i caally related to te ability of te

28 see P. Macaer, L. Darden, and C. Craver, “Tinking abot Mecani,” Philosophy o

Science , 67 (2000), pp.1-25. It a been ggeted tat we are eqivocating on te word “beavior”

ere. Tere i no dobt tat brain beavior, cognitive beavior, and anial beavior ay be

ditingied. Bt te point i tat tey all ay be tdied and cognitive nerocience atteptto elicit te ecani wic relate te.




an it i part of to ee, tere i an inclination to deny any real eeing to it.

Likewie, wile we igt decribe etaporically an atoatic door wit a

ligt enor a eeing wen it exibit te appropriate beavior of opening, it

nonetele ee odd to take c peec too erioly. We want to ay tat

te door doe not truly ee anyting.Tere are at leat two reaon we igt ave for ti reticence. Firt, one

igt eitate to ay tat te door ee becae nlike an eeing, te door

a no ndertanding of wat it ee. Wile te door igt exibit (a very li-

ited range of ) eeing beavior, it i not concio of wat it i eeing and i na-

ble to report any content of it awarene. (We often ay ting like, “I didn’t

ee yo,” in ti ene to ean tat we did not recognize te peron in front of

a oeone tat we know or were not aware of te identity of te peron we

were eeing.) In ti ene, we alo want to deny tat neron a iolated part

can ee becae tey are not concio of anyting, let alone viible object.

second, one igt eitate to ay tat te door trly ee if yo old tat

tre eeing involve “penoenal concione,” “concio experience,” a

“qalitative apect,” “qalia,” etc. – prae tat are often ed to indicate a

belief tat te entity a oeting ore tan i ggeted by it poeion

of te relevant abilitie and tat i not expreed in it beavior. If “eeing” i

ndertood in ti way, ten acription of eeing to an electronic door, a ne-

ron, or a brain i nlikely to be explanatorily efl, a will be diced in te

following ection. If we deand explanations of oeting ore tan an entity’

ability to ee – it ability to exibit igt-beavior (weter icro or acro,

and inclding bot iple repone and toe indicative of awarene c a

rt-peron report) – ten we are likely to enconter proble weter we

are talking abot a an, it part, or anoter type of entity all togeter; bt

nerocientit are not generally occpied wit ti proble of concione.

2. Conscious Experience, Mental States, and Qualia

A noted above, one fondation of nerocience i tat te beavior of ne-

ron and brain yte are crcial cae involved in prodcing overt anial

beavior. Part of ti i te belief tat overt anial beavior i open to (bt not

exated by) ecanitic explanation. In ti ene it i a piloopical fon-

dation of nerocience tat anial (inclding an) are ere pyical y-

te. Te contrat, ere, i wit toe (vitalit, dalit) wo wold arge tat

oe non-pyical entitie are needed becae witot te an beavior

i in principle inexplicable. Te ally alo old oe very trong view abot

wat ay cont a legitiate pyical ter. Pt anoter way, nerocientitgenerally deny tat tere i a fndaental dierence in kind between pyical,




ecanical yte and aal, altog tere i a ge glf in coplexity

and in ow tey ay interact wit oter yte. Ti i a coplex clai and

we all retrn and elaborate it oewat in te nal ection.

Many of te point we raied above can be fond in Bennett and Hacker’

dicion of concione. Tey arge for a ltifaceted conception of con-cione tat epaize power or abilitie bt retrict tee to entient

creatre (or certain wole anial). Tey write:

Firt, entient creatre wo are concio being do not contain concione,

tey are concio (or nconcio), and concio o vario ting. Tey feel

pain, perceive object in teir environent, feel fear or anger, take pleare in

vario activitie and condition, deire ting and pre wat tey want. Tey

ave vario active and paive power, inclding te paive power of aving

teir attention cagt and eld by oeting tey perceive: tat i, te power tobecoe and ten to be concio of oeting tey perceive.29

Accepting ti, we old tat nerocience i eential to explaining tee

power, to explaining ow it i tat “entient creatre” do te ting tat

tey do. In doing o, nerocientit will inevitably treat entient creatre a

pyical yte becae teir interet i in ncovering te pyical eca-

ni involved in prodcing te capacitie at ie.

In contrat, Bennett and Hacker old tat “it i deeply ileading to refer

to entient being a ‘pyical yte’.”30

Tey clai:

[s]entient being are not ere pyical yte. Te atopere (weater yte)

igt be aid to be a “ere pyical yte,” a volcano can be aid to be a ere

pyical yte, and o too igt a pocket calclator or a copter. Bt anial

and an being are not ere pyical yte, bt living, entient “yte.”

sentient being are preciely wat we contrast wit ere pyical yte. And it i

obvio wy we do o, for tey ave capacitie tat ere pyical yte lack. 31

Ti i not te only contrat to be drawn, owever: Mot nerocien-

tit old tat entient creatre are physical systems in tat tey are not, evenin part, non-pyical – tey ave no extra vital pirit, iaterial ol, or

Carteian ind. In oter word, it i eld tat depite teir iene co-

plexity and teir extraordinary abilitie, entient creatre are til l jt pyi-

cal being woe (qite opiticated) capacitie can be explained in pyical

ter. We will retrn to ti ie in section 4, were we arge tat c

attept to redctively explain te beavioral capacitie of anial do not

29 Bennett and Hacker, Philosophical Foundations, p. 298.30 Ibid., p. 299.31 Ibid., p. 298.




coit nerocientit to te type of ontological redctioni tat Bennett

and Hacker fear wen tey write tat te “propertie and power [of entient

creatre] ltiately depend on, bt are not redcible to, te pyical and

icropyical procee tat caracterize teir pyical contittion.”32 We

arge tat wile it i tre tat tee power are not ontologically redcible toteir generating ecani, tey are explained by toe ecani – and

prodcing c explanation i a core goal of te brain cience.

Explanatory v. ontological redctioni of te “propertie and power”

of entient being i not te ie tat Bennett and Hacker’ dicion of con-

cio experience foce on, owever. Intead, tey look at te broad way

in wic te ter “concione” i eant wen it occr, for exaple, in

prae like “concio experience” and “concio ental tate”:

[]erocientit, cognitive cientit and pilooper are inclined to eqateconcione wit entience in general, or indeed to extend it draatically to

alot te wole range of te ental. Or rt tak i to invetigate ti exten-

ion. sbeqently, we all probe one of it root: naely, te conception of

qalia tat i crrently ebraced by any nerocientit and pilooper.33

Ti age – te ene of “concione” tied to te piloopical concept

of penoenal concione and qalia – i Bennett and Hacker’ priary

target. Tere i c to like in teir analyi of tee probleatic concept.

Or concern ere, owever, i wit te interplay between piloopy andte brain cience. Focing on te latter, it i ileading to epaize toe

nerocientit wo ebrace qalia, or “toe wo caracterize ‘te proble

of concione’ a te leading proble of nerocience,”34 in elcidating te

fondation of nerocience. Mot nerocientit do not conider te prob-

le of concione to be a proble for erio reearc.

Bennett and Hacker caracterize te proble a claiing tat concio-

ne ee to be beyond te pyical. Tey write:

Pzzleent i generated by te togt tat a erely physical decription of teworld wold oit experience . To be re, te beavior of aniate bodie wold

be inclded in it. Experience, owever, are not beavior. Tey are oeting

tat nderlie beavior, oeting eentially bjective. Te beavior tat ex-

ibit orrow, ope, joy, fear, aection, etc. i erely te oter k of te inner

pycological reality wit wic eac bject i intiately acqainted.35

32 Ibid., p. 301.33 Ibid., p. 263.34 Ibid., p. 261.35 Ibid., p. 261.




However, ti ppoed proble i not a cientic proble for ain-

trea nerocientit, rater it i a eta-proble tat callenge te cope of

teir reearc or adeqacy of teir etod. Ti proble of concione

i eentially an argent tat tere i oeting (concio experience or

penoenal concione) tat nerocience old be able to explain, btwic i togt to reit te type of pyical and beavioral explanation

tat aintrea nerocience eploy. By tiplation, ti proble i not

and cannot be a central proble of brain nerocience. It i by at rled ot

a a proble for te brain cience to tackle epirically, and by ti exclion

claied a a piloopical proble tat qetion te olely redctivit, pyi-

calit ontology often read into te explanatory work done by nerocientit.

ot rpriingly, even a crory review of crrent nerocience jornal

reveal tat ti proble of concione i not te central proble of ne-

rocience. In fact, te blk of te work dealing wit concione over te

pat two decade concern te vario active and paive power – c a

attention and awarene – tat Bennett and Hacker treat a piloopically

nprobleatic. Ti fact i eaily ied, owever, in te wirl of qote tat

Bennett and Hacker reprodce fro a relatively all nber of reearcer

wo ave been actively ping for cientic engageent wit te prob-

le of concione; ator c a Benjain Libet, Bernard Baar, Franci

Crick, and Gerald Edelan.36 Baar, in particlar, a capioned wat e

call “te new concione cience,”37 noting tat it i an ongoing callenge

to interet aintrea brain cientit in treating “concione a an object

of cientic crtiny.”38 He write: “For year it wa coon to ear cientit

ay tat an concione wa nlike any oter cientic proble, in tat

it wa not at all clear wat evidence wa relevant to it; a for teory, it eeed

o far beyond or copreenion tat it wa ardly wort talking abot.”39

Wile Bennett and Hacker’ caracterization of te centrality of te prob-

le of concione i ileading, te entia and optii diplayed by

reearcer like Baar indicate tat tere i a need for piloopical analyi of

te concept of concione. Redirecting Bennett and Hacker’ analyi froaintrea nerocience to te growing inority of reearcer engaged

wit te new concione cience, c of teir critiqe i appropriate.

Tee cientit are engaged wit an eentially ontological proble tat owe

c of it proinence to a backla againt certain aterialit or pyicalit

36 J. syta, “Penoenological Obvione and te ew science of Concione,” Philosophy

o Science , (fortcoing).37 B. Baar, In the Theater o Consciousness: The Workspace o the Mind , Oxford: Oxford Univerity

Pre, 1997.38 Ibid., p. 34.39 Ibid., p. 13.




pilooper of ind. Te (igly piloopical) work of new cientit like

Baar ten provide Bennett and Hacker wit an opening to callenge te

relevance of cience to piloopy:

It i triking (and perap old be ditrbing) tat te ot fndaental rea-on [for ti pzzle] i piloopical, indeed Carteian. seen rom one particular

perspective , it can appear deeply pzzling ow caal tranaction in te aterial

world can give rie to anyting a categorically distinct rom matter a experience.

How can te ipact of radiation pon te cone and rod of te retina generate

te experience of (concioly) eeing oeting? How can event in te cortex

“give rie” to conscious mental states?40

Ti pzzle i claied a piloopical becae it i ontological in natre;

bt, one can deny tat nerocience i (or old be) in te bine of gen-erating ontologie witot denying tat te nding of nerocientit are

relevant to te piloopical debate.

Te pzzleent tat Bennett and Hacker point ot a been coonly

een in te piloopical debate on concione of te pat 30 year. Ti

i not a failing of nerocience to be rectied by an everyday perpective,

owever. Te baic proble, ere, i not in talking abot experience or even

concio experience and teir propertie, bt in taking all decription to

refer to kind of ontological entitie and aing tat pyical or aterial

decription can only refer to fndaental particle and force. Te problelie in generating incoenrable ontological pictre of te world fro or

decription of it. Bt tere i no obvio reaon wy pyiological explana-

tion t be incopatible wit rt-peron decription of one’ experience,

depite te fact tat tey ave dierent graar. Dierent type of crite-

ria are ed in cientic and penoenological aertion. A Wittgentein

noted, y recognition tat I a in pain operate dierently fro y jdg-

ent tat oeone ele i in pain: “it ake ene to ay abot oter people

tat tey dobt weter I a in pain; bt not to ay it abot yelf.”41 In

te rt-peron cae, “wat I do i not, of core, to identify y enationby criteria.”42 Te point i tat we ally do not oberve orelve and ten

decide weter we are experiencing a given enation or not baed on apply-

ing a criterion to oe inner-experience. scientic tird-peron attribtion

fnction dierently. It i baed on applying criteria in order to give oberva-

tion report, and tey are bject to jtication by reaon giving. Depite

ti, a erging of rt- and tird-peron approace i not only poible, bt

40 Bennett and Hacker,Philosophical Foundations, p. 262.41 Wittgentein, Philosophical Investigations, §246.42 Ibid., §290.




i coonplace in edicine were rt-peron decription of te patient’

pain are ed by te pyician a a bai for diagnoi. Treatent i gided

bot by pyiological ndertanding and penoenological decription. And

oetie it i diclt for te patient to report wat it i tat i felt.

We agree wit Bennett and Hacker tat a proble of concionearie wen langage goe atray. However, it i not priarily te nero-

cientit wo ave ied langage. A J. L. Atin eld, it i very often

te pilooper wo ave created an nneceary tecnical langage.43

onetele, to eaningflly explore ie of concione reqire ore

tan jt cleaning p te terinology; we alo need knowledge of wat

nerocience ow abot te working of te brain if we are to integrate

or ecanitic ndertanding of te world wit or enory experience

of it. Wile Bennett and Hacker’ alot exclive foc i on conceptal

ie, and tereby largely denie te relevance of nerocience to ie of

concione, Patricia Crcland old tat tere i a real piloopical

proble of concione tat nerocience cold olve by way of redc-

tion. Againt ti, we arge in te next ection, tat er, oetie, trictly

redctive pyicalit ontology in fact cloe o nerocience fro actal

relevance to te proble.

3. Churchland and Consciousness

Patricia Crcland’ dearcation of te poition on te proble of con-

cione follow er pyicalit aption. se pejoratively decribe two

baic attitde tat one cold ave wit regard to penoenal concio-

ne: “Werea pragatit tend to epaize tat concione i a natural

penoena of te brain, yterian favor te idea tat it i a pernatral

penoenon, or at leat i beyond the physical in oe ene or oter.”44 In ti

diviion a pyicalit ontology i eqated wit te natral, and relt in an

eiter/or forced coice tak: concione i eiter physical or it i mysteriously beyond the physical . Her next tep i to arge tat te pyical coice i poible

and to articlate cientic approace to te proble:

It i poible, for all we can tell now, tat concione, or at leat te enory

coponent of concione, ay be berved by a pyical btrate wit

a ditinctive ignatre. In te ope tat tere i oe ditinct and dicernible

pyical arker of te btrate, te direct trategy ai rt to identify te

43 J. L. Atin, Sense and Sensibilia, Oxford: Oxford Univerity Pre, 1962.44 Crcland, Brain-wise , p. 128.




btrate a a correlate of penoenological awarene, ten eventally to get a

redctive explanation of concio tate in nerobiological ter.45

Te ggetion i tat consciousness itsel i te priary proble. Te rt

goal i to nd a pyical btrate tat correlates wit concione and wicigt erve a a ecani for concione. T, Crcland note tat:

Dicovering oe one or ore of te neral correlate of concione wold

not on its own yield an explanation of concione. evertele, in biology

te dicovery of wic ecani pport a pecic fnction often ean tat

te next tep – deterining preciely how te fnction i perfored – ddenly

becoe a wole lot eaier.46

One qetion tat old be raied ere, owever, i weter concio-

ne i bet conceived of a te fnction of oe neral ecani? Following

Bennett and Hacker, if we tink of concione in ter of te vario

active and paive power tat are ditinctive of entient creatre, ten ini-

ally nerocientit old be invetigating a ot of unctions and looking

for a variety of mechanisms tat enable toe divere power.

Crcland’ ggetion for a direct cientic approac to concione i

oewat odd. It gget tat tere i a big proble ot tere (a ard proble

of concione); bt, ti ake it ee like te brain cience ave not ade

any progre in explaining ow we concioly do oe of te ting tat wedo. T, Crcland’ concern wit te enory coponent of concione

cannot be a concern wit ow we perceive object in te environent, for

pyical explanation of perceiving object are not erely poible, bt actal

(in ecani ceata, if not all te detail). We can explain, for exaple,

wy a certain wine tate bitter in ter of tannin and penolic propertie of

toe tannin, and ow tee activate te bitter tate receptor in te tonge,

etc. sc exaple can be prodced ad nauseam. Crcland, owever, ee

to want to explain oeting ore; e want to explain concione itsel –

treating it a oeting ad by a concio being, or in Bennett and Hacker’ter, a oeting contained in c a being – by redcing it to a et of work-

ing entitie and activitie witin er pyicalit ontology.

Te baic proble i tat Crcland allow er ontological concern to

ape er aeent of te cientic qetion tat need to be aked and er

coitent to a very pecic ontological for of pyical redction. It i

alo nclear wat kind of ting are allowed to cont a pyical in er redc-

tion. Crcland’ concern wit oering a pyicalit repone to te prob-

45 Ibid., p. 134.46 Ibid., p. 135.




le of concione lead er to poe a big ontologically-loaded qetion,

rater tan aking a ot of aller qetion abot te ting we are able

to do a concio being. Intead of aking wat concione itelf is, we

old tart by aking wy we are aware of oe of te enory ditinction

we ake (bt not oter). Wy i inforation abot te bitter tate of a wineacceible to oe bject, bt not acceible in te ae way to oter peo-

ple? Wy doe te inforation tat provide te content of or rt-peron

report ave te ode of acce tat it doe, and not fnction in oe oter,

ore ecanical or nconcio way?

Crcland’ engageent wit concione a a potential proble

for ontological pyicali i in tep wit te piloopical literatre.

Conider, for exaple, ed Block’ ditinction between acce concio-

ne and penoenal concione.47 It i penoenal concione tat

raie te big proble, bt it doe o becae it i taken to conceptally

irrelevant for te explanatory practice in te brain cience. Block’ con-

cern i tat in anwering te vario inforational qetion abot or

enory abilitie, we leave oeting ignicant ot (penoenal con-

cione). Ti ene tat oeting i left-ot, owever, again relate

to treating cientic explanation a ontological decription. Exactly ow

coitted Crcland i to explaining wat i left ot i not alway clear,

becae it i far fro clear wat e i looking for in er earc pyical

btrate or ecani for concione.

Te point we wi to tre i tat inofar a concione i ndertood

a a btantive ting woe very exitence i probleatic, te poibility

for cientic explanation i nderct. Intead we old foc on develop-

ing explanation of wat i done concioly, wic will inclde detai ling

te procee by wic inforation i provided and ed by oe anial

yte. Tee explanation, in trn, need to inclde ow c infora-

tion i acceed. Knowing concioly i adverbial, a oppoed to knowing

nconcioly or procedrally. A relevant ditinction i between concio

and nconcio activitie, and te dierent for tee take and te etey ave, not between te nature of concione ver te nature of

pyical ting. Tat i, te goal old be to oer explanation of wat we

do, not to ake nneeded ontological clai. Bennett and Hacker ee

to agree, and do not ake ontological clai, tog tey ave little to

ay abot te tat of te referent of te ter related to concione in

ordinary langage.

47 . Block, “On a Confion abot te Fnction of Concione,” Behavioral and BrainSciences, 18 (1995), pp. 227-247.




4. Science, Reduction, and Consciousness

Crcland write tat “wen I tep on a torn, it till rt in te ae way,

weter I know tat te pain i really an activity in neron or not.”48 Ti

expree a traditional piloopical for of redction, or ontological redc-tion. Crcland old tat, a it trn ot, pain i really (i noting bt) brain

activity. Ti i an ontological clai abot te natre of pain. Crcland

aert, for exaple, tat te pain i not in te foot bt in te brain. At te

ae tie, Crcland alo foce er decription of redction on expla-

nation. se tree tat “te poibility tat ental penoena igt be

ndertood in a nerocientic fraework i aociated wit reductive explana-

tion in cience generally.”49 se contine:

Mot iply, a redction a been acieved wen te caal power of te ac-ropenoenon are explained a a fnction of te pyical trctre and caal

power of te icropenoenon. Tat i, te acropropertie are dicovered to

be te entirely natral otcoe of te natre of te eleent at te icrolevel,

togeter wit teir dynaic and interaction.50

Wat i not clear i tat in giving a redctive explanation of a creatre’

abilitie, for exaple, to recognize, conceptalize, and repond to pain in

ter of neronal activity we will ave own tat pain is really nothing but

neronal activity.More broadly, Crcland write tat tere are tree ypotee tat

nderpin er book. Te rt ypotei i: “Mental activity i brain activity.

It i ceptible to cientic etod of invetigation.”51 Te ie i wat

connect tee two entence. Te rt gget an ontological redction, bt

te econd indicate tat e i concerned wit cientic explanation. Frter,

te econd entence i not a ypotei; ental activity (ndertood in ter

of te power and abilitie evidenced in concio beavior) a been and i

being invetigated cientically. Ti doe not reqire or iply tat ental

activity i noting bt brain activity, owever.Wile we arged above tat a neron eeing i not nonenical, wat wa

eant i tat (1) oe neronal beavior can be reaonably and inforatively

decribed a eeing beavior and (2) tat c neronal beavior i part of an

explanation of te organi’ eeing. Tat we explain beavior in a certain

way doe not iply an ontological redction – tat eeing is really (nothing but)

48 Crcland, Brain-wise , pp. 29-30.49 Ibid., p. 20.50 Ibid., p. 21.51 Ibid., p. 30.




brain activity. Te explanation doe not iply eliination, bt prae c a

“i really,” “i noting bt” do. sc a ove indicate confion abot dier-

ent ene of te ter “redction.” Crcland write tat, “an ndertanding

of ental penoena – c a eory, pain, dreaing, and reaoning – in

ter of nerobiological penoena i a candidate cae of redction, inaca it look reaonable to expect tat tey are brain fnction.”52 Rater, we nd

tat it i reaonable to invetigate or cognitive abilitie in ter of nerobio-

logical ecani. Ti invetigation need not be, and we arge old not

be, een a redction in ti trong piloopical ene of identity.

Bennett and Hacker are clearer on te ditinction between ontological

redctioni and explanatory redctioni.53 Tey correctly note tat te “i

really” type of redction fond (at point) in Crcland i “not cience bt

etapyic.”54 At te ae tie, tey go on to play fat and looe wit te di-

tinction – point ade againt ontological redction are ifted to explanatory

redction, inclding an epai on law tat reie te entitie in explanation.

Bennett and Hacker’ initial point i to deny ontological redction of

pycological attribte to te interaction of neron. T, tey trike te

wedge tat drive te plit between nerocience and pycological attribte

in teir dicion of te o-called ereological fallacy. Tey write:

so, if tere i no ene to literally identiying neral tate and congration wit

pycological attribte, tere cannot be general bridge principle linking te

redcing entitie (neral congration) wit te entitie tat are to be redced(pycological attribte). Bt if tere can be no bridge principle, ten tere i

no ope for any for of redction tat will allow one to derive te law gov-

erning penoena at te iger level of pycology fro te law governing

penoena at te neral level.55

T, even in explanatory redction, Bennett and Hacker ee te denial

of bridge principle linking tee two real of entitie to inge on te po-

ibility of noological redction. Te ggetion i tat explanatory reduction

t be nomological reduction; tey ten arge tat te latter fail becae tereare no law of an beavior: “ot only are tere no bridge principle

allowing any for of ontological redction of pycological attribte to

neral congration, bt it i far fro evident tat tere i anyting tat

can be dignied by te nae of pycological law of an action, tat

igt be redced to, and o explained by reference to, watever nerologi-

52 Ibid., p. 20.53 Bennett and Hacker, Philosophical Foundations, p. 356.54 Ibid., p. 356.55 Ibid., p. 362.




cal law igt be dicovered.”56 It i not clear, owever, tat nerocience

in order to oer explanation of an beavior typically eek, or tat it

ogt to eek, law of an beavior tat ten redce to nerological law

and ten to te law of pyic.

A Bennett and Hacker note, it i not clear tere are or need be any claw, epecially if law are taken to be noological niveral. However, ti

doe not preclde ecanitic explanation. Mot of biological, and neroci-

entic, penoena are explained by coplex ecani tat are not law-

like in teir beavior; bt te elcidation of tee ecani i nonete-

le explanatory. Te explanatory need for niveral law i jt not tere.57

Moreover, few if any ecani are peciable in ter of one kind or

level of ontological entitie and activitie, wic i wat everyone ee to

be aing i neceary for piloopical redction. Mecani are, ot

alway, ltilevel. Wile iolating tannin a te cae in te wine of te bit-

ter tate we experience wen we tate tat wine, ean tat ti ceical

penolic copond i a cae of or experience, it i doe not ean tat or

experience i nothing but te ceical reaction in or tonge to ti co-

pond. Te experience involve or dicriination of te bitter tate of te

wine, and ti involve nero ceical reaction, bt none or even all

of tee is te experience. Te yteic propertie of te experience of tat-

ing te wine are not at te ae level a te vario part of te ecani

tat explain or ability to dicern te ditinctive tate of ti wine. Bt ten

neiter are overt beavior c a facial expreion of digt or abiance

provided by te friend wit wo one tate.

erocientit explain an or anial beavior by decribing neronal

and yteic propertie relevant to te ecani by wic te beavior i

prodced dring a given experiential epiode. Bennett and Hacker ee to

recognize ti, altog tey treat ecanitic explanation a te articlation

of condition of poibility:

erocientic explanation can typically explain ow it i poible for crea-

tre wit c-and-c a brain to do te kind of ting tey do. Tey can

explain wat neral connection t obtain and wat neral activitie t

take place in order for it to be poible for te anial to poe and exercie te

power it natrally poee.58

56 Ibid., p. 362.57 see s. Mitcell, Biological Complexity and Integrative Pluralism, Cabridge: Cabridge

Univerity Pre, 2003; and, epecially, Id., Komplexitäten: Warum wir erst anangen, die Welt zu

verstehen, Frankfrt a Main: srkap, 2008.58 Bennett and Hacker,Philosophical Foundations, p. 364.




Ti odal ixing of “t” and “poible” itake te natre of te

explanation. eronal ecani are not intended to tate general con-

dition of poibility. Dicovery of ecani ove fro ow poibly,

to ow plaibly, and, opeflly, to ow actally te beavior i prodced.

Te oveent i driven by te evidence we nd tat te ecani i terigt one. Ti i not ontological or “i really only” reductive explanation. It i

redctive in a ene tat we are explaining a acro-penoenon by appeal

to yte and byte tat are ore icro. Generally, ti i te way tat

cientit, a oppoed to pilooper, e te ter “redction.” Ti doe not

preclde oter explanation at oter level.

Tere i anoter iportant apect of clai abot redction tat need to

be addreed. Bennett and Hacker old tat or beavior i explained by or

everyday decription: “We contantly ak for explanation of wy oeone

did or i doing oeting and we are typically given anwer tat atify .”59

For exaple, we ak wy oeone raied er and and are typically atied

by te anwer tat e wa ailing a taxi. Bennett and Hacker tate tat te

“typical explanation we reqire take te for of citing te agent’ reaon for

doing wat e did, or citing i otive, and tee are neiter caal nor noo-

logical explanation of an beavior.”60 sc explanation clearly cannot be

redced to nerobiological explanation. Bt Bennett and Hacker do not foc

on te ain reaon for ti. Reaon giving i a ocial penoenon tat exit

aong conitie of people, and ot nerobiological and cognitive expla-

nation conne teelve to individal and part of individal. It doe not

follow, owever, tat nerocience cannot explain any beavior, or even tat

wat nerocience ay tell i not relevant to ocial beavior. It doe follow

tat explanation olely abot individal cannot explain te ocial preppoi-

tion neceary for aking ocial beavior and action intelligible.

5. Concluding Thoughts

Let cloe ti eay by looking briey at oe relation between explana-

tion by ecani and ontic coitent. We do not believe tat any

cience (let alone all te cience) i in te bine of providing ltiate

etapyic. However, cience doe provide , at any given tie, very good

ypotee for some of te “ting” in te world, and tee are te entitie

and activitie tat cientit e wen providing explanation by ecani.

Macaer, Darden and Craver wrote:

59 Ibid., p. 363.60 Ibid.




eted ierarcical decription of ecani typically bottom out in lowet

level ecani. Tee are te coponent tat are accepted a relatively fn-

daental or taken to be nprobleatic for te prpoe of a given cientit,

reearc grop, or eld. Bottoing ot i relative […] Te explanation coe

to an end, and decription of lower level ecani wold be irrelevant toteir interet […] Bt reeber, wat i conidered te botto ot level

ay cange […] At dierent itorical oent, in dierent eld, dierent

ecani, entitie, and activitie ave been dicovered and accepted. Te et

of type of entitie and activitie o far dicovered likely i not coplete. Frter

developent in cience will lead to te dicovery of additional one.61

ow wile we believe in ecani, we do not believe tere are only

oe ort of fndaental “pyical” ecani. We ay decribe te

Aerican legal yte in ter of te ecani by wic it fnction, and

o invoke ocial entitie c a jdge, legal precedent, jry election, and

entencing practice. We ay explain ow knowledge work, wic involve

ocial nor for ing te knowledge.62 We ay attept to dicover and

articlate cognitive ecani for planning tat e entitie and activitie

tat do not refer to te brain at all. Te point ere i tat or ontic coit-

ent are dictated to oe degree by teorie we ave abot te world and

by te cience we cooe to e to anwer or qetion. Pyic i not te

only cience; in fact, pyic i not even one nied cience. Moreover, abot

any ting we ave no teory or cience, or, if yo will, only a folk teorytat erve any of or prpoe qite adeqately.

Bennett and Hacker ak, “i it really intelligible to ppoe tat te con-

dct of individal an being in te circtance of teir live will alway

be rendered clearer by nerocience?”63 Of core not – no ore tan wold

or ability to e a refrigerator be greatly enanced by ndertanding te

pyic involved in explaining ow refrigerator work. Bt or ability to x

te ay be. erocience doe not ai to replace day-to-day explanation

of beavior, anyore tan qant ecanic ai to replace or everyday

explanation of fall ing bodie. Expert knowledge i not needed or called for in ot of or everyday interaction.

onetele, we all alo know, in a day-to-day ene, tat cange in or

brain aect or beavior. We know wat brain daage can do, wat drg

can do, even wat nger can do to or beavior. We do not avoid doc-

tor becae te pyiological detail of teir explanation are ore tecnical

.61 Macaer, Darden, and Craver, “Tinking abot Mecani.”62 see P. Macaer and L. Obeck, “Te social in te Epiteic,” in P. Macaer and G. Wolter

(ed.), Science, Values and Objectivity, Pittbrg: Univerity of Pittbrg Pre, 2004, pp. 78-89.63 Bennett and Hacker,Philosophical Foundations, p. 364.




tan or day-to-day explanation. We go to te exactly becae of ti.

One explanation need not redce anoter for it to be ore efl in oe

itation for oe prpoe, nor do explanation need te tat of law to

be cientic. Frter, no explanation need be te bet explanation in every

itation it cold be applied to. onetele, it i illy to go to te oppoiteextree and deny te poibility or vale of nerocientic explanation.

Te vale of nerocientic explanation can be recognized and accepted

witot rigid ontological coitent to te entitie tat frae te; like-

wie, ti vale i not diinied by recognizing te poibility of ipor-

tant and efl explanation in oter ter. Explanation do not invoke lti-

ate ontological entitie wit a correponding apriori etapyical tat.

Explanation are itorical penoena tat are context, teory and prpoe

relative. Explanation need to be een a or attept to ndertand te world,

to predict it core, and to intervene in te frterance of or interet. soe

explanation are ore efl tan oter in a given context. Ueflne doe

not reqire tat an explanation e a is really only decription. Redctioni

in te trict and piloopical ene a no place in cience or in piloopy.

Peter Macaer Univerity of [email protected]

Jtin syta Univerity of Pittbrg

[email protected]

philosophy and the brain sciences

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