ph2000-midterm hmecaskey f10

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Hananh M. MecaskeyPH 2000- Modern Philosophy Midterm

Fr. Anselm RamelowFall 2010

1. Question #2: What is the relevance of the concept of nature or substantial form in thehistory of Modern philosophy?

1.1 Characteristics of Modern Philosophy Affecting Considerations of NatureModern philosophy is marked by characteristics that depart from previous conceptions of

the natural world previously held. All of these characteristics, (1) an obsession with method, (2)almost rabid individualism, (3) dialectic of skepticism for certainty, (4) move to

scientific/mathematical thinking, which (5) questions and departs from metaphysics, (6) becomesanthropocentric vs. teleological, (7) introduces some forms of materialism to philosophical ways

of thinking, (8) nature is something to be controlled being judged by how it works rather than itsends, pointing to (9) a rise in technology. Since nature has become what a thing does rather than

what it is, Modern philosophers tend to lose the concept of a particular nature, what a thing is,which is virtually an erasure of Aristotelian substantial form. Mechanistic forms of thinking

inform views of nature, so that a thing tends to be judged by the operation of its parts rather thana unified whole.

1.2 Bacon on Nature:

Beginning with Bacon, nature in the Modern period became analyzed in an increasinglyscientific way that omitted traditional considerations of theology. Bacon used an inductive

method of analysis, specifically with an anti-metaphysical bent, attempting to understand naturethrough classification of all sciences. Specifically in the first of his four idols which tempt human

beings into speculation, Bacon makes statements about nature which demonstrate that he seemsto be concerned with only a physical reality.

The first classification of idols, Idols of the Tribe, mistrusts the capacity of humanperception to lead to reality. Unlike Aristotles understanding that knowledge comes first

through the senses (i.e., human nature is trustworthy for transmuting knowledge), Bacon doubtsthe capacity of human natures physicality to really convey reality to the mind. The second set of

idols, Idols of the Cave, demonstrates Bacons suspect of the natural conditions in whichhuman nature develops and is disposed to, warning individuals to be suspect of their own biases.

The third set of idols, Idols of the Market, exemplifies another of Bacons skepticisms aboutsense reality. In this category, Bacons nominalism describes how the words we use say nothing

about the true nature of reality. The final set of idols, Idols of the Theatre decries the follies ofmetaphysics, basing Bacons natural theories purely in what is scientifically perceptible.

In all of these categories of idols, Bacon makes clear that nature, for him, is onlyunderstood through scientific induction. This consideration of nature may be most clear in

Bacons deification of the Kingdom of Science, about which Bacon uses religiousconnotations to speak about the physical world. While on the surface, this may seem a similar

project to Aristotle pursuing an understanding of Physics, Bacon eliminates the metaphysicalcomponent of Aristotles work, the substantial form, creating a conception of nature which is

entirely a secular space.


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1.3 Descartes on Nature:Following Bacon, Descartes also analyzed nature through science. Descartes omission of

substantial form affected his consideration of nature in that while he acknowledges a spiritualreality, it was dualistically related to scientific reality (matter in a physical consideration), as

opposed to Aristotles hylomorphic configuration of reality and change which is not dualistic,

since matter and form compose one whole substance. Whiles Descartes too doubts the capacityof senses to convey nature in its reality, unlike Hobbes who seeks a kind of empirical certaintyabout nature and entirely denies metaphysics, Descartes employs a mathematics to understand

how nature works.Defining the goal of his analysis as to regain mastery and possession of nature, Descartes

tries to methodologically prove that one can have a mathematical physics. Seeking a certainunderstanding of nature, Descartes begins with his own mind, not doubting thathe senses but

doubting whathis senses inform him of in nature. Instead of defining reality through manycategories the way Aristotle does, all as accidents of substantial forms that give things their

identity, Descartes reduces classification of reality apart from his mind to quantity or extension.Separating matter and mind by this extension, which is all material things, Descartes

creates a conception of nature in which all matter is manipulated by the will of minds. Byalienating the spiritual (soul) from material nature, Descartes creates a discombobulated system

wherein even bodies are extended objects subject to the manipulation of the mind. Thus forDescartes, all physical nature is extended matter which is animated by/manipulated by mind.

1.4 Occasionalists on Nature:

Moving from Descartes to the Occasionalists, we transition from Descartes mechanisticsystem in which God guarantees the correlation of mind with matter to a conception of nature

where one cannot necessarily even rely on God to disclose what nature really is.Maintaining the subject/object dualism of Descartes, Malibranche distinguishes between

ideas and essence. While man knows ideas of God, man cannot know Gods essence or theessence of anything else unless God gives man knowledge of that essence. Man is further

alienated from himself in that the cognate mind has no power over the object of the body: Godmust supply this power through an act of will. In terms of understanding nature, this connotes a

very low anthropology, that man has no ability to do anything without the aid of God.Spinozas notion of nature coincides with his conception of God in that God is, in one

sense, natura naturans (generating nature) and in another sense natura naturata (generatednature). Taking from Descartes a high regard for mathematics, Spinoza says that nature unfolds

from the mind of God with a geometrical necessity. Concerning nature as created and God asCreator, Spinozas thought has deterministic consequences: God, as extended in space and time,

is a necessary being who does not freely create, for there is a necessity behind His acts ofcreation. For nature, there are no final causes particularly in the sense of a goal or purpose given

by God: since God is mechanically driven to create, nature is mechanically driven to act as itdoes.

Leibnitz, influenced by the work of both Descartes and Spinoza, differed from otherOccasionalists in his consideration of nature, but saying that God creates the best of all possible

worlds as a result of intentional choices. There is an element of determinism is Leibnitzs God,however, for while non-extant worlds are possible, those which do exist are necessary. Leibnitz

divides all extant things into monads, which are little cogitors. Whereas Descartes saw animalsas little machines, Leibnitz sees them as little minds. Even things like rocks and plants have


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controlled only by human beings superior ability to agree to external regulation by socialcontracts.

Since life as considered by the Modern philosophers is now judged by motion rather thanby some principle of potentiality and actuality, a growing increase in recreating or simulating life

through technology rises. Nature being understood as how something works, nature no longer

participates in Gods being in any way, but is rather constructed by God, who may or may not bepart of the mechanism at large Himself. The change of focus from the individual mechanisticfunctions of a thing rather than of a thing as a unified whole causes us to attempt to know God,

not in Gods essence, but by in what God has done. Since human beings are somehow stillunderstood to be in the image of God, human beings are understood to function like God in

controlling nature and creating through artificial reality and mechanisms. Developing technologyexercises our similar nature to Gods, allowing us to strive to return to paradise through our

machinery. Man having an individualistic understanding of himself, sees God as having no partin the arrangement of nature, but rather this is something man himself must do.

Note to Reader:

I hope you will forgive the great length of the initial section, because even though itis abbreviated, I felt it necessary to lay out the general Modern attutide towards nature in

order to proceed in describing and analyzing modern concepts of God.

2. Question #3: Describe and analyze the different concepts of God and their implications in thephilosophers studied so far. (Bacon, Descartes, Malibranche, Spinoza, Leibnitz, and Hobbes)

2.1 Bacon of God and Consequences:

With the work of Francis Bacon, we are introduced to the idea of the AbsoluteMonarch, a volunteerist authority who creates laws, but it never subject to them himself.

Bacons perspectives of absolutist law reflected his own theology that God too was absolute inpower and never determined by laws He had already given. The result of Bacons legal position,

that the monarch is absolute and above law, allowed him to justify doing anything for the sake ofpleasing the monarch, which seems to be a very relative concept of justice: what is good is doing

whatever pleases the highest authority. If applied to theology, I see striking similarity to ancientcultic worship of gods: the character of these gods was unknown and so human-like they were

more subject to moody whims than to be just and good in absolute senses.If God is thus, what does this make morality? Can God be depended on anything, even to

keep His word? I would suggest the idea is unlikely. If one thinks thus of God, one would mostlikely set out to build ones own fortune, pacifying God as one would an absolute monarch, but

doing as Bacon does as well: separating religion from science. If God cannot be depended upon,one must work out how to operate life and society through scientific methods. Thus Bacons

description of Gods nature as to hide His own glory seems something of an excuse to keep Godout of his work as one might flatter a monarch, saying that ones daily work was too mundane

for the monarchs greatness.

2.2 Descartes on God and Consequences:Descartes, unlike Bacon, did not try to dismiss the idea of God from science, but rather

attempted to resolve his theology through scientific method. Unlike Bacons desire for empiricalcertainty, Descartes was interested in mathematics as seen in his privileging of mind (the realm


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of the spiritual form him) over matter. Understanding God as the bridge between the two realmsof subject (mind) and object (matter) in his theory, Descartes drew correlations between humans

as beings of pure thought and angels/more like God. Rooting the human identity in our abilitiesto think, Descartes labels cognition as how we humans are made in the image of God and

superior to the animalsmore like the angels as intellectual beings because the body is not part

of our human identity. As pure, logically reasoning thought-beings, however, man becomes morelike a machine, which then causes us to assume God is machine-like.In his proof for the existence of God, Descartes says that the idea of the infinite is too

great to know in principle or to know formally, it must be given to us by God. Since it is GodHimself who has given us this idea of infinitude, which could not possibly come from elsewhere,

God must exist. While a good proof, what are the implications of God as just a Thinker, asmechanical? Is the incarnation possible if we make God so thought-directed that flesh could not

be part of His nature? I think this raises real problems for the understanding of human nature asin-fleshed as well, because this is one thing that distinguishes us from God in our finitude. Any

attempt to take Descartes beyond what he has done with science and theology into the realm ofthe hypostatic union would be extremely problematic.

2.3 Occasionalists, God, and Consequences:

Whereas for Descartes, God guaranteed that the minds reality corresponded to the outsideworld, this idea became far more important for the Occasionalists.

2.3.1 Malibranche

As a Catholic priest, Malibranches philosophical ideas pertained largely to religion,especially to conceptions of worship and paganism. He held that God should be worshipped as

the only cause of all things, and that to know this would free one from the superstitious need toworship many gods. In other words, Maibranche denied the existence of secondary causality

which is extremely important in traditional conceptions of Catholic doctrines. Malibranche sawGod as the first cause in competition with the possibility of any other sort of causality, because

his understanding of Gods omnipotence was that God was the only one who has power. Thisseems to have dramatic consequences for human free will (do we really have any at all, if God is

the only cause?) and it could be argued that this conception of omnipotence actually reducesGods power to create, because instead of creating things with their own ability to create, God

must do everything Himself.Malibranches conception of God completely alienates us from authentic relationships

with people and things. Instead of things affecting us, it is God who affects us, causing our ideasdirectly. Thus we are passive observers, even in our own salvation, which seems to be a more

Protestant conception of grace than a Catholic one. I would even ask, what sort of nature is graceperfecting, and is there even a need for grace if God is doing everything Himself anyways? One

can also imagine that this concept of God creates huge problems with explaining evil and sin.Malibranche explained sin as a deficiency or a privation which did not need to be caused, thus

not implicating God in sin. But since ideas are not even our own, and God even proceeds ourown knowledge of ourselves as cogitors, how can we actually sin? Malibranches explications of

the cogitors knowledge of God sound so much like the Beatific Vision that one wonders whatheaven is supposed to be like?

2.3.2 Spinoza


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Expelled from his own synagogue because of heterodox beliefs, Spinozas understandingof God attempts to combine pantheism and monotheism. Spinozas deductions begin from an

ontological definition of God as the self-caused: if Gods existence is perfection, Gods ownthought causes His essence to be. Since God is the one thing which exists out of itself, God is

first in Spinozas order of being and knowing, causing all knowing. Seeking clear and distinct in

the steps of Descartes, Spinoza realizes that the most distinct and clear ideas are in the mind ofGod, thus all should attempt to think with the mind of God. For Spinoza, this is the realization ofa kind of genetic causality, that thought itself produces the reality of that thought. Thus, when we

realize we are at one with God, we lose our individuation in God and are able to think with themind of God.

Harkening back to something of a Platonic system, one of the consequences of Spinozasconception of God is that there is no belief in individual immortality. There also arises the

question of physical reality, because we are the thoughts that think our bodies, the very idea ofour bodies. So understanding God to be in one sense generating nature and in another sense

generated nature, Spinoza describes God as the great undistinguished, both active and passive.Thus relationships are merely apparent, not actual, and we are part of a great causal chain which

harkens back to the mechanism of Descartes. Since for God things necessarily unfold fromGods mind, God too is a part of the causal chain. This is a kind of determinism/fatalism in

which our only freedom is not to change our situations, but rather our dispositions towardssituations.

Interestingly enough, the consequences of Spinozas philosophy of God producesurprising results: God has a body; God is extended in space and time; God is not free as a

creator, but produces out of necessity; God can have no goals or purposes since God ismechanistically driven to do what God does. This leaves no ultimate definition for good or evil,

and also draws into question what one can mean by the concept truth. Of course interesting, itis no surprise that Spinozas theological philosophizing was not popular with his fellow Jews.

2.3.3 Leibnitz

For Leibnitz, God is a person who acts intentionally and always makes the best decisions.Since God always chooses the good, Leibnitz argues that we have reason to praise God.

Leibnitzs project concerning God is to bridge the gap between Descartes volunteeristic,contingent notions of God and those of Spinoza who claims that God makes no choices and that

all possibilities are by necessity (denies possibility). For Leibnitz, God had the option of makingmany possible worlds, but God chose to make the best. There is a small element of determinism

in this thinking, because God must necessarily choose the best in whatever God does.In his hierarchy of monads, Leibnitz has God as the highest monad, because God is able

to think the most clearly and distinctly. Seeing all created things as having some element of mindrather than machine, Leibnitzs theory restores some sense of natural dignity. Leibnitz also says

because the monads are simple, they are indestructible, secure in the knowledge that life will bepreserved as thought of God. This, however, also eliminates an idea of individual immortality.

Establishing a kind of occasionalism in the monads idea to know, Leibnitz says all ideas comefrom God because the monad cannot perceive outside of itself. This creates little ability for man

to freely choose to have relationship with God, which makes differentiating ideas of guilt quitedifficult. If man has no choice in relating with God and no ability to think outside of God, how

can man be faulted for what man does?


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2.4 Hobbes on God and Consequences:Hobbes understanding of God is empirical and political, for he says that it is God-like to

establish a state, because creating a state is akin to creating some form of artificial life. LikeGods creation, Hobbes says a state cannot be created ex nihilo. Yet Hobbes materialism is

based on having: (1) no universals; (2) knowledge as power, and (3) knowledge of action as

knowledge of nature. One wonders what God is, if there are no universals, and just how limitedGods power is.Hobbes political beliefs of absolute monarchy within his social contract betrays some

further beliefs about God: since without agreement to submit to one sovereign monarch humanbeings would be animalistic and violence, Hobbes seems to think that people are individually

bereft of moral, unless selfishness is moral. Saying that the absolute monarch in social contracttheory is meant to guarantee the self-preservation of all, Hobbes says that while the monarch is

there, the contact is amongst individuals. By analogy, this would suggest that human beingsbehave morally to one another not because of some covenant with God, but out of fear of one

another. All the fear and terror they would naturally enact on one another is then channeled toand through the one source of the absolute monarch. If might makes right, it would seem that for

Hobbes, God is God because God can wield the most control.

2.5 ConclusionIt seems that though the Modern philosophers are very keen on moving towards and

understanding of life and even morals through increasingly less internal natures and morescientific methods, the notion of God still remains extremely key in each thinkers theory. While

Bacons absolute monarch is a model for how he understands God, extant but uninvolved withsociety, Descartes finds a need for God in bridging the gap of understanding between subject and

object. The Occasionalists build off this understanding of God, making Him increasingly moreimportant for knowledge. For Malibranche, God guarantees the relation of interior and exterior

things, but makes God the only cause, problemitizing guilt of human action. For Spinoza, God isall things, and thus individuals should seek to shed their individualism and return to a collective

God-consciousness. For Leibnitz, God is able to think most clearly and distinctly, and givesknowledge to monads that have no windows to any kind of externality. Thus while God chooses

the best of all possible things, God still bears in some way the responsibility of human actionssince God is the first think humans know. For Hobbes our empiricist, God is an absolute

monarch in terms of a dictatorremoving the animosity from typical human relations andbecoming an external, collective source of fear and dread. All of these conceptions of God are

greatly lacking from a healthy Catholic perspective, yet demonstrate crucial transitions towardsour Godless philosophy today.

ph2000-midterm hmecaskey f10

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