Personal Identity This lecture will help you understand: • Diachronic Identity • Ship of Theseus Paradox

– Substance Criterion – Continuity Criterion

• Introducing Locke’s Psychological Continuity Approach

René Magritte, Not to Be Reproduced (La Reproduction Interdit), (1937)

Question 1: What is the Problem of Personal Identity?

A. What makes one the person one is? B. What makes one the same person over

time despite one’s many changes? C. How are mind and body related? D. A and B

• Given all that can happen to me (aging, changing jobs, marriage, divorce, accidents, winning the Nobel prize, Alzheimer’s), what sorts of changes can I undergo, and still be me?

Diachronic Identity (Greek, dia, through, chronos, time)

• This is the question of diachronic identity: – On what basis do we judge this individual now

(call her “x”) to be the same as that individual then (call her “y”)?

• It turns out to be a lot more difficult than you might imagine!

The Ship of Theseus

The Ship of Theseus Paradox “The ship wherein Theseus and the youth of Athens

returned [from their voyages] had thirty oars, and was preserved by the Athenians [to this very day] . . . for they took away the old planks as they decayed, putting in new and stronger timber in their place, insomuch that this ship became a standing example among the philosophers, for the logical question of things that grow; one side holding that the ship remained the same, and the other contending that it was not the same.” (Plutarch, Vita Thesei, 22-23)

Which is Theseus’ original ship?

SHIP A

= Old-plank Ship

SHIP B

= New-plank Ship

• It looks like there are four possible answers:

• It looks like there are four possible answers:

A. Ship A = Old-plank ship

• It looks like there are four possible answers:

A. Ship A = Old-plank ship B. Ship B = New-plank ship

• It looks like there are four possible answers:

A. Ship A = Old-plank ship B. Ship B = New-plank ship C. Both Ship A and B

• It looks like there are four possible answers:

A. Ship A = Old-plank ship B. Ship B = New-plank ship C. Both Ship A and B D. Neither Ship A nor B

You Decide! It looks like there are four possible answers:

A. Ship A = Old-plank ship B. Ship B = New-plank ship C. Both Ship A and B D. Neither Ship A nor B

Two Types of Identity

• Ship A = Old-plank ship – Substance (Bodily) Criterion

• David Hume

• Ship B = New-plank ship

– Continuity Criterion • John Locke

USS Constitution

George Washington’s Axe (“my grandfather’s axe”)

John Locke’s Socks

• John Locke proposed a scenario regarding a favorite sock that develops a hole. He wondered if the sock would still be the same sock after a patch was applied to the hole. What about if a second patch was applied, and a third, etc., until all of the material of the original sock has been replaced with patches?

Automobiles

Computer Modifications

Human Beings

Psychological Continuity Approach

• Locke was probably the greatest and most influential English philosopher.

• He was a contemporary of Descartes, and like Descartes he was a dualist.

• However, unlike Descartes he was not rationalist. He was an empiricist. He denied that we are born with any knowledge. At birth, we are a tabula rasa.

• An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1689)

John Locke (1632-1704)

• “Self is that conscious thinking thing—whatever substance made up of (whether spiritual or material, or simple or compounded, it matters not)—which is sensible or conscious of pleasure and pain, capable of happiness or misery, and so concerned for itself, as far as that consciousness extends” (IP 273-274).

“Man”

• “The identity of the same man consists . . . in nothing but a participation of the same continued life, by constantly fleeing particles of matter, in succession vitally united to the same organized body” (IP 271).

Prince and the Cobbler

• “For should the soul of a prince, carrying with it the consciousness of the prince’s life, enter and inform the body of the cobbler . . . everyone sees that he would be the same person with the prince, accountable only by the prince’s actions. But who would say that it was the same man?” (IP 273)

Man = Cobbler

Man = Cobbler

Person = Prince

Question 2: In Locke’s view,

A. a rational parrot could not be the same person as an individual at another time.

B. a rational parrot could not be the same human as an individual at another time.

C. a rational parrot could be the same person as an individual at another time.

D. B and C

Person • “the substance whereof personal self

consisted at one time may be varied at another, without the change of personal identity; there being no question about the same person, though the limbs which but now were a part of it, be cut off” (IP 273).

Accountability

• “In this personal identity is founded all the right and justice of reward and punishment” (IP 274).

Memory and Consciousness

• “Had I the same consciousness of that I saw the ark and Noah’s flood, as that I saw an overflowing of the Thames last winter, I could no more doubt that I who write this now, that saw the Thames overflowed last winter, and that viewed the flood at the general deluge was the same self . . . than that I who writes this am the same myself now whilst I write . . . that I was yesterday” (IP 273).

Personal Identity

• “personal identity consists: not in the identity of substance, but, as I have said in the identity of consciousness” (IP 274).

Loss of Memory?

“But yet possibly it will still be objected, — Suppose I wholly lose the memory of some parts of my life, beyond a possibility of retrieving them, so that perhaps I shall never be conscious of them again; yet am I not the same person that did those actions, had those thoughts that I once was conscious of, though I have now forgot them? To which I answer, that we must here take notice what the word I is applied to; which, in this case, is the man only” (IP 274).

Drunkenness? • “But if it be possible for the same man to have distinct

incommunicable consciousness at different times, it is past doubt the same man would at different times make different persons; which, we see, is the sense of mankind in the solemnest declaration of their opinions, human laws not punishing the mad man for the sober man's actions, nor the sober man for what the mad man did, — thereby making them two persons: which is somewhat explained by our way of speaking in English when we say such an one is "not himself," or is "beside himself"; in which phrases it is insinuated, as if those who now, or at least first used them, thought that self was changed; the selfsame person was no longer in that man” (IP 274).

Sleep? “if the same Socrates waking and sleeping do not

partake of the same consciousness, Socrates waking and sleeping is not the same person. And to punish Socrates waking for what sleeping Socrates thought, and waking Socrates was never conscious of, would be no more of right, than to punish one twin for what his brother-twin did, whereof he knew nothing, because their outsides were so like, that they could not be distinguished; for such twins have been seen” (IP 274)