philippine-us military relations post 9/11

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Implications for Philippine Security Policy in the Context of an Emergent China

A research paper presented to

DR. CAROLINA G. HERNANDEZ

And the faculty of the College of Social Sciences and Philosophy

of the University of the Philippines, Diliman

In partial fulfillment of the requirements for

Political Science 280 (Problems in Philippine Foreign Relations)

Submitted by

TAN, AVEMAR T.

2002-05695

19 October 2010


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Philippine-US Military Relations Post 9/11 TAN, Avemar T. 2 | P a g e

Introduction to the Study:

When two commercial flights commandeered by alleged Islamic terrorists collided with

the World Trade Center in New York on September 11, 2001, the horrific sight generated,

among others, pledges of support from the allies of the United States. The Philippines, under the

leadership of then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo was one of those who promptly answered

George W. Bushs call for action and the nation found itself embroiled in the ensuing Global

War on Terror as part of the Coalition of the willing.

While West Asia served as the main battlefield, Southeast Asia was likewise gaining

reputation as the Second Front of this war on terror. The Abu Sayyaf, a local group operating

in Southern Mindanao who were once characterized by President Arroyo as a gang of money-

crazed bandits became one of the organizations that were included in the list of international

terrorists, and were discovered to have links with other alleged terrorist groups operating in the

region specifically Jemaah Islamiyah. Other accounts reported that insurgent groups in Southern

Mindanao including the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) had ties with the Al Qaeda and

with Osama Bin Laden and that camps set up in the area were being used as training facilities for

new recruits. These reports did not go unnoticed and with it came the US realization that the

Philippines was crucial in the success of the Global War on Terror. Subsequently, the US

provided significant funding for security assistance and in addition, the annual Balikatan

combined Military Exercises held in the Philippines were expanded to include counter-terrorism

focused mainly against the Abu Sayyaf in Southern Mindanao.

Arguably, foreign and security policies of states, especially of one as influential a player

in the international arena as the United States have significant impacts on the policies of others in

the playing field. As such, in light of the recent turn of events, particularly the 9/11 Attacks, and

the renewed importance the Philippines plays in the United States security agenda, there is a

need to determine what specific changes are observable in the Philippine-US Military

relationship and, on the basis of other international developments, what implications these

changes could bring with it.


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A. Statement of the Problem:

It is a widely held notion that the 9/11 Attacks, which constituted the single most

important new development in the security environment of the recent decade were what

prompted George W. Bush to expand and strengthen US military posture. While this research

does not assume a casual relationship between the Attacks and the increased robustness of U.S.

Military posturing, the veracity of the alleged changes in the Philippine-US military relationship

is examined to determine if there is truth to the popular belief that reinvigoration of ties did

occur.

Furthermore, this research explores the implications of such an intensified military

relationship between the Philippines and the United States. This research is based on the

following hypothesis:

After 9/11, the US expanded and strengthened its military relationship

with the Philippines and in turn, this reinvigoration of the military ties between

the two states has significant implications for Philippine security policy and

foreign relations especially towards an emerging China.

B. Objectives of the Research:

1. This research intends to demonstrate how the security policy pronouncements of theUnited States, being the most significant player in international affairs at this point in

time, affects the security policies and strategies employed by less influential nations and

its allies

2. This research also aims to show the reader that developing an independent securitypolicy, one that is devoid of foreign influences and considerations is unlikely since states

exist within a larger community where the actions, decisions and events in one state

would have profound effects and influences on the policies and decisions of another


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A Brief History of Philippine-American Relations:

The Philippines has had a long history with the United States, which began in 1898 when

Spain ceded the Philippines to the Americans through the Treaty of Paris, ending the Spanish-

American War and marking the beginning of what would be the American Occupation of the

archipelago that was to last until 1946.1

Shortly after regaining its independence, the Philippines entered into a treaty with the

United States granting the latter the right to retain the use of the bases in the Philippines for a

period of 99 years, to permit the US to use such bases as the latter may determine according to

military necessity and to enter into negotiations with the US concerning the expansion of such

bases.2 These bases had proven to be strategically valuable in fending off the Japanese invasion

and in arresting the continued advance of the Axis forces during the Second World War where

Filipino soldiers fought side by side with the American troops.3 The 1957 Mutual Defense Treaty

formalized and further solidified the military alliance between the two countries.4

The Philippines strategic importance was further highlighted during the Cold War where

the country was promoted as Americas shining example of democracy and capitalism. As an

American ally, the Philippines would send its troops in various conflicts that involved the United

States particularly those which took place in the Korean Peninsula and Vietnam.5

1Dio, Dino C. (2007) The Philippines as a Major Non-NATO Ally and the War on Terror. A Research submitted to

the Faculty of the Air Command And Staff College, Air University. Alabama: Maxwell Air Force, pp. 2-5

Felix, Victor A. (2005) Philippine-US Relations: Challenges and Opportunities After 9/11. Pennsylvania: US Army

War College, Carlisle Barracks, pp. 1-4

Lum, Thomas and Larry A. Niksch (2009) The Republic of the Philippines: Background and US Relations.

Congressional Research Service Report for Congress. 15 January 2009, p. 12

Ibid., Felix, pp. 1-43

Docena, Herbert (2007)b At the Door of all the East: the Philippines in United States Military Strategy. Focus on

the Philippines: Special Report No. 2, November 2007. Quezon City: Focus on the Global South, p. 14

Ibid., Felix, pp. 1-4; Dio, p. 2-5

De Castro, Renato Cruz (2003) Special Relations and Alliance Politics in Philippine-US Security Relations, 1990-

2002 in Asian Perspective, Vol. 27 No. 1, pp. 137-1645

Ibid., Felix, pp. 1-4; Dio, pp. 2-5; De Castro, pp: 137-164


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A Decline in the Alliance:

By 1988 however, the deadlock in the Philippine-US base review coupled with a Soviet

proposal to forge a naval arms control agreement with the United States altered American

foreign policy and a debate on the strategic importance of Philippine bases ensued in

Washington.6

The reduction of the threat emanating from the Soviet Union prompted the US to

reassess its security strategy wherein the reduction of forward deployment was eyed.7

Thus,

Philippine demands for higher base-related compensation did not generate positive responses

from the United States who, by May of 1990 was already of the position that although the

presence of the bases were extremely desirable.. these were no longer vital to American

ability to fulfill Washingtons defense commitments in the Pacific Theater.8

Despite this however, the Philippine Senates rejection of the proposed Philippine-

American Treaty of Friendship extending the presence of the US Military Bases placed a dent in

the relationship of the two allies and in the following years, there was a marked decline in

Philippine-US relations which was characterized as having become essentially moribund.9 The

withdrawal of US forces from the Philippines dealt a significant blow in the US capacity to

project its power in the region and warned that it would be difficult to guarantee the external

defense of the Philippines since US forces had lots a facility from which they could

operate.10

Although the formal military alliance covered by the Mutual Defense Treaty of 1957 was

not rescinded, relations cooled and were limited to the Joint Military Exercises that had been

held annually since 1981 and which had been drawn up in accordance with Article II of the

6 Op. cit., De Castro (2003) pp. 137-164

Peachy, Shane (2003) Are the USAs National Interests in the Asia Pacific Region Sufficient to Keep America

Engaged in the Region as the 21st

Century Progresses? In The AustralianDefence Force Journal, No. 161,

July/August 2003 pp. 23-277

Op. cit., De Castro (2003) pp. 137-164; Peachy (2003) pp. 23-278

Ibid., De Castro (2003) pp. 137-1649

Banlaoi, Rommel C. (2002) The Role of Philippine-American Relations in the global campaign against terrorism:

Implications for regional security in Contemporary Southeast Asia, August 2002.10

Op. cit., De Castro (2003) pp. 137-164


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Treaty.11 By 1995 however, even these exercises which included a series called the Balikatan

was placed on an indefinite hold and only small-scale exercises with no more than twenty US

personnel were permitted.12

The United States turned to the Philippines neighbors and was able

to secure contracts with Singapore, Thailand and Malaysia which granted US access to various

ports where its planes and ships may dock for refueling or repairs, despite being able to assure

that there would be no power vacuum in the region which might permit the rise of a regional

Asian hegemony the strength of its presence in the region had been significantly reduced.13

The Impetus for the Revival

During the first quarter of 1995, approximately three years after the last of the American

troops left Subic Naval Base in 1992, the Philippine government discovered the presence of

large man-made structures on the Mischief Reef, which comprise part of the contested features

on South China Sea that were the subject of ongoing territorial disputes with China and a number

of ASEAN member countries as well.14 These structures had been built by the Chinese but they

alleged that these were simply shelters built by Chinese fishermen plying the South China Sea.15

According to former Senator Orlando Mercado during one of his speeches in December 1998,

Chinas defense build up is a major regional concern that has prompted the Philippines to

strengthen its ties with the US16

In addition to the external threat of an increasingly expansionist China, it was likewise

uncovered that beginning in the late 1980s Osama Bin Laden had been building networks,

dummy foundations and terrorist cells in the Philippines to develop, finance, plan and set into

motion, a series of terrorist attacks that would target a number of American commercial airline

11Op. cit., Docena (2007)b

12 Radics, George Baylon (2004) Terrorism in Southeast Asia: Balikatan Exercises in the Philippines and the US War

against Terrorism in Southeast Asian Journal, Vol. 4 No. 2 May 2004, p. 11813

Op. cit., Peachy (2003)14

Severino, Rodolfo C. (2007) Southeast Asia in Search of an ASEAN Community: Insights from the former ASEAN

Secretary-General. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, pp. 180-18915

Ibid., Severino (2007), pp. 180-18916

Mercado, Orlando S. (1998) The New Context of Philippine-American Relations in Changing Tides: Rethinking

Philippine-American Relations in the New Global Environment. Proceedings of the 2nd

Seminar in the Carlos P.

Romulo Foundation for Peace and Development, Foreign Policy Series held last December 3-4, 1998, Makati City.


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carriers and also, assassinate the Pope during his visit to Manila.17 It was in 1995 when these

series of terrorist attacks dubbed as the bojinka plots were exposed due to a freak accident in

an apartment in Manila involving a number of explosives and unstable chemicals18

.

These multiple threats: Chinese encroachment on Philippine territory, the documented

resurgence of communist insurgency and the subsequent exposure of terrorist plots that have

been subsequently traced to Osama Bin Ladens networkprovided the impetus for the

Philippines to reconsider negotiations with the US for a treaty which could operationalize the

existing Mutual Defense Treaty.19

The Philippine Senate would go on to ratify the Visiting Forces Agreement in 1999

which provided the legal framework for the resumption of joint military exercises and substance

to the existing Mutual Defense Treaty.20 This marked what would essentially be the beginning of

the revival of the military relations between the two states and by the following year, the

Balikatan Exercises which had been discontinued in 1996, restarted.21

9/11 and the Global War on Terror:

With the September 11th

Attacks in 2001, which took place under the administration of

President George W. Bush, came fundamental change in the global security environment.22

Terrorism emanating from non-state and not readily identifiable actors turned into the foremost

threat that confronted the international community.23

In addition, observers note that as a result

17Ressa, Maria A. (2003) Seeds of Terror: An Eyewitness Account of Al Qaedas Newest Center of Operations in

Southeast Asia. New York: Free Press.

Abuza, Zachary Tentacles of Terror: Al Qaedas Southeast Asian Network in Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol.

24, 2002. Accessed through:www.questia.com/PM.qst%3Fa%3Do%26d%3D5002516117Accessed on: 25 July 2009

Op. cit., Banlaoi, 200218 Op. cit., Ressa (2003); Abuza (2002)19

Estrada, Joseph Ejercito (1998) Shaping Philippine-American Relations for the Future Relations in Changing Tides:

Rethinking Philippine-American Relations in the New Global Environment. Proceedings of the 2nd

Seminar in the

Carlos P. Romulo Foundation for Peace and Development, Foreign Policy Series held last December 3-4, 1998,

Makati City.20

Op cit., Banlaoi, (2002)21

Op. cit., Felix (2005)22

Op. cit., Dio (2007)23

Ibid.,Dio (2007)
http://www.questia.com/PM.qst%3Fa%3Do%26d%3D5002516117http://www.questia.com/PM.qst%3Fa%3Do%26d%3D5002516117http://www.questia.com/PM.qst%3Fa%3Do%26d%3D5002516117http://www.questia.com/PM.qst%3Fa%3Do%26d%3D5002516117


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of 9/11 the United States seemed to have given more attention to Southeast Asia than in the

preceding 25 years and in particular, to its military relationship with its oldest Asian ally, the

Philippines.24

Shortly after the Attacks, Philippine President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo pledged her

support for the United States saying that the Philippines is prepared to go every step of the

way, committing specific and concrete assistance to the United States which included allowing

US and Coalition Forces transiting the area to use Philippine air space, sea lanes and military

facilities including both Clark Airfield and Subic Naval Base.25

In addition, President Arroyo

expressed the countrys readiness and willingness to deploy support and medical personnel and

combat forcesif requested by the United Nations.26 These moves were seen by some as a way

by which the Philippines maximized its renewed alliance with the United States to combat

existing and persistent threats of terrorism and Islamic extremist insurgency particularly in

Southern Mindanao where peace has yet to be achieved.27

Evidences of the Reinvigoration of Philippine-American Military Relations:

Not long after the first attacks against the Taliban in Afghanistan who were allegedly

harboring Osama Bin Laden and the al Qaeda group whom the Americans pinpointed as the

mastermind behind the grim 9/11 Attacks, the Philippines gained the reputation of being the

second front in the Global War on Terror. The acquisition of this label was brought about by

definitive proof linking the Abu Sayyaf Group and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front who have

24The Stanley Foundation. (2004) US Security Relations with Southeast Asia: A Dual Challenge. Policy Bulletin.

March 11-12, 2004, Washington D. C. Accessed through:

www.stanleyfoundation.org/publications/pdb/SEAa04pb.pdfAccessed on: 4 September 2010.25

Lander, Mark (2002) Philippines Offers US its Troops and Bases in The New York Times. October 2, 2001, p. 5

Niksch, Larry (2007) Abu-Sayyaf: Target of Philippine-US Anti Terrorism Cooperation. CRS Report for Congress.

January 24, 2008. Congressional Research Service, p. 1

Thayer, Carlyle A. (2005) Internal Conflict and Terrorism in Southeast Asia: Regional Responses and US

Leadership. A paper presented to the panel on Internal Conflict an Terrorism in Southeast Asia: Assessing the

Effectiveness of Regional Responses and US Leadership. 46th

International Studies Association Annual Convention,

Hilton, Hawaiian Village, Honolulu, Hawaii, USA, March 1-5, 2005. Accessed through:

www.allacademic.com/meta/p71023_index.htmlAccessed on: 4 September 2010.

Op. cit., Dio (2007); Banlaoi, (2002)26

Op. cit., Thayer (2005)27

Op. cit., Banlaoi (2002)
http://www.stanleyfoundation.org/publications/pdb/SEAa04pb.pdfhttp://www.stanleyfoundation.org/publications/pdb/SEAa04pb.pdfhttp://www.allacademic.com/meta/p71023_index.htmlhttp://www.allacademic.com/meta/p71023_index.htmlhttp://www.allacademic.com/meta/p71023_index.htmlhttp://www.stanleyfoundation.org/publications/pdb/SEAa04pb.pdf


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been operating in Southern Mindanao to the Jemaah Islamiyah and the al Qaeda, both of whom

were included in the list of international terrorist organizations. Subsequently, the Abu Sayyaf

was also included in this list and became the subject of Philippine-US Anti-Terrorism

Cooperation.28

The Philippine governments decision to involve itself in the American-led war on

terrorism was seen as a deliberate and calculated move to generate support and financial aid from

the United States to help contain the Islamic extremist insurgency in Southern Mindanao that has

dragged on for decades.29

Indeed, acknowledging the Philippines support for the Global War on Terror and in

recognition of the potential threat of Islamic extremism in Southern Mindanao and nearby states

with a considerable large Muslim population specifically Indonesia and Malaysia, George W.

Bush committed to working with the US Congress to increase Foreign Military Financing (FMF)

to the Philippines from $1.9 Million in 2001 to $19 Million for the fiscal year 2002 and to

sustain such an increase until 2003.30 In addition, George W. Bush promised an additional $10

Million in defense goods and/or services to assist the Armed Forces of the Philippines and

another $10 Million to support counterterrorism and law enforcement assistance.31

According to Philippine National Security Adviser Roilo Golez, actual assistance in 2002

increased to $20 Million and to $78.65 Million in 2003.32

These figures made the Philippines the

largest US military aid recipient in Asia for the said period.33

Aside from this, the US

government provided $2.4 Million in 2003 for International Military Education and Training and

$93.2 Million worth of excess military equipment.34

28Op. cit., Niksch (2007)

29Op. cit., Banlaoi (2002)

30 Singh, Daljit (2002) The Post September 11 Geostrategic Landscape and Southeast Asian Response to the

Threat of Terrorism. September 2002. Accessed through: http://www.iseas.edu.sg/pub.html Accessed on 4

September 2010. Op. cit., Dino (2007); Felix (2005); Lum and Niksch (2009);31

Op. cit., Dino (2007); Felix (2005); Lum and Niksch (2009); Singh (2002); Banlaoi (2002)32



Golez, Rolio (2005) RP-US Collaboration Against Terrorism, in Philippine Historical Association Historical

Bulletin Volume 35 (2001-2003). Quezon City: New Day Publishers.

Op. cit., Dino (2007); Felix (2005); Lum and Niksch (2009); Singh (2002); Banlaoi (2002)
http://www.iseas.edu.sg/pub.htmlhttp://www.iseas.edu.sg/pub.htmlhttp://www.iseas.edu.sg/pub.html


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Aside from financial assistance for the Philippine military, the United States government

also extended direct support missions against domestic terrorist groups. For instance, the

Balikatan exercises conducted between January 15 to July 31, 2002 which involved anywhere

between 1,650 to 2,665 US military personnel were conducted, for the first time, in hostile areas

in Southern Mindanao such as Basilan and Zamboanga, and was targeted against a specific

group, the Abu Sayyaf.35

These were noteworthy modifications on the original Balikatan Series

that began in as early as 1981.36

Another significant change in the Balikatan Exercises held in

2002 was the inclusion, in its terms of reference, a provision which allowed US forces to

engage in combat if done so in self-defense.37

Herbert Docenas Focus on the Global South Report entitled Unconventional Warfare

documents a number of other changes in the Philippine-US military cooperative exercises post

9/11 such as the involvement of Special Operations Forces, and the launching of a Joint Special

Operations Task Force for the Philippines which is distinct from the regular joint combined

training exercises held in the country and evolved from the Balikatan Exercises conducted in

2002. 38 The JSOTF-P, unlike previous exercises, operated in areas where there are actual

hostilities and explicitly targets the Abu Sayyaf and elements of Jemaah Islamiyah and has been

packaged in the overall context of the Global War on Terror.39

In addition to the Balikatan, a number of other Joint Military Exercises also underwent

changes after 9/11. For instance, HANDA, an annual war game designed to enhance RP and US

bilateral planning was shifted its focus on the defense of the Philippines against an external

attack.40

35Docena, Herbert (2007)a Unconventional Warfare: Are US Special Forces engaged in an offensive war in the

Philippines? Focus on the Philippines: Special Report No. 1, January 2007 Quezon City: Focus on the Global South.

Op. cit., Niksch (2007)36

Op. cit., Dino (2007)37

Op. cit., Dino (2007); Golez (2005), Docena (2007)a38

Fargo, Thomas B. (2003) Statement of Admiral Thomas B. Fargo, Commander US Pacific Command before the

House Armed Services Committee on US Pacific Command Posture regarding Operation Enduring Freedom-

Philippines, March 12, 2003. Accessed from:http://www.globalsecurity.orgAccessed on: 4 September 2010.

Op. cit., Docena (2007)a39

Op. cit., Docena (2007)a40

Op. cit., Dino (2007)
http://www.globalsecurity.org/http://www.globalsecurity.org/http://www.globalsecurity.org/http://www.globalsecurity.org/


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Aside from conceptualizing and putting into motion a number of other joint military

exercises, the Philippines, in November 2002, acceded to the Mutual Logistics Support

Agreement (MLSA) which allowed the United States to use the Philippines as a supply base for

military operations throughout the region.41

In October 2003, recognizing the Philippines dedication and commitment to the Global

War on Terror, George W. Bush designated the country as a Major Non-NATO Ally (MNNA).

This meant that the Philippines would become eligible for:

priority delivery of excess defense articles, stockpiling of US defense articles, purchase of depleted uranium anti-tank rounds, participation in cooperative

research and development programs and participation in the Defense Export

Loan Guarantee program that backs up private loans for commercial defenseexports.42

For the Philippines, becoming a Major Non-NATO Ally meant the following

concessions: $30-Million dollar grant for equipment and training of the Armed Forces of the

Philippines for counter terrorism, a $25-Million dollar grant for training a combat engineering

unit and for military assistance in the war on terror and another $30-Million dollar grant for

development assistance in conflict areas in Mindanao.43

According to Lt. Col. Dino Dio, the

designation of the Philippines as MNNA represents the best chance for the Philippines to

accelerate its military capability development.44

The Philippines clearly acquired a number of concessions in its reinvigorated military

relationship with the US following 9/11 since Gloria Arroyos pledge of support for the GWOT

boosted the Philippine-US bilateral relations and security cooperation and led to the grant of

about $100 Million in military and economic aid as well as $1 billion worth of trade benefits.45

Thus, the Global War on Terror provided the driver to elevate RP-US defense relationship to a

new level comparable to that of the early years of the Cold War.46

41Op. cit., Lum and Niksch (2009)

42Op. cit., Dio (2002)

43Ibid., Dio (2002)

44Ibid., Dio (2002)

45Op cit., Singh (2002)

46Op. cit., Dio (2002)


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The desire for enhanced military relations from the perspective of both the United States

and the Philippines, however, predate the 9/11 Attacks. Even prior to the US Presidential

elections of the year 2000, for instance, Condoleeza Rice had made statements reflecting the

Republican Partys penchant to employ military power in pursuit of national interests.47

From

the Philippine perspective on the other hand, the external threats and domestic insurgencies

previously noted exposed the need for US military support.

The Angelo dela Cruz Hostage Incident, A Bump to a New Direction:

The renaissance of the Philippine-US Military Alliance, however, ran into difficult

ground when, in July 2004 a Filipino overseas worker by the name of Angelo dela Cruz was

kidnapped in Iraq and held hostage in exchange for the withdrawal of the Philippine

humanitarian and peacekeeping contingent station in the said country. This was a classic

example of how Philippine security policy, by way of committing support for the Global War on

Terror threatened to compromise Philippine Foreign Policy prioritizing the safety of its OFWs.

This case also clearly illustrated how international affairs could potentially affect domestic

moves and decisions. What happened to Angelo dela Cruz likewise highlighted the potential

detrimental effects of Philippine involvement in the Global War on Terror, specifically that it

increased the risk for Filipino workers stationed in predominantly Islamic states especially since,

at this time, the GWOT had been increasingly although erroneously packaged as a war against

Islam. Weighing the consequences of her options, President Arroyo chose to give in to the

hostage takers demand and withdrew the Philippine contingent in exchange for the safe return of

Angelo dela Cruz.48

The incident had the effect of dousing the rekindled Philippine-American

relationship with cold water and the Philippines decision was negatively received by the

Coalition.49

47Rice, Condoleeza (2000) Promoting the National Interest in Foreign Affairs 79, No. 1 (January/February 2000).

Birkel, Franz-Josef, Warren Karle and David Welch (2003) The Effects of the Bush Doctrine on Commitments and

Alliances in South-East Asia in The Australian Defence Force Journal, No. 161 July/August 2003.48

De Castro, Renato Cruz (2009) Domestic Woes and Overseas Tactics in the Philippines. Accessed through:

http://wwwglobalasia.org/V4N3_Fall_2009/Renato_Cruz_De_Castro.htmlAccessed on 4 September 2010.49

Ibid. de Castro (2009)
http://wwwglobalasia.org/V4N3_Fall_2009/Renato_Cruz_De_Castro.htmlhttp://wwwglobalasia.org/V4N3_Fall_2009/Renato_Cruz_De_Castro.htmlhttp://wwwglobalasia.org/V4N3_Fall_2009/Renato_Cruz_De_Castro.html


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Anticipating another reversal in US attitude towards the Philippines, the Arroyo

government proceeded to increase its engagement with China and to wean itself from tendencies

to depend on the United States.50

Although Philippine relations with China has been marred by the territorial dispute

involving certain features on the South China Sea and the past conflicts of the bi-polar world

order of the Cold War, the Philippine policy of strategic engagement with China which followed

the official resumption of diplomatic ties in 1975, considerably improved bilateral relations and

in economic terms, China has even become the countrys 3rd

largest trading partner.51

In

September 2004, shortly after the Angelo dela Cruz incident that took place in July and the

negative opinion which it brought about, President Arroyo visited China and concluded a

Memorandum of Understanding on Defense Cooperation.52 Between 2004 and 2005 there were a

number of high-level exchange visits between the two countries and a number of large contracts

were awarded to Chinese contractors including, for instance, the contract on the rehabilitation of

the North Rail and the provision of a Philippine National Broadband Network.53

Even prior to his reelection in November 2004 however, George W. Bush extended a

conciliatory hand to the Philippine government and reaffirmed its military relations with the

Philippines by deepening its ties with the latter further through its support for the Philippine

Defense Reform.54

In addition to this, in November 2004, President Bush likewise expressed his

continued confidence in the Arroyo Administration by nominating and supporting the

Philippines for the post of Chairman of the Anti-Terrorism Task Force in the Asia Pacific

Economic Conference (APEC).55

50Morada, Noel M. (2009) The Rise of China and Regional Responses: A Philippine Perspective in The Rise of

China: Responses from Southeast Asia and Japan. Ed. Jun Tsunekawa. NIDS Joint Research Series No. 4 Tokyo: The

National Institute for Defense Studies.51

Ibid., Morada (2009),

Baker, Carl (2004) China-Philippines Relations: Cautious Cooperation. Special Assessment: Asias Bilateral

Relations. Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, October 2004. Accessed through:www.apcss.org/.../China-

PhilippinesRelationsBaker.pdfAccessed on: 4 September 2010.52

Op. cit., Morada (2009)53

Ibid., Morada (2009)54

Op. cit., Lum and Niksch (2009)55

Op. cit., Lum and Niksch (2009); Thayer (2005)
http://www.apcss.org/.../China-PhilippinesRelationsBaker.pdfhttp://www.apcss.org/.../China-PhilippinesRelationsBaker.pdfhttp://www.apcss.org/.../China-PhilippinesRelationsBaker.pdfhttp://www.apcss.org/.../China-PhilippinesRelationsBaker.pdfhttp://www.apcss.org/.../China-PhilippinesRelationsBaker.pdfhttp://www.apcss.org/.../China-PhilippinesRelationsBaker.pdfhttp://www.apcss.org/.../China-PhilippinesRelationsBaker.pdfhttp://www.apcss.org/.../China-PhilippinesRelationsBaker.pdf


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Nonetheless, despite these developments in Philippine-US Military relations, the

Philippines chose to also engage in security relations with China and in May 2005, the Philippine

government signed agreements relating to annual defense and security dialogues, training of

Filipino soldiers by Chinese troops, Chinese technical assistance for the AFP and the provision

of $ 6-million dollars worth of non-lethal military equipment.56

Analysis: Implications for Philippine Foreign and Security Policy towards an Emergent China

While the Philippine Armed Forces is clearly in an abysmal state and warrants both

financial and technical support not to mention training in modern techniques of defense and

warfare, the reinvigoration of Philippine-US military relations framed in the context of the

Global War on Terror carries with it, the potential of dragging the country into compromising

situations worse than the Angelo dela Cruz incident. Continued US engagement in Southern

Mindanao has for instance internationalized an otherwise domestic conflict and opens the doors

for furthering anger and extremism among a misunderstood Muslim population which might

drive them further into the arms of radicalism and anti-Americanism. In addition, this

internalization of the issue has the potential of expanding the number of players and the

Philippines may find itself embroiled in conflict with groups and non-state actors who are in

reality the enemies of the United States and not the Philippines per se. Also, considering the

Philippines foreign policy of labor deployment, of which a vast number of those working

overseas do so in predominantly Muslim countries, and others, as news reports show have made

it well into restricted conflict areas such as Afghanistan and Iraq, the danger that Philippine

involvement in the drawn-out Global War on Terror poses on these contract workers remain

high.

On the other hand, since the evidence shows that the American penchant for expanding

its military posture in world (Asia Pacific included) was actually established prior to 9/11 and

was partly in response to the emergence of China as a regional power, the Chinese perception of

the threat posed by the United States on Chinese ability to expand in the region may likewise

compromise Philippine standing considering that the Philippines maintains both economic and

56Op. cit., Morada (2009)


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military relations with both. It is a fact that though China and the United States have become

somewhat interdependent economically with China being the US largest creditor and the latter

as the largest market of Chinese goods, there remains unresolved issues between the two states.

A clear example of this is their relations with Taiwan.

In its Defense White Paper published in the year 2000, China clearly viewed American

reengagement in the Asia Pacific as an attempt to constrict Chinese activities in the region and

expressed alarm at the US strengthening [of] its military presence and bilateral alliances in the

region.57

Hillary Clintons statement last July 2010 during the ASEAN Regional Forum in

Hanoi where she reiterated that it is in the United States interest and in the interest of all

counties who rely on the trade route through South China Sea that freedom and safety of

navigation and over flight in the South China Sea is maintained has likewise been taken by China

as a threat. 58

Such a threat perception may further lead to Chinese feelings of insecurity thus leading to

a classic case of the security dilemma in which China would expand and improve its military

capability to counter the perceived external threat posed by the United States. Indeed, the recent

Chinese action and their subsequent announcement of their successful attempt of planting the

Chinese Flag in an unspecified portion of the South China Sea in August of this year and the

recent visit of North Korean leader Kim Jong Il to China during the same month are Chinese

attempts to flex its muscle.59

This is especially after considering that differences over US

57Banlaoi, Rommel C. (2003) The Philippines in China-US Relations: A Strategic Assessment. A paper presented to

the Institute of Asia Pacific Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Beijing, August 10-16, 2003.58

Thayer, Carlyle A. (2002) Background Brief: China, the United States and the Balance of Power in Asia Accessed

through:http://www.viet-studies.info/kinhte/Thayer-China-US-Balance-of-Power-in-Asia.pdfAccessed on: 4

September 2010

___. (2010) Beijing hits out at US comments on South China Sea. Inquirer Global Nation Website. Accessed

through:http://globalnation.inquirer.net/news/breakingnews/view/20100726-283224/Beijing-hits-out-at-US-

comments-on-South-China-SeaAccessed on: 4 September 201059

Reuters (2010) ChinaPlants Flag in South Sea Amid Disputes. Reuters Website. Accessed though:

http://af.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idAFTRE67P11320100826Accessed on: 4 September 2010;

The Associated Press (2010) China, North Korea Confirm Kim Jong Il Visit. CBS News Website. Accessed through:

http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2010/08/30/world/main6819364.shtmlAccessed on 4 September 2010
http://www.viet-studies.info/kinhte/Thayer-China-US-Balance-of-Power-in-Asia.pdfhttp://www.viet-studies.info/kinhte/Thayer-China-US-Balance-of-Power-in-Asia.pdfhttp://www.viet-studies.info/kinhte/Thayer-China-US-Balance-of-Power-in-Asia.pdfhttp://globalnation.inquirer.net/news/breakingnews/view/20100726-283224/Beijing-hits-out-at-US-comments-on-South-China-Seahttp://globalnation.inquirer.net/news/breakingnews/view/20100726-283224/Beijing-hits-out-at-US-comments-on-South-China-Seahttp://globalnation.inquirer.net/news/breakingnews/view/20100726-283224/Beijing-hits-out-at-US-comments-on-South-China-Seahttp://globalnation.inquirer.net/news/breakingnews/view/20100726-283224/Beijing-hits-out-at-US-comments-on-South-China-Seahttp://af.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idAFTRE67P11320100826http://af.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idAFTRE67P11320100826http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2010/08/30/world/main6819364.shtmlhttp://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2010/08/30/world/main6819364.shtmlhttp://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2010/08/30/world/main6819364.shtmlhttp://af.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idAFTRE67P11320100826http://globalnation.inquirer.net/news/breakingnews/view/20100726-283224/Beijing-hits-out-at-US-comments-on-South-China-Seahttp://globalnation.inquirer.net/news/breakingnews/view/20100726-283224/Beijing-hits-out-at-US-comments-on-South-China-Seahttp://www.viet-studies.info/kinhte/Thayer-China-US-Balance-of-Power-in-Asia.pdf


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arms sales to Taiwan and the activities of US military ships in Chinas Exclusive Economic Zone

have seen a rupture in militarytomilitary relations between the two states.60

Indeed, America has viewed heightened Chinese engagement and perceived

expansionism in Southeast Asia as a threat to its freedom of navigation and US security

predominance and some analysts view China as a potential strategic adversary in the Asia

Pacific Region.61 Consequently, Americas decision to improve its ties with its allies in the Asia

Pacific has been interpreted as an attempt to counterbalance China.62

Conclusion and Recommendation:

This paper thus concludes that indeed, there is evidence showing that there has been a

reinvigoration of military relations between the Philippines and the United States which included

increased financial assistance for improving military capability; the expanded, refocused and

more frequent joint military exercises held in the Philippines; the inclusion of conflict areas as

venues for joint military exercises and the provision of various military equipment, helicopters

and fighter planes for Philippine use. This research further concludes that in the context of a

sensitive balance in the Chinese-American relations of whom both are valuable allies for the

Philippines, the marked improvement in the military alliance between the Philippines and theUnited States may easily be misconstrued by China as an attempt to curtail its expansion thus

creating a security dilemma that may effectively destroy the existing sensitive balance.

In such an environment where the Philippines may so easily be caught up in an ensuing

conflict between two giants, it is therefore in the best interest of the country if not all states, to

continuously engage China positively in various aspects in as much as the country also engages

the United States so as to prevent further insecurities on the part of China and so as to help

60Nasaw, Daniel and David Batty (2010) China retaliates over US arms sales to Taiwan Accessed through:

http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/jan/30/china-sanctions-taiwan-arms-salesAccessed on 4 September 2010

Op. cit., Thayer, Carlyle A.http://www.viet-studies.info/kinhte/Thayer-China-US-Balance-of-Power-in-Asia.pdf61

De Castro, Renato Cruz (2010) Empowering a New Era in the United States-Philippines Security Alliance in

Backgrounder, No. 2431, 28 June 2010. Massachusetts: The Heritage Foundation.

Allison, Graham T. and Robert Blackwill (2000) America's National Interests A Report from the Commission on

America's National Interests, p. 24.62

Op. cit., Peachy (2003)
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/jan/30/china-sanctions-taiwan-arms-saleshttp://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/jan/30/china-sanctions-taiwan-arms-saleshttp://www.viet-studies.info/kinhte/Thayer-China-US-Balance-of-Power-in-Asia.pdfhttp://www.viet-studies.info/kinhte/Thayer-China-US-Balance-of-Power-in-Asia.pdfhttp://www.viet-studies.info/kinhte/Thayer-China-US-Balance-of-Power-in-Asia.pdfhttp://www.viet-studies.info/kinhte/Thayer-China-US-Balance-of-Power-in-Asia.pdfhttp://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/jan/30/china-sanctions-taiwan-arms-sales


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develop it into a responsible, benign regional power with a stake on maintaining regional peace

and security. It is in the Philippines interest to maintain cordial through not so dependent

relations with both states. However, the country must likewise be ready to swiftly maneuver

should the situation, in the far-off future, take a turn for the worse.

Since states do not exist in a vacuum and the current highly globalized world has

highlighted states interdependence and essentially the obsolescence of a foreign policy that is

truly independent of external considerations and influence, the Philippines decisions, foreign

and security policy moves must likewise be made cautiously and with due consideration of the

international environment. The Philippines decision to expand its alliances, although potentially

problematic in the future should the situation take a sharp turn for the worse, is likewise a bold

an strategic move which, if played well, may provide greater benefits for the country. Indeed in

an environment where nothing is certain and nothing is permanent, knowing the right moves and

the appropriate time to make them is the only way by which maximum benefits may be derived

from foreign and security policy decisions. It must however be kept in mind that such games are

best left to leaders or foreign policy developers who have vision, direction and a complete

understanding of the relations between various state and non-state actors in the international

community, something which the current Philippine administration has yet prove it possesses.


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