phenomenology of life or life of idea

8/13/2019 PHENOMENOLOGY OF LIFE or LIFE OF IDEA

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/phenomenology-of-life-or-life-of-idea 1/184

Salahaddin Khalilov

PHENOMENOLOGY OF LIFE

orLIFE OF IDEA

Baku

2012



Khalilov S.S.

Phenomenology of Life or Life of Idea. – Baku,

“Azerbaijan University” Press, 2012 – 184 p.

ISBN 978-9952-8147-3-6

© Khalilov S.S., 2012

___________________________________________________



This book is dedicated to:Prof. Anna Teresa Tymieniecka



To be is to be alive! A.-T. Tymieniecka

Being is the enlivenment of Idea! Abu Turkhan



Introduction

The rise of modern Western civilisation is related to the

formation of the new type of thinking. This thought became possible due to the descent from the heavens to the earth and to

choosing earthly realities from sensory experience and even-

tually to the widely application of scientific experiments to real

vital processes. Thus, during many centuries, the West made

significant progress from researching abstract realities towards

the realities of practical activity, and in this way the bases of

the “second technogenic nature” and the information societywere founded. However, it did not realise that it would be

alienated from man and from the essence of individual life

when covering this long distance.

Nevertheless not everybody in the West could keep his

finger on the pulse of time and the initiatives of western

pragmatism and rationalism towards overcoming the crisis by

replacing them with so-called postmodern views does not justify itself. On the other hand, the knowledge which has been

objectivized on account of the alienation from the inner world

of the human being, his experiences and existence and the epis-

temic methodology, positivism, neo-positivism, post-positi-

vism and eventually linguistic analyze, semantic philosophy,

structuralism, neo-structuralism, which have been established

5



Introduction

on the base of it (knowledge), and the transition from here to

postmodernism – this is the very crisis that has been caused by

the one-sided development of rationalism.

Everything is transformed to its opposite and reach the

point of self-denial when it goes too long on the same line.

Nonetheless, on account of the fact that the Earth is

round, there is another way to go to India, and it would be

possible to suppose that this movement that continued to the

opposite direction, one day would be directed towards the Eastonce again. It is interesting that the second way to India goes

via America as well as the way of the Western world to Eastern

philosophy this time goes via America. I would like to talk

about the distinguished American philosopher Anna-Teresa

Tymieniecka`s philosophy of the return to the East.

The Husserlian Phenomenology managed to gain a

place for itself in a condition when there was hegemony ofscience, and when scientism had become a leading mode of

thought.

Indeed, science and its application can be considered as

the symbols of the West. But what kind of science is it? Is it

the science of sciences, which attempts to be transformed to the

abstract mathematical-philosophical system, or the deductive-

axiomatic science or the science which arises from experienceand serves experience, practice and technique? Does not tech-

nicism, which is not approved by Husserl, underlie Modern

Europe? Husserl speaks, on the one hand, about the spirit of

Europe, and on the other hand, criticizes empiricism. Never-

theless, first off all, due to empiricism and scientific-practical

activity, Europe managed to lay the foundation of Modern

Western civilization. For this reason, for us, it symbolizes the6



Introduction

essence of Modern Times better than F. Bacon and R. Des-

cartes.

By putting forward phenomenology, which is a kind of

alternative to empiricism, naturalism, technicism and even

positivism, for finding a solution of the crisis, did Husserl, in

fact, want to `rescue` Europe in Modern Times from the crisis

or from its Western essence? Or, will Existentialism, which is

another teaching that has been based on phenomenology, return

Europe its real face? Is not Existentialism an Eastern phenome-non formed in the West?

Jean-Paul Sartre writes: “We have in Husserl... a gradual

elucidation and a remarkable description of the essential struc-

tures of conciseness” (un pointillisme d’essence) “but never the

posing of the …ontological problem, namely that of the being

of conciseness… In the same manner the problem of the being

of the world remains in suspense… We never return from the phenomenological epoché to the world”.

1 That is to say, Hus-

serl’s practice of denying Ontology and Metaphysics was, in

fact, another face of positivism.

There was a need to the real great philosophy. Max Sche-

ler's phenomenological realism, Heidegger's hermeneutic phe-

nomenology, Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology of perception

and such other new phenomenologies were not, in fact, a directcontinuation of Husserl’s teaching, but were the result of the

inclinations towards becoming distant from it in different

1 J.-P. Sartre, “Conscience de soi et connaissance de soi” , Société

Française de philosophie (Séance du 2 juin 1947), p. 55; Herbert Spiegel-

berg, The phenomenological Movement , Dordricht-Boston, 1994, p. 476.

7



Introduction

directions as well as towards approaching philosophical proble-

matic.

And finally, we encounter the phenomenology of life and

with the return back to the real great philosophy. The guarantor

of this return is Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka who is one of the

most distinguished philosophers of the present day.

Poles coalesce on the top.

If the West truly wants to move away from its rationa-

listic traditions, instead of searching the alternatives for logicand sensory experience, it should be found the methods which

could complete them and rescue mankind from the one-sided

thought and from the syndrome of `alienation`, and pave the

way for moral richness.

Phenomenology has special place among the philosophi-

cal teachings, which try to create the integrated view of cog-

nitive process in the 20

th

century. At first sight, phenomeno-logy appears as a new stage in the development of the history

of Western thought.

Nevertheless, the analyze indicates that the cognitive

element, which is presented as `a phenomenon` and explicitly

expresses the truth at the intentional point, looking back over

several centuries , was known in Medieval Islamic philosophy

as the illumination of idea. Henry Corbin, who drew the atten-tion to this direction, considered it possible to compare phenol-

menology with Illuminationism ( Ishraqiyya). In the second half

of the 20th century, Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka has directed the

attention to this very aspect and has considered it necessary to

learn Islamic philosophy in the West from a new perspective.

On the one hand, she has built her teaching on the basis of the

traditions of Western Philosophy, but on the other hand, by8



Introduction

attaching great importance to the inner and emotional lives of

human beings, she has developed `phenomenology of life`,

which is a new branch of phenomenology. Tymieniecka herself

has emphasized the necessity of applying to Islamic philosophy

in this issue: “A significant situation of the living individual-

beingness within the system of life, – and one of paramount

importance for our argument, concerned as it is with preparing

the way for possible dialogue between phenomenology and

Islamic philosophy – is to be acknowledged”.

2

Thus, Tymieniecka`s works arise not only from the

thoughts of E. Husserl, M. Heidegger and E. Levinas, but also

from Eastern thought. It should not be a coincidence that

during the recent years she has been attaching importance to

Illuminationism, in particular to the teaching of Mulla Sadra.

We find there a great deal of usage from the terminological ba-

sis of the concept of Illuminationism. It is also not a coinci-dence that Tymieniecka supports introducing the thought of the

great Azerbaijani philosopher and the founder of Illuminatio-

nism Shihabaddin Suhrawardi to Western Philosophy in a new

form.

It is true that traditionally phenomenology has been

accepted as a product of Western thought. However, even

among Husserl’s sources of idea some Eastern sources arementioned (usually Buddhism). The close relation of this tea-

ching to Islamic philosophy, especially to Ishragism (Illumi-

2 A.-T.Tymieniecka, “The Unveiling and the Unveiled”, The Passion of

the Soul in the Metamorphosis of Becoming , Edited by A.-T.Tymieniecka,

Dordricht-Boston, 2003, p. XLIII.

9



Introduction

nationism) has been revealed in the studies conducted under

the leadership of Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka in last decades.

In this book, we also tried to put the issue in another

light. The phenomena here are also viewed in the context of

illumination of idea. In doing so, the thought of Abu Turkhan

“Being is the enlivenment of Idea” is taken as a basis. This

kind of approach took its bases from middle age Islamic phi-

losophy, in particular, Ishragism. In fact, this approach has

even deeper roots, and can be traced back Pluto’s doctrine. It isnot by chance, that Spiegelberg writes, “In fact, the conception

of a “logos” of the “phainomena” is quite Platonic and can be

traced more or less explicitly to Plato’s attempt to salvage the

appearances from the world of Heraclitean flux by relating

them to the world of logos, i.e., of the changeless Forms”.3

However, for seeing the changeless Forms, we first need to

remove the multicolored covers that are the cause of thediversity in the material world. It is called unveiling in Islamic

philosophy. Tyminiechka investigates this event in her article

“The Unveiling and The Unveiled”, and directs the attention to

the solution and analysis of this problem in the Islamic

philosophy.

Though the reality of the physical world is accepted in

Islamic philosophy, it is considered there as mortal, transientand deceptive: and the human soul is accepted as a second

existence of the only real being-of the spirit on a local-indi-

vidual scale. The body, in turn, is considered as the instrument

of the soul. The human world there is, in fact, the world of the

3 Herbert Spiegelberg. The Phenomenological movement. A historical

introduction. Dordrecht . Kluwer, 1994, p.7.

10



Introduction

soul. However, the soul is not uniform but is the interior part of

the multi-stage inner structure. The revelation of truths is pos-

sible due to the contact of the individual spirit (soul) with the

divine spirit, and this is what is called intuition. It is called illu-

mination (ishraq) in Ishraqism. However, intuition itself has

various levels: the moments of inspiration (ilham), ecstasy

(wajd ), unveiling (kashf ) and finally revelation (wahy).

The whole existence is viewed on the scale of con-

sciousness in the Husserlian phenomenology. The unveiling of phenomena is, in fact, a revelation or illumination of truths by

means of intuition. That is to say, the notion of phenomenon in

the Husserlian phenomenology is closely related to the notion

of truth in Islamic philosophy. The knowledge gained through

sensory experience is not considered as true (truth). On the

contrary, for reaching the truth, it is required to become free

from the impacts of sensory experience. It reminds us, in turn,the phenomenological reduction. In fact the epistemological

system in Islamic philosophy has been comprehensively stu-

died. Merely Western philosophy, which had not been aware of

these developments, had to re-discover all these, and phenol-

menology undertook this mission. Nevertheless, the Husserlian

phenomenology can explain the problem only one-sided. The

variety and multi-stageness of structure of the soul is not takeninto consideration. Reason in Islamic philosophy is only one

aspect of the soul. In the Husserlian teaching, in turn, only

reason is drawn forth and this variety is not sufficiently expres-

sed. Probably for this reason Tymieniecka establishes her

teaching on the world of soul which is a richer world (in the

context of Avicenna’s and Suhrawardi`s discussions).

11



Introduction

A.-T. Tymieniecka views the formation of intuition in

the context of creativity. For her, in fact, the human being lives

when he creates. A more precise approach than Descartes’s

thesis “I think, therefore I am” is the attitude “I create, there-

fore I am”. Considering the fact that creativity is a specific ex-

perience, it could be said that Tymieniecka’s philosophy is

closer to Existentialism; or more precisely, in Tymieniecka’s

works, the way from Phenomenology to Existentialism is con-

tinued, and it is taken a step towards a new stage by quality(essence). She rightly calls this teaching the “phenomenology

of life”, because this teaching could be considered as a trans-

formation of the philosophical searches within phenomenology

from the abstract sphere to real human life.

12



MAN AND THE WORLD

• Way to “The Logos of Life”

• “The Esoteric Passion” of Western Philosophy

for the Eastern Basis



“Man is there present under all his aspects: natural

man who fulfils physiological functions, social man in the

bosom of the human community, as well as the man who

feels, who loves, or who hopes and who, so doing, trans-

cends himself and wins his freedom by breaking the chains

of natural man. This system which knots harmonious

bonds between man and the world does it on a different

basis, issuing from man's conquest of himself”.

A.-T. Tymieniecka



Way to “The Logos of Life”

Every man lives out his own ordained life; a life that has

been predestined for him. However, after the human beingreaches a certain mature age, he begins to weigh up, and if he

reaches a higher mature age then he calculates his own life.

Namely, this life is a conscious life perceived in the first stage,

but man still cannot build his life on his own. Consciousness

here is posterior to events and life. In the second stage, man

chooses his life on his own; that is to say, what is of concern

here is a consciously built life.

The cognition of man of his own life and his building his

future life consciously become possible only due to philoso-

phical thinking. However, not every man can rise to the level

of philosophical thinking and the vast majority live an uncons-

cious and spontaneous life.

The aim is to convey the illumination and self-cognitive

practices of limited number of human beings, who have per-

ceived themselves and the world, to others and to present it to

the use of everyone. Is it however possible? For the present, we

can only transfer knowledge. Namely, the practice of the trans-

fer of inner illumination and mental energy among people is

not yet known. For this reason, everything can be transferred to

others only after arranging them into logical patterns and brin-

15



Man and the World

ging them into the form of knowledge, and as if they go into

space-cosmos that is common for everyone, and only after this

they become useful for being accepted by others; or more pre-

cisely, the transfer becomes possible by means of language. A

man can transfer his condition as well as his feelings through

scientific, philosophical and artistic languages.

It is impossible for every man, of course, to be a philo-

sopher. However, can philosophers, besides perceiving the

world and the life they live, also find the methods of conveyingit to others?

Self-cognition, that is, man’s understanding of his perso-

nal life as if by observing from outside, and his using the

dialogue and mutual agreement between him and “Ego”, which

he has pushed it aside, in his life experience, differ from the

abstraction and depersonalization of gained knowledge and

carrying them out of personal life and as if entering these typesof knowledge, which belong to man and to his relations with

the world, into the system and creating from them a theoretical

teaching.

However, in the next stage, this system of depersonalized

and abstracted knowledge –philosophy- must re-descend into

life and illuminate the lives of non-philosophers.

A specialized man, of course, in a certain meaning, isasymmetric and sometimes even degenerative, that is, in spite

of his poor development in all other fields, he has great un-

exampled knowledge and skills in a certain field. For this

reason, he has left the entire harmonious human image and has

possessed a specific and different image. However, it does not

mean that the germ of completeness in his activities has

disappeared for ever. The image of that completeness, which16




has lagged behind development, is probably continuing to

remain as a germ in that man. When life “treads on his corns”

and when the world “twinkles” in front of his eyes, then as if

that completeness within him becomes revived, and by gaining

completeness for an instant, man understands the great, true

meaning of life. Literature and the arts undertake the mission

of providing the harmony for such specialized people and

causing them to experience the beauty of the complete image

of the world. Literature forms a virtual world for us and showsthe completeness and another aspect of the world to specialized

but yet incomplete men; and the real world becomes completed

with this figurative world; and thus man reaches his comple-

teness.

Unlike the universe, which is infinite, a stone that weighs

a gram, a small part of the world is finite in measure. Air,

which weighs a gram, spreads all over the world and as if in-cludes the whole world.

Reason, as thickened and patterned senses in the form of

knowledge, has lost its opportunity to spread over the world by

being re-thinned. Senses, in turn, are active and agile like air. If

“a drop” of a sense “evaporates” then it can re-conquer the

whole world; or more precisely, with our senses we are

determined to include the entire world. How many timesshould we gather, with our knowledge, different local beings,

which have been detached from the world, together so that we

can re-create an image of the world?

Literature can make man complete just because it excites

feelings. Science takes man to pieces just because it has been

increasingly localized in the small parts of the world. In this

respect, unlike science, literature is formed due to inspiration17



Man and the World

and fervency rather than rational thinking. For this reason, lite-

rature is closer to philosophy in terms of its mission and duty.

It is not a coincidence that Tymieniecka speaks of the contest

between them: “Philosophy and literature are caught in a con-

stant contest as each attempts to absorb each other’s task”.4

The aim of teaching philosophy to people is, in fact, to

return them their completeness and give them a chance of li-

ving a perfect and complete life. It is very difficult. Music and

poetics can accomplish this function better. Philosophy, in turn,attempts to establish that complete image, not on feelings and

senses, but on reason itself. The reunification of the sepa-

rated.... However, each one builds a different world from the

parts of this “constructor”. They build and thus every time es-

tablish themselves once again.

There cannot be a philosopher who does not have senses.

That is, only by means of senses philosophy can gain comple-teness. This is a specific sense. This has been always called

“love” in the history of philosophy. Love is a connective sense.

As Abu Turkhan says: “Reason separates, love unites”.

The personal sensory experiences and life of every man

are, first of all, the realisation of senses. The life of the body, to

wit, as it is accepted in biology, “life”-breathing, the metabo-

lism with nature and the activities of every organ of the bodylike circulation of blood, heartbeat, etc. – all these are usually

the same processes for all people. Namely, the model of the bo-

dy and its functionality cannot characterize personal life. Con-

4 A.-T.Tymieniecka, Logos and Life. The Passions of the Soul and the

Elements in the Onto-Poiesis of Culture. Book 3: the Life-Significance of

Literature, Dordricht-Boston: Kluwer, 1990, p. 16.

18




sidering this fact, philosophers do not seek human life in the

context of the body’s functionality. However, the body is an

instrument and means for the practical activity of the human

being. The activities realized by means of it, reveal the in-

tention, aim and also the knowledge and skills of the human

being. Man becomes “revealed” in society as a social being.

For this reason, there are some inclinations towards seeking hu-

man life at social plane and in its social functioning.

Nevertheless, what kind of actions does the human beingdo? What kind of functions does he perform and which po-

sition does he represent as “Self” in relations with others?

When seeking the answer to these questions we have to

return to the wishes and ideals of the human being as well as to

his “functioning” programme and to his knowledge and skills.

However, there is a need here to differentiation and identifyca-

tion. Namely, although knowledge is a main index of humanlife, only quantitative indices could be shown as its criterion.

That is to say, the contents of knowledge are usually same for

all people who study in a certain field. There are few differen-

ces and many common aspects. Less or more knowledge can-

not be a major factor that characterizes a person. What distin-

guish people are rather their goals of life and what they look

forward to. There is a saying: “Where there is s a will there is away”. However, the human being does not have a single inten-

tion and goal in his life. There are small and big plans in life;

and the achievement of a certain goal paves the way for a grea-

ter goal.

It would be naive to think that the whole activity of the

human being is consciously planned by him and he chooses his

way of life on his own. The outside impacts, social norms,19



Man and the World

traditions and tendencies, moral values, religious canons, pre-

judices, temporary fashions and the impacts of the local social

environment and collective that a person has accidentally ente-

red, etc. – all these have serious impacts on man’s daily life

and sometimes on his whole life.

In fact, there are people who, despite all outside impacts,

choose their lives themselves and consciously determine it, but

they are minorities. In any case, we mean these very minorities

when we speak of “personal life” and the “meaning of life”, be-cause the lives of the rest might be suggested not by them-

selves but by social environment.

The meaning of human life, in fact, manifests itself not

due to the absolutization of any of man’s rational, sensual or

practical functionings, but at their crossroad and in the whole,

which includes all his aspects. Tymieniecka writes: “Man is

there present under all his aspects: natural man who fulfils physiological functions, social man in the bosom of the human

community, as well as the man who feels, who loves, or who

hopes and who, so doing, transcends himself and wins his

freedom by breaking the chains of natural man. This system

which knots harmonious bonds between man and the world

does it on a different basis, issuing from man's conquest of

himself”.5

R. Descartes, E. Husserl and other followers of the line of

“Cogito Ergo Sum” treat reason and rational thinking as a

central element. Nevertheless, what is the role of reason in

5 A.-T.Tymieniecka , Logos and Life. Creative experience and the

critique of reason Book 1, // Analecta Husserliana: v. 24, Dordricht-

Boston, 1988, p. 58.

20




choosing personal life and in living it? We have mentioned

above that the contents of knowledge are usually same for all

people who study in a certain field. Then what about reason?

Can the human being be characterized by the knowledge that

he has obtained not from his sensory experiences but from

rational thoughts? With what does the thought of a man differ

from that of another man? At least, logic is same for all people

as well as mathematics. Yet the degree of adopting and using

them can be different. However, all adopters adopt a samething and a same content. If all people keep to the “norms” of

thought then they will be the same in this aspect; or if a cosmic

mind, the logos of the world, etc. are taken as sources of reason

then it should be taken into consideration that this is also the

same for everybody. In other words, reason can only be a

means for individual life, but cannot be life itself.

Then what can individualize man, characterize his perso-nal life, cause him to know himself and reveal `Self`? If we

return to sensory experience once again, we will find there the

experiences that are common for everybody and are usually re-

peated. Nonetheless, there are some individual, dear and native

experiences and besides being the most striking pages of hu-

man life, they are also his personality and indicator of his level.

Such pages are related not to the current, traditional and “nor-mal” life of man, but rather to his creative activities. For in the

act of creativity, the real nature of man and his essence be-

comes unveiled. Paying attention to this very necessity Tymie-

niecka writes: “First and foremost the discovery of human cre-

ative experience allowed us access to the logos of life, for it is

reflected in human creative experience in its manifold ra-

21



Man and the World

diation.”6 Afterwards, Tymieniecka shows the way that leads

to revealing the “Ontopoiesis of Life”: “We found a definitive

station (platform) and our compass not in cognition but in the

human creative act, which enters the sphere of becoming-

individualizing life. We thus interpret in its original nature the

becoming that reveals the logos of life within pristine nature.

With only one step further (but what an infinite step!), the en-

tire field of the becoming of life, of the ontopoiesis of life, lies

open.”

7

“The great enigmas of the Universal Logos”

8

becomesunveiled due to Tymieniecka`s conception of “Ontopoiesis”.

The Husserlian phenomenology is not sufficient for the

identification of individual life. The points, which are put

forward here, are not for individual and personal lives, but for

an abstract “common man”. However, the window to man’s

native world can be open only from within his life.

“Ego” stands at the centre of the world and the goal of philosophy is to create a world model that Ego stands at its

centre. One of the main goals of Tymieniecka is to lay stress on

human life, look at the world from the prism of the life values

of man and see, as a central element in the architectonics of the

world, not a cognitive process, knowledge, concrete senses,

etc., but life itself: “Life” as such means primordially different-

tiation and constructiveness. It means individualization from

6 Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka, The Fullness of the Logos in the Key of

Life. Book 1. The Case of God in the New Enlightenment . Springer, 2009. p.

xxxiii.7 Ibid.8 Ibid.

22




within a circumambient realm, an individualization which si-

multaneously transforms that realm into one’s own milieu”.9

Life, in turn, is related to the factors, which have impor-

tant place in the daily activities of man and are native to him,

excite him and encourage him to live, rather than science and

rational cognition, which are “alien” to him and do not charge

him emotionally.

No doubt Tymieniecka does not reach this conclusion all

of a sudden. If we follow the evolution of her thought we donot encounter any rectilinear trajectory. This way is zigzag-

ging. Till reaching this final and decisive formulation of her

philosophy, Tymieniecka had continued her studies in many di-

rections and more than once she “walked up and down” in

philosophical space. However, because the history of philo-

sophy is “in sight”, if we draw this way linearly in retrospect,

we would see the line of Leibnitz - Ortega y Gasset - Tymie-niecka.

José Ortega y Gasset thinks that phenomenological thin-

king must be based on a phenomenon, which is an independent

system, and this system must be human life. He writes that he

“abandoned Phenomenology at the very moment of accepting

it. Instead of withdrawing from consciousness, as has been

done since Descartes, we become firm in the radical realitywhich is for every one his [or her life]”

10.

9 A.-T.Tymieniecka, Logos and Life. Creative experience and the

critique of reason. Book 1. // Analecta Husserliana: v. 24, Dordricht-

Boston, 1988, p. 327.10 Ortega y Gasset, José, The Idea of Principle in Leibnitz and the

Evolution of Deductive Theory. New York: Norton, 1971. § 29 //

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/gasset/

23





“The Esoteric Passion” of Western

Philosophy for the Eastern Basis

Heart and inspiration are praised more than mind and

reason in the East. Although reason is accepted by Islamic

Peripatetics as the highest stage in the structure of the soul,

divine love is considered higher than anything else in Sufi

philosophy.

According to Suhrawardi`s classification, there is a great

emotional-spiritual spectrum between animal and reasoningsouls in the structure of the soul and it basically implies

aesthetic emotions. Unlike Western Sensualism, which overra-

tes the role of the five senses in cognition and unlike Western

Realism that insists on the importance of the reasoning soul,

Suhrawardi pays attention to the active role of all three steps in

cognitive process, and this, in turn, becomes possible on ac-

count of the synthetic functions of aesthetic emotions. For thereason that beauty is related to both instinct and truth, the way

to reach the truth goes through the artistic-aesthetic life. A poet

needs to be filled with enthusiasm as well as a philosopher

cannot embrace truth without ecstasy (wajd ).

In her article called “The esoteric passion for space” Prof.

Tymieniecka tries to explain the relationship between aesthetic

and voluptuous feelings of human being and the space factor,25



Man and the World

which is more fundamental-existential factor than others. Here

we remember al-Farabi`s notion of “the soul of the Earth”. This

notion means that without being dependent on the human ap-

proach to them, different places have esoteric power and at-

tractiveness. Uniting with the vital process of humans or ani-

mals and even plants, this attractiveness creates an opposite re-

lationship. The idea of the unity of the world appears not only

ontologically but also subjectively – as a coherence and unity

of emotional experiences. The unity of man and world is putforward in the emotional perspective of space.

From what necessity do the expressions such as “the soul

of the Earth”, “the esoteric passion for space”, “the reviving of

idea” and other non-traditional and metaphoric and even mysti-

cal expressions originate?

Although the word “aliveness” is mainly used as a syno-

nym of “having the soul” there are other shades of meaningtoo. The verbs “to be alive” and “to breathe” coincide with one

another in most languages.

However, there is one more term of aliveness. The living

being is born from another living being. In other words, all li-

ving beings come to the world through genetic inheritance and

increase in generation and, after remaining as living beings for

a period of time, they pass away from this world. Life is estab-lished between birth and death.

The dead do not return to life.

However, the word “reviving” is also used in a broad sen-

se. Namely, if any being has not yet died and favourable condi-

tions have been created (or cured) then it can become revived.

What is of concern here is the reviving of a living one. That is

to say, the movement, which is directed from life to death,26



“The Esoteric Passion” for the Eastern Basis

changes its moving direction again towards life. Why do the

plants become withered? Is it because of the lack of water, light

and fertilizer? If a withered plant is watered or is lightened then

it becomes revived. The main point is that it should be taken

into consideration what and how much the plant needs. The po-

tential opportunity is within the plant. The material (or energy)

needed for its realization is taken from outside. The reviving

becomes possible only when the opportunities of the environ-

ment meet the needs of the central factor.Things are divided into living and non-living ones. The

reviving of non-living things is considered impossible.

However, we will view “reviving” as a universal catego-

ry. Namely, we will investigate the terms of the reviving of

non-living things.

The living world has been programmed. However, the

objects of the non-living world also contain certain informa-tion; they have certain forms and structures. These forms are

the copies of an idea. The reviving of this copy requires energy

from outside. The energy source for the reviving of idea could

be obtained only due to the intellectual potential of men. The

attention of the human being is directed to the object and thus a

certain image of the object is formed. Whose reviving do we

mean in this case?For the reason that the idea in the object (its structure and

form) is a copy, it is not capable of being revived. It can only

take part in “fermentation”. Only the human being, who has

access to the real McCoy of these ideas, is capable of giving

birth to idea.

The human soul also does not keep all ideas alive in

itself. As a rule, they settle in the passive fund. At the result of27



Man and the World

the contact with the copies, which are in the material world,

man’s ideas, which are reserved in the passive fund, can be ac-

tivated. As if this is a process of “fermentation” and, as a result

of it, passive ideas can become revived.

The revived ideas are those phenomena that a special

teaching based on them has been established in the West.

At the heart of the controversy is what attitude do phe-

nomena have towards the relation between objects and human

mind? To what extent is their connection to the object as wellas their adequacy to it? For Kant, the 'thing-in-itself' is incom-

prehensible. What do we comprehend then?

According to Husserl, what consciousness is directed to

are phenomena. Namely, what is of concern is not the object,

but its meaning. On the other hand, what we take as being is

phenomenon, and the existence of the object and its perception

as a whole stays out of cognition.The different aspect of Hume’s agnosticism is that what it

talks about is the image of sensory impression. Namely, what is

perceived is not the object itself, but the mental image of

sensory impression. The problem of to what extent this image

corresponds to the object is out of cognition. The model is

same. Hume, Kant and Husserl take, as an object of cognition,

not a concrete object, which is considered as material reality, but its image, form and appearance. However, in Hume this

image is formed through organs of sense, while in Husserl it is

accepted as a pure meaning purified of senses. The purification

of this image of the senses and the liberation of reason from all

kinds of psychologism and the adoption of meaning purely is

one of the important problems in Husserl.

28




However, the senses also can be completely at different

levels. The cognitive senses serve the perception formation of

the knowledge of an object gained though organs of sense. This

sensory image resembles the object in terms of its external

signs, or more precisely, we think so. Nevertheless, there can

be another way of being affected by the object. Namely, we do

not form an image considering its colour, form, sound and

other physical indicators; on the contrary, by being liberated

from this sensory information, we suffice only with an impres-sion formed within us through non- apparent ways; more pre-

cisely, the external signs of the object recede into background

and we take into account only the sensual experience and emo-

tional state formed by it. This experience, however, is incom-

prehensible for us. As if an abstract image gradually differen-

tiates and the secret relations between our sensual condition

and the object become revealed. For the reason that such clari-fication mostly does not happen, we become unaware of our

senses and their sources.

Unlike a sensory image, an image of idea is related to our

primary knowledge. Leibnitz says: «...the knowledge that our

ideas give us, for ideas are the only things that knowledge has

anything to do with».11

* * *

Just as different things, every plant and all living beings

have been programmed, and just as the whole future life has

been taken into account in every germ as a project, likewise the

11 G. W. Leibniz. New Essays on Human Understanding. Book III:

Ideas, p. 177 // http://www.earlymoderntexts.com/pdf/leibnew4.pdf .

29

http://www.earlymoderntexts.com/pdf/leibnew4.pdf




Man and the World

whole nature and world can be viewed as a programmed sys-

tem. Individual programs are included within the macro-pro-

gramme in the context of nature.

Every man as well as society as a whole have inner de-

velopment regularity and inner motive impulses as an orga-

nism.

Just as every human thought has a certain relative inde-

pendence, likewise the world of reason is also autonomous and

it has its own inner regularity and objective development ways.Merely, sometimes man follows one of these ways and the way

leads man. Husserl writes: «According to the guiding ideal of

the Renaissance, ancient man forms himself with insight

through free reason. For this renewed “Platonism” this means

not only that man should be changed ethically [but that] the

whole human surrounding world, must be fashioned anew

through free reason, through the insights of a universal philo-sophy».

12

However, on the one hand the human being has to consi-

der himself in the context of the experience of humanity, but on

the other hand as a part of nature. Nature itself, besides being a

manifestation of an idea, is also a reality of a certain experien-

ce. Leibnitz writes: «space is only an order of coexisting

things».13

Order, in turn, is a manifestation of logos. In thissense, space itself, on the one hand, is a carrier of divine idea

and, on the other hand, a carrier of reason. Thus the mental

12 Husserl Edmund, The Crisis of European Sciences and

Transcendental Phenomenology. An introduction to Phenomenological

Philosophy, Evanston, 1970. p. 4713 G. W. Leibniz, New Essays on Human Understanding , Book II:

Ideas, p. 102 // http://www.earlymoderntexts.com/pdf/leibnew2.pdf 222.

30






relief of space, together with the ideals of man, is a mani-

festation of “collective sensory experience” (Carl Jung) and

subconscious memory in a different perspective.

In her studies, Tymieniecka pays a special attention to the

subconscious desires of man and their roles in human life. This

sense, which is called by her “esoteric passion”, is presented as

a result of the hidden attempts of human reason.

In the analysis of “the esoteric passion for space”, which

is related to the cosmos and imagined extraordinary space,Tymieniecka applies to the ontopoetic revealing of life and

ascribes it, in fact, to its essence that arises from the individual

cosmic beginning of life. She writes: “Can there be a more fun-

damental grounding, a firmer and more indicative point of de-

parture than life itself? I submit that the living being recognizes

itself as “himself” or herself ” not by a cognitive act but by

“being alive ” – by experiencing itself within its milieu of beingness, directing its instincts and appetites, recognizing the

elements of the circumambient world in their vital relatedness

to itself, and lastly but foremostly, by recognizing that one is

the acting center of the existence, as a self-sustaining agent

who directs within this universe of existence through expe-

rience, observation, reflection, and deliberation his or her own

course and who, finally, endows that course with moral andaesthetic values, and upon the wings of the spirit seeks to

understand the reasons of it all and soars to the metaphysical

31



Man and the World

and spiritual realm above, carrying within a thoroughly felt

self-aware conviction that to be is to be alive.”.14

Tymieniecka mentions that under the wings of creative

imagination, man’s subconscious passions enable him to rise to

higher positions and thus man becomes capable of moving

away from the bounds of his personal existence.

Which inner aspect of man does Tymieniecka mean when

speaking of the “passions of the Earth” or “the esoteric passion

for space”?The human being has conscious searches as well as,

together with a space that his mind reaches and his knowledge

make it possible to describe it, he has also an unbelievable

broadness, which cannot be comprehended by ordinary reason,

and the inconceivable world of imagination which is revealed

by a spiritual will directed to eternity. This eternal world and

cosmic expanse has a mirror reflection as well as it has a projection to the inner world of man, to the material environment

to which he is directly related, and to the “esoteric homeland”.

In fact, before Tymieniecka, a number of great philosophers,

including Sufi thinkers, have spoken of the projection of the

whole sea in a drop of water and of the manifestation of the

whole world in every particle of the world, or modern nature

scientists speak of the existence of the code system of thewhole organism in each cell of the organism. Tymieniecka`s

contribution is that she attempts to conceive of every individual

as a projection of the cosmic expanse, which corresponds to

14 Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka, The Fullness of the Logos in the Key of

Life. Book 1. The Case of God in the New Enlightenment . Springer, 2009. p.

xxxi-xxxii.

32




human life and which is codified to this life. Namely, the hu-

man being seeks his life and his native material place directly

in the image of the cosmic expanse which could be revealed, in

fact, by individual sense and reason. What bring her creativity

closer to Sufism are mostly these searches. For this very rea-

son, in the last period of her creativity, she increasingly refers

to distinguished Islamic thinkers. It is not coincidence that

Tymieniecka acknowledges that her “phenomenology of life

considers with the metaphysics of Mulla Sadra on the matter ofa ‘radical metamorphosis”.

15

There have been written many works on the comparison

of a man with the whole world and universe and on revealing

the sameness of them. Ibn Arabi`s al-Tadbirat al-Ilahiyya

لتد ير ت اللهية) - Governance of the Human Kingdom) is dedi-

cated completely to this problem. According to Hurufism, the

secrets of the universe are manifested in man and man, in turn,expresses his secret in letters. In this sense, the soul and letter

are considered same. For the reason that all these searches have

not found their systematic continuation in following philoso-

phical investigations, it is very hard to put them in the context

of modern philosophical thinking. Nevertheless, the studies of

Tymieniecka seem to be a continuation of these ideas. Alt-

hough she is a western person, her closeness to the eastern spi-rit means the transformation of Western philosophical thinking

from spiritlessness to spirit and the determination of the return

15 A.-T.Tymieniecka, “The Unveiling and the Unveiled”, The Passion

of the Soul in the Metamorphosis of Becoming , Edited by A.-

T.Tymieniecka, Dordricht-Boston, 2003, p. XLIII.

33



Man and the World

In Eastern philosophy, in particular in Sufism, this prob-

lem has been symbolized as a relation of “drop” and the

“ocean”. Mawlana Jalaluddin Rumi says:

Listen, O drop, give yourself up without regret,

and in exchange gain the Ocean....

Give a drop, and take this Sea full of pearls.

“The drop and the ocean” is a poetic and figurative expression of the serious philosophical problems like finite and

infinite, death and eternity, soul and spirit, dark and light, indi-

vidual and society, quantity and quality.

And once again two poles are of concern; but the poles of

sameness, and the essences that are more sharply expressed in

these poles; or the manifestation of the same content to mini-

mum and maximum extents, and the change in quality and es-sence due to quantity difference.

These poles could be taken at different perspectives and

scales. Tymieniecka speaks of the different poles of living

being: “We may see living beingness as a filigree, a micro-

cosmic counterpart of the great macrocosmic horizon”.16

This world is between two infinities: the infinite small

and the infinite big are the opposite poles. Opposites are inunity and can be transformed to one another. This, in turn,

leads to the conclusion that space is inclined and the lines of

the world are circular. The fact that the drop in the example of

“the drop and the ocean” is, in fact, infinitely divisible leads us

to the questions put in Zeno of Elea's Aporia. Although the

16 Ibid, p. XXIX.

34




drop is finite in terms of its final measure, it is infinite in terms

of its complex inner structure. It is impossible to find the cor-

relation of infinities in mathematics, or it is a special discus-

sion.

In this case, the correlation of the drop to the ocean is

zero. Namely, only the ocean exists, and the drop is only an

apparent being. Speaking with the terminology of Plato, it is

the shadow as well as it is appearance (Schein; Erscheinung)

in Hegel and fana (annihilation), non-existence and nothing-ness in Sufism and Existentialism.

If we take it in the spiritual context, it could be said that

in return for the Divine or Absolute Soul, the individual soul

(human soul) is nothing, and it needs to join to the Absolute for

existing. The wish of the drop to become, by being united with

the ocean, eternal, arises from this need. Only in this case it can

prove its existence. The reason why individual “existence” isabandoned is because it is temporary and mortal.

35



PHENOMENOLOGY OF LIFE:

HISTORICAL PREMISES

• The Effect of Illumination on the Way Back

from Aristotle to Plato

• Al-Suhrawardi’s Doctrine and Phenomenology

• Intentionality and Transcendentality



The Effect of Illumination on the Way

Back from Aristotle to Plato

Though both Plato and Aristotle have been regarded as

the representatives of rationalism, in fact, Aristotle was not so

consistent in his attitude; he also attached great importance to

the sensory experiment and to the role of the knowledge gained

in this very way.

Aristotle`s statements against Plato, which give the im-

pression of struggle, in fact, caused the two teachings to be-come clearer and to come `cleared out` until today. As it was

mentioned by the famous researcher of the Ancient philosophy

V. Asmus, the criticism of Plato`s theory of forms constitutes

the main line of Aristotle`s book Metaphysics. 17

Namely, for

Plato idea (form) and notion are not merely our opinions about

existence, but existence itself. Aristotle, in turn, considers that

if there is not anything cognized then the knowledge about itdoes not exist too. (Otherwise, it would be knowledge about

nothing.)

For getting the idea about the correct and comprehensive

view of reality, it is not sufficient to divide it into the indefinite

17 В.Асмус, Метафизика Аристотеля. – Аристотель. Метафизи-

ка. Сочинения, том 1, М., 1976, p. 5.

37



Phenomenology of Life: Historical Premises

and conditional notions like thinking and substance. Then the

place that he occupies and the role that he plays could not be

clearly conceived. For us, the most optimum model is to define

the ultimate idea on the one hand and the ultimate matter on the

other; and the peculiarities of the world and the human being

that are placed between the two poles as well as the relation-

ships between them could be elucidated only after this.

After understanding God as the only Ultimate Being

which includes in him the poles of the ultimate idea and matter,

we are going to elucidate the status of the ultimate idea and the

ultimate matter which are completely separated from each

other. Some researchers identify the ultimate idea with God.

Matter in this case is left aside and two alternatives remain to

explain it; either matter was derived from idea, or by not de-

pending on God, it has existed from the very outset. None of

these explanations could lead to the efficient conclusion forunderstanding the world.

The first approach reminds us of the teaching of Plato.

That is, the only true being is the world of forms (ideas). The

material world as well as the things and events in it, are sup-

posedly the copies of ideas, and so they are deprived of the real

existence. The temporality and conditionality of things and

events in the world leads to the denial of their real existence ingeneral. Nevertheless, the path of the human being to God, in

fact, goes through the material world. The absolutization of the

soul and the denial of the body, in one sense, could not play the

role of the optimal methodological basis for learning the gist

and mechanism of the events that happen in real life.

By being, in fact, a dualist standpoint, the second ap-

proach considers matter and God at the same status. This stand- 38



The Effect of Illumination from Aristotle to Plato

point could be considered as an equivalent to the conceptuali-

zation of the duality of light and darkness, good and evil, idea

and substance, fire and earth (in Empedocles) - which goes

back to Zoroastrianism- in the form of idea and matter.

By having the body, the human being himself is a part of

the middle world. Other things consist of the unity of idea and

materiality, or more precisely, they are made of matter-material

on the basis of a certain idea, likewise, the human being is also

the carrier of the idea of the body. To tell the truth, unlike allother creatures, the human being is also the carrier of another

idea-the idea of the universe, namely he is microcosm, as well

as he is the idea which could become active in certain times,

that is, he is an idea which is transformed into consciousness.

In other words, though by having the soul, the human being

gets the opportunity to approach the ultimate idea and travel to

the world of ideas (and to be absorbed in himself, to headtowards his inner and spiritual world), he could appear as the

same organized side with things and events if is in this world.

That is to say, he has to obey the laws of this world and adjust

himself to its harmony.

The human being, who includes the world in himself as a

passive idea, `learns` it in parts at the time when he is in the

concrete contact with it. That is to say, by depending on thecontact points with this world, the inner world of the human

being is illuminated and opened. However, by not being

dependent on the external world, the human being could also

travel to his inner cosmic world and would like to turn back

and find or create in this world what he saw there. This very

point stands on the basis of the creative process.

39




If the human being wants to reveal (in himself) the idea

that is conveyed by either other things and events or his own

body, then it will be clear that not only one idea but many ideas

are included in these things. Then which idea appears at the

first approach and what do the things, which do not appear,

mean for us? The whole question is that the human being

accepts the sign, peculiarity, form, structure and regularity, in a

word, the idea that he could discover in objects and events, as

idea, and the rest, which are obscure and unknown, he accepts

them as matter and material. For the reason that the material

substance has a complex structure, the higher levels, which are

revealed in the hierarchy of ideas that it includes, are accepted

as idea and the lower levels, which are obscure, as matter. By

the idea of `table`, for example, the macrostructure and form,

which provide its function, are meant. What it was made of, as

well as the structure of its `material`, and the lower structurallayers of this structure (molecules, atoms and etc.) are silently

belonged to content and matter. When the human being looks

at the object not with the naked eye, but with the microscope,

what he observes are cells, molecules and etc. In this case he

will not be able to observe the microstructure.

Indeed, the illuminated side is accepted as idea and the

obscure one as matter, exactly like that of Illuminationism(Ishraqiyya).

Analogically, the illuminated side in the brain-microcosm

corresponds to consciousness (the idea, which is brought to a

focus, - intentionality) and the passive side to unconsciousness

and unrevealed-consciousness (in the obscure part of the

brain). Therefore, the main question is that which structural

level the human being gives his attention to. The material40




object and event are maybe the carriers of many things. How-

ever, what we know is its part that coincides with his cognitive

view. The obscure part has been called differently by different

philosophers. In fact, it corresponds to Kant`s notion of `the

thing-in-itself (das Ding an sich)`.

Aristotle also tried to determine the mutual relationship

and correlation between form and matter. He brilliantly noticed

that there was a problem here. By reason of the fact that it was

difficult to fully clarify the problem, he used another notion -the notion of substratum. For Aristotle, everything refers to

substratum but it does not refer to anything. `And in one sense

matter is said to be of the nature of substratum, in another

shape, and in a third, the compound of these. (By the matter I

mean, for instance, the bronze, by the shape the pattern of its

form, and by the compound of these the statue, the concrete

whole.) Therefore if the form is prior to the matter and morereal, it will be prior also to the compound of both, for the same

reason`.18

In this search Aristotle came to the idea of `thing in

itself`, which, considering the knowledge level of his time, was

a brilliant notion: `because each thing is inseparable from itself,

and its being one just meant this`.19

The human being sees, hears (gets information with hissense organs) when he is in contact with this world, and each

time a certain life table appears in front of him. It gives the

human being the impression that truth is outside and the aim is

18 Aristotle, Metaphysics, tr. W. D. Ross, Oxford 1924, p. 7619 Ibid, pp. 95-96, 98

41




`to reflect` this outsider with senses and thus to get knowledge

about the world in this way.

When philosophers approached the problem more deeply,

they started to be sceptical about the degree of adequacy of the

information, which was gained through senses, to the truth. The

idea of reaching the ultimate truth by means of the purposeful

thought or intuition or revelation was diversely expressed in

Indian and Chinese philosophies as well as in Ancient Greek

Philosophy. This idea was leading in Medieval Islamic Philo-

sophical Thought. Shahab al-din al-Suhrawardi also mentions

that the knowledge gained through the outside senses mislead

the human being and alienate him from the ultimate truth. In

the New Age philosophy Descartes took the same approach

and claimed that the truth is not gained due to the sensory ex-

periment but to the purposeful thought.

However, the notions, which claimed that the ready ideasin the human mind existed without being dependent on mate-

rial realities, have been also met with resistance. The discus-

sion of this problem was clarified in the teaching of John Look

at its best. Kant, in turn, by accepting either the results of the

sensory experiment or pure reason, claimed that the real pano-

rama of the world arose from the synthesis of these two truths.

Thus, throughout the whole history of philosophical thought,the seeking of truth has realized by being based sometimes on

the sensory experiment and sometimes on the purposeful ratio-

nal thought.

At the same time, there were the cases in which accepting

the human being as an independent being and comparing him

with the material world as an independent substance and even

regarding idea as the only being were subjected to humiliating42




Then what is of concern here? What is of concern here is

the acceptance of a certain image, which has been formed in

our consciousness, as reality; that is to say, not a material thing

or object, which stands behind the image, but the image itself is

accepted as reality. On the other hand, a question arises here:

what is the difference between the image, which appears in the

sensory experiment, and this intellectual image? The difference

is that this image, in fact, is not an image of the single-of any

object, which is taken in isolation, but an image of the whole.

Everything was clear in the pre-Kantian philosophical

teachings, because the problem of the preference of either idea

or matter, either God`s will or human`s sensory experiment as

well as the problem of giving priority either to senses or

reasoning in the cognitive process were unambiguously solved

there. Although there were different standpoints and sometimesthey contradicted with each other, there was no need for con-

troversies, because there was a clearness in every teaching

about what should have been taken as substance as well as

what should have been accepted as initial or derivative. Even

Aristotle, who moved away from the teaching of Plato and took

neither a systematic idealistic nor a systematic materialistic po-

sitions, took a clearer epistemological and ontological positionthan Kant. It is unquestionable that Aristotle accepted the ob-

jective existence of the sensory world. In his teaching, idea is

not taken as an independent substance, furthermore by identi-

fying it with `form` it is even presented as a way of the

existence of the things and events of the material world. The

things and events, which are cognized through the sense or-

gans, as well as the logical principles, which have been gene- 44




ralized later and which are the bases of intellectual activity, are

in fact chosen from material real processes. In Kant, in turn,

`the thing in itself`, whose independent existence is not denied,

does not play in the cognitive process a main role but a suppor-

ting one. Cognition takes its sources not only from the material

world but also from the intellectual world itself. Furthermore

this dualism is not simply a dualism, that is, this teaching gives

no ground for accepting both the material and ideal beginning

as a same formed dual substances.The teaching of Kant has synthetic character. On the one

hand it is shown in this teaching an initiative towards preser-

ving the rationalist tradition, which by corresponding to those

of R. Descartes B. Spinoza and G.W. Leibniz assumes intellec-

tual thinking as a basis, and on the other hand it is seen here the

obvious and unobvious impacts of the English empiricism,

which was developed by F. Bacon and J. Locke, and even theinfluences of Berkeley`s Sensualism, which is the idealist va-

riant of this tradition. The reason why Kant`s successors gave

different and sometimes incompatible explanations to his

teachings is related to from the standpoint of which philoso-

phical tradition they approached the problem. The efforts

towards explaining Kant`s teaching on the basis of rationalism,

empiricism, agnosticism or even subjective idealism are themain reasons that condition the motleyness of Neo-Kantism. In

fact, the philosophy of Kant cannot find its explanation in the

context of all these traditional teachings, because this philo-

sophy has a new essence.

This is, in fact, a newness for Western philosophy. For

six centuries before Kant, in the East, in Medieval Islamic

philosophy, the bases for the syncretic philosophical teaching45




were founded, and the great Azerbaijani philosopher Shahab

al-Din Suhrawardi was the first who took the first step in this

direction.

The transition from the moral and material polarisation as

well as from the polarisation of thought and nature towards the

system of the internal relationship between the trinity of God,

nature and man, was the main reason that conditioned this

syncretism. Indeed, the world is seen from the prism of the

relations between poles, when man goes out and observes the

world from outside. When man enters himself into these re-

lations he has either to be absorbed by one of these poles or he

has to give a new explanation of the world. The movements

that accept man as a part of nature, as a living and physical

being, and even the most vulgar materialism lead in the last

instance to the very bipolar explanation of the world that was

created by God. On the other hand, the absorption of the hu-man nature into the divine idea and taking him only as an ideal-

spiritual being, as an `ego` or an emotional-spiritual world and

as an arena of sensual experiences, make it necessary, willingly

or unwillingly, to take into consideration another pole in the

form of the shadow of ideas or in the form of virtual world and

`non-ego`.

However, if the one foot of man is taken in this worldand another foot in the other, that is, if he is taken on the one

hand as a physical being and on the other hand as ideal-

spiritual being, as a unity of contradictions and as a complex

syncretic system, then the necessity of going out of traditional

ontology appears. In other words, by dividing man into two

parts and then adding one of them (the body) to the material

world and another one (reason, morality) to the world of ideas,46




it is possible however to get one more variant of the traditional

polarization. Nevertheless, if we do not divide man into these

two parts and in case we take him as a unit independent being,

then the world becomes not bipolar but three polar. This is, in

turn, an absurd from the standpoint of geometrical logical

tradition or more precisely it is an absurd for the one-

dimensional space. Namely one line may have not three, but

two poles and two edges. The multipolness is normal in two

and three-dimensional space. It means that the transition tosyncretic teachings in philosophy, in one sense reminds us the

transition from one-dimensional space to multidimensional

space.

Accepting man as a substance by abandoning traditional

beings, and beside simple movements, like solipsism, the duty

of finding the new combinations of the trinity of God, nature

and man are the central problems of a number of modern philo-sophical movements.

Although the material being, the world of things are not

the main source of human cognition in Kant`s teaching, or

more precisely, though the information that we get from this

world does not express the real truth, however its independent

existence and its participation in the cognitive process are

accepted. On the other hand, the human being enters the infor-mation that he gets into his unique thinking system as well as

he regulates and packs them. It is supposed that the categories

of time, space and causality play this very role. However it is

questionable that where and how does man gets this inborn

ability? Another question arises that if the things, which are

drawn to the cognitive process and which are the partners of

the sensory experiment, as well as their nature still remain un- 47




known for us, then what kind of thing the object that we

cognize? Whose reflections are the knowledge gained from

nature? Where has the place been left for the idea of God; has it

been left in the nature of a-priori knowledge or in the nature or

essence of `the things in themselves`?

Some researches of Kant blamed him for subordinating

the object to the subject. N. Hartmann emphasized that the sub-

ject in Kant`s teaching was not only the individual subject, but

subject in general. Namely the empirical subject and empirical

object stand vis-à-vis and both of them enter space and time at

the same time. The thought of the subject includes the empiri-

cal object through `the transcendental ideality`.20

Hartmann,

however, unfortunately continues this point of view and hurries

to abandon the scheme of Kant in this problem: It is not

possible to cognize the appearance outside the `thing in itself`:

either both of them are cognizable, or none of them.

21

. How-ever Hartman forgets that what is of concern here is not

essence and manifestation, but is `the thing in itself` and

manifestation. The thing in itself, in turn, is single and every

single does not include any ordinary essence, but the hierarchy

of essences. It is, of course, possible that any essence may

appear from this complex system and hierarchy and it could be

cognized as a sensory image and then as an empirical idea.However, the reason why the cognized idea does not

correspond to `the thing in itself` is that the thing still keeps in

itself many uncognized essences (generals, forms, eidoses) and

there could be an infinite number of these latter. There is an

20 See. Философия Канта и современный идеализм. Мoscow.,

Наука, 1987, p. 28-29.21 Ibid, p. 29.

48




indefiniteness here and its adequate cognition, of course, is

impossible.

Is the subject of science really the dehumanized objective

world, or the world of meaning as it has been accepted by the

community of scientists, or the general-scientific panorama of

the world, or a model, which has been become a paradigm and

the mode of thought that corresponds to this model? To what

extend what a neutral person sees and feels in the sensorial

course of the event correspond to what a scientist, who hasresearched that event for years, sees and feels? For what ac-

counts does the difference appear?

The thing is inexhaustible, infinite and indefinite. Then

what does man cognize adequately? He does not cognize the

thing itself, but its model; as well as he cognizes a concrete

form and concrete structure, which have been foregrounded by

being simplified and taken out from the hierarchy of infiniteessences, forms an eidoses.

What are cognized here are the structure and wholeness.

Is the thing entire then? Each thing is different under different

angles, scales, perspectives and under different structural le-

vels. That is to say, it includes a large number of wholenesses.

Materia, in turn, is unattainable for cognition. It is not

possible to see absolute darkness. However, it is also impos-sible to see absolute light. Al-Suhrawarti writes: The light of

lights (nur al-anwar) is invisible because of the severity of his

clarity.22

What we see are those who are between two

invisibles.

22 Ş.Sühr əvərdi , İşıq heyk əll əri, p. 221.

49




The human being is at the crossroads of idea and matter.

He is in twilight, lights up now and again and then is extin-

guished once again. He shines and then sets like twinkling

stars.

The coordination of the term of `light` with intellect and

the term of `darkness` with `the thing in itself` and matter in al-

Suhrawardi, makes it possible to draw certain parallels between

these two epistemological systems. In the philosophical

teaching of al-Suhrawardi, the cognitive problems were solved

differently and uniquely from the Platonic, Neo-Platonic and

Aristotelian views which had existed until that time. Though at

first glance, the epithets of light and darkness corresponds here

to the world of forms and the world of things, in fact, what is of

concern here is the unity of these two worlds personified by the

human consciousness (the thinking soul). That is to say, unlike

Plato, he does not see the truth in comprehending forms, name-ly in merely being united with light. In fact, what is of concern

here is the illumination of the physical being and its becoming

clear to the human being. Only at the level of illumination and

unveiling (kashf), the true essence of the thing and event is

unfolded and the forthcoming duty is to purify this essence

from the knowledge that we get them via our sense organs and

cognize it purely.The views about not taking knowledge from the world of

events and their appearance as products of thought had existed

in the pre-Kantian period. However, as a general rule, in the

previous philosophies one of the two extreme views was cho-

sen. By taking the material world- the objective reality as ini-

tial, materialists regarded all knowledge as derivative, as well

as idealists, by completely abandoning the material word and50




matter as a form of existence, sought the truth only in the world

of ideas, which exists outside of man, or in the feeling world of

man himself. Kant was the first who accepted the participations

of both two bases in the cognitive process and divided know-

ledge into two parts - one comes from experiment (a pesterior)

and another is the product of pure reason (a priori).

Unlike the claims of materialists Kant does not accept

experiment as a reflection of the material world. `The thing in

itself` is unattainable for cognition. That is to say, what is cog-nized is not matter. What is cognizable then? For Kant, it is the

form, which is manifested and explained in the relation of `the

thing in itself` with us (in experiment). In other words, what we

cognize are not matter and `the thing in itself`, but the certain

manifested signs of it. But how are the manifested and hidden

signs determined.

`A deaf understands what is in his heart` as it is said in anAzerbaijani proverb. Namely, during the contact of man with

object, man cannot recognize the sign, which he has not pos-

sessed before, that is, which has been never programmed in his

world of genetic or genetic-social-intellectual knowledge. In

other words, what is clear for us is only the sign of a thing and

event which we can see its form and hear its voice as well as

we (our brain, nervous system and mentality) are the carriers ofit (of its idea and basic forms). In the spectrum of electromag-

netic waves, for instance, we can see only the waves in the

interval of 0.4–0.8 microns. The ultra-violet rays, whose wave-

length is less than 0.4 μ, as well as the infra-red rays, whose

wavelength is larger than 0.8 μ, go out of our view. At the sa-

me time, we cannot hear what bats hear. Our possibility to re-

ceive sound waves has been determined in advance. It means51




that the human being takes the information from the event that

he encounters only within the scope his natural abilities. This

opinion could also be considered valid for the form. If any

form, which has been known and `native` to us in advance, is

not observed in object, then we consider it as amorphous.

Continuing these views we could conclude that if we went

beyond the human egoism and did not claim that the mutual in-

teraction of man and object, the resonance points in this pro-

cess (recognition, cognition) are the same with object and ob-

ject consist of these points, then we would not discuss the ma-

terial being, but we would discuss its process of contact with

object as well as its known aspects to our cognition.

What we should talk about is not the transition of `the

thing in itself` to `the thing for us`, but taking `the thing for us`

from `the thing in itself`. Each `thing in itself` has infinite signs

as well as it is inexhaustible and eternal, or more precisely, it isinfinite inasmuch as indefinite. All the indefiniteness is equal

to one another (just because we are deprived of the possibility

of evaluating them).

Thus experiment, in fact, is the point of mutual relation-

ship of man (ego) with matter, or more precisely it is the point

of their sameness; the point of sameness between the ideal

world of man and the material world. This point is finite thathas been chosen from infinity. Especially the knowledge that is

expressed by language is now a knowledge which is finite, de-

finite, and capable of being made mathematical as well as

which is established under logical forms, in a word, which is

formal knowledge-information. Living knowledge, in turn, has

not yet been deprived of its relationship with existence as well

as it has not been broken off, separated, put into language fra- 52




mes and `preserved`. The idea, which by the influence of `the

thing in itself` has been transformed from the passive existence

in the world of ideas into the form of active existence and

which returns to life and is refreshed, is the very empirical

cognition. (And then it is put into the Procrustes frame of for-

mal logic and utilized for preserving and then preserved - with

material ways out of burning cognition).

Theoretical cognition, in turn, is the product of the

thought which is directed to the inner of man and to his idealworld, not to the material world and to `the thing in itself`.

These epistemological problems are expressed in Eastern

(Islamic) philosophy with the term of `illumination` (ishraq).

The attempts towards the explanation of epistemological

problems by means of the notion of `illumination` were also

known to Ancient Greek Philosophy. Referring to an unknown

philosopher, Aristotle said in a passage of Rhetoric: ‘God kind-led our reason to be a lamp within our soul’.

23 His comparison

of reason with the light within the human soul shows that

relating light to the divine source of human thought and ente-

ring wajd (the state of ecstasy in Sufism) and revelation to

epistemology do not belong only to Medieval Islamic Philoso-

phy. However what is of concern in Aristotle`s teaching is the

phenomenon of intellect as a whole; the relationship betweenobject and the knowledge about it are not a subject of discus-

sion within this context. Al-Suhrawardi took a step further in

this problem and tried to reveal the mechanism of the cognitive

process. What is important here is to determine the initial car-

23 Aristotle, Rhetoric, tr. W. Rhys Roberts, 2010 The Pennsylvania

State University, p.75

53




rier of information. Namely, to what extent the thing-object is

initial, comparing to our knowledge, and to what extent it is the

carrier of truth; or, truth is a phenomenon, which was given to

man by nature and revealed in the light of the divine contact

and, in fact, is an independent phenomenon comparing to the

thing-object. If so, then the adequacy between the information

that the thing carries and our knowledge is not only the result

of the sensory experiment, but the result of deriving both of

them from the same divine beginning and the transformation of

the same idea from the same beginning into the human ego and

things (in the shape of form).

One of the main differences of the Modern Philosophy

with Ancient Greek philosophy and Medieval philosophy is

that not only it removed the indifference to the sensory experi-

ment but also tried to base scientific knowledge on observation

and experiment. Unlike the rationalism of Descartes, F. Baconand Spinoza, the development of Naturphilosophie (philoso-

phy of nature) by Galileo and Newton as well as the attempts

of F. Bacon and J. Locke towards establishing new science on

the basis of the methodology based on sensory cognition divi-

ded philosophy into two diametrically opposite lines. These

two lines were in fact the extension and struggle of the lines of

Aristotle and Plato, which were founded in Ancient Time, inModern Time.

One of the main problems that philosophical thought fa-

ced in 18th

century was the problem of passing from empirical

knowledge to theoretical knowledge. In this very period, it

seems as if I. Kant showed an initiative to combine these two

lines and to establish the entire conception of cognition, and

tried to found the entire unit system that included the relations54




between sensory and rational cognitions. In this sense, Kant`s

teaching could be also accepted even as a bridge between ma-

terialism and idealism. Kant does not regard matter as deriva-

tive from idea and as a form when he speaks of the relation

between the sensual image and the sensory object. `It has been

sufficiently demonstrated by the critique of pure reason that

there can be absolutely no theoretical knowledge beyond the

objects of the senses, nor any theoretico-dogmatic knowledge,

since in that case everything would have to be known a priorithrough concepts; and this for the simple reason, that all con-

cepts must be capable of resting upon an intuition of some sort,

to provide them with objective reality; but all our intuition is

sensuous.`24

By looking at the later development line of philosophical

thought we can see that these peace efforts were not so suc-

cessful as well as the initiative towards establishing theoreticalknowledge and scientific theories on empirical material and

basing them on the philosophical plane did not justify itself.

The analysis of the development way of scientific knowledge

shows that theory is possible only due to generalizing idea.

Such ideas, in turn, are not taken from experiment and they be-

come possible only as a product of rational thinking. Especially

the development of mathematics, and the possibility of the re-lative-independent formation of abstract theoretical construc-

tions without being dependent on experiment, reinforced the

necessity of the return to the line of Plato once again. That is to

say, gaining the truth and founding perfect theoretical tea-

chings demonstrated the necessity of the abstraction from the

24 Kant, Theoretical Philosophy after 1781, Cambridge, 2002, p. 385

55




sensory world as well as the necessity of seeking for the con-

nection with the world of forms. Indeed, the above-mentioned

examples from al-Suhrawardi show that the ideas about the two

independent sources of cognition were put forward still in the

Middle Ages. Namely, it was claimed in these teachings that

the basic way to reach the truth was not based on the sensory

experiment but on the divine illumination (ishraq), ecstasy and

unveiling (wajd and kashf). The analogical approaches in 19th

and 20th

centuries continued in the different branches of

intuitivism and irrationalism and this process, in turn, demon-

strates the appearance of the necessity of the return from the

Aristotelian line, which has been methodological basis in

science for a long time, to the line of Plato.

56



Al-Suhrawardi’s Doctrine and

Phenomenology

Although the doctrine of Shihabaddin Yahya al-Suhra-

wardi (1154-1191) emerged from a combination of several

doctrines, it is an original and independent theory, one which

unfortunately has not yet been deeply studied. However, as

time passes, this doctrine not only does not become outdated,

but becomes more timely. In it can be found elements and the

main principles of Kantian philosophy, phenomenology, exis-tentialism, intuitionism, and even Freudianism and several

other modern doctrines.

Al-Suhrawardi’s philosophy was created through a

combination of Zoroastrianism, ancient Greek philosophy, Is-

lamic theology (kalam), and Sufism. Employing an original

synthesis of Plato and Aristotle, he made a great step forward

in the direction of formulating rationalism in the modern sense.If we abstract ourselves from the ontological problem of al-

Suhrawardi’s rather complex and comprehensive doctrine and

∗ Islamic Philosophy and Occidental Phenomenology on the Perennial

Issue of Microcosm and Macrocosm. ed. Anna-Teresa Tymieniceka,

(Berlin: Springer, 2006), pp. 262-276.

57




focus our attention only on the issue of the mind and cognition,

we can see very great similarities with phenomenology.

Al-Suhrawardi’s doctrine has its own specific termino-

logy. According to him, light is a personification of the divine,

while darkness is a representation of the sensible world. But, in

an approach distinct from that of Plato, al-Suhrawardi does not

confront the world of ideas and its relation to the sensible

world. Al-Suhrawardi’s doctrine rather deals with the irradia-

tion of the human and the illumination of man’s inner world.

Only at the moment of illumination does the human acquire

authentic knowledge through revelation. Cognition of the per-

ceptible world is not denied. However, according to al-Suhra-

wardi, only the outer aspects of an object, rather than its inner

aspects, are cognized on the perceptual level and through

sensible experience.25

For al-Suhrawardi, it is in the process of illuminationthat the thinking soul acquires all the real form of an object,

which is whole and cannot be analyzed. On the contrary,

analysis concerns only sensible things. In addition, a thing is

unable to create anything nobler than itself. He considered

delusion to be inevitable in the sphere of observation and

perception. Yet delusion is not excluded in the sphere of logic

and verbal description. Truth can neither be expressed bywords, nor fitted into language.

26 On the contrary, verbal des-

cription occurs only after illumination has ceased. The truth

cannot be attained through perception, or representation, or in-

ference.

25 Al-Suhrawardi 1999a, p. 21826 H.Z. Ulken 1995, p. 236

58



Al-Suhrawardi’s Doctrine and Phenomenology

Although in the gnoseology of al-Suhrawardi, knowled-

ge is achieved through the interrelations between humans and

the perceptible world, on the one hand, and the world of light,

on the other. In its ontological aspect, the thinking soul stands

at the center of his attention. He assumes that a human is able

to see an object only if it is illuminated. That is to say, for an

object to be cognized by a human, there needs to be an

emanation generated by the Light of Lights, i.e. an illumination

of the soul, al-Ishraq

27

Thus, matter concerns the interrelationof object and subject, and enlightenment concerns them both.

Due to the impact of the object, enlightenment occurs in the

human’s inner world, and he cognizes what is in himself

already. This interrelation resembles the role played by the

‘thing in itself’’ in Kant’s doctrine.

The source of light is not any object, but the Supreme

Light, Nur al-Anvar. In his The Shape of Light, al-Suhrawardiwrites that you cognize a thing only by generating the image of

it in yourself. The object cognized by you ought to be adequate

to that thing, otherwise you would be unable to cognize it as it

is.28

Unlike Kant, al-Suhrawardi admits the cognizibililty of

things, objects, because he stresses the adequacy between the

thing and image. At first glance, it may be thought that this

position coincides with the sensualist theory of cognition. Butwhen viewed in the context of al-Suhrawardi’s doctrine, it be-

comes clear that he is not speaking of the object, but of the

generation of the image of the object by human imagination.

On the other hand, the image is not understood as a set of

27 M A Razavi 1998, p 606.28 Al-Suhrawardi 1999a, p 217.

59




sensations, rather as proceeding from the cogitative soul i.e.

reason. Al-Suhrawardi writes: “your rational soul-intellect is

neither body, nor corporeal, nor implied for it is revealed to

some extent. It is an indivisible element, it exists permanently,

and no imagination may divide it.29

When reading this book, it

becomes clear that his theory is more about ideas than about

sensual images. By contrast, ideas take part in the formation of

sensual images as a whole. “Sometimes it happens that the soul

internally observes a mental thing (emphasis added),30

and at

some point it imaginarily imitates it, and that image is reflected

onto the sensual world.31

Al-Suhrawardi does not deny the participation of sen-

sible objects in the cognition process, for in his doctrine the

soul plays quite a significant role vis-à-vis the object. To be

explicit, at first enlightenment has to occur at the intellectual

level in order for the object to be seen. According to the naturalsciences, light (here spoken of not as enlightenment, but as an

optic phenomenon) brightens an object, which is then reflected,

strikes the senses, and causes the creation of a definite sensible

image. The light here is an ordinary cause along with other

physical qualities (such as sound and heat) and is known to be

29 Al-Suhrawardi 1999a, p 217.30 Being different from the sensing of sensual things and objects,

directing thought to a mental thing is consonant with the expression“internal representation” in modern philosophy. The expression to observe

internally reinforces this conclusion even more and calls to mind inten-

tionality. Moreover, in al-Suhrawardi these expressions do not have an oc-

casional character, but rather are used in a systematic manner and are the

main terms in his theory of cognition. We want to emphasize once more that

in al-Suhrawardi ‘internal observation’ is directed at mental objects.31 Al-Suhrawardi 1999a, p 229.

60




a simple transmitter. Actually, sight possesses a number of ad-

vantages and priorities vis-à-vis other senses; it plays a greater

role in the entire implication of entities and events. However,

the whole sensible image cannot be generated from sense-

perceived data, for the essence of the object is embodied in the

whole image. That wholeness (eidos, form) is generated by

physical light, but as a result of an emanation, i.e. being not the

result of perception, but of intellection.

This analysis indicates that al-Suhrawardi came close toKant’s gnoseology, or more correctly, that he anticipated Kant.

Analyzing al-Suhrawardi’s “Hikmat al-Ishraq,” Russian philo-

sopher Smirnov writes that, like Ibn Sina (Avicenna), al-Suh-

rawardi distinguished between two kinds of True Cognition:

direct, intuitive cognition and indirect, logical cognition. Ac-

cording to al-Suhrawardi, direct acquisition of truth is con-

nected with the cognition of “self,” while logical cognition isassociated with investigation.

32

Is there not conformity between the truth acquired by

means of investigation and Kant’s notion of “experience?” The

first mode of cognition, again just as in Kant, is considered to

be innate cognition. It is very interesting that al-Suhrawardi,

not satisfied with only this, also classified knowledge as fol-

lows: “innate knowledge” and “acquired knowledge.” This isKant`s distinction of a priori and a posteriori knowledge

enunciated in other terms.

According to al-Suhrawardi’s doctrine, at first a human

has to cognize himself in order to acquire knowledge and

32 Smirnov 1998, p. 57.

61




cognize any object.33

This idea can be viewed in the context of

Socrates’ dictum “Know thyself.” However, here the emphasis

is on “the object,” not on the “self.” The point is an inquiry into

self by cognizing the external object. The enlightenment disco-

very occurs when a human finds that what is in the object is

“himself.” Thus the cognitive process is possible due to an

adequacy between the “self” and the external object.34

A question arises at this point: Does this inquiry of

humans into the “self” in order to cognize the object, seeking

knowledge of it first in the self, not signify a priori know-

ledge? (Though al-Suhrawardi does not use the term a priori,

he seeks the origin of knowledge first in the self, then in the

object.) Here it is possible also to divide human “inquiry into

the self” into two steps. In as much as humans may cognize

any object through comparison with knowledge gained through

previous experiences, that knowledge appears to be a pos-teriori rather than a priori. Kant himself wrote in this respect:

“In what follows, therefore, we shall understand by a priori

knowledge, not knowledge independent of this or that expe-

rience, but knowledge absolutely independent of all expe-

rience.”35

The goal of cognition is ascension from the knowledge

acquired in semidarkness to the knowledge achieved incomplete illumination. Referring to al-Suhrawardi’s imaginary

discussion with Aristotle, Corbin writes: “His first answer to

the seeker who questions him is ‘Awaken to yourself’. Then

begins a progressive initiation into self-knowledge as know-

33 Razavi, p. 60734 Al-Suhrawardi 1999a, p. 22335 Kant 2003, p. 43.

62




ledge which is neither the product of abstraction, nor a re-

presentation of the object through the intermediary of a form, a

Species, but a Knowledge which is identical to the Soul itself,

to the personal, existential subjectivity, and which is therefore

essentially life, light, epiphany, and awareness of self.”36

Al-Suhrawardi opposes the view that people’s souls are

parts of a unified soul likened to a divine being, because a

single, incorporeal being cannot have parts. In explaining thelink between the divine being and individual souls, al-Suhra-

wardi compares the soul to a wick. Wicks are enkindled by fire

and then while the wick burns, and the fire remains intact and

is undivided.

In traditional Peripatetic thought the notion of “indivi-

sibility” is regarded as an attribute of simplicity. In al-Suhra-

wardi, the soul, though indivisible, is at the same time hetero-geneous. All of these aspects of the soul must then be reviewed

in the light of another notion, that of the whole. The soul has an

elevation which raises a person from an animal soul to a ratio-

nal one. In the middle are all the senses, perceptions, and so on.

Unfortunately, Descartes does not accept the possibility

of a conditional partition of the soul and speaks against the idea

of any interaction between the lower and higher parts of thesoul. As he writes: “For there is within us but one soul, and this

soul has within it no diversity of parts; it is at once sensitive

and rational too, and all its appetites are volitions. It is an error

to identify the different functions of the soul with persons who

play different, usually mutually opposed roles – an error which

36 Corbin 1993, p. 210.

63




arises simply from our failure to distinguish properly the func-

tions of the soul from those of the body”.37

Furthermore, Descartes tries to explain all this by re-

lying on natural scientific considerations, on the construction

of the parts of the body: the brain, heart, the circulation of the

blood. Here an important drawback of Aristotle’s doctrine ap-

pears in Descartes, according to which the sensual level of the

soul is ascribed to the body. He writes: “So there is no conflict

here except in so far as the little gland in the middle of the

brain can be pushed to one side by the soul and to the other

side by the animal spirits (which, as I said above, are nothing

but bodies), and these two impulses often happen to be oppo-

sed, the stronger canceling the effect of the weaker”.38

In al-Suhrawardi, the internal structure of the soul is

described as comprising two spheres. The macrostructure, as

already mentioned, includes the animal soul, the sensual soul(“power of soul”) and the rational soul, whereas the micro-

structure comprises composite parts of all of these levels. For

instance, in describing the middle link he sets forth five “outer”

and five “inner” senses. The outer senses are the traditional

sensations: “touch,” “taste,” “smell,” “hearing” and “sight;” the

inner senses are “common sense” ( sensus ommunis) (which is a

faculty integrating all of the sense-perceived data), “retentiveimagination” (which is the repository of all the forms integra-

ted by the sensus communis), “estimation” (which enables a

subject to judge the imperceptible intentions of individual sen-

sible objects), “compositive [and creative] imagination” (ana-

37 Descartes 1985b, Vol. 1, p. 346.38 Ibid.

64




lysis, synthesis, and investigation are accomplished due to this

sense), and finally “memory.”39

The animal soul stands at the lowest level in the internal

hierarchy of the soul. Contact with the body is realized through

the animal soul. All senses arising from the requirements of the

body pertain to it. All desires and passions pertain to it as well.

There is a relation between the different levels of the soul. The

animal soul is the carrier of the requirements of the rational

soul. While the body lives, the soul governs it.

40

Al-Suhrawardi presents this example in order to explain this rela-

tion. A thing that generally causes pleasure or pain sometimes

occurs without causing them. The sensual state of a person can

be such that he may not feel the pain of a blow, or not be made

happy by some pleasant event.41

Hence, the reality of sensation

does not depend only on the external cause that gave rise to it,

but is also related to the propensity of the soul to experiencethat sensation.

The doctrine of al-Suhrawardi contains a hierarchy of

light (nur ) as well. This system is very complex. There are

many types of light in al-Suhrawardi.

But in order for it to be clear we would like to present

this complex system in the relatively simple model given

below in Fig. 1 (Schema 1). It is difficult to imagine this modelin three-dimensional space. As the corporeal world itself is

three dimensional and natural light is understood within it, we

can imagine the light of reason only in a fourth dimension.

39 Al-Suhrawardi 1998, pp. 30-32.40 Al-Suhrawardi 1999a, p. 218.41 Ibid, p. 227.

65




That is to say that thought should go beyond traditional

geometrical notions. The main purpose is to demonstrate exis-

tence alongside the corporeal world and the world of reason,

for the structure of the soul can only be demonstratively ima-

gined in terms of its spatial contact. In al-Suhrawardi, the rela-

tionship between the soul and the body, on the one hand, and

the world of reason, on the other, requires imagining both of

the worlds in the same space in order to understand the soul.

There is another major feature of the soul in al-Suhra-

wardi, which is its individuality. In our first model, we illustrate

the relationship of the corporeal and the mental world of one soul,

which is still not

sufficient. There is

an interim world of

individual souls in

al-Suhrawardi, andtaking this into ac-

count as well makes

the model conside-

rably complex. We

present this comple-

xity in schemata 2

and 3 in Fig. 1. Thisscheme, however, is

not advantageous for

creating a general

impression. The dis-

course in the doc-

trine of al-Suhrawar-

di goes beyond the66




scope of human cognition. Here the Heavens also possess cog-

nition and stand at a higher level in the hierarchy. It should also

be taken into consideration that there is one more thing that

creates difficulties in that the relationship between the

corporeal world and the world of souls is expressed as being

between external and internal worlds in ordinary thinking and

language. If we want to adapt to this we have to imagine the

soul as being within the body. Moreover, in al-Suhrawardi’s

doctrine, the soul of Heaven, the Light of Lights, and otherlevels must be placed inside. But if we consider the traditional

usage of the notions of “internal” and “external” to be quasi

contrary, both nature and “heaven” in common consciousness

will remain inside the circle. And the world of reason (the

world of light), which is greater and infinite, surrounds it and

stands outside. Then the system of all these complex relations,

such as darkness within the circle and the helplessness of eventhe sun, the coming of light from the outside (the cosmos...),

and the illumination of the soul by the light of reason would be

framed more correctly. However the unconformity of this

complex doctrine with the ordinary mind was the cause of

some erroneous interpretations both in the East and,

subsequently, in the West. Various philosophers have

incorrectly seen a parallel expression for “reason” in the me-taphor of “light.”

In his book Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Ri-

chard Rorty places great importance on the metaphor of “mir-

ror reflection” when explaining rationalism.42

Pointing to the

capability of reason to reflect the truth as it is and, thereby,

42 Rorty 1997, pp. 32-33.

67




play the role of a “mirror,” to use Francis Bacon’s words, Ror-

ty at the same time reminds us of the inappropriateness of this

metaphor in the context of sensory cognition. For Bacon, who

equated the human intellect with sensory perception, the “intel-

lect mirror” naturally distorts and creates delusive appearan-

ces.43

However, neither the representatives of empirical philo-

sophy, nor Descartes and the rationalists that followed him,

directed their attention to the “mirror” essence of reason by ex-

pressing the degree of adequacy and authenticity of the know-

ledge obtained through reason (which is largely because Des-

cartes’ rationalism is a vague rationalism).

However, it is also a fact that several centuries pre-

viously a doctrine of pure rationalism existed and the “mirror

reflection” metaphor was used to express its essence more

clearly.44

It is interesting that this is spoken of as a twofold (eventhreefold) reflection in al-Suhrawardi. This is because his doc-

trine of cognition constitutes a multifaceted hierarchic system.

The highest level is the celestial level. The complete revelation

of truth, the most radiant condition of knowledge, is on this le-

vel. The world of reason is illuminated by the divine light ( Nur

al-anvar ). That is why, as the first mirror reflection, the level

of cognition can be considered to be in direct contact with theDivinity (His reflection, emanation), which corresponds to

Neo-Platonic and scholastic notions. In this, al-Suhrawardi

describes the essence of the first mirror reflection: “The soul

sometimes enters the holy (Guds) world and merges with its

43 Ibid.44 Al-Suhrawardi 1999a, p 229.

68




Holy Father, obtains knowledge from Him ... both in sleep and

wakefulness, as if standing in front of an ornamental panorama

and, as a mirror-reflecting ornament, acquires extra-mundane

data” from them.45

Attachment to the body precludes the soul

from joining the world of reasons46

and reflecting them. But

“when bodily attachments are lessened, the soul joins the

celestial souls.”47

The soul’s finding what it seeks means deli-

berate direction of thought. In this context al-Suhrawardi puts

forward the model of a twofold mirror: “Know that souls may‘see’ varieties of forms because the sensus communis knows

that whatever form appears is due to the ‘vision’ of that form;

and the faculty of imagination will be imprinted from it, as

between two facing mirrors. Two things prevent the faculty of

imagination from imprinting forms upon the sensus communis:

when the mind preoccupies the imagination with thoughts; and

when outer senses preoccupy it with sense perceptions – resul-ting in the distraction of the sensus communis.

48

45 Al-Suhrawardi 1999a, p 229.46 It would be relevant to recall Suhrawardi’s own classification in

order to understand correctly the place of the “world of reasons” in his

doctrine. According to Suhrawardi there are three worlds: the first is the

world of reasons, the second is the world of souls, and, finally, the third is

the world of things. If we consider that the soul’s highest level is the ra-tional soul, then it will be clear that there is a difference between reason and

the mind that is included in the soul. There is a difference in terms of degree between them. Suhrawardi notes that the light of the first being illuminates

reason. Then there originates the passage from reason to soul, which is

possible due to the reflection of reflection. Suhrawardi writes that “the

reflection of light is more honorable than the reflection of its reflection”

(Ibid, p.225).47 Al-Suhrawardi 1998, p 81.48 Al-Suhrawardi 1998, p. 82.

69




Imagination has a special place in al-Suhrawardi’s doc-

trine of ‘reflection in the world of reason.’ Unlike memory,

which remembers sensory images, imagination vitalizes ‘men-

tal things’ in thought and creates imaginary relations among

them: “The image may ... be illuminated upon the faculty of

imagination and from there fall upon the sensus communis,

thus making it visible [to the subject]. Thus, the subject may

see a pleasant form, which may even speak to the person in

pleasant terms; or the subject may not hear a voice nor see a

writ. All such phenomena are due to [images] that are im-

printed upon the sensus communis”.49

In al-Suhrawardi, the architectonics and structure of the

soul are so perfect that it can only be talked about by first ap-

proaching the classics of Western philosophy. Rorty considers

one of Descartes’ greatest merits to be “the differentiation of

thought and extended substance”

50

. However, in the doctrine ofal-Suhrawardi, there is already a perfect system of such dif-

ferentiation. In his ‘Statutes of Light,’ al-Suhrawardi writes:

“The soul does not become nonsense with the nothingness of

body, because it does not possess extension”51

. To explain this

idea, he gives an interesting example. There is no definiteness

to the dimensions of an elephant or a fly as such. However, in

reality (existence), they do differ in their dimensions and vo-lumes. They do not, however, occupy space in their soul; thus

they are non-dimensional.52

49 Ibid, p. 83.50 Rorty 1997, p 32.51 Al-Suhrawardi 1999a, p. 226.52 Ibid, p. 217.

70




In another place, al-Suhrawardi writes: “The soul does

not originate due to any thing, as a thing cannot create some-

thing nobler than itself.”53

On this issue his position funda-

mentally differs from Aristotle’s. According to Aristotle, “It ...

seems that all the affections of soul involve a body.”54

But al-

Suhrawardi puts the emphasis on the independence of the soul

from the body and on its functioning due to illumination. The

soul both cognizes and controls the body. Aristotle puts forth

the question of “how could what has no parts think what has parts, or what has parts think what has none?”

55 Aristotle does

not take into account the essence and degree of difference, the

essential difference between the soul and the body. In contrast,

there is a hierarchy of them in al-Suhrawardi: Soul is higher

and nobler than body. Therefore, though what has parts cannot

think what has no parts, what has no parts can think what has

parts.The ancient Greeks always had what is universal at the

center of their attention. The eidos of Plato and the forms of

Aristotle are universal. However, likening souls one to another

does not explain the individuality and the true existence of hu-

mans. It is one thing if in the example of the soul the point is

some human essence in general; it is another if the soul is the

essence of each individual, his personality, and his ‘ego.’ Inthis understanding the soul is equivalent to ‘consciousness.’

Unlike Plato, al-Suhrawardi asserts that eide are in the

body itself and, unlike Aristotle, he does not accentuate form as

53 Ibid, p. 221.54 Aristotle 2001, p. 537.55 Aristotle 2001, p. 545.

71




being a substance. In al-Suhrawardi’s view, a thing is a thing

only with a form. As M. Abou Rayan notes, according to al-

Suhrawardi, things consist of matter and sensual qualities.56

Al-Suhrawardi’s notion of idea (‘heyet’ ) of is more assonant

with Locke’s notion of “idea” than with Plato’s. The location

of an idea in a thing illuminates it to some degree; it is not in a

state of darkness, but of semidarkness. Finally, according to al-

Suhrawardi, the shapes of these eide are also in the mind

(rational soul) and, therefore, their reflections in the necessary

illumination can appear as identification.57

Hence, he does not

give ground to dualism. In his view, these two essences, two

worlds, are in a unity. But, according to dualists like Descartes,

Malebranche, and Leibniz, physical and mental phenomena

cannot be associated.58

The al-Suhrawardi’s doctrine is monistic on the ontolo-

gical plane as well. For him, darkness is not a self-containedsubstance and is explained as the absence of light. Light is the

essence of a unified being.

Descartes was the first Western philosopher to separate

the soul and the body, which he viewed as two different sub-

stances. According to Descartes, the soul has no extension. Al-

Suhrawardi also asserted this. “The soul does not disappear

with the disappearance of the body, because it does not possessextension.”

59

Now, Rorty, to give an example, ascribes this theory

only to Descartes. This is true only given that the Western

56 Rayan 1976, p. 260.57 Al-Suhrawardi 1976, p.71.58 See Priest 2000, p. 25.59 Al-Suhrawardi 1999a, p. 227.

72




world is still not sufficiently aware of Eastern philosophy. Reza

Davari Ardakani, who supports the opinion Rorty expresses,

makes the following generalization in his article on the com-

mon features of Islamic Philosophy and Phenomenology: “Is-

lamic philosophy and mysticism can neither be considered

phenomenology nor its root, since phenomenology has been

nourished in a new philosophical and intellectual context and

emerged only after Kant and Descartes.”60

He tries to establish

this by noting that in ancient philosophy the knower and theknown were not differentiated. But while this declaration takes

in all Islamic Philosophy too, the point was actually contested

therein before Descartes. Perhaps Ardakani’s declaration ap-

pears so for the reason that he does not consider the doctrines

of Ibn Sina and al-Suhrawardi, who put forward the principles

of the demarcation of the knower and the known several

centuries before Descartes. Moreover, Descartes was not al-ways consistent in his position. Sometimes, he wandered too

far toward naturalism and tried to explain the mind through

physiological processes in the body.

It could be thought that since Descartes stands between

al-Suhrawardi and Husserl, it would be more reasonable to

compare al-Suhrawardi and Descartes first. However, reflec-

tion shows that, although Descartes is in the middle chrono-logically, the sequence in the relative position of the doctrines

here is different. In actuality, the philosophy of ‘ Ishraq’ is

somewhere between that of Descartes and Husserl. Some of al-

Suhrawardi’s thoughts are very relevant even within the con-

text of the research of the most recent philosophers.

60 Ardakani 2003, p. 242.

73




Despite the great achievements of Ibn Sina and al-

Suhrawardi in the formulation of rationalism as a whole sys-

tem, the prioritization of knowledge would not be accom-

plished in Western rationalism until Kant and until that point

the treatment of knowledge had a merely syncretic character.

Reason, feelings, desires, and knowledge obtained through ex-

perience, their logical analysis, etc., all occupied the same

space. Here Rorty points out the definition of thought given by

Descartes: “By the term ‘thought,’ I understand everything

which we are aware of as happening within us, in so far as we

have awareness of it. Hence, thinking is to be identified here

not merely with understanding, willing, and imagining, but also

with sensory awareness.”61

As can be seen, Descartes’s approach does not coincide

with that of modern phenomenology. Taking reason as pure

reason, differentiating it from practical reason and sensoryexperience, differentiating a priori knowledge from a poste-

riori knowledge, and analytic and a priori synthetic arguments

from synthetic experiential arguments in philosophy, all began

with Kant, and this demarcation and crystallization of concepts

made it possible for Husserl to create a theoretical doctrine that

is perfect, both philosophically and logically, and considerably

free of the internal contradictions seen in syncretic rationalism.Husserl writes: “The faith in the possibility of philosophy as a

task, that is, in the possibility of universal knowledge, is

something we cannot let go. We know that we are called to this

task as serious philosophers.”62

61 Descartes 1985c, p. 195.62 Husserl 1970, p. 17.

74




According to al-Suhrawardi, beyond the individual soul

there are souls in the High Heavens existing outside its margins

both in terms of their scale and in terms of the power of

passion. According to the philosophers, along with our rational

soul there exists a living, enlightened celestial soul, which is in

love with its originator, rational souls loving with eternal

passion.63

In one of his works, Kant writes on the destiny of

mankind: “Individuals and even whole peoples think little onthis. Each, according to his own inclination, follows his own

purpose, often in opposition to others; yet each individual and

people, as if following some guiding thread, go toward a

natural but to each of them unknown goal; all work toward

furthering it, even if they would set little store by it if they did

know it”.64

Herein Kant talks about the purpose of nature. He emphasizes that, although individuals and things do not possess

their own plans, because nature has a common plan, they are

therefore related.65

Al-Suhrawardi writes: “The thing that is

necessarily renewed and continues to exist is ‘motion’. Every

motion may cease, with the exception of the circular motion of

the celestial spheres. These cause innovations to happen in our

world. Unless the first effective factor alters, there is no causesetting innovative things in motion. If the motion of the ce-

lestial spheres motion ceased what would induce innovative

things to happen? The motion of heaven is volitional”.66

63 Al-Suhrawardi 1999b, p 213.64 Kant 1963, pp 11-12.65 Ibid, p 12.66 Al-Suhrawardi, 1999a, p.. 223.

75




The explanation of celestial motion by its soul in al-

Suhrawardi is more comparable to Kant’s notion of “natural

purpose” and Schopenhauer’s notion of “universal will” than to

hylozoism. “It is soul that makes Heaven move.”67

According

to al-Suhrawardi the processes taking place in the universe are

the causes of innovations in our world. That is to say, connec-

tions between large-scale and small-scale phenomena are gene-

rated by the relations between big and small purposes, as well

as by the universal and individual souls. Kant writes: “Since

the philosopher cannot presuppose any [conscious] individual

purpose among men in their great drama, there is no other ex-

pedient for him except to try to see if he can discover a natural

purpose in this idiotic course of things human. In keeping with

this purpose, it might be possible to have a history with a de-

finite natural plan for creatures who have no plan of their

own”.

68

This thought of Kant is consonant with al-Suhrawardi’s

idea of a ‘spark in the darkness,’ and this in its turn can be

compared to the notion of ‘order in chaos,’ which constitutes

the basis of synergism.

How can it be that order, harmony, and ‘purposeful

events’ originate on the ground of disorderly, complicated mo-

tions in amorphous systems? Or how can it be possible that inendless and infinite darkness illumination takes place within it

or in part of it?

Though the relations between big and small systems,

the universe and the human world, macrocosm and microcosm

67 Ibid. 68 Kant 1963, p. 12.

76




in al-Suhrawardi’s, as well as Kant’s, doctrine somehow re-

mind one of astrology, it may simply be that possessing a per-

fect philosophical system is the methodological background for

astrology. Distinct from the material unity of the world, here is

a unity of ideas, a unity of purpose, a unity of souls – of uni-

versal consciousness and individual consciousness! Here is a

merging of parts with the whole and of individual conscious-

ness with world consciousness! Here Kant is very consonant

with al-Suhrawardi and Husserl. Although Husserl, unlikeKant, does not speak of universal, but only of European huma-

nity, the purpose he seas at work is the same.

Husserl is original because the full formulation of ra-

tionalism in modern European philosophy was first accom-

plished by him. However, in our view, before being a philoso-

phical doctrine, the doctrine of Husserl is a meta-mathematical

and meta-scientific doctrine, and such an attitude toward philosophy in Europe had been developed by scholars long

before. But where mere scientists do not try to ground their

indifference to every metaphysical appearance… Descartes and

Husserl set this very goal for themselves.

Indeed, Descartes is one of those who laid the

conceptual base of modern European thought. This was not

because he raised rationalism to a high level, but rather because, somehow in acting as a renaissance scholar, he took

part in the process of connecting the rationalist ideas of the

ancient Greeks, primarily Aristotle, and to some extent of

medieval Eastern (Islamic) scholars, with the experimental

sciences which are the main success story of modern times and

so initiated the self-cognition of this scientific process in the

philosophical sphere.77




The principal merit of Descartes and Bacon is primarily

their founding what we call today the “philosophy of science.”

It should be taken into consideration that modern Western

civilization is characterized more by science and the practical

application of science than by any philosophical doctrine.

Descartes himself writes that “it is not enough to have a good

mind; the main thing is to apply it well.”69

Yes, science and its application can be considered the

symbols of the West! But which science? The science of

sciences, world-comprehending science, deductive axiomatic

science that attempts to frame an abstract mathematical philo-

sophical system, or that science which to a large degree is ac-

cumulated through experience and serves practice, application,

and the science of techniques?

Does not the technologism that Husserl so much dis-

liked stand at the foundation of modern Europe? On the onehand, Husserl speaks about the European spirit; on the other

hand, he opposes skepticism and empiricism. But, in fact,

Europe (actually when I say Europe I mean the whole of the

West in today′s realities) established the basis of modern Wes-

tern Civilization primarily due to its empiricism and scientific

practical activity. Consequently, in our view, Francis Bacon

symbolizes the essence of modern times better than does Rene´Descartes. When seeking a remedy for the crisis of Europe in

modern times, Husserl puts forward phenomenology in part as

an alternative to empiricism, technologism, and positivism. By

that does he want to save Europe from crisis or from the Wes-

tern core? Or will another doctrine, that of existentialism,

69 Descartes 1985a, p.111.

78




which took its essential features from phenomenology, restore

the true image of Europe? Is not existentialism an Eastern

phenomenon emergent in the geographical West? No, quite the

opposite! These doctrines signify a synthesis with the East or a

return to the East rather than a return to Europe or the West!

79



Intentionality and Transcendentality

The cognition’s subject intentionally finds out the idea

carried by the object or event when cognizing it. That is to say,

the idea passively contained in the object is not illuminated by

itself, but as a result of focus of human’s-subject’s attention on

it. In conception of Ishragism it is called illumination, but in

phenomenology it is intentionality.

The phenomenon differs from the object itself in the

point that not the whole complex of passive ideas but only one

of them are illuminated, and in considered context it replaces

the object. But the rest is the collection of passive ideas which

remains dark to the subject is called “thing in itself” by Kant.

In this meaning darkness could also be understood as non-

being.

Thus, in fact “thing in itself” as it is presented in Kant’s

conception, is not something that remains untouchable, dark for

the human being, but it is assessed as a dark part standing in

every concrete cognition process. In this approach, relying to

synthesis of agnosticism and phenomenology a new model of

knowledge appears here. Transcendentality is being relativized

and conditioned by intentionality.

The process of cognition doesn’t only begin by means of

external sense organs. To achieve the truth it is necessary the80




joining of the soul to this process. Especially, the poetry is

need of it. The famous Arabic poet and thinker Ameen Rihani

wrote: “A body”, says Umapati in a chapter on the Soul’s

Enlightenment, “lives by union with the soul; so the embodied

soul lives by union with pure Thought.”70

The problem of

illumination of soul is not only necessary part of poetry, but

also in general, of the true cognition. The factor of illumination

of soul is very important in the ishragism of Suhrawardi and

generally in tasavvuf. By this way, according to these doctrinesthe covert aims and deep means that can not be achieved just

by perception but only can be opened by illumination. Ameen

Rihani explains it that: “This is the highest, noblest form of

spirituality – the divine essence, which can be attained only by

those who follow devotedly the path of vision – those who seek

the light that bridges the darkness between eye and soul, and

without which there can be no vision. But there is what might be called a workaday spirituality, which is within the reach of

all. And we need not be afraid to yield in this to the practical

spirit of the times to discover the light within us”.71

The light within us illuminates the things and is evident

to its idea. Suhrawardi wrote: “Anything that apprehends its

own essence is a pure light, and every pure light is evident to

itself and apprehends its own essence.”72

The enlivened idea ofhuman being is the same with the illumination of the idea of

the thing.

70 Rihani Ameen F., The path of Vision, Platform İnternational,

Washington, D.C., 2008, p. 12.71 Ibid.72 Suhrawardi, The philosophy of illumination, Brigham Young

University Press, Provo, Utah, 1999, p. 82.

81




Anna-Teresa Tymieniechka connects the illumination

with idea of “phenomena”: “All is the work of logos. Reason?

Spirit, life, human significance, partake of its innumerable

lights. They manifest themselves in concrete phenomena within

the orbit of living beings”.73

Ideas in things and in genetic memory of human being

are the result of the same creation process. In other words,

passive ideas in microcosm and passive ideas in things are

equivalent to each-others, since both of them are the copies of

same active, original idea.

A human’s relation with the cosmic spirit (with the spirit

of the world) takes place as a realization of a higher level idea

that it carries. Reason is a realization of the cosmic idea. The

realization of this idea is well happens in mutual contact and

relation with external world. As the cosmic spirit (microcosm)

is the same potential base for all people, everybody knows thislanguage. But simply, for different people different parts of this

program are activated. In order to use this potential base of

knowledge that is intrinsic to a person, he has to exercise his

will.

The idea that has been illuminated and enlivened has the

possibility of being reproduced. This is turn happens during

the material realization process.The existence of several carriers of the same idea de-

pends on the ampleness of material. The possibility of creating

different things, in its turn, from the same amount of material

depends on the ampleness of ideas.

73 Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka, The Unveiling and The Unveiled //The

Passions of the Soul in the Metamorphosis of Becoming, Kluwer Academic

Publishers, 2003, XXI.

82




In the condition of idea poverty, the world would consist

of the things repeating each other and would be monotonous.

In such a case the ‘diversity’ would result only from variety of

material and space/time.

The richness of ideas, however, gives the possibility of

creation of things with different essences. This diversity often

shows itself as a potential possibility. In other words, we can

talk about a virtual diversity in such a case. On the one side

limited amount of material but a range of different ideas,forms, and projects...On the other side, by contrast, limited

number of ideas but ampleness of material...

Every creation consists of the concrete unification of

matter and idea, in other words material realization of an idea.

On the other hand, any thing that is already a reality, cannot by

itself enliven or illuminate the passive idea it carries. This is

only possible by a deliberate focus of human cognition. Hence,enlivened idea can be multiplied by hundreds of copies again.

Our real world is a result of ‘coincidental unifications’ of

the worlds of virtual ideas and virtual matters. The congrega-

tion of two opposite poled virtuals creates one reality. Some-

times it may seem to a person that he can control these con-

gregations. But a person can achieve it only in the local scale,

in the scale of realization of the concrete idea. On a broaderscale this is an uncontrollable process for a human being and it

is realized only by a greater might’s will. People call this Might

(power) – God (almighty).

The enlivenment of material things can result in the

emergence of a new essence, new system only due to the

gravity of some alive idea. This congregation is in fact syn-

thesis, i.e. the utilization of previous materials by a new es- 83




sence. In such a case the essence of summands is not in focus,

rather the whole system comes into play as a material

realization of one new alive idea or an essence. If there is no

such kind of a mobilizing idea, the ‘as if’ accumulated things

will in fact stay as themselves, and their congregation in one

place will not result in the emergence of a new essence.

***

Pantheist philosophic concepts, in fact, depart from the

idea of universal unity by relying on the ideas about the whole

sensual world and the whole nature, and identifying this

‘whole’ as a unified image, with God. At least, a human being,

his senses and thoughts remain outside of this ‘unity’. Thus,

this creates the basis for confrontation of Man-Nature.

There are a number of examples where God had been

proposed to be understood as a unity of all things He hadcreated (first approach). However, in case when God is not

separated from the sum of His creations but rather is equated to

it, this appears to coincide with classical pantheist concepts

(second approach).

In a third approach, after creating the world, God moved

away, and the world which we are in contact with became to

exist without of His influence and participation (deism). Themain active party here becomes a human being.

In a fourth approach, even after creating the world, God

continues to control processes happening in it, and any minor

acts of will and activities of a human being always becomes a

part of greater idea, and greater activity in a larger scale.

One of the issues which always was a matter of dispute in

Middle Ages philosophy was the fact that a statement “nature84




always existed” is in conflict with the statement “the nature

was created by God”. When God is identified with nature this

contradiction becomes resolved in itself, and infinity of nature

does not become an object of debate. However, if God stands

in a higher level, then doesn’t it lead to a necessary conclusion

that nature was created at some point of time? These questions

have been debated for a long time.

However, there is a fifth approach as well. According to

this approach, though a sensual world as a sum is not equatedto God, active participation of God in all things and events in

this world is presumed.

Unlike the view that all events and things, in particular

alive beings have been genetically programmed in advance and

their fates have been determined from birth (fatalism), the

approach recognizing the role of both will of a human being

and God in the world processes, gives a chance of creating a better model of the world.

In fact, the acceptance of the world as an ‘objective

reality’ or its creation by God does not change anything (this is

merely a debate between religious men and atheists, or is a

metaphysical problem in a meaning as used by positivists).

The important issue in philosophy is sound determination

of a scale and subject of active beginning in the world. Thus,there is a difference between idea that things and events have

been programmed in advance, and the idea that though the fate

of large scale processes are programmed, the small events from

which they are consisting exist simply to create a statistic ef-

fect. The fundamental issue is whether the whole nature, the

whole humanity, the whole world have been programmed and

whether they are the carriers of a certain mission.85




According to other conception, both big and small events

have been programmed. However, the alteration activity of

people possessing freedom of will distorts this harmony In

such as case which programmer is taken as a basis? Are small

ones being adjusted to the mission of the big or big ones com-

promise small ones?

In fact the mission of bigger ones prevail over the smaller

ones. As it is stated in Holy Koran, the harmony of Earth and

Haven is more complex and perfect that that of human’s who is

considered the greatest miracle.

In Spinoza’s pantheism, as well as in some traditional

pantheist-materialist concepts God is presented in a personality

of sensual world. Understanding of the idea of God in the

context of natural laws, and harmony of the world is closer to

materialist views. However, how do those who are not accep-

ting sensual world as a being, and who are considering an ideaas a being, formulate the relationship between God and the

world, and in what form can pantheism come into play here?

If we identify the world of ideas with God, then the

matter of relationship between sensual world and God, will

come to the same point as the relation between an idea and a

thing. However, this will not be a traditional pantheism, be-

cause according to this approach the sensual world is a worldwhich does not have any relation with God. This approach is

closer to views of some religious persons. Inasmuch as, some

people (mostly dealing with religion) by identifying the world

of spirits with God, are not in fact aware that they give a way

to a thought as if the sensual world is beyond God. Never-

theless, identification of the entire world of spirit or a world of

86




ideas with God, is in fact a form of pantheism - idealist

pantheism.

However, it is not right to approach to any idealist system

as pantheism, because in the world of ideas as well there is a

hierarchy and God is considered to be the creator of all these

ideas, even of the most common idea, i.e. God stands above

being. According to religious view however, the only being in

fact is the God himself, but it should not be understood that this

being encompasses both worlds of ideas and senses. If it had been understood so, then it would be no different than pan-

theism again. The world of ideas is being evaluated as either a

shed, creative product of a real being, or the below stage in the

hierarchy.

When the goal is understanding or giving some logical

explanation of God, or attempt to reveal His structure and es-

sence, then the ideas generally go in the direction of one of thekinds of pantheism.

Sometimes Hegel is also considered in a pantheist. But in

fact Hegel differentiates absolute spirit from concrete embo-

diments of spirit.

There could be two versions: in a first version, God is

considered to be an absolute spirit, and the existence of spirit in

lower levels is not included here. In a second version, absolutespirit is understood as a spirit in a wider meaning. In this case it

can be considered pantheism.

Let us consider the relativity between the thoughts that

‘God embraces the whole world’ and that ‘God is the only

being’. According to Islamic philosophy, everything is insub-

stantial and relative except God. The absolute truth belongs

only to God. True knowledge belongs only to God either. Can87




something, which does not belong to being and which repre-

sents nonbeing, possess a true knowledge about being?

This world is insubstantial. Our senses can deceive us.

But how can we find the truth? It seems only by reaching the

true being (world of being). But how can something belonging

to nonbeing enter to being? Maybe, a human being is awarded

with a feature of becoming being. Maybe, when a human being

leaves his body he joins the true being. Remember, when God

created a human being “he blew him from his spirit”. And in

this meaning a human being is a carrier of a true being.

A being is an Absolute Spirit. When a human being lives

with his body he joins to nonbeing, when he lives with his

spirit he joins to being.

What about other things? What is their chance to be a

being? According to pantheism live beings, non-live being and

human beings are regarded all in the same status. All are en-compassed by God in the same level or all are carriers of the

idea of God in the same degree. When materialist pantheism is

speaking in a position of divinized nature (nature = sensual

world) no differentiation is made between a human being and a

stone. Idealist pantheism (being = spirit = God) on the other

hand, does not leave any chance for contact with God for the

representatives of sensual world. Entire sensual world and liferemain outside God, and are considered non-being.

What is the factor that generalizes sensual world, which

gives the possibility to evaluate things perceivable sensually, as

parts of the whole? The question here can be presented in two

directions: Is there anything that encompasses everything, and

which is the sum of everything? Or is there anything that pene-

trates to everything, in other words, what is behind all sensual88




things? In scientific doctrines these are indicated as cosmos,

universe and atom, and element. However, there is also some-

thing that encompasses in itself both the greatest and broadest

and the smallest and basic, and this is the idea of God. In other

words, being that encompasses everything and at the same time

is reflected in everything is God.

When we try to understand this internal relationship and

commonality we reach to the idea of God. It is not by chance

that those who are explaining Sufism in the context of pan-theism evaluate God as a “symbol of unity of a human being

with universe, mystery of the world, and symbol of eternity”.

The reference to the idea of God is necessary because,

the sensual world which is infinite from the perspective of time

and space (spaceless and timeless), goes beyond the cognition

capacity of a human being. The creativity of a human being

encompasses only the local meetings of idea and matter.Whena person creates something he at the same time distorts another

thing, and sometimes he even does not think of what was

distorted. On the one hand a person can cognize only what he

himself created, on the other hand he can create only what he

has cognized. Being one of the local fields of the eternal world,

both of these consist of models ‘world with a human’ and

‘world for a human’. Thus, the world in which we live, the onewhich is real for us is the world which fits to the scale of

human reason which is illuminated. The rest of the world is

dark for us, i.e. non-existent for us. In Kant’s terms, it is ‘a

thing in itself’ on a larger scale.

The real world is blurred; it is located between absolute

light and darkness, between being and non-being. In the

philosophy of Neo-Platonism the world of reason is considered89




lightened, while the sensual world is considered dark. Time

and space is also relevant to only matter and material world. In

fact, what is dark is not material world but rather the absolute

matter. As it is the case with the idea, the absolute matter is

also beyond time and space. Creation and annihilation are

realized as illumination of some fields in the dark, and dar-

kening of others.

90



SOUL AND BODY

• The Specificity of the Body: Two Ideas in

one Thing

• Soul and Body in the Phenomenological

Context

• About the Correlation of Memory and Remembrance in the Structure of the Soul



The life of a river is in its flow. It looks as if its

life comes to an end when merging with the sea.

However, its life finds its meaning just in this

very moment of merging

Abu Turkhan



The Specificity of the Body:

Two Ideas in one Thing

In philosophical literature mostly the problems of spirit

and body or soul and body have been researched. But the pro-

blem of spirit-soul-body or mind-soul-body has not been clari-

fied enough. As a part of the nature a human being is in interre-

lation with it. From the other side, a human being is spiritual

phenomenon; he/she possesses the soul as well. Via the soul it

becomes into contact with spirit, cosmic reason.Spirit is considered to be a cosmic phenomenon. With

entering a drop of that to human being the bridge among hu-

man being and world of spirits is realized.

The human being, above all, needs the physical health to

maximally realize himself and his material and moral potential.

The quotation `a sound mind in a sound body`, was not said in

vain. This idea of course could not be absolutized; that is tosay, physical health is not sufficient for spiritual health. Ne-

vertheless, this condition is necessary, though it is not suffi-

cient.

It has been mentioned a lot that the healthy body is ne-

cessary for the healthy soul. However, for some reason or

other, it is forgotten that the soul, in its turn, is also necessary

for body health. Nonetheless, this thesis has older roots in the93



Soul and Body

history of philosophical thought. It is not a coincidence that the

traditional Eastern medicine does not try to treat the soul by the

use of the body, but it treats the body by the use of spirit.

Though the physical recourses of the body are limited, its spi-

ritual energy potential is high. If the human being could get in-

to harmonious contact with nature then he could get an extraor-

dinary strength to control spiritual energy and direct it where

he wants. It is said in the teaching of Lao Tzu that `the weak

and gentle could defeat the strong and sound` when spiritual perfection is attained at the level of Tao. 74

Like Taoism as well

as the teaching of Yoga and other Eastern teachings also based

on the principle of the harmony and unity of the soul and

body.75

Plato says: `I do not think that if the human body is

sound it creates complacency in itself; for me, complacency is

a condition for the better situation of the body`.

76

It is not at alla coincidence that psychology and psychotherapy, which are

based on the most modern techno/experimental phase, apply to

Taoism and Zen-Buddhism. The contact of the human soul

with the cosmic energy gives further opportunities for the reali-

sation of the structure, which is codified in the body as an em-

bryo. On the contrary, the spiritual inconstancy as well as the

fall of the soul to the level of the animal soul and negative

74 Лаоцзы , Обрести себя в дао, Moscow 1999, p. 158.75 See for example. The History of Psychiatry: an Evaluation of

Psychiatric Thought and Practice from Prehistoric Times to the Present, by

Franz G.Alexander, M.D. and Sheldon T.Selesnick, M.D., N.-Y., 1966;

Harriet Beinfield, Efrem Korngold, Between heaven and earth: a guide to

Chinese medicine, Ballantine Books, 1992.76 Платон, Аристотель, Пайдейя: Восхождение к доблести,

Moscow, 2003, p. 157.

94

http://www.google.com/search?tbs=bks:1&tbo=p&q=+inauthor:%22Harriet+Beinfield%22

http://www.google.com/search?tbs=bks:1&tbo=p&q=+inauthor:%22Efrem+Korngold%22

http://www.google.com/search?tbs=bks:1&tbo=p&q=+inauthor:%22Efrem+Korngold%22

http://www.google.com/search?tbs=bks:1&tbo=p&q=+inauthor:%22Harriet+Beinfield%22



The Specificity of the Body: Two Ideas in one Thing

emotions weaken the body and separate him from the cosmic

harmony. At the same time they relegate its instinct and immu-

nity of self-defence as well as its power of resistance to outside

influences.

For us, it should be spoken of physical training rather

than protecting health. For the body genetically possesses the

healthy development programme. Our aim is to expose all the

factors that ruin this health and remove them. The determina-

tion of the optimal mutual contact norms of the body with theenvironment is necessary for its protection from further

loadings.

How does the human breathe, in what local climatic con-

ditions he is as well as the food that he is fed with and the

boundaries of the motive dynamics of the different parts of the

organism, all these things are also genetically codified. The

education should be realized in accordance with the genetic andintellectual potential of the human being, and likewise physical

training also should be realized in accordance with the charac-

teristics and potential of each concrete organism. Frankly spea-

king, physical training in fact should consist of the realisation

of physical potential. Accordingly, it is necessary to learn the

bases of the healthy way of living for solving this problem op-

timally. The Valeology was founded for this very need. Thecentral problem of Valeology is the suggestion and training of

the health culture in the personal development process of an

individual. The purpose here is to develop the health resources

of the human being and therefore to determine the boundaries

of the healthy way of living. Different people have different

health resources as well as the loading possibilities of the

different organs and muscles of the body are different.95



Soul and Body

The science of medicine, which is an entirely scientific

and practical field of activity, exist for taking care of human`s

health and treating him for illnesses. And who and how is en-

gaged in the protection and treatment of the spiritual existence

of the human being? The way of living of the human being and

his practical activity is subjected not only to one but also to a

number of different scientific-theoretical and practical fields.

The conditions of physical health are based on learning the

human body scientifically and the science of medicine isformed primarily on anatomy and physiology whereas there

are, in fact, more pretenders to guide morality and assume pos-

session of it. Besides scientific fields like ethics and pedagogy,

ethics and religion also play decisive role in this field. The

health of soul could not be only based on knowledge. Faith and

belief are also important here as well. First of all, all these as-

pects should be taken into consideration in schools and theeducational strategy.

On the individual scale, medicine plays one of the main

roles in the coordination of relationships between the body and

soul. Moreover, the task of Medicine is comparatively easy,

because the creation of the model of the healthy organism is

wholly and totally monopolized by science. And `the concep-

tion of healthy morality` does not have alternatives. Differentcountries and nations have different ideas about this subject. At

the philosophical level, ethics could be valued only theoreti-

cally but at the same time socio-popular consciousness plays

the decisive role at the practical-empirical level.

Indeed, the healthy body could not be a sufficient con-

dition for the healthy soul. The healthy social environment is

also at least necessary for it. The criteria for the society and the96




social environment have not been determined as equal values.

When the society is ill, then for the reason that human beings,

who are in charge of treating it, are also parts of that social

environment, the situation becomes complicated. Accordingly,

it becomes doubtful who has an authority to treat others as well

as the side which is supposed to be ill thinks that the opposite

side is ill and etc. On the other hand, the criteria of emotio-

nal/spiritual health do not have the same historico-geographical

invariants. That is to say, these criteria are different in differenttimes and nations.

In this respect, it could be considered that the creation of

the atmosphere for `the healthy soul` is one of the main func-

tions of the state.

Traditionally considered cognition is a reflection of

‘reality’, sensory cognition is a result of the physical interrela-

tion of the body with the circumambient world and material en-vironment. Herewith, the human body even in a passive condi-

tion reflects external effects and even counteracts them. Defen-

ding this position materialists consider that physical signals

(light, sound etc.) turn into the fact of sensation, perception and

ultimately the fact of consciousness. However, the realization

comes if the human body is considered an object of physical

reaction, as essentially side, that it is impossible to uncover thecore of the cognitive process, and so proponents of this reflec-

tion theory do ascribe some activity to the human body. The

human body as it were becomes not an object but the subject of

the physical interrelation in the deliberative cognitive process.

In our view, one of the drawbacks of such conceptions as these

is the identification of the human with the human body, whe-

reas the hard core task lies in ascertainment of the conditions97



Soul and Body

(criteria) for demarcating reason (conscious acts) and uncon-

scious states of the soul. The complexity of the structure of

soul, the diversity of its states long ago attracted the attention

of researchers. The separation of reason (mind) from the re-

maining parts and levels of the soul is the main element of the

epistemological doctrines of Ibn Sina and Suhrawardi also.

In Islamic philosophy, a human being himself is a perfect

world. Ibn Rushd says in his work, Fusus Al-Hikam: “The

world itself is a great human being. All truth in the world resi-des in the truth of a man”. “The body is of course the form of

existence of the soul. As for the further existence of the soul it

needs the body as well.” A human soul mentally apprehends it-

self only because it is prescinded, whereas animal souls are not

prescinded, which is why they do not apprehend themselves.

For, the mental apprehension of any object is its prescindment

from matter. As Al-Farabi says: “The soul apprehends bymeans of organs only imaginable and perceivable objects. As

for universals and mentally conceivable objects, it conceives

them per se”77

.

A human soul is a carrier of two different ideas, and there

is no primordial relation between them. One of these ideas

refers to the body. That is to say, the body itself is an in ad-

vance coded and programmed system. On the other hand, one part of the body – the brain – appears to be a carrier of another

idea. That is the idea operative in the whole Universe. That is

to say, the universe is the main carrier of its own idea. This

idea is actualized over the flow of time, and by it the universe

as it were evolves. The idea in the universe is also a coded,

77 Ibid.

98




programmed, and evolving system. Everything begins with the

conception of the embryo. There happens the unification of Yin

and Yang, form and matter, idea and chaos. It is actualized in

the material world, but copies of this idea are as if multiplied

and in potential, passive form the idea is present in all human

beings in their brains. By that a human is primordially aware

(informed) of everything going on in universe, including his/

her body. According to the terminology of Suhrawardi’s doc-

trine of Ishrag stronger sources of light contemplate dark mat-ters by illuminating them. That standing lower in the hierarchy

of luminosity is not able to contemplate and cognize that

standing higher. Ideas in the brain (the idea of the cosmos) are

higher than the ideas of the other organs of the body. But a man

not focusing (meditating) on some organ cannot contemplate it.

An organ can be cured due to our arriving at a picture of its

perfect form (idea). In turn, the body can contribute to perfec-ting the soul. Al-Farabi writes: “When the soul is imperfect,

then it gains perfection due to [the body], for the body appears

to be a condition of its perfection just as the soul appears to be

a condition of the body’s existence”78

. Thus aiming at cogni-

zing the world, a man can appeal on the one hand to the exter-

nal world, partly revealing for himself the ideas established in

the universe. These are all those codes, regularities of the exter-nal world that are discovered by means of experience, experi-

mental-scientific investigations. On the other hand he can fat-

hom all these in his internal world. The “internal world” is

precisely a copy of the idea of the universe; that is present in

the brain of a man. But not every human is aware of it – about

78 Ibid.

99



Soul and Body

his internal treasure. He generally seeks for it outside. Accor-

ding to Ibn Sina and Suhrawardi, all bodies move through the

will of their souls. In the hierarchy, the soul lies higher than the

body (soulless bodies cannot move without intervention from

outside). By scientific investigations a man cannot exactly de-

marcate which knowledge he acquires from the external world

and which from the internal world. In the process of scientific

creation they blend. Kant made an effort to differentiate (de-

marcate) knowledge between the a priori and the a posteriori.Thus the transcendental world appears to be inside humans.

However, to a priori (internal) knowledge Kant assigned only

some system-forming knowledge such as knowledge of space,

time, causality etc. But without the mediation of the feeling of

harmony inwardly inherent to humans, knowledge from expe-

rience could never grow to become theory. And all mathema-

tical knowledge is acquired only due to the operations of theinternal world of a man.

Speaking on the soul, al-Suhrawardi, the founder of Ish-

raqizm, of addresses himself to the second person singular (to

“you”): “You cannot remind yourself about yourself. But you

sometimes forget some part of body. If you were an aggregate

of those parts, in forgetting the body, or some part of it, you

would stop realizing yourself, and being yourself. Conse-quently, you are not in the body or in its parts”.

79 Al-Suhra-

wardi continues his discourse on this issue and reminds us that

the “body needs food, is constantly renewed as time passes,

and maybe nothing will remain from the previous condition. If

79 al-Suhrawardi, “ Hikmat al-Ishraq in H. Corbin (ed)”, Tehran and

Paris, 1999, p. 216.

100




you were a part of the body, then gradually nothing would re-

main of your personality and your thinking substance would

cease to exist”.80

Yes, much takes place in the body that a person does not

even suspect. Al-Suhrawardi asks how it can be that one is not

informed about processes emanating in one and concludes that

one’s personality is in another world, in a different space than

that of the body. A person always knows what takes place in

the soul, for this is one’s true existence. Here, in al-Suhrawardi,we see the mind and itself so he reverses the Cartesian thesis:

“ I am thinking, therefore I exist”.81

Al-Suhrawardi’s thought

could be expressed in succinct terms: “My existence is not in

my body, but in my rational soul”, or even more succinctly: “ I

exist, therefore I am thinking”.

The thinking person can also think without seeing. Ac-

cording to al-Suhrawardi in the perfect state the soul findsthings that are not seen by the eyes, not heard by the ears. If the

soul does not enter the world of reason, it is dependent on the

external world, as it were becoming blind. In his doctrine, the

images of blindness and of “the eyes of reason” are more ap-

propriate, because according to his terminology the material

world corresponds to darkness, whereas the world of reason

corresponds to light.Besides, we want to stress once more that in al-Suhra-

wardi, the discourse is not only a meditation on the external

80 Ibid , p. 217.81 Rene Descartes, The Principles of Philosophy. Part II. The principles

of material things, in philosophical writings of Descartes, trans. John

Cottingham, Robert Stroothoff, and Dugald Murdock. (Cambridge:

Cambridge University Press, 1985), Vol. I, p. 127.

101



Soul and Body

world, but a meditation on the “self’’, on the one’s own soul

and internal processes. This is a condition for conscious life.

This position conforms to the approach of phenomenology. It is

not an accident that Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka considers the

re-establishment of the basic foundational unity of the con-

scious life as one of the merits of Husserl.82

In contrast to naturalists who characterize life as meta-

bolic exchange with the environment, philosophers are right to

direct attention to internal for potential development. Sun, soiland water are only sources of energy. However, the progress

and future states of a plant are planned earlier in its seed. The

specific status of plants in the animate world was defined more

accurately by Plato, in accord with the conception suggested in

this article.) For Plato a plant moves only internally, within it-

self, and resists foreign influences. It does not know its nature

and condition. Thus though existing as an animate being, a plant is fastened to its place, inasmuch as it is not given the

possibility of moving by itself, to change its place.83

In animals too, for the vivification and movement of the

idea within the form of the embryo, additional energy, a bene-

ficial environment and the influence of the environment is re-

quired. Otherwise the potential idea cannot be fulfilled. (Ener-

gy is required for the vivification of the idea). What differren-tiates an animal from a plant is its possession of a will. That is

to say an animal’s actions are not planned beforehand in the

82 A-T. Tymieniecka, Logos and Life: Three Movements of the Soul,

Book 2 (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1998, p. 4.83 Plato, Timaeus. 77 b.

102




form of a passive idea. What is planned is only the animal’s

existence, its functioning as an animate being.

An animal’s movement as a whole thing is different from

its inner movement. Its inner movement, regardless of its

having a will, is realized as a material embodiment of the idea

in its embryo.

Like an animal, a human also has inner movement, and

the process of the material embodiment of an idea occurs,

regardless of the person’s own will. The difference with ahuman is that he himself has the capability to put forward an

realize ideas distinct from the idea his body expresses.

In conclusion, it could be said that not only the intellec-

tual activity, psychological condition and spiritual-moral life of

the human being, but also his physical health, in the last in-

stance, are dependent on the state of his soul and its potentials.

103



Soul and Body in the Phenomenological

Context∗

The problem of determining the boundary between con-

scious and unconscious is in some sense equivalent to the

problem of isolating the rational soul in the structure of inter-

nal life.

From what does consciousness originate? The core con-

dition for consciousness is the obviousness of an object. This is

achieved by the concretion of a certain idea in the confines ofthe body. (For every object, reality is the synthesis of an infi-

nite number of ideas). Intentionality, phenomenological reduc-

tion, is the isolation of a single idea in pure form. Alongside

Brentano’s and Husserl’s notably efficient idea about the inten-

tionality of consciousness, other ideas and constructions of

Husserl directed at the creation of an all-embracing theory

seem to be argumentative and are sometimes also artificiallyconstructed. For instance, there is the problem of the corporeal

activity of man, the idea of kinetic consciousness, etc. where

∗Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka (ed.), Phenomenology of Life—From the

Animal Soul to the Human Mind, Book II. The Human Soul in the Creative

Transformation of the Mind,. Analecta Husserliana XCIV (Berlin:

Springer,2007), pp.189-199.

104



Soul and Body in the Phenomenological Context

the functions of the body are seen as if detached from the func-

tioning of the sensory organs.

Analyzing Husserl’s thought, P. Prekhtel writes this:

“Considering the intentional structure of consciousness, it

seems that these sensory impressions repose in receptivity,

hence in sensory affects ‘incurred’ by the body. Now sensory

impressions emanate from movement of the body, the hands,

head, and eyes.” Ostensibly, the body thereby becomes the or-

gan of perception. But actually all the sense organs make upone whole and pertain to the body. So-called ‘kinetic motion’

is easily ascribed to the context of subject-object relationships.

Traditionally considered, cognition is a reflection of ‘reality,’

sensory cognition is a result of the physical interrelation of the

body with the circumambient world and material environment.

Herewith, the human body, even in a passive condition,

reflects external effects and even counteracts them. Defendingthis position, materialists consider that physical signals (light,

sound, etc.) turn into the fact of sensation, perception, and,

ultimately, the fact of consciousness.

However, the realization comes if the human body is

regarded as an object of physical reaction, as essentially pas-

sive, that it is impossible to uncover the core of the cognitive

process, and so proponents of this reflection theory do ascribesome activity to the human body. The human body as it were

becomes not the object but the subject of physical interrelation

in the deliberative cognitive process. In our view, one of the

drawbacks of such conceptions is identifying the human with

the human body, whereas the hard core task lies in ascertaining

the conditions (criteria) for demarcating reason (conscious

acts) and the unconscious states of the soul. The complexity of105



Soul and Body

the structure of the soul and the diversity of its states have long

attracted the attention of researchers. The separation of reason

(mind) from the remaining parts and levels of the soul is the

main element of the epistemological doctrines of Ibn Sina and

Suhrawardi too.

***

The idea of acquiring genuine truth by way of inten-

tional thought, intuition, and revelation has been expressed in

Indian-Chinese and ancient philosophies of different shades.This idea was a leading one in the Middle Ages, in Islamic phi-

losophical thought as well. S. Suhrawardi notes that the know-

ledge obtained by means of the external senses distances man

from the genuine truth. In Modern philosophy, Rene Descartes

also defends this position and claims that truth is obtained not

through sensory experience, but by intentional thought. How-

ever, the concept of the existence of ideas in the human brainwithout any connection to material reality met resistance. This

problem is especially elucidated in John Locke’s doctrine. But

Kant, by accepting the results of both sensory experience and

pure reason, claims that the real view of the world is formed by

the synthesis of these two sources of knowledge. Thus over

philosophical history the search for truth was conducted by

referring either to sensory experience or to rational, intentionalthought. There were also instances of taking an idea as an

autonomous being and confronting it with the material world as

a free substance and even of considering ideas to be the only

being, as well as adopting a negative attitude toward the ma-

terial world and the human body. Plato considered the material

world to be a shadow of ideas and for him only ideas were the

truth. However, Plato’s ideas are above not only things and106




events, but also human consciousness. Nevertheless, the direct-

ly known and only factual reality for a human being is his inner

world. But this world too is not always illuminated and re-

vealed to him. Whether in human contact with external things

and events, or while focusing his mind on his inner world, only

some moments of this world are revealed and illuminated for

him. Past events are not alive today and are transferred to an

archive, a passive area, and have lost their reality. For a human

being the real is only his feelings, ideas, and the phenomena ofthe moment. Thus his reality consists of these phenomena.

The role of idea and sense in the structure of feeling is

also a very important question. Opposing psychologism and

holding the position that scientific doctrines should be expres-

sed with mathematical precision in our philosophical activity,

Edmund Husserl gives importance to clear ideas in the struc-

ture of the human brain and presents feelings as a reality on thelevel of ideas, that is, as being independent of the senses.

Things and events known from the sensory world are fixed

with corresponding ideal images and phenomena here when

consciousness is directed at a thing. The question here is that of

accepting an image that has appeared in our consciousness as a

reality. That is to say not the thing, the matter behind this

image, but the image itself is regarded as reality. The questionis what the difference is between the image formed by sensory

experience and the mental image. The difference is that the

mental image is not actually the image of an individual con-

crete thing, but of a universal .

Generally it is thought that Husserl’s doctrine is built on

Descartes’ doctrine. But there is an important point made in

John Locke’s doctrine on the way from Descartes to Husserl.107



Soul and Body

Locke writes that our cognition concerns our ideas. And as the

mind has no direct object other than its own ideas, which it

studies or will study in all its thoughts and discourses, so our

cognition concerns only them. Here the question is not about

the origin of ideas. Nor is it whether they were obtained

through previous experience or by way of intuition. The ques-

tion is about the role of the ideas of the ego in the process of

cognition. Once formed as an image, an idea is kept in the me-

mory and can feature on the agenda at any time in future life.There are also ideas acquired in an intuitive way. The follo-

wing process of knowledge consists of man’s observation of

his own ideas.84

There is no need for proof if the comparison of

ideas is made without referring to sensory experience. John

Locke even uses the notion of “self-evidence” and considers it

an important condition for cognition.85

John Locke considers

the directing of thought toward one definite theme to be themain means of cognition. So he not only refers to Descartes’

doctrine, but also considerably improves it. He uses the notion

of “actual cognition” and explains it as direct observation of

the mind. (As it happens the idea of ‘actual cognition’ has been

put forward by Ibn Sina.) Here Locke also directs attention for

a moment to the fact that our limited reason is able to think

correctly and clearly about only one thing at a given time.86

And a person is the active bearer of the idea to which his

84 John Locke. An Essay Concerning Humane Understanding . Book IV.

Of knowledge and probability. Chapter II.1.

(http://www.gutenberg.net/1/0/6/1/10616/)85 Ibid., Chapter III.6.86 Ibid., Chapter I.8.

108




thought is directed at any moment. Other ideas and knowledge

are not illuminated and are out of one’s focus and attention.

***

In the inanimate world every event, every thing, is a

passive carrier of a certain idea. However, though found in the

passive and inanimate, this idea has a complex, hierarchic

structure. That is to say the organization of a thing has lower

layers that exist regardless of the macro idea. But how ismovement in the inanimate world understood? The removal of

a thing in relation to other things, that is, mechanical move-

ment, does not require any change in the idea, the thing. That

is, if a thing moves, preserving its persona, this is only dis-

placement. A change in a thing’s idea is possible due to a

change in the relations between its inner parts. Every structural

change here can bring about a change in the idea at a higherlevel. The change in an object over time, without any foreign

influence causing it, is in fact envisaged in its idea.

However, the difference with the world of plants is that

here change induced by foreign influence is also planned be-

forehand. (That is, some changes caused by external influences

can also be potentially envisaged.) For instance, additional

energy from the sun and the soil is required for an embryo(seed) to sprout. What form this embryo will grow into is plan-

ned in the embryo itself. This is revivification of a passive idea

by external influence (additional energy). That is, here the mo-

vement takes the form of the revivification of an idea. Al-

though foreign influence, additional energy, was not in the

structure of the seed before, there was a place ready for it.

When the original idea is not fulfilled, the thing (seed) acts like109



Soul and Body

an inanimate thing, that is, there is no movement inside it. No

movement at its lower levels serves to effect a change in the

macrostructure. At most, these levels provide for its preserva-

tion. Tymieniecka also shares the view that the life of

animate beings is the realization of a certain project.87

In contrast to naturalists who characterize life as me-

tabolic exchange with the environment, philosophers are right

to direct attention to the internal for potential development.

Sun, soil, and water are only sources of energy. However, the progress and future states of a plant are planned earlier in its

seed. The specific status of plants in the animate world was de-

fined more accurately by Plato, in accord with the conception

suggested in this article. For Plato a plant moves only inter-

nally, within itself, and resists foreign influences. It does not

know its nature and condition. Thus, though existing as an ani-

mate being, a plant is fastened to its place, inasmuch as it is notgiven the possibility of moving by itself, of changing its

place.88

In animals too, additional energy, a beneficial environ-

ment, and the influence of the environment are required for the

vivification and movement of the idea within the form of the

embryo. Otherwise the potential idea cannot be fulfilled. (Ener-

gy is required for the vivification of the idea.) What differen-

87 Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka. The Unveiling and the Unveiled.

Uncovering the Cornerstones for Metaphysical Dialog between Occidental

Phenomenology and Islamic Philosophy. In A-T. Tymieniecka (ed.) The

Passion of the Soul in the Metamorphosis of Becoming . Islamic Philosophy

and Occidental Philosophy in Dialog 1. Dorchreht, Kluwer Academic

Publishers, 2003.88 Plato, Timaeus. 77 b.

110




tiates an animal from a plant is its possession of will. That is to

say, an animal’s actions are not planned beforehand in the form

of a passive idea. What is planned is only the animal’s exis-

tence, its functioning as an animate being.

An animal’s movement as a whole thing is different

from its inner movement. Its inner movement, regardless of its

having a will, is realized as a material embodiment of the idea

in its embryo.

Like an animal, a human being also has inner move-ment, and the process of the material embodiment of an idea

occurs, regardless of the person’s own will. The difference

with a human being is that he himself has the ability to put for-

ward and realize ideas distinct from the idea his body expres-

ses.

***

The analyses and generalizations of the conceptions ofAl-Farabi, Ibn Sina, and Suhrawardi bring us to the following

conclusions. The world is what man is in at every moment. A

human being’s cognition of the world is possible only within

the limits of how he was programmed in advance and of that

potential which he has. Reality is neither an external nor an in-

ternal world, rather it appears from their contact. Exactly at this

time the transcendental ‘ego’ coincides with the empirical‘ego’ and a human being finds wholeness, as it were, and duali-

ty disappears. At every moment of contact between a human

being and the world, a local reality appears. This reality is the

real feelings of the human being. The life of five minutes be-

fore is no longer a reality. Although there can be a causal

relation between the life lived before and filed away in the

archive under the name of the past (life that is retained in the111



Soul and Body

memory) and the life being lived now, life in fact consists only

of the actualized, activated part of man’s world of ideas at the

present moment. Infinite potential worlds exist that are not li-

ved by the human ‘ego,’ but of whose existence in the form of

possibilities there is no doubt. This world was present in the

past and will be present in the future; it has its own regularities

and structure. It exists as the embodiment of a great idea. Yes,

the world is programmed, it is also controlled. A great, com-

plex idea is realized in the form of ongoing actualization withinit, under a system of smaller ideas. But separate events, sepa-

rate systems in the world enter into a relationship with each

other only on the basis of a primordial program. One event can-

not interfere in another’s project. Each lives only its own life.

Each exists only through the realization of its destiny. All ob-

jects and events in the world are under the competence of a pri-

mordial program, fate, and destiny. Man is the only exception.Only he has a will and the possibility of choice. Only man can

actively intervene in the processes going on in the world, can

change the flow of events, and can abrogate fate on a local le-

vel. Here the multi-staged, hierarchical structure of the world

has to be taken into consideration. There is a local idea stan-

ding at the base of every object, and this is its destiny. It results

from the structure and internal logic of the object. It determinesa local system. But the greater system that surrounds it has its

own structure, logic, and destiny. Changes taking place in the

large system are reflected in the fate of sub-systems and ele-

ments. Fate in the large sense depends generally on ongoing

processes in the whole system occurring alongside the internal

being of every element. In other words, programming itself has

a hierarchic structure. Little ideas obey big ideas. Events hap- 112




pening on one step also depend on events on a higher step. Hie-

rarchy here should be understood not only in terms of matter,

but also and more importantly in terms of ideas. Thus events

taking place in any one world are under the sphere of influence

of the superior world. Here the degree of superiority, the direc-

tion of the rising line goes like an arrow toward the outside, on

the one hand, and like an arrow toward the inside, on the other.

Suhrawardi writes that something standing on a lower level

cannot command something standing on a higher level. As anexample he points out that the body does not control the soul,

rather the soul controls the body. The lowest level is the level

of materiality. The way up passes through the stage of mora-

lity. There are different stages on the way from darkness to

light … The direction is from dark to light, from exterior to

interior, from local idea to universal idea. Among all beings,

only the human being is the bearer of an active idea alongside a passive idea and only he possesses the ability to program

events himself. Although he was created, he has the ability to

create, construct, and influence the flow of events. A human

being differs from other creatures by his ability to conceive

ideas and to make free choices – an aptitude that even angels

do not possess.

***A human soul is the carrier of two different ideas, and

there is no primordial relation between them. One of these

ideas refers to the body. That is to say, the body itself is a sys-

tem coded and programmed in advance. On the other hand, one

part of the body – the brain – appears to be the carrier of ano-

ther idea. That is, of an idea operative throughout the whole

Universe. That is to say, the universe is the main carrier of its113



Soul and Body

own idea. This idea is actualized over the flow of time, and by

it the universe evolves, as it were. An idea in the universe is al-

so a coded, programmed, and evolving system. Everything be-

gins with the conception of the embryo. The unification of Yin

and Yang, form and matter, idea and chaos occurs. It is ac-

tualized in the material world, but copies of this idea are mul-

tiplied and in potential, passive form the idea is present in all

human beings in their brains. By that, a human is primordially

aware (informed) of everything going on in the universe, inclu-ding in his/her body. According to the terminology of Suhraw-

ardi’s doctrine of Ishrag, stronger sources of light contemplate

dark matters by illuminating them. That which stands lower in

the hierarchy of luminosity is not able to contemplate and cog-

nize that which stands higher. Ideas in the brain (the idea of the

cosmos) are higher than the ideas of the other organs of the

body. But man, if he does not focus (meditate) on some organ,cannot contemplate it. An organ can be cured by arriving at a

picture of its perfect form (idea). In turn, the body can contri-

bute to perfecting the soul. Al-Farabi writes: “When the soul is

imperfect, then it gains perfection due to [the body], for the

body appears to be a condition of its perfection, just as the soul

appears to be a condition of the body’s existence.”89

Thus by

trying to cognize the world, man can appeal, on the one hand,to the external world, partly revealing for himself the ideas es-

tablished in the universe. These are all those codes, regularities,

of the external world that are discovered by means of experi-

ence and experimental-scientific investigations. On the other

89 Al-Farabi. Natural-scientific treatise. Translation from

Arabic. (Alma-Ata: Nauka, 1987, p. 292.)114




hand, he can fathom all these in his internal world. The “in-

ternal world” is a precise copy of the idea of the universe; that

is, it is present in the brain of man. But not every human being

is aware of it – of his internal treasure. He generally seeks for it

outside. According to Ibn Sina and Suhrawardi, all bodies

move through the will of their souls. In the hierarchy, the soul

lies higher than the body (soulless bodies cannot move without

intervention from the outside). By scientific investigations man

cannot demarcate exactly what knowledge he acquires from theexternal world and what from the internal world. In the process

of scientific creation they blend. Kant made an effort to dif-

ferentiate (demarcate) between a priori and a posteriori know-

ledge. Thus the transcendental world appears to be inside hu-

mans. However, Kant assigned only some system-forming

knowledge, such as knowledge of space, time, causality, etc. to

a priori (internal) knowledge. But without the mediation of thefeeling of harmony inwardly inherent in humans, knowledge

from experience could never grow to become theory. And all

mathematical knowledge is acquired only due to the operations

of the internal world of man.

***

According to Eastern philosophy, a human being ishimself a perfect world. However, there are also conscious

worlds other than humans. The main thing is a human’s ability

to create contact between his own and the outside world. Ac-

cording to Taoism, the Earth, the Sun, and the constellations

are all sources of energy. Man can consciously benefit from

these energies. Although nothing is said directly about the con-

sciousness of celestial objects or the material world in the clas- 115



Soul and Body

sic works of Taoism and Buddhism, contemporary representta-

tives of Taoism claim it to be factual. Mantek Chia declares:

“The Earth is a very big and exceptionally alive being”… And

it is one that affects human life. This idea was widespread in

the Islamic East in the10th to 12th centuries.

Ali Ibn Abu Talib writes in an appeal to man, “a very

big world resides in you.” Ibn Rushd Fusus Al-Hikam says in

his work: “The world itself is a great human being. All the

truth in the world resides in the truth of man.” “The body is ofcourse the form of existence of the soul. As for the further

existence of the soul it needs the body as well.” “When a soul

is imperfect, then it gains perfection due to [the body], for the

body appears to be a condition of its perfection just as the soul

appears to be a condition of the body’s existence”90

A human

soul mentally apprehends itself only because it is prescinded,

whereas animal souls are not prescinded, which is why they donot apprehend themselves. For the mental apprehension of any

object is its prescindment from matter. As Al-Farabi says: “The

soul apprehends by means of organs only imaginable and

perceivable objects. As for universals and mentally conceivable

objects, it conceives them per se.”91

***In what relations are the object ‘itself,’ as well as its

copy, model, and its separate features of sound, color, etc.?

Aristotle in Metaphysics uses the term “Socrates himself”92

90 Ibid., p.292.91 Ibid., p.292.92 Aristotle. Metaphysics. in The basic works of Aristotle. Richard

McKeon. ed. The Modern Library. (New York. 2001), p. 694.

116




and tries to explain him as a substratum. This comes from Aris-

totle’s materialist view, for a “himself” may be not a substra-

tum, rather it is a form, idea, eidos.

The explanation of a passive idea is less complicated,

inasmuch as it is supposed that it is equivalent to the notions of

structure and form. This explication is directed toward an al-

ready constructed, existent world. When it is said that any ob-

ject is a bearer of a certain idea and has a definite form, it is not

its creation, activity, the motion toward self-exhaustion, or endthat is being spoken about. Its activity and functioning are con-

sidered only in the form of possibilities in the passive idea and

form.

When positing that the world is created with a definite

form and system of forms and that the Creator does not in-

terfere in the processes going on afterwards, we have to search

for motion and the source of activity in this world. Aristotlerightly points out that Plato’s doctrine of ideas gives only a

static model of the world and cannot show the source of mo-

tion. In his search for the ‘first cause,’ Aristotle considers not

only the cause of being, but also of motion. “Causes are spoken

of in four senses. In one of these we mean the substance, i.e.

the essence (for the ‘why’ is reducible finally to the definition,

and the ultimate ‘why’ is a cause and principle); in another thematter or substratum, in a third the source of the change, and in

a fourth the cause opposed to this, the purpose and the good

(for this is the end of all generation and change).”93

As we can

see, two of the causes that Aristotle points to are related to

being, the other two are connected to motion and its purpose.

93 Ibid., p.693.

117



Soul and Body

By analyzing the views of the philosophers before him, Aris-

totle points out that most of them take only the material be-

ginning as the start, i.e. that from which things are constituted

and into which they will turn in the end. This natural beginning

does not appear from anything, it is always being maintained.

However, Aristotle shows that the idea of a unitary material

beginning is not sufficient. Because besides providing an ans-

wer to what these changes, appearances, and disappearances

have emanated from, an explanation should also be given ofwhy they have appeared. “For at least the substratum itself does

not make itself change; e.g. neither the wood, nor the bronze

causes the change of either of them, nor does the wood manu-

facture a bed and the bronze a statue, but something else is the

cause of the change. And to seek this is to seek the second

cause, as we should say–that from which comes the beginning

of the movement.”

94

When searching for the cause of move-ment Aristotle does not differentiate between living and non-

living, and specifically does not relate the source of movement

with the soul. But subsequently medieval Islamic philosophers

(Al-Farabi, Ibn Sina) treated this problem specifically in rela-

tion to the soul. They apprehended the soul as being the cause

of all movements. Firstly, we have again to look at the

difference between the spiritual and the material, the living andthe non-living. Rene Descartes considers “thought” to be the

main attribute of non-corporeal substance and extension to be

that of corporeal substance.95

But the ability to think is revea-

94 Ibid., p.695.95 Rene Descartes, The Principles of Philosophy. Part II. The principles

of material things, in philosophical writings of Descartes, trans. John

118




led only at the higher level of the soul and is inherent only in

the human soul. Non-corporeal substance has various forms

distinct from thought. While it is true that Descartes under-

stands the notion of ‘thought’ in the broad sense, even so this

notion is not enough for characterizing the world of soul, spirit.

Nor is it enough to differentiate the corporeal world, things and

objects, by just their spatial extension. For imagining reality

more rightly and comprehensively, it is not sufficient to divide

it according to such conditional and indefinite notions asthought and essence. In that case we cannot clearly imagine the

place and role of man. In our view, the optimal model is again

to define the notion of an absolute idea, on the one hand, and

the notion of absolute matter, on the other. Only after that is it

possible to clarify the characteristics and relations of the hu-

man and sensory world that is between those two poles. Some

researchers identify the absolute idea with God. Then thematter is left aside, and two explanations of matter become

possible: either matter is the progeny of an idea, or it existed

primordially and independently of God. Neither of these

explanations can yield results on the way to understanding the

world. The first view recalls the doctrine of Plato. In other

words, the only true being here is the world of ideas. The ma-

terial world, things and events are the copies of ideas, as it we-re, and so they are deprived of real being. The condition of the

temporariness of things and events in the material world spurs

complete rejection of their real existence. But for humans the

way to the world of ideas and God passes through the material

Cottingham, Robert Stroothoff, and Dugald Murdock. (Cambridge:

Cambridge University Press, 1985), Vol. I, p. 244

119



Soul and Body

world. Rejection of the body and absolutizing the spirit cannot

be the optimal methodological approach for learning the me-

chanism and core of the events happening in real life. The

second view, being dualist, in fact accords matter and God with

the same status. This view arises from conceptualizing the dua-

lity of light and dark, good and evil, idea and body, fire and

soil, now in the form of idea and matter. By having a body,

man is part of an interim world. As other things are constituted

from the unity of idea and matter, more correctly, as they areformed, made of matter on the basis of a certain idea, so man is

the carrier of the idea of the body. Unlike all other things, a

human being is also the carrier of another idea–the idea of the

universe, of which he is a microcosm. Moreover, these ideas

are those that can at any moment be activated, animated, and

turned into consciousness. In other words, by possessing soul

and spirit, man has the ability to approach the absolute idea, toset out from his interim world to the world of ideas (be directed

to the inner, spiritual world) while being in this world, and he

can also be on the same level with things and events (as the

owner of a body and an empiric ‘I’). He has to obey the rules

of this world and adapt to its harmony. Keeping the world in

himself as a passive idea, man ‘learns’ it part by part while

being in concrete contact with it. So the inner world of man ismainly illuminated and uncovered depending on the moments

of contact with this world. However, man can travel to his

inner world (in fact, a microcosm and the idea modeling the

universe) independently of this external world and would like

to find or create in this world the things that he has seen there.

It is specifically this moment that stands at the base of the

creative process. If man wants to reveal an idea carried by120




other things, events, or his own body, it will be seen that these

things bear not one but numerous ideas. What idea is revealed

on the first approach and what others are there for us? The

problem is that man will use only the one word “idea” for

attribute, form, structure, and regularity that he finds in a thing

or event and will consider all the rest that is dark and unknown

as matter, material. As a thing has a complex structure, the up-

per levels that are revealed in the hierarchy of ideas embodied

in it are designated as ideas; the unclear lower parts are desig-nated as matter.

***

For instance, when speaking of the idea of a table, is

only the macrostructure serving its main function, its form con-

sidered. However, what it is made from, the structure of its

“matter,” its lower structural layers (molecular, atomic, and

other levels) is beyond a doubt related to its substantial matter.When looking at a thing through a microscope, what is obser-

ved is a molecule, a cell, so that the macrostructure cannot be

observed. The illuminated, clarified side is what is accepted as

its idea, while the dark side is designated as matter, as it is in

al-Suhrawardi’s Ishrag teaching. Analogically in the micro-

cosm that is the brain, the illuminated side corresponds to con-

sciousness, while the passive side corresponds to unconscious-ness, to unrevealed consciousness. So the main issue is the

structural level man’s attention is focused on. Things and

events are perhaps the carriers of many things. But what is

known to us is that part encountered by the mind’s view. Dif-

ferent philosophers name the dark side differently. Suhrawardi

calls it “barzakh,” which actually corresponds to Kant’s notion

of the “thing in itself.”121



About the Correlation of Memory and

Remembrance in the Structure of the Soul

Knowledge is the most alien of the different forms of

consciousness for the human being, particularly, knowledge

which is not related to the human being, his personal life, and

his fate. In fact, human participation as a subject is ruled out in

the content of knowledge. Because of the events reflecting per-

sonal life and reflecting events that happened in the life of a

human being are related to personal emotions and feelings,they are kept in the memory as a remembrance. In this sense,

knowledge and remembrance can be distinguished. Certainly

this differentiation comes from distinguishing events as native

and alien to a person. It also expresses the difference between

single and common. Thus, remembrance remains in the memo-

ry not as knowledge, but as an image. The human being retains

events in his memory as he understands and lives. That is because remembrance is the second mental existence of the

human life. It is also the form of existence of life, as opposed

to material life, which does not obey the law of the inevitability

of time and which can reoccur and be restored at any desirable

moment. The remembrance can be “bitter” or “sweet,” “pale”

or “motley,” and can make a person feel what he lived in his

past. But knowledge is inanimate and neutral and is not directly122



Memory and Remembrance in the Structure of the Soul

related to the personal senses, and in this sense it is alien to the

person.

Are the events related to personal life not summarized

in the mind? Are imagination and sensual images not connec-

ted with appropriate notions, and proper knowledge deduces

from it accordingly? As Suhrawardi stated: “luminosity, disco-

very, occurs when a human being finds in the object what is in

“himself.” Thus the cognition process is possible due to ade-

quacy what is in the “self” and in the external object.

96

Thisopinion corresponds to Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka’s idea of

ontopoiesis of life.97

In real mental life, neither are sensual images separate

from notions, nor are notions separate from sensual images. It

should be said that the sensual and rational are always in unity

and complete each other. However, both sense and image, as

well as notions and judgments, possess a certain relativeindependence. Thanks to this independence we differentiate

them and assess them as different levels of cognition. Events

that organize personal life can be divided into two parts: first–

unique phenomena which happen only once or rarely, second–

repeat events which happen on a regular basis and very often

depending on the circumstances. The second also includes

events which seem to be different, while the main elements ofthem coincide.

Certainly there are no events that are totally unique and

completely unrepeated in their all elements. However, a person

96 al-Suhrawardi, “Hikmat al-Ishraq in H. Corbin (ed),” Tehran and

Paris, 1999, p.22397 The Passions of the Soul in the Metamorphousis of Becoming. Ed. by

A.-T. Tymieniecka, p. 3.

123



Soul and Body

does not feel the need to compare unrepeated, mainly unique

events in terms of their second degree elements. That is be-

cause the sensual images of these events, remembrances, do

not succumb to rational operation which consists of getting rid

of some elements and generalizing others. It keeps its sensual

integrity and concreteness.

However, there is no need to keep in mind every detail

of repeated events in all their own concreteness, and this is of

course impossible. This is because most of personal life iscomposed of repeated events. This is why details are left and

the sensual image gets rid of the insignificant elements and the

main repeated elements are generalized. Notions are formula-

ted and events become interpreted by the system of notions. So

repeated events, which are the necessary elements of every-day

life, are not retained in the memory as entire sensual images

and do not become a remembrance. Events that are retained inthe memory through the notions in a generalized form, namely

an “inanimate” scheme of a certain group of events, do not in-

fluence the sensual state of the human being.

It is only possible to think through notions, whereas it is

impossible to be affected by them.

Understanding everyday events that are not connected

with human specialization and professional activity, and aremostly general for all, is suitable for cognition form and is

called “ordinary consciousness.”

As a professional cognitive form of philosophical

thought, scientific cognition, and literary cognition, ordinary

consciousness is one of the main forms of understanding

reality. However, it has one main distinctive quality. Ordinary

consciousness is not professional cognition form and composes124




the main basis of cognitive activity of all people. Everyone

mainly addresses ordinary consciousness, not only from the

perspective of their personal life and in everyday activity, but

also in professional activity in any field.

The production of daily sensual practice is often called

ordinary knowledge. This knowledge is organized as the

generalization of reflections of people’s everyday practical

activity and is a kind of first knowledge that appeared due to

the formulation of the generalized ability of human beings. Asstated above, transferring from thinking through sensual ima-

ges (prelogical thinking), remembrance, and sensual imagina-

tion of the consciousness to thinking through notions mostly

encompasses daily life activity (activity which is not imposed

on labor division). Early notions are those reflections of gene-

ralized elements that appear at the time of necessary activity.

Relations among things are reflected as relations among no-tions, and early knowledge appeared accordingly. By reflecting

life activity, which is common to everyone, and by reflecting

“daily life,” that kind of knowledge is considered “ordinary

knowledge.” However, along with the expansion of human ac-

tivity that kind of knowledge goes beyond the notion of

“ordinary knowledge.” Gradually, the centre of gravity in Hu-

man-Nature relations shifts toward Nature. In that kind of in-teraction a human being systematically receives impulses and

his activity goes beyond the necessary needs of ordinary indi-

vidual life. Consequently, “ordinary knowledge” loses its sim-

plicity to a higher degree. Specifically, ordinary knowledge,

which organizes the core of human activity, knowledge appears

in a relatively different character, providing activity in a wider

sense. That kind of knowledge is not for direct use in indivi- 125



Soul and Body

dual life, but for society’s use. However, through society, this

knowledge indirectly affects the life of the human being as a

member of society.

In his first formulation process, the human being gra-

dually ceases to live for himself, but mostly lives as a member

of society, as a personality. That kind of change appears not

only in his material activity, but also in the character of his

knowledge, as well as in the scope of his knowledge.

Knowledge that was alien to human beings becomesmore alien because of its wandering from his personal life. On

the other hand, knowledge forces him to become a member of

society, forces him to become closely tied to society. In spite of

seeming paradoxical, the formulation of a human being as a

social being and a member of society in this context, the

formulation of society, is connected with expanding human-

nature relations and human influence on society.Historically, human beings (their first ancestors) were

an indivisible part of society and were essentially not separated

from the other parts. At that time, man’s ancestors lived as a

flock, lived in a certain correlation with each other. However,

this is a characteristic element of nature and it would not be

right to look for man’s social essence here.

During the next period of natural-historical develop-ment, the process of man’s separation from nature began. Du-

ring this period, there were no personalities or biosocial beings,

but only biological existence. However at the top level of bio-

logical evaluation, the process of becoming human beings

began, due to the appearance of the first components of con-

sciousness and changes in objective reality. And this process

126




coincides with the separation of man from nature and putting

himself before it.

During mutual correlation with nature, man primarily

acts to ensure his material needs and to understand nature as

his extension, then as being different from himself, as an op-

posite side. As long as man does not separate himself from

nature, his imagination is restricted to sensual images and sen-

sual thinking. Although sensual images of the first historical

reflection forms of human-nature relations possessed certaindynamism, it did not reflect reality and its objective context

adequately. It is very difficult for people to separate themselves

from nature and feel their ancestors’ prelogical syncretic mode

of thinking, since contemporary man thinks with notions pro-

per to the law of logic. It is possible to understand, but it is dif-

ficult to feel. So, the law of logic (we mean dialectical logic) is

also reliable for prelogical matters . Analyzing national creative masterpieces and mostly

mythology shows that the appearance of knowledge in its ob-

jective content and logical thinking are products product of

long-term transformation. During transformation periods,

trends toward uniting personal fate with desires and symbolic

meaning with the real images of real events gradually decrease.

Events become free from decorations and they are shown in alltheir bareness, simplicity, relatively dim, but with their own

color. Nature is no longer regarded as an extension of man and

becomes independent. Man separates himself from nature, and

nature from himself. A relative division between the moral and

the material gradually becomes obvious. As long as sensual

images were not generalized and formulated in the shape of a

notion, the world was Chaos in human understanding. The127



Soul and Body

formulation of a notion made it possible for man to transfer the

order and harmony that exist in the material world to the

human moral world.

The human intention to separate nature from himself

and to study objective reality did not only come from his per-

sonal needs, but also from the needs of a human being, people,

and society, acquiring “impersonal” knowledge and shaping it

to the logical form which is general for all and expressed with

words – all these are serious steps in the formation of persona-lity, from biological existence to biosocial existence. Speech

appeared in the formation of notions and its importance as a

mode of intercourse among people gave a strong boost to the

formulation of man as a social being. The transformation from

human-nature relations to society-nature relations happens in

harmony with the transformation from syncretic to logical

thinking.As the field of human activity expands, the field of

human knowledge broadens as well. Ordinary knowledge is

historically the most ancient among the forms of knowledge

formulated as a result of material activity, which is common

and necessary to all. Other fields of knowledge have been

appeared thanks to the division of labor and did not belong to

all but to some group of people depending on the field ofactivity. However, this first formulation process, division of

labor and specialization, encompasses only the material field of

activity. During that period, acquiring knowledge was not an

independent activity, rather it was only a necessary part of

expedient material activity. Knowledge was not separate and

did not become an independent object of cognition.

128




When talking about speech, we do not mean “material

communication,” and “real life language.” As long as thought

was not separate from activity, speech could not be indepen-

dent. But at that time there was objective reality for knowledge,

as well as the formation of speech, to become independent.

Although “communication in a primary human flock” was dif-

ferent in quality from communication among contemporary

human beings, and intellectual communication, it played a very

important role in the formation of the second one as a neces-sary historical process.

As Karl Marx noted, the human being does not begin to

act from a theoretical attitude toward the objects in an external

world. Just like every animal, he begins from needs such as

eating, drinking, etc., which do not have any active impact , but

through this impact he ensures his needs by possessing external

objects. Through the repetition of this process, the ability ofthis object to ensure a person’s need becomes fixed in the

human memory. So, origination of knowledge was related to

man’s active material influence on nature to ensure his needs.

However, at that time. man could not separate his attitude

toward the external world from external objects. A human

being did not understand what he possessed; he possessed it

only unconsciously, as a part of his active influence on nature.Since the human being could not separate himself from nature,

and nature from himself, his knowledge was not separated from

material activity as an event of consciousness and did not beco-

me an independent fact of consciousness.

However, human activity was not only restricted to ma-

terial activity. Already man’s influence on nature became ex-

pedient. The early form of activity based on ensuring indivi- 129



PHENOMENOLOGY AND SCIENCE

• Synergetics as a Positivistic “Trick” for

Philosophy

• On the Idea of Circular Development of the

Philosophy of Science

• “Native” and “Alien” Knowledge and the

Conditions of Their Compatibility

• Two Mathematical Models of the World

• Mind and Sense as the Frame and Membrane of

the Shrine of Life



Phenomenology and Science

For thousands of years, human beings have either tried to

cognize larger-scale events considering their own current and

practical activities or, considering the meaning of life and the

highest power as well as the being who created the universe,

they have sought the solution to all other problems in the di-

vine power and in worshiping him.

In fact, this is the starting point of science and religion.

Both of them have chosen from the actual life of the human

being and once again have been relatively-independently struc-turalized and developed for applying to the same actual life.

Correspondingly, philosophical thinking has also two dif-

ferent sources - two starting points. The first of them is the phi-

losophy which has its roots in the practical activity of the hu-

man being as well as in rational thought and generally in ra-

tional life; it is the very way that goes from naive realism to the

idea of God and religious philosophy. And the second is the philosophy which has arisen from astonishment, intuition and

the sense of holiness; this is the way that begins from the idea

of God and religious philosophy and moves towards the phi-

losophy of actual life.

These two ways, which come face to face with each

other, of course, intersect somewhere here. Simultaneously,

there have been attempts at thinking in both directions andtrying to unite the two different types of thinking and world-

view.

For materialist philosophy, sensualism and the rationalist

teachings, which confirm that the cognitive process starts from

sensory experience, the direction of the cognitive way is from

the specific towards the general and from real material to scien-

tific-theoretical theses. For even general principles mostly134



Synergetics as a Positivistic “Trick” for Philosophy

come out as the components of rational cognition when deduc-

tive methods are implemented. It means that in terms of time

and space, the human being acts in a local environment so his

learning object should also be finite. If the solution of a vital or

even mathematical problem leads to infiniteness then it is

explained such that the task has not been correctly put and its

solution is impossible. The aim here is to transform the object

of cognition into the finite models of the infinite world. At the

same time, logical thinking itself is finite and belongs to localobjects, and it only exists for the solution of solvable problems.

On the contrary, if the human being imagines his own

personal life and the local environment that surrounds him as

an indivisible part of infinity - in other words, if he looks at the

concrete events of life from the peak of eternity and infinity,

then sensory cognition as well as logical thought becomes

helpless here. However, two variants are possible here. Firstly,in return for this infinity, the human being feels himself as

`nothing` and abandons hope to achieve anything with his own

experience and mind in the cognition of the world. He leaves

himself up to the will of supernatural powers, at best to the dis-

cretion of divine belief. In this case, in order to keep balance, it

becomes necessary to connect with those supernatural powers

and to use mystical methods. Mythical thinking is mostly dis-tinguished by these aspects. The second is to consider religious

emotion and the general harmony of the world as well as the

idea of unity and to seek the finite in the infinite and to be ba-

sed for the cognition of the finite on the pieces of information

which come through the non-rational way.

In fact, the situation considerably changes if scientists go

a step further from the level of being ordinary researchers as135




and this is the very meeting point where rising up and walking

down thought ways meets.

The data, which have been obtained by the different ways

that differ from traditional research methods and their sources

are unknown, are accepted by scientists as a sort of coinciden-

ce. It means that it is not certain in advance when the muse will

come and intuition will be active and when a darkness will be

lightened. All these are counter-intuitive and have not arisen

from the logical course of cognition and healthy thinking and atthe same time they are` additions` that occur unexpectedly, like

`a gift from the unseen world` or `a divine gift`. However, ac-

cording to other thinkers (poets, philosophers and theologians)

the human attains knowledge not in a planned, balanced and

predictive manner but as a result of an inner spiritual progress

and spiritual enlightenment as well as a divine gift; and other

types of knowledge that are attained otherwise, are consideredas imperfect and one-sided. This approach, which is widely

spread in philosophy, implies that the ultimate truth could be

attained not with sensory experiment and logical thinking, but

it could be attained as a `divine gift` through divine inspiration,

ecstasy and prophetic revelation.

However, we disagree with this confrontation and one-

sided approach. We think that either real scientific activities or philosophical researches demand to synthesize both of the

cognitive ways.

Scientists have to seek outside influences whenever they

cannot explain the events, which happen in relatively closed

systems that they research, within the boundaries of that sys-

tem. Such outside influence is accepted either as a `coinciden-

ce` or the appearances of the higher system on the lower sys- 137




tem. For example, the emergence of a self-directed and regu-

lated motion in the homogeneous and amorphous system (as

well as in chaos) is not understood by logic. A number of re-

searchers who consider the emergence of order in chaos almost

as a sensation and the study of such non-standard events are

presented as a new scientific direction and method which differ

from the conventional sciences. The main reason why so much

importance is attached to synergetics is to emphasize this very

`abnormality` and exception.The synergetic method is a quiet ordinary and normal

research method while it comes down through the vertical.

That is to say, not only certain types of systems, but also all

objects and events as well as relatively closed systems and

even so-called fully closed systems, being the parts of bigger

systems and infinity, are carriers of their harmony. The period

of motions in large systems is larger than usual and the un-derstanding of lower systems of their own situation, `because

of not having patience to wait`, as a stationery situation is

natural. And suddenly this stationarity is disordered and the

new order and rule appears from amorphism and chaos. In

other words, whatever exists earlier appears in our viewing

circle and draws our attention. If the subject is excludes, then

the equilibrium of a local system is disturbed, to wit, not depending on our observing, the balance of a local system is up-

set. (It is interesting that a same event could be accepted as

`disorder` from one side and as `new order` from another. )

In fact, just because ordinary science works within the

scopes of stationary systems and local time, it accepts the rules,

which are incompatible with the system and could not be ex-

plained within the system and comes from outside (in fact from138




a higher system, for instance, from cosmos), as a disturbance of

the inner rule.

Indeed, science is not sufficient to provide the claim (or

need) of the human being to include the world as a whole. For

the reason that science serves the detailed and adequate ex-

pression of the world, it could be claimed that within a scienti-

fic activity only local world, namely a certain part of the world

which is included by our `viewing circle` could be learnt. Even

inside the local world, rules could be chosen differently.

Fig. 1. Alternative perspectives of the same system

1. The diagonal creates the knot point in each

small square.

2. The diagonal creates the knot point from

the each two small squares.

3. The diagonal creates the knot point from

the each three small squares.

An example of the classification of the framework`s knot

point and dividing it into different rules is shown in the figure

139




1. Similarly, different rules, panoramas, harmonies and structu-

res-ornaments appear when we look over the world or a local

part of it in different cross-sections and different perspectives

as well as at different angles.

What is important is that the talking point here is not

time-space continuum and the locality of the geometric space

but the paying attention to the world from a certain perspective

and the choosing a certain type of attitudes from within the

complex and multi-scale attitude system and adopting them separately. It means that a number of models of the world are es-

tablished and it is demanded to gather these models somehow

in order to create the general scientific view of the world. In

fact, because it is very difficult to reach the most general and

the total view, the human cognition uses here the possibility of

contrary connection. Being somehow in contact with the ulti-

mate destination it determines not only its own orientation, butalso gets additional strength for its motion. This is the very at-

traction of the purpose and the ultimate destination! To move

being captivated by the absolute and general harmony!!! As if

the human being by throwing a lasso rivets himself to the other

end of the word and tugs himself. Alpinists also behave in this

way. Each time the hook is thrown to the top of the destination

and thus the rope becomes the shortest and most acceptableway between the alpinist and the top of the destination. The

distance is overcome not only on account of brawn, but also

with the support from the top of the destination. The gravita-

tion is not repulsed only by muscle strength but also by means

of `the gravity from above`.

It is easy to rise up when the wish of `the above` is com-

pleted with the consent of `the below`.140




It is impossible for a human being, who does not imagine

the ultimate destination, to find way. Any moving trajectory is

not yet `the way`, because a light should be seen at the end of

the way. By leaving one empirical-real material to another, one

could be lost within the chaotic collection of these materials. It

is not possible to create a theory by collecting empirical data.

On the contrary, the counters of the theory should be predeter-

mined so that the empirical material could be correctly placed

and connected, to wit, it is necessary to have some early infor-mation about the data that is sought. It seems of course too pa-

radoxical and contradictious. It is not a coincidence that even

in ancient ages Plato turned this dilemma into the subject of his

dialogues. In his dialogue Meno, a debate between Socrates

and Meno takes place. Meno asks Socrates that ` how will you

ever know that this is the thing which you did not know? ` And

Socrates points out the second part of the problem: ` if heknows, he has no need to enquire; and if not, he cannot; for he

does not know the very subject about which he is to enquire`.98

Here the problem towards the difference between one form of

knowledge and another, namely the problem of the relativity of

knowledge emerges. Science cannot go from pure darkness to

light. Science seizes a ray, which has come from somewhere,

and by following it, goes through the way of emerging into thedaylight. This ray could not be a result of empirical researches;

it comes from afar - from the philosophical approach towards

the world as well as from inspiration and ardour; it is called

intuition or God`s gift in different contexts.

The science can never replace the function of philosophy.

98 Plato, Meno, Платон. Диалоги , Moscow: Эксмо, 2008, I/383-384.

141

http://tureng.com/search/emerge%20into%20the%20daylight







Any concrete scientific field and the special sciences re-

flect a certain perspective of the complex model of the world

and the structure of the majority of the certain kind of knot

problems. And the philosophical standpoint is the directing po-

wer for the whole view of the world. For, the fundamental prin-

ciples of a great number of scientific principles have been put

forward by philosophers. Heisenberg, for instance, thinks that

the atomistic philosophy of the Ancient Greeks should be me-

thodological basis for the contemporary atomic physics.

99

The search for ultimate substance in ancient philosophy

developed in a number of directions. We can divide them into

two main parts. It was started either from accepting a substance

(water, air, fire etc.), a number of substances, for example, the

four elements (water, air, fire and earth.), as prima materia, or

the starting point was not the matter, but numbers or the prima-

rity of the geometrical form.The concept of atomism itself is an extension of the first

line. That is to say, the smallest material beginning is accepted

as a basis. What is important is that after passing several hun-

dreds of years, the development of science has eventually pro-

vided an opportunity to re-establish these philosophical ideas in

the basis of experimental and mathematico-theoretical material.

I mentioned above that each field of science researchesthe world not as a whole, but as local problems.

The attention is drawn to a perspective or a local part of

the world and this part is seemed as if it is the whole world. In

fact, considering the principle of the identity of the whole and

99 В. Гейзенберг. Физика и философия. Часть и целое. Мoscow,

Наука, 1989, p. 28

142

http://tureng.com/search/fundamental%20principles







the part, each field of science researches the whole world.

However, we are in need of the service of philosophy for

collecting the fields of science. The development of science in

the 20th

century was so noteworthy that the atomistic model

that had been put forward by Leucippus and Democritus were

driven into a corner and sloughed off by the mathematical mo-

del of the world, which had been put forward by Pythagoras

and Plato. The question here is that modern physics cannot ac-

cept the atom or elementary particle as a material particlewhich has its concrete trajectory.

Now, we can speak of particle only with a certain proba-

bility; it is mostly easier to present it as a packet of waves. And

what is the most important here is that the only thing which

remains stable is the mathematical formulae. For this very

reason, Heisenberg points out that the elementary particles for

the modern quantum theory are mathematical forms in the lastinstance, they are merely more complex mathematical forms in

comparison with the geometrical forms that were conceived in

the age of Pythagoras and Plato.100

The most remarkable aspect of Heisenberg`s point of

view is that he considers easier to explain the achievements of

modern physics in the context of the teaching of Heraclitus. As

in case the notion of `fire` is replaced by energy then contemporary scientific ideas become compatible with that of Herac-

litus.101

The reason that made Heisenberg to address the history

of philosophy is that not being satisfied with the local re-

100 Ibid, p. 36.101 Ibid, p. 35.

143

http://tureng.com/search/in%20the%20last%20instance







searches in a certain field of physics, he tries to create the ge-

neral scientific view of the whole world and give the indivi-

sible mathematical formula of the whole material.102

And it becomes clear that the creation of the general view

is possible, without being based on a few centuries of empirical

and theoretical researches, considering the more universal no-

tions, to wit, it is possible with philosophical approaching. On

the contrary, if theoretical ideas and philosophical models had

not existed, the empiric materials would probably have losttheir ways. However, modern physics follows exactly the line

drawn by Plato and the Pythagoreans.103

We are now in the 21st century. If Einstein and Heisen-

berg had been alive, they would have probably drawn their at-

tention to the other ideas that were put forward in philosophical

teachings but at the same time scientific searches still now

could not approach them. I mentioned above that Heisenbergdifferentiated between the two philosophical directions that the

scientific-theoretical notion, which is connected with the sear-

ching of the fundamental substance, is based on them. How-

ever, there is a third direction too. It is re-emergence of the

principles, which were formerly put forward by Parmenides

and Anaxagoras and can be bases for not only materia, but also

for soul. Namely, Parmenides was guided by the idea of unity.At the same time Anaxagoras and the Neo-Platonists based

their ideas on the idea of `nous`. I think the development of

science in the 21st century will continue with this direction.

102 А. Н . Вяльцев. Математизация физики // Ученые о науке и ее

развитии. Moscow, Наука, 1971, p. 126.103 В. Гейзенберг. Физика и философия. Часть и целое, p. 37.

144




Michio Kaku, for example, writes in the preface of his book,

`Physics of the Impossible`: “So is it impossible to think we

might one day be able to teleport ourselves from one place to

another, or build a spaceship that will one day take us light-

years away to the stars? Normally such feats would be conside-

red impossible by today's physicists. Might they become pos-

sible within a few centuries? Or in ten thousand years, when

our technology is more advanced? Or in a million years? To

put it another way, if we were to somehow encounter a civili-zation a million years more advanced than ours, would their

everyday technology appear to be "magic" to us? That, at its

heart, is one of the central questions running through this book;

just because something is "impossible" today, will it remain

impossible centuries or millions of years into the future?”104

M. Kaku`s fantasy, in fact, seems entirely emaciated. The

problem of `invisibility` has already become one of the mostreal studies of Japanese researchers. For now, the concrete

steps towards the screening of the object, as well as towards

creating the effect of `absolute transparency` have been taken.

Not only the films on `the journey to stars` as well as ` on the

reading of thoughts and on the issues of telepathy` are being

made, but also science itself is doing certain research studies in

this fi

eld.In a word, these quests of realizing the impossible are not

only a finding of M. Kaku. It is possible to say that all the great

thinkers of all times have not been satisfied with `what is pos-

sible`; they have achieved what they could, and have thrown a

stone at what they could not have achieved. Some of them, in

104 M. Kaku. Physics of Impossible, London, 2008, xii.

145




turn, have thought even on its philosophy and have presented

the unattainable and unfathomable as a form of reality. In his

book, `The unknowable`, Semen Liudvigovich Frank, who is

an outstanding researcher in the field of the philosophy of

science, tries to explain the attempts of mind to go beyond its

possibilities as a regularity. Yet Frank accepts that `our cogni-

tion is sufficient to cognize existence only within a limited

circle`… Our standpoint will be clearer if we take into conside-

ration the fact that the cognitive ability of the human being islimite

g

the ge

should be changed to consider the environment to be changed.

d not only qualitatively but also quantitatively.105

It is questionable that if the discrepancy between the up-

per and lower systems appears and if one of them is subjected

to the change, then how the other one will approach this

change. If we take into consideration the fact that in compa-

rison with the lower system, the upper system, in one sense,

plays the role of the environment, then this question will soundas reminding of the known problem between the central ele-

ment and the environment. It reminds us of Avenarius' doctrine

of the principal coordination as well as of the theory of con-

trary relationship. The century-old discussions towards compa-

ring heredity with the upbringing as well as towards comparin

ne with the environment will be also remembered here.

The environmental change influences its inhabitants (thecentral factor) by some means or other. However, is it possible

for the changing of an inhabitant to find its reflection in the

environment? Or in other words, how many inhabitants, factors

105 С . Л .Франк. Непостижимое в сфере предметного знания //

Сочинения, М., «Правда», 1990, pp. 218-219.

146




Or, another question arises here. Is it possible, in prin-

ciple, for the factor and environment to be changed without de-

pending on one another?

For the teaching of Abu Turkhan, which begins directly

from eternity and relates the reasons of all changes to the sys-

tem that has been planned and programmed on the universal

scale, and which claims that nothing is accidental and a more

universal harmony appears on all scales, the order of things is a

ring and component of the order of the universe. If, at anystage, a certain system seems to us as chaos, it means that the

time of planned intentional change has not yet reached. There-

fore, all of them pre-existed in the program in advance. Merely

for the reason that we are not aware of the fine structure of the

system that we call chaos, we cannot also see the embryos of

the forthcoming regulated motions that are hidden here.

The emergence of an order in chaos and reaching thetransition time to the regulated order could be possible only for

two reasons. The first reason could be taking it into account in

`in the internal program`. The second reason, in turn, could be

taking it into consideration in the program of the upper system,

namely in `the external program`. As the condition in the lower

system is conditioned by the environmental condition. When

the environment changes, then its previous balance is disorde-red and it passes to a new condition. In this case chaos itself is

seen as `a balance`. That is to say, the system -`the lower sys-

tem` is established such that all its internal elements share the

equal rights, to wit, they become identical. This internal `ba-

lance` is possible just because the external environment also

does not show the initiative to disorder it and furthermore it

provides the opportunity for this to happen.147




The mentality that has been formed within nature study is

so that further energy is needed only for establishing order. In

the rest cases, the processes are intended to disorder any order

and to the transition to dynamic `balance`. It is known in phy-

sics as ` the law of increasing entropy`. The increase of en-

tropy, in turn, means the decrease of information. That is to

say, further energy is needed for giving further information to

the system as well as for increasing the information that it has

preserved.Every substance and event, as well as the information

that the system has preserved within itself is first of all either

its primary program or its genetic formation. The information

that has been added to the system as a result of outside interfe-

rence, usually appear at the level of macrostructure. For

example, a household good is put only in a room which is filled

with air. And the information about this room now will be con-nected to that household good. Air acts here only as a back-

ground and those who want to describe the room do not refer to

the air in here and its parameters. The molecular content abso-

lutely is not of concern here. If the second or third thing is put

in the room, then their correlations to one another as well as the

distance between them become the subjects of a new macro-

structure and so of new information. The problem of designappears here. However, this design does not include the struc-

ture of these things, their internal structure and the information

that they have preserved in themselves. In one sense they have

been left aside from the structure. What is of concern here is

the structure of the model created by the designer. The internal

structures of things are not taken into account, that is, they are

included in the background-`chaos`. The information here is, in148




fact, what we have included. The information that have been

preserved by these things and their separate elements is an

unshown and `secret` information.

As a general rule, the secret information that `chaos` has

preserved in itself is not taken into consideration.

As well as the fact that there is no such thing as absolute

chaos is not taken into account. The elements, in turn, are not

wholly identical. Furthermore, the possibility of differing the

elements, which have previously acted as identical, from eachother with the change of the external environment is sunk into

oblivion.

To sum up, synergetics appears at the crossroads of the

cognitive way, which rises from the bottom, and the cognitive

way that begins from the top. Though the fact that inorganic

systems also preserve a program in themselves and they are in

fact potential organic beings has newly accepted in naturestudy, it was investigated in philosophy long ago.

In this respect, endeavors of evaluating synergetics like a

new methodology and attempts of pushing the philosophy out

of the agenda by transferring the methodological function of

philosophy to synergetics bring to mind the traditional charac-

teristics of positivism and neo-positivism. However, in spite of

the fact that science develops continually it can study the uni-verse only by adapting it (the universe) to the finite models.

149



On the Idea of Circular Development of the

Philosophy of Science

Up until Aristotle`s time, there were either the naive

materialistic views that considered the world merely as a sen-

sory perceivable reality, as a system based on the same mate-

rial basis, or there were absolute idealist views that by connec-

ting the real being only with idea and mind, accepted the senso-

ry world as a shadow and illusion and considered the know-

ledge that were taken from the sensory experiment not as truthand knowledge but as a judgement. Aristotle preferred to unite

form and matter. Unlike Plato, he sought ideas not above things

but in things themselves and replaced idea-eidos with form

which determined the essence of the thing and its function.

This `replacement` was not at all merely an alternative

view, but was the basis of a different view on the world that

played an important role in the later development of the historyof the philosophical thought. Sometimes the foundation of

logic is considered as one of Aristotle`s contributions to the

sphere of founding a number of new scientific fields. However,

`logic` is the natural result of his thought system. That is to say,

there is no need for logic within the idealistic teachings that are

not based on the sensory experiment. The appearance of the

truth in the intuitive form and in the form of revelation does not150



Circular Development of the Philosophy of Science

leave any space for logic. Logic mostly takes into consideration

generalizing the knowledge that are taken from the sensory ex-

periment, and outlining the exact counters and boundaries of

these `commons`-notions and `correctly` connecting them to

each other and forming the patterns of thought. Neither the

Pythagorean dialectic nor that of Heraclitus is compatible with

formal logic and nor is the philosophy of Plato. For the reason

that logic frames thought it is generally in contradiction with

the spirit of the dialectical philosophy. From this stantpoint, asthe founder of logic, Aristotle stimulated the development of

scientific knowledge rather than philosophy. Formal logic

begins from the denial of the dialectical philosophy by conside-

ring that any object or event could be both good and evil, hot

and cold, active and still. We would even say that it begins

from the denial of philosophy and thus lays down the founda-

tions of the scientification of thought.Logic in its essence belongs to the patterns of thought,

dialectics, however, to thought itself. Thought no longer exists

as living thought after it has entered into hearts. At the first

glance, we encounter here a point that may seem paradoxical.

According to Marxism dialectics belongs to nature and, for He-

gel`s teaching, to the sphere of thought. For Marxism, the `li-

ving` processes of nature overstep the limits of formal logic.The human being merely uses logic as local and limited me-

thod when he perceives the world and reflects it in conscious-

ness and thought.

Hegel, in turn, considers mind and thought in motion and

development. Formal logic belongs neither to `living nature`

nor to living thought; it somehow appears in materializing and

`naturalizing` thought. In fact, neither pure idea nor pure mate- 151




ria possesses the concreteness of time and space. Appearing

only during the contact of idea with materia, the notions of

time and space are also the indicators of sensory objects. `Two

objects cannot exist at the same time in the same space`, this is

an example to the law of contradiction in logic. In fact, other

laws of logic also appear under the condition of the concretness

of time and space. Logic is merely the result of the initiative of

creating time and space concreteness both in the sensory world

and in the world of thought, it is a result of the initiative of packing and shaping thought. For bringing any idea to the

notice of others, man is firstly obliged to verbalize and symbo-

lize it. Only in this case the concreteness of thought in terms of

time and space is needed. All the laws and principles of logic

are obtained here.

It is interesting that Kant was the first who attempted to

prove that time, space and causality do not objectively exist innature, but belong to thought. However, he did not continue

this thesis towards uncovering the essence of formal logic.

`The other side of the medal` will appear if we look at the

problem symmetrically. Kant emphasizes that the categories of

time, space and causality are necessary when the events in the

sensory world are explained, that is, when they are transferred

to the sphere of thought. If we look at the contrary process- atthe problem of transferring intellectual matters to the sensory

world, then again we will need the notions of time, space and

causality. Under the very circumstances of the concreteness of

time and space thought becomes shaped within the patterns of

formal logic. What is the pattern then? It is the concreteness of

time and space. The notion of `space` has specific meaning

152




here. What is of concern here is the demarcation of thoughts

and the concreteness of the borders of idea.

We should take into consideration the historically known

fact that Pythagoras and Plato, who were representatives of dia-

lectical thought, entered into history also as representatives of

mathematics and mathematical thought. Certainly Plato was

not mathematician. However, with his way of thinking he con-

tributed to bringing mathematics to the forefront and Aristotle,

in turn, served the development of science (nature study). In-deed, unlike the thinking line of Aristotle, which is based on

intending to learn nature as it is, as well as on the sensory expe-

riment and thus on quality conditions, the line of Plato, which

gives the prominence to the idealization of the world or to the

ideal world, leaves more place to quantity conditions. We con-

front here with a seeming paradox; on the one hand we face he-

re with mathematical exactness, which reminds us of forma-lism, but on the other hand with the disappearance of the boun-

daries and outlines of quality concreteness (mathematical regu-

larity). What is needed here is probably to unveil the close rela-

tionship of mathematics with dialectics. Setting size limits for

the concreteness of quality provides the opportunity for the

transition to a new quality outside the size; and this is, namely

the dialectics.This regularity, which would be formulated after several

thousand years by Hegel as one of the main principles of dia-

lectics, in fact, also expressed the relationship-correlation bet-

ween formal logic and mathematics.

It should also be taken into consideration that formal lo-

gic was not limited only to excluding sophistry and dialectics,

but also was indifferent to mathematics and avoided it.153




As a universal talent Aristotle himself, of course, did not

stay out of mathematics, but the line that he referred to and de-

veloped was mostly based on quality divisions and quantity in

some sense receded into back stage. Considering the definite-

ness of `the thing is what it is`, formal logic does not pay atten-

tion to quantity change and the possibility of its transformation

into something else.

It is not a coincidence that when the great mathematician

and philosopher of our time A.Whitehead analyzed the tea-ching of Aristotle, he mentioned that formal logic damaged not

only philosophy but also science. He writes: `But the Platonic

doctrine of the interweaving of Harmony with mathematical re-

lation has been triumphantly vindicated. The Aristotelian clas-

sifications based upon qualitative predicates have a very res-

tricted application apart from the introduction of mathematical

formulae. Indeed, Aristotelian Logic, by its neglect of mathe-matical notions, has done almost as much harm as good for the

advancement of science`.106

On the other hand it appears that, besides its damage, his

staying out of mathematics had also good effects. The great

historian of science and philosophy in the Modern Time A.

Koyré writes: `The teaching of Aristotle is not mathematical

teaching and this is the weak aspect of it; however, it is thestrong aspect of it too. This teaching is a metaphysical tea-

ching. Though the Aristotelian world is not geometrically cur-

ved, if it is possible to say, it is metaphysically curved`.107

106 А.N . Whitehead. Adventures of Ideas. London, 1933, p.157.107 А. Койре. Очерки истории философской мысли. М., 1985, p.17.

154




Abu Turkhan, in turn, emphasizes the third incurvation

event – incurvation of intellectual space. For his hypothesis,

both the geometric and metaphysic incurvations are related to

the locality and limitation of the rational potential of the human

being. As if, thought itself (human thought-science) has circu-

lar motion like celestial bodies, atoms, electrons, etc.108

Accor-

ding to the Koran, God has given the human being limited

knowledge; thought can go until a certain border and the more

it approaches the border, the more the difficulties. The thoughtintensifies and is screened, and then turns back (and we abso-

lutely are not aware of our return). The motion of advance is

replaced by rotary motion. It is probably better to say that it is a

spiral motion. That is to say, there are both the components of

advance and return here (Perhaps the Sun itself, atoms, etc.

move spirally, but we can only observe the rotary component.

Does not the effect of `the expansion of the universe` inform usabout the components of advance?)

Now, Aristotelian physics, which was falsified long time

ago, is replaced by Galilei-Newton`s Mechanics and the con-

ception of absolute space and time becomes the main scientific

principle. However, then Einstein comes and once again time

and space become relative. Does not the actuality of Leibnitz in

the 21st

century, who `did not understand` the principles of Newton and related the continuum of space and time to sub-

stances, as well as the return of thought to Aristotle lay the

foundation of a new circular motion? Or, the other example:

108 Ə bu Turxanın “fikir f əzası” təlimi (Abu Turkhan`s teaching of

`intellectual space`) // «Fəlsəf ə və sosial-siyasi elmlər» jurnalı, 2008, № 4,

pp. 159-160.

155




The idea of `the source of the motion should be sought within

the substance itself` is rejected by the principle of `outside in-

fluence`. However, several centuries later, it is unveiled that

electrons have a will and thus once again the necessity to study

the nature of the substance appears. Modern genetics, in turn,

indicates that all the way to the next development of organism

is founded when it is in embryo. Is not it the return to Medieval

Islamic philosophical teachings and from there once again to

ancient philosophy? Or, does not Modern Phenomenology re-turn to Cartesian teaching and Cartesian teaching, in turn, to

Ishraqism (The Philosophy of Illumination), Ishraqism to Ma-

nichaeism, the teaching of Mani to Zoroastrianism, and thus

does not everything begin over again. Do not the returns from

Existentialism to Sufism and from Sufism to Zen-Buddhism

notify that in one sense philosophical thought has circular mo-

tion (in fact, spiral)? All that have been said above show thatthe facts, which indicate that in some day or other the progres-

sive thought turns back `in an uninformed way`, and the hypo-

theses, which claim that intellectual space is not rectilinear but

curvilinear, are not accidental.

156



“Native” and “Alien” Knowledge and the

Conditions of Their Compatibility

Summary

The `placement` of new types of knowledge in certain

theoretical systems is thought within the limits of the two side

models: every new knowledge is added to previous knowledge

when the principle of cumulativity is used as base. The main

problem is how this `addition` is realized. However, there is asecond way; the existing system of knowledge collapses and

then is constructed once again. The real process usually hap-

pens between these two poles.

It depends on the compatibility between new knowledge

and the theory whether previous knowledge will be preserved

or will be destroyed and constructed anew. Together with the

methods of verification and falsification it is also possible toexamine the accuracy of new theoretical proposals by means of

theoretical trial-and-error method. The implementation of

this method, which is widely spread in practice, to theory is

realized by the way of entering any new idea and proposal

directly to the structure of the theory without any control. It

becomes a criterion of truth whether or not new knowledge is

compatible with the known theoretical system, which has157




already been tested, and whether it is native or alien to this sys-

tem.

Introduction

Types of knowledge are not always systematic, or more

precisely, not all knowledge form a unit system. The know-

ledge on a certain area of specialization and on a certain prob-

lem is put in order on certain principles and theories. They are,

in turn, included within a more fundamental principle andtheory. However, sometimes the general panorama of an area

of specialization, that is, the collision of the structure of a block

with the examples of the structure of other blocks or with diffe-

rent unities causes the formation of more optimum or more

pragmatic configurations.

The need for a new knowledge arises from the need to fill

in certain gaps. Namely, seeking a new knowledge within cer-tain conditions is found, in fact, by the order of a known and

established theory and in seeking the answers to the questions

that arise from its analysis.

New types of knowledge usually have two main sources.

They express either a new empirical fact or, by being an integ-

ral part of other theories and even of the theories of other scien-

tific fields, they `pay a visit` to the viewed field, or they aretransferred. The second situation is observed mainly in the in-

tersection of sciences.

A new scientific fact is usually seen as an independent

side which is not dependent on existing theoretical systems.

However, it is nothing of the kind. Although a fact comes from

nature, its description and representation is realized by means

of well-known notions and terms. Any empirical fact enters the158



About “Native” and “Alien” Knowledge

scientific area together with a certain interpretation. If we go

one step further, it could be said that leading standpoints and

paradigms play leading roles in the establishment of instru-

ments as well as in measuring process. Thus the relation

between a scientific fact and theory is established still in the

first step-at the beginning of experiment. It is not a coincidence

that Ferdinand Gonseth and Gaston Bachelard emphasize that

every experiment is realized due to the primary intellectual

construction.

109

It can be understood so that as if anappropriate scientific knowledge has a genetic structure.

Namely, it depends on that genetic structure, which lies behind

the experiment, whether this knowledge corresponds to any

theory or not and whether it is native or alien. Everything

depends on the notion that the result of which necessity and

search is the statement of experiment and what kind of thought

is it based on and `the order` of what kind of theoretical systemdoes it fulfil.

The problem of placing new knowledge in previous theo-

retical system is, in fact, a specific condition of a more univer-

sal process. What is of concern here is that whether the thing,

which is included within the existing environment, is native or

alien in terms of idea and structure as well as genetic rela-

tionship and coordination possibility is of concern here.It is worth remembering a fact in physics: for re-crystalli-

zation of dissolved and amorphous water, firstly a piece of

crystal is dropped inside it and the next crystallization process

happens around this nucleus. That is to say, although there is a

material in the amorphous environment, for the reason that its

109 Bachelard, c. 54 C. 156 (19)

159




memory does not have the structure of crystal, it cannot inde-

pendently become crystallized. The idea of crystal must be gi-

ven to the amorphous environment from outside. By repeating

itself, the idea creates crystal on a certain scale; or more

precisely, the next process is the reproduction process by gro-

wing or being copied and repeated. The essential difference is

in the idea; a certain idea and structure is preserved in its smal-

lest particle, `atom`, embryo and nucleus. Like in the living

world, idea-structure is within the seed and it grows and de-velops in a fertile environment.

Firstly the examination and recognition processes take

place when a new knowledge and a new idea enter existing

knowledge system. If new knowledge is not so new for this

system, that is, if it is constructed from a certain structure and

is only internally different, then it is not difficult to place it; it

has already a place within the configuration of the system andit is not received as an alien element. However, if the new is a

very new then no place is found for it within the existing con-

figuration, that is, new one is an alien for the previous system.

If the genetic structure is different then the key of knowledge

must be carried with it, because the system does not recognize

it and cannot open it. If it has come without the key then it will

stay out of the system or will be a base for another system.Some other knowledge systems can recognize and accept it but

if they `do not recognize` it they will not accept it.

We are far from modernizing all the processes that hap-

pen in the world of knowledge and thought. Our aim is to em-

phasize the existence of substructure programs and self-recon-

struction processes here like in nature as well as to emphasize

160




the possibility of the implementation of the synergetic metho-

dology here.

The arrangement of new idea in the context of already

formed scientific theories and knowledge systems and the con-

ceptualization of new knowledge as well as examining it whe-

ther it is scientific or not and whether it fits into the frame of

normal science or not as well as the formation of new scientific

configurations and the use of certain mathematical apparatus

and models, of course, are within the scope of scientific active-ty. However, the creative process should not be confused with

the process of patterning and `normalization` of science. Un-

fortunately, scientific activity itself and the mechanism of

scientific inventions remain in the background in the modern

philosophy of science, and the problems of the rationalization

and structuralization of science become prominent. It is not a

coincidence that the vast majority of research studies are devo-ted to scientific criteria and to the problems of demarcation.

Non-logical and uncertain cognitive processes can be vie-

wed in two stages when approaching scientific creativity as a

whole: firstly, the stage until the period of the obtainment of

new knowledge and the rational end of the non- conscious

`seeking` process, and secondly, expressing the obtained new

knowledge with an adequate language by giving a logicalshape to it.

New idea enters the established science system –the

boundaries of `normal science` from outside as a product of

creative thinking. Then, are `the sending` to outside and car-

rying a different idea from outside to inside realized as a pro-

cess by means of the traditional methods of science? Certainly

not! It is possible that the idea brought from outside may not161




correspond to scientific standards. If it is not aware of the nor-

mal scientific language then it will be accepted as alien. Then

how does it assimilate the climate as well as the rules and

methods of the new environment that it has been brought into?

If the compatibility does not happen here then how is the new

one expelled from the previous one? Just like it is sine qua non

in the transplantation of the organs of the body as well as the

analogical relation emerges between new knowledge and the

viewed theory.In fact, the condition of the re-construction of the pre-

vious normal scientific system reminds us Kuhnian paradigm

shifts. However, Kuhnian paradigm shifts belong to larger-

scale processes. Namely, what is of concern here is the change

of the world’s scientific panorama and the change of termino-

logy. We in turn talk about the current scientific innovation

process, that is, about the freshness of science based on newideas and about its operativeness and development and about

the internal details of this development. This process, in fact,

reminds us the trial-and-error method in empirical sciences.

Every innovation here is empirically examined and if `the

right` (in fact, expected) result is not gained it means that the

idea does not justify itself. We direct the attention to the use of

this traditional method in theory. Namely, every new empiricalknowledge, which is ready to be examined in practice, can be

examined by means of the trial-and-error method. However, it

is possible to examine `the accuracy` of a theoretical proposi-

tion by giving it a place in the structure of the theory. M.

Bunge emphasizes this possibility and calls this examination

`an intertheoretical examination`: “An intertheoretical exami-

162




nation will try to find out whether the given theory is compa-

tible with other, previously accepted theories.”110

If a theory easily `digest` the innovation it means that it is

not an incompatible innovation. Namely, that theory has sec-

retly and potentially included this `innovation`; and if there is

not a compatibility between them, then this new knowledge is

either incomplete or it requires a new theoretical environment

and infrastructure as well as an alternative conception and

teaching. In situations such as this, new knowledge can liveoutside like a destitute step-child and one day it can seize the

power.

It seems as if every idea is reborn in a new context and

lives a second and different life.

Every theory is, on the one hand, included in the struc-

ture of a larger theory, and on the other hand, it attempts to in-

crease its capacity on account of new ideas and new types ofknowledge.

There can be also certain gaps in large scientific-concep-

tual systems and theories. Every theory goes through a certain

formation phase. Its most perfect state is to rise to the stage of

self-consciousness. In this case, theory shows its incomplete-

ness and insufficiency. As K. Popper noted, sometimes the

author of a theory himself cannot well perceive it. 111

After atheory has been established it passes a long-lasting improve-

ment and is explained in different ways. This is the stage of

110 Mario Bunge, Philosophy of Phisics, Dordricht-Holland/Boston –

USA, 1973, p. 212.111 Karl R. Popper, Objective Knowledge. An Evolutionary Approach,

Oxford, 1979 // К.Р.Поппер. Объективное знание. Эволюционный

подход. М., УРСС, 2002, p. 284.

163




interpretation. In this stage, a lot of logical results, which have

been gained from the theory, are interpreted and subjected to

`the examination procedure`.

There is a need to some additions and details for making

theoretical configurations better and ensuring its integrity. We

seek for that detail that we need in the syncretic, patterned

`wild` idea which come to us from outside. In other words, we

try to `domesticate` it. One way of it is that the idea is placed in

the gap and the reaction of the system and configuration isawaited. If the system accepts it and if a normal feedback is

formed between it and other elements of the new theory, it

means that this is what we have sought. If there is not compa-

tibility then the seeking must be continued.

By using new idea as base, a researcher can build a new

configuration and system on it. Then a competition arises bet-

ween theories and the better working theory is considered asaccurate.

Now we would like to approach the advent of a new idea

not from the standpoint of the trial-and-error method, but from

a slightly different context. Firstly, it would be appropriate to

look at where and which environment and context a new idea

has been chosen from. It is possible to encounter a new idea,

which has been placed long ago and even hundred or thousandyears ago in the structure of life itself or in poetry and philoso-

phical teachings or in the structure of other sciences and arts

when going beyond a scientific problem and even beyond a

specific science, that is, when thinking completely in a diffe-

rent direction. However, it is as if we suddenly perceive that

this idea is in search of a problem within a scientific field. This

is what is called `the illumination`. Not every scientific create-164




vity and discovery of new knowledge can be gained only by

sensory experience and logical analysis. It must be there an

absolute recognition opportunity and its condition is compati-

bility and relationship.

165



Two Mathematical Models of the World

Summary

The biggest insufficiency of the present mathematics is

that it consists, in fact, of the eclectic mixture of two different

models.

In the first model , the world is taken as infinity and what

is chosen as an element here is the unit. Everything is measured

with the multiples of the unit . The teachings of atomism are al-

so based on this very idea. It means that there is a smallest final

bound of this world which has been not yet broken; and this

bound is also finite. The most adequate expression of it in the

sphere of numbers is the unit . The atom of natural numbers is

also the unit . All numbers consist of the different multiples of

this atom - this unit.

According to the second model, this world is in unity and

its mathematical manifestation is the unit. It is possible to

approach the unit, whereas it is not possible to reach it. The

world is between zero and one. Everything here is measured

with fraction. All changes are made in the denominator of frac-

tion, but not in the numerator. Numbers, in turn, serves to show

into how many parts the unit is divided: every element is 1/ N

and N is the set of all natural numbers: 0 < N < ∞

The simplified variants of the mathematical model of the166




world paves the way for the comparative analyse of its

alternative philosophical interpretations.

Introduction

The leading principle in the majority of scientific tea-

chings is cumulativity. It is acted from the naive faith that by

gathering knowledge about the separate events and things of

the world, we can get knowledge about the world as a whole.

In fact, it should be moved not from parts to the whole, butfrom the whole to parts.

When the world is accepted as unit then its mathematical

model also changes. That is to say, our approach to the world

could be understood not as an approach to infinite, but as an

approach to the unit. In this case, all other events (and know-

ledge about them) are expressed as the parts of the unit, that is,

as fractional numbers.Depending on how to explain the unit and zero, it is also

possible to establish two different models of the world.

The alternative mathematical models of the world

The teachings and mathematical models, which take the

world as infinity, choose the unit as element. Everything is

measured with the multiples of the unit . The atomistic tea-chings are also based on this very idea. Namely, there is a

smallest final bound of this world which has been not yet bro-

ken; and this bound is also finite. The most adequate expres-

sion of it in the sphere of numbers is the unit . The atom of na-

tural numbers is also the unit . All numbers consist of the diffe-

rent multiples of this atom-this unit. It is true that, in parallel

to it, the notion of fraction is also used in mathematics. Na- 167




mely, it turned out that beside natural numbers there were also

fractions. However, this kind of approach arose from mixing

two mathematical systems and two different models as well as

from their eclectic unity. This, in fact, is the biggest insuffi-

ciency of the present mathematics. Due to this turmoil and con-

fusion, it has not yet been possible to create a simple mathema-

tical image of the world. Namely, if the atom of the physical

reality is accepted as an adequate to the notion of the unit in

mathematics, then the existence of fractions becomes impos-sible; because the atom is indivisible according to its definition.

One of the two ends of the world becomes finite and

another infinite when this type of model is established. That is

to say, this model includes the infinitude, but it does not how-

ever include the infinitesimal ; because there is not a smaller

one than the unit . However, it is possible that there can be a

completely opposite model to it. The world itself is finite ac-cording to this model, in other words, it is the unit ; and infinity

is within it. In this case, what exists is the infinitesimal , not the

infinitude. What is paradoxical here is that the infinitudeness

finds room in the finite, that is, in the unit, or it is placed within

it.

It is not indeed so easy to give its philosophico-ontologi-

cal explanation. This mathematical model of the world is verysimple in turn; the world is between zero and one. Everything

in this world (the world of multiplicity in philosophy) is mea-

sured with fraction. The change is made not in the numerator of

fraction but in its denominator. Numbers, in turn, serves to

show into how many pieces the unit is divided: every element

is 1/ N and N is the set of all natural numbers: 0 < N < ∞.

The main point is the differentiation between the parti-168




cular and the general as well as between matter and form. Aris-

totle mainly used the term of species. That is to say, in spite of

their specificity, each type is expressed with the notion of the

unit (it also reminds us Russell's logical atomism112

). What is

chosen as a species, or what is specially differentiated as ge-

neral? - All these depend on in what level of structure the

world’s map, which is drawn by men, is viewed.

Every structure level, in fact, corresponds to a sphere of

the world. There is not an uninterrupted transition between the-se spheres; there is only a discrete transition. Just like electron

covers in N. Bohr`s atomic model, which, each of them being

one sphere and one layer, can only discretely pass to the next

layer, and although the world is uninterrupted at a certain level

of structure, it becomes possible at another level of structure

Thus, there is one general idea and –the unit on the basis

of each type. However, due to a higher generalization, theseunits themselves, in the higher stages of hierarchy, are transfor-

med into manifestations, into the particular states of a more ge-

neral and into the copies of the unit which stands in a higher

layer. Then it is not important what type is of concern as ell as

the manifestations of an idea or an essence are no longer com-

pared with each other by quality, on the contrary, they are com-

pared by quantity; as well as it is elucidated that how many ma-nifestations, events and things are of concern, or how many

multiples of its unit it corresponds to. Here it becomes neces-

sary to explain the measurement unit of the physical parameter

and it is also necessary to elucidate what part of this unit the

112 Russell В, The Philosophy of Logical Atomism. Open Court, La

Salle, 1993.

169




concrete physical object keeps; and only in this case mathe-

matics steps in. Or, when the relation between two events, pro-

perties and physical quantities is determined, each of them are

represented with their appropriate multiples or they are repre-

sented in a form that has been changed as the result of a mathe-

matical operation. Mathematical attitude, equation and formula

cannot belong to a concrete manifestation and to a relation

between material objects. First of all, it is necessary for this to

idealize, model and symbolize those material objects, or inother words, it is important here to precisely discover the ideas

that they carry.

It is possible to measure different properties and charac-

teristics of any material object. However, the constant attitude

and regularity, which can be expressed as formulae, can belong

not to a specific material object, but to this or other general and

idea that it carry, or more precisely, to the relation betweenideas and to their structure.

What carries the meaning is not multiples and numbers

but units; because the unit is the symbol of species (types) and

essence. It becomes necessary here to differentiate between

`the unit` and the notion of `one`. It is not a coincidence that

for elucidating whether the unit has quality characteristics or

not, Gottlob Frege also suggests distinguishing between theunit and the notion of one.

113

Zero and the unit. The internal dynamics of zero

Leibnitz, still at that time with a great sagacity, noted that

113 Г. Фреге, Основоположения арифметики // Логико-

философские труды. p. 175.

170




numbers are expressed by means of the Unit (1) and Nothing-

ness (0). He explained the problem of Existence and Non-exis-

tence, in a certain meaning, by means of mathematical lan-

guage. U. Eco uses these ideas of Leibniz as examples to ex-

plain linguistic structuralism.114

Is the beginning however unit? Or, does everything start

from zero? As the unit has its opposite, but zero does not have

an opposite or it is equal to itself. That is to say, it is possible to

accept zero as emptiness and as a notion that has not any con-tent as well as it could be viewed as a joining of positive and

negative unities (opposites). From this standpoint zero seems to

be more fundamental than the unit. Modern scientific studies

show that next to matter there is also antimatter and the annihi-

lation process happens when they contact each other, that is,

both of them `disappear`. The contrary process however is also

possible, that is, the creation of two positive and negative tag-ged particles (for example, electron and positron) from this

non-existence and zero, in a certain condition, is also possible.

This, in turn, shows that the form of existence, which is accep-

ted as nothingness, non-existence and zero, is in fact a more

complex being. Just as atoms, which are neutral (because posi-

tive and negative charges balance each other), the positive and

negative directed stepouts in the social life, for example, goodand evil, also neutralize each other. The normal state, which

include both good and evil, does not arrest attention and what

arrests attention is only the good or the evil, which comes to

the forefront in a certain situation and which breaks the balan-

114 Эко У, Отсутствующая структура. Введение в семиологию,

ТОО ТК «Петрополис», 1998, p. 13.

171




ce. Mathematically expressed, 1 and -1 have a certain value,

but 0 and its multiples have no value. Whereas when 0 beco-

mes broken to pieces, it becomes equal to the sum total of 1

and -1, that is, it turns out that it includes in both of them.

The results of our study and the Modern Thinking in ge-

neral require the changing of the attitude towards zero. Zero is

not only a symbol of emptiness, but it is also a symbol of com-

pleteness, balance and neutrality. In this case, zero competes

even with the unit. For the reason that the traditional standpointconsiders the unit as a symbol of unity and completeness, it has

captured one of the shades of meaning of zero. It is worth here

reminding that zero also means silence and quietness.

Silence in fact is the absence of sound and quietness, in

turn, is the absence of motion. However, the absences of other

qualities like mercy, love, generosity, etc. are mostly expressed

not with the zero point and with the neutral situation, but withthe existence of opposite qualities, for example, with cruelty,

hatred, stinginess, etc. These are however the other poles of

those qualities. Then how is the zero point defined? It is mostly

accepted as a beginning or transition point, that is, it is accep-

ted neither as mercy nor as cruelty, neither as love nor as hat-

red, and neither as generosity nor as stinginess. Nevertheless, it

becomes possible only when the model that we have establi-shed is the one-dimensional space. Namely, the change hap-

pens between -1 and +1 and 0 is only a transition point here.

However, even within this model we can accept zero not only

as the absence of positive and negative qualities, but as the uni-

ty and sum of their states which are equal in value but opposite

in direction. It is called as dynamic balance. Even sometimes

not some love or some hatred but the culmination of both of172




them can be together. It is true that balance can often be disor-

dered in this case as well as the leaps from one pole to another

can also be possible. However the entire panorama can only be

expressed by means of the dynamic zero. We can also describe

events with two-dimensional and three-dimensional spaces. In

this case, any state of quality should be taken as a vectoral

quantity. Then together with the opposite diametric positions of

these qualities to each other, their states under different angles

could also be taken into consideration. The state of zero of thisquality can become possible only when the substitute vector is

equal to zero. That is to say, the state of zero rarely becomes

possible in reality or it is only an idealization. For us, it is

possible to describe the real situation as the fluctuations around

zero and to give its mathematical expression.

We have cited a number of examples from spiritual life.

The application of mathematics in this field is still next to no-thing. Mathematics is mainly used in the explanations of phy-

sical events. For this reason, it is worth here paying attention to

the more comprehensive states like warmth and coldness, and

positive and negative electrical charges.

For the reason that warmth is the final indicator of statis-

tical event, it is slightly difficult to apply the vectoral quantity

model to this area. If we finally move on to the motion trajecto-ry of separate particles and try to determine the final tempera-

ture by means of the substitute of the vectors that indicate the

motion of these particles, then the problem will become more

complicated. Statistical methods are applied to escape from this

very complication.

Here a very important philosophical conviction appears;

it turns out that the quietness point is pithier and more complex173




than the motion point. Namely, motion only covers the stepouts

from the state of balance and from the neutral situation, and

these, in turn, the issues which are mainly concrete and their

calculation is possible; because the state of balance (chaos, ho-

mogeneous environment and the equality of substitutive vector

to 0) is accepted as a calculation system or as a beginning, or,

expressing it with mathematical symbolism, as zero condition.

However the internal structure of the state of balance is more

complex and the internal processes are either the only reasonsfor these motions or together with outside impacts.

Conclusion

The present mathematics is established not on the first or

second model of the world, but on the mixed form. That is to

say, it is intended here that the world is situated not between 0

and 1 or 1 and∞

, but between 0 and∞

or even between -∞

and+∞. The idea of the discrete structure of the world has been in-

stinctly (blindly) abandoned and mathematics has developed

on the idea of continuity for a long period of time.

By moving out from its philosophico-ontological mea-

ning, the unit in mathematics acts as an element of all possible

structural variants. Unlike the first model, the unit here does

not express the entire world and the wholeness of this world;on the contrary, it acts as an element and indivisible basis of all

things and types.

Each type of wholeness and each relatively completed

system can be accepted as an element when it moves on to

another scale and another level of structure. For this reason,

every type has its own unit.

174



Mind and Sense as the Frame and

Membrane of the Shrine of Life

Which one’s role is more important, sensation or reason,

in human life? How are they related to each other and what is

their participation level and mutual relation in the entire life

phenomenon? This problem has been studied very little in phi-

losophy. Instead, the specific place of science and the arts and

their mutual relationship in the structure of social life have

been studied relatively more. For this reason, we will attemptto investigate the problem of the correlation of reason and sen-

sation in the structure of personal life by analogy with the re-

lation of science and the arts in social life. Although absolute

equality and sameness are not of concern here, but nevertheless

there are some similarities that could contribute to the clarifi-

cation of the problem in question.

The process of scientific creativity is no doubt possibledue to the active role of subject. Just like in all creative pro-

cesses, the author here is the soul too. However, we look at this

process mostly from the standpoint of a scholar and researcher.

Whereas, without being related to other souls or to the world of

souls, the individual soul cannot produce any new idea with

reference only to sensual knowledge that it gains by means of

175




his personal experience, or more precisely, by means of its

body that it rules.

Epistemology still attempts to explain the development

process of science and the discovery of new scientific know-

ledge without reference to the notion of the soul and only being

limited to reason and sensory experience. For this reason, the

models, which are used in this field, are deprived of opportu-

nity to reflect the real course of the creativity process. The real

process is more complex and is directly related to the activityof the soul.

What is meant from reason and sense is mostly individual

reason and the sensory experience of an individual. That is to

say, each person gains all knowledge due to his personal expe-

rience. The knowledge that is the products of the experience

and the reason of others, is transmitted to others after being

verbalized, that is, after being put to a new objective form.Cumulativity, which is one of the main principles of Modern

Epistemology, expresses the possibility of the gathering of this

objectivised knowledge. Namely, the gathering of knowledge

is an independent process that happens on the different plane

apart from individual creativity processes, and has considerable

social content. It means that the gathering of knowledge is no

longer considered as a process that happens in the spiritualworld but as a socio-historical event. The conception of Kuhn

is one of the obvious examples of this approach.

Karl Popper also considers the problem of the entry of

new knowledge into the structure of theory apart from the dis-

covery of that knowledge. Knowledge, in his theory, is separa-

ted from its author and enter to an independent existence world

176



Mind and Sense as the Frame and Membrane

- to the world of `objective knowledge`. In this case, the spirit

of the creative scholar is again left aside.

It is interesting that the connection between different

types of knowledge is sought after they become depotentiated.

Whereas, according to Carl Jung’s theory of collective uncon-

sciousness, the sensual world of every person is not a result of

only his personal sensory experience but also includes the sen-

sory experiences of previous generations and counterparts. It is

possible to ascribe this idea to the knowledge that is at thecreative and initial stage. If this idea is applied to Epistemolo-

gy, then it is possible to come to a conclusion that knowledge

is discovered, in fact, not as a round and smooth thing, which

has lost all its opportunities and connections, but it is disco-

vered with all its connections and relations. Merely, for expres-

sing it by words and known ideas, scholars mostly clip its

wings, make it disconnected and depotentiate it. Then, onceagain they seek the new forms of connection to enter it to

known theories.

The whole problem is that, for expressing new and un-

known ideas by means of known ones, it becomes often neces-

sary `to pare it` and mould it into certain shapes. However, a

new-born knowledge considerably loses its originality in this

process and by being removed from its natural condition it isframed in the clothes that are not cut for it.

New types of knowledge are pared off in accordance to

the criteria and terminologies of the teachings and theories that

have been known in advance. Whereas this knowledge would

could be the embryo of an entirely new theory. The scholars,

who approach the problem more fundamentally, instead of ta-

king a position to hurriedly pare new knowledge and place it177




anywhere, attempt to keep it alive in its initial and natural con-

dition and to cut out new clothes that fit it.

Building the temple of science does not happen only due

to Cumulaivity. If we only collect different types of know-

ledge, the wall will not be durable. For this reason, it is neces-

sary to overlap them on each other as well as pack them and

clothe them. However it is not the end of the matter. There

ought to be the mutual transition probability between a theory

and another one. After climbing to a certain floor and beco-ming too distant from land, it becomes difficult to go down and

then climb up from another part for receiving news from the

other side of the wall. Therefore, there should also be doors

and windows between walls. For the moving of air, builders

even make the middle of frameworks from non-hermetic mate-

rial.

The most important aspect, which differentiates sciencefrom poetry and the arts, is that it has rational frame. The

reason why scientific knowledge could be collected, is, that

these types of knowledge are closely related to each other with

logical chain. In other words, we can compare the plants built

from logic with reinforcing concrete constructions. This con-

struction enables both neighbouring rooms and floors to be

closely connected to each other. For this reason, this type of theframework is used for building multi-storey buildings. Sensa-

tion should not be added here for the durability of framework.

The principle of cumulativity in science reminds us this frame-

work. The types of knowledge could not only be collected.

They ought to be included into the structure of larger construc-

tions, theories and teachings. For this purpose, knowledge

ought to be dependent on logical rules or it should be mathe-178




matized. However, new discovered knowledge still does not

easily become independent from sensation, simile and figura-

tive images. Therefore, for being entered into the framework,

they should be moulded into patterns and be adapted to a cer-

tain pattern and cliché on the basis of unit logical and ma-

thematical principles.

For some reason or other, when it is spoken about the

role of senses in the epistemic process, only the cognitive sen-

ses are remembered. Then a question arises: how can these fiveindependent senses form the whole image. The formation of

the whole images of things in us does not happens due to those

five cognitive senses but by means of a number of different, in-

teractive senses. According to Husserl, every appearance of the

thing in some way includes the whole thing. Then on account

of what does it become possible? The cognitive senses are not

capable of it. At the same time we cannot comprehend the dif-ferent structural levels of the thing. In our daily life we observe

things only by means of the senses which are the expressions

of macrostructure. If we want to observe the internal processes

by dividing the thing into different parts, then another complex

of senses will appear.

Things enter to our daily life only with their macrostruc-

ture and total functions. The apple, for instance, forms a certainimage in our consciousness as an entire object. The image of a

specific apple basically coincides with the general notion of the

apple that existed in our consciousness in advance. However,

for a pharmacist-doctor, who makes a certain medicine from its

seed, the apple will be much associated with that medicine.

This is, in turn, the evaluation of one object in different structu-

ral levels.179




The same object can be a basis, in our consciousness, for

the formation of different phenomena.

Time and space are not taken as a moment and point:

both of them have a certain duration and interval, and for this

reason the same thing could be expressed by different pheno-

mena in different situations. If we comprehend a thing in a

certain moment only as a phenomenon, it does not mean that

the thing really consists of this phenomenon. For the reason

that Husserl does not accept the material existence of the thingout of phenomenon, he ties to explain these possibilities of

diversity as the potential possibility of the world of conscious-

ness itself. Considering this, Levinas writes that the object is

never fully comprehended. It means that the approach of Phe-

nomenology, in fact, is closer to Kant’s agnosticism and his

teaching of `the-thing-in-itself (das Ding an sich)`. Merely

Husserl replaces the concrete existence of the thing with theactive existence of consciousness and its potential possibilities.

Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka writes: “In its search for un-

derstanding, the human mind oscillates between what is

obvious and what is mysterious, what is hidden and what is

manifest\ what is visible and what is invisible. It is itinerary,

from Parmenides` goddess and Heraclitus` hidden, through the

great Platonic and Aristotelian lines, the neo-Platonists, al-Fa-rabi, Avicenna, Mulla Sadra, Leibniz, Kant, Husserl, and Hei-

degger, on to the present-day thinking, is that of the metaphy-

sical quest for the key by which to open the seemingly locked

access to the stable, generative factors animating the fluctua-

180




ting reality of life, the human soul, the world, the ultimate des-

tiny of human beings.”115

The real life becomes possible due to the activation of

consciousness. What we experience are the events (phenolme-

na) in the potential world that are drawn to our consciousness

( Herausfassen in Husserl). The existence of a thing is determi-

ned by our drawing it to the sphere of active consciousness.

Naturalism ascribes it directly to nature and to the objec-

tive world itself. Husserl’s phenomenology, in turn, ascribes itto the world of consciousness. As to us, we put emphasis on the

contact of both of them with one another and their being expe-

rienced simultaneously. This idea, in fact, was put forward in

12th

century by the establisher of the doctrine of Illumina-

tionism (Israqiyya), Shahab al-Din al-Surawardi. Later on, it

was developed further in the philosophies of Mulla Sadra and

Abu Turkhan. Al-Suhrawardi calls the transition between twoworld `barzakh (the intermediate state)`. On the one hand, he

applies the hierarchy of lights to the architectonics of human

heart (soul), and on the other hand to the architectonics of the

material world. At the point of illumination (Husserl uses the

term of intuition), the connection between these two sides

arises and this is the life that man experiences.

Life includes both existence forms; it exists as the mate-rial being and as the event (phenomenon) of consciousness si-

multaneously. The bridge between these two edge states and

poles is active consciousness, experience or life. Henry Corbin

115 Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka, “The Unveiling and the Unveiled”, in

The Passions of the Soul in the Metmorphosis of Becoming , Edited by

Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka, Boston, 2003, p. XXIV.

181




was the first who tried to link Phenomenology with Illumina-

tionism. Later on, Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka discussed this

problem in her works in detail. The school that she has estab-

lished as well as the conferences of The World Phenomenology

Institute and the books that have been published by this

institute enable Illuminationism and Phenomenology to be

compared with each other. I would say that this initiative paves

the way, as a whole, for the approach between Eastern and

Western philosophical doctrines. It is the result of these effortsthat instead of speaking about building the temples of reason

and sensation separately, today we can speak of building the

entire temple of life, which includes both of them.

182



Contents

Introduction ................................................................................................ 5

MAN AND THE WORLD......................................................................... 13

Way to “The Logos of Life” ..................................................................... 15

“The Esoteric Passion” of Western Philosophy for theEastern Basis ............................................................................................. 25

PHENOMENOLOGY OF LIFE: HISTORICAL PREMISES................ 36

The Effect of Illumination on the Way Back from Aristotle to Plato ... 37

Al-Suhrawardi’s Doctrine and Phenomenology ..................................... 57

Intentionality and Transcendentality ...................................................... 80

SOUL AND BODY .................................................................................... 91

The Specificity of the Body: Two Ideas in one Thing ............................ 93

Soul and Body in the Phenomenological Context ................................ 104

About the Correlation of Memory and Remembrance

in the Structure of the Soul .................................................................... 122

PHENOMENOLOGY AND SCIENCE.................................................. 131

Synergetics as a Positivistic “Trick” for Philosophy ............................ 133

On the Idea of Circular Development of the Philosophy of Science ... 150

“Native” and “Alien” Knowledge and the Conditions of Their

Compatibility .......................................................................................... 157

Two Mathematical Models of the World .............................................. 166

Mind and Sense as the Frame and Membrane of the Shrine of Life ...... 175

183

phenomenology of life or life of idea

Documents