peter russell - human rights western foreign policy and the dissolution of yugoslavia...
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Human Rights Western Foreign Policy and the Dissolution of Yugoslavia 1989-1994TRANSCRIPT
Human Rights, Western Foreign Policy, and the Dissolution of Yugoslavia, 1989-1994
Peter Russell
Submitted in total fulfilment of the requirements of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
29 October 2009
School of Historical Studies
The University of Melbourne
Printed on archival quality paper
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Abstract This dissertation analyses Western policy responses to the dissolution of Yugoslavia between 1989 and 1994 from the perspective of human rights. Drawing on a range of publicly available source materials, including press reports, official speeches, declarations, government documents, reports from non-governmental organisations, and articles and memoirs written by participants, it re-evaluates the available evidence in order to offer a fresh perspective on the motivations and actions of the West in this particular case and also on broader developments concerning the place of human rights in post-1989 international relations. It seeks to test the assumption, common in the immediate post-Cold War period, that human rights would be given a more prominent and consistent place in international relations, using Yugoslavia as a case study. The study adopts a trans-national approach, looking at the human rights elements of Western policy as a whole rather than on the policies of any single state in order to achieve a broader perspective. Focusing primarily on the United States, Great Britain, France, and Germany (and including when relevant smaller countries such as Italy, Austria, the Netherlands, and others), it examines how, when, and to what extent human rights were actively considered and influential in the policymaking process, the circumstances under which they were excluded or marginalised, and effects of the chosen policies on the state of human rights in the former Yugoslavia. In looking at these different issues, this dissertation makes argues first that it is necessary to look beyond Western “human rights policy” per se in order to evaluate the place of human rights in Western policies; in many cases, policies which were clearly not human rights-driven had profound and sometimes unexpected human rights consequences. Second, it argues that there was no reliable correlation between the severity of human rights abuses in Yugoslavia and the policy attention that those abuses received, and further that political calculations at times dictated that more severe abuses should be given less attention, if at all possible. Third, it contends that the Yugoslav case provides little or no evidence to support the contention that there was a consistent, broad-based, durable increase in the role of human rights in Western foreign policies in the post-Cold War era. Fourth, it argues that the poor results of many Western policy choices in terms of human rights cannot necessarily be attributed to a simple lack of concern with human rights. The Yugoslav case demonstrates some of the many difficulties of incorporating human rights into the policymaking process. Most fundamentally, this dissertation emphasises the complexity of the relationship between human rights and foreign policy, even in a relatively confined (politically and geographically) case like Yugoslavia with clear and at times overwhelming human rights dimensions.
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Declaration This is to certify that i. the thesis comprises only my original work towards the PhD, ii. due acknowledgement has been made in the text to all other material used, iii. the thesis is less than 100,000 words in length, exclusive of tables, maps,
bibliographies and appendices Peter Russell 29 October 2009
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Acknowledgements Writing a PhD dissertation, as the cliché has it, is a solitary occupation, but in fact I owe thanks to many people for their guidance, encouragement, patience, camaraderie, and support. First and foremost, I want to thank my supervisors for all of the above. Ara Keys has been part of this project since its inception, first as my associate and then as my primary supervisor. Her comments, criticisms, and suggestions have been invaluable and greatly improved the final product, not least by way of her efforts to set me straight on the eternal question of “that” vs. “which” and our running debate over my alleged overuse of commas. My first primary supervisor, Robert Horvath, did a superb and much-appreciated job of getting this dissertation off to a good start; it would have been a poorer effort without his broad knowledge in the field of human rights. While Ara was on leave, David Goodman stepped in as my primary supervisor with invaluable feedback on my writing and the overall direction of the thesis. Finally, Sean Scalmer, as my secondary supervisor in the latter half of the project, brought in a fresh perspective on the subject that was extremely helpful to me in clarifying my arguments and structure. I also want to extend my thanks and appreciation to the many other people in the School of Historical Studies who have helped me on my way over the last three and a half years. The rotating cast of characters inhabiting John Medley East Room 626 must come first on this list, in particular Sam Koehne, Elise Grosser, Nat Dowling, Rob McArthur, and Daniel Fleming. To them I have to add Prue Mann, Michael Pickering, Liam Connell, Bec Sanders, Danielle Thornton, Jennine Carmichael, Prue Flowers, Tim Jones, and the many others who have assisted me in procrastination by coffee, lunch breaks, pub nights, and many random conversations, and sometimes more concretely by sharing commentary, criticisms, and simply the experience of being a post-graduate student. The professional staff in the School have also been a great help in navigating the procedures and requirements of the degree, as well as simply making the School a welcoming place to be. Beyond the confines of the University, my first and biggest thanks go to Laura Mar, for her love, companionship, support, and encouragement. And especially for her toleration of my surgically attached computer over the last several months. I also greatly appreciated her ability to successfully drag me away from the thesis from time to time for some much-needed getaways into the great outdoors. Many other friends on three continents provided encouragement and snark, as appropriate. You know who you are. Cheers to you all. I‟d also like to thank Glenn Gould and Johann Sebastian Bach for providing an excellent and much-used soundtrack for writing, editing, and extended stretches of staring blankly at the computer screen. For occasions where more stress-relieving music was called for, credit is due primarily to Art Bergmann, Nick Cave, and the Weakerthans. Last but certainly not least, I would like to dedicate this dissertation to my parents. I suspect that they‟re almost as surprised as I am that I‟ve ended up doing a PhD, and I hope they like the results.
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Table of Contents Abstract ii Declaration iii Acknowledgements iv Table of Contents v Abbreviations vii Selected Cast of Characters viii Chapter 1 Introduction: A New World Coming Into View? 1 I. Literature Review 11 II. Methodology, Sources, and Structure 17 Chapter 2 Cold War redux: Human Rights, Kosovo, and Democracy 24 I. Background 24 II. Kosovo 33 III. Democracy and Human Rights in Theory… 41 IV. … and in Practice 45 V. Conclusion 50 Chapter 3 Managing Dissolution: Human Rights, Self-Determination, and Recognition 53 I. Background 53 II. Human Rights and the Preservation of Yugoslav Unity 56 III. Human Rights and Managing Yugoslav Dissolution 68 IV. Human Rights and Recognition 82 V. Conclusion 88 Chapter 4 The Bosnian War: Human Rights, Ethnic Cleansing, and Western Priorities 91 I. Background 91 II. Human Rights and the War in Bosnia 95 III. Western Knowledge of the Conditions in Bosnia 99 IV. Human Rights and the Question of Military Intervention 115 V. Conclusion 126 Chapter 5 Passive Coercion: Human Rights, Arms Embargos, and Economic Sanctions 129 I. Background 129 II. Human Rights and the International Arms Embargo 132 III. Economic Sanctions and Human Rights in Serbia and Bosnia 146 IV. Conclusion 163 Chapter 6 Containment: Human Rights, Humanitarianism, and Peace Talks 166 I. Background: Aid, Negotiations, and Human Rights 166
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II. Humanitarian Aid as Military Assistance 175 III. Safe Areas 178 IV. The Refugee Crisis 188 V. Peace Talks and Ethnic Cleansing 196 VI. Humanitarianism and Hostages 203 VII. Conclusion 211 Chapter 7 Conclusion: A „Pretence of the Protection of Human Rights‟? 213 Bibliography 222
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Abbreviations
BA Bosnian Army CSCE Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe DEMOS Democratic Opposition Coalition of Slovenia EC European Community EU European Union FRY Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro, post-April 1992) HDZ Croatian Democratic Union ICFY International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross ICTY International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia JNA Yugoslav People‟s Army OSCE Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe RS Republika Srpska SFRY Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Yugoslavia prior to January
1992) UN United Nations UNHCR United Nations High Commission (or Commissioner) for Refugees UNHCHR United Nations High Commission (or Commissioner) for Human Rights UNPREDEP United Nations Preventive Deployment Force UNPROFOR United Nations Protection Force VOPP Vance-Owen Peace Plan
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Selected Cast of Characters
Albright, Madeleine US Ambassador to the UN, 1993-97 Badinter, Robert French Constitutional Court Judge, Chair of the Arbitration
Commission of the Conference on Yugoslavia Baker, James A., III US Secretary of State, 1989-92 Bassiouni, M. Cherif Head of the UN Commission of Experts, 1992-93 Boban, Mate Bosnian Croat leader, “President” of the breakaway
Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna, 1991-1994 Boutros-Ghali, Boutros UN Secretary General, 1992-97 Bush, George H. W. US President, 1989-1993 Carrington, Lord Peter Chair of the EC Conference on Yugoslavia, 1991-92 Christopher, Warren US Secretary of State, 1993-97 Clinton, William J. US President, 1993-2001 de Michelis, Gianni Italian Foreign Minister, 1989-92 Draskovic, Vuk Serbian nationalist opposition leader, head of the Serbian
Renewal Party Eagleburger, Lawrence Former US Ambassador to Yugoslavia. US Deputy
Secretary of State, 1989-92; Secretary of State, 1992-93 Genscher, Hans-Dietrich German Foreign Minister, 1982-1992 Hogg, Douglas UK Foreign Minister, 1990-95 Holbrooke, Richard US Assistant Secretary of State, 1994-96; chief Yugoslav
envoy for President Clinton Hurd, Douglas UK Foreign Secretary, 1989-95 Izetbegovic, Alija President of Bosnia-Herzegovina, 1992-96 Juppé, Alain French Foreign Minister, 1993-95 Karadzic, Radovan Bosnian Serb leader, “President” of the Republika Srpska,
1992-96 Kenney, George US State Department Yugoslav desk officer, resigned 1991 Kinkel, Klaus German Foreign Minister, 1992-98 Kohl, Helmut German Chancellor, 1982-98 Kouchner, Bernard Co-founder of Médecins Sans Frontières; French minister
for humanitarian action, 1988-92 Kucan, Milan Slovene Communist Party leader; first President of Slovenia,
1991-2002 Lake, Anthony US National Security Advisor, 1993-97 Loncar, Budimir Yugoslav Foreign Minister, 1988-91 Mackenzie, Lewis Canadian Major-General, UNPROFOR commander of
Sector Sarajevo, 1992 Major, John UK Prime Minister, 1991-1997 Markovic, Ante Last Yugoslav Prime Minister, 1989-91 Mazowiecki, Tadeusz Former Polish Prime Minister; UN Special Rapporteur on
Human Rights in the Former Yugoslavia, 1992-1995 Mendiluce, Jose Maria UNHCR head in Bosnia, 1991-93 Milosevic, Slobodan President of Serbia, 1989-97 Mitterrand, François French President, 1981-95
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Mladic, Ratko General of the Bosnian Serb Army Morillon, Philippe French Lieutenant-General; UNPROFOR Commander in
Bosnia, 1992-93 Ogata, Sadako UN High Commissioner for Refugees, 1991-2001 Owen, Lord David Former UK Foreign Minister; EC Co-Chair of the ICFY Perez de Cuellar, Javier UN Secretary General, 1982-91 Poos, Jacques Luxembourg Foreign Minister, 1984-99 Raznatovic, Zeljko Serbian paramilitary leader, better known as “Arkan” Rifkind, Malcolm British Defence Secretary, 1992-95 Sacirbey, Mohammed Bosnian Ambassador to the UN, 1992-2000 Seselj, Vojislav Serbian paramilitary leader and ultranationalist politician;
founder and president of the Serbian Radical Party Silajdzic, Haris Bosnian Foreign Minister, 1990-93, Prime Minister 1993-96 Stoltenberg, Thorvald Former Norwegian Foreign Minister; UN Co-Chair of the
ICFY, 1993-96 Thatcher, Margaret UK Prime Minister, 1979-1990 Tudjman, Franjo Founding leader of the HDZ; first President of Croatia,
1990-99 Vance, Cyrus Former US Secretary of State; Special UN Envoy, 1991-2;
UN Co-Chair of the ICFY, 1992-93 van den Broek, Hans Dutch Foreign Minister, 1982-93; European Commissioner
for External Relations, 1993-99 Vllasi, Azem Ethnic Albanian head of the League of Communists of
Kosovo and president of Kosovo, 1986-88 Zimmermann, Warren Last US Ambassador to Yugoslavia, 1988-92
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Chapter 1
Introduction: A New World Coming Into View?
As the Cold War ended, there was a widespread belief in the West that human
rights would be given a more prominent role in international relations. This was perhaps
most clearly expressed by US President George H. W. Bush in a speech he delivered on 6
March 1991, at the conclusion of the Gulf War:
Now, we can see a new world coming into view. A world in which there is the very
real prospect of a new world order. In the words of Winston Churchill, a world
order in which "the principles of justice and fair play protect the weak against the
strong. . . ." A world where the United Nations, freed from cold war stalemate, is
poised to fulfill the historic vision of its founders. A world in which freedom and
respect for human rights find a home among all nations.1
According to this view, which was not limited to the United States, it was only the Cold
War superpower rivalry which had kept human rights marginalised and all-too-frequently
ignored. With that gone, governments would be free to give them the attention they truly
deserved.
Among the assumptions underpinning Bush‟s speech, the most fundamental was
that the West had always wanted to prioritise human rights but had been prevented from
doing so by Soviet obstructionism. But the speech implied other assumptions as well. It
suggested, for instance, that human rights issues were a legitimate subject of international
relations, and that the way a state treats its own citizens was a rightful topic of concern for
other states. This idea called into question the inviolability of national sovereignty, a
bedrock assumption of international relations. It assumed, too, that states would care
sufficiently about human rights violations beyond their borders to expend resources –
political, financial, and material – to prevent or end them. It suggested a reconsideration of
what constituted the “national interest”, adding human rights to the more traditional
components such as military and economic power and advantage. In essence, it posited that
the end of the Cold War meant a major change, not only in the current patterns of inter-
state relations (in the form of the collapse of communism and the disappearance of the
1 George H. W. Bush, „Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the Cessation of the Persian
Gulf Conflict, 6 March 1991‟. John Woolley and Gerhard Peters, The American Presidency Project (TAPP) [online]. Santa Barbara, CA: University of California (hosted), Gerhard Peters (database). Available from www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=19364 (accessed 12 July 2008).
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Soviet Union), but in the very nature and substance of those relations.
To say that human rights were expected to play a larger role after the Cold War is
not to suggest that they emerged from nowhere in 1989. On the contrary, human rights
had been a prominent and growing part of international discourse since the early to mid-
1970s. Even as US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger dismissed human rights concerns as
„political science lectures‟ and mocked those who promoted them as having „a vocation for
the ministry‟, for example, the US Congress passed the Jackson-Vanik Amendment, tying
favourable trade relations with human rights standards.2 The Helsinki Final Act, signed by
thirty-five European and North American states in August 1975, cemented human rights
issues more firmly in the international sphere. These developments accompanied the
growth in size and influence of human rights non-governmental organisations such as
Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch (which began as Helsinki Watch in 1975,
explicitly focused on monitoring implementation of the Helsinki Final Act human rights
provisions). In fits and starts, with many setbacks, human rights took on greater
importance in international relations. This process was particularly visible at the UN and at
the series of Helsinki follow-up meetings, where it became increasingly common for states‟
human rights records to be publicly criticised.3
Despite this slow but steady increase in the attention accorded to them, human
rights were still widely seen as being subordinate to the East-West confrontation of the
Cold War. Human rights were politicised, used by both sides as a means to attack their
opponents, while abuses by allies were ignored or downplayed. While unquestionably more
prominent in international relations by 1989 than they had been twenty years earlier, human
rights were still at best a second-order concern for most governments. They were not seen
as being of greater or even equal importance to security or stability, and were often
sacrificed out of mere convenience. The expectation as the Berlin Wall came down was
that this situation could now change, that it was only the bipolar Cold War political
confrontation that had prevented human rights from playing a larger and more important
role in international relations, and become a primary concern in and of themselves.
As the Berlin Wall fell and expectations for human rights rose, the Socialist Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) was moving towards dissolution and disaster. This process
2 Quoted in Michael Zezima, „Nothing but Human Rights‟, The MIT Western Hemisphere Project, 16 August
2001. Available from web.mit.edu/hemisphere/events/kissinger-chile.shtml (accessed 25 October 2009); Department of State, „Memorandum of Conversation: Secretary‟s Meeting with Foreign Minister Carvajal, 29 September 1975‟. Available from www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB110/chile08.pdf (accessed 25 October 2009).
3 See Daniel C. Thomas, The Helsinki Effect: International Norms, Human Rights, and the Demise of Communism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001).
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did not suddenly emerge at the end of the eighties. On the contrary, many observers felt
that Yugoslavia had been on borrowed time since the death of long-time Yugoslav leader
Josip Broz Tito in 1980. Tito had dominated the modern Yugoslav federation since its
founding after World War II, and it was largely his efforts which had kept the country
united. Upon his death, however, the Yugoslav presidency (which he had held) was
converted into an unwieldy institution in which power rotated between representatives of
all six Yugoslav republics and its two autonomous provinces. The new presidency had little
moral authority and was subject to debilitating disputes between its members which
effectively paralysed the political leadership of the country.
As a result, the 1980s in Yugoslavia were marked by the resurgence of long-
submerged ethnic, political, and economic rivalries between and within the federation‟s
constituent republics. The long-running conflict between Serbs and Albanians in the
province of Kosovo re-emerged and worsened. Intellectuals and political leaders in the
richer republics of Slovenia and Croatia began to argue that they would be better off
independent of Yugoslavia. Serb nationalism became a potent force in Serbia, and was
adeptly used by a Communist apparatchik named Slobodan Milosevic in his rise to power
and the presidency of the republic. By the time Bush made his speech to the US Congress,
Slovenia and Croatia were less than four months away from unilaterally declaring their
independence from Yugoslavia, an event that marked the start of a series of wars which
stretched over the remainder of the decade (and, in some senses, beyond). These wars,
particularly in Bosnia, saw levels of violence not seen in Europe since the end of World
War II. They were also the occasion of massive violations of human rights, from political
repression to mass rape, from extra-judicial killings to the deliberate targeting of civilians,
which added the term “ethnic cleansing” to the international vocabulary. For the first time
in decades, there was discussion about how to respond to war crimes, crimes against
humanity, and genocide in Europe.
The collapse of Yugoslavia thus offers an excellent case with which to consider the
idea that human rights would have a new importance and visibility in post-Cold War
international relations, for a number of reasons. First, it took place in the immediate post-
Cold War period, when hopes and expectations were high and new international alignments
had not yet formed. If there was ever an opportunity for the reshaping of international
relations which Bush envisioned, it was in Yugoslavia. Second, the dissolution of
Yugoslavia was a lengthy process; beginning in 1989, it was not fully complete until the
separation of Serbia and Montenegro in 2006, and the declaration of Kosovo‟s
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independence in 2008. While Yugoslavia, and Bosnia in particular, has often been referred
to as a “crisis”, it was a very long, drawn-out crisis (as opposed to, for instance, the
genocide in Rwanda, which was barely two months from start to finish in its active phase).
The Yugoslav situation also encompassed many different elements, including both
domestic and international politics, ethnic tensions, humanitarian concerns, and human
rights. This allows the consideration of human rights in foreign policy in many different
contexts, including most notably that of democratisation, the debates over recognition of
the former Yugoslav republics, and the humanitarian and human rights disaster of the
Bosnian war. Different Western states took the lead on the Yugoslav issue at different
times, enabling a comparison of the treatment of human rights issues over time between
the US, UK, France, and Germany, as well as the EC/EU as a whole. This dissertation
focuses on the crucial early years of this process, from 1989 until roughly the mid-point of
the war in Bosnia in early 1994. It was in this period that Western governments first
grappled with the difficulties and implications of Yugoslavia‟s dissolution, although the
Western response continued to evolve until the end of the war in Bosnia in 1995. These
first five years saw the emergence of all the major themes and issues of Yugoslavia‟s
dissolution, from democracy to self-determination to ethnic cleansing and genocide, and
the span is long enough to demonstrate the complexities and changeability of the Western
policy response.
Before going further, there are two points which require more explanation. First, it
would be useful to first define exactly what “human rights” means as used here, to provide
the necessary context for the discussion to follow. Since the focus is on human rights
within the context of foreign policy and international relations, the appropriate frame of
reference is therefore human rights as defined in the relevant international documents.
These include, among others, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948); the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1976); the International Covenant on
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (1976); the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (1948); the Convention Against Torture (1975); the
Geneva Conventions and their additional protocols; and the UN Charter itself. They
include both “negative” rights, such as freedom of the press, freedom of assembly, and
freedom of speech, and “positive” rights such as the right to clean water, food, medical
care, and shelter. Broadly speaking, all of the actors in the former Yugoslavia accepted the
validity and applicability of the international human rights standards delineated in these
documents. This was particularly true in the West, but it was also true for the Serbs, the
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Croats, the Bosnians, and the Kosovo Albanians – although of course all sides
unanimously denied that they were violating those standards.4
Second is the question of what is meant by “the West”, and how useful the concept
is in the context of this dissertation. The phrase as used here refers to the states of
Western Europe (including both members and non-members of the EC/EU) along with
the United States and Canada. Within this broad definition of “the West”, the specific
focus varies according to which states were taking the lead on Yugoslav issues at any given
time. In the period under consideration, the most influential states with regard to the
Yugoslav crisis were the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and Germany.5 These
states therefore receive the most attention here, varying according to the specific time
frame and issue being discussed. The policy positions of smaller states such as Italy,
Austria, and Hungary, which at times played important roles, are discussed as and when
appropriate.
It is important to recognise that there were significant differences among Western
states in terms of their perceptions of what was at stake in the Balkans, their calculations
of national self-interest, and their preferred policy responses. These differences, based as
they were in the unique perspective of each state, persisted throughout the period
examined in this dissertation (and indeed beyond). Germany, for example, had much closer
cultural and historical ties to the region than did Britain and France and was much more
directly affected by the ongoing post-Cold War changes in Europe. On the other hand, it
did not have any vital interests at stake in the Balkans and was constitutionally limited as far
as its potential military involvement in the region.6 The presence of large numbers of
Yugoslav Gastarbeiter in Germany, together with the experiences of the German public and
government concerning self-determination, left the country very sympathetic to the
aspirations of the Croats and Slovenes and much less so to the Serbs.7 Germany played a
4 The level of formal acceptance varies; the United States, for instance, only ratified the Genocide
Convention in 1988, and has still not ratified the ICESCR. 5 As Burg and Shoup observe in relation to Bosnia in particular, these states (along with Russia) „played
critical roles in shaping the collective responses to the crisis. Throughout, each of these actors pursued their own, often conflicting, national interests. But, they also acted in concert. They dominated the activities of the multilateral organisations and institutions most directly involved in the conflict. Through these organisations, they attempted to define the political framework within which the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina had to be fought, and within with its solution had to be found‟; Steven L. Burg & Paul S. Shoup, The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1999), 189-90.
6 Marie-Janine Calic, German Perspectives‟, in Alex Danchev and Thomas E. Halverson, eds., International Perspectives on the Yugoslav Conflict (New York: St. Martin‟s Press, 1996), 52, 54-8, 62-5; Paul Garde, Vie et Mort de la Yougoslavie (Paris: Fayard, 1992), 390-1.
7 Daniele Conversi, German-Bashing and the Break-up of Yugoslavia (Seattle: Donald W. Treadgold Papers, 1998), 19-20, 40. Conversi argues, however, that „public support for recognition was not more pronounced
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much smaller role during the Bosnian war, but its role in the debates over the arms
embargo and the refugee issues in 1993 (discussed below, chapters 5 and 6) was similarly
affected by the presence of large numbers of ex-Yugoslavs in the country.
Britain and France, in contrast, have most often been depicted as reflexively pro-
Serb, albeit at least initially in the context of maintaining a united Yugoslavia. Both
countries have been accused of „follow[ing] the basic instinct of primordial alliances and
historical memories‟, of being „trapped with an inherited vision of “plucky little Serbia”,
the ancient ally against the Boche‟.8 The echoes of wartime alliances were, according to some
commentators, bolstered by a revival of anti-German sentiment and fears in the wake of
that country‟s reunification.9 Also at play in both countries were, in Daniele Conversi‟s
words, „equivalent doses of Croato-phobia‟, based primarily on memories of Croatian
Fascist Ustashe atrocities in World War II.10 As Mark Almond notes, Belgrade successfully
built on this foundation in its propaganda, „hammering home fear of a Fourth Reich into
millions of heads including receptive brains in the West‟.11 Bosnian President Alija
Izetbegovic later accused „Paris and London‟ of having „from the very beginning taken the
role of Serbia‟s protectors‟.12
In the case of France specifically, another factor may have been its „tradition‟ of
conceiving of the state as being naturally a centralised and (theoretically) monoethnic
entity; as Paul Garde argues, „for the average Frenchman, the notion of a multinational
State is incomprehensible‟.13 He also notes a tendency in the French press to fail to
distinguish between the actions of Serbia, Yugoslavia, and Croatia, further inhibiting any
thorough understanding of events.14
Pro-Serbian sentiments in Britain – which were widespread in government, in the
in Germany than in other countries. What distinguished Germany was the political will and capacity to adapt to shifting circumstances‟; ibid, 22. See also Mark Almond, Europe‟s Backyard War: The War in the Balkans (London: Heinemann, 1994), 51, 237-8.
8 Conversi, German-bashing, 21; Almond, Europe‟s Backyard War, xiii. On the role of historical ties in French and British attitudes, see also James Gow, „British Perspectives‟, in Alex Danchev and Thomas E. Halverson, eds., International Perspectives on the Yugoslav Conflict (New York: St. Martin‟s Press, 1996), 87-9; Brendan Simms, Unfinest Hour: Britain and the Destruction of Bosnia (London: Allen Lane, 2001), 11-12; Olivier Lepick, „French Perspectives‟, in International Perspectives on the Yugoslav Conflict, Alex Danchev and Thomas Halverson, eds, (New York: St. Martin‟s Press, 1996), 78.
9 See, inter alia, Marcus Tanner, Croatia: A Nation Forged in War (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997), 273; Daniele Conversi, „Moral Relativism and Equidistance in British Attitudes to the War in Former Yugoslavia‟, in Thomas Cushman and Stjepan G. Mestrovic, eds., This Time We Knew: Western Responses to Genocide in Bosnia (New York: New York University Press, 1996), 287; Almond, Europe‟s Backyard War, xii-xiii, 246-7. This thesis is, however, not universally accepted; see Simms, Unfinest Hour, 3.
10 Conversi, „Moral Relativism‟, 255; Garde, Vie et Mort, 383-4. 11 Almond, Europe‟s Backyard War, 50-1; see also Bennett, Yugoslavia‟s Bloody Collapse, 161-2. 12 Quoted in Simms, Unfinest Hour, 6. 13 „… pour le Français moyen, la notion meme d‟État multinational est incomprehensible‟ (author‟s
translation); Garde, Vie et Mort, 381. 14 Ibid., 385-6.
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press, and in academia – have been attributed to a number of distinct sources besides those
discussed above.15 There was a widespread tendency to see the violence and secessionism in
Yugoslavia through the lens of Britain‟s experiences in Northern Ireland.16 British
diplomatic involvement in the region was centred on Belgrade, and the Foreign Office
„lacked any overall expertise on the Balkans‟.17 The lack of a non-Serbian perspective on
events was reinforced by the „respective strengths of the Serb and Croat communities in
Britain‟, an imbalance which was not improved by a restrictive refugee policy that
„prevented the consolidation of a significant Yugoslav presence, apart from the influential
Serbian nationalist diaspora‟ already in the UK.18 Even budgetary concerns played a role,
and some writers have alleged that anti-Catholicism did so as well.19 All of this collectively
reinforced and supported the basic conviction that British (and European) interests were
best served by a quick victory by the strongest force in the region (i.e., Serbia), thereby
restoring stability and ending the violence.20 British policy overall was rooted in „the
profoundly conservative political realism of its practitioners‟, linked to „an acute sense of
the limitations of British power‟.21 Given that Britain held the EU Presidency during the
latter half of 1992 and arguably „exerted a disproportionate influence over US policy‟, the
British position was perhaps the most important of the European states; Izetbegovic
described Britain in December 1992 as the „biggest brake on any progress‟.22
In comparison with the Europeans, the United States lacked the same depth of
historical, political, and cultural involvement with Yugoslavia and its peoples, but it is worth
noting that key figures – notably Deputy (and later full) Secretary of State Lawrence
Eagleburger and National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft – had previously served in US
diplomatic missions in Belgrade. According to some commentators, this connection „seems
to have introduced a strong element of emotional commitment to the Yugoslav cause (as
opposed to Western interests, let alone to the West‟s would-be friends), which blinded them
15 Concerning the press and academia, see Tanner, Croatia, 272-3; Conversi, „Moral Relativism‟, 245; Simms,
Unfinest Hour, 300-13. On the lack of opposition viewpoints within government and parliament, see Simms, Unfinest Hour, 273-300.
16 Tanner, Croatia, 273; Almond, Europe‟s Backyard War, 254; Gow, „British Perspectives‟, 89; Simms, Unfinest Hour, 9-10, 286-9.
17 Conversi, „Moral Relativism‟, 258; also 261; Conversi, German-bashing, 58; Christopher Bennett, Yugoslavia‟s Bloody Collapse: Causes, Course and Consequences (London: Hurst & Co., 1995), 174.
18 Tanner, Croatia, 273; Conversi, German-bashing, 49. Tanner further notes „the Yugoslav leaders ability to speak English – an important factor … Again the Croats lagged behind‟.
19 Regarding budgetary issues, see Simms, Unifnest Hour, 8; Gow, „British Perspectives‟, 90; Almond, Europe‟s Backyard War, 252-3. Regarding anti-Catholicism, see Tanner, Croatia, 273; Simms, Unfinest Hour, 3.
20 Conversi, German-bashing, 16-17; Almond, Europe‟s Backyard War, 234-5. 21 Simms, Unfinest Hour, 6-7. As James Gow puts it, „The major fault with British policy was its pusillanimous
realism‟; „British Perspectives‟, 97. 22 Conversi, „Moral Relativism‟, 245; Conversi, German-bashing, 42. Izetbegovic quoted in Simms, Unfinest
Hour, 6. See also Gow, „British Perspectives‟, 87-8.
8
to the real aims of Milosevic‟.23 Warren Zimmermann, the last US Ambassador to
Yugoslavia, had also previously served in the Belgrade embassy. The American perspective
on the Yugoslav crisis – the dominant one in its earliest stages, and significant throughout –
is discussed in more detail in Chapter 2.
Despite these very real differences, over time a recognisable, broad, “Western”
approach to Yugoslavia, and specifically to the human rights aspects of the crisis, took
shape. Whatever the specific policy preferences of Berlin, Paris, London, and Washington
on any given issue, they proved repeatedly able in practice to reach a consensus on what
overall approach they would adopt. Consider, for instance, the question of recognition of
the individual Yugoslav republics in 1991-92, discussed below in Chapter 3. Germany
favoured the policy, Britain and France opposed it, and the US remained essentially neutral,
though tending to the Franco-British position. Nevertheless, by the end of 1991 a
consensus had been reached, and by early 1992 the whole of the EU had applied it in
practice, to be followed a few months later by the US. Likewise, the Clinton administration
did not simply go ahead and apply its “lift and strike” policy in 1993 in the face of
European opposition, as discussed in Chapter 4.
Such a broad consensus was possible because, in spite of the differences among the
policies of various states (and even among the policies of the same state at different times),
when a choice was required between a given government‟s policy preferences and
maintaining intra-Western unity, one (or more) of the concerned states was typically willing
to compromise to maintain that unity. As in the cases just mentioned, these compromises
did not necessarily involve an actual change of heart by the state(s) in question, just a
willingness to abide by the collective decision. This was particularly the case for the
members of the EC/EU, who, as Mark Almond puts it, were seeking to „wipe out the
embarrassing memory of the Community‟s unfortunate ability to act as one (or even two)
at the start of the Gulf War six months earlier … and … banish the haunting doubts about
its capacity to act as a counterweight to‟ the US and USSR.24 It was also true that „the last
thing the Twelve wanted‟ in the run-up to the December 1991 Maastricht Conference and
European unification „was the distraction of a Balkan squabble‟.25 But while the Europeans
were eager to demonstrate their own power and competence, they had no desire to drive
wedges between themselves and Washington; trans-Atlantic cooperation remained as
important at the end of the Cold War as it had been over the previous decades. As for the
23 Almond, Europe‟s Backyard War, 39. 24 Ibid., 31. 25 Ibid., 17.
9
US, Thomas Halverson argues that it was „a paramount interest in American policy … to
act, or at least be seen to act, in concert with allies rather than unilaterally … [because] [i]t
was competitive strategies in the Balkans and elsewhere which had proved so disastrous in
the past‟.26 But as Halverson also astutely observes, „when unity is a top priority, real
differences produce lowest common denominator policies‟, and this was certainly the case
in the former Yugoslavia.27
With this in mind, it can be seen how the approach described above can be fruitful
on a number of levels. First, and most straightforward, it looks at Western foreign policy in
Yugoslavia from a fresh perspective, that of human rights. It does not pretend to be a
comprehensive, blow-by-blow accounting of every action taken during this period; nor is it
a history of the Yugoslav wars themselves. It is instead aimed at tracing the thread of
human rights through Western actions. This results in the minimising of some aspects and
greater concentration on others. It is an exercise in interpretation, in looking at established
events from a new perspective. Since the period in question is relatively recent, official
“behind the scenes” material is not yet available, necessitating a reliance on publicly
available sources. Evaluations of Western policymaking will inevitably change when
internal documents become available, but this does not negate the value of a study carried
out on the basis of publicly available material; there is a need to understand how these
issues were publicly framed, and how the responses were justified and explained. There is
ample material to support the interpretation which is argued here, which can then serve as
a useful starting point for further researches once official archives become available.
Second, it seeks to illustrate how the events in Yugoslavia both drove and illustrated
a change in the meaning of “international human rights” issues in the post-Cold War
period, although the language used to discuss them remained the same. At the beginning of
this period, the phrase brought to mind prisoners of conscience, freedom of the press,
falsified elections, and the like. By the end of this period, the phrase summoned up images
of mass rape, “ethnic cleansing”, and genocide. This marked a shift, both in terms of
commission and attention, from abuses typical of a peacetime situation to abuses which
can only be the result of open war and mass violence. Any study of the role of human
rights concerns in Western foreign policy must take into account this drastic shift in what,
exactly, human rights concerns were at different times; this is even more the case for a
work focused on Yugoslavia, which was a primary source of this shift.
26 Thomas Halverson, „American Perspectives‟, in Alex Danchev and Thomas E. Halverson, eds.,
International Perspectives on the Yugoslav Conflict (New York: St. Martin‟s Press, 1996), 7; see also 13-14. 27 Ibid, 7; see also Simms, Unfinest Hour, 14.
10
Third, it uses the Yugoslav crisis as a case study to investigate the assumptions of
the time concerning the new importance of human rights in international relations with the
end of the Cold War. The collapse of Yugoslavia was the first, largest, arguably most
severe, longest, and most prominent crisis in the post-Cold War period in which issues of
foreign policy and human rights were inextricably entwined. It argues that, in the case of
Yugoslavia, there was no increase in the amount of attention paid to human rights which
did not correspond to changes in the perceived self-interest of the states in question. That
is to say, human rights were still subject to the same calculations of realpolitik and inter-state
competition which had always been the case. It was simply that the circumstances, and thus
the calculations, had changed. The Yugoslav case thus does not offer any indications of a
significant and sustained increase in the importance of human rights in international
relations in the post-Cold War period.
Fourth, it evaluates some of the dilemmas inherent in the application of human
rights to foreign policy, in the post-Cold War era or any other. Despite the raft of
international treaties and declarations concerning human rights, the actual meaning and
application of human rights principles is often ill-defined and vague. It is not always clear
what is a “good” policy in terms of human rights, and policies which appear reasonable
can and often do have unexpected consequences. Different aspects of human rights can be
contradictory, and require decisions over which should be prioritised; democratisation, for
example, may not contribute to political stability. While the latter may be necessary for the
protection of some human rights, the former is arguably a basic human rights issue in
itself. The appropriate balance is often unclear at best. The general Western emphasis on
civil and political rights resulted in a tendency to ignore the effects of Western policies on
economic, social, and cultural rights, for example in the application of the economic
sanctions.
In looking at these different issues, this dissertation argues first that it is necessary
to look beyond Western “human rights policy” per se in order to evaluate the place of
human rights in Western policies; in many cases, policies which were clearly not human
rights-driven had profound and sometimes unexpected human rights consequences.
Second, it argues that there was no reliable correlation between the severity of human
rights abuses in Yugoslavia and the policy attention that those abuses received, and further
that political calculations at times dictated that more severe abuses should be given less
attention, if at all possible. Third, it contends that the Yugoslav case in this period does not
support the contention that there was a consistent, broad-based, durable increase in the
11
role of human rights in Western foreign policies in the post-Cold War era. Fourth, it argues
that the poor results of many Western policy choices in terms of human rights cannot
necessarily be attributed to a simple lack of concern with human rights. The Yugoslav case
demonstrates the many difficulties of incorporating human rights into the policymaking
process. Throughout, this dissertation emphasises the complexity of the relationship
between human rights and foreign policy, even in a relatively confined (politically and
geographically) case like Yugoslavia with clear and at times overwhelming human rights
dimensions.
I. Literature Review
There are several bodies of scholarship that are relevant to this study. These include
the literature which takes the process of the dissolution of Yugoslavia as its primary
subject matter, that which focuses on the foreign policies of specific states in relation to
Yugoslavia, work dealing with events and developments in the field of human rights, and
the literature on humanitarianism and humanitarian intervention. In combination, this
material covers a great deal of ground concerning the disintegration of Yugoslavia, the
international responses to that disintegration, and relevant human rights and humanitarian
developments and issues. What this literature does not do, however, is explicitly and directly
consider the Western responses to the Yugoslav crisis from a human rights perspective, in
order to evaluate not only the role of human rights in the Western policy response, but also
the effect of Western choices on the state of human rights within the former Yugoslavia. A
consideration of events from a human rights perspective can add depth to the more
traditional analyses of the Yugoslav crisis, shedding additional light on the priorities and
decision-making processes in the major Western capitals.
Despite the importance of human rights concerns like genocide, ethnic cleansing,
detention camps, and refugees in the Yugoslav crisis, human rights as a factor in Western
policymaking has received relatively little explicit attention in the various areas of the
literature. Some authors do implicitly or explicitly argue that human rights were an
important consideration in Western policymaking. These authors accept the premise that,
as Raju Thomas writes about the United States in particular, Western states were acting „in
the pursuit of what [they saw] as moral and humanitarian causes‟.28 Michael Ignatieff
28 Raju G. C. Thomas, „War, Humanitarian Intervention, and International Law: Perceptions and Reality‟, in
Raju G. C. Thomas, ed., Yugoslavia Unraveled: Sovereignty, Self-Determination, Intervention (Lanham, Md.: Lexington Books, 2003), 165.
12
similarly stipulates the good motives of the West.29 But the assumptions about the place of
human rights concerns in Western policymaking are left largely unexamined and
unsupported, taking for granted some of the very premises which this dissertation seeks to
examine.
Other authors pass over the question of the role of human rights within the
policymaking process with only a brief mention. In his discussion of the US perspective on
the Yugoslav conflict, Thomas Halverson suggests that human rights violations „challenged
numerous international principles and presented impulses for American intervention which
contradict established rules of state behaviour‟, but does not offer any analysis of the
effects of those challenges and impulses.30 Carole Hodge, in her generally thorough
examination of British policy, mentions the human rights dimensions of Srebrenica, for
instance, but does not address the role that those dimensions may have played in the
formulation of the British response.31 It is certainly legitimate to argue that human rights
played little role in Western policymaking, and by omission that is what these writers seem
to be saying, but they provide little data or analysis to support this implicit assumption.
Authors such as Tariq Ali go even further and explicitly deny any significant role for human
rights in Western policymaking.32 The inconsistency of Western human rights concerns
elsewhere is offered as evidence for the absence of such concerns in the former
Yugoslavia, but rather than empirically examining available material to support their
argument, these writers start from the position that human rights were irrelevant to
Western policy decisions.33
Still others simply do not address the relationship between human rights and
Western policymaking at all, or at least not to any great depth. This is particularly true for
that literature which focuses on the events within the former Yugoslavia. Some of this
work is, in terms of human rights, primarily descriptive, cataloguing and documenting the
29 Michael Ignatieff, The Warrior‟s Honor: Ethnic War and the Modern Conscience (London: Chatto & Windus,
1998); Michael Ignatieff, Empire Lite: Nation-Building in Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan (London: Vintage, 2003). Interestingly, despite their shared assumptions concerning Western motivations, Thomas and Ignatieff have diametrically opposed opinions on Western policies, with Thomas condemning them and Ignatieff supporting them.
30 Halverson, „American Perspectives‟, 3. 31 Carole Hodge, Britain and the Balkans: 1991 until Present (London: Routledge, 2006), 114-16. See also, inter
alia, Patricia Kollander, „The Civil War in Former Yugoslavia‟, in Jeffrey S. Morton, R. Craig Nation, Paul Forage, and Stefano Bianchini, eds., Reflections on the Balkan Wars: Ten Years After the Break Up of Yugoslavia (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2004), 3-22.
32 Tariq Ali, „Nato‟s Balkan Crusade‟, in Master‟s of the Universe?: Nato‟s Balkan Crusade, Tariq Ali, ed. (London: Verso, 2000), 345-59.
33 See also, inter alia, Noam Chomsky, A New Generation Draws the Line: Kosovo, East Timor and the Standards of the West (London, New York: Verso, 2000); Edward Herman and David Peterson, „Morality‟s Avenging Angels: the New Humanitarian Crusaders,‟ in Rethinking Human Rights: Critical Approaches to International Politics, David Chandler, ed., (Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2002), 196-216.
13
massive human rights abuses that accompanied the disintegration of the federation. In
some cases, human rights are treated more analytically than descriptively, but this is done
within the broader political and military context for the Yugoslav actors themselves. Within
this literature, Western states or other international actors such as the UN are significant
for the actions they took (or, in many cases, did not take), not for the motivations behind
those actions.
Also relevant, from a very different perspective, is the scholarship which takes as its
focus human rights, humanitarianism, or humanitarian intervention – all areas which have
obvious connections to events in Yugoslavia. The human rights literature, however, does
not shed much light on the particular place of human rights in Western policies in
Yugoslavia, generally taking either a very wide or very narrow approach to the topic which
has limited room for events in Yugoslavia.34 The literature on humanitarianism and
humanitarian intervention touches frequently on human rights but is not truly focused on
human rights issues.35 As journalist David Rieff points out, however, there is a tendency to
conflate humanitarianism and human rights which is visible both in humanitarian
organisations and in the literature in this area.36 One observer, for instance, commented on
the „sense that at last the West was going to take human rights, humanitarian issues,
seriously‟, as if they were one and the same.37 But while it can be argued that
humanitarianism has at its roots a concern for human rights to food, shelter, or medical
care, to describe Bosnia as a humanitarian disaster is to fundamentally mischaracterise the
34 See, inter alia, Aryeh Neier, Taking Liberties (New York: PublicAffairs, 2003); Aryeh Neier, War Crimes:
Brutality, Genocide, Terror and the Struggle for Justice, 1st edition (New York: Times Books, 1998); David P. Forsythe, „Human Rights Policy: Change and Continuity‟, in Randall B. Ripley and James M. Lindsay, eds., U.S. Foreign Policy After the Cold War (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1997), 257-82; William Korey, The Promises We Keep: Human Rights, the Helsinki Process, and American Foreign Policy (New York: St. Martin‟s Press, 1993); William Korey, NGOs and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights: A Curious Grapevine (New York: St. Martin‟s Press, 1998). Another example of the broad-strokes approach is David Forsythe‟s excellent The Internationalization of Human Rights, which takes as its subject most of the post-World War II era, although its date of publication necessarily limits its consideration of Yugoslavia; David P. Forsythe, The Internationalization of Human Rights (Lexington: Lexington Books, 1991), 18-19, 23, 122-3.
35 General works include Simon Chesterman, Just War or Just Peace?: Humanitarian Intervention and International Law (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001); Raju G. C. Thomas, „War, Humanitarian Intervention, and International Law‟; Nicholas J. Wheeler, Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000). Work looking more directly at one or more aspects of Yugoslavia include David Chandler, From Kosovo to Kabul: Human Rights and International Intervention (London, Sterling, Va.: Pluto Press, 2002); Robert C. DiPrizio, Armed Humanitarians: U.S. Interventions from Northern Iraq to Kosovo (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002); Ramesh Chandra Thakur and Albrecht Schnabel, Kosovo and the Challenge of Humanitarian Intervention: Selective Indignation, Collective Action, and International Citizenship (Tokyo, New York: United Nations University Press, 2000).
36 David Rieff, A Bed for the Night Humanitarianism in Crisis (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2002), 21-2. 37 Mark Duffield and Joe Stork, „Bosnia is the Classic Case of Using Humanitarian Aid as a Smokescreen to
Hide Political Failure‟, Middle East Report (1994), 18. Nigel Rodley‟s specific treatment of intervention „in defence of human rights‟ is the exception rather than the rule; To Loose the Bands of Wickedness: International Intervention in Defence of Human Rights, 1st English edition, Nigel S. Rodley, ed. (London: Brassey‟s, 1992).
14
issues at stake.
From the point of view of this study‟s intended focus on the human rights
dimensions of Western policies in the former Yugoslavia, these bodies of literature have a
number of drawbacks. These are not the result of poor scholarship, but simply of the
differing and particular interests and intentions of the scholars in question. Writers
concerned with, for example, British or American policies in Yugoslavia do not examine
continuities (or discontinuities) between different states. Those who focus on events within
Yugoslavia devote little time to the motivations of international actors. Much of the
literature commences with the outbreak of war upon the Croatian and Slovenian
declarations of independence in June 1991, thus missing crucial developments in the
preceding two years and obscuring the developments in Western human rights concerns
and responses.38 Human rights concerns are not distinguished from humanitarian issues.
The specific relationship between human rights and Western policies is, in one way or
another, left largely unexplored.
The literature concerned with the phenomenon of mass rape is one of the few
bodies of work which directly and intimately addresses human rights, events in the former
Yugoslavia, and Western policies.39 The debate over classifying rape as a war crime re-
emerged in the early nineties as a direct result of events in Bosnia, and generated a small
body of work which discusses rape as a human rights issue in itself and in connection to
broader issues such as genocide and ethnic cleansing.40 This is one of the few areas where
38 Most of this material concludes at the end of the Bosnian war in 1995. For example, Wayne Bert, The
Reluctant Superpower: United States‟ Policy in Bosnia, 1991-95 (New York: St. Martin‟s Press, 1997); Norman Cigar, Genocide in Bosnia: The Policy of “Ethnic Cleansing”, 1st edition (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1995); Lenard J. Cohen, Broken Bonds: The Disintegration of Yugoslavia (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1993); Ivo H. Daalder, Getting to Dayton: The Making of America‟s Bosnia Policy (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2000); Misha Glenny, The Fall of Yugoslavia: The Third Balkan War (London: Penguin, 1992); James Gow, Triumph of the Lack of Will: International Diplomacy and the Yugoslav War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997); Jeffrey S. Morton et al, eds., Reflections on the Balkan Wars: Ten Years after the Breakup of Yugoslavia (Basingstoke, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004); Laura Silber and Allan Little, The Death of Yugoslavia, rev. ed. (London: Penguin, BBC Books, 1996); Simms, Unfinest Hour.
39 There is also a large body of work in many fields concerning the ICTY, but this falls outside the scope of this study.
40 This was the case of Dragoljub Kunarac, a Bosnian Serb convicted of rape as a war crime in March 1998. The first conviction for rape as genocide was the case of Jean-Paul Akayesu, convicted at the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda in October 1998. See for example Mass Rape: The War Against Women in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Alexandra Stiglmayer, ed. (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1994); Karen Engle, „Feminism and Its (Dis)Contents: Criminalizing Wartime Rape in Bosnia and Herzegovina‟, American Journal of International Law 99, No. 4 (2005), 778-816; Catherine N. Niarchos, „Women, War, and Rape: Challenges Facing the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia‟, Human Rights Quarterly 17 (1995), 649-90; Cindy S. Snyder et al, „On the Battleground of Women‟s Bodies: Mass Rape in Bosnia-Herzegovina‟ Affilia 21, No. 2 (2006), 184-95; Beverly Allen, Rape Warfare: The Hidden Genocide in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996); Todd A. Salzman, „Rape Camps as a Means of Ethnic Cleansing: Religious, Cultural, and Ethical Responses to Rape Victims in the Former Yugoslavia‟, Human Rights Quarterly 20 (1998), 348-78.
15
the events in Yugoslavia are acknowledged as the driving force in the advancement of an
issue; the first ever conviction for rape as a war crime was handed down at the ICTY.41 But
many of the scholars writing in this area were actively involved in the campaign to treat
rape as a war crime, and exhibit a level of emotional engagement with the topic which casts
doubt on the objectivity of their accounts. The topic is also discussed in relative isolation,
and does not effectively situate it within the overall picture of Western policies either in
terms of human rights or other political motivations. The role of the mass rape issue as a
driver of Western policy is largely ignored.
Another body of literature which is highly relevant to the Yugoslav situation is that
which deals with the relationship between democracy or democratisation and human
rights.42 This literature demonstrates a broad academic consensus that „democracy and
human rights ... belong firmly together ... [they] have a fundamental connection‟, and that
therefore promoting democracy entails promoting human rights‟ and vice versa.43 This
literature explores the commonly used definitions of “democracy” and “human rights”,
and furthermore examines the distinctions between democratic and democratising states.44 The
specific case of Yugoslavia, however, is left largely unexamined in favour of the developing
world or the post-communist transitions in the former Soviet bloc.45 One significant
example to the contrary is Carol Skalnik Leff ‟s study of democratisation in „ethnofederalist‟
post-communist states (i.e., the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia), but the
focus in this case is on democratisation and the dissolution of these states, not the human
rights issues per se.46 In general, these studies also concentrate more on democracy than on
41 See, for example, Cynthia Enloe, „Afterword: Have the Bosnian Rapes Opened a New Era of Feminist
Consciousness?‟, in Mass Rape: The War Against Women in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 219-30. 42 See, inter alia, Zehra F. Arat, „Human Rights and Democracy: Expanding or Contracting?‟, Polity, Vol. 32,
No. 1 (Autumn 1999), 119-44; David Beetham, „Linking Democracy and Human Rights‟, Peace Review, Vol. 9, Issue 3 (Sept., 1997); Thomas Carothers, „Democracy and Human Rights: Policy Allies or Rivals?‟, Washington Quarterly, Vol. 17, No. 3 (Summer, 1994); Christian Davenport, „Human Rights and the Democratic Proposition‟, Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 43, No. 1 (Feb., 1999), 92-116; Tony Evans, „If Democracy, Then Human Rights?‟, Third World Quarterly, Vol. 22, No. 4, 623-42; Human Rights Watch, Slaughter Among Neighbors: The Political Origins of Communal Violence (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995); Anthony J. Langlois, „Human Rights without Democracy? A Critique of the Separationist Thesis‟, Human Rights Quarterly, Vol. 25, No. 4 (Nov., 2003), 990-1019; Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder, „Democratization and the Danger of War‟, International Security 20, No. 1 (1995), 5-38; Jack Snyder, From Voting to Violence: Democratization and Nationalist Conflict (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 2000).
43 Beetham, „Linking Democracy‟; Carothers, „Democracy and Human Rights‟. 44 Beetham, „Linking Democracy‟; Arat, „Human Rights and Democracy‟; Davenport, „Human Rights and
the Democratic Proposition‟, 93. 45 Of those cited here, Arat and Evans fall into the former category. More broadly, there is for example a
large body of work on democracy, democratisation, and human rights in Latin America. An example of work on the ex-Soviet bloc states is Bruce Parrott, „Perspectives on Postcommunist Democratization‟, in Politics, Power, and the Struggle for Democracy in South-East Europe, Bruce Parrott and Karen Dawisha, eds. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 1-39.
46 Carol Skalnik Leff, „Democratization and Disintegration in Multinational States: The Breakup of the Communist Federations‟, World Politics, Vol. 51, No. 2 (Jan., 1999), 213-14.
16
human rights. Nevertheless, this literature is a valuable resource when considering the
interplay between democratisation and human rights in the early period of Yugoslavia‟s
dissolution.
There is thus a massive amount of literature which deals with various aspects of
the dissolution of Yugoslavia, with related Western foreign policies, and with human rights
developments in the nineties, the sheer volume of which attests to the importance of and
interest in these topics. But it is precisely this demonstrated interest which makes the
absence of work examining these factors together so surprising. While each area of inquiry
can be looked at in relative isolation by specialists in the Balkans, foreign policy and
international relations, or human rights, such an approach both excludes an exploration of
the connections which exist between these areas and often yields an incomplete
understanding even of the specific topic under consideration. The general
compartmentalisation of the literature in geopolitical, chronological, and conceptual terms,
while it allows greater concentration on detail and analysis within each particular
framework, is also the major reason that it fails to look at these connections. As yet there
has been no major monograph which looks specifically at the connections and feedback
processes which connect Yugoslavia, the West, and human rights.
The intention of this dissertation is to bring the human rights perspective as an
additional and significant factor into the scholarly debates surrounding Western policies
with regard to Yugoslavia‟s dissolution. It seeks to build on the studies and approaches
outlined above, and to demonstrate that human rights issues should not and cannot be
ignored when discussing the events in question, particularly in view of the rhetorical
importance given to human rights in the post-Cold War milieu and the scale and severity of
the human rights issues at stake in the former Yugoslavia. If there is a single theme that
could be said to run through this dissertation, one respect in which it most contributes to
the topic, it would be that human rights are a complicating and at times paradoxical part of
the policymaking process, and one which has been unjustifiably minimised and
oversimplified, not least by policymakers themselves. Human rights, it argues, must be
more explicitly considered both as motivating factors for policy and in terms of how they
are affected by policy. The specifics of course vary from issue to issue. In some cases it was
apparently believed that human rights would automatically be improved by the pursuit of a
given policy, for instance the firm Western support for democratisation at all costs, or
Germany‟s urging of early recognition as something that would inhibit the fighting. In
other cases, such as the use of economic sanctions, the significant human rights impact was
17
largely ignored; although an argument could have been constructed that the negative
impact in Serbia and Montenegro was justifified by the supposed goals of the policy, this
was not done. In still other cases, the pros and cons of a given policy in terms of human
rights was very much open to debate, and is in fact still debated; an example of this might
be the question of military intervention as a way of stopping the fighting and the atrocities.
The perspective presented here attempts to further our understanding and thinking about
the issues by illuminating the significance of human rights in relation to them as an
ingredient of policy and as a subject of policy – whether or not human rights were
considered in such terms or not.
II. Methodology, Sources, and Structure
This dissertation takes a trans-national approach to its subject matter, varying its
focus according to which state or states were taking the lead in dealing with the Yugoslav
crisis at any given time. This is done to facilitate a better understanding of wider policy
patterns in the West, particularly in terms of the importance of human rights, which is
poorly served by a state-by-state approach. A narrow focus on British foreign policy in the
Balkans, for instance, necessarily limits consideration of the policies of France or the
United States, but none of these states made their policies in isolation. No single Western
state played the leading role with regard to Yugoslavia throughout this period; the United
States, Germany, Britain, France, and the European Community/Union collectively all
shaped the Western response to events at different times, to say nothing of the role of the
UN. Smaller states such as Italy or Austria were also at times important participants in
formulating Western policies. Each state had different internal political issues and
constraints, but by stepping back to consider their collective policies, patterns emerge and
connections become clear which are simply not visible if one concentrates on a single
participant.
This dissertation does not adopt any specific theoretical approach to its material in
terms of political science, though it does accept that states act to maximise their perceived
interests. In that vein, however, it agrees with David Forsythe‟s argument that human rights
can and should be treated as within „the bounds of national interest or political calculation‟,
not „as a moralistic and legalistic subject divorced from the proper study of power and
public policy‟.47 The question then becomes one of discerning how states – or more
specifically, politicians and policymakers – perceived their interests and incorporated
47 Forsythe, The Internationalization of Human Rights, 177.
18
human rights into them. The appropriate place of human rights in calculations of interest
is far from straightforward. How, for instance, should human rights concerns be balanced
against more traditional interests of international stability, or the principle of state
sovereignty? How such questions were resolved (or avoided) in the former Yugoslavia is
central to this dissertation.
This study relies on primary source material which is all currently in the public
sphere, since most government records are still unavailable. Evidence is drawn from a wide
variety of sources. These include news reports; government briefings, press releases,
intelligence documents, and parliamentary proceedings; official statements, interviews,
press conferences, and memoirs by politicians and policymakers; policy documents and
reports from international organisations such as the UN, NATO, the EC/EU; and
materials produced by non-governmental organisations including the ICRC, Human Rights
Watch/Helsinki Watch, and Amnesty International. David Owen‟s account of his time at
the ICFY has been particularly useful in many respects, as have the writings of Richard
Holbrooke, James Baker, Geert-Hinrich Ahrens, John Major, and Hans-Dietrich Genscher,
among others.48
These sources clearly have certain limitations, but collectively form a solid basis for
this study. Only sources in English and French have been used, but (particularly in the news
coverage) these provide sufficient information concerning the positions of Germany, Italy,
and other non-English speaking states. It is very likely that some of the issues discussed in
this dissertation were the topics of intense debate within the State Department, Foreign
Office, and their equivalents in other states, but the available information suffices at the
least to evaluate how the Western responses were presented to the public, which is
revealing in itself of the thought processes in question. Direct statements by policymakers
concerning human rights or justifying Western policies are placed alongside an analysis of
those policies themselves – which ones were implemented, when and how they were
applied, and their results – in order to arrive at a more complete assessment of their human
rights aspects.
The secondary literature is also a rich source of material, including a great deal of
48 David Owen, Balkan Odyssey (London: Victor Gollancz, 1995); Richard Holbrooke, To End a War (New
York: Modern Library, 1998); James A. Baker III, The Politics of Diplomacy: Revolution, War and Peace, 1989-1992 (New York: G.P. Putnam‟s Sons, 1995); Geert-Hinrich Ahrens, Diplomacy on the Edge: Containment of Ethnic Conflict and the Minorities Working Group of the Conferences on Yugoslavia (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2007); John Major, The Autobiography (London: HarperCollins Publishers, 1999); Hans-Dietrich Genscher, Rebuilding a House Divided: A Memoir by the Architect of Germany‟s Reunification, trans. Thomas Thornton (New York: Broadway Books, 1998).
19
primary material – quotes from and interviews with policymakers, for instance – which
sheds light on the relationship between human rights and Western policies, even if not
considered from such an angle in the source. The literature is also used extensively to
provide the background and context which is necessary for a proper discussion of Western
policies. Jasna Dragovic-Soso‟s work on the actions and motivations of the various
Yugoslav actors merits particular mention.49 Susan Woodward‟s analysis of the crisis, which
contains a great deal of material concerning both the internal dynamics in Yugoslavia and
the Western responses to the situation, has also been useful.50 Of material dealing with
Western policies more specifically, the work of Samantha Power, Carol Hodge, and
Brendan Simms has been particularly useful.51 Paul Shoup‟s work on Yugoslavia‟s
disintegration in relation to Western foreign policies in the 1980s has provided useful
context and background, as has his work in collaboration with Steven L. Burg on
international intervention in the conflict in Bosnia.52 James Gow and David Rieff provided
critical perspectives on Western action and inaction, and Saadia Touval‟s work on
international mediation in the former Yugoslavia has bee invaluable in illuminating some of
the processes and thinking involved in these efforts.53
Given the scale and complexity of events in the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s,
this study does not attempt to cover the entire decade. It focuses instead on a period
beginning in 1989, when the cracks in the Yugoslav federation began to widen, and ending
49 Jasna Dragovic-Soso, „Saviours of the Nation‟: Serbia‟s Intellectual Opposition and the Revival of Nationalism
(London: Hurst & Company, 2002). 50 Susan L. Woodward, Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution After the Cold War (Washington DC: The
Brookings Institution, 1995). Woodward‟s book is in some senses both a secondary and a primary source; in 1994 she worked as an advisor to Yasushi Akashi, who was the Special Envoy of the UN Secretary General between December 1993 and October 1995 – a period which does, however, largely fall outside that discussed in this dissertation. Her work has been challenged as showing „effective acquiescence in Serbian war aims and a dislike of Germany, Austria and Croatia that borders on hatred‟; Attila Hoare, review of Balkan Tragedy in Books on Bosnia: a critical bibliography of works relating to Bosnia-Herzegovina published since 1990 in West European languages, Quintin Hoare and Noel Malcolm, eds (London: The Bosnia Institute, 1999?), 178. This judgement is not universally accepted; for reviews ranging from the quite critical to much more positive, see, inter alia, Michael Libal, „The Balkan Dilemma‟, Harvard International Review, Spring 1996, vol. 18 issue 2, 66-8; David Campbell, „Metabosnia: narratives of the Bosnian war‟, Review of International Studies (1998) 24, 261-281; K.S. Brown, (untitled review of Balkan Tragedy), Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science , Vol. 548 (Nov., 1996), 220-21; Janusz Bugajski, „Blood and Soil in Bosnia‟, Orbis, vol. 40, issue 4 (Fall, 1996); Vesna Drapac, „The End of Yugoslavia‟, Contemporary European History, 10, 2 (2001), 317-331.
51 Samantha Power, “A Problem from Hell”: America and the Age of Genocide (New York: Basic Books, 2002); Hodge, Britain and the Balkans; Simms, Unfinest Hour.
52 Paul S. Shoup, „The Disintegration of Yugoslavia and Western Foreign Policy in the 1980s‟, in Lenard J. Cohen & Jasna Dragovic-Soso (eds), State Collapse in South-Eastern Europe: New Perspectives on Yugoslavia‟s Disintegration (West Lafayette: Purdue University Press, 2008), 333-64; Burg and Shoup, The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina .
53 Gow, Triumph of the Lack of Will; Rieff, A Bed for the Night; David Rieff, Slaughterhouse: Bosnia and the Failure of the West (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995); Saadia Touval, Mediation in the Yugoslav Wars: The Critical Years, 1990-1995 (Houndmills: Palgrave, 2002).
20
during the Bosnian war, in early 1994. This time frame has been chosen for a number of
reasons. While not encompassing the whole of the Bosnian war, this span of time suffices
to illustrate the major points outlined above. It includes both the introduction of those
points and a sufficient span of time to analyse their application and development in
practice. It is true that most of the policies discussed herein had their inception and first
application by, at the latest, the end of 1992. But their consequences cannot be adequately
considered without taking into account how the application of the policies and their
interaction with each other – and hence their human rights content and import – changed
and developed over time as circumstances changed within Yugoslavia and internationally.
Most importantly, it limits the time frame to that period within which Western states
refused to directly employ – or even to seriously consider the use of – military force to
influence events in the former Yugoslavia. It was only in early 1994 that this longstanding
line in the sand was crossed. This was the result of a number of converging factors,
including the strong international reaction to the Markale market bombing in Sarajevo in
February 1994, the increasing willingness in Western capitals to admit that the non-military
approach had decisively failed to produce results, the growing willingness of the US to take
the lead in dealing with the Yugoslav crisis, and the international reaction to the spring
1994 genocide in Rwanda and to the failure of the international community to prevent or
usefully respond to it. The willingness to employ military force after this time – a
willingness which only increased between February 1994 and the end of the war in late
1995 – fundamentally changed the politico-military context in which Western policies were
being made.54
The dissertation concentrates primarily the policy responses of the major Western
states, and the EC/EU, to the dissolution of Yugoslavia. It highlights the attention given
(or not given) to human rights concerns by those governments within the context of their
policy responses in order to evaluate the importance which the West gave to those human
rights issues. Covering this material in depth necessitates the exclusion of other aspects of
the international response to the Yugoslav crisis. For example, little time is spent on the
work which was done in venues such as the Conference for Security and Cooperation in
Europe (CSCE) and the United Nations. Nor is there much attention given to the role of
non-governmental organisations (both humanitarian and human rights-oriented) such as
the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Amnesty International, Helsinki
54 An investigation of Western policies in this later period from a human rights perspective is
unquestionably called for and would complement and extend the analysis of the pre-1994 period, but due to limitations of space this could not be undertaken within this dissertation.
21
Watch/Human Rights Watch, Oxfam, and many others in both the reporting on and
response to the crisis, particularly in Bosnia. The details of the long-running and complex
negotiations over the succession of Bosnian peace plans at the ICFY are not explored.
However, these aspects of the Western response to the Yugoslav crisis are included as and
when appropriate to particular issues or concerns.
The dissertation can be divided roughly into three sections. The first, from 1989 to
the middle of 1990, looks at the place of human rights in Western Yugoslav policy in the
immediate aftermath of the collapse of communism across most of Europe. In this
period, the United States was the primary Western actor in Yugoslav affairs. Its dealings
with Yugoslavia were closely concerned with human rights, and emphasised two issues
above all. The first of these was the situation in the Serbian province of Kosovo, and
specifically the human rights abuses being committed by the Serbian government against
the ethnic Albanian majority in the province. The second was the democratisation of
Yugoslavia, a process on which the Bush administration in particular placed a very high
priority. Chapter 2 examines the place which these two issues had in US policy in
Yugoslavia, and argues that while this policy did indeed emphasise human rights to a
greater degree than it had in the pre-1989 period, this was not due to an overall shift in the
priority given to human rights so much as to the change in Yugoslavia‟s geopolitical
significance with the end of the Cold War.
The second period, discussed in Chapter 3, begins in mid-1990 and concludes with
the Western recognition of Slovenian and Croatian independence in early 1992 that
decisively ended Yugoslavia‟s existence as a unified state. This period saw a distinct shift in
both the actors and the priorities in Western Yugoslav policy. The lead role was
relinquished by the United States and taken over, collectively, by Europe. More specifically,
Germany and certain of Yugoslavia‟s neighbours, including Italy and Austria, came to the
fore and drove Western policy. The human rights-centric policy of the previous stage was
subordinated to the task of dealing with the political crisis of Yugoslavia‟s disintegration,
which was seen as a threat to European security and stability both in its own right and in
the precedents it might set for the increasingly fragile USSR. In their response to this
situation, however, the Europeans perhaps surprisingly emphasised human rights,
incorporating it into their debates over the recognition of the breakaway republics. The
chapter argues that the role of human rights in Western policy actually increased in this
period, at the same time that the explicit focus on human rights concerns in Yugoslavia
diminished.
22
The third period concerns the war in Bosnia, beginning in early April 1992, and is
broken down further into three chapters. Chapter 4 is devoted to demonstrating the
massive shift in the nature of human rights issues as the Bosnian war worsened, and the
shift in the underlying meaning and import of human rights rhetoric in this period. It
outlines precisely what the human rights issues were in Bosnia, including such issues as
mass rape, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and genocide. It continues on to demonstrate what
was known about these issues in Western capitals at the time, a necessary background for
the consideration of Western policy choices in the following chapters. In the light of this
information, the chapter finally argues that the pattern of Western actions and rhetoric
indicate that the primary concern was not in fact to end the fighting and end the atrocities
– although such a result would have been welcome – but rather to contain it within Bosnia
(or at least within the former Yugoslavia) and to avoid being forced to intervene militarily.
In the process, human rights concerns were paradoxically sidelined and (to the extent that it
was possible) ignored, precisely as the scale and nature of human rights abuses massively
increased and worsened.
Chapter 5 then considers human rights in relation to the use of international
sanctions on the former Yugoslavia. More precisely, it looks at the human rights
implications of the decision to impose and maintain an arms embargo on all of the former
Yugoslavia, and of the economic sanctions which were directed specifically at the FRY (i.e.,
Serbia and Montenegro). Since these policies were all begun during the earlier period of the
dissolution, they serve to connect Western policies in the two periods and to illustrate how
the same policy may have entirely very different impacts on human rights in changed
circumstances. The chapter argues that the insistence of most of the European states that
these policies be maintained, and the eventual acquiescence of the United States to this
position, indicates the primacy of domestic and international political and security
concerns over human rights concerns, and supports the contention that the main Western
goal was containment and military non-involvement at whatever cost was necessary. Within
the sphere of human rights, the sanctions gave more weight to those of the Bosnians than
of the Serbians, while the embargo simultaneously indicated a lack of concern with human
rights in Bosnia.
In chapter 6, the material presented in the previous two chapters is placed in the
context of the major Western initiatives during the first half of the Bosnian war: the
humanitarian mission and the search for a negotiated settlement to the conflict. It further
develops the idea that addressing the human rights abuses which were inherent in the
23
Bosnian war was a distinctly secondary concern compared with the importance of
containment and military non-involvement. It demonstrates how the humanitarian mission,
while it did address some extremely fundamental human rights, was never cast in such
terms, and in fact was far more counter-productive than otherwise from a human rights
perspective. The policy is considered both overall and in terms of specific issues within it:
the way in which humanitarian aid contributed to the war, the treatment of refugees, the
creation of so-called safe areas, and the problem of hostages. The Western insistence on its
central importance was still more evidence that human rights concerns were of negligible
importance in the policy making process. The same applies to the peace talks, whether
conducted under the auspices of the UN/EU International Conference on the Former
Yugoslavia (ICFY) or under the American-led Contact Group. In their efforts to make the
problem go away, Western countries deliberately overlooked, mischaracterised, and
minimised the human rights implications of the various proposed settlements, from the
Vance-Owen Peace Plan of early1993 to the Contact Group Plan in mid-1994.
In conclusion, chapter 7 briefly considers further developments as the Bosnian war
continued, including the eventual application of military force and the implementation of
the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY). It will address the
ramifications of the role of human rights in Western policy in Yugoslavia in a broader
context, returning to the questions posed in this introductory chapter and suggesting
further avenues of research.
24
Chapter 2
Cold War redux: Human Rights, Kosovo, and Democracy
As Communist systems throughout Europe began collapsing, Western attention to
Yugoslavia focused on two human rights issues which would not have been out of place
anytime in the preceding two decades or more. The first was in the Serbian province of
Kosovo, where the Serbian government was committing widespread human rights abuses
against the majority ethnic Albanian population; the second concerned the process of
democratisation in Yugoslavia. This chapter begins with an examination of the Kosovo
situation, the Western response to it, and the effects that response had on Serbian policies
and the state of human rights in Kosovo. It then turns to the more complex issue of
democratisation, beginning with a consideration of the nature of the relationship between
democracy and human rights and Western ideas on the topic, and then examining the
practical application and effects of those ideas in Yugoslavia. The conclusion puts these
events into the context of the questions discussed in the introductory chapter. It argues
that the West did give greater importance to human rights concerns in its relations with
Yugoslavia in this period, but that the results were mixed at best and demonstrated several
core difficulties involved in such a policy. This change in the role of human rights did not,
however, signify that human rights now had greater influence in Western foreign policy, but
rather resulted from a continuity of Cold War policies and habits.
I. Background
In 1989, Yugoslavia was a relatively stable federal state ruled by an authoritarian
Communist party. Its human rights record was poor, if not as bad as some of its
neighbours. The worst abuses, including economic and political discrimination, abuse of
police powers, and extra-judicial killings, occurred in Kosovo, an autonomous province
within the republic of Serbia. The actions of the Serbian government in Kosovo in turn
were the subject of great concern in Croatia and, especially, Slovenia, and contributed
directly to the moves towards independence in the latter republics.1 By the middle of 1990,
two of Yugoslavia‟s six constituent republics (Slovenia and Croatia) were striving for full
1 See, inter alia, Dragovic-Soso, „Saviours of the Nation‟, 220; Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, 98; Human Rights
Watch, Slaughter Among Neighbors, 117; Robert J. Donia and John V. A. Fine, Bosnia and Hercegovina: A Tradition Betrayed (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 217; Sabrina Ramet, Balkan Babel: The Disintegration of Yugoslavia from the Death of Tito to the War in Kosovo (Boulder: Westview Press, 1996), 27; Bennett, Yugoslavia‟s Bloody Collapse, 11, 105-6; Almond, Europe‟s Backyard War, 205; Christopher Cviic, „Slovene and Croat Perspectives‟, in Alex Danchev and Thomas E. Halverson, eds., International Perspectives on the Yugoslav Conflict (New York: St. Martin‟s Press, 1996), 121-22.
25
independence, two more (Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia) were seriously worried
about their own prospects if that happened, and one (Serbia) was insistent that under no
circumstances would secession be permitted to happen. As Communist rule crumbled,
ambitious politicians – some sincere, some merely opportunistic – had begun deliberately
stoking ethnic fears to build nationalist bases of power even as they adopted democratic
forms and slogans. Human rights abuses worsened in Kosovo, in Serbia, and in Croatia, but
open warfare of the sort that later characterised the former Yugoslavia had not yet begun.
Nevertheless, the roots of later events in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina – ethnic
cleansing, concentration camps, war crimes, genocide – lie in this earliest period of post-
Cold War Yugoslavia. In the Serbian human rights abuses in Kosovo lay the roots of the
conflict that ultimately prompted the NATO bombing campaign a full ten years later.
These years lack the drama of the wars in Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia, perhaps explaining
why they are frequently ignored in studies of the death of Yugoslavia. It was at this time,
however, that the lines of ethnic and political division formed and solidified and that many
of the principal actors – including Milosevic, Tudjman, and Izetbegovic – took up their
chosen roles.
This period is of key importance in understanding Western behaviour in the region
in ensuing years, and particularly for understanding the place of human rights in Western
policymaking. It is necessary to understand Western attitudes to Yugoslavia at the
beginning of that country‟s dissolution in order to grasp the ways in which they developed
and changed. The changes were nowhere more evident than in the area of human rights,
which for the first time assumed an important position in Western policies toward
Yugoslavia. The country had traditionally enjoyed a sort of informal immunity from
human rights criticism, based upon its position as a Communist state outside the Soviet
sphere of influence and as a leader of the non-aligned movement. While there had been
some criticism of Yugoslavia‟s human rights record, it had been muted at best; Human
Rights Watch described it as a „policy of inattention‟.2 With the end of the Cold War,
however, Yugoslavia‟s perceived geopolitical importance had greatly diminished, and the
kind of criticisms the West had traditionally directed at the Soviet Union and its satellites
began to be directed at Yugoslavia as well. This new Western concern with human rights
2 Human Rights Watch, 1989 World Report on Human Rights: Yugoslavia (Human Rights Watch, 1989);
available from www.hrw.org/legacy/reports/1989/WR89/ (accessed 5 September 2009). See also, inter alia, Jeri Laber, „Yugoslav Repression‟, New York Times, 31 August 1982; Warren Zimmermann, Origins of a Catastrophe: Yugoslavia and its Destroyers - America‟s Last Ambassador Tells What Happened and Why (New York: Times Books, 1996), 15; David Fromkin, Kosovo Crossing: American Ideals Meet Reality on the Balkan Battlefields (New York: Free Press, 1999), 153.
26
was concentrated on two issues: democratisation of the polity, and the specific situation in
Kosovo.
Though the pressure on Yugoslavia on human rights grounds was new, the
concerns themselves were not. The political repression and human rights abuses being
carried out in Kosovo were in many ways typical of the behaviour of Communist regimes
across the continent, and the province was a longstanding human rights black spot. The US
ambassador in Belgrade, Warren Zimmermann, later described it as having been „the most
serious European human rights problem west of the Soviet Union‟ around the turn of the
decade.3 The problems in Kosovo stemmed from its unfortunate combination of ethnicity,
population trends, Serbian nationalist mythology, and Yugoslav political structures.
Ethnically, the population of the province was overwhelmingly Albanian, with only roughly
ten percent being ethnic Serb in origin.4 The Serb proportion in Kosovo had formerly been
substantially larger, but patterns of population growth and migration had been
exacerbating the Serb/Albanian imbalance since at least 1945.5 Kosovo was the site of one
of the foundational legends of the Serbian people and nation, the 1389 battle of Kosovo
Polje, and many of the holiest sites of the Serbian Orthodox church were in the province.
Serbian nationalist opposition leader Vuk Draskovic described it as „the Serbian Jerusalem
… Kosovo is the capital of the Serbian nation‟.6 Serb-Albanian tensions in Kosovo had
grown progressively worse during the 1980s, and members of both groups had committed
human rights abuses. The upsurge of ethnic nationalism across Yugoslavia in the late
eighties provoked a sharp escalation in both the tensions and the abuses. In political terms,
Kosovo was an “Autonomous Province” of Serbia, a status which had many but not all of
the same perquisites as a full republic. Crucial among these perquisites was Kosovo‟s right
to have a representative member in the eight-person Yugoslav presidency. Control of
Kosovo (and of Vojvodina, the other Serbian Autonomous Province,) thus greatly
increased the Serbian government‟s influence within the federal presidency.7 One perquisite
that Kosovo did not have was the right to self-determniation; although it was not entirely
3 Zimmermann, Origins, 14. 4 This was the estimated proportion around 1989/1990; see, inter alia, Chuck Sudetic, „Serbia Suspends
Government of Albanian Region‟, New York Times, 6 July 1990; Alan Cowell, „Trial Shows Strain on One of Yugoslavia‟s Ethnic Fault Lines‟, New York Times, 9 December 1989; „Hearing of the Europe and Middle East Subcommittee of the House Foreign Affairs Committee on Developments in Europe‟, Federal News Service, 24 July 1990.
5 See Independent International Commission on Kosovo, The Kosovo Report: Conflict, International Response, Lessons Learned (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 38-39, which shows the decline in the Serb proportion of the population from 23.6% in 1948 to 9.9% in 1991.
6 Quoted in Eve-Ann Prentice, „Draskovic Pleads for Softer Sanctions‟, The Times, 24 September 1993. 7 Serbia‟s close alliance with (or control of) the republic of Montenegro gave Serbia de facto control of four
of the eight votes on the federal presidency.
27
clear whether this notional right belonged to republics or nations under the 1974 Yugoslav
Constitution, it indisputably did not belong to Kosovo as an Autonomous Province.8
Kosovo was also at the heart of Slobodan Milosevic‟s rise to power in Serbia. As
Zimmermann put it, he „defined his political identity by his nationalism on Kosovo‟.9
Serbian nationalists argued that, since Kosovo was the legendary birthplace of the Serbian
nation, control over the province was essential to Serbian identity.10 Exerting that control,
and ending the real (though frequently exaggerated) abuses suffered by Kosovo Serbs at
the hands of the Kosovo Albanians, was central to the nationalist rhetoric which Milosevic
used to bring himself to power beginning in 1987.11 As Jasna Dragovic-Soso writes, it was
Milosevic‟s „uncompromising defence of Serbia‟s integrity as a republic that spurred the
outburst of general enthusiasm for his regime‟.12
In March 1989, Milosevic had the Serbian constitution changed to remove
Kosovo‟s autonomous status, bringing the province back under the control of Belgrade for
the first time since 1974. He did not, however, abolish the formal autonomy of Kosovo,
because maintaining that de jure status while having the province under effective Serbian
control allowed Milosevic to exercise Kosovo‟s vote in the federal presidency. Human
rights abuses in Kosovo became much more systematic and official in character and were
clearly directed at the assertion of unchallengeable Serbian control. The provincial
assembly was illegally dissolved and the Serbian government assumed direct control of the
province, placing it under military occupation by the Serb-dominated Yugoslav People‟s
Army (JNA).13 Local media were suppressed, and Albanian-language education was
8 For an excellent discussion of the confusions concerning the issue of self-determination in Yugoslavia,
see Audrey Helfant Budding, „Nation/People/Republic: Self-Determination in Socialist Yugoslavia‟, in Lenard J. Cohen and Jasna Dragovic-Soso, eds., State Collapse in South-Eastern Europe: New Perspectives on Yugoslavia‟s Disintegration (Purdue University Press, 2008), 91-129. See also below, 68-72.
9 Warren Zimmermann, „The Demons of Kosovo‟, The National Interest No.52 (Summer 1998). 10 For an excellent discussion of the intellectual construction of the importance of Kosovo to Serbia, see
Dragovic-Soso, Saviours, 115-61. 11 Ibid., 207-12. 12 Ibid., 211. See also Ivan Vejvoda, „Serbian Perspectives‟, in Alex Danchev and Thomas Halverson, eds.,
International Perspectives on the Yugoslav Conflict (New York: St. Martin‟s Press, 1996), 104-5; Almond, Europe‟s Backyard War, 190-210.
13 The exact process by which the JNA came to be aligned with Serbia, and the reasons for this development, are complex and fall beyond the scope of this dissertation; see, inter alia, Florian Bieber, „The Role of the Yugoslav People‟s Army in the Dissolution of Yugoslavia: The Army Without A State?‟, in Lenard J. Cohen & Jasna Dragovic-Soso (eds), State Collapse in South-Eastern Europe: New Perspectives on Yugoslavia‟s Disintegration (West Lafayette: Purdue University Press, 2008), 301-32; Human Rights Watch, Slaughter Among Neighbors, 118-21; Daniele Conversi, „Central Secession: towards a new analytical concept? The case of former Yugoslavia‟, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, Vol. 26, No. 2 (April 2000): 334-47, 349-50; Conversi, German-Bashing, 52-4; Branka Magas, The Destruction of Yugoslavia: Tracking the Break-Up 1980-92 (London, New York: Verso, 1993), 266-70, 197-8; Milos Vasic, „The Yugoslav Army and the Post-Yugoslav Armies‟, in David A. Dyker and Ivan Vejvoda, eds., Yugoslavia and After: A Study in Fragmentation, Despair and Rebirth (London, New York: Longman, 1996), 116-137; Ramet, Balkan Babel, 50-51; Bennett, Yugoslavia‟s Bloody Collapse, 131-4; Almond, Europe‟s Backyard War, 22-4; Donia and Fine, Bosnia and
28
eliminated. Efforts to reduce the Albanian majority in Kosovo resulted in increasingly
discriminatory polices and an increase in human rights abuses.14 Albanians suffered mass
dismissals and other types of economic deprivation, and services such as education and
health care were provided separately if at all, leaving the impoverished Albanians at a
severe disadvantage. Organised state violence, in the form of beatings and killings of
ethnic Albanians, was also a problem in this period, though it became more common later
in the decade.15
Lack of democracy, too, was not a new concern for Western governments. They
had long targeted communist regimes on this ground, although Yugoslavia had largely
escaped such criticisms due to its unique position during the Cold War.16 The collapse of
communism in Europe seemed to many in the West to provide a perfect opportunity to
secure major improvements and advances in these areas. The “friendly” communist
government in Belgrade no longer merited support, and Western leaders wanted it to
follow the pattern emerging in the former Soviet bloc. Western governments expected that
traditional goals of security and stability would be enhanced with the emergence of a newly
democratic Yugoslavia with an improved standard of human rights. Several distinct factors,
however, made the Yugoslav situation much more complex and difficult than those of
other European communist states. First was the fact that communism was not a foreign
imposition on Yugoslavia; it was Tito, not Stalin, who had created Yugoslavia‟s communist
system. Second was the complicating effect of Yugoslavia‟s federal structure and its volatile
mix of nationalities and ethnicities. Third, and related to the first two, was the uneven pace
of democratisation in Yugoslavia.
Individually and collectively, these factors had great significance for the process of
democratisation in Yugoslavia. The domestic nature of the Yugoslav communist regime
meant that, unlike in the rest of central and Eastern Europe, communism was not seen as
an alien imposition but was identified with the country itself. This meant that opposition to
the communist regime was easily equated to opposition to the Yugoslav federation itself.
And although Yugoslav communism had been marginally more economically successful
than the Soviet-bloc varieties, by the late eighties it was increasingly unpopular. The
Hercegovina, 208-10, 219-23.
14 Independent International Commission on Kosovo, The Kosovo Report, 41-2. 15 Alex J. Bellamy, „Human Wrongs in Kosovo, 1974-1999‟, in The Kosovo Tragedy: The Human Rights
Dimensions, Ken Booth, ed. (London: Frank Cass, 2001), 112-18. For a fuller discussion of Serbian abuses in Kosovo, see, inter alia, Bellamy‟s chapter in its entirety, and the section on „The Origins of the Kosovo Crisis‟ in the Independent International Commission on Kosovo, The Kosovo Report, 33-66.
16 Regarding the changes in Yugoslavia‟s geopolitical position, see, inter alia, Shoup, „The Disintegration of Yugoslavia and Western Foreign Policy in the 1980s‟, 336-40.
29
country‟s economic performance was declining rapidly, and the government had a history
of asserting heavy-handed federal control and repressing nationalist sentiments in the
republics. The ethnic divisions in Yugoslavia were much more significant and difficult to
manage than elsewhere; of at least eight major ethnic groups, six were officially „constituent
nations‟ (in the language of the Yugoslav constitution) with ethnically-based republics of
their own.17 The Serbs were numerically and politically the most powerful, and the most
identified with the communist regime; the Serbian capital of Belgrade was also the
Yugoslav federal capital.
These circumstances played a huge role in the uneven pace of democratisation in
Yugoslavia. When elections were held in Slovenia and Croatia – the two most
“westernised”, economically developed, and – in the case of Slovenia at least – ethnically
homogeneous republics before democratic elections nationwide, it allowed ethnic-based
nationalist parties to position themselves as the only alternative to central communist
control.18 Anti-Yugoslav rhetoric was common; a presidential candidate in Slovenia openly
declared in early 1990 that „[t]he Yugoslav state can no longer rationally communicate; it
can only command. Only the Serbs believe Yugoslavia still exists. It doesn‟t, except in a
notional sense‟.19 For the voters, opposition to communism became difficult to distinguish
from opposition to federalism, encouraged by the rhetoric from the candidates. By degrees,
democracy and independence came to be inseparable in the public mind. Politicians and
parties who advocated a renewed, democratic, non-communist Yugoslav federation in the
Croatian and Slovenian elections received little attention and fewer votes.20
Through their contribution to increasing ethnic tensions, the elections had two
important effects with regard to human rights. The first was a direct contribution to an
increase in human rights abuses, an effect that was most evident in Croatia. New president
Franjo Tudjman had cautioned the Croatian Serb community, which made up about ten
17 Slovenes, Croats, Serbs, Montenegrins, Macedonians, and, in Bosnia, the Muslims (an ethnic, not a
religious, category in Yugoslavia). The other two were a substantial Hungarian minority in the Serbian province of Vojvodina, and the ethnic Albanians which comprised some 90% of the population of the province of Kosovo. There was also a substantial Romany population in Yugoslavia. Even Czechoslovakia, a federal state similar in some respects to Yugoslavia, had only two major ethnic groups, more territorially concentrated, with a smaller (though not insignificant) power differential between them. Leff cites variations „territorial ethnonational distribution‟ as key to understanding the different levels of violence in the breakup of ethnofederalist states; „Democratization and Disintegration‟, 232, fn. 50
18 Slovenia‟s population was 87.6 percent Slovene. Croatia‟s was 78 percent Croat, 12 percent Serb, and 10 percent others, a proportion that still left it more ethnically homogeneous than any of the other republics save Slovenia and Serbia itself. See Touval, Mediation in the Yugoslav Wars, 12; Ahrens, Diplomacy, 27-31.
19 Quoted in Marcus Tanner, „East Europe Elections: Democracy Battles with Disintegration‟, Independent, 4 April 1990.
20 See, for example, Dijana Plestina, „Democracy and Nationalism in Yugoslavia‟, Christian Science Monitor, 31 May 1990; Franjo Tudjman, „All We Croatians Want Is Democracy‟, New York Times, 30 June 1990.
30
percent of the population, to remember „who is the host and who the newcomer‟ in
Croatia and promised to „rectify‟ the longstanding disproportionate presence of ethnic
Serbs in the republican government.21 Once in office, and in spite of its simultaneous and
contradictory campaign promises of inclusiveness and cooperation, the new government
acted on these threats, showing „a willingness to use excessive police force in quashing
ethnic unrest among the Serb minority‟ and purging Croatian Serbs from government
positions, including police forces, to be replaced by ethnic Croats.22 It also „sent special all-
Croat police units to collect arms that reserve military units stored in police stations in
parts of Croatia‟, actions that, „[b]ecause, at least in the initial stages ... were conducted only
in Serb villages‟, left „good reason to question whether the large show of police force was
necessary to carry out legitimate government orders or whether it was used to intimidate
the minority population‟.23 Changes to the Croatian constitution downgraded the legal
status of the Serbs from „constituent nation‟ to „national minority‟.24 In spite of the
promised „appropriate constitutional protections‟, the HDZ program was „essentially
Croato-centric‟ and left the Croatian Serbs with little in the way of legal protections for
their human rights.25 To some observers, the actions of the Tudjman government
21 Quoted in Dragovic-Soso, Saviours, 235. The “newcomers”, it should be noted, had been living in Croatia
for several centuries. 22 Regarding the use of excessive police force, see Human Rights Watch, 1990 World Report on Human Rights:
Yugoslavia (Human Rights Watch, 1990). Available from www.hrw.org/legacy/reports/1990/WR90/ (accessed 5 September 2009). To be fair, this response was not unprovoked; the same report goes on to note that, „[f]rom August to October, armed Serbs blocked roads and sealed off towns in parts of Croatia to prevent Croatian authorities from interfering with an unofficial referendum, in which the Serbian minority declared its autonomy within Croatia. Regarding the government employment “purges”, see Jonathan S. Landay, „Croatia Warns Serbs Against Holding Referendum‟, United Press International, 14 August 1990; Glenny, Fall, 12-14; Branka Magas, The Destruction of Yugoslavia, 256. According to Misha Glenny, this process sometimes even extended, unofficially, to non-governmental positions, including jobs in the tourist, health, and education sectors, restaurants, and private businesses; Glenny, Fall, 77. It should be noted that Glenny‟s work is not without its critics; see, for example, Ivo Banac, who nevertheless concedes that Glenny „is reliable – or at least amusing – when he reports [though] not nearly as reliable when he analyzes‟; „Misreading the Balkans‟, Foreign Policy, Winter 1993/94, 173-82. As Human Rights Watch noted in its 1992 report (on developments in 1991), „[e]thnic discrimination is also a serious problem in Croatia. Individual Croatian workers required their Serbian colleagues to sign loyalty oaths to the Croatian government; those who refused often lost their jobs. The Croatian government belatedly condemned such campaigns but did not prosecute the organizers‟; Human Rights Watch, 1992 World Report on Human Rights: Yugoslavia (Human Rights Watch, 1992). Available from www.hrw.org/reports/1992/WR92/HSW-08.htm#P995_282970 (accessed 4 June 2010). See also Cohen, Broken Bonds, 129-35; Tanner, Croatia, 223-32; Ramet, Balkan Babel, 209-10.
23 Human Rights Watch, 1990 World Report. This action unsurprisingly generated a confrontational response from the Croatian Serbs, who the report notes „demonstrated against the arms seizures and in some cases seized the arms themselves‟, which in turn provoked the „Croatian government, using heavy-handed police tactics, [to] occup[y] several Serb villages‟.
24 Institute for European Studies, Inter-Ethnic Conflict and War in Former Yugoslavia (Canberra: Institute for European Studies, 1993), 4. This change in status was extremely provocative and threatening; see below for more on the ethnic balancing act which was the Yugoslav federal system.
25 Lenard J. Cohen, „Embattled Democracy: Postcommunist Croatia in Transition‟, in Politics, Power, and the Struggle for Democracy in South-East Europe, Bruce Parrott and Karen Dawisha, eds. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 78.
31
amounted to „a concerted effort to alienate and disenfranchise the Serbs of Croatia‟.26
These developments evoked memories of Croatia‟s World War II Ustashe regime
and provoked growing fears of persecution amongst the Croatian Serbs.27 With support
and encouragement from Serbia, they began to develop their own political institutions and
moved towards declaring the independence of Serb-majority areas from Croatia.28 Ethnic
Croats in these enclaves were then subjected to abuses from the local Serb majority, which
justified them by pointing to the actions of the Croatian government. It is only fair to note,
however, that according to Geert Ahrens, „Serb complaints [from Croatian Serbs not
resident in the secessionist regions] were taken up with the Croatian government, which
was receptive, and improved the situation in many cases‟.29
The second worrisome effect of the elections for human rights was more subtle
and indirect, and consisted of damage to the „Yugoslavian idea‟ that a united Yugoslavia
benefited all the Yugoslav nationalities more than would independence and
fragmentation.30 The new Croatian and Slovenian governments were oriented from the
start towards dismantling the existing Yugoslav state.31 The winning DEMOS coalition in
Slovenia had declared as early as May 1989 its „firm decision to prepare the ground for …
the possibility of a unilateral declaration of independence‟.32 Shortly before the election, its
leaders announced their intention to seek full independence within a year of being
elected.33 The HDZ in Croatia was less forthright, but Tudjman had personally emphasised
„the Croatian people‟s centuries-old craving for an independent state‟ and the need for the
„self-determination of the whole Croatian nation within its natural and historical borders‟.34
More ominously for the future, he clearly considered those borders to include much of
Bosnia-Herzegovina, on the grounds that „the majority of the [Bosnian] Moslems is in its
26 Donia and Fine, Bosnia and Hercegovina, 223. 27 The Ustashe regime was responsible for the deaths of between 85,000 and 700,000 Serbs during the war;
estimates vary widely. As David Rieff notes, however, the period had – from the Croatian point of view – the redeeming feature of being the „brief period their country had been independent‟; see Slaughterhouse, 63-4. See also Budding, „Nation/People/Republic‟, 112.
28 William Bartlett, Croatia: Between Europe and the Balkans (London: Routledge, 2003), 37-8; Touval, Mediation, 89-90.
29 Ahrens, Diplomacy, 132. He goes on to note that „[i]t was not important whether this was done out of conviction or the wish to be recognized, as long as improvements could be realized‟. See also 140.
30 Zimmermann, quoted in Curtis Wilkie, „US Envoy Sees No Yugoslav Breakup‟, Boston Globe, 23 January 1990. The Croatian election also had this effect, but it was overshadowed in that case by the more direct consequences.
31 Pavkovic, Fragmentation, 125. 32 Quoted in Dragovic-Soso, Saviours, 232. 33 Ibid., 245. The promise was quite accurate; Slovenia declared its independence on 25 June 1991, just over
fourteen months later; see the next chapter for more on this period. 34 Ibid., 234-5.
32
ethnic character and speech incontrovertibly of Croatian origin‟.35
By seeking to leave the federation, Slovenia and Croatia upset the carefully designed
balance which Yugoslavia‟s constitution sought to create between its constitutive nations.
This situation increased fears that smaller nationalities would in future be at the mercy of
the ethnic majority in any given republic, fears that were given substance by developments
in Croatia. The Bosnian and Macedonian governments began to question the viability of
remaining in a rump Yugoslavia dominated by Serbia proper and their domestic ethnic Serb
populations. The consensus in the West was that human rights „would be best advanced if
Yugoslavia remained united‟, and nobody believed that the country could dissolve
peacefully.36 But once started, the process of dissolution moved so quickly that a free
democratic election at the federal level was never held, denying the population the
opportunity to choose between ethnic nationalist and pro-Yugoslav parties at a national
level. Zimmermann‟s prediction that free elections would „spread all over the country in a
short period of time‟ proved only partially correct.37
Western policymakers largely failed to appreciate these complexities, and the
situation was further complicated by the fact that Slovenia was the pacesetter in the drive
for greater independence and sovereignty, with Croatia generally supporting its initiatives.38
With 87.6 percent of its population consisting of ethnic Slovenes, Slovenia was the least
ethnically diverse republic in Yugoslavia; equally important, some 98 percent of Slovenes
lived within the borders of the republic.39 It was, therefore, Slovenia that came closest to
the Western concept of the nation-state, and it was easy and tempting to view the other
republics in a similar light, no matter how inaccurate such an image was in reality. By
„viewing the Slovene situation in isolation from the multinational and geopolitical context‟,
the West could avoid dealing with the true risks which democratisation posed to
35 Franjo Tudjman, Nationalism in Contemporary Europe (Boulder: East European Monographs, 1981), 114; see
also Ramet, Balkan Babel, 210; Bennett, Yugoslavia‟s Bloody Collapse, 146-7; . Ahrens notes, however, that attempts to expand „into majority Croatian areas of BiH … failed and did not become official policy‟; Diplomacy, 122.
36 Zimmermann, Origins, 62. 37 Quoted in Wilkie, „US Envoy‟. Elections were in due course held throughout Yugoslavia, but with greatly
varying degrees of freedom and legitimacy, and never at the federal level; see Dragovic-Soso, Saviours, 229. Whether it could have happened differently is an interesting but ultimately unanswerable question. Leff argues that it would have required „an altogether different democratization dynamic‟, and questions whether „an alternative mode of transition was possible, given the power realities in Yugoslavia‟; Leff, „Democratization‟, 229.
38 Cohen, Broken Bonds, 81, 176; Glenny, Fall, 86-7. Christopher Cviic notes that Slovene dissatisfaction with Yugoslavia „started to be voiced openly in the early 1960s‟, and that by the mid-1980s serious work was being done „on the preparation of a political and economic programme for a sovereign Slovenia within Yugoslavia if possible, outside it if not‟; „Slovene and Croat Perspectives‟, 120-23.
39 Touval, Mediation, 12.
33
Yugoslavia‟s unity, ethnic balance, and stability.40
Western involvement in Yugoslavia in this period demonstrates remarkable
continuities with Cold War policies on human rights and international relations which were
carried over from the 1980s. Western states attempted to pursue a very traditional type of
human rights diplomacy while simultaneously urging the wholesale reconstruction of
Yugoslavia‟s political system. The immense, and immensely unsettling, changes of 1989 and
1990 were seen only as an opportunity to extend – geographically and conceptually –
policies which, in terms of their basic content, could have been pursued at any time over
the previous decade or more. It was only in the summer of 1990 that some Western
policymakers began to seriously consider the possibility that this “traditional” human rights
approach might be counterproductive and damaging. Not only was it not achieving its
declared ends, it was actively contributing to pressures on Yugoslavia‟s unity that had grave
implications for both human rights and European stability and security.
II. Kosovo
It is our feeling that freedom of speech, freedom of assembly were violated there. There are political
prisoners in Kosovo. This was admitted to me by their minister of interior.
- Warren Zimmermann 41
The human rights abuses Serbia was committing in Kosovo gained little notice in
Europe, but they were not wholly ignored. Conservative MP John Bowis singled out
Kosovo for attention in the British House of Commons in December 1989. He warned of
the threat posed to the Albanians by the presence of „Serbian troops, aircraft and
helicopters throughout Kosovo‟, and that „[p]eople … being arrested for minor
infringements of the constitution … is an example of tyranny within a user-friendly
Communist state and we must be aware of it‟.42 When in early February 1990 Bowis
followed up on this issue and asked what „representations‟ the UK had made to Yugoslavia
concerning the abuses in Kosovo, the government reassured him rather vaguely that it had
„frequently raised human rights matters with the Yugoslav authorities‟, and that the
Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs had spoken to the Yugoslav
ambassador about Kosovo specifically on 22 November 1989.43 German Foreign Minister
40 Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, 202. 41 Quoted in Wilkie, „US Envoy‟. 42 Hansard, 20 December 1989, c. 419. 43 See „Written Answers‟, Hansard, 7 February 1990.
34
Hans-Dietrich Genscher later acknowledged the importance of the revocation of Kosovo‟s
autonomy, but maintained that it was „understandable that the international response was
so minimal, since 1989 was the year of peaceful revolutions … and 1990 was entirely
devoted to‟ events in the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union and the reunification of
Germany.44
Events in Kosovo garnered more attention in Washington, which generally took the
lead concerning Yugoslavia at this time. Responding to the human rights abuses there
became a prominent part of the policies of the Bush administration. The man most
directly responsible for carrying out these policies was the new (as of early 1989) US
ambassador in Belgrade, Warren Zimmermann. Zimmermann was a career diplomat who
knew Yugoslavia well, having served in the US embassy in Belgrade for a period in the late
1960s. He also had very strong human rights credentials: before taking up the Yugoslav
posting, he had been the head of the US delegation to the Vienna CSCE follow-up
meeting, where human rights had figured prominently on the American agenda.45 At least
one scholar has suggested that Bush‟s decision to appoint him to the Belgrade post
„suggested an implicit, if not explicit, portfolio to exert U.S. pressure on human rights‟ in
Yugoslavia.46
Zimmermann certainly did make the abuses in Kosovo a central issue in his
dealings with both the federal (Yugoslav) and Serbian governments almost from the
moment he arrived in Belgrade. He justified American interest in Kosovo by pointing to
the Vienna document, reminding the Yugoslav government that „Yugoslavia‟s record had
gotten off lightly at Vienna‟.47 Despite intense opposition from the Serbian government, he
personally visited Kosovo, met with figures on all sides of the conflict, and repeatedly and
publicly condemned the human rights violations that he found there.48 These actions were
strongly supported by Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger, himself a former
ambassador to Yugoslavia in the early 1980s.49 Eagleburger had emphasised the gravity and
importance of the situation in Kosovo in Congressional testimony in early 1989.50 On a
visit to Belgrade in February 1990, Eagleburger told Milosevic that „[t]he United States has 44 Genscher, Rebuilding, 489. 45 Zimmermann, Origins, 15. 46 Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, 151. 47 Zimmermann, Origins, 15. 48 Human Rights Watch, 1989 World Report. 49 According to Zimmermann, he and Eagleburger had worked out the plan to focus on human rights prior
to his departure for Belgrade; Warren Zimmermann, „The Last Ambassador: A Memoir of the Collapse of Yugoslavia‟, in Bosnia: What Went Wrong? (Washington DC: Council on Foreign Relations, Inc., 1998), 2-3.
50 „Hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the Confirmation of Deputy Secretary of State‟, Federal News Service, 15 March 1989; Zimmermann, Origins, 14.
35
a legitimate commitment to defending human rights‟, and suggested that US aid and
business investment might depend on a good human rights record.51 Certain members of
Congress also maintained a particular interest in Kosovo, keeping a „laser-like focus‟ on the
province to ensure that human rights abuses there were not overlooked.52 For his part,
Zimmerman found the congressional attention to be „marginally useful as a demonstration
to the Serbs of how deeply Americans cared about Kosovo‟, but felt that it was
counterproductive due to the anti-Americanism and resistance that it provoked from even
moderate figures in Serbia.53
Why exactly did the US begin to exert serious pressure over Kosovo in 1989? After
all, while the abuses were certainly of sufficient severity and scale as to warrant
condemnation and pressure, they were not new; human rights abuses had been going on in
Kosovo for many years before 1989. They were also not substantially different in nature or
severity from abuses that many Soviet-bloc communist states, as well as Yugoslavia, had
been committing for years. Washington‟s willingness to condemn human rights abuses in
Yugoslavia was a distinct departure from past practise in its relations with Belgrade. Was it
in fact a confirmation of the idea that human rights would have a new importance in
foreign policy as the Cold War faded away, or is there some other explanation?
The answer is to be found not in any new-found respect for human rights, but in
the geopolitical changes which were part and parcel of the end of the Cold War.
Yugoslavia, as a non-aligned European communist state outside the Soviet sphere of
influence, had always held a political and propaganda importance for the West
disproportionate to its economic or geographical size, political influence, or location. Its
significance in the East-West competition of the Cold War had previously prompted
Washington and its European allies to largely ignore Yugoslavia‟s human rights abuses in
the interests of not antagonising Belgrade.54 With the progressive collapse of communism
across Europe, however, Yugoslavia was no longer in a distinctive position, and its de facto
immunity to human rights criticism no longer applied.55 According to Zimmermann, he
and Eagleburger were in agreement „that the traditional American approach to Yugoslavia
no longer made sense, given the revolutionary changes sweeping Europe … Yugoslavia no
longer enjoyed the geopolitical importance that the United States had given it during the
51 Quoted in Zimmermann, Origins, 59. 52 Zimmermann, Origins, 126. 53 Ibid., 126-7. This division between the administration and Congress became more pronounced later in
1990 and 1991, and will be discussed in more detail in the following chapter. 54 Human Rights Watch, 1989 World Report. 55 See, for instance, the comments of Senator Moynihan at Eagleburger‟s confirmation hearings, 15 March
1989; see above, 34 (fn. 50).
36
Cold War‟.56 This meant that offending Belgrade was no longer of such concern, and the
relationship between Yugoslavia and the United States might well now be more important
to Belgrade than to Washington. If the administration wished, therefore, the longstanding
concern about Kosovo in Washington could now be made a priority. This is exactly what
Zimmermann and Eagleburger agreed to do. „[I]f Yugoslavia wanted to continue its close
relations with the United States‟, they agreed, „it would have to curb human rights abuses in
Kosovo‟.57 The change in attitude appeared to confirm the expectations for human rights
in the post-Cold War world, but it proved to be extremely fragile as circumstances
continued to change.
Despite the fact that it was the rapid and progressive collapse of communism that
allowed the renewed attention to the situation in Kosovo, there was a tendency in the West
to view events in Kosovo through an anti-communist lens. Western states persistently
interpreted Serbian actions in Kosovo as deriving from the communist nature and ideology
of the Serbian government, to the exclusion of alternative explanations such as Serbian
ethnic nationalism. As one newspaper described it, the Kosovo situation was „a conflict
between an official ideology that has lost the power to compel or persuade, and the raw,
untried forces of democracy‟.58 This mindset was not unreasonable in view of the fact that
nominally communist governments remained in power at all levels in Yugoslavia
throughout 1989 and well into 1990. But it hindered attempts to accurately understand
what was going on, which had serious implications for the appropriateness and
effectiveness of Western attempts to influence those events and improve the human rights
situation in Kosovo.
The habit of interpreting events in Kosovo in terms of communist repression is
well illustrated by the trial of Azem Vllasi. In the aftermath of the removal of Kosovo‟s
provincial autonomy, Vllasi, the ethnic Albanian head of the Kosovo Communist Party,
met with striking Albanian miners who were protesting Belgrade‟s action by barricading
themselves in the mines. In response, he was arrested in March 1989, removed from office,
and put on trial as a counter-revolutionary. The New York Times described the trial in
October as an anachronistic show trial in „a political style that much of Eastern Europe has
given up with bewildering speed in recent months‟.59 In Vllasi‟s words, it was a „stage-
managed political trial‟, and „a campaign for my political liquidation‟; his wife decried the
56 Zimmermann, „The Last Ambassador‟, 2. 57 Zimmermann, „The Last Ambassador‟, 3. 58 Tanner, „East Europe Elections…‟. 59 Cowell, „Trial Shows...‟.
37
„Stalinist nature‟ of the prosecution.60
Yet the headline of the article – „Trial Shows Strain on One of Yugoslavia‟s Ethnic
Fault Lines‟ – hints at the real nature of these events. While the form of the trial
undoubtedly deserved the Stalinist label, and it was undeniably politically motivated, there
was an extremely important difference from the political trials referred to by the Times: it
was not about communist control in Kosovo. It was about maintaining and reinforcing
Serbian control in Kosovo, both in the sense of the Serbian state proper, and the Serbian
“nation”. That is, it was based in ethnic nationalist concerns which depended crucially on
the Serb or Kosovo Albanian identity of the protagonists, not their support or otherwise
for communism. It may well have been „Yugoslavia‟s biggest political trial in 30 years‟, but
that description implied a context that in practical terms no longer existed, no matter which
label was still applied to the Serbian and Yugoslav governments, and motivations that no
longer applied.61
This tendency – to frame and interpret the ethnic issues that lay behind the trial
and other abuses in such a way as to reinforce the familiar picture of a centralised
communist state oppressing a democratically minded minority – was a recurring theme in
US policies concerning Kosovo. The US regularly described the actions and aspirations of
Kosovo Albanians in ethnic terms, while consistently and confidently attributing the
actions of the Serbian government to its nominally communist ideology. According to
Republican Senator Alfonse D‟Amato, for example, what was happening in Kosovo was a
confrontation between „Communist Serbians who are resisting democratic reforms and …
prodemocracy Albanians who seek only self-government and equality under Yugoslav
law‟.62 The US government paid little attention to the fact that Serbia, too, was an ethnically
based republic, and failed to recognise that not only was the Serbian government not
immune to ethnic nationalism, it was actively using it to bolster its own power. Trials like
Vllasi‟s, and the wide range of human rights abuses in Kosovo, were not being employed to
defend communism, but to reinforce the political and military control of Kosovo by the
Serbian state, and the social, cultural, and economic domination of the province by ethnic
Serbs. The use by the Serbian government of „the same old repressive tactics‟ was taken as
confirmation that the Serbian government was „an old Stalinist regime … hardline
communist‟.63 The change in aims and motivations in Belgrade to at the very least include
60 Ibid. 61 „Death Trial‟, Independent, 30 October 1989. 62 „Yugoslavia‟, Congressional Record, page S9165, 28 June 1990. 63 Senator Alfonse D‟Amato, quoted in „Statement of U.S. Senate Delegation on Visit to Yugoslavia‟, U.S.
Newswire, 31 August 1990.
38
nationalist ethnic concerns apparently went largely unappreciated at the time. It is worth
noting, in this respect, that when Milosevic first emerged as a prominent figure in 1987 and
1988, he was seen as a „true “Titoist”„, appealing to „the forces of socialism, brotherhood,
unity and progress‟ against „those of separatist nationalism and conservatism‟.64 By 1989
and 1990, this characterisation was no longer accurate.65 As one observer later noted,
„[a]lthough the Communist parties (with suitably altered names) won the elections in Serbia
and Montenegro, the political system that they were fashioning was, for better or worse, as
different from Titoist communism as the systems‟ that were emerging in the other
republics.66 The point is not that the abuses were either better or worse in this context, but
that the motivations behind them were not what Washington thought they were, and thus
perhaps required different responses.
Zimmermann himself seemed to recognise the ethnic component of the Serbian
actions in Kosovo, but the policy the State Department decided to employ against Belgrade
did not take any account of this factor, and partly as a result was completely ineffective.67
Washington had little leverage. The annual US aid budget for Yugoslavia amounted to only
about $5 million, and trade was relatively small, especially in comparison to the volume of
Yugoslav trade with Europe. Lacking any means of exerting serious pressure, Washington
resorted instead to “naming and shaming”. This approach was very much in the style of
human rights diplomacy as it had been practised during the 1980s, including by
Zimmermann himself in his capacity as US ambassador to the CSCE, but it was premised
on the Serbian government caring sufficiently about its international reputation to be
willing to change its policies. The problem was that Milosevic did not care about
international or even pan-Yugoslav public opinion. His actions were aimed at building and
maintaining his support within Serbia and amongst Serbs elsewhere in Yugoslavia, and
domestic power politics based on ethnic nationalism trumped international
condemnation.68 In practical terms, the pressure from the United States amounted to little
more than public criticism of the Serbian and Yugoslav governments for human rights
64 Dragovic-Soso, Saviours, 207. 65 Ibid. 66 Aleksa Djilas, „A House Divided‟, New Republic, Vol. 208, No. 4 (25 January 1993), 38. Branka Magas notes
that, by the time of the Serbian elections in late 1990, „the word “Communist” meant very little. The Serbian Communist Party had already become the party of aggressive Serb nationalism‟; The Destruction of Yugoslavia, 288.
67 Zimmermann, Origins, 14, 61. 68 In this regard, Mark Almond compares Milosevic to Bismarck: feeling „little of the emotional pull‟ of
ethnic nationalism, but „hemmed in by his own evocation of national ghosts‟; Europe‟s Backyard War, 20-21. For the purposes of this inquiry, it is irrelevant whether Milosevic and his regime truly believed their own nationalist rhetoric or simply used it to retain and increase their power; the result and the political dynamic were the same in either case.
39
abuses in Kosovo and warnings that there would be consequences – generally unspecified –
if the situation did not improve.
The American approach therefore had little if any effect on Serbia‟s actions in
Kosovo. The province was too important to Milosevic both for generating and retaining
political support in Serbia and for controlling the federal presidency for him to respond to
the embarrassment of Zimmermann‟s criticisms. Yugoslav foreign minister Budimir
Loncar, who was unsympathetic to Milosevic and his aims, told the US ambassador bluntly
that „nobody [was] going to stop Milosevic from doing what he want[ed] in Kosovo‟, and
that Milosevic himself „[didn‟t] particularly care about the international reaction to Kosovo
or its effect on Yugoslavia‟s relations with Western countries‟.69 That was not quite
accurate; in fact Milosevic did care about the criticism, but only in a negative sense. He
refused to meet with Zimmermann for more than a year after his arrival in Belgrade as a
form of protest over the US pressure.70 But it was correct insofar as it predicted Milosevic‟s
response to international pressure. When Eagleburger traveled to Yugoslavia in February
1990 to reiterate American concerns to the Yugoslav and Serbian leadership, Milosevic
clearly resented what he considered to be illegitimate interference. He defended Serbian
actions as being necessary for self-defence against „Islamic fundamentalism‟ and the „narco-
mafia‟ in Kosovo. Serbs, he claimed, were being „systematically murder[ed] and rape[d] …
and this doesn‟t even take into account the mental murder of the 200,000 Serbs who live in
Kosovo‟.71 Comments such as this do not suggest a mindset which would easily or likely be
changed by Washington‟s tactics.
It is difficult, however, to suggest an approach that would have been more
successful. The importance of Kosovo for Serb nationalists, the reliance of the Milosevic
regime on their support, and the need to control Kosovo‟s vote on the federal presidency
meant it was unlikely that any policy would have induced the Serbian government to relax
its policies in the province.72 It is possible, if not likely, that recognition in Washington of
the basis of Kosovo‟s importance to Belgrade might have served as the starting point for
attempts to find a policy to at least ameliorate Serbian actions, and would at least have
meant that the criticisms directed at the Serbs could have been more appropriately directed.
And it might have been possible, for example, to direct efforts towards finding a modus
vivendi for the Serbs and Albanians which allowed both for Kosovo‟s nationalist importance
69 Quoted in Zimmermann, Origins, 16. 70 Zimmermann, „The Last Ambassador‟, 3. 71 Zimmermann, Origins, 60. 72 See above, 26-7.
40
to the Serbs and the understandable desire of the ethnic Albanian majority for greater
political and cultural independence. Such an approach could perhaps have considered the
current administrative boundaries of Kosovo, the population distribution within the
province, and the location of sites of particular importance to Serbian nationalists and the
Serbian Orthodox Church. The nature of Yugoslavia‟s federal system, though, and
Kosovo‟s vote on the presidency make it unlikely that Milosevic could have been induced
to relax his control of the province.
Western criticism and pressure over Kosovo was also limited by a strong desire to
preserve a unified Yugoslavia, an issue that is explored in more detail in the next section of
this chapter as well as in Chapter 3. At this point, it suffices to observe that the nature of
the Yugoslav federal system, and the informal but real position of dominance of Serbia
and Serbian leaders within it, made it very difficult to direct pressure in such a way as to
have an impact on Serbia without damaging the prospects of the federation as a whole.
Compounding this problem was the fact that many in the West – for instance in the US
Congress – were either unable or unwilling to distinguish between the actions of the
Serbian government and those of the Yugoslav federal government in the first place.
So while Human Rights Watch may have had reasonable grounds to praise
Zimmermann for his „unprecedented attention to questions of human rights‟ in 1989, the
actual effect of that attention was negligible at best, though it may have begun the process
of focusing some media attention on a region that traditionally was largely ignored.73 The
situation in Kosovo remained essentially unchanged as of early 1990. Hopeful signs could
perhaps be found in the calls by Yugoslav president Ante Markovic in February for
„dialogue‟ in Kosovo, and in his condemnation – directed at threatening nationalist
demonstrations in Serbia – of „any activity outside the legal institutions of the system‟.74
But the Yugoslav presidency was increasingly ineffectual and irrelevant, as will be seen, and
only two days after those statements, Western observers were accusing police of „state
terrorism‟ for their use of excessive force against Albanian protestors.75 On the eve of the
anniversary of the constitutional change in late March, Serbia assumed control over
Kosovo‟s police force, and heavily augmented the police and military presence in the
province in anticipation of protests.76
The situation came to a head in the summer of 1990 in a series of events that
73 Human Rights Watch, 1989 World Report. 74 Judy Dempsey, „Belgrade Offers an Olive Branch to Kosovo‟, Financial Times, 2 February 1990 75 „Yugoslavia Police Fire on Rioters‟, Toronto Star, 4 February 1990. See also the comments by Richard
Boucher, „State Department Regular Briefing‟, Federal News Service, 8 February 1990. 76 Laura Silber, „Kosovo Anniversary Sparks Alert‟, Financial Times, 28 March 1990.
41
underlined the ineffectualness of the American government‟s pressure over human rights
in Kosovo. In late June, the Serbian government announced its intention to hold a
referendum, proposing that free, multiparty elections should not be held in Serbia until
after the enactment of a new, as yet unwritten constitution. It was a blatant ploy by the
Milosevic regime to entrench its own power and dampen calls for democratisation in
Serbia; as the sitting government, it would of course have a great deal of control over the
form of the proposed new constitution. Moving with conspicuous speed, the referendum
was held a mere six days later, making any organised opposition effectively impossible.
Justifiably suspecting that the constitution would neither acknowledge their desire for
autonomy or independence nor offer them any real human rights guarantees, nearly all
ethnic Albanians in Serbia, including Kosovo, boycotted the vote. The Serbian population
as a whole, however, endorsed it with nearly ninety percent approval.
The response of the Albanian-dominated Kosovo Assembly was to declare that
henceforth Kosovo was a political unit with the same rights and powers as the six existing
Yugoslav republics.77 The power that the legislators had most in mind, of course, was the
right to secede, which the Yugoslav constitution gave only to the republics. The Assembly‟s
action went beyond merely reclaiming the autonomous status that the Milosevic
government had revoked the year before. It aimed at removing Kosovo from Serbia‟s
jurisdiction entirely, and opened the door to the possibility of its leaving Yugoslavia
altogether. It was a direct challenge not only to Milosevic‟s authority over Kosovo, but to
the basis of his popular political support. The Serbian response was predictably severe. On
6 July, the government in Belgrade indefinitely suspended the Kosovo Assembly, and the
Serbian government assumed direct rule over Kosovo, as it was empowered to do under
the 1989 constitutional amendments Milosevic had pushed through. Police shut down
Albanian-language print and broadcast media in the province. The Serbian government
showed no hint of concern about international perceptions of its actions or with the
possibility of repercussions.78
III. Democracy and Human Rights in Theory … Don‟t be afraid of democracy and freedom. It ain‟t going to hurt anybody…
- George H. W. Bush 79
77 Sudetic, „Serbia Suspends...‟. 78 See, for instance, Carol Williams, „Yugoslavs Plan the Breakup of Their Country‟, Toronto Star, 5 August
1990; Zimmermann, Origins, 16. 79 George H. W. Bush, „The President‟s News Conference with Journalists from the Economic Summit
Countries‟, 6 July 1989. TAPP, www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=17246 (accessed 8 October 2006).
42
The other primary focus of Western attention in Yugoslavia in 1989 and 1990 was
on the process of democratisation in the country, which also had profound if less
straightforward human rights implications. Only a few months before Serbia‟s dissolution
of the Kosovo Assembly, Croatia and Slovenia had held the first multi-party elections in
Yugoslavia since World War II. The old-guard communist regimes were decisively defeated,
and in what appeared to be a good sign for human rights, the new governments, composed
of coalitions of former opposition groups, professed a greater respect for human rights
norms and pledged to make improvements. Western governments welcomed these results
as a vindication of their policies that appeared to confirm yet again that democracy and
human rights went hand-in-hand. As had been the case in Poland, Czechoslovakia,
Hungary, and East Germany, democratisation did seem to be accompanied by greater
respect for human rights, and vice versa.
As soon became clear, however, the relationship between democracy, and more
importantly democratisation, and human rights was considerably more complicated than
anticipated by Western policies. Within weeks, the new Croatian government was pursuing
discriminatory and inflammatory policies aimed at Croatia‟s ethnic Serb minority. The
Croatian Serbs carried out their own abuses against ethnic Croats in Serb-majority regions
and even threatened secession to join with Serbia. As the results of the elections played
out, the whole of Yugoslavia and even Croatia itself seemed increasingly on the verge on
disintegration. During the ensuing wars, and even after they had ended, the Tudjman
government was responsible for widespread and chronic human rights violations, from
suppressing freedom of the press in Croatia to participation in ethnic cleansing in Bosnia-
Herzegovina.80 This result did not bear out the assumed connection between democracy
and human rights that had apparently been validated by events elsewhere in Europe, or
what Paul Shoup calls the Western „belief that Yugoslavia should have benefitted from,
rather than been destroyed by, the transition to democracy following Communism‟s
collapse‟.81 Democratisation in Yugoslavia confounded these expectations and ushered in a
period of human rights abuses on a scale that had not been seen in Europe for nearly fifty
years. It was not, as Shoup points out, „a foregone conclusion … that the victory of the
West following the collapse of Communist Eastern Europe should have provided a
80 Lester Brune, The United States and the Balkan Crisis, 1990-2005: Conflict in Bosnia and Kosovo (Claremont CA:
Regina Books, 2005), 79. During the wars, of course, the Serbians and the Croatian Serbs were committing their own extensive human rights abuses both within Croatia and elsewhere in the former Yugoslavia.
81 Shoup, „The Disintegration of Yugoslavia‟, 349.
43
hospitable – and peaceful – environment for the peoples of Yugoslavia rather than
encouraging a descent into violence‟.82
Western governments repeatedly linked democracy and human rights in 1989 and
1990, in official statements that invariably called for improvements in both democracy and
human rights (i.e., “freedom”, particularly in the American idiom) in the newly ex-
communist states of Europe in the expectation that such improvements could and would
now come to pass in tandem. This was not a new idea – the Reagan administration had
begun to connect democracy promotion and human rights in the early 1980s – but such
rhetoric now had a new resonance in light of the upheaval in Central and Eastern
Europe.83 In May 1989, U.S. President George H. W. Bush solemnly declared that
„[d]emocracy is on the move. … Freedom, democracy, human rights, these are the things
we stand for. … I would encourage every government to move as quickly as they can to
achieve human rights‟.84 NATO „welcome[d] the marked progress in some countries of
Eastern Europe towards establishing more democratic institutions, freer elections and
greater political pluralism‟, and accused governments that „ignore[d] this reforming trend‟
of „continu[ing] … to violate human rights and basic freedoms‟.85 In July, the G-7
„reaffirm[ed] [its] commitment to freedom, democratic principles, and human rights‟.86 In
November, British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher opined that „genuine democracy with
multi–parties and full human rights and secret ballots‟ was „the most important thing‟ for
Eastern Europe.87 All of these statements exhibit a belief that „democracy without freedom
is a contradiction in terms‟; they could, should, and indeed must go together.88 For Bush,
these concepts were virtually interchangeable, and he slipped naturally and easily from one
to the other. At a news conference in July, he spoke of them as literally a single concept,
referring to „freedom and democracy‟ with the singular term „it‟, a habit which Zehra Arat
notes „is common among Western officials, [but] the United States government has been
the most assertive in treating the two terms as analogous‟.89
82 Ibid. 83 Neier, Taking Liberties, 187. 84 George H. W. Bush, „Remarks and a Question-and-Answer Session with Reporters Following a Luncheon
with Prime Minister Brian Mulroney of Canada‟, 4 May1989. TAPP, www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=16999 (accessed 9 October 2006).
85 NATO, Declaration of the Heads of State and Government participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, 30 May 1989; available from www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c890530a.htm (accessed 10 February 2008).
86 G-7, Declaration on Human Rights, 15 July 1989. Available from www.g8.utoronto.ca/summit/1989paris/human.html (accessed 9 October 2006).
87 Margaret Thatcher, Press Conference after Paris European Council, 18 November 1989. Available from www.margaretthatcher.org/archive/ (accessed 11 August 2006).
88 David Beetham, „Freedom as the Foundation‟, Journal of Democracy, Vol. 15, No. 4 (October, 2004) , 62. 89 Bush, „The President‟s News Conference…‟, 6 July 1989; Arat, „Human Rights and Democracy‟, 136.
44
Western governments associated human rights and democracy in ways that suggest
two distinct associations between the two concepts: as either inseparable or identical.
According to the first view, human rights were regarded as „an intrinsic, rather than
extrinsic, component of democracy‟, in the belief that democracy could only be built on a
foundation of secure human rights and that human rights could only be guaranteed
through democracy.90 Thus, in a document entitled „Securing Democracy‟, the G-7
„applaud[ed] the introduction of the rule of law and the freedoms that are the bedrock of a
democratic state‟.91 The CSCE reaffirmed in November 1990 this „steadfast commitment to
democracy based on human rights and fundamental freedoms‟ and, among other measures,
established an Office of Free Elections, later expanded and renamed the Office for
Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, to provide advice and support to newly-
democratic ex-communist states.92 Human Rights Watch asserted in 1990 that only
„multiparty politics and enduring democratic institutions … would ensure the systematic
protection of human rights‟.93 The implication is clear: policies to promote democracy
could not be separated from policies to promote human rights, not because they were
identical, but because they were simply inseparable. As Robert Wesson puts it, „human
rights (meaning civil and political rights) are part, a good part, of democracy, and they can
be assured only by legal, responsible, that is, democratic governments‟.94
Also clearly visible in Western thinking and policy in 1989 and 1990 was the idea
that human rights and democracy were not simply complementary and inseparable but
literally identical to each other.95 Human Rights Watch, for instance, ascribed the
democratic revolutions in Eastern Europe to „public demands for such rights as freedom
of expression, freedom of movement and freedom of assembly‟ which „brought down the
Berlin Wall [and] overturned dictatorships‟.96 President Bush called in 1989 for the
expansion of „the CSCE human rights basket to include free elections‟.97 This line of
90 Beetham, „Linking Democracy‟. 91 G-7, Political Declaration: Securing Democracy, 10 July 1990; available from www.g8.utoronto.ca/summit/1990houston/political.html (accessed 9 October 2006). 92 CSCE, Charter of Paris for a New Europe, 21 November 1990 (accessed 17 April 2008);CSCE, Document of
the Copenhagen Meeting on the Human Dimension of the CSCE, 29 June 1990 (accessed 29 August 2006); CSCE, Prague Document on Further Development of CSCE Institutions and Structures, 30 January 1992 (accessed 29 August 2006). All available from www.osce.org/documents/.
93 Human Rights Watch, 1990 World Report on Human Rights: Yugoslavia (Human Rights Watch, 1990). Available from www.hrw.org/legacy/reports/1990/WR90/ (accessed 5 September 2009).
94 Robert Wesson, quoted in Arat, „Human Rights and Democracy‟, 132-3. 95 Reasonable basis for this idea is not difficult to find; democracy is essentially treated as a basic human
right in, for instance, Article 21 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Articles 22 and 25 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. See also Evans, „If Democracy‟, 631.
96 Human Rights Watch, 1989 World Report. 97 George H. W. Bush, „Outline of Remarks at the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Headquarters in
45
thinking culminated with a CSCE declaration in June 1990 that „free elections‟ and „a form
of government that is representative in character‟ were „essential to the full expression of
… the equal and inalienable rights of all human beings‟.98
IV. … and in Practice
The Yugoslav republic seems about to fall apart. I guess my questions are to you, what can we do to support
the democracy movement in Yugoslavia and specifically regarding Kosovo, is there a real danger that one
Yugoslavian ethnic or nationality group will crush all opposition as it seems to be doing and impose control
throughout Yugoslavia?
- US Senator Larry Pressler 99
All of these ideas were applied to Yugoslavia, which in the rapidly changing
circumstances quickly came to be considered „behind the times in the struggle for political
freedom‟.100 The French Minister for European Affairs later described it as having been „an
archaic prison of peoples, a last bastion of communism which had to be brought down to
complete the victory of the west‟.101 Democracy was supposed to be a „firewall against a
Communist reversal‟, but in Yugoslavia, communism refused to fall.102 As noted above,
prior to April 1990, all federal and republican Yugoslav governments remained at least
nominally communist.
Most observers in the West therefore welcomed any sign of democratisation; „the
standard medicine prescribed for most of the world‟s ills‟ was expected to „cure
Yugoslavia‟s afflictions: it would redress human rights, alleviate ethnic tensions and keep
the country united in peace‟.103 For the US, democracy was the primary concern in
Yugoslavia, and the „traditional mantra‟ of „support for Yugoslavia‟s unity, independence,
and territorial integrity‟ was to be „reassert[ed]‟ only „in the context of democracy; [the US]
would strongly oppose unity imposed or preserved by force‟.104 Human Rights Watch
Brussels‟, 4 December 1989. TAPP, www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=17906 (accessed 9 October 2006).
98 CSCE, Document of the Copenhagen Meeting. 99 Speaking to Secretary of State James Baker, „Hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on
Foreign Policy Priorities‟, Federal News Service, 2 February 1990. 100 Human Rights Watch, 1990 World Report. 101 Author‟s translation („l‟opinion internationale tenait la Yougoslavie pour une archaïque prison des peuples,
un dernier bastion communiste don‟t l‟éclatement parachèverait la victoire occidentale‟); Élisabeth Guigou, Pour Les Européens (Paris: Flammarion, 1994), 181.
102 Baker, Politics of Diplomacy, 202. 103 Touval, Mediation, 17. 104 Zimmermann, „The Last Ambassador, 3. This was, as Touval points out, a „sharp departure from the
previous US policy of unqualified support‟; Mediation, 24.
46
praised the growth of „conditions for free expression and democracy‟ in Slovenia, and
expressed guarded optimism concerning the tentative moves in late 1989 towards a multi-
party political system throughout Yugoslavia.105 Warren Zimmermann welcomed political
liberalisation, predicting that, in spite of „the severe debates and disputes‟ arising from
ethnic and nationalist tensions, Yugoslavia would quickly adopt a liberal democratic system
with free elections nationwide.106 The optimism at times reached absurd heights; for one
Scottish newspaper, the mere proposal of a new non-communist constitution „based on
freedoms and human rights … [would] completely eliminate … [a]ll possibilities for
subjective and arbitrary interpretations of the constitution (regarding individual rights) ‟.107
A rare dissenting view was expressed in May 1991 by Italian Foreign Minister Gianni de
Michelis, who warned that „[a]ccording to its present constitutional structure, Yugoslavia
could be either united but undemocratic, or democratic – but in pieces‟, but his concern
was not widely shared.108
What exactly did Western leaders mean by “democracy” in this context? Did they
consider it to be, as one commentator has described it, „a mode of decision-making about
collectively binding rules and policies over which the people exercise control‟, something
that needed to be understood „based on its principles rather than on its governmental
institutions‟?109 Western policies in Yugoslavia did not indicate nearly so nuanced an
understanding. As applied, they suggest a much cruder definition, equating democracy with
simple „popular control of the government‟.110 Promoting democracy was treated as if it
were the same as promoting multi-party elections, which were encouraged wherever and as
quickly as possible. Little consideration was given to what Susan Woodward described as
the political momentum of national rhetoric, loyalty, and rights over economic
assets and territories [, which] was moving too rapidly for the construction of
genuine alternatives, or even for individual citizens freely to develop political
identities and associations appropriate for a post-socialist system.111
The mechanism of elections was conflated with the ongoing process or system of
democracy within which that mechanism was intended to work. Very little attention was 105 Human Rights Watch, 1989 World Report. 106 Quoted in Wilkie, „US Envoy…‟. 107 „Yugoslav Rights “Safe”,‟ The Herald, 16 February 1990. 108 Quoted in Almond, Europe‟s Backyard War, 42-3. 109 David Beetham, „Liberal Democracy and the Limits of Democratization‟, Political Studies (1992), XL,
Special Issue, 40; Beetham, „Linking Democracy‟. 110 Arat, „Human Rights and Democracy‟, 120. 111 Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, 144.
47
paid to ensuring the civil and political rights that were „preconditions for a free and fair
election‟.112 President Bush summed up Western policies and principles in his blunt
assertion that „free elections are best‟.113 There were critics of this view – Human Rights
Watch accused Washington of being „so preoccupied with promoting the emergence of
elected governments that it has neglected the legal developments needed to secure and
institutionalize basic freedoms‟ – but this attitude was the exception, not the norm.114
For those who cared to see them, however, there were troubling undercurrents in
the democratisation of Yugoslavia. The same Human Rights Watch report concluded that
most human rights abuses in Yugoslavia arose from „nationalist policies‟ in the republics, or
from „abusive measures adopted by the federal or republic governments to quell nationalist
sentiment‟.115 The implications of this warning in the context of the hoped-for
democratisation were serious but not widely appreciated. If “nationalist policies” by
communist republican governments were already a main cause of human rights abuses,
then democracy contained the seeds of greater abuses in the future. In Yugoslavia, as
subsequently became clear, „party competition coincide[d] with lines of cultural division‟,
leading to a situation where „the struggle for power … [was] waged in the interest of the
specific community rather than of the society as a whole‟.116 At the time, however, few
wanted to be reminded that, as journalist Hugh Graham wrote in February 1990, „in the
past, voters have proven no wiser than statesmen or dictators. Nor is democracy an
ideology. It is merely a system … Democracy can still end up enfranchising a mob, and
legitimizing national prejudice …‟.117 This process is exactly what happened in Yugoslavia,
beginning with the election fallout in Croatia.
It was not only in Croatia and Slovenia that ethno-nationalism was a political factor,
and its emergence in Serbia was more consequential in the long run. The regime in
Belgrade had built its power base on Milosevic‟s recognition and manipulation of Serb
nationalism, which he continued to exploit as the country disintegrated.118 When Milosevic
cast himself and the Serbs as the only true defenders of Yugoslavia, he did so based not on
any affection or sincere support for a multinational, multiethnic Yugoslavia, but rather on
the “right” of all Serbs to live in a single, Serbian nation; the motto „all Serbs in one state‟
112 Snyder, From Voting to Violence, 26. 113 George H. W. Bush, „Interview with Foreign Journalists‟, 21 November 1989 TAPP, www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=17863 (accessed 9 October 2006). 114 Human Rights Watch, 1989 World Report. 115 Human Rights Watch, 1989 World Report. 116 Beetham, „Linking Democracy‟. 117 Hugh Graham, “Is Democracy as Outdated as Communism?,” Toronto Star, 13 February 1990. 118 Dragovic-Soso, Saviours, 207-12.
48
first appeared after the 1990 Serbian elections.119 Daniele Conversi has labelled the Serbian
position – superficially supporting and advocating for Yugoslavia, but more fundamentally
an expression of Serbian nationalism – „secessionism by the centre‟, and argues that it arose
from „a powerful [Serbian] nationalist movement [that] emerged before the break-up of the
state‟.120
Hoping first to achieve its ends within the formal structures of the Yugoslav
federation, the Serbian government demanded „a tight federation with minimal autonomy
for the republics‟.121 Given the ethnic Serb domination of the federal government and the
Yugoslav National Army, this formula amounted to de facto Serbian control over the whole
of Yugoslavia, which would have had dire implications for the other republics. This state
of affairs unsurprisingly engendered resistance from Slovenia and Croatia, which feared
that even the existing levels of republican autonomy under the federal Yugoslav system
were under threat. It also put Bosnia and Macedonia on their guard concerning what they
might face in a Belgrade-dominated future Yugoslavia without Slovenia and Croatia. When
this approach failed, Conversi argues, Belgrade „opt[ed] for a de facto secessionist hidden
agenda eventually leading to the dissolution of the state‟.122 While arguably underplaying
the active (as opposed to reactive) nature of Slovenian and Croatian nationalism and
secessionism, Conversi correctly notes that the increasing „delegitimis[ation] and
weaken[ing]‟ of the Yugoslav state by Serbian moves helped to create an „aggravating
legitimacy vacuum‟ which nationalists on all sides „took advantage of … to press their
claims further and further in the direction of independence‟.123 The growing sense – on all
sides – that ethnic groups and their members could only be safe by asserting control over
their own independent, sovereign territories added to the momentum towards dissolution.
Officially, the West wholeheartedly supported the continuing unity of Yugoslavia
well into 1991.124 In practice, however, Western statesmen believed that formerly
119 Zimmermann, Origins, 22; Zimmermann, „The Last Ambassador‟, 15. While Milosevic personally may
have avoided the use of so explicit a formulation as that motto, he nevertheless clearly espoused the same idea. In June 1988, he complained in reference to Kosovo that „if things did not change, “the Serbs would probably be the only nation in the world who - without being forced to - accepted to live in three separate states”„; quoted in Dragovic-Soso, Saviours, 210. And according to Dragovic-Soso, Milosevic in 1990 „came round to [intellectual opposition leader Dobrica] Cosic‟s point of view that Yugoslavia could not be saved and that Serbs had to create a new state for their nation. . . . Milosevic‟s strategy – divulged in private only to his closest collaborators – revolved around "expelling" the Slovenes and Croats from the common state and "cutting off" parts of Croatia, while keeping the Republic of Serbia intact with its autonomous provinces‟; ibid, 240.
120 Conversi, „Central Secession‟, 338. 121 Zimmermann, Origins, 60. 122 Conversi, „Central Secession‟, 338. 123 Ibid. 124 Genscher, Rebuilding, 491. François Mitterrand was still speaking in June 1991 of maintaining „the unity of ‟
49
„totalitarian countries‟ should „move as quick as they can down democracy‟s path‟, and
ignored the potentially corrosive impact on Yugoslavia‟s unity.125 Western policymakers
appear to have largely ignored the implications of the political platforms of the Slovenian
and Croatian oppositions and the Serbian government for Yugoslav unity and thus for
Yugoslav human rights.126 Persistent Western anti-communism – assisted by Croatian and
Slovenian portrayals of the situation – encouraged the acceptance of a simplistic narrative
in which the Slovenes and Croats were seen to be throwing off the shackles of a
centralised communist tyranny and thus were deserving of support and encouragement
from the West.127 Warnings that „democracy ha[d] yet to evolve into a political force strong
enough to unite Yugoslavia and its 23 million people in the wake of communism‟ were
given little credence.128
Less than a year after the elections, US Assistant Secretary of State Richard Schifter
spelled out the consequences when he testified on the state of human rights in Yugoslavia
before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. While still claiming that „1990 saw
Yugoslavia and „guaranteeing minority rights‟ there; quoted in Jacques Amalric, „Why Does the West Oppose Slovenian Independence?‟, The Guardian, 28 June 1991.
125 Bush, „Remarks …‟, 4 May 1989. Saadia Touval contends that the view that „the West supported the preservation of a unified Yugoslavia until the summer of 1991 … rests on a somewhat narrow and literal interpretation of statements that endorsed unity and does not take into account the nuances of these statements … When these additional aspects … are taken into consideration, Western policies appear far more equivocal‟; Mediation, 22.
126 Without access to currently classified sources, it is impossible to definitively say whether or not this aspect was considered in the policymaking process behind closed doors.
127 Not everyone believed this portrayal of the situation; one Western diplomat in Belgrade was of the opinion that „[t]his simplistic view that sees a free, democratic Croatia and a bad, barbaric Bolshevik Serbia is a lot of crap. It affects perceptions around the world and gets played back into the Yugoslav crisis. Communism is becoming an increasingly meaningless buzzword to understand what is happening in Yugoslavia‟; quoted in Blaine Harden, „Croatia‟s Nationalism Takes Hard Turn to the Right‟, Washington Post, 17 June 1991. See also John V. A. Fine, „Heretical Thoughts about the Postcommunist Transition in the Once and Future Yugoslavia‟, in Yugoslavia and Its Historians: Understanding the Balkan Wars of the 1990s, Norman M Naimark and Holly Case, eds., (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003), 179-82; Pavkovic, Fragmentation, 147-8; Francesco Privitera, „The Relationship Between the Dismemberment of Yugoslavia and European Integration‟, in Reflections on the Balkan Wars: Ten Years After the Break Up of Yugoslavia, Jeffrey S. Morton et al, eds., (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2004), 42-3.
128 Tanner, „East Europe Elections…‟. See also Touval, Mediation, 17-21. It is possible, had the leadership in Belgrade (and all the other capitals) desired it, that a smooth transition and dissolution of the country could have been achieved. It was, however, plain at least to some that the Serbian leadership harboured no such desire, and that in its absence, a peaceful breakup of the country was unachievable. From his vantage point in Belgrade, for example, Warren Zimmermann concluded that „no breakup of Yugoslavia could happen peacefully. The ethnic hatred sown by Milosevic and his ilk and the mixture of ethnic groups in every republic except Slovenia meant that Yugoslavia‟s shattering would lead to extreme violence, perhaps war‟; Zimmernann, „The Last Ambassador‟, 6. The CIA concluded in September 1990 that rising „ethnic passions‟ in all republics made it much more likely that Yugoslavia would end „with a bang‟ than „with a whimper‟; CIA. End of a Nation-building Experiment (21 September 1990), 6; available from www.foia.cia.gov (accessed 24 August 2009). As Paul Shoup observes, „virtually all the actors in this drama outside Kosovo were ready to go to war to achieve their objectives. This can be interpreted either as suicidal irrationality or a sign of how seriously they viewed their cause(s), but it was the rock on which all attempts to negotiate an end to the conflicts … were to founder‟ (emphasis in original); Shoup, „The Disintegration of Yugoslavia‟, 350. See also Ramet, Balkan Babel, 38, 42; and Ivan Vejvoda, who describes the „vision‟ of „a “velvet divorce” in the winter of 1990-91‟ as „utopian‟; „Serbian Perspectives‟, 101.
50
significant movement toward increased respect for freedom of speech and freedom of
religion‟ and significant political liberalisation as a result of the „democratic revolutionary
fervor which swept the region in 1989‟, he was forced to admit that all had not gone as
anticipated. Government repression and „rabid forms of nationalism‟ were evident in many
parts of the country, and „[e]ven where elections were free and fair, the parties associated
with democratic freedoms, respect for the individual, and equal rights for all did not fare
particularly well‟.129
V. Conclusion
In the immediate post-Cold War years, human rights played a central part in
Western relations with Yugoslavia. With regard to Kosovo, a traditional type of human
rights diplomacy focused on political repression and attempted to address it by means of
public criticism and political pressure. The human rights implications of the push for
democratisation were more complex, but they came down to a conviction in the West that
democracy and human rights were simultaneously compatible, essential to each other, and
indeed essentially identical. The results, however, failed to measure up to expectations.
Western pressure over the abuses in Kosovo achieved little, if anything. The process of
democratisation had consequences that rendered human rights in Yugoslavia less secure,
not more, and that threatened greater problems in the future. Until events reached crisis
levels between April and June 1990, there is little evidence that policymakers in the West
understood the ramifications of their preferred policies in Yugoslavia.
If human rights in Yugoslavia were now being given greater importance than they
had been in previous years, however, it was due neither to any absolute increase in their
importance in international relations at this time nor to any substantive change in the
conditions in Yugoslavia. The primary concerns – political repression and personal
freedoms in Kosovo, and democratisation more generally – were traditional human rights
issues on which the West had been criticising the Soviet bloc for many years, and had long
been equally pertinent to Yugoslavia. Their new application to Yugoslavia was dependent
on the broader geopolitical changes as the Cold War ended, which radically reduced
Yugoslavia‟s importance and usefulness to the West. That Western policy on Yugoslavia
could now focus on human rights was not because they had suddenly become more
important, but because the factors which had previously inhibited Western criticism had
changed or disappeared. The same kind of calculus of political and diplomatic advantage 129 „Human rights in Yugoslavia - statement by Assistant Secretary Richard Schifter to the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee‟, US Department of State Dispatch, Vol. 2, No. 2, 4 March 1991.
51
that had obtained during the Cold War was still being applied, but the results of those
calculations now dictated that more attention be paid to human rights in Yugoslavia. While
in some respects this supports the idea that human rights issues would become more
prominent in the post-Cold War world, subsequent developments revealed how fragile and
contingent was this prioritisation of human rights.
Western policy in this period also illustrates some of the serious difficulties with
such a human rights-oriented foreign policy. The Kosovo strand demonstrated that the
best-intentioned policies may be futile or counterproductive if there is no accurate
understanding of the situation that they are meant to influence. The ineffective “naming
and shaming” approach was premised on a mistaken interpretation of the motivations of
the Serbian government. The abuses were based in ethnic nationalism and internal political
calculations, not in an outdated communist ideology held by the government in Belgrade.
Milosevic‟s concerns were internal, not external, and as a result, attempts to use
international opinion to sway him were misguided. A better understanding of Milosevic‟s
motives and the internal politics in Serbia might have led Washington to a more effective
approach. It would at the very least have resulted in criticisms that addressed the actual
political issues driving Serbian policies.
The efforts to promote democracy showed a number of other flaws. Western
assumptions about the relationship between democracy and human rights were shown to
be dependent on specific circumstances rather than general laws. In Yugoslavia, the highly
decentralised federal structure of the state, the ethnic rivalries, and the “home-grown”
nature of the central communist regime decoupled the relationship; democracy, at least in a
limited, technical sense, was shown to be a potential threat to human rights rather than
their guarantor. The uneven introduction of democracy led directly to a rapid increase in
racial tensions and human rights abuses in Croatia. Much more significantly in the long run,
it encouraged the already prominent centrifugal tendencies in Yugoslav politics, threatening
a violent dissolution which, it was widely acknowledged, would inevitably be accompanied
by massive human rights abuses. It also showed the potential contradictions and difficulties
involved in attempting to promote multiple aspects of human rights simultaneously, by
demonstrating that democracy and human rights as usually conceived were not
automatically complementary in practice.
Finally, both the Kosovo and democracy aspects were symptomatic of fundamental
continuities in foreign policy between the Cold War and post-Cold War periods. The issues
at play in Kosovo were not at all new; the human rights concerns there were typical of
52
Cold War criticisms of communist states. It was only their application to Yugoslavia which
was new. As for democracy, the basic assumptions concerning the relationship between it
and human rights as applied in Yugoslavia also predated the end of the Cold War. In spite
of the radically different international circumstances which made it possible and desirable,
in Western eyes, to apply these standards to Yugoslavia, there was nothing in the content
of either policy to indicate any real rethinking concerning the nature of human rights or
their position in international relations.
53
Chapter 3
Managing Dissolution: Human Rights, Self-Determination, and Recognition
Human rights played an ever-changing and uncertain role in Western policies
toward Yugoslavia from the summer of 1990 until early 1992. In some respects, Western
policymakers demonstrated increased attention to human rights issues, but they also
showed a willingness to overlook human rights concerns when they conflicted with broader
policy goals. This chapter begins by looking at the development of US and European
policies from mid-1990 until the June 1991 declarations of independence by Slovenia and
Croatia. It looks first at how continuing interest in Kosovo and democratisation in both the
US Congress and the Bush administration supported arguments both for and against
maintaining a united Yugoslavia, while the Europeans tended toward the latter position for
reasons of both self-interest and principle. It then examines the European assumption of
leadership and the shift in emphasis to managing Yugoslavia‟s accelerating dissolution, the
growing role for human rights through developments in the CSCE, and at the
contradictory treatment of human rights at the negotiating table. The next section looks at
the human rights aspects of the EC debate over recognition, including the issue of self-
determination and the work of the Badinter Commission. It concludes by considering
these events in the context of the larger questions addressed by this dissertation, arguing
that human rights played a significant role in the Western response at both the beginning
and end of this period, under both American and European leadership, but a much smaller
role when the primary Western focus was on attempting to hold the federation together.
I. Background
The Serbian crackdown in Kosovo in the mid-summer of 1990 had repercussions
far beyond the borders of that province or even Serbia as a whole. Serbian actions in
Kosovo, and the international response to them, were a major factor in the growing
impetus towards secession in Slovenia.1 As the situation in Kosovo worsened, Slovenia
declared its sovereignty and asserted its right to unilaterally secede from the federation.
Croatia followed the Slovenian lead with calls for an „alliance of sovereign republics‟ in
place of the Yugoslav federation.2 Milosevic‟s response, directed particularly at the
Tudjman government in Croatia, made it clear that, from his perspective, the status quo
1 See, inter alia, Zimmermann, Origins, 31, 54; Timothy Heritage, „Yugoslavia lifts Kosovo Emergency Rules‟,
Independent, 19 April 1990; Cohen, Broken Bonds, 63; Dragovic-Soso, Saviours, 145-6. 2 Klas Bergman, „Democratic Croatia Seeks Yugoslav Confederation‟, Christian Science Monitor, 9 July 1990.
54
with regard to republican borders in Yugoslavia was dependent on the continuation of the
federation.3 First the Serbian abuses in Kosovo and later the less severe but still significant
abuses in Croatia, including both those committed by the Croatian government against
ethnic Serbs and those committed by ethnic Serbs against ethnic Croats, fuelled ethnic and
nationalist tensions in Yugoslavia, driving the country rapidly towards dissolution and war.
The crisis remained largely non-violent for another year, until Slovenia and Croatia
declared their independence in late June 1991. The Serb-controlled federal military
responded to this action with military force. Although the Slovenian war was short, the
conflict in Croatia was a different matter. Large portions of the republic where Croatian
Serbs either constituted a local majority or a sizeable minority of the population declared
their own independence from Croatia, with the ultimate goal of union with Serbia.4 The
JNA forces in Croatia, bolstered by troops withdrawn from Slovenia, took the side of the
Croatian Serbs, and the level of violence rapidly escalated. By autumn 1991, Serbian
paramilitary and JNA forces were engaged in large-scale operations in Croatia, besieging
the cities of Vukovar and Dubrovnik and inflicting heavy civilian casualties. The latter
garnered more media attention, due to its scenic setting and popularity as a holiday
destination for Western Europeans, and did see its share of human rights violations. On 27
October, for example, the situation in Dubrovnik prompted the EC to issue a statement
that „forcefully remind[ed] the leadership of the Yugoslav Peoples Army and all those
exercising control over it of their personal responsibility under international law for their
actions, including those in contravention of relevant norms of international humanitarian
law‟.5 But the former was perhaps the more significant of the two; following a brutal three
month siege, Vukovar fell to JNA and Serbian paramilitary forces in mid-November.
Amidst the violence and ethnic cleansing following the fall of the city, approximately 260
ethnic Croatian men were taken from the city hospital by JNA forces and murdered.6 By
3 Ian Traynor, „Yugoslav Unity Faces New Threat as Leaders Clash‟, Guardian, 26 June 1990. 4 „[C]lose to 26 per cent [of the Croatian Serbs] were concentrated in areas adjacent to Serbia or to Bosnia-
Herzegovina … where they constituted an absolute majority in eleven communes (69 per cent of the population compared with 22 per cent of Croats) and a sizeable minority in other areas‟; Touval, Mediation, 88. See also Cohen, Broken Bonds, 127-9; Ahrens, Diplomacy, 27-31 (especially 30), 111-12; Burg and Shoup, The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 88-9.
5 Quoted in Burg and Shoup, The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 87. 6 See, inter alia, Silber & Little, Death, 176-185; Michele Mercier, Crimes Without Punishment: Humanitarian
Action in Former Yugoslavia (London: Pluto Press, 1994), 86; Zimmermann, „The Last Ambassador‟, 14; Human Rights Watch, Prosecute Now!, 1 August 1993 (available from www.hrw.org; accessed 25 September 2009); Ahrens, Diplomacy, 116-19; Almond, Europe‟s Backyard War, 225-8; Tanner, Croatia, 261-267; Human Rights Watch, 1993 World Report on Human Rights: The Former Yugoslav Republics (Human Rights Watch, 1993); available from www.hrw.org/legacy/reports/1993/WR93/ (accessed 12 September 2009); Second interim report of the Commission of Experts established pursuant to Security Council resolution 780 (1992), UN doc. S/26545, 6 October 1993, 12-13, paras. 40-47 (available from www.un.org/en/documents/; accessed 22
55
the end of the year the front lines had largely stabilised with the occupation of
approximately one-third of Croatia by Serbian and Croatian Serb forces, though the
fighting continued.7 A more durable ceasefire was finally achieved in January 1992, leading
to the deployment of UN peacekeepers in Croatia beginning the following month. The
1991-92 conflict in Croatia resulted in an estimated 20,000 dead and missing, although the
exact number and proportions are disputed, and the material and economic damage
inflicted by the war was extensive.8
Western policies and concerns shifted radically as the nature and extent of the
Yugoslav crisis changed in this period, with significant implications for the role of human
rights in those polices. US policy priorities remained dominant for most of 1990 and part
of 1991. The Bush administration kept the process of democratisation and the situation in
Kosovo in the foreground, but commentators and policymakers increasingly framed these
concerns within the larger context of the survival or demise of the Yugoslav federation.
Pressure from Congress drove this process as the Bush administration increasingly lost
interest in Yugoslavia due in large part to the looming conflict with Iraq and a sense that
Yugoslavia was (or should be) a European problem. Human rights remained important in
the dispute between some members of Congress and the administration over whether or
not a unified Yugoslavia should be supported; partisans of both approaches used human
rights to support their arguments. But as the survival of the Yugoslav federation grew
more doubtful and US interest diminished, the European Community and its member
states began to assume the primary role in Western relations with Yugoslavia, bringing a
distinct shift in the nature of Western concerns. Whereas in the US debates were
dominated by disagreements over whether unity or fragmentation would better promote
human rights, Europeans were much more concerned about what the dissolution of
Yugoslavia might mean for European stability and security. The outbreak of war in June
1991 greatly reinforced these concerns.
The shift to European leadership on Yugoslavia had a number of implications in
terms of human rights. On the one hand, European governments concentrated on crafting
a response to the more strictly political crisis of Yugoslavia‟s disintegration, at the expense
of the US concentration on more explicit human rights issues. For the Europeans, unity
September 2006).
7 Concerning the role, successes, and failures of the JNA in Croatia (and in Bosnia), see, inter alia, Burg and Shoup, The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 81-3; Ahrens, Diplomacy, 38; Bennett, Yugoslavia‟s Bloody Collapse, 158-9, 165-6; Almond, Europe‟s Backyard War, 41-2, 220, 224-5; Mazower, The War in Bosnia, 14.
8 See, inter alia, Almond, Europe‟s Backyard War, 229; Tanner, Croatia, 277-8; „Martic Witness Details Croatian War Casualties‟, Institute for War and Peace Reporting. Available from www.iwpr.net/report-news/martic-witness-details-croatian-war-casualties; accessed 20 May 2010.
56
was the priority, not democracy, although they did couch the discussion in terms like
“democratic unity”. Kosovo was likewise a distinctly secondary concern for the Europeans,
although they did not entirely ignore the situation. This is not to say, however, that human
rights considerations were irrelevant to the European responses. The various means which
European leaders used to try to end the fighting and preserve the federation (including a
comprehensive arms embargo, economic sanctions, and negotiations conducted by the EC
and later the UN) all had explicit or implicit human rights implications, as did the attempts
to resolve claims to the right of self-determination in the Yugoslav context. The nature of
these implications, and the manner in which they were dealt with, show a willingness to
sacrifice immediate human rights concerns in the interests of a political settlement and an
end to the violence.
As the Europeans moved away from an explicit focus on human rights in
Yugoslavia, however, other developments brought human rights back into the picture.
First, and literally coincidentally with the crisis in Yugoslavia, was the CSCE Moscow
Conference on the Human Dimension, held in September and October 1991. The events
in Yugoslavia were on the minds of all the delegates in Moscow. The Conference produced
the so-called Moscow Mechanism which, by legitimating and extending the consensus
within the CSCE member states concerning the place of human rights in international
relations, had direct relevance to Western attempts to deal with the Yugoslav crisis. Second,
and possibly more important in the long run, were the internal EC debates over diplomatic
recognition of the would-be independent republics, which resulted in the creation in
September 1991 of the Arbitration Commission of the EC Conference on Yugoslavia, an
independent legal body created explicitly to consider the issues related to recognition. The
Commission devoted a great deal of attention to human rights in its deliberations and
opinions, thereby ensuring that human rights concerns had an official place in the
European policy on recognition. Largely as a result of the Commission‟s work, human
rights issues played a central, albeit flawed, role in the decision to recognise Slovenia and
Croatia in January 1992.
II. Human Rights and the Preservation of Yugoslav Unity
Our only hope is for Western involvement. I tell the Americans, the British and the EC that they have to
get more involved. I ask them, do you need to have victims before you will intervene?
- Darko Bekic 9
9 Bekic was a foreign policy adviser to Croatian President Franjo Tudjman. Quoted in Ian Traynor, „West‟s
57
Kosovo and democracy continued to be topics of concern in the United States, but
they increasingly came to be considered within the context of Yugoslavia‟s survival or
disintegration. No influential voices in the Bush administration or Congress disputed that
democracy and human rights in Yugoslavia should be policy priorities, but there was a great
deal of disagreement over how best to achieve the greatest improvements in the shortest
time. Both sides of the debate claimed that human rights concerns justified their stance.
Those who argued the necessity of maintaining a united Yugoslavia, including the Bush
administration itself, were willing to overlook human rights problems and flawed
democracy in order to do so. They acknowledged the problems with this course, in light of
the human rights violations of the Serbian government and the lack of overall
democratisation, but argued that if Yugoslavia could be held together, democracy would
eventually spread throughout the country, thus easing tensions and improving the human
rights situation. Critics of this approach, including many members of Congress, saw it as
rank pandering to the Communists in Belgrade and an abandonment of the United States‟
moral duty. For them, human rights concerns dictated that those republics that had already
democratised, in however limited a sense, should be rewarded and encouraged to go
further. Those governments that lagged behind, republican or federal, were to be punished
for their failure.10
The differing positions can be clearly seen in a debate in the pages of the New York
Times in late 1990, which began with an opinion piece entitled „Why Keep Yugoslavia One
Country?‟ The article was co-authored by two members of Helsinki Watch, including the
organisation‟s executive director, Jeri Laber. After describing at length the human rights
abuses being committed in Kosovo, and briefly mentioning Croatia and Slovenia, the
authors castigated the Bush administration for „continu[ing] to give economic support to a
federal Government in Belgrade that is apparently too weak to speak out or act against
those who are committing human rights abuses‟:
Why not acknowledge the Government‟s impotence and offer aid to those
republics that will protect the rights of all their citizens? We might be able to help
them in a peaceful evolution to democracy…. There is no moral law that commits
us to honor the national unity of Yugoslavia. But there are laws, both moral and
Balkan View Brings Dismay‟, Guardian, 26 October 1990.
10 It was still taken as a given, by all sides, that greater democracy would bring about improved human rights.
58
statutory, that commit us to deny aid to governments that oppress.11
The article elicited a supportive letter from Senator Bob Dole, a long time opponent and
vocal critic of the administration‟s policy, particularly with regard to Kosovo.12 Dole felt
that the authors were „right on target‟, and noted that his own recent visit to Yugoslavia had
„led [him] to much the same conclusion‟.13
Yugoslav specialist and professor of law Robert Hayden offered the opposing
view.14 He contended that Laber‟s article was „remarkable for its lack of comprehension of
Yugoslavia and its limited view of human rights‟. In his view,
[i]f the Yugoslav state collapses, the republics are almost certain to fight one
another because of the large minority populations that are scattered through the
country, each of which will be oppressed by the local majority and seek protection
from compatriots in adjoining republics.
This would, he argued, lead „at best‟ to „strict repression‟, population transfers, and
„permanent hostility and an arms race‟. At worst, he predicted „such communal violence as
to make present human rights abuses in Kosovo seem absolutely civilized‟. Hayden
suggested that Laber and Anderson, and by extension Dole, were „cavalierly advocat[ing]
policies that are likely to turn Yugoslavia into the Lebanon of Europe‟. Neatly
encapsulating the position of the Bush administration, he argued that „federal authority is
the only power likely to protect minorities in the regions of Yugoslavia‟.
The visit Dole referred to had been made in August, as part of a Congressional
delegation investigating the human rights situation in Yugoslavia. After three days in
Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia, and Kosovo, the delegation came away with decidedly mixed
feelings. In its statement on the visit, the delegation enthusiastically welcomed „the rapid
strides toward democracy and free enterprise economics‟ being taken in Slovenia and
11 Jeri Laber and Kenneth Anderson, „Why Keep Yugoslavia One Country?‟, New York Times, 10 November
1990. 12 Zimmermann, Origins, 14. Dole was co-sponsor, along with Senators Pell and Pressler, of Senate
Concurrent Resolution 124, which, in Pell‟s words, „urges the Government of Serbia to begin a genuine dialog with the recently formed Democratic Alliance Movement and other democratic forces in Kosova. It calls for Kosova‟s autonomy to be restored, and it makes clear that the United States Congress will not tolerate continued repression against Albanians in Kosova‟; see „Yugoslavia‟, Congressional Record, page S9165.
13 Robert Dole, „Don‟t Turn Yugoslavia Into Europe‟s Lebanon‟, New York Times, 3 December 1990. See below for more discussion of Dole‟s visit to Yugoslavia and its results.
14 Robert Hayden, „Don‟t Turn Yugoslavia Into Europe‟s Lebanon‟, New York Times, 3 December 1990.
59
Croatia, but did not comment on the growing human rights abuses in Croatia.15 Nor did it
address the increasingly evident political strains on the federation to which their
democratisation was contributing, even as it noted the contrast between the atmosphere in
the northern republics and the „perpetuation of old line Communist repression in Serbia‟.16
Dole later wrote that traveling „from democratic Croatia to Communist Serbia is like going
through a time warp – back to the Cold War‟.17 Serbia tried to prevent the delegation from
going to Kosovo, and its visit there was marred by open repression on the part of the
Serbian authorities.18 The Americans in turn declared that they were „deeply disturbed at . . .
fresh evidence that Serbian authorities are engaged in a systematic pattern of violating the
human rights of Albanians‟.19 Dole himself went further, accusing the Serbian government
of „systematically destroying‟ the rights of the Kosovar Albanians.20
The senators left Yugoslavia determined to use Congress‟ fiscal powers to force the
administration to consider human rights in its Yugoslav policy. In Dole‟s opinion, US aid to
Yugoslavia should be made dependent on progress on human rights and democratisation,
and should be „targeted to those republics on the road to democracy‟ rather than „to or
through‟ the federal government.21 In keeping with a long-standing congressional pattern
of bilateral human rights policies, this was to be done through the foreign operations
appropriations bill for 1991. The so-called Nickles Amendment would have „target[ed] aid
to those republics that have held free and fair elections, and that are not engaged in the
abuse of human rights‟ and required the US to oppose multilateral assistance on the same
grounds.22 Due to opposition from the executive branch and within Congress, the final
version was much milder and called only for „free and fair elections in all republics and
substantial improvements in human rights‟.23 If in six months the Secretary of State could
not or would not certify that Yugoslavia was in compliance with these standards, all
American aid was to be cut off. That aid only amounted to some $5 million – Europe was
by far the larger contributor to Yugoslavia – but the symbolic importance was significant,
15 „Statement of U.S. Senate Delegation...‟, 31 August 1990. 16 Ibid. 17 Quoted in Harden, „Croatia‟s Nationalism‟. 18 „Albanian Protest Broken Up in Yugoslavia‟, New York Times, 30 August 1990; A. D. Horne, „U.S. Protests
to Yugoslavia About Arrest of American‟, Washington Post, 8 September 1990. Immediately following the delegation‟s departure, Serbia arrested and expelled a group from the International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights which had been investigating abuses in Kosovo; Blaine Harden, „Serbia Said to Arrest, Expel Rights Investigators‟, Washington Post, 6 September 1990.
19 „Statement of U.S. Senate Delegation‟. 20 Quoted in Marcus Tanner, „Albanians Strike Over “Repression” by Serbia‟, Independent, 4 September 1990. 21 Dole, „Don‟t Turn Yugoslavia‟. 22 Ibid. 23 Ibid. See also the comments by Senator Frank Lautenberg, Congressional Record, p. S16624, 24 October
1990.
60
and the legislation also imposed restrictions on US support for funding through
international agencies such as the International Monetary Fund.
The Nickles Amendment was the first indication that the US might respond to
continuing human rights abuses with specific penalties rather than vague warnings. Even
so, it was arguably a shortsighted and punitive means of expressing human rights concerns,
and it was certainly at odds with the Bush administration‟s policy of shoring up Yugoslav
unity. The initial version had the advantage of directly rewarding those governments which
were making the best progress on human rights, but the federal government was to be
completely ignored or, worse, held responsible for actions over which it had little if any
control.24 The amendment explicitly proposed to punish the whole of Yugoslavia for
human rights abuses committed by Serbia within Serbia and Kosovo, and imposed blanket
requirements for democracy that completely ignored the warnings of the spring and
summer.
The White House and State Department were opposed to the Nickles Amendment
and the approach to Yugoslavia that it represented. Warren Zimmermann, for example, felt
that punishing the federal Yugoslav government for the sins of the republican
governments was shortsighted and heavy-handed. In his opinion, critics of the
administration‟s approach „did not understand that democratic unity favored [Yugoslav
Prime Minister Ante] Markovic, not Milosevic, who had no interest in unity on a
democratic reformist basis.25 The problem which Zimmermann foresaw, and about which
he warned Washington, was that
no breakup of Yugoslavia could happen peacefully. The ethnic hatred sown by
Milosevic and his ilk and the mixture of ethnic groups in every republic except
Slovenia meant that Yugoslavia‟s shattering would lead to extreme violence,
perhaps even war. Thus we favored at least a loose unity while encouraging
democratic development.26
Rather than being punished, the federal government, which under Markovic was pursuing
extensive free market economic reforms and supported a politically pluralist united
24 As a Hungarian diplomat observed, „the authority Mr Markovic represents does not correspond to the
reality of today‟s Yugoslavia‟; quoted in Richard Bassett, „Yugoslav Troubles Cast Shadow Over Summit‟, The Times, 1 August 1990. See also Zimmermann, Origins, 47, 131; Dempsey, „Belgrade Offers…‟.
25 Zimmermann, „The Last Ambassador‟, 6. 26 Ibid.
61
Yugoslavia, should instead be offered greater support.27 If allowed time to work, the
economic reforms would produce an economic recovery that would lessen inter-ethnic
rivalries, which partly derived from resentments between the richer republics of Slovenia
and Croatia and the rest of the country. Greater prosperity would reduce the appeal of
independence and temper the influence of nationalist demagogues. Zimmermann‟s efforts
„did achieve a high public level of U.S. political support for the embattled prime minister‟,
but did not succeed in securing concrete financial assistance.28 Contrary to the opinion
being expressed in Congress, the administration lamented the fact that „[t]he central
government … is not as strong and authoritative as one might wish‟.29
Meanwhile, Serbian actions in Kosovo, and the US response to them, contributed
to the desire for independence in Slovenia and Croatia. Milan Kucan, the new president of
Slovenia, had as early as 1989 „align[ed] himself and the Slovene cause with Albanian
human rights‟, and „portrayed Serbia as the enemy of Slovene democracy, as witnessed by
its repression of [those] rights.30 Later that same year, he told Zimmermann that Kosovo
was
the worst human rights problem in Europe. It‟s giving all of Yugoslavia a bad
name. How are we going to get into the European Community or the Council of
Europe with this Kosovo albatross around our neck? If we have to go through
Belgrade to join Europe, we‟ll never make it.31
The US administration acknowledged this; speaking about the June-July 1990 crackdown,
Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs Raymond Seitz told a
congressional subcommittee that he „[did] not believe that the action of the Serbian
government … advanced the reconciliation of peoples in Yugoslavia‟.32 But the approach
embodied in the Nickles Amendment did not take this reality into account, and could only
reinforce the idea that the best hope for Slovenia and the Slovenian people, and Croatia,
was to get out of Yugoslavia as quickly and completely as possible. Saadia Touval argues
that the US stance on democratisation and unity prompted the Croats and Slovenes – „who
27 For more on Markovic‟s planned economic reforms, see Judy Dempsey, „Nationalism Versus a Bright
Future‟, Financial Times, 6 July 1990. See also „Hearing … on Developments in Europe‟, Federal News Service, 24 July 1990.
28 Zimmermann, Origins, 51. 29 „Hearing … on Developments in Europe‟ 24 July 1990. 30 Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, 98. 31 Zimmermann, Origins, 31. 32 „Hearing … on Developments in Europe‟, 24 July 1990.
62
considered themselves as democrats‟ – to hope for increased US support.33
Although the Bush administration supported Markovic and wanted to maintain a
unified Yugoslavia, it did not evince any particular interest in the situation. The White
House had literally nothing to say concerning the events of the summer of 1990, including
the crackdown in Kosovo, the worsening human rights situation in Croatia and Serbia, and
the Croatian and Slovenian unilateral declarations of sovereignty. In the four months
between 11 July and 19 November 1990, an eventful period in Yugoslavia, the
administration made no public comment whatsoever concerning Yugoslavia.34 US
policymakers paid virtually no attention to Yugoslavia between late 1990 and mid-1991, in
spite of the fact that even the Deputy Secretary of State had long since recognised that „the
more difficult the economic situation becomes, the more difficult the nationality issues‟.35
Eagleburger‟s trip to Yugoslavia in February 1990 was the last direct high-level State
Department involvement until Secretary of State Baker‟s futile last minute attempt to avert
disaster in June 1991. In part, this was due to the simple fact that the United States was
preoccupied elsewhere, in particular the first Gulf War; the last thing the White House
wanted was to divert attention and resources to the Balkans. Insofar as Washington did
focus on Europe, the end of the Cold War and events in the Soviet Union and its satellites
received the lion‟s share of its attention.36 It was symptomatic of the lack of interest in the
White House that President Bush needed to be repeatedly reminded who were the players
and what were the issues in Yugoslavia.37 But this focus on the bigger picture, and on Iraq,
does not suffice to explain the administration‟s lack of interest in Yugoslavia.
More important were the beliefs that Yugoslavia was neither America‟s problem nor
an issue with any political traction. The former attitude was famously expressed in James
Baker‟s assertion that „[w]e don‟t have a dog in that fight‟, and underlay US action (or
inaction) throughout this period.38 Baker refused a suggestion from his own State
33 Touval, Mediation, 25. 34 Even the mentions on those dates were peripheral at best; the 11 July reference was merely the offhand
inclusion of Yugoslavia in the G-7 Houston Economic Summit Economic Declaration, and that of 19 November was an oblique reference by Bush to the „the ugly resurgence of … ethnic, racial, and religious intolerance‟ in unnamed countries in his remarks to the Paris CSCE meeting. See George H. W. Bush, „Houston Economic Summit Economic Declaration‟, 11 July 1990. TAPP, www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=18668 (accessed 9 October 2006); George H. W. Bush, „Remarks to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe in Paris, France‟, 19 November 1990. TAPP www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=19074 (accessed 9 October 2006).
35 „Remarks of Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger on Political and Economic Developments in Eastern Europe, to the U.S. Chamber of Commerce‟, Federal News Service, 16 February 1990.
36 David Halberstam, War in a Time of Peace: Bush, Clinton, and the Generals (New York: Scribner, 2001), 32-4; Halverson, „American Perspectives‟, 6-7.
37 Ibid., 44. See also Touval, Mediation, 23. 38 Ibid., 46.
63
Department that the US send an observer to the European-led talks in mid-1991 on the
grounds that it might be taken as a signal of American willingness to get more involved.39
According to David Gompert, the administration made a very deliberate decision made
that the US had no vital interests in Yugoslavia and should not get involved.40 As for the
political aspects, Zimmermann, who did favour greater US involvement, was bluntly told
by a State Department official in Europe „that Yugoslavia had become a tar baby in
Washington. Nobody wanted to touch it. With the American presidential election just a
year away, it was seen as a loser‟.41
The administration‟s response to the Nickles Amendment reflected this lack of
interest. During the six month grace period following the passage of the legislation, the US
government exerted no real effort to secure improvements in Yugoslav human rights
standards. The ban on American aid accordingly went into effect on 5 May 1991. Secretary
of State Baker made no public comment at this time; the State Department‟s official
position was simply that „[n]o actions that would be prohibited under the legislation will be
taken‟.42 An anonymous administration official opined on 19 May that „[t]his marks a big
turning point in our relations with Yugoslavia. It really does change our policy‟.43
Only three days later, President Bush „informed the Government of Yugoslavia
that he would consider lifting suspension of all United States economic assistance‟,
personally telephoning Markovic to assure him that American support for his economic
reforms and for Yugoslav unity remained secure.44 On 23 May, Baker testified before the
Senate Foreign Operations Subcommittee that, in his opinion, the Nickles Amendment
is aimed at the wrong target and it is hurting the very people that are interested in
promoting free market economic reform and in promoting democracy…. [I]n an
effort to correct a tragic situation and to right a wrong, we are running a serious
risk of injuring the wrong party.45
He declined to promise to enforce the ban imposed by the legislation. And on 25 May,
39 Holbrooke, To End a War, 29. The peace talks are discussed further below. 40 David C. Gompert, „The United States and Yugoslavia‟s Wars‟, in The World and Yugoslavia‟s Wars, 140. 41 Zimmermann, „The Last Ambassador‟, 15. See also Halberstam, War in a Time of Peace, 32. 42 David Binder, „U.S., Citing Human Rights, Halts Economic Aid to Yugoslavia‟, New York Times, 19 May
1991. 43 Both quoted in ibid. 44 A White House spokesman, quoted in David Binder, „Bush Tells Belgrade That U.S. May Consider
Restoring Aid‟, New York Times, 22 May 1991. 45 „Hearing of the Foreign Operations Subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee‟, Federal
News Service, 23 May 1991.
64
American aid to Yugoslavia resumed, though the announcement was accompanied by mild
criticism of human rights violations in both Serbia and Croatia.46 While significant for the
light it shed on the Bush administration‟s policy and the message it sent to the Yugoslav
leaders, the failure to uphold the aid ban was of little practical significance. As State
Department spokeswoman Margaret Tutwiler pointed out, by late June some seventy
percent of the $5 million aid package had already been disbursed.47
On 21 June 1991, in a last-ditch effort to avert unilateral declarations of
independence by Croatia and Slovenia, Baker made a one-day visit to Belgrade, during
which he warned his hosts that „[n]either the U.S. nor any other country will recognize
unilateral secession‟.48 In a more conciliatory tone, he reiterated American willingness to
„help in whatever way we can in assisting Yugoslavia to democratize, to maintain respect for
human rights and to preserve the unity of Yugoslavia‟.49 This stance, however laudable for
its expressed goals, differed hardly at all from the administration‟s position of a year before,
and utterly failed to come to grips with the developments in Yugoslavia in the meantime.
While the administration kept insisting that democracy and respect for human rights within
a united Yugoslavia were the best foundations for a prosperous future, it either did not
know or did not care that none of the key players within Yugoslavia had the same
priorities. As political scientist Lenard Cohen puts it, „American policy ignored the
possibility that the preservation of the Yugoslav federation might no longer be tenable, and
that emphasis should be placed on ensuring its peaceful breakup or reconfiguration into a
confederation‟.50
European governments were much more cognizant of the real state of affairs in
Yugoslavia and were crafting their policies accordingly. This was not the result of different
attitudes towards the desirability of Yugoslavia‟s survival; they were initially as dedicated as
the Bush administration to that end, and continued to support this position publicly well
into 1991. In February of that year, for instance, the EC called for a „peaceful and
democratic solution to the Yugoslav crisis which respects human rights and fundamental
liberties‟ while reiterating its preference for the maintenance of the „unity and territorial
46 David Binder, „U.S. Resumes Aid It Suspended to Yugoslavia‟, New York Times, 25 May 1991. 47 „State Department Regular Briefing‟, Federal News Service, 25 June 1991. Saadia Touval offers a somewhat
different interpretation, arguing that the administration „reversed its position‟ on the sanctions based on a recognition of their „uselessness … against a federal government that was rapidly losing its capacity to act‟; Mediation, 26.
48 Baker, Politics of Diplomacy, 482. 49 Mary Curtius, „Baker Urges Yugoslavia to Remain United‟, Boston Globe, 22 June 1991. 50 Cohen, Broken Bonds, 216.
65
integrity of Yugoslavia‟.51 Hans-Dietrich Genscher points out that the EC „publicly
endorsed a democratically united Yugoslavia‟ on 9 May and „called for restitution of the
nation‟s constitutional rule‟ in the following month.52 At the end of May, EC
representatives Jacques Santer and Jacques Delors traveled to Belgrade to hint at economic
benefits that might be obtained if the country remained united. They offered support for
financing from international financial institutions, direct EC financial support to the value
of several billion dollars, and the immediate commencement of talks on associate
membership in the EC for Yugoslavia.53
Western European reasons for supporting Yugoslavia‟s unity were much more
concrete, and much less oriented towards human rights issues, than those of the United
States. Europe was much more heavily involved economically in Yugoslavia than was the
US. According to one State Department source, this fact was central to the US decision to
„[turn] over principal responsibility with respect to Yugoslavia to the European
Community‟.54 This was the justification used by Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of
State Ralph Johnson in a statement in late October 1991; when asked „[w]hy are we
supporting the EC‟s efforts, rather than taking the lead ourselves‟, Johnson referred to the
much greater scale of Europe‟s „trade and investment ties with Yugoslavia‟, which were
„vital to Yugoslavia‟s economy‟.55 The greater economic importance of Yugoslavia to the
EC was reflected in the much greater amount of aid being offered by Brussels. In
comparison to the $5 million of annual US aid, the EC committed itself in April 1991 to
provide approximately 800 million ecus in aid and support to Yugoslavia between 1991 and
1996.56 There was also an economic aspect to concerns that unrest and civil disturbance in
Yugoslavia would generate huge numbers of economic migrants – and actual refugees, if it
came to outright fighting – seeking entry into EC states. This issue had little relevance for
the United States, but according to Francesco Privitera, as early as 1989 and 1990, „the main
preoccupation of Western cabinets was how to face expected mass migration from the
51 Author‟s translation („les Douze ont appelé les autorités yougoslaves à rechercher "une solution pacifique
et démocratique à la crise yougoslave dans le respect des droits de l‟homme et des libertés fondamentales". Ils réaffirment en outre leur attachement au maintien de "de l‟unité et à l‟intégrité territoriale de la Yougoslavie".‟); „Les Douze Lancent Un Appel Pour Une Solution Pacifique à La Crise Yougoslave‟, European Information Service, 9 February 1991.
52 Genscher, Rebuilding, 491. 53 Cohen, Broken Bonds, 216. 54 Korey, NGOs, 402. 55 „US Efforts to Promote a Peaceful Settlement in Yugoslavia - Statement by Principal Deputy Assistant
Secretary of State Ralph Johnson‟, Dispatch, Vol. 2, No. 42, 21 October 1991. Johnson pointed out that „exports account for 30% of Yugoslavia‟s GDP [but] the US accounts for only about 5% of Yugoslav trade…. Europe accounts for nearly 80% of Yugoslav trade, about half of which goes to the EC‟.
56 „Paraphe du Troisième Protocole Financier‟, European Information Service, 6 April 1991.
66
East‟.57 This was a particular concern for Germany, with its already large numbers of
Yugoslav “guest-workers”, but it was felt in other states as well.58 Even before the start of
any serious fighting, in the first half of 1991, the number of Yugoslav asylum seekers in
Germany rose by 35%, to 15000 people.59
As serious as these economic issues were, European governments feared the
political consequences of a disintegrating Yugoslavia as much or more. Commentators
were already saying in July 1990 that war in the Balkans „could endanger detente and the
democratic processes going on throughout Europe‟.60 Concern was particularly acute in
those states that directly bordered Yugoslavia. The Italian foreign minister warned in
August 1990 that „[i]f Belgrade is not able to manage its nationalist difficulties, then a crisis
could result which will gravely affect the European structure which is now unfolding‟, and
when Austria called for CSCE intervention, in June 1991, it was based on fears that events
in Yugoslavia „threaten[ed] European stability‟.61 The French concurred; François
Mitterrand had been concerned with the potential for European instability of the
disintegration of Yugoslavia, and particularly of the precedent it might set for the Soviet
Union, since 1989.62 This was, it should be noted, in stark contrast to the view in
Washington, where Lawrence Eagleburger insisted that, while the situation „certainly is a
threat to the stability and well-being of the peoples of Yugoslavia‟, it „is no longer the kind
of threat to European stability that it used to be‟.63
Yet despite all of this, European dedication to a united, democratic Yugoslavia was
actually weakening by the summer of 1991.64 The EC did indeed „publicly endorse‟ this
57 Privitera, „Relationship Between the Dismemberment‟, 41. 58 Richard H. Ullman, „Introduction: The Wars in Yugoslavia and the International System after the Cold
War‟, in The World and Yugoslavia‟s Wars, Richard H. Ullman, ed. (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1996), 18. Refugees are, of course, a human rights issue in themselves, so in this sense human rights were already playing a significant part in European policymaking in a way which they had not for the US. Even so, the main concerns of European governments concerning refugees appear to have been social and economic in nature.
59 Anna Tomforde, „Expulsion of Asylum-Seekers Shows Tough Line by Bonn‟, Guardian, 4 July 1991. 60 John Keane, „Letter: Dangers of Civil War in Kosovo‟, Independent, 25 July 1990. 61 Quoted in Bassett, „Yugoslav Troubles…‟; Michael Wise and Sarah Helm, „Yugoslavia: First Test for New
Europe‟, Independent, 28 June 1991. 62 Lepick, „French Perspectives‟, 77-8; Julius W. Friend, The Long Presidency: France in the Mitterrand Years, 1981-
1995 (Boulder: Westview Press, 1998), 223. 63 Quoted in „Eurogroup/Atlantic Council Washington Seminar: New Security Challenges and the Future
Role of the Alliance‟, Federal News Service, 25 June 1991. In a narrow sense, Eagleburger was correct, in that the collapse of Yugoslavia no longer invited the kind of Soviet adventurism which had previously been a concern. But the context and tenor of his remarks indicates that he did not see the Yugoslav situation as an overall threat to European stability and security. The US was, however, concerned about the precedent Yugoslavia might set for the USSR; see Almond, Europe‟s Backyard War, 44-5.
64 It is important to recognise that there were differences between the various European states; one can no more speak of “Europe” as a single unit than one can of “the West”. The evidence indicates that one major factor in the decision to support independence for the Yugoslav republics was bound up with either physical proximity (Italy, Austria, Hungary) or consciousness of potentially severe refugee issues
67
position in May and June, as Genscher claimed, but in private that consensus had already
begun to break down. The change in attitude emerged from a reevaluation of the likely
outcomes in Yugoslavia, not a change in actual preference, which, in turn, derived directly
from the much greater geopolitical and economic exposure of Europe to Yugoslavia. To
most American policymakers, Yugoslavia was a distant and distinctly second-rate concern
that was subsumed in the larger picture of post-Cold War developments. For the
Europeans, Yugoslavia was a local and regional issue which demanded attention out of
sheer self-interest; as the (Spanish) president of the European Parliament said, the
„madness … is cropping up on our frontiers; we are talking about a neighbour which has its
borders on our community‟.65 The EC aid mentioned above was earmarked specifically for
improving the road and rail infrastructure in Yugoslavia that connected central Europe and
Greece – in a sense, internal EC infrastructure.66 Europe – or more specifically, the
European Community – almost literally enveloped Yugoslavia.
The European assessment, based on much closer involvement and observation, was
that the dissolution of Yugoslavia could not be prevented. Human rights benefits or
problems were irrelevant in this calculation. Ironically, the CIA had reached the same
conclusion, and predicted in October 1990 that „Yugoslavia will cease to function as a
federal state within one year, and will probably dissolve within two…. There is little that
the United States and its European allies can do to preserve Yugoslav unity‟.67 But while
this unpalatable conclusion was largely ignored by the Bush administration, the Europeans
were more realistic. As early as September 1990, one anonymous diplomat admitted that „if
[the Yugoslav leaders] do not care about what the world says, forget about Yugoslavia,
because they‟ll destroy it‟.68
The watershed came with the Croatian and Slovenian declarations of independence
on 25 June 1991. As fighting broke out between the JNA and republican forces, it was no
longer possible to pretend that a federal Yugoslavia still existed on any practical level. By
early July, Germany and Austria were openly supporting Croatian and Slovenian
which would probably accompany the outbreak of violence (the same states plus, notably, Germany). Those European states which were further away and which, furthermore, had historic ties to Serbia, particularly Britain and France, were allegedly much less willing to entertain the possibility of republican independence. As the dominant republic in the current federation, Serbia of course stood to lose the most if it fell apart. Nevertheless, the overall trend was clear. See also Touval, Mediation, 31-3.
65 David Israelson, „European Envoys Seek to Mediate in Conflict‟, Toronto Star, 29 June 1991. 66 David Gardner and Laura Silber, „Brussels‟ Warning to Yugoslavs on Aid‟, Financial Times, 21 May 1991. 67 Central Intelligence Agency, Yugoslavia Transformed , NIE 15-90, October 1990, iii. Available from
www.foia.cia.gov (accessed 24 August 2009). 68 Patricia Clough, „Freedom‟s Darkened Dawn‟, Independent, 10 September 1990.
68
independence, though they were not yet advocating official recognition.69 Italy and
Denmark had also moved in this direction, as had Hungary, in actions if not in words.70
European public support for a unified Yugoslavia diminished as the violence increased, and
polls indicated that „for most Europeans, democracy and the recognition of the right to
self-determination in the Balkans were of paramount importance‟.71 Two months later,
while there was some European willingness to send a buffer force to keep the peace in
Yugoslavia, British officials were admitting openly that „we can‟t impose peace by military
force‟.72 In sharp contrast to the American position, European governments were
beginning to focus on ways to manage rather than prevent the dissolution of Yugoslavia,
although as the next section shows, there was a broad range of opinion concerning the best
way to do so.
III. Human Rights and Managing Yugoslav Dissolution
One cannot save a federation by force. We are no longer in the times when empires divided the Balkans. It
therefore requires mutual consent. That supposes a dialogue to lead to a contract.
- François Mitterrand 73
Neither the US nor the European response showed any particular concern with
human rights. Washington once again insisted that „[t]he United States continues to
recognize and support the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia‟, and that it still advocated a
peaceful resolution to the situation, but US involvement was to be limited to support of
European initiatives.74 The Bush administration refused to officially specify what it would
consider to be a satisfactory outcome, but an anonymous official claimed on 2 July that the
US would support „even full independence – provided it‟s done peacefully‟, while denying
that this represented a change in US policy.75 In the meantime, Bush deferred to the
Europeans: „It‟s essentially a European matter, and they‟re coping … quite well‟.76
69 David Binder, „Some Western Nations Split Off on Yugoslavia‟, New York Times, 3 July 1991. 70 Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, 159-60; Conversi, German-bashing, 20. 71 Conversi, German-bashing, 21-2. 72 Sarah Helm and Marcus Tanner, „EC Troops Set for Role in Yugoslavia‟, Independent, 3 August 1991;
David Gardner and Laura Silber, „France Seeks Yugoslav Force‟, Financial Times, 6 August 1991. 73 Author‟s translation, François Mitterrand, 23 July 1991 („On ne peut pas sauver une fédération par la
force. Nous n‟en sommes plus au temps où les empires se partageaient les Balkans. Il faut donc un consentement mutuel. Cela suppose un dialogue pour aboutir à un contrat.); François Mitterrand, Mitterrand en Toutes Lettres, Edith Boccara, ed. (Paris: Belfond, 1995), 403.
74 „White House Regular Briefing‟, Federal News Service, 26 June 1991. 75 Carol Giacomo, „U.S. Voices Support for Rebel Republics‟, Toronto Star, 2 July 1991. 76 George H. W. Bush, „Remarks on the London Economic Summit and an Exchange with Foreign
Journalists‟, 8 July 1991. TAPP, www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=19756 (accessed 7 September 2006).
69
The EC response Bush found so satisfactory was focused on political and military
concerns, with only peripheral engagement with human rights issues. It consisted primarily
of the dispatch of the EC “troika” to Yugoslavia to try to negotiate a ceasefire and, more
broadly, to defuse tensions.77 This was the occasion of Luxembourg foreign minister
Jacques Poos‟ famous declaration that „this is the hour of Europe, not the hour of the
Americans‟, which marked the decisive shift of leadership on Yugoslavia from the US to
Europe.78 After an initial failure, the troika succeeded in negotiating the Brioni Accords in
early July. These secured a ceasefire in Slovenia, a three-month moratorium on further
independence-related actions by Croatia and Slovenia, and a withdrawal of federal
Yugoslav troops from the latter republic. An EC observer mission, acting on behalf of the
CSCE, was subsequently dispatched to Slovenia to monitor the ceasefire. The Brioni
Accords had no explicit human rights content, and did not address the issue of human
rights violations by any of the governments involved.79 But while the immediate fighting
could be dealt with in this way, a more permanent resolution was unavoidably bound up
with one of the most basic of human rights, that of self-determination.
Self-determination is a foundational principle of international human rights law.
Article 1 of both the ICCPR and the ICESCR states that „All peoples have the right of self-
determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely
pursue their economic, social and cultural development‟. Section VIII of the Helsinki Final
Act declares that „[t]he participating States will respect the equal rights of peoples and their
right to self-determination … [b]y virtue of [which] all peoples always have the right, in full
freedom, to determine, when and as they wish, their internal and external political status‟.80
However, as many observers have pointed out in reference to Yugoslavia, the exact
relationship between human rights and self-determination was, and still is, a contested
issue.81 The dilemma for the EC, confronted with the „fatal indeterminacy of the principle
77 This mission consisted of the foreign ministers of the current, previous, and subsequent holders of the
EC presidency, which in this case were Luxembourg, Italy, and Holland. 78 Annika Savill, Donald Macintyre, and Andrew Marshall, „EC Dispatches Peace Mission to Belgrade‟,
Independent, 29 June 1991. 79 Genscher summarises the Brioni Accords as follows: „1. Yugoslavia‟s People‟s Army will retreat to its
barracks. There will be a cease-fire. 2. Implementation of Slovenia‟s and Croatia‟s declarations of independence will be suspended for three months. 3. As planned, the Croatian Mesic will assume the leadership of the Collective Presidency. 4. No later than August 1, 1991, negotiations on the future of Yugoslavia‟s domestic affairs will resume‟; Rebuilding, 497.
80 Helsinki Final Act (1975), section VIII. Available from www.osce.org/documents/mcs/1975/08/4044_en.pdf (accessed 24 August 2009). 81 For some of the differing perspectives on the relationship between self-determination and human rights,
see Milton David Fisher, Self-Determination and Human Rights, Occasional Paper No. 16 (Indian Ocean Centre for Peace Studies, June 1992), 1; Institute for European Studies, Inter-Ethnic Conflict, 34-5; Frederic L. Kirgis Jr., „The Degrees of Self-Determination in the United Nations Era‟, American Journal of International
70
of self-determination‟, was to determine how that principle applied in the Yugoslav
context.82
One area in which there was no disagreement concerned the use of force by any of
the Yugoslav parties: this was unanimously held to be totally illegitimate and unacceptable.
Hans-Dietrich Genscher told the Yugoslav foreign minister on 25 June that while
disagreement was possible concerning independence, „military intervention was not
permissible on any account‟.83 Citing the Helsinki Final Act and the Paris Charter, he
insisted that „the use of force to resolve political issues was not acceptable. The
renunciation of force … was a basic element of peace in Europe.84 Gianni de Michelis
echoed Genscher‟s position, telling Loncar to urge Belgrade to avoid using military force.85
In early July Douglas Hurd expressed the British government‟s conviction „that the use of
force would bring disaster on Yugoslavia‟ and called for „restraint‟ from the armed forces
because „Yugoslavia‟s problems cannot be resolved by force, and further military action will
lead inevitably to widespread bloodshed‟.86 The next month, Mitterrand declared that „[o]ne
cannot save a federation by force … mutual consent is needed‟.87
Beyond the prohibition on violence, there was little agreement concerning self-
determination. The European response was being driven by Germany at this point, largely
because it was the only major state with its own clearly defined policy.88 The concept of
self-determination had great currency and popular resonance in that country because, as
David Halberstam put it, „Germany itself was now being reconstituted and becoming
whole ... why should not the same thing happen for these smaller friendly nations?...
Croatia and Slovenia were seen as legitimate countries that had a right to long-awaited
independence‟.89 It was therefore not surprising that Germany became the first major
Law 88, No. 2 (1994), 306-7; Korey, Promises, 369; Robert McCorquodale, „Self-Determination: A Human Rights Approach‟, International and Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol. 43 (1994), 857-885; Daniel Philpott, „In Defense of Self-Determination‟, Ethics 105, No. 2 (1995), 352-3; Jean E. Manas, „The Impossible Trade-off: “Peace” versus “Justice” in Settling Yugoslavia‟s Wars‟, in The World and Yugoslavia‟s Wars, Richard H. Ullman, ed. (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1996), 42-58. See also Budding, „Nation/State/People‟; Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, 163-4.
82 Stanley Hoffmann, „Yugoslavia: Implications for Europe and for European Institutions‟, in The World and Yugoslavia‟s Wars, 104. Another commentator, Ivan Vejvoda, describes the „explosive potential of its [self-determination] vagueness of definition … within the crumbling, complex Yugoslav institutional construction; „Serbian Perspectives, 101.
83 Genscher, Rebuilding, 494. 84 Ibid. 85 Ibid. 86 Hansard, 3 July 1991, c. 328. 87 Author‟s translation („On ne peut pas sauver une fédération par la force‟); Mitterrand, En Toutes Lettres,
399. There was, as Touval notes, an inherent contradictions in Western policies that combined apparent support for unity „hedged by warnings against enforcing it‟; Mediation, 22, 25-6.
88 Korey, NGOs, 402. 89 Halberstam, War in a Time of Peace, 89. See also Conversi, German-bashing, 40.
71
European state to express support for Croatian and Slovenian independence. When it did
so, along with Austria, it made its case in terms of human rights, urging the acceptance of
„the right of self-determination in Slovenia and Croatia‟ as being consonant with the
language of the Helsinki Final Act of 1975.90
The German government‟s position was not solely based on popular enthusiasm
for self-determination. In a near-reversal of the position taken by Robert Hayden and the
Bush administration, Germany argued that splitting up Yugoslavia would actually lead to a
reduction in the level of violence and human rights abuses in the region. Genscher
explained this position at the EC General Council on 25 June 1991: „[i]f negotiations were
blocked and warfare continued, it would be necessary to investigate whether, as a last
political resort to end the bloodshed and the expulsions, it might be advisable to
internationalize the conflict by recognizing both republics‟.91 What this meant was that
what was now unequivocally a multi-sided intra-Yugoslav civil war would, in terms of
international law, become one or more international wars between independent sovereign
states. Such a development would not necessarily have any effect on the fighting, but it
would put the United Nations and the international community on much firmer legal
ground for involvement, since the argument could no longer be made that the conflict was
an internal affair of a sovereign state.92 What was missing, however, was some plausible
explanation of the mechanism by which internationalisation would stop the growing
violence. The Germans contended that recognition would demonstrate that the
international community supported and would protect Croatia and Slovenia, which would
thus encourage Serbia to cease its aggression and so end the war.93 Immo Stabreit,
Germany‟s Ambassador to the US, later asserted in defence of Germany‟s policy that
„recognition of Slovenia and Croatia robbed Milosevic of the “save Yugoslavia” rhetoric
that he [had] been using, not without success, to disguise the true meaning of his “Greater
Serbia” strategy‟.94 But the expectation that merely redefining Croatia as an independent
state would somehow deter the Milosevic government from its course was unrealistic in the
extreme.95
90 Binder, „Some Western Nations…‟. For more on the status of self-determination in the Helsinki Accords,
see Korey, Promises, 369-70. 91 Genscher, Rebuilding, 500. 92 See, inter alia, Ahrens, Diplomacy, 136. 93 Genscher, Rebuilding, 500, 514; see also Marc Weller, „The International Response to the Dissolution of
the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,‟ American Journal of International Law, Vol. 86, No. 3 (July, 1992), 587.
94 Quoted in Conversi, German-bashing, 42-3. 95 Philip H. Gordon, France, Germany, and the Western Alliance (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995), 56. It is true
that by early 1992 the fighting in Croatia had largely ceased, but while this coincided with the recognition
72
Without a plausible threat to follow up diplomatic support with real action, the
German policy had no realistic chance of success, and it was clear to all concerned that
Western concern about the growing violence did not translate into a willingness to employ
force to stop it.96 According to Jim Baker, „[t]here was never any thought at that time of
using U.S. ground troops in Yugoslavia‟, a lack of interest which he claimed was due to the
fact that „the American people would never have supported it‟.97 In the US military, only
one of the six members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff favoured action, and JCS chair Colin
Powell reinforced the administration‟s reluctance by providing deliberately inflated
estimates of the troop requirements for any serious intervention.98 The European stance
was similar. In the case of Germany, historical and constitutional issues meant that it could
not offer its own forces for use in Yugoslavia, a fact that caused some resentment amongst
its European partners.99 Britain was adamantly opposed to any use of military forces in
Yugoslavia; the most that Hurd would concede in early July was that „European observers
from the Community or the [Western European Union] … if there were a ceasefire …
could help in observing and thus to maintain it‟.100
As the situation worsened and the fighting spread to Croatia, some governments
did begin to reconsider the feasibility and acceptability of more forceful action. As one
journalist wrote at the time, „[European] Community leaders … know that they cannot sit
back and watch as Yugoslavia dissolves into a bloodbath.... They know that the point when
action has to be taken – whatever the diplomatic rules – is coming closer‟.101 The French
government was the first to break ranks, and began to press its European partners to
consider dispatching an „interposition force‟ to Yugoslavia.102 Britain, however, still refused
to consider any military involvement in Yugoslavia, arguing that „[t]here is no peace to keep.
of Croatia‟s independence, it was not a result of that recognition. The durable ceasefire in Croatia was due to the mutual desire of both the Serbs and the Croats for the deployment of UN peacekeeping mission by late 1991, not the formal redefinition of the conflict from internal to international; see the discussion on recognition below. The ceasefire did not end the war in Croatia, however, but only froze it in place. When circumstances changed in 1995, the Croatian government retook the separatist regions in a renewed military campaign that created some of the largest refugee flows of the wars.
96 It was also the case that, having denied the validity of a resort to arms for any of the parties within Yugoslavia, the Western powers had painted themselves into a corner concerning their own potential use of force. On what grounds would the deployment of foreign troops, whether to defend the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia or to support republican claims to independence, have more legitimacy than the use of domestic troops? As Genscher himself said to Loncar, „[o]ne of the established elements of European postwar policy was that the use of force to resolve political issues was not acceptable‟; Rebuilding, 494.
97 Baker, Politics of Diplomacy, 635-6. 98 Halberstam, War in a Time of Peace, 39-40, 36, 57. 99 Lawrence Freedman, „A Bloody Lesson in Human Rights‟, Independent, 12 September 1991. 100 Hansard, 3 July 1991, c. 328. 101 Sarah Helm, „Yugoslavia‟s Divisions Expose Conflict and Confusion Within the EC‟, Independent, 6 August
1991. 102 French Foreign Minister Roland Dumas, quoted in Gardner and Silber, „France Seeks Yugoslav Force‟.
73
It would mean sending in a force to hold the parties apart. Public opinion isn‟t ready for it
yet. It is too drastic‟.103 The move by France, followed by most other major EC states,
towards at least consideration of more forceful intervention represented another step in
the progression of European policy away from attempts to prop up a federal Yugoslavia
and towards acquiescence to its dissolution.104
It is doubtful, however, whether the talk of military intervention was more than
public posturing.105 The use of WEU forces would have required both an invitation to
intervene from the relevant parties in Yugoslavia, and unanimous agreement within the
WEU and the EC to do so, but neither of these circumstances applied.106 The French
effort has been dismissed as „an empty gesture‟ since Britain would not, and Germany
could not, participate with their own forces.107 The same skepticism applied to the French
calls, starting in August, for Security Council action, which would have required American
participation. Whether the French honestly hoped or expected to convince their allies or
not, there was never, at this stage, any serious chance of putting European troops on
Yugoslav soil.
The Europeans thus had limited influence in determining the borders of the new
states. The simplest solution was simply to convert the existing internal republican borders
into international borders, and this was the course favoured by the EC governments;
Gianni de Michelis, for example, „categorically rejected a change of Yugoslavia‟s internal
borders‟.108 This was not the first approach considered by the EC. A Dutch proposal of
July 1991 argued that the mix of ethnicities in most republics and the unlikelihood that
Yugoslavia could either survive or „peacefully dissolve into six independent republics within
their present borders … point[ed] in the direction of a voluntary redrawing of internal
borders as a possible solution‟.109 This would be done „in accordance with international law,
by peaceful means and by agreement‟, with the participation of „all republics and the
federal government‟.110 According to Saadia Touval, this was rejected, not on legal grounds,
103 A Foreign Office source, quoted in ibid. In fact, it appears that there was much more public support for
intervention than was claimed by governments at the time; see Richard Sobel, „U.S. and European Attitudes Toward Intervention in the Former Yugoslavia: Mourir Pour La Bosnie?‟, in The World and Yugoslavia‟s Wars, 145-81.
104 Hodge, Britain and the Balkans, 9. 105 See below, Chapter 4, for a discussion of the question of military intervention in both Croatia and Bosnia. 106 Hoffmann, „Yugoslavia: Implications...‟, 108. 107 Friend, The Long Presidency, 223. 108 Genscher, Rebuilding, 497. 109 Quoted in Owen, Balkan Odyssey, 32. See also Touval, Mediation, 70-1; Mikulas Fabry, „Territorial Integrity
and the Balkan Wars‟, in Jeffrey S. Morton, R. Craig Nation, Paul Forage, and Stefano Bianchi (eds), Reflections on the Balkan Wars: Ten Years After the Break Up of Yugoslavia (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2004), 138-9.
110 Quoted in Owen, Balkan Odyssey, 32.
74
but because it „would open a Pandora‟s Box, and that the idea was impractical in view of
the large number of ethnic pockets in the different republics‟.111 Endorsing the internal
borders as international borders „was deemed the least conducive to endless trouble and
fragmentation in disintegrating empires‟.112 The French, for instance, contended that „the
Helsinki principles did not apply to internal borders, and that the question of whether the
internal boundaries might acquire the same status as international boundaries must be
decided by means of an appropriate legal mechanism‟.113 Discussing the matter in 1994,
François Mitterrand still questioned the process by which „internal administrative borders
of a State‟ became „automatically international borders‟.114 Ultimately, this question was
referred to the Badinter Commission for consideration.115 It was never in question whether
or not it was legal to change international borders by force; as noted above, it unequivocally
was not. The issue was whether or not the international community was automatically
bound to recognise the existing internal republican borders, without change, as
international borders.
It was in an effort to dissuade the different parties from using violence to claim
territory that the EC collectively stated on 27 August that it and its members „would never
accept a policy of faits accomplis, since they were determined to refuse recognition to border
changes brought about by force‟.116 According to Genscher, „acknowledging the
inviolability of borders was of preeminent importance‟.117 The problem with this approach
was that it neither dealt with the claims to independence of the various ethnic minorities
nor made any provision to guarantee or protect their human rights. Absent any willingness
on the part of the Europeans or the US to deploy troops to Yugoslavia, what could be
done to alleviate these problems and concerns? The European response marked the
prominent reappearance of explicit, “traditional” human rights concerns in Western
policymaking. Their solution was to tie the legitimacy of the would-be independent states
to binding human rights commitments taken to protect their minorities, which it was hoped
would ease the concerns of those minorities and thus leave them more willing to accept the
111 Touval, Mediation, 71. 112 Hoffmann, „Yugoslavia‟, 104. He further notes that even „an observer who is generally very critical of the
EC [John Zametica] [concedes that] “a shift torwards endorsing the principle of s-d [for peoples] would have opened up a Pandora‟s box throughout Y and incidentally implied that the EC was condoning the use of force”„.
113 Touval, Mediation, 68. 114 Author‟s translation, interview with Le Figaro, 9 September 1994 („Pourquoi les frontières administratives
intérieures d‟un Etat devaient-elles devenir automatiquement des frontières internationales?‟); Mitterrand, En Toutes Lettres, 406.
115 Touval, Mediation, 77. This is discussed further below in the section on recognition. 116 Genscher, Rebuilding, 501. 117 Ibid., 508.
75
status quo regarding borders. As Genscher described it, „without a guarantee of rights for
minorities, a change of borders could hardly be avoided‟.118 The connection between
human rights and international support and recognition was to become more explicit in the
ensuing months.119
The more activist approach with regard to human rights standards in Yugoslavia
was bolstered by developments at the concurrent CSCE Conference on the Human
Dimension, held in Moscow from early September to early October 1991. While not
specifically about Yugoslavia, the outcome of the conference clarified the place of human
rights within the CSCE in general and in relation to Yugoslavia in particular. Up to this
point, the CSCE had served largely as a talking shop for expressing international concerns
and had played little direct role in the Yugoslav crisis. The principle of unanimity on which
the organisation operated prevented it from any serious involvement, since the agreement
of the Yugoslav government itself would have been required. Even as the Moscow
conference began, CSCE delegates at a meeting on Yugoslavia being held in Prague
conceded that there was little they could to help resolve the crisis, and ended with nothing
more than calls for the CSCE to follow the lead of the EC.120
Western leaders did not see the CSCE as being very useful or applicable to the
Yugoslav crisis. Genscher, as then-chairman of the organisation, insisted that European
action be „incorporated in CSCE‟, but not on the basis of its human rights or political
competencies; it was only „to prevent the belief that the European Community was acting
without including the Soviet Union or any other European nation‟.121 The need for
inclusiveness was an important diplomatic consideration, but it had nothing to do with the
CSCE being particularly suited to the current challenges. The US Ambassador to the
CSCE, Max Kampelman, underlined its inadequacies when he mused that its most useful
role might be as an invited outside mediator which could „give [the Yugoslavs] a little help‟
in bridging their differences, hardly an encouraging perspective.122 The British were
similarly pessimistic; Douglas Hurd had stated in Parliament on 3 July that he did „not
know what further can be achieved under the CSCE machinery, which is why we are not
118 Ibid., 497-8. 119 In an attempt to apply pressure without the threat of military intervention, the EC also employed an arms
embargo and economic sanctions on the various parts of Yugoslavia; these are discussed in more detail, along with their application to the Bosnian conflict, in Chapter 5.
120 Marc Champion, „Armies Meet on the Highway of Brotherhood‟, Independent, 5 September 1991. See also Almond, Europe‟s Backyard War, 54-6, 242.
121 Genscher, Rebuilding, 498. 122 „USIA Foreign Press Center Briefing on Minority Rights and the US Position at the CSCE Meeting‟,
Federal News Service, 26 June 1991.
76
relying exclusively on it‟.123
The CSCE did have some human rights competencies and attempted to adapt them
to deal with the Yugoslav crisis, but the legitimacy of the CSCE‟s mandate to address
human rights was questionable.124 The establishment of the Committee of Senior Officials
(CSO) in late 1990 was the most notable of the moves towards institutionalising CSCE
processes. In June 1991, the procedures were set for the calling of emergency meetings of
the CSO by member states. These procedures were almost immediately invoked, and the
CSO met to consider the situation in Slovenia on 3-4 July 1991, and that in Croatia a
month later, on 8-9 August. In both cases, the Committee condemned the use of violence,
called for a cease-fire, and offered the services of the CSCE as mediator.125 But the CSCE
lacked the capacity to monitor a cease-fire, and simply sanctioned EC monitoring efforts.126
However, the CSCE was beginning to expand the conception of the role of the “human
dimension” in international relations in a way that had direct relevance to Yugoslavia. In
July 1991, the CSCE Meeting of Experts on National Minorities was held in Geneva, and
declared in its closing Report that issues „concerning national minorities … are matters of
legitimate international concern and consequently do not constitute exclusively an internal
affair of the respective State‟.127 As William Korey points out, it was the first time a
Helsinki document had declared human rights to be a „“legitimate international concern”,
[which implied] that intervention by outside powers was justified‟.128
The Moscow meeting became something of a watershed concerning the place of
human rights in international relations under the CSCE, leading to the possibility that the
organisation might play a more active role in Yugoslavia. In the conference‟s closing
123 Hansard, 3 July 1991, c. 328. The one CSCE element which seemed, at least potentially, most relevant to
Yugoslavia was the Conflict Prevention Centre, established in Vienna at the end of 1990. But despite its grandiose title, the CPC had little in the way of resources and a rather unclear mission; as the director of the Centre, Bent Rosenthal, observed, „[i]t‟s not clear if the provisions setting up the center apply to internal use of force‟, and it was never called upon to take action on Yugoslavia. The CPC emerged out of Cold War arms control and security concerns, intended, in William Korey‟s words, to „focus … not on intra-state ethnic and racial tensions, but rather on potential inter-state conflicts as related to notification of military maneuvers‟. Proposed by the Soviet Union and viewed with suspicion by NATO members, it was „enthusiastically‟ welcomed by „East European countries, searching for international bonds after the collapse of the Warsaw Pact‟, but had little to offer for Yugoslavia. See Marc Fisher, „New European Peace Institute in Vienna Has Lofty Goals, but Little Else‟, Washington Post, 20 June 1991; Korey, Promises, 349.
124 Rachel Brett, „Human Rights and the OSCE‟, Human Rights Quarterly 18 (1996), 677-8. 125 Korey, Promises, 362-4. 126 Ibid, 364. For more on the evolution of the CSCE in the early 1990s and its relevance to Yugoslavia, see
Jonathan Dean, „The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe - Can It Do the Job?‟, in Ending Europe‟s Wars: The Continuing Search for Peace and Security (New York: The Twentieth Century Fund Press, 1994), 214-32.
127 Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Report of the CSCE Meeting of Experts on National Minorities, Geneva 1991, 1 July 1991. Available from www.osce.org/documents/ (accessed 29 August 2006).
128 Korey, Promises, 382.
77
Document, the member states reiterated that internal human rights issues were legitimate
subjects of international interest.129 This declaration was the culmination of long-standing
developments more than it was an abrupt radical and unprecedented departure, but it
placed the conclusion of the earlier Geneva meeting at the heart of official CSCE policy.
That policy position was then given some substance through the creation of the so-called
Moscow mechanism to handle accusations of human rights abuses by CSCE member
states, an outcome which depended on an unprecedented and unexpected unanimity
between the Western European and North American states and the Soviet Union.130 In
many cases the Soviet team, led by former dissenter and human rights campaigner Sergei
Kovalev, wished to go even further than did the Westerners. According to Korey, Kovalev
stated in his closing speech that the Soviets had been willing „to go much further‟ on the
question of intervention. Kovalev later wrote that this might have gone so far as to give
CSCE states the authority „to take any measures, including economic sanctions, against the
perpetrator [of] systematic … human rights abuses‟.131 Soviet Foreign Minister Boris Pankin
spoke in support of a „system of control and inspection‟ for human rights „identical to
those applied in the military sphere‟.132 These proposals were not taken up by the West, due
to concerns over possible precedents and the implications for international stability.
Nevertheless, the Moscow mechanism marked an important step towards
redefining human rights as an unambiguously international concern. This development was
spurred by a sense of urgency deriving both from Yugoslavia itself and from the potential
parallels with the Soviet Union, especially in the wake of the unsuccessful coup and the
successful independence of the Baltic states.133 Kampelman, for example, clearly had the
current situation in his mind when he declared that „we have taken [these] measures to
avoid future Yugoslavias‟.134 What the Moscow mechanism did was to increase the
129 Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Document of the Moscow Meeting of the Conference on the
Human Dimension of the CSCE, 4 October 1991. Available from www.osce.org/documents/ (accessed 29 August 2006).
130 The cooperation between East and West at this Conference was in large part due to the reaction of the Gorbachev‟s government to the unsuccessful military coup of August 1991, which had initially threatened the holding of the conference itself.
131 Korey, Promises, 415. 132 Author‟s translation (un „système de contrôle et d‟inspection identique à ceux appliqués dans le domaine
militaire‟); quoted in Sophie Pons, „La CSCE à la Recherche d‟un Système Efficace de Contrôle‟, Agence France Presse, 12 September 1991.
133 „M. Genscher Demande la Création de “Missions de Surveillance” de la CSCE‟, Agence France Presse, 10 September 1991; „Hommage Appuyé de Roland Dumas à Mikhail Gorbatchev et Boris Eltsine à la CSCE‟, Agence France Presse, 10 September 1991. Mark Almond argues that the aftermath of the failed Soviet coup was a „unique opportunity to act decisively‟ and make, if necessary, what he believes would have been „a swift and probably bloodless intervention against the slow-moving and vulnerable columns of JNA armour and vehicles as they advanced ponderously across Croatia‟; Europe‟s Backyard War, 239.
134 Author‟s translation („Nous avons pris des mesures pour éviter de futures Yougoslavie‟); quoted in Pierre
78
mediation and fact-finding capacities of the CSCE with respect to human rights abuses.
The key declarations were to be found in Articles 12 and 13, which removed the need to
have the cooperation and approval of the (allegedly) offending state: any member state
could, „with the support of at least nine‟ others, initiate action which could include the
establishment of „a mission of experts or of CSCE rapporteurs‟.135 Other member states,
or the CSCE collectively, thus had the right to investigate and report on concerns of
serious human rights abuses within Yugoslavia without requiring the consent of the latter
to initiate the process.
There was still disagreement, however, over what measures the CSCE might
legitimately take. The Moscow mechanism attempted to marry a newly assertive position
on the international importance of internal human rights standards to the more traditional
CSCE procedures of mediating conflicts among member states. The European participants
advocated a much more forceful and active approach, including the dispatch of teams of
observers to monitor ongoing conflicts. Such teams, Genscher argued, could be sent at the
request of any member state, „even without the agreement of the state concerned‟, and
would, without „intervening in [a state‟s] internal affairs‟, help to support the „constitutional
order‟ and restrain the actions of „insurgents‟.136
The US argued that this contradicted the notion of consensus that underpinned the
whole Helsinki process.137 Washington‟s preferred approach consisted of four elements: a
cease-fire, EC monitoring, a clear rejection of the use of force to change borders, and a
demand that all parties fulfill CSCE human rights requirements.138 Any action, however,
was premised on the agreement of all parties. The US characterised the European
approach of fact-finding and observation as „judgmental‟ and counterproductive; the CSCE
should play the role of an impartial mediator.139 In the end, however, the Conference
adopted the European approach. Only a few weeks after the end of the conference, the
CSCE employed the Moscow mechanism in its decision to dispatch a mission of inquiry
on human rights to Yugoslavia.140 A purely European initiative, Genscher, as head of the
Glachant, „Nouvelle Dimension pour les Droits de l‟Homme mais aussi Nouveaux Défis pour la CSCE‟, Agence France Presse, 4 October 1991.
135 CSCE, Document of the Moscow Meeting, Articles 12 and 13. 136 Author‟s translation („L‟envoi d‟observateurs . . . doit être possible même sans l‟accord du pays concerné. .
. . M. Genscher a proposé que la CSCE, sans "intervenir dans les affaires intérieures" des Etats, insiste sur le rétablissement de l‟"ordre constitutionnel". "Les insurgés ne doivent pas pouvoir compter sur la reconnaissance" internationale‟); quoted in „M. Genscher Demande…‟.
137 Korey, Promises, 408. 138 Ibid., 407. 139 Ibid., 408. 140 „Une Mission d‟Enquête des Droits de l‟Homme de la CSCE en Yougoslavie‟, Agence France Presse, 22
October 1991.
79
CSCE, appointed its head, and the mission would also include separate representatives
from both the EC proper and from the EC Conference on Yugoslavia.
This Conference, chaired by former NATO Secretary-General Lord Carrington,
had been created by the EC as another means of pursuing an end to the violence and a
mutually agreeable negotiated settlement.141 Warren Zimmermann described Carrington‟s
job as getting „the feuding Yugoslav republics to define the relationship they were prepared
to have with each other‟.142 In an atmosphere of general pessimism, the Conference
commenced on 7 September 1991 with the immediate goal of halting the fighting.143 As the
Dutch Foreign Minister bluntly declared, „if this conference is to have a chance of success,
combat must cease‟, a position the chairman shared.144 Unfortunately, a durable ceasefire
proved an elusive goal. By early November, Carrington was running short on patience and
admitted that he was „not sanguine‟ about the chances of success.145 He publicly warned the
Serbs and Croats that their recalcitrance was threatening the Conference itself. The
continuing violence, he said, „not only makes a farce of a conference aiming for a peaceful
settlement, but is also unacceptable in international terms‟, and he threatened to
recommend the adjournment of the conference if the latest ceasefire failed.146 He did not
do so, however, and after yet another failure in mid-November still maintained that „[t]he
real problem is getting the cease-fire started…. I think there is a possibility, but keep your
fingers crossed‟.147 His final, fourteenth, attempt, signed on 23 November, failed as well.
The achievement of a general settlement proved just as elusive, in spite of
encouraging early signs of progress. An agreement reached on 4 October committed the
republics to forming some kind of „loose association or alliance of sovereign or
independent republics‟, rejected any border changes achieved by force, and, according to
Tudjman, „implied European Community recognition of the independence of Croatia‟.148
141 The Conference consisted of the foreign ministers of all twelve EC states, the presidents of all six
Yugoslav republics, and the national Yugoslav presidency. Carrington‟s appointment has been the subject of some criticism; see, inter alia, Conversi, German-bashing, 16; Conversi, „Moral Relativism‟, 260; Almond, Europe‟s Backyard War, 239-41; Simms, Unfinest Hour, 11-12.
142 Zimmermann, „The Last Ambassador‟, 13. 143 Charles Goldsmith, „EC Will Go Ahead on Yugoslav Talks Despite Fighting‟, International Herald Tribune, 7
September 1991. 144 Author‟s translation („Si cette conférence doit avoir une chance de succés, il faut que les combats cessent‟);
quoted in „Ouverture de la Conférence sur la Yougoslavie à La Haye‟, Agence France Presse, 7 September 1991.
145 Quoted in Paul L. Montgomery, „Europeans Threaten to End Yugoslav Peace Effort‟, New York Times, 6 November 1991.
146 Quoted in Julie Wolf and Ian Traynor, „Yugoslav Peace Talks Close to Collapse‟, Guardian, 6 November 1991.
147 Quoted in Chuck Sudetic, „House-to-House Fighting in Croatian City Nears End‟, New York Times, 14 November 1991.
148 Quoted in Blaine Harden, „Yugoslav Sides Accept Peace Pact‟, Washington Post, 5 October 1991.
80
If implemented, this agreement might have permanently ended the fighting, but it
foundered on ceasefire violations; as Carrington noted, the „acid test‟ of any agreement was
what actually happened on the ground.149 This was the closest the Conference came to
finding a negotiated settlement to the whole situation.
The place of human rights in these negotiations was ambiguous. Hans van den
Broek presented a list of „principles which should … guide the work of the conference‟ at
its outset, and prominently included the „protection of the rights of everyone in
Yugoslavia‟.150 The 4 October agreement had included human rights provisions, notably a
commitment from Croatia to protect the human rights of the Croatian Serbs. The
inclusion of this provision was of some importance, since the agreement would also have
required the return to Croatian government control of the approximately one-third of
Croatian territory currently controlled by Serb paramilitaries and federal military forces. A
subsequent proposal offered by Carrington and van den Broek on 18 October explicitly
included „observation mechanisms for the protection of human rights and a special status
for certain groups or regions‟.151 Such language suggests that human rights were still
considered to be a vital international concern, and that a durable settlement could only be
reached if they were included.
Troubling indications to the contrary included the revision of the 18 October
proposal in the ensuing negotiations. The Milosevic government had initially rejected this
proposal outright, but continued to participate in the Conference. The grounds for the
rejection were that the terms of the proposal effectively abolished the federal state of
Yugoslavia; the Serbian representatives made no mention whatsoever of its human rights
provisions. Nevertheless, it was these provisions that were sacrificed by the EC negotiators
over the next two weeks, largely in an attempt to get the Serbians on board.152 Specifically,
149 Quoted in ibid. 150 Author‟s translation („protection des droits de tous en Yougoslavie‟, one of „les trois principes qui doivent
. . . guider les travaux de la conférence‟). The other two were „no unilateral changes of frontiers by force‟ („pas de changement unilatéral des frontières par la force‟), and the need to „take into account all the preoccupations and legitimate aspirations‟ of the participants („prise en compte intégrale de toutes les préoccupations et aspirations légitimes‟); quoted in „Ouverture de la Conférence…‟.
151 Author‟s translation („mécanismes de surveillance pour la protection des droits de l‟Homme et un statut spécial pour certains groupes ou régions‟); quoted in „Fin de la Réunion du Bloc Serbe de la Présidence à la Veille du Sommet de La Haye‟, Agence France Presse, 18 October 1991. Saadia Touval notes further that this status was to „apply, in particular, to the Serbs living in areas of Croatia where they form a majority‟; Mediation, 74. Touval implicitly criticises Carrington‟s decision to „expand … the agenda further by including a reference to the problems of Kosovo and Vojvodina‟. While conceding that the decision „made sense considering the potential for future violence … and … in terms of the logical consistency of the principles the EU enunciated‟, she nonetheless sees their inclusion as simply „increasing [the Serbs‟] motivation to wreck the plan rather than cooperate with it‟; Mediation, 83.
152 Although Touval argues that Croat objections to the „special status‟ for Croatian Serbs also played a role in the removal of these provisions; Mediation, 74.
81
provisions for the restoration of the provincial autonomy of Vojvodina and Kosovo, which
would have removed them from direct Serbian control, were left out of the final draft, a
huge concession to Belgrade.153 Carrington and the EC were apparently willing to abandon
the rights of the Kosovo Albanians in order to secure an agreement between Croatia and
Serbia. While this might be justifiable in terms of the relative violence and levels of human
rights abuse going on at that time in Kosovo and Croatia, it was a far cry from van den
Broek‟s call to protect the rights of all the people of Yugoslavia.
Even the idea of dispatching a peacekeeping force to the region was not an
unalloyed positive with respect to human rights, although it was made clear to both sides
that no peacekeepers would be sent to Yugoslavia until, in the words of UN Secretary
General Javier Perez de Cuellar, „an effective ceasefire‟ was in place.154 Furthermore, in a
proviso clearly directed at the numerous Serb paramilitary forces, Milosevic would need to
give assurances that „all presently armed elements will extend full support‟ to the
peacekeepers.155 But the prospects for a ceasefire only improved with the emergence of an
effective military stalemate in Croatia in the last months of 1991. The Serbs had succeeded
in establishing their control over nearly a third of the republic, and the Croatian
government had found itself completely unable to retake the territory. As this became
clear, both sides turned to the UN, represented in Yugoslavia by former US secretary of
state Cyrus Vance, asking for the dispatch of a peacekeeping force to the region.
Maintaining a peace would certainly have contributed to an improvement in the
state of human rights, but neither the Croats nor the Serbs wanted peacekeepers because
they actually wanted an internationally enforced end to the conflict. Both sides were hoping
to use the UN presence to serve their own ends.156 The Serbs had by this point been
militarily successful in occupying the Croatian territory that they regarded as “theirs”, and
the presence of peacekeepers would effectively freeze the existing pattern of control in
place.157 If Vance‟s preference to deploy UN forces throughout the conflict areas were
followed, this effect would only be increased.158 The Croatians were pushing instead for
deployment along the official republican borders, which would at least prevent the Serbs
153 Hodge, Britain and the Balkans, 16; see also Touval, Mediation, 74-5. 154 Quoted in Paul Lewis, „U.N. Peacekeepers Seen for Croatia‟, New York Times, 13 December 1991. 155 Quoted in ibid. 156 Touval, Mediation, 95-6; Tanner, Croatia, 279 157 Tanner, Croatia, 268-9; Almond, Europe‟s Backyard War, 229; Gow, Triumph, 62. Christopher Bennett, in
contrast, attributes Milosevic‟s willingness to deal to the incipient recognition of Croatia; Yugoslavia‟s Bloody Collapse, 171-2; see also Conversi, German-bashing, 15, 58.
158 Jane Rosen et al., „UN to Patrol Yugoslavian Flashpoints‟, Guardian, 27 November 1991. Carol Hodge asserts that this plan was actually „brewed in Belgrade‟, and only „later, presumably to lend it respectability, became referred to as the Vance Plan‟; Britain and the Balkans, 16.
82
from pressing their military advantage further. It thus offered them time to build up their
forces and to plan to retake the Serb-occupied territory sometime in the future.
There was also the risk that, whatever form the deployment took, it would free up
Serb forces in Croatia and allow them to be moved elsewhere in Yugoslavia. Much more
likely than a return to Serbia, however, was a redeployment into an increasingly unstable
Bosnia-Herzegovina. Once there, they would be in a position to support the separatist
Bosnian Serbs in much the same way they had those in Croatia. The Bosnian government
had announced that it too was seeking recognition from the EC, a move which Bosnian
Serb leader Radovan Karadzic called „risky and illegal . . . We are Yugoslavia and we are
staying in Yugoslavia‟.159 The fragility of Bosnia was such that there were calls for the
deployment of peacekeepers there as well, as a preventive measure to soothe an „explosive‟
situation.160 As became clear later in 1992, of course, such concern was amply justified.
IV. Human Rights and Recognition
As I have made clear, for some time the question of recognising Yugoslav republics, especially Croatia and
Slovenia, has not been a matter of principle – clearly they will not be willing to go back into any entity
called Yugoslavia. Recognition has been a matter of timing and judgment – a phrase that I have often used
before.
- Douglas Hurd 161
Other processes which also culminated around this time, however, threatened to
undermine the potential progress achieved by Carrington and Vance. While they had been
concentrating on ceasefires and negotiations within Yugoslavia, the member states of the
EU, led by Germany, had been debating the case for and against recognising Slovenia and
Croatia as independent states. The debate revolved around both political and legal
questions, and came to include human rights in an unexpectedly prominent fashion.
Central to the process, and particularly to the role of human rights within it, was
the Arbitration Commission of the Conference on Yugoslavia, created in pursuit of the
„common goal [of] bring[ing] peace to all parties in Yugoslavia and to find durable
solutions‟ to the problems there.162 Established on 27 August 1991 at the suggestion of
159 Quoted in Ian Traynor and John Palmer, „Key Yugoslav Republic Seeks EC Recognition‟, Guardian, 21
December 1991. 160 Ibid. 161 Hansard, 18 December 1991, c. 261. 162 Author‟s translation („Notre but commun est d‟apporter la paix à tous en Yougoslavie et de trouver des
solutions durables qui font justice à leurs préoccupations et à leurs aspirations. A cette fin, nous avons
83
France and Germany, the Commission‟s purpose was to consider and issue opinions on
legal questions and issues connected to the crisis in Yugoslavia and the potential
recognition of its constituent republics as independent states.163 It was chaired by French
Constitutional Court Justice Robert Badinter (hence its more common name, the Badinter
Commission), and included as well the heads of the constitutional courts of Germany,
Italy, Spain, and Belgium. All Conference participants, including the Yugoslav
representatives, expressed their support for the creation and intended role of the
Commission. Submissions were invited and received from all interested parties, including
Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia, and the EC Conference itself. Its exact mandate and
mode of working were left undefined; according to Genscher, it was left to the chairman to
„define the commission‟s sphere of concern‟, and it was to „retain absolute freedom on
methods and structure‟.164
To all intents and purposes Croatia and Slovenia were already independent states;
their simple inclusion in the mediation process as „effective equals‟ has been cited as
evidence of this.165 The recognition issue addressed by the Commission was therefore
essentially a very practical one: how could legal recognition of this fact be reconciled with
current international legal and procedural norms regarding the inviolable nature of
international borders? The Commission‟s recognition of the urgent practical nature of
these questions was perhaps the reason for the controversial nature of some of its legal
rulings, despite the eminent legal status of its members. It may well be true that the
Commission‟s description of Yugoslavia as being „in the process of dissolution‟ was legally
unprecedented, but it was nonetheless an accurate assessment of the actual state of affairs
at the time.166 It is not the intention here to revisit the debate over the legal correctness or
otherwise of the Commission‟s rulings. These issues – the debate over the “dissolution”
ruling, whether or not the doctrine of uti possidetis accurately applied, and many other issues
– have been thoroughly, if not conclusively, discussed elsewhere.167 However, the strictly
aussi décidé d‟établir une commission d‟arbitrage dans le cadre de la conférence.‟); a joint declaration issued at the opening of the Conference on 7 September 1991, quoted in „Ouverture de la Conférence…‟.
163 In the opinion of at least one scholar, the Commission was also part of an effort „to restrain German unilateralism‟; Touval, Mediation, 67, 69. Mark Almond, on the other hand, asserts that the Commission was simply „intended as a time-wasting exercise … [and] … an expression of wounded Gallic pride‟; Europe‟s Backyard War, 245.
164 Genscher, Rebuilding, 501-3. 165 Touval, Mediation, 40, 46-7. 166 Badinter Arbitration Committee, Opinion No. 1 (3). Available in Alain Pellet, „The Opinions of the
Badinter Arbitration Committee: A Second Breath for the Self-Determination of Peoples‟, European Journal of International Law 3, No. 1 (1992), 183. Aleksandar Pavkovic criticises this as „a term previously unknown in legal literature‟; Fragmentation, 149. See also Helen Quane, „The United Nations and the Evolving Right to Self-Determination‟, International and Comparative Law Quarterly 47, No. 3 (1998), 570.
167 See, inter alia, Kamal S. Shehadi, Ethnic Self-Determination and the Break-up of States, Adelphi Paper 283
84
legal issues cannot be separated from the urgent need to find a resolution to the situation;
by late 1991, it was not really in question whether or not recognition would be granted,
only when and under what conditions that would be done.168 Even if it is correct to argue
that that the priority for EC/CSCE intervention in July and August was simply to stop the
fighting, „not to establish criteria for judging the right to self-determination among
Yugoslav nations and citizens, to reverse the process of a state‟s disintegration, or to lay the
basis for a genuine political negotiation of the conflicts‟, that was no longer the case by
October and November.169 By that point, stopping the fighting required such criteria and
judgments. The Commission‟s legal decisions placed human rights squarely at the centre of
the Western response.
James Gow offers a useful summary of the Commission‟s findings on self-
determination:
Sovereignty applied to territorial units. Self-determination, up to and including
statehood, applied to such units. Self-determination could apply to other „national‟
(that is, self-defining ethnic, religious, genetic, cultural, linguistic etc.) groups, as an
expression of their members‟ individual human rights, but this would not include
the right to form a state; it could, however, entail the right to levels of autonomy -
that is, to political and cultural prerogatives and powers, perhaps of self-
governance, operable within the boundaries of a state.170
Crucially, however, the potential sovereignty of “territorial units” – i.e., the republics – was
held to be dependent on their achieving and guaranteeing certain human right standards.
This started with a somewhat pro forma statement in Opinion No. 1, which found that
„problems of state succession‟ must be settled „in keeping with the principles and rules of
international law, with particular regard for human rights and the rights of peoples and
minorities.171
(London: IISS/Brassey‟s, 1993), 29-30; Pavkovic, Fragmentation, 149-50; Wheeler, Saving Strangers, 248; Steve Terrett, The Dissolution of Yugoslavia and the Badinter Arbitration Commission: A Contextual Study of Peace-Making Efforts in the Post-Cold War World (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Group, 2000); and Weller, „The International Response‟, 569-607.
168 Touval, Mediation, 78. 169 Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, 165. 170 Gow, Triumph, 77. 171 Badinter Arbitration Committee, Opinion No. 1 (3); Pellet, „Opinions‟, 183. As Gow further noted, it was
„[t]he blending of elements of international law … with the provisions of the SFRY Constitution‟ that clarified „the issues at stake. Sovereignty and statehood were both linked to territory; national self-determination was linked to them in cases where “nation” referred to the people living within the boundaries of a defined territorial unit; sovereignty, statehood and national self-determination were not necessarily linked, and were not juridically to be combined where “nation” alluded to the members of an
85
This idea was taken up and elaborated upon in Annex 1 to the Commission‟s
opinions, issued on 16 December 1991, which specified „Guidelines on the Recognition of
New States in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union‟. It spelled out „a common position on
the process of recognition of these new States‟, which had to conform to international law
and provide „guarantees for the rights of ethnic and national groups and minorities‟.172
Annex 2 then „invit[ed] all Yugoslav republics to state by December 23 whether they
accepted those requirements, supported the efforts of the Conference on Yugoslavia, and
wished „to be recognized as independent states‟. It also specified that any applications
received would be „submitted through the Chair of the Conference to the Arbitration
Commission for advice before the implementation date‟, thus reinforcing the role of the
Commission in adjudicating the importance and status of human rights in the process of
recognition.173
In January 1992, the Commission delivered its assessments of the applications for
recognition from Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Macedonia. In each case, the
state of human rights in the republic was central to its decision of whether or not to
recommend recognition. With regard to Slovenia and Macedonia, the Commission „[took]
the view‟ that both republics „satisfie[d] the tests in the Guidelines on the Recognition of
New States in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union and the Declaration on Yugoslavia
adopted by the Council of the European Communities on 16 December 1991‟.174 In the
case of Bosnia-Herzegovina, it was „of the opinion that the will of the peoples of Bosnia-
Herzegovina to constitute the [Socialist Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina] as a sovereign
and independent State cannot be held to have been fully established‟, thus failing to satisfy
the EC criteria. It suggested that „[t]his assessment could be reviewed if appropriate
guarantees were provided by the Republic applying for recognition, possibly by means of a
referendum of all the citizens of [Bosnia-Herzegovina] without distinction, carried out
under international supervision‟.175 Lastly, the Commission found that Croatia‟s
constitutional arrangements regarding the protection of the rights of minorities were
unsatisfactory, but that, „subject to this reservation, the Republic of Croatia meets the
ethno-national community which formed part of one or more states, or territorial units to become states‟; Gow, Triumph, 77.
172 Badinter Arbitration Committee, „Annex 1: Declaration on the “Guidelines on the Recognition of New States in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union” (16 December 1991)‟; available in Danilo Türk, „Recognition of States: A Comment‟, European Journal of International Law 4, No. 1 (1993), 72.
173 Badinter Arbitration Committee, „Annex 2: Declaration on Yugoslavia (Extraordinary EPC Ministerial Meeting, Brussels, 16 December 1991)‟, available in Türk, „Recognition‟, 73.
174 Badinter Arbitration Committee, Opinions 6 and 7 in „Annex 3: Opinions No. 4-10 of the Arbitration Commission of the International Conference on Yugoslavia‟; available in Türk, „Recognition‟, 80, 84.
175 Badinter Arbitration Committee, Opinion No. 4; ibid., 76.
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necessary conditions for its recognition‟ by the EC and its member states.176
The impact of these opinions was unfortunately reduced by the fact that
international recognition had already begun in late December, with Germany‟s unilateral
recognition of Croatia and Slovenia. The Germans maintained that this was done in
accordance with the Commission‟s work; technically the German resolution, dated 19
December 1991, agreed only conditionally to grant recognition to those republics that
requested it, subject to a commitment „that they will meet the requirements set forth in the
December 16 declaration‟.177 In practical terms, though, recognition of the two republics
was unlikely to be reversed even with the announcement by the Commission of an
unfavourable verdict.178 Genscher insisted that the move would help to reduce the violence
in Yugoslavia; „[w]hat‟, he asked his EC colleagues on 16 December, „could possibly end
the war in Croatia if not recognition and thus internationalization?‟179 The action was
nevertheless widely condemned, predictably by the Serbian government and media, but
also by the United States, the UN secretary-general, and many European officials and
diplomats who felt that it would simply worsen the situation.180
In its push for recognition, the German government did feel the need to
specifically address the human rights concerns being considered by the Commission. In
order to be „fully knowledgeable in that area‟, Germany had commissioned its own human
rights expert, Christian Tomuschat, „to prepare an evaluation of methods to deal with
minorities in Croatia‟.181 His conclusion, offered in late November, was that there was no
need for concern; Croatia‟s constitutional arrangements were „of exemplary significance to
the further development of the protection of minorities in Europe‟.182 Germany was
therefore confident that its judgment would be validated by the Commission. Genscher
claims in his memoirs that it did exactly that. According to him, the Commission‟s report
recommended the recognition of Croatia and Slovenia and came out in favour of
recognizing Macedonia. Croatia‟s president promised the commission that its
Serbian inhabitants would be granted special autonomic status, in accordance with
176 Badinter Arbitration Committee, Opinion 5; ibid., 77. 177 Genscher, Rebuilding, 516. 178 The German government later (March 1993) justified its recognition policy on the grounds that
„refraining from recognition “would have meant capitulating to a master-race logic” (herrenvolk in the original German text), implying an analogy between Serbian nationalism and Nazism‟; Touval, Mediation, 79.
179 Ibid., 514; see also 500. 180 „Germany Recognizes Croatia, Slovenia … Action Is Assailed by Serbian Media‟, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, 24
December 1991. 181 Genscher, Rebuilding, 515. 182 Quoted in ibid. See also Ahrens, Diplomacy, 139-40.
87
Lord Carrington‟s convention paper. We considered the Badinter-Herzog
Commission‟s report an impressive corroboration of our own earlier evaluation.183
This version of events is misleading at best. In fact, as shown above, the
Commission advised that Croatia did not meet the requirements of the EC for recognition,
though it might do so relatively easily if it so desired. The Commission did note
approvingly the extensive provisions „of the [Croatian] draft Convention of 4 November
1991, notably those contained in Chapter II, Article 2(c)‟ which dealt with the treatment of
minorities.184 Given the timing of his presence in Zagreb, in late November, it was these
provisions that Tomuschat evaluated and approved. However, the Croatian government did
not actually pass its Constitutional Act until 4 December, after Tomuschat‟s visit, and the
Commission pointedly observed that the legislation „[did] not fully incorporate‟ all those
provisions which had been promised. It thus withheld recommending recognition of
Croatia until the republic „supplement[ed] the Constitutional Act in such a way as to satisfy
those provisions‟.185
The German government did not reconsider its position once the Commission‟s
report was released and, as Genscher‟s memoirs indicate, maintained that its
recommendations accorded with what the German government was already doing. And
with Germany‟s premature recognition a fait accompli, the other European states followed
suit, in the case of Croatia in spite of the Commission‟s recommendations.186 The decision
to do so had more to do with the concurrent negotiations on the Maastricht Treaty on
European Union than with the Yugoslav case itself; Britain extracted concessions on
monetary union and social policies, while France secured German agreement on European
institutional reform.187 Rather than insist on the actual incorporation of guarantees into the
Croatian constitution beforehand, they settled for a promise that the improvements would
be carried out later. The promise was not honoured, and the treatment of minorities in
183 Ibid, 516. 184 Badinter Arbitration Commission, Opinion 5; Türk, „Recognition‟, 77. 185 Ibid. 186 The US was more reluctant to accept this conclusion, and declined to recognise the independence of any
of the Yugoslav republics until April 1992. Recognition was not offered to Macedonia at all, but this was due not to human rights difficulties but to objections from Greece over the republic‟s name. This was in spite of the fact that Opinion No. 6 directly addressed Greek concerns, noting „that the Republic of Macedonia has, moreover, renounced all territorial claims of any kind in unambiguous statements binding in international law; that the use of the name `Macedonia‟ cannot therefore imply any territorial claim against another State‟. See Badinter Arbitration Committee, „Recognition of States - Annex 3‟; Türk, „Recognition‟, 77-80.
187 Touval, Mediation, 80.
88
Croatia did not improve in the aftermath of recognition.188 Nor was recognition
responsible for the reduction in violence in Croatia, which was already underway as a result
of the developments discussed above.
The most serious problem with the German approach, however, was not
necessarily how it affected Croatia or Slovenia, but how it might interact with the initiatives
of Carrington and Vance and affect the situation in Bosnia. Both men were adamant
opponents of Germany‟s plan. Carrington flew to Brussels to argue against „untimely
recognition‟ that might jeopardise the entire peace process. Furthermore, he warned,
Milosevic had „hinted that military action would take place if Croatia and Slovenia were
recognised. This might well be the spark that sets Bosnia-Herzogovina [sic] alight‟.189
Speaking after the decision on recognition was taken, Vance admitted that he was „very
disappointed‟, though not surprised, and reiterated Carrington‟s warning concerning the
possible effects on the peace negotiations.190 These were the same concerns cited by the
British, the French, and the Americans, all of whom opposed German policy in this area.191
The European recognition of Croatia and Slovenia on 15 January 1992 marked the
end of the first phase of the dissolution of Yugoslavia. The internationalisation of the
crisis that Germany had advocated had been largely achieved, and what had been internal
administrative borders between those republics and the rest of Yugoslavia were now the
borders of independent states. Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia were actively pursuing
the same status, leaving only Serbia and Montenegro in what would soon be called the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). Open war had broken out between the Serb-
dominated federal government in Belgrade and those republics seeking independence,
resulting in over ten thousand dead and the first appearance of the kind of ethnic divisions
and hatred which were to be the hallmark of the next stage of the process.
V. Conclusion
Human rights were entwined in Western policies in Yugoslavia throughout this
period, in terms of both motivations and consequences. They remained central to the 188 See, inter alia, Human Rights Watch, World Report 1993; Human Rights Watch, World Report 1994: Croatia
(Human Rights Watch, 1994). Available from www.hrw.org/reports/1994/WR94/Helsinki-06.htm#P220_81066; accessed 20 May 2010.
189 Quoted in Sarah Lambert, „EC Defuses Yugoslav Recognition Row‟, Independent, 17 December 1991. 190 Quoted in David Binder, „Yugoslav Peace Mission Goes On, Vance Declares‟, New York Times, 19
December 1991. 191 Hella Pick, „Early Recognition “Is Unstoppable”„, Guardian, 5 December 1991; Lewis, „U.N. Peacekeepers
Seen…‟; „La France Espère Que l‟Accord de Bruxelles Aura “Un Effet Psychologique” Sur les Parties En Conflit‟, Agence France Presse, 17 December 1991; „Washington and Bonn Clash Over German Plan to Recognise Breakaway Yugoslav Republics‟, Guardian, 6 December 1991. The repercussions of the policy of preemptive recognition are discussed further in the next chapter.
89
contradictory and divided American approach, which remained dominant until well into
1991. Still preoccupied with Kosovo and democracy, Congress and the White House used
these issues to argue both for and against supporting Yugoslavia‟s unity and survival. But
the Bush administration had no particular interest in Yugoslavia, and as its foreign policy
became largely a matter of supporting European initiatives, the US position became less
and less significant. Once it became clear that Yugoslavia would not survive, and the
Europeans took the lead, Kosovo and democracy nearly disappeared from the agenda, but
human rights did not. The question of self-determination came to the fore, and the place
of human rights in international relations was highlighted at the Moscow CSCE meeting,
with direct application to Yugoslavia. Human rights were not prominent in the negotiations
at the Conference on Yugoslavia, but the Badinter Commission placed them squarely at the
centre of European policy on recognition, although the application of its opinions by the
EC was flawed at best.
Regarding the appropriate place of human rights in international relations, this
period presents a mixed picture. On one level, they became less important; from being the
main element of Western policy in Yugoslavia, as driven primarily by the United States,
human rights became only one element in policies that sought to respond to and manage
the geopolitical crisis of Yugoslavia‟s dissolution. These attempts sometimes demonstrated
a clear willingness to ignore or downgrade human rights concerns, for example in the
October negotiations at the Conference on Yugoslavia. At the same time, however,
Western governments were themselves both wrestling with human rights issues such as
self-determination, and actively incorporating them in the opinions of the Badinter
Commission. Furthermore, although the German approach diluted the effect of the
Commission‟s work on Yugoslavia at the time, it did nevertheless introduce and validate the
idea that human rights standards were valid criteria for assessing the potential legitimacy of
a new state, a development with far wider implications.192 And the Commission‟s
November opinions clearly influenced the way Germany went about making its case for the
recognition of Croatia and Slovenia. This was obscured but not invalidated by the fact that
some states offered recognition before the early January opinions, which addressed each
republic specifically and in detail. In the absence of pressure for speedy recognition, the
Commission‟s impact was more evident in the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina; recognition
192 The EC Guidelines on the Recognition of New States was, for example, cited by the Supreme Court of Canada
in Reference Re: Secession of Quebec (1998) 2 SCR 217, para. 143, as an example of how the „process of recognition, once considered to be an exercise of pure sovereign discretion, has come to be associated with legal norms‟.
90
was not offered until after the suggested referendum was held a few months later.
The inclusion of human rights in policymaking complemented rather than
conflicted with the ends Western governments were seeking to achieve. Attempts by
Carrington to garner Serbian support at the Conference notwithstanding, there were few
evident conflicts either between human rights issues or between human rights and Western
political goals. On the contrary, dealing with the human rights abuses of minorities in
Yugoslavia was an essential part of attempts to defuse the crisis and manage the
dissolution. The application of human rights principles was never simple; the disagreement
in Washington about how best to promote human rights is evidence of that. But there was
no fundamental contradiction involved in doing so, unless it lay in the competing claims to
the right of self-determination by the different ethnic groups.
Finally, this period marked the beginning of a shift in the meaning of “human
rights” in international discourse. The developing crisis began to eclipse what might be
termed the “traditional” human rights concerns related to Kosovo and democratisation –
freedom of the press, freedom of assembly and political participation and so on – even
though they did not disappear in Kosovo and actually worsened in Croatia. In relation to
the minority issues, these were still the issues on which the Badinter Commission focused.
But they began increasingly to be overshadowed by more extreme abuses arising from the
organised and deliberate ethnic violence: a growing refugee population, war crimes, and
crimes against humanity. This was a difference in both kind and degree, but its importance
and significance was obscured by the consistent use of generic phrases like “human rights
abuses”. This process would go much, much further with the war in Bosnia.
91
Chapter 4
The Bosnian War: Human Rights, Ethnic Cleansing, and Western Priorities
The war in Bosnia saw the culmination of a shift in the nature of human rights
concerns that had begun with the Croatian war. Human rights issues such as political
repression and freedom of the press were utterly eclipsed by the atrocities being committed
in Bosnia.1 Yet the more serious nature of the human rights abuses in the former
Yugoslavia did not translate into greater efforts to deal with those abuses on the part of the
West. On the contrary, Western governments attempted to minimise or otherwise avoid
facing up to what was being done in Bosnia. They adopted policies that failed to address
the human rights aspects of the conflict and in some ways actively worsened the conflict in
human rights terms. Human rights concerns in fact played a much smaller role in Western
policymaking over the first two years of the Bosnian war than they had done previously. In
order to understand the magnitude and nature of the human rights dimensions of the
Bosnian war, this chapter looks first at the phenomenon of ethnic cleansing and the means
by which it was carried out: the deliberate targeting of civilian populations through
violence, killing, and the destruction and theft of property, the destruction of cultural
monuments and institutions, mass rape, the appalling mistreatment of prisoners of war,
and genocide. It then examines the sources, detail, and chronology of Western knowledge
about these events to establish the knowledge base from which Western governments acted
in responding to the conflict. Finally, the chapter argues that the most fundamental priority
for Western governments in Bosnia was not ending the war and its attendant human rights
violations, but was rather to avoid being forced into undertaking military intervention. This
priority is what underlay the policies which are discussed in the following chapters.
I. Background
As the pace of events slowed in Croatia with the ceasefire and the deployment of
UNPROFOR, the focus both within Yugoslavia and internationally turned to the
neighbouring republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, which along with Macedonia had been a
strong supporter of a reformed federal or confederal Yugoslavia. This attitude had
1 This is not to say that events in Kosovo, for example, were completely ignored even after the crisis had
begun in Bosnia. See, inter alia, Hansard, 8 May 1992, c. 281; Hansard, 26 July 1993, c. 839; Ian Traynor, „Owen Turns from Bosnia to View the Bigger Picture‟, The Guardian, 21 October 1993; Daniel Williams, „U.S. at Odds With Europe Over Sanctions on Serbia‟, Washington Post, 27 November 1993; „Hearing of the House International Relations Committee: U.S. Policy on Bosnia‟, Federal News Service, 18 October 1995.
92
changed, however, with the successful departure of Slovenia and Croatia. The Sarajevo
government no longer considered remaining in the new Serb-dominated Yugoslavia to be a
viable option, and accordingly sought full independence and international recognition. In a
virtual replay of events in Croatia, the Bosnian Serbs rejected this option and threatened
war and secession if the government persisted in its course. In early March, Sarajevo held
the referendum on independence which the Badinter Commission had recommended. The
Bosnian Muslim and Croat communities strongly supported the referendum, but most
Bosnian Serbs, whether through conviction or as a result of threats and suppression,
refused to cast a vote.2 Given the ethnic makeup of the population, which was only about
one-third Serb, this result satisfied Western concerns about the level of popular support for
independence, but some observers have argued that the referendum was „inherently
destabilizing‟ and even „the proximate cause of the war in Bosnia‟.3 On 6-7 April 1992,
Europe and the United States recognised Bosnia‟s independence. On 7 April, Radovan
Karadzic declared the secession of the Bosnian Serbs‟ self-proclaimed “Republika Srpska”
(RS), and the war began.
In a shockingly short space of time, the Bosnian war far surpassed the
destructiveness of the fighting in Croatia the previous year. The basic outlines of the
conflict became clear by late 1992, and remained largely unchanged until well into 1994.
The Bosnian Serbs, with Serbian support, succeeded in seizing nearly seventy percent of
the republic‟s territory, and were intent on seizing more to create land links between these
areas and Serb-held regions in Croatia. The Republika Srpska, with its “capital” in Pale, was
to all intents and purposes an independent state in terms of its control over this territory,
though it was highly dependent on Serbia and was not recognised as such internationally.
Having driven out most of the non-Serb population in the RS by mid-summer 1992, the
ethnic cleansing campaign settled into a form of slow siege-warfare directed against
government-held cities such as Sarajevo, Gorazde, and Srebrenica, which were largely or
completely surrounded by Bosnian Serb territory. Most Serb military activity was directed
against the government forces and the Bosnian Muslim population. From Belgrade,
Milosevic attempted to manipulate the Bosnian Serbs for his own ends, supplying them
even as he disavowed any influence over their actions.4
2 See, inter alia, Touval, Mediation, 108; Burg and Shoup, The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 117. 3 Donia and Fine, Bosnia and Hercegovina, 234. 4 It is important to remember that “the Serbs” were not a unified group, and Milosevic‟s undoubted
prominent role in encouraging and supporting the Serbs in Bosnia (and Croatia) did not mean that he was in undisputed control of events or of leaders such as Karadzic; see, inter alia, Tanner, Croatia, 241-4, 255-7, 280; Noel Malcolm, Bosnia: A Short History (London: MacMillan, 1994), 238-9; Ramet, Balkan Babel, 49-
93
The Bosnian Croats, meanwhile, played an unpredictable and erratic role in the war,
even though they had initially been supportive of the Sarajevo government and of Bosnian
independence. Making up only some seventeen percent of the population, the Croats
benefited from overt and covert support from Zagreb and from their relative concentration
in certain parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina, over which they gradually consolidated control.5
Bosnian Croat leader Mate Boban had proclaimed the independent “Croatian Union of
Herceg-Bosna” in early November 1991, and after the outbreak of war, this entity became
increasingly politically, economically, and militarily integrated with Croatia proper. Relations
between Sarajevo and the Bosnian Croat “capital” of Mostar deteriorated correspondingly,
and the Bosnian Croats became unreliable allies and sometime foes of the national
government. In May 1992, for example, Boban and Karadzic met in Graz, Austria, and
agreed on a plan to partition Bosnia between the Croats and the Serbs.6 The Croats carried
out their own ethnic cleansing campaigns against both Serbs and Muslims in the territory
they controlled, and as the war dragged on they frequently clashed with Bosnian
government forces.
The third side in Bosnia was represented by the legal government in Sarajevo, led
by Alija Izetbegovic. While commonly referred to as the “Muslim” side both within Bosnia
and internationally, the government, at least initially, also enjoyed popular support from
many Bosnians of Croat and Serb background who valued the tolerant multiethnic
traditions of the region; the Bosnian Army (BA) was comprised of members of all ethnic
groups.7 But as the ethnic cleansing continued and the war dragged on, the Izetbegovic
50; Vejvoda, „Serbian Perspectives‟, 100, 103. Even Mark Mazower, while making clear the importance of Belgrade‟s „support … to the Bosnian Serbs‟, concluded that such support „ allowed the [Bosnian Serbs] to take an increasingly intransigent line in negotiations with representatives of the other Bosnian communities‟, indicating the local role in the course of events; The War in Bosnia: An Analysis (London: Action for Bosnia, 1992), 2. The shared responsibility was aptly summed up by Tadeusz Mazowiecki in November 1992: „The Serbian authorities in de facto control of certain territories in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in the [UNPAs] bear primary responsibility for the policy of ethnic cleansing carried out there. The command of the [JNA] and the political leadership of the Republic of Serbia also share responsibility for this policy, which could not have been continued … without their active support‟; Human Rights Situation and Reports of the Special Rapporteurs and Representatives: Situation of Human Rights on the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia, UN doc. A/47/666 (S/24809), 17 November 1992, 38, para. 136. Available from www.un.org/en/documents (accessed 22 September 2006).
5 Burg and Shoup argue that Franjo Tudjman had effective control over the Bosnian Croats, who lacked any strong independent leaders of their own; The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 66-7. See also Christopher Cviic, „Croatia‟, in David A. Dyker and Ivan Vejvoda, eds., Yugoslavia and After: A Study in Fragmentation, Despair and Rebirth (London, New York: Longman, 1996), 210; Tanner, Croatia, 285-92; Donia and Fine, Bosnia and Hercegovina, 248-56.
6 John F. Burns, „Pessimism is Overshadowing Hope In Effort to End Yugoslav Fighting‟, New York Times, 12 May 1992. For an excellent account of the changing alliances, see Burg and Shoup, The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 133-8. See also Malcolm, Bosnia, 248-9; Bennett, Yugoslavia‟s Bloody Collapse, 198-201.
7 Regarding the multi-ethnic nature of the Bosnian Army, see Burg and Shoup, The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 139.
94
government came to be more and more identified with the Bosnian Muslim community,
which made up about forty-four percent of the Bosnian population. Nevertheless, it was
never based on the same explicitly ethnic principles that were demonstrated in Karadzic‟s
and Boban‟s mini-states. Whereas the Croats and the Serbs both sought to create ethnically
pure, politically discrete territories, the Sarajevo government insisted that it stood for a
unified Bosnia that could include all ethnic groups.8
The internationally recognised government in Sarajevo soon controlled only about
thirteen percent of the country, mostly in the central area around the capital but also
including several enclaves in Serb and Croat-held regions. With isolated and brief
exceptions, the government was on the defensive throughout this period, unable to even
break the siege of its own capital let alone relieve smaller and more isolated towns. As a
result, the government forces and the Muslim population suffered the majority of the
casualties of the war. In Sarajevo alone, roughly ten thousand people died in the next three
years – as many as had died in all of Croatia up to early 1992 – as a direct result of Bosnian
Serb artillery and sniper fire, or from lack of food, medicine, and shelter. BA forces did
commit atrocities and even ethnic cleansing, but they committed far fewer such offences.9
The government, however, was accused of deliberately exacerbating the suffering of the
population for the public relations effect of the news coverage, and even of shelling its
own people to generate international shock and outrage.10
This basic situation remained largely unchanged for the next three years.
Occasional cease-fires were negotiated, and were usually quickly violated. The Bosnian
Croats went from supporting the government to fighting the Muslims and back again,
several times. There were occasional atrocities which stood out from the general violence,
such as the mortar bombings of the Sarajevo markets in August 1992 and February 1994,
the destruction of the Bosnian Muslim village of Santici by Croat forces in April 1993, and
the massacre of eight thousand Muslim men and boys by the Bosnian Serb Army in
Srebrenica in July 1995. But the front lines rarely moved, the sieges dragged on, and the
8 Burg and Shoup argue that „none of the three nationalist parties … was committed to the notion of a
civil society‟, but admit that the SDA „did support the idea of a civil society in its party program in December 1992‟; The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 12, also 62-5; see also Tanner, Croatia, 240-1; Bennett, Yugoslavia‟s Bloody Collapse, 189. On the decreasing strength of the multiethnic ideal in the Bosnian government, see Donia and Fine, Bosnia and Hercegovina, 265-7.
9 Ethnic cleansing was committed by all-Muslim units such as the Seventh Muslim Brigade, which formed as the war dragged on and the perception that the Bosnian Muslims were being abandoned to their own devices grew; see Silber and Little, Death, 298-9; Burg and Shoup, The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 13, 68.
10 See, for instance, Lewis Mackenzie‟s comments in Blaine Harden, „Can the West Stop the Rape of Bosnia? Should It?‟, Washington Post, 24 July 1992; Rieff, Slaughterhouse, pp. 101-2 ; Major, pp. 543-4; Simms, Unfinest Hour, 186-7. The accuracy of these accusations has never been conclusively proven, but neither have they been proven to be false.
95
ethnic cleansing continued. Much of the remainder of this chapter is devoted to exploring
in greater detail the process and driving forces of ethnic cleansing and what Western
governments knew about it. Particular attention is paid to the establishment of
concentration camps in Bosnia in which mass killings, torture, and other severe violations
of international human rights were carried out, to the practice of mass rape by Bosnian
Serb forces and by Serbian paramilitaries, and to the issue of genocide.
II. Human Rights and the War in Bosnia
Burn it all.
- Ratko Mladic 11
At the heart of the war in Bosnia was the euphemistically named practice of
“ethnic cleansing”, which inherently involved massive and deliberate violations of human
rights.12 A 1995 CIA report described „techniques that the [Bosnian Serb Army itself]
referred to as ethnic cleansing‟, including:
laying siege to cities and indiscriminately shelling civilian inhabitants; “strangling”
cities (i.e., withholding food deliveries and utilities so as to starve and freeze
residents); executing non-combatants; establishing concentration camps where
thousands of prisoners were summarily executed and tens of thousands were
subjected to torture and inhumane treatment; using prisoners as human shields;
employing rape as a tool of war to terrorize and uproot populations; forcing large
numbers of civilians to flee to other regions; razing villages to prevent the return
of displaced persons; and interfering with international relief efforts, including
attacks on relief personnel.13
Human rights abuses are rightly seen as endemic to any modern war, but the singularity of
what happened in Bosnia was in their deliberate application. The mistreatment,
displacement, and killing of civilians in Bosnia were neither accidental nor even incidental
to traditional military objectives. They did not result from combat operations between
regular armies, or from the pursuit of military objectives such as the destruction of war-
11 Commander of the Bosnian Serb Army, directing the bombardment of Sarajevo; quoted in John F. Burns,
„Taped Order Loud and Clear: “Burn it all”„, New York Times, 9 June 1992. 12 It was not unique to Bosnia, however; similar acts were a part of the continuing Croatian conflict; see
Human Rights Watch, 1993 World Report: the former Yugoslav Republics. 13 CIA, Sanitized Bosnia: Serb Ethnic Cleansing, EUR 94-1008c/s, 5 January 1995, 2. Available from www.foia.cia.gov (accessed 24 August 2009).
96
related economic or industrial targets. They were not, to use another euphemism,
“collateral damage”. On the contrary, in the words of the UN Special Rapporteur on
Human Rights in the former Yugoslavia, Tadeusz Mazowiecki, „the principal objective of
the military conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina is the establishment of ethnically-
homogeneous regions. Ethnic cleansing does not appear to be the consequence of the war
but rather its goal‟.14
Ethnic cleansing was a fast-moving process, carried out with deliberate and
organised brutality. Mazowiecki touched on both issues in his October 1992 report:
This goal [i.e. of ethnic cleansing] to a large extent has already been achieved
through killings, beatings, rape, destruction of houses and threats. Such practices
have intensified in recent weeks and there is less and less resistance on the part of
the non-Serbian population, increasing numbers of whom are ready to abandon
everything and to flee their homeland…. Serbian leaders are not ready to desist in
their plans. The Muslim and Croatian populations, in the territory controlled by
Serbian authorities, live under enormous pressure and terror. Hundreds of
thousands of people are being forced to leave their homes and to abandon their
belongings in order to save their lives.15
Ethnic cleansing involved „the summary execution, disappearance, arbitrary detention,
deportation and forcible displacement of … people on the basis of their religion or
nationality‟, with the goal of „rid[ding] all Serbian-controlled areas of non-Serbs, or at least
to diminish their numbers significantly‟. The indiscriminate use of military force and
„rampant rape and sexual abuse‟ was „aimed at terrorizing the civilian population to induce
its surrender or flight‟.16
Abuses of human rights as embodied in the actual execution or conduct of ethnic
cleansing garnered the most attention, but the basic intent of the policy involved denials of
fundamental human rights as enumerated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
(UDHR) and in the (legally-binding) International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR). For example, ethnic cleansing called for arbitrary exile, in violation of Article 9
of the UDHR. It denied freedom of movement and residence, violating Article 13 of the
UDHR and Article 12 of the ICCPR. It abrogated Article 2 of the ICCPR, which required 14 Report on the situation of human rights in the territory of the former Yugoslavia submitted by Mr. Tadeusz Mazowiecki,
Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, UN doc. E/CN.4/1992/S-1/10, 27 October 1992, para. 6. Available from www.un.org/en/documents/ (accessed 22 September 2006).
15 Ibid., para. 6. 16 Human Rights Watch, 1993 World Report.
97
equal protection and application of all rights enumerated in the Covenant „without
distinction of any kind‟, and Article 26, regarding equality of all persons before the law.
Perhaps most fundamentally, the ideal of ethnic “purity” could not be reconciled with
Article 27 of the ICCPR on the right of minorities „to enjoy their own culture, to profess
and practise their own religion, or to use their own language‟. It was not merely the
conduct of ethnic cleansing which violated human rights; such violations were implicit in
the concept itself.
The Bosnian Serbs, supported, encouraged, and supplied by Serbia, were the prime
movers and practitioners of ethnic cleansing, but they were not the only offenders; as
Helsinki Watch noted, „Muslim and Croatian forces also are using intimidation, harassment
and violence against Serbs … to force the flight of Serbs from [some] areas under their
control‟.17 But as a 1994 CIA report asserted,
there is no information – nor is there a pattern of events – suggesting that either
Bosnian Muslim or Bosnian Croat leaders have encouraged large-scale ethnic
cleansing efforts in conjunction with their military forces to gain and hold
territory. Non-Serb forces in Bosnia have not pursued sustained campaigns of
ethnic cleansing as have the Bosnian Serbs, but most often have committed
atrocities or expulsions in response to such acts perpetrated against their own
ethnic group.18
The report further noted that, although „Croats and Muslims have also committed
atrocities … their actions have consisted overwhelmingly of random, discrete – though
sometimes ferocious – episodes that lack the sustained intensity, orchestration, and scale of
the Bosnian Serbs‟ efforts‟, and concluded that the evidence indicated that the Serbs were
„probably responsible for at least 90 percent of the destruction, displacement, and loss of
life associated with ethnic cleansing in Bosnia‟.19 While the assertion that Croats did not
deliberately carry out ethnic cleansing is questionable, the overall assessment is accurate.
The ethnic cleansing campaign was aimed at establishing and reinforcing the claim
of ethnic Serbs to as much Bosnian territory as possible, to the point that it has been
described as „not an ethnic war, but a war of territorial conquest‟.20 It served this purpose
17 Human Rights Watch, 1993 World Report. 18 CIA, Sanitized Bosnia, 5-6. 19 Ibid., 4. See also Tanner, Croatia, 289-91. 20 Magas, The Destruction of Yugoslavia, 324.
98
in three ways.21 First, once begun it engendered increased bitterness and polarisation
between the different ethnic communities, making any return to the prewar status quo of
ethnic intermixture less likely.22 Indeed, in some senses the war was responsible for the
creation of these ethnic communities in the way it effectively forced Bosnians of all
ethnicities to declare themselves as a member of a specific group.23 Second, occupying
more territory was beneficial to the Serbs in purely military terms and made it less likely
that that any military reversal would dramatically threaten their gains. Third, de facto
territorial control strengthened the hand of the Bosnian Serb and Serbian leadership in the
peace talks, putting them in a position of power in relation to the Bosnian government.
The Serb ethnic cleansing campaign quickly created massive numbers of refugees
and displaced persons.24 The sheer scale of the problem, and the rapidity with which it
developed, was unprecedented in postwar Europe, far surpassing even Croatia the previous
year. In less than a week, the UNHCR was reporting at least 100,000 refugees.25 By 25
April, the figure had risen to 325,000; a month after that, to 930,000. 26 By the beginning of
August, up to two and a half million people had been forced from their homes, with
another 850,000 living under siege conditions, out of a total population of some 4.3
million.27 The influx of Bosnian refugees placed a severe strain on neighbouring countries.
Croatia, which already had its own displaced persons to cope with, was housing around
300,000 Bosnian refugees by July, at which point it announced that „all new arrivals will be
directly transported to the borders of Slovenia, Austria and Italy‟.28 By late in the year, the
situation of the refugees still in Bosnia was so dire that hundreds of thousands of lives
21 Woodward discusses several different means of justifying such claims, all of which were (at times
contradictorily) used in Bosnia. Ethnic cleansing either bolstered or was justified by three of four (or possibly four of five) of these; see Balkan Tragedy, 212.
22 The ethnic cleansers were largely successful in creating these enduring divisions; as was seen in the post-Dayton period, few Muslims or Croats wished to return to live in regions under RS control, or indeed to formerly mixed towns like Mostar which had seen intense Muslim-Croat conflict. See, for instance, Sumantra Bose‟s account of post-war Mostar in Bosnia After Dayton: Nationalist Partition and International Intervention (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 95-148.
23 Previously, Bosnia had been notable for the peaceful coexistence of its multiple ethnicities, the prevalence of inter-ethnic marriages, and the number of its citizens who described themselves as “Yugoslav” on the census; see, inter alia, Ahrens, Diplomacy, 27. Noel Malcolm argues that „[t]he main basis of hostility was not ethnic or religious but economic‟; Bosnia: A Short History (London: MacMillan, 1994), xxi.
24 Technically, refugees must be outside their state of origin; those still within its borders are displaced persons. For brevity‟s sake, however, the former term will be used here, unless the distinction is significant.
25 Laura Silber, „Bosnia War Creates 100,000 Refugees‟, Financial Times, 14 April 1992. 26 „Bosnia Peace Initiatives Earn Breathing Space‟, Globe and Mail, 25 April 1992; John F. Burns, „Bosnia‟s
Nightmare‟, New York Times, 24 May 1992. 27 Hella Pick, „Refugees Flee, Diplomats Dither‟, Guardian, 1 August 1992. 28 Michael T. Kaufman, „Croatia Warns It Will Take Bosnian Refugees to European Borders‟, New York
Times, 16 July 1992. The European response to the refugee problem is discussed below, in Chapter 6.
99
were thought to be at risk in the event of a harsh winter.29 For the remainder of the war,
there was no significant improvement in the refugee problem, which is discussed in more
detail in chapter 6.
Ethnic cleansing presented human rights problems which differed both in kind and
in degree from those which had characterised the earlier stages of Yugoslavia‟s dissolution.
In comparison to the repression in Kosovo and the issues surrounding the democratisation
of Yugoslavia, the human rights dimension of the conflict in Bosnia was much more
serious and fundamental. Civil and political rights such as freedom of the press or political
participation, or even economic rights relating to constraints on Albanians in Kosovo or
Serbs in Croatia, were not fundamentally questions of life and death itself. In Bosnia,
individuals and communities alike were threatened not simply with repression but with
destruction. These issues had begun to emerge in the course of the war in Croatia, but the
difference here was one of degree. For all its atrocities and violence, the ethnic violence in
the Croatian war did not approach the ferocity and deliberate large-scale organisation
which characterised the Bosnian conflict. The context too was different; ethnic Serbs
constituted nearly one-third of the Bosnian population, which radically changed the
dynamic of the conflict in Bosnia in comparison to Croatia. All of these circumstances
became quickly apparent as the conflict developed.
III. Western Knowledge of the Conditions in Bosnia
We know that there is horror in these detention camps. I cannot confirm on hard evidence the -- some of the
charges that have been made. It is absolutely essential -- whatever is going on there -- that there be open
inspection, and that humane treatment of the people in these concentration camps be guaranteed. But in all
honesty, I can‟t confirm to you some of the claims that there is indeed a genocidal process going on there.
- George H. W. Bush 30
The means by which the Bosnian Serbs (and, on occasion, the Croats and Muslims)
pursued their goals were the most urgent and obvious human rights issues in Bosnia, and
therefore received the most attention in the West.31 The extraordinarily heavy media
attention given to Bosnia drove this concern; while certainly not flawless or unbiased, the
media coverage did effectively convey at least the broad outlines of events to Western
29 CIA, Assessment of Humanitarian Situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 9 September 1992. Available from
www.foia.cia.gov (accessed 24 August 2009). 30 „Statement by President Bush, Peterson Air Force Base, Colorado‟, Federal News Service, 6 August 1992. 31 See above, 96-7.
100
audiences. Print journalism played an important role, and could delve into details and
background in way which the broadcast media generally could not, but television coverage
was particularly effective in translating the statistics and studious neutrality of UN reports
or White House press conferences into the effects on real people and places.32 The level of
coverage was bolstered by the relative proximity of the atrocities to the West; it was not far
away in Africa or Asia, but practically next door. There was, as one commentator observed,
„a coincidence of European geography and imagery‟ which made the war much more
shocking to Western eyes than might have been the case for similar events elsewhere in the
world.33 Media coverage of the war was paralleled and supplemented by a variety of
specifically human rights-oriented reporting from non-governmental organisations, notably
including the detailed information produced by Helsinki Watch.34 In 1994, for example,
that organisation sent missions to investigate and publicise abuses in Sarajevo and other
parts of the country under Muslim and Croat control, and sought „to identify persons who
planned or perpetrated abuses‟ in the course of the Bosnian Serb ethnic cleansing
campaign in eastern Bosnia in 1992.35
Numerous official inquiries into human rights abuses in Bosnia, generally set in
motion by multinational organisations such as the UN or EC, also fed public interest.
These missions were mostly established early in the course of the war, some as one-off
investigations, others as ongoing processes and sources of information. The UN Human
Rights Commission appointed former Polish Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki as
Special Rapporteur in mid-August 1992 with a mandate to investigate the reports of
atrocities in Bosnia, and he served in this capacity until August 1995, filing eighteen
32 For a fuller discussion of the role that media played in the West, see, inter alia, Burg and Shoup, The War in
Bosnia-Herzegovina, 162-4; James J. Sadkovich, The U.S. Media and Yugoslavia, 1991-1995 (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1998); Richard Paterson, A. C. Preston, and James Gow, Bosnia by Television (London: British Film Institute, 1996); Danielle S. Sremac, War of Words: Washington Tackles the Yugoslav Conflict (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1999); Gregory Kent, Framing War and Genocide: British Policy and Media Reaction to the War in Bosnia (Cresskill, NJ: Hampton Press, 2005); Mark Thompson, Forging War: The Media in Serbia, Croatia, Bosnia and Hercegovina (Luton: University of Luton Press, 1999), 2-5.
33 Power, Problem from Hell, 279; see also R. Craig Nation, „The Balkan Wars and the International War Convention‟, in Reflections on the Balkan Wars: Ten Years After the Break Up of Yugoslavia, Jeffrey S. Morton et al, eds. (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2004), 148-9.
34 In addition to its yearly reports, Helsinki Watch produced a number of more specific reports on Bosnia, including, inter alia, War Crimes in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Vol. 1, 1 August 1992 (available from
www.hrw.org/en/reports/1992/08/01/war-crimes-bosnia-hercegovina-volume-i; accessed 20 August 2008); War Crimes in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Vol. 2, 1 April 1993 (available from
www.hrw.org/en/reports/1993/04/01/war-crimes-bosnia-hercegovina-volume-ii; accessed 20 August 2008); War Crimes in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Bosanski Samac, 1 April 1994 (available from
www.hrw.org/en/reports/1994/04/01/war-crimes-bosnia-hercegovina-bosanski-samac; accessed 20 August 2008); War Crimes in Bosnia-Herzegovina: UN Ceasefire won‟t help Banja Luka, 1 June 1994 (available from www.hrw.org/en/reports/1994/06/01/war-crimes-bosnia-hercegovina; accessed 20 August 2008).
35 Human Rights Watch, 1995 World Report: Bosnia-Hercegovina. Available from www.hrw.org/legacy/reports/1995/WR95/ (accessed 28 September 2009).
101
detailed and outraged reports on his findings. In October 1992, the Security Council passed
Resolution 780, calling for the establishment of a Commission of Experts to evaluate „the
evidence of grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions and other violations of
international humanitarian law committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia‟.
Commonly called the Bassiouni Commission, after the American law professor who
directed most of its work, it delivered its conclusions in October 1993. The European
Community, in December 1992, sent a delegation led by former diplomat Dame Anne
Warburton to investigate allegations of mass rape. Later in the war, an International
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) was set up and carried out
investigations for legal proceedings.36 In addition to all these, the operations of the UN
High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) and, later, the UN High Commission for
Human Rights (UNHCHR) provided a wealth of information on the effects of the war.
International attention ensured that the human rights abuses being committed in
Bosnia were quickly and amply documented, making this information easily available to
policymakers. Some of the coverage addressed the broad picture of the conduct of the
war, while others discussed particular incidents in more detail, such as Serb hostage-taking
or Bosnian government use of civilians as shields.37 Television coverage of the Trnopolje
camp in early August 1992, for instance, was very effective in translating the language of
human rights into reality for the viewers.38 The periodic reports filed by Mazowiecki laid
out in great detail the multitude of abuses to which civilians were subjected.39 The work by
human rights NGOs, too, went into detail on many issues, with the explicit intention of
influencing the international response. As the 1994 Human Rights Watch report put it, the
organisation „continued monitoring and reporting on violations of the rules of war in
Bosnia … with a view to identifying by name those responsible for such abuses‟, in support
of its call for the establishment of a war crimes tribunal.40
Western governments paid heed to outside sources of information but also had
36 UN Security Council Resolution 808, 22 February 1993; Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 2
of Security Council Resolution 808, S/25704, paras. 93-98, 3 May 1993. 37 Chuck Sudetic, „Serbs Hold 5,000 Hostages Fleeing the War in Bosnia‟, New York Times, 21 May 1992;
John F. Burns, „Muslim Officer Stops U.N. Evacuation of Srebrenica‟, New York Times, 5 April 1993. 38 Power, Problem from Hell, 276. 39 On forced military recruitment, see First Periodic Report on the situation of human rights in the territory of the
former Yugoslavia submitted by Mr. Tadeusz Mazowiecki, Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, E/CN.4/1994/3, 5 May 1993, 14, paras. 63-7; on summary executions, Fifth Periodic Report…, E/CN.4/1994/47, 17 November 1993, 6, paras. 29-34, 8 paras. 47-50, 11-12, paras. 77-82; on the use of torture, Tenth Periodic Report…, E/CN.4/1995/57, 16 January 1995, 8, paras. 24-5; and on the military targeting of civilian populations, Twelfth Periodic Report…, E/CN.4/1996/6, 5 July 1995, 14-15, paras. 66-70. All available from www.un.org/documents/.
40 Human Rights Watch, 1994 World Report: Bosnia-Hercegovina. Available from www.hrw.org/legacy/reports/1994/WR94/ (accessed 28 September 2009).
102
their own intelligence. In the US, for example, a classified State Department memorandum
dated 14 April 1992 documented a
clear pattern of use of force, intimidation, and provocation to violence aimed at
forcibly partitioning [Bosnia] and effecting large forced transfers of population….
The clear intent of Serbian use of force is to displace non-Serbs from mixed areas
(including areas where Serbs are a minority) to consolidate Bosnian Serb claims to
some 60% of Bosnian territory … in a manner which would create a "Serbian
Bosnia.”41
Some lower-level officials spent considerable time and effort to keep their superiors well
informed on events in Bosnia, but with only limited success and at some risk to their
professional prospects.42 In August, two Congressional staffers (including the future
ambassador to Croatia, Peter Galbraith) researched and wrote a report for the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee which noted that „the US state department … had early
reports of killings associated with the forcible transfer of populations but did not follow
up on the reports‟.43 Nonetheless, the US government was sufficiently well informed that it
was able to submit to the UN between September 1992 and July 1993 eight detailed and
lengthy reports „relating to the violations of humanitarian law, including grave breaches of
the Geneva Conventions, being committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia‟,
pursuant to UN Security Council Resolution 771.44
Certain specific issues attained an importance and level of interest which made
them stand out above the general background noise of quotidian abuses. One of the first
of these, emerging in the summer of 1992, was the existence of concentration or detention
camps in Bosnia-Herzegovina. These camps first came to public attention in mid-July, with
the publication the first of a series of pieces by journalist Roy Gutman in Newsday.45
Gutman‟s reporting described a network of camps run by the Bosnian Serbs in which
thousands of Muslim and Croat civilians and prisoners of war were imprisoned under
appalling conditions and systematically slaughtered.46 Follow-up reporting quickly built on
Gutman‟s work, detailing the horrendous abuses being committed in the camps and the full
41 Quoted in Power, Problem from Hell, 264. 42 Ibid., 264-9, 287. Power quotes the response to a junior State Department official‟s appeal for action in
Burundi in 1972 as still representative of the State Department mindset; he was asked, „do you know of any official whose career has been advanced because he spoke out for human rights?‟; ibid., 83.
43 Quoted in Silber and Little, Death, 251. 44 Dispatch Vol. 3, Nos. 39, 43, 46, 52, Vol. 4, Nos. 6, 15, 16, and 30. 45 These reports are collected in Gutman, Witness to Genocide. 46 Roy Gutman, „The Death Camps of Bosnia‟, Newsday 2 August 1992.
103
scale of the system. By 3 August, the US government was confirming reports of torture
and executions in the Serb-run camps, and the Red Cross was pushing for access to all of
the reported camps.47 Human Rights Watch later reported that „deliberate and systematic
torture was widespread in Serbian-controlled detention camps throughout Bosnia-
Hercegovina, and summary executions, disappearances, severe beatings and sexual abuse
were common there‟.48 Inmates were subject to random violence, filthy living conditions,
and deprivation of food, water, and shelter. These abuses were committed both on
imprisoned civilians and on legitimate prisoners of war.
The Gutman stories were the first to publicise the camps, but Western
governments and international organisations had had information for several months
confirming both their existence and the conditions therein. Rumours about detention
camps had begun circulating nearly a year before, during the Croatian conflict.49 A
Canadian humanitarian group provided information to the UN on the existence of and
conditions in concentration camps associated with the Croatian war as early as January
1992.50 The Bosnian government had reported the existence of camps in that republic,
based on eyewitness accounts, to the UN Secretary General in May, and followed up with „a
more precise list of camp locations‟ in July.51 Unfortunately, as Human Rights Watch put it,
„high-ranking U.N. officials withheld this information from the press and public‟.52 As with
the more general abuses, the US government in particular was well-informed about the
camps long before they became publicly known. CIA analyst Jon Western, working largely
on his own initiative, had developed a clear picture of the network of camps by early July,
and reported his conclusions to his superiors.53 The Senate Foreign Relations Committee
Report of 18 August, mentioned above, concluded that „inadequate shelter, food and
sanitation are the universal characteristics of these camps. Rape, beatings and killings
occurred in some instances…. Killings in the camps often appear to be recreational and
sadistic‟.54
47 Don Oberdorfer, „U.S. Verifies Killings in Serb Camps‟, Washington Post, 4 August 1992; Stephen
Engelberg, „Red Cross Seeking Speedy Access To Serbian “Concentration Camp”„, New York Times, 3 August 1992.
48 Human Rights Watch, 1993 World Report. 49 Oberdorfer, „Red Cross Seeking…‟. 50 Leonard Doyle, „UN “Given Evidence of Torture in January”„, Independent, 10 August 1992. The article
identifies the camps as „in Bosnia‟, but in fact those mentioned in the article were located in Serbia, and predated the Bosnian war.
51 Bosnian UN Ambassador Mohamed Sacirbey, quoted in Silber and Little, Death, 252. 52 Michael Simmons, „West Under Fire for Division and Inertia‟, Guardian, 19 August 1992. 53 Power, Problem from Hell, 265-6. 54 Quoted in John M. Goshko, „“Ethnic Cleansing” by Serb Militias Found to Result in Many Deaths‟,
Washington Post, 19 August 1992.
104
Related to and overlapping the issue of the camps were the allegations of mass
rape in Bosnia, which differed from what Geoffrey Robertson calls „“spoils-of-war”
rapes‟.55 The situation in Bosnia was instead what one commentator later described as a
„policy of genocidal rape‟ carried out by the Serbs, which „aimed at the destruction of a
people‟.56 The press began to report on it as early as June 1992.57 Mention of rape as one
abuse among many continued and increased over the next few months, but one of the first
articles to focus specifically on the commission of mass rape as a military tactic appeared in
late August. Quoting interviews and testimony by multiple victims and by doctors and
refugee workers, the article described a deliberate policy of mass rape of Muslim women
by Serb soldiers and paramilitaries. According to one of the doctors who examined some
of the victims, the women were „raped because it was the goal of the war. My impression is
that someone had an order to rape the girls‟.58 Further reporting elaborated on the scale
and full implications of the practice. On 8 September, a Times article entitled „Rape is a War
Crime Too‟ pointed out that „the fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 … expressly forbid
the sexual abuse of women civilians‟ and, furthermore, that „rape of civilian women in war
might contravene the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide‟.59
Press coverage intensified in the latter part of 1992 and the first half of 1993, leading to
the spectacle of foreign journalists „scouring refugee camps [asking] “Anyone here been
raped and speak English?”‟60
The subject of rape as a war crime was taken up by a large number of NGOs, both
in the form of investigations and in working to keep the issue in the international spotlight.
An investigation by the World Council of Churches concluded that rape was being used as
a „weapon of war‟.61 Amnesty International reported that rape was being „carried out in an
organised and systematic way‟ which derived from the Serb ethnic cleansing campaign.62
Three Croatian women‟s organisations hired a prominent American law professor,
Catherine MacKinnon, to argue their case in front of an international legal tribunal (which,
it must be noted, did not yet exist). According to MacKinnon, „[o]ne of the goals … is to
55 Geoffrey Robertson, QC, Crimes Against Humanity: The Struggle for Global Justice (London: Penguin Books,
1999), 87. “Spoils of war” rapes, already „prohibited in terms by Geneva Convention IV and as a form of torture by all human rights conventions … were not taken seriously until they featured in war crimes indictments‟ handed down later by the ICTY.
56 Allen, Rape Warfare, 100. See also Mercier, Crimes, 117-21. 57 John F. Burns, „Bosnian Survivors Recount Brutality and Mass Slayings‟, New York Times, 21 June 1992. 58 Roy Gutman, „Muslims Recall Serb Attacks‟, Newsday, 23 August 1992. 59 Barbara Hewson, „Rape Is a War Crime Too‟, The Times, 8 September 1992. 60 Linda Grant, „Anyone Here Been Raped and Speak English?‟, Guardian, 2 August 1993. 61 Gustav Niebuhr, „Religious Groups Decry Mass Rape in Bosnia‟, Washington Post, 23 December 1992. 62 Leonard Doyle, „Bosnia Rapes “Horrifying” Says Amnesty‟, Independent, 22 January 1993.
105
establish that rape is a violation of women‟s human rights, for peacetime as well‟.63
By the end of 1992, official investigations of the rape stories were also being
carried out. The most prominent, dedicated specifically to the issue, was the EC Mission
led by Dame Anne Warburton. Initiated at the European Council meeting in Edinburgh on
11-12 December, the Mission spent a total of nearly two weeks investigating in Croatia and
Bosnia in late December and again in late January. While „its mandate focused on the
investigation of alleged abuses against Muslim women‟ in Bosnia, the Mission‟s report
pointed out that the prevalence of rape of Muslim women was „explicable in terms of the
intensity and pattern of the conflict‟, and that there were „many and disturbing reports of
rape of Croat and Serbian women and children, as well as sexual abuse of men in detention
camps‟.64 It further noted the inherent difficulties in obtaining accurate information under
the conditions in Bosnia.65
Nevertheless, the Warburton Report concluded that „the rape of Muslim women
has been – and perhaps still is – perpetrated on a wide scale and in such a way as to be part
of a clearly recognizable pattern, sufficient to form an important element of war strategy‟.
It accepted estimates of around 20,000 victims as most plausible, though the suggested
numbers ranged between half and three times that amount; such a figure suggested
perhaps a thousand resulting pregnancies. It dismissed arguments that the rapes were „a by-
product of war‟, opting instead for „the view that rape is part of a pattern of abuse, usually
perpetrated with the conscious intention of demoralising and terrorising communities,
driving them from their home regions and demonstrating the power of the invading
forces‟.66 The Mission‟s recommendations focused primarily on what was needed to
ameliorate conditions and treat the victims in Bosnia and Croatia, but also noted its belief
that „there is now a strong case for clearly identifying these abuses as war crimes‟ and
emphasised the need to support the efforts of various agencies to gather documentary
evidence of the abuses.67
Mazowiecki‟s investigations corroborated these findings, albeit cautiously. In his
report dated 10 February 1993, Mazowiecki asserted that 63 Judy Mann, „Rape and War Crimes‟, Washington Post, 13 January 1993. 64 Warburton Mission II Report (EC Investigative Mission into the Treatment of Muslim Women in the Former
Yugoslavia), February 1993, para. 9. Available from www.womenaid.org/press/info/humanrights/warburtonfull.htm (accessed 8 April 2008). 65 Ibid., para. 10. 66 Ibid., paras. 10, 13, 14, 17, 18, 20. The Warburton report is not without its critics; Françoise Hampson, for
instance, describes it as „handicapped by a discriminatory mandate, inadequate time and a questionable methodology‟, and recommends the „detailed examination and assessments‟ in the Mazowiecki reports as „a useful balance‟. Françoise Hampson, „Law and War‟, in International Perspectives on the Yugoslav Conflict, Alex Danchev and Thomas Halverson, eds., (New York: St. Martin‟s Press, 1996), 167.
67 Warburton Report, paras. 28-41, 42, 43.
106
rape is one of … the variety of methods which are used to achieve ethnic
cleansing…. [It] has been used not only as an attack on the individual victim, but is
intended to humiliate, shame, degrade and terrify the entire ethnic group.68
He argued that „it is not possible at present to determine the numbers of victims‟ but „it is
clear that there are large numbers involved and care for them must be the first priority‟.69
The report included an extensive annex detailing the investigation and conclusions of a
team of medical experts on which Mazowiecki had based his report.70 Mazowiecki, too,
distinguished between rape as a by-product of war and as a deliberate policy, which he
found was primarily committed by ethnic Serb forces against Muslim women.71 His later
reports noted the commission of rapes by Croats and Muslims as well as Serbs, and,
eventually, the slow diminution of the commission of rape in Bosnia. In February 1994, he
wrote that rape „remains widespread, if not on a scale comparable to that earlier in the
course of the war‟.72 That was the last mention of rape in Mazowiecki‟s reports save for a
single instance in his final report in August 1995.73
Work independently undertaken by the UN Commission of Experts, created in
October 1992, took a similarly careful tack. In its first interim report in February 1993, the
Commission simply noted the existence of the allegations and its intention to investigate
them.74 In its second and final report in October 1993, it noted that the majority of cases
which it had reviewed involved the reported rape of Muslim women by Bosnian Serbs, but
hesitated to endorse „the conclusion that a systematic rape policy existed‟, perhaps in
consideration of its mandate to examine the strictly legal evidence for violations of
international humanitarian law.75 Although it argued that the systemic nature of the rapes
„remain[ed] to be proved‟, the report acknowledged that, among other factors, „[g]roup
involvement of the members of the same military units in rape suggests command 68 Report on the situation of human rights in the territory of the former Yugoslavia submitted by Mr. Tadeusz Mazowiecki,
Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, UN doc. E/CN.4/1993/50, 10 February 1993, p. 19, para. 85. Available from www.un.org/en/documents/ (accessed 22 September 2006).
69 Ibid., 19-20, para. 86. For a discussion of the various estimates concerning the number of rapes, see Burg and Shoup, The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 170.
70 Ibid., Annex II, 63-75. 71 Ibid., 55, para. 260. 72 Fifth Periodic Report…, paras. 20-28; Sixth Periodic Report…, E/CN.4/1994/110, 21 February 1994, para. 55. 73 Final Periodic Report on the situation of human rights in the territory of the former Yugoslavia submitted by Mr. Tadeusz
Mazowiecki, Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, E/CN.4/1996/9, 22 August 1995, para. 45. All available from www.un.org/en/documents/ (accessed 22 September 2006).
74 First interim report of the Commission of Experts established pursuant to Security Council resolution 780 (1992), UN doc. S/25274, 10 February 1993, 17, paras. 58-60. Available from www.un.org/en/documents (accessed 22 September 2006).
75 Second interim report of the Commission of Experts, 16, para. 68.
107
responsibility by commission or omission‟.76 In the Commission‟s opinion,
[i]f further investigations prove that a nexus exists between these activities and the
policy of "ethnic cleansing", then it could be argued that rape has been used as an
instrument of war and carried out in a manner designed to instil terror, shame and
other psychological consequences in a given population group to coerce their
removal and prevent their return. However, the consequences and conclusions of
such practices have yet to be determined more fully by comprehensive
investigations.77
The Commission then declared its intention to conduct such investigations, depending on
appropriate support from UN Member States.78
Looming over and subsuming all of this – the civilian abuse, the camps, the rapes,
the ethnic cleansing and goals of the war – was the issue of genocide. Since World War II,
genocide has come to rank as the ultimate in human rights abuses, something that is
completely unjustifiable and, in theory at least, completely unacceptable. But consisting as it
does of a multitude of other acts, all tied together by the overall intentions of the
perpetrators, genocide is much more difficult to delineate and prove than the existence of
concentration camps or allegations of mass rape. The 1948 UN Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment on Genocide defines the term thus:
In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts committed
with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious
group, as such:
(a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about
its physical destruction in whole or in part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.79
76 Ibid., 16, para. 69. 77 Ibid., 16-17, para. 70. 78 Ibid., 19, paras. 81-3. The prevalence of mass rape was later called into question, but this did not affect
the information on which Western governments were (or were not) acting in 1992 and 1993. See, for example, Linda Grant, „Where Have All the Raped Bosnian Women Gone?‟, Globe and Mail, 14 August 1993. For a discussion of the lack of evidence for the estimated numbers, see Neier , War Crimes, 176.
79 Article 2.
108
The Convention binds its Contracting Parties to „undertake to prevent and punish‟
genocide as a „crime under international law‟, and the prominent international human rights
lawyer Geoffrey Robertson argues further that it „has been ratified by such a large majority
of states that it can now be considered a rule of modern customary international law,
binding on all states (whether they have ratified the convention or not)‟.80
Genocide was a concept with particular resonance in Yugoslavia as a result of its
experiences during World War II. Serbs in the Nazi-backed independent wartime Croatia
had been subjected to genocidal policies under the Ustashe government of Ante Pavelic.
With the goal of creating an ethnically-pure Croatia (which included large parts of modern
Bosnia), the Pavelic regime attempted to wipe out the Serb population. Hundreds of
thousands of Serbs were killed by Ustashe death squads and in Croatian concentration
camps, though the precise numbers will probably never be determined and are the subject
of considerable debate.81 These events were still in living memory when Yugoslavia began
to disintegrate, and they were quickly appropriated for use in the developing conflict. There
was a resurgence of interest in the wartime genocide in Serbian nationalist circles in the
mid-1980s.82 By 1989, Croatia was being accused, at a series of rallies organised by the
Writer‟s Association of Serbia, of continuing its genocidal policies against the Croatian
Serbs.83 Once violence broke out, the “ustashe” label was revived by the Serbs to apply to
the Croatians.84 In return, the Croatians and, later, the Muslims, often referred to the Serb
forces as “chetniks”, after the brutal wartime Serbian royalist faction. Many Serb
paramilitaries proudly assumed the name; Vojislav Seselj officially adopted it for his
paramilitary force, the Chetnik Movement.
The first accusations of genocide in the Yugoslav wars came from (or on behalf of)
the Serbs: in September 1991, Milosevic accused Croatia of resuming a „policy of genocide‟
that had begun in World War II.85 In January 1992, the Yugoslav federal government in
Belgrade sent a memorandum to the UN, the EC, and all major Western governments
which claimed that
80 Article 1; see also Robertson, Crimes, 212. 81 The official Yugoslav government figure was some 600,000 deaths at the camp at Jasenovac, for instance,
while nationalist Croat accounts argue that only some 60,000 Serbs died in all of Croatia during the war. On this subject, see, inter alia, Branka Magas, „Franjo Tudjman – Obituary‟, originally in Independent, 13 December 1999. Available at www.bosnia.org.uk/news/news/171299_2.cfm. Accessed 22 June 2010; Cviic, „Slovene and Croat Perspectives‟, 128. Bennett accepts a figure of about 85,000 for Jasenovac; Yugoslavia‟s Bloody Collapse, 45-6.
82 Dragovic-Soso, Saviours, 100-114. 83 Ibid., 236. 84 Some of whom, it should be noted, deliberately courted the label; see Silber and Little, Death, 93, fn. 1. 85 Quoted in Paul L. Montgomery, „Yugoslavs Joust at Peace Meeting‟, New York Times, 8 September 1991;
see also Bennett, Yugoslavia‟s Bloody Collapse, 140-41.
109
the Croatian organs of government and their paramilitary and outlaw armed
formations have, in the course of 1991 and the beginning of 1992, for the second
time in half a century, committed the crime of genocide against the Serbian
people in Croatia and other serious criminal acts.86
In support of its claim, the memorandum cited various acts of ethnic cleansing, including
the destruction of cultural monuments, abuse and murder of civilians, arbitrary arrests, and
the suppression of the Orthodox Church. It also drew explicit connections and parallels to
the Pavelic regime, citing its anti-Serb policies and extensively describing Croatian attacks
on the museum and memorial at Jasenovac.87 Croatian Serbs frequently referred to the
treatment of their community during World War II as a justification for their unwillingness
to live in an independent Croatia. In Bosnia, the Serb leadership played up the idea that the
Serbs faced an existential threat, necessitating their demands for territorial concessions and
control: „Since we are losing Yugoslavia as a sovereign state … we have to have other
insurance which we can only have in confederal units within Bosnia-Hercegovina‟.88 Later,
as criticism mounted of Serbian actions in Bosnia, Belgrade accused the „international
media‟ of subjecting the Serbs to a „new form of genocide … It is as if the international
public is being prepared for Serbia‟s destruction‟.89
Despite these early attempts by the Serbs to appropriate the term for their own use,
most references to genocide in Bosnia cast Serbs as the perpetrators, not the victims.
Although he avoided the use of the word itself, Radovan Karadzic evoked the spectre of
genocide committed by the Serbs as early as October 1991, when in the Bosnian Parliament
he warned his opponents:
Do not think that you will not lead Bosnia-Herzegovina into hell, and do not think
that you will not perhaps make the Muslim people disappear, because the Muslims
cannot defend themselves if there is war - How will you prevent everyone from
being killed in Bosnia-Herzegovina?90
86 „Yugoslav Government Sends Memorandum to UN and Others on “Genocide” in Croatia‟, BBC Summary
of World Broadcasts/Tanjug, 3 February 1992. 87 Milosevic (and separatist Croatian Serb leaders) made good use of the spectre of Jasenovac to frighten
the Croatian Serbs; see Tanner, Croatia, 230-31. 88 Karadzic, quoted in H. Evans Thomas, „Bosnia-Hercegovina Prepares for Independence Referendum‟,
United Press International, 28 February 1992. 89 Ian Traynor, „Serbia‟s All Too Immovable Object Defies All Too Resistable Force‟, Guardian, 18 April
1992. 90 Quoted in Silber and Little, Death, 215.
110
Without an agreed territorial division prior to recognition, he warned, „no one will be able
to prevent civil war in Bosnia‟.91 Some observers abroad noted the developing dynamic in
Bosnia well before open war began. American diplomat Herbert Okun, for example, was
concerned by the escalation in rhetoric and fear mongering, warning Karadzic in early 1992
that his insistence on „the mortal danger that Serbs are under in Bosnia‟ would lead to
„preemptive genocide‟.92
References to genocide increased as soon as the war broke out, but the official
comments were carefully and cautiously phrased, at least for a while. On the very day that
the EC recognised Bosnia, Croatian President Tudjman announced that „Croatia has to find
a way to protect the rights of the Croatian people in Bosnia-Hercegovina and to prevent
genocide against them‟.93 He did not, however, allege that genocide was currently in
progress. By the middle of May, Bosnian Foreign Minister Haris Silajdzic was making
repeated reference to the commission of „cultural genocide‟ by the Serbs, but again, did not
make any claims concerning genocide per se.94
The caution applied to the use of the word “genocide” by the Bosnians did not last
long. President Izetbegovic still avoided the term itself when he told reporters on 9 June
that „[t]he aggressor is committing terrible massacres against the civilian population. Such
tragedies have never been seen here even during World War II‟, but he was clearly making
reference to genocide.95 An anonymous Sarajevo resident was less restrained when he
managed to telephone the home of an American diplomat in Belgrade: „[t]his is citizen of
Sarajevo. Do you know what is happening in Sarajevo? This is genocide, this is holocaust.
What will you do? Please will you do something?‟96 By June 1993, all reticence had
disappeared; Silajdzic called on the delegates at the World Conference on Human Rights in
Vienna „to take all measures to stop the genocide in at least one town, Gorazde … This is
the test. If this is not done I don‟t think there will be any credibility left for any of us in the
international community or in the United Nations…. Bosnia-Herzegovina is not a natural
91 Dusan Stojanovic, „Serbs In Bosnia Urge Federal Army To Take Control‟, Associated Press, 5 March 1992. 92 Quoted in Rieff, Slaughterhouse, 112. In May 1993, Karadzic accused Izetbegovic of „lead[ing] his people to
the brink of total extinction‟ by his rejection of a tripartite division of Bosnia; see John Pomfret, „Joint Plan on Balkans Denounced‟, Washington Post, 24 May 1993.
93 „Croatian President Hints at Military Support for Bosnia‟, United Press International, 6 April 1992. 94 Quoted in „Hearing of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe re: The Crisis in Bosnia-
Herzegovina‟, Federal News Service, 12 May 1992; „News conference with Haris Silajdzic‟, Federal News Service, 19 May 1992.
95 John F. Burns, „Bosnian, Desperate Over Shelling, Appeals to U.S. for an Air Attack‟, New York Times, 9 June 1992.
96 Ibid.
111
disaster. It is a genocide by the Serbian regime in Belgrade‟.97
These claims slowly developed traction in the Western media. The reporting on the
camps, for instance, and the reactions to that reporting, included numerous explicit
comparisons with the Nazis.98 Even so, a New York Times special report in August 1992
could still state that there was „little evidence, as yet, [of] a policy of mass killing [at the
camps]…. the [US] investigation did not substantiate assertions that the camps had once
again brought genocide to the heart of Europe‟.99 By late in the year, though, headlines
described „a new savage age‟ and „horrors … [which] recall the Nazi nightmare‟, and
editorials called on the West to „draw … the line short of genocide‟.100 Accusations of
genocide were nevertheless still not fully accepted; headlines in the summer of 1993 still
put the word in quotation marks, while the Irish Times announced that „claims of genocide
on all sides deserve closer examination‟.101
NGOs and official investigators took up the question and provided a wealth of
documentation concerning genocide in Bosnia. While clear about the extent of ethnic
cleansing and human rights abuse, they were initially cautious about making extreme claims.
Mazowiecki never explicitly addressed the question of genocide, but the information
included in his reports over a three year period strongly supports the allegations. Even in
his earliest reports, he declared that „the Muslim population are the principal victims [of
widespread and serious human rights violations] and are virtually threatened with
extinction‟.102 Human Rights Watch, in August 1992, was only prepared to say that „the
extent of the violence and the fact that it is targeted along ethnic/religious lines raises the
question of whether genocide is taking place‟, but it was willing, in stages, to go further.103
In its 1993 Report (which covered events in 1992), the organisation was willing to state that
„[t]he extent of the violence and its selective nature along ethnic and religious lines suggest
crimes of genocidal character against Muslim and, to a lesser extent, Croatian populations
97 Quoted in „Bosnia challenges all nations to end “genocide”„, Glasgow Herald, 16 June 1993. In a May 1994
interview, a „senior Muslim official referred to the atrocities as “the tenth Serbian genocide against the Muslims”‟; Touval, Mediation, 105.
98 Power, Problem from Hell, 276-9. See also Peter Novick, The Holocaust in American Life (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1999), 251-5.
99 Stephen Engelberg with Chuck Sudetic, „In Enemy Hands – A Special Report‟, New York Times, 16 August 1992.
100 Michael Getler, „In Europe, a New Savage Age‟, Washington Post, 21 December 1992; David J. Scheffer, „Drawing the Line Short of Genocide‟, New York Times, 29 December 1992.
101 „Bosnia challenges…‟; David B. Ottaway, „Rights Assembly Demands Action on Bosnia “Genocide”„, Washington Post, 25 June 1993; Ian Traynor, „Claims of Genocide On All Sides Deserve Closer Examination‟, Irish Times, 18 June 1993.
102 Report…, E/CN.4/1992/S-1/10 27, 2, para. 5. 103 Human Rights Watch, War Crimes in Bosnia-Hercegovina, Vol. 2; quoted in Sarah A. Kent, „Writing the
Yugoslav Wars: English Language Books on Bosnia (1992-1996) and the Challenges of Analyzing Contemporary History‟, American Historical Review, Vol. 102, No. 4 (October, 1997), 1107.
112
in Bosnia-Hercegovina‟.104 The second volume of War Crimes in Bosnia-Herzegovina in April
took an even firmer position: „What is taking place in Bosnia-Hercegovina is attempted
genocide – the extermination of a people in whole or in part because of their race, religion
or ethnicity‟, and although all sides were guilty of abuses, „the chief offenders have been
the Serbian military and paramilitary forces‟.105 Some organisations were less reticent, such
as the London-based Action for Bosnia, which while still not making the accusation
outright, strongly suggested in a December 1992 publication that genocide was being
committed by the Serbs in Bosnia. 106
The analyses of subordinate officials in Western governments also supported the
allegations of genocide, even if their superiors resisted the use of the term due to its legal
implications.107 George Kenney, the State Department official in charge of the Yugoslav
desk in 1992, flatly declared when resigning in protest of US inaction that „what‟s going on
in Bosnia is genocide‟, and that only a wilful blindness and refusal to confirm the reports
coming out of the Serbian camps allowed the US and UN to ignore the provisions of the
Genocide Convention.108 In April 1993, regional specialists in the State Department wrote
an internal memorandum which called for Western military intervention to end „Serbian
aggression and … genocide‟.109 They were unsuccessful in persuading their superiors:
references to genocide were deleted from their memoranda, and they were requested to
provide evidence of atrocities by the Bosnian government forces, in an apparent attempt to
„muddy the waters‟.110 In August the Croatian desk officer at the State Department resigned
in protest of US inaction. His reasons echoed Kenney‟s the year before: „A dangerous
precedent is being set. Genocide is taking place again in Europe, yet we, the European
Community and the rest of the international community stand by and watch‟.111 As Richard
Johnson, yet another former State Department Yugoslav specialist, aptly put it, „[s]ome call
it genocide – but not those who can make a difference‟.112
104 Human Rights Watch, 1993 World Report. 105 Human Rights Watch, War Crimes in Bosnia-Hercegovina, Vol. 2; quoted in Kent, „Writing the Yugoslav
Wars‟, 1107. 106 Mazower, The War in Bosnia, 19. The same publication discusses the conduct of ethnic cleansing in some
detail, including the deliberate nature of the policy, conditions in the camps, and mass rape; 16-23. 107 Don Oberdorfer, „U.S. Aide Resigns Over Balkan Policy‟, Washington Post, 26 August 1992. 108 Eric Schmitt, „U.S. Aide Who Quit Calls Yugoslav Policy Ineffective‟, New York Times, 27 August 1992;
„George Kenney‟s Message‟, New York Times, 27 August 1992. It is only fair to note that Kenney‟s interpretation of Bosnia later changed; less than three years later, he was arguing that „the charge of Genocide has worn thin‟; see George Kenney, „The Bosnian Calculation‟, New York Times, 23 April 1995.
109 Martin Walker, „Clinton Hit By Revolt on Bosnia‟, Guardian, 24 April 1993. 110 Simms, Unfinest Hour, 91. 111 Steven A. Holmes, „State Dept. Expert on Croatia Resigns to Protest Policy in the Balkans‟, New York
Times, 24 August 1993. 112 Richard Johnson, „Some Call It Genocide‟, Washington Post, 13 February 1994.
113
Although little effect on actual policy could be discerned, it is clear that higher
officials in the US at least were increasingly persuaded by the kind of analyses coming out
of the State Department. It was implicit in Lawrence Eagleburger‟s December 1992
warning that the world had „a moral and historical obligation not to stand back a second
time in this century while a people faces obliteration‟.113 A letter to President Clinton from
a bipartisan group of Congress members in April 1993 was rather less oblique when it
declared that „the United States cannot acquiesce in genocide in Bosnia‟.114 But although
Clinton‟s new Secretary of State Warren Christopher admitted in his confirmation hearings
that the Serbian campaign in Bosnia had resulted in „near genocidal or perhaps really
genocidal conditions‟, he did little to follow up on this once confirmed.115 And if a
November 1993 written reply from the State Department to a House subcommittee stated
unequivocally that „the Department of State does believe that certain acts committed as
part of the systematic Bosnian Serb campaign of “ethnic cleansing” in Bosnia constitute
acts of genocide‟, the administration as a whole resisted this conclusion.116 An even greater
reticence was shown by the Europeans, who were less inclined than the US to look in any
detail at what was happening in the former Yugoslavia. The British, for example, habitually
downplayed the seriousness of events throughout the war.117
The question of whether genocide was being committed in Bosnia was (and is) not
necessarily as clear as it may seem; the issue was one of „enormous complexity‟, and
ultimately „[t]he determination of genocide depends on one‟s definition‟.118 A clear
equivalency cannot necessarily be drawn between ethnic cleansing and genocide, even if
that usage „has been absorbed into the general, everyday, vocabulary‟.119 One argument
against equating the two concerns the number of dead. Estimates ranged as high as
250,000, but most were between 70,000 and 100,000, and even the Bosnian government,
with „an interest in portraying the number as high as possible‟ revised its claim downward
in April 1995 to 145,000, „about 3 percent of the prewar population‟.120 Although „a
sobering number‟, as Charles Boyd puts it, he questions whether „that total after 38 months
113 Don Oberdorfer, „Eagleburger Urges Trial of Serb Leaders‟, Washington Post, 17 December 1992. 114 Walker, „Clinton Hit…‟. 115 And his choice of words was, of course, was carefully calculated to avoid triggering the Genocide
Convention‟s requirements to act in cases of genocide. Johnson, „Some Call…‟. 116 Ibid. See also Graham Fraser, „Bosnian Debate Flares Again in Bosnia‟, Globe and Mail, 5 February 1994. 117 Simms, Unfinest Hour, 24. 118 Burg and Shoup, The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 181. 119 Henry R. Huttenbach, „The Genocide Factor in the Yugoslav Wars of Dismemberment‟, in Reflections on
the Balkan Wars, Jeffrey S. Morton et al, eds. (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2004), 24. 120 Charles G. Boyd, „Making Peace with the Guilty‟, in Bosnia: What Went Wrong? (Foreign Affairs
Reader/Council on Foreign Relations, Inc., 1998), 70.
114
of warfare make[s] charges of genocide a meaningful contribution to policy debate‟.121
George Kenney later made a similar critique: after pointing out that the Stockholm
International Peace Research Institute in 1996 estimated only 30-50,000 deaths, he
condemned „[h]ysterical journalists‟ of inappropriately „revv[ing] up visions of Nazi
concentration camps and the killing fields of Cambodia‟.122 Brent Scowcroft, on the other
hand, addressed the issue of motivation. He believed that
[i]n Bosnia … we all got ethnic cleansing mixed up with genocide … Ethnic
cleansing is not “I want to destroy an ethnic group, wipe it out.” It‟s “They‟re not
going to live with us. They can live where they like, but not with us” … There is a
proscription on genocide, but there is not a proscription on killing people.123
Another critic of equating the two concepts argued that, in Bosnia, „the concept of
genocide was reinvented to encompass‟ ethnic cleansing, reapplying to simple expulsion
what rightly belonged to the Holocaust.124
But determining genocide is not simply an exercise in counting the dead.125 Human
Rights Watch head Aryeh Neier was certain that genocide was being committed; Bosnia
„was the first time Human Rights Watch invoked the Genocide Convention; the first time
we called for international intervention; and the first time we called for the establishment
of a war crimes tribunal‟.126 Henry Huttenbach, in his consideration of „the genocide
factor‟, concludes that „mass expulsions can be a part of a process endangering the
existence of a group … [they] were accompanied by willful, lethal violence on a scale that
suggested bona fide genocide … The goal was not merely control of ancestral territory but
also the elimination of the targeted ethno-populations‟.127 Countering Scowcroft‟s ideas
concerning intent, Mark Almond points out that the attacks were not only about expelling
the “wrong” population; they also targeted „the physical monuments to the centuries of
Muslim culture in Bosnia‟, and particularly aimed at
exterminating those people who embodied the separate identity of the Muslims.
Muslim clergy … were frequently killed on the spot or later separated out from 121 Ibid. 122 George Kenney, „Letter: Another Interpretation of the War in Bosnia‟, Guardian, 17 April 1997. 123 Quoted in Power, Problem from Hell, 288-9. 124 Raju G. C. Thomas, „Prologue: Making War, Peace, and History‟, in Yugoslavia Unraveled: Sovereignty, Self-
Determination, Intervention, Raju G. C. Thomas, ed., (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2003), p. viii. 125 Power, Problem from Hell, 65. 126 Neier, Taking Liberties, 305. 127 Huttenbach, „The Genocide Factor‟, 24-5.
115
other prisoners to be murdered…. the educational and social elite of the Muslim
community was particularly savagely attacked. The deliberate murder of lawyers,
doctors and teachers gave the lie to the propaganda claims that the Serbs were not
bent on anything more than protection of their own people and were happy to let
the Muslims enjoy autonomy in their own areas. By eliminating so many members
of the Muslim elite, the Serb forces were engaged in an attempt to render any kind
of Muslim society unviable.128
All of this in combination, as Almond concludes, „seemed to fit the definition of genocide
given in the UN convention‟.129
In sum, there was a vast amount of information available to Western governments
about human rights abuses in Bosnia from the moment the war began, if not before. All of
the various sources – the media, international human rights NGOs, the UN-sponsored
investigations of Mazowiecki and the Bassiouni Commission, and the missions and
intelligence agencies of the EC, its member states, and the US – confirmed, repeated, and
expanded on what was already known. It was effectively impossible for Washington,
London, Paris, or Brussels to claim that they did not know what was happening (although
they did, particularly early in the war). Western policymakers were not acting in a state of
ignorance regarding human rights abuses in Bosnia. This knowledge did not, however,
translate into strong or effective actions to stop these abuses. The human rights aspects of
the policies which the West did adopt are discussed in the next two chapters, but it is
necessary first to consider why officials in the West displayed less rather than more concern
for human rights as the level of abuses – and the level of knowledge about those abuses –
increased. The answer is in itself revealing about the role of human rights in the Western
policy response.
IV. Human Rights and the Question of Military Intervention
„For most of 1992, we couldn‟t send memos that called for the use of American force. The best we could do
was to write arresting things that led inexorably to the conclusion that force would have to be used.
- John Fox 130
The Western reaction to these events appears somewhat paradoxical, because even
128 Almond, Europe‟s Backyard War, 267. Silber and Little also discusses the targeting of Muslim community
leaders; Death, 244. 129 Almond, Europe‟s Backyard War, 267 130 A Yugoslav analyst at the State Department; quoted in Power, Problem from Hell, 266.
116
as the frequency and severity of human rights abuses in Bosnia increased virtually beyond
measure in comparison to Kosovo and even Croatia, the role and prominence of human
rights in Western policies diminished markedly. The West took a very passive approach to
the war in Bosnia, first by maintaining the arms embargo and economic sanctions which
had been imposed during the Croatian phase of the dissolution, and second by
concentrating on international peace talks and the delivery of humanitarian aid. None of
these responses directly addressed the human rights issues arising from the war, nor did
they show any promise of quickly ending it. Perhaps more importantly, the significance
given to negotiations and humanitarianism militated strongly against any serious attempt to
include human rights in any substantive way. The human rights aspects of the arms
embargo and economic sanctions are discussed in chapter 5, and those of the peace talks
and humanitarian response in chapter 6, but it is necessary first to consider why, if they
were so ill-suited to ending the conflict in any timely fashion, Western governments opted
to utilise them.
Publicly, of course, the priority was, as James Baker put it, to „end the nightmare‟,
to stop the fighting and hence the human rights abuses.131 The policies adopted, however,
suggest that neither ending the war nor even reducing the atrocities were the priority for
Western governments, although either development would have been welcome. To the
contrary, those goals were distinctly secondary to the true priority, which was minimising
the chances of being forced into any form of outright military intervention or engagement
in Bosnia. It was this which underpinned virtually every policy decision made for at least
the first two years of the war. Though hardly a disinterested observer when it came to
Western willingness to intervene, David Owen was correct when he observed that every
major Western government was of the opinion that (as Bismarck had famously
commented) “the Balkans were not worth the healthy bones of a single Pomeranian
grenadier”, and that this attitude „ensured that international diplomacy without military
power was the hallmark of every attitude and action toward the former Yugoslavia‟.132
In both Europe and the United States, influential figures called for rapid and
131 „Questions and Answers with Secretary of State James Baker and German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel‟,
Federal News Service, 30 June 1992. 132 Owen, Balkan Odyssey, 17. For discussion of the Western antipathy to the idea of military intervention, see
inter alia Rieff, Slaughterhouse and A Bed for the Night; Hodge, Britain and the Balkans; Power, Problem from Hell; Western, Selling Intervention and War: The Presidency, the Media, and the American Public (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005). Interestingly, a 1991 JNA report concluded, according to an article in the army journal in October of that year, „that there was little reason to expect international armed intervention in Yugoslavia. … the EC countries … could not engage in meaningful military operations without U.S. support, which, because the United States was not significantly involved, was lacking‟; quoted in Ramet, Balkan Babel, 244.
117
decisive military intervention in Bosnia.133 Owen himself, prior to his co-chairmanship of
the ICFY, called on Prime Minister Major „not to accept the conventional wisdom that
nothing can be done militarily to stop the escalation of fighting and the continuation of
such grotesque abuses of human rights‟.134 Former British Prime Minister Margaret
Thatcher made her position plain in an editorial entitled „Stop the Excuses. Help Bosnia
Now‟, in early August 1992. Dismissing comparisons with Vietnam, Lebanon, and Desert
Storm, she argued for „a range of military interventions‟, up to and including
direct strikes on military targets and communications … A clear threat of military
action would force Serbia into contemplating an end to its aggression. Serbia
should be given an ultimatum to comply with certain Western demands … If
those demands (which should be accompanied by a deadline) are not met, military
retaliation should follow … It should also be made clear that while this is not a
war against the Serbian people, even installations on the Serbian side of the border
may be attacked if they play an important role in the war.135
She repeated this call in December 1992 and April 1993, accusing the West „by not doing
more, [of having been] a little like an accomplice to massacre‟.136 Bernard Kouchner, the
French minister for humanitarian action, defended the idea of „war against barbarism,
against violations of human rights and the murders of starving children‟.137 Owen returned
to the idea of military intervention in April 1993, suggesting „authorization to take the
necessary measures to interdict the [Bosnian Serb] supply lines from the air‟.138
On the other side of the Atlantic, George Kenney‟s resignation and subsequent
public call for action has already been mentioned; he warned that nothing could be
accomplished in Bosnia without „very strong pressures, including military pressures, against
Serbia to stop its campaign of genocide‟.139 Even prior to that, a bipartisan group of US
133 Although as Donia and Fine point out, „[c]alls for military assistance to the Bosnians have been heard
mostly from Western politicians out of office‟ (original emphasis); Bosnia and Hercegovina, 257. 134 Owen, Balkan Odyssey, 15. 135 Margaret Thatcher, „Stop the Excuses. Help Bosnia Now.‟, New York Times, 6 August 1992. Less drastically,
she advocated lifting the arms embargo on Bosnia and supplying Bosnian forces; this approach is discussed in Chapter 5.
136 Margaret Thatcher, „We Must Not Fiddle While Bosnia Burns‟, Ottawa Citizen, 21 December 1992; Margaret Thatcher, Interview for BBC Television, 13 April 1993, available from www.margaretthatcher.org/archive/ (accessed 13 January 2007).
137 Quoted in Eleanor Davey, Indifferent Memory: Bosnia, the Holocaust, and Vichy Debates in France, 1991-95, Honours thesis, University of Melbourne, 2006 (unpublished), 33.
138 Owen, Balkan Odyssey, 142; see also Burg and Shoup, The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 141. 139 „George Kenney‟s Message‟.
118
senators had „called for a limited use of force against the Serbs‟ in early summer 1992.140
Former Secretary of State George Shultz argued in December of that year that effective
military intervention was „a definable, doable mission, and it doesn‟t involve you getting
into a swamp.... we should get about the task‟.141 Richard Holbrooke, later Clinton‟s special
envoy for the former Yugoslavia, sent the incoming president a memo calling for the „direct
use of force against the Serbs‟, with the proviso that „the actions must be effective … If
done only to show the world we are "doing something," minor bombing … might be a
quick public relations success, but it would be followed by a long-term disaster‟.142 Within
the Clinton administration, UN Ambassador Madeleine Albright and National Security
Advisor Tony Lake led a push to employ air strikes in April 1993.143
These calls largely fell on deaf ears, and failed to bring about an interventionist
policy in any Western government. Opposition to military involvement was often rooted in
a conviction that there was simply nothing useful Western military forces could do in
Bosnia, or as Bush put it, that there was no „quick and easy military answer to [the Bosnian
conflict]‟.144 This belief was particularly strong in the United States, where both Bush and
Clinton subscribed to some form of the “ancient hatreds” explanation for the Bosnian
crisis, which held that the root causes of the conflict went back hundreds of years.145 James
Baker announced before the end of May 1992 that „there will be no unilateral use – no
unilateral use – of US force‟, while the president insisted in early June that „prudence and
caution prevents military actions‟.146 A month later he was more explicit, declaring that „I
have no plans to inject ourselves into a combat situation in Yugoslavia‟, a position which he
140 Ryan C. Hendrickson, The Clinton Wars: The Constitution, Congress, and War Powers (Nashville: Vanderbilt
University Press, 2002), 72. 141 Dennis Hevesi, „Shultz Calls for Military Intervention in Bosnia‟, New York Times, 9 December 1992. 142 Holbrooke, To End a War, 50-53. 143 Walker, „Clinton Hit…‟. 144 „News Conference by President George Bush‟, Federal News Service, 8 August 1992. 145 See, inter alia, George H. W. Bush, „Question-and-Answer Session in Grand Rapids‟, 29 October 1992,
TAPP, www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=21708; William J. Clinton, „Remarks in a Town Meeting with Russian Citizens in Moscow‟, 14 January 1994, TAPP, www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=50032 (both accessed 10 October 2006). This idea was not unique to the US, however, with British prime minister John Major referring to it in Parliament in June 1993; Almond, Europe‟s Backyard War, 43. The “ancient hatreds” thesis has been dismissed by serious scholars of the Bosnian crisis. See, inter alia, Donia & Fine, Bosnia and Hercegovina, 220; Malcolm, Bosnia, xix-xxiv; Bennett, Yugoslavia‟s Bloody Collapse, viii, 6; Ramet, Balkan Babel, 243. As Adam Roberts has noted, „calling the conflict in former Yugoslavia a case of “ancient hatred” and “civil war” has often been code language for recommending a policy of partial or total non-intervention; „Communal Conflict as a Challenge to International Organisation‟, in Alex Danchev and Thomas E. Halverson, eds., International Perspectives on the Yugoslav Conflict (New York: St. Martin‟s Press, 1996), 177; see also 183-4.
146 „Helping the new independent states; sanctions on Serbia/Montenegro – excerpts from Secretary of State James A. Baker‟s remarks following Lisbon Conference on Assistance to the New Independent States, 24 May 1992‟, Dispatch, Vol. 3, No. 22, 1 June 1992; „Excerpts from the President‟s News Conference at White House‟, New York Times, 5 June 1992. See also Halverson, „American Perspectives‟, 9-10, 12-13.
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still held in late October, when he ruled out „sending American kids into this very
complicated ethnic, historically ethnic battle over there‟.147 Perhaps the most vehement
expression of this view came from Lawrence Eagleburger in September 1992:
I have said this 38,000 times, and I have to say this to the people of this country as
well. This tragedy is not something that can be settled from outside and it‟s about
damn well time that everybody understood that. Until the Bosnians, Serbs, and
Croats decide to stop killing each other, there is nothing the outside world can do
about it.148
Clinton‟s approach was essentially the same, and he warned that US forces should not
„become embroiled‟ in Bosnia, or „get involved in the conflict on behalf of one of the
sides‟.149 As late as January 1994, he insisted that „I believe in general what I‟ve always
believed. There‟s not going to be a settlement in Bosnia until the sides decide that they have
more to gain from signing a peace agreement than by continuing the fighting‟.150
When it came to „rushing in to use force‟, though, „there [were] no fundamental
differences between the US and the leading western European states‟.151 The French
government was in general agreement concerning the basic intractability of the conflict.
François Mitterrand felt that „adding war to war will resolve nothing‟, and the official
position of France was that „a military escalation was a dead end‟.152 Even so, there was an
abortive French proposal in early 1993 to deploy 20,000 Western troops (10,000 American,
5,000 each British and French) around Sarajevo to drive back Serb forces in the event of
the failure of a negotiated settlement, but it was quickly dropped in the face of British
opposition and American disinterest.153 Germany, having „constitutional and historic
difficulties‟ with the use of military force, as well as „political reservations‟ about the idea,
147 George H. W. Bush, „The President‟s News Conference in Munich, Germany‟, 8 July 1992. TAPP,
www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=21212; George H. W. Bush, „Question-and-Answer Session in Secaucus, New Jersey‟, 22 October 1992. TAPP, www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=21641 (both accessed 8 October 2006).
148 Quoted in Holbrooke, To End a War, 23. 149 William J. Clinton, „The President‟s News Conference with President François Mitterrand of France‟, 9
March 1993. TAPP, www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=46314 (accessed 10 October 2006). 150 William J. Clinton, „Exchange with Reporters‟, 24 January 1994. TAPP,
www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=50354 (accessed 10 October 2006). 151 Bush, „News Conference‟, 8 August 1992. 152 Quoted in Alan Riding, „Mitterrand Will Send Troops Only to Protect Bosnia Relief ‟, New York Times, 14
August 1992, and Lepick, „French Perspectives‟, 81. 153 James Bone, Eve-Ann Prentice, „France Has Secret Plan for Western Military Shield Round Sarajevo‟, The
Times, 3 February 1993.
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prudently refrained from much comment.154
Many considered Britain „the greatest obstacle to collective action‟ in Bosnia, a
reputation earned by its consistent and forceful opposition to military action.155 British
opposition was not based in the “ancient hatreds” theory, although this idea was not
unknown in the UK.156 Douglas Hurd was bluntly dismissive of it in April 1993:
I do not believe that hatred and killing are inevitable, somehow irredeemably
logged in the history books as something that has to happen. That is not the
history of the former Yugoslavia. The killing and hatred will come to an end –
perhaps not soon, but never too soon.157
Nevertheless, he had earlier ridiculed those who advocated intervention in the war,
although he conceded that it „would have been morally justified if it could have been
effective in bringing those atrocities to an end‟.158 Unfortunately, he continued,
It would be easy to increase the casualty list without stopping the conflict … The
difficulty with all the military options … is that in such terrain, with the
intermingling of military personnel and civilians and of Serbs, Bosnians and
Croats, it is hard to work out a practical scheme which would not merely add to
the number of people killed without ending the fighting…. I am not saying that
those ideas should not be considered from time to time. The position is so bleak
that I do not believe that such ideas should be excluded indefinitely, but I have
tried to set out the analysis until now.159
Despite the suggestion that the policy might be reconsidered, this was never done, and
Douglas Hogg could unequivocally reassure parliament in May 1993 that „[w]e will not
deploy United Kingdom ground troops in a combat role‟ in Bosnia.160
But as Hogg‟s phrasing suggests, the basic opposition was to the use of ground
154 „Questions and Answers…‟, Federal News Service, 30 June 1992. Germany did, however, contribute forces
to the humanitarian mission and to the enforcement of the embargo and sanctions. In July 1994 its Constitutional Court ruled that Germany „could take part in military operations beyond the country‟s borders without having to modify its constitution‟, which reopened the debate concerning the deployment of combat aircraft and ground troops; Calic, „German Perspectives‟, 62-7.
155 Simms, Unfinest Hour, 5. Those who felt this way included Jacques Delors, Bob Dole, Tadeusz Mazowiecki, and George Soros.
156 Hansard, 26 July 1993, c. 849. 157 Hansard, 23 April 1993, c. 1175. 158 Hansard, 25 September 1992, c. 123-26. 159 Ibid. 160 Hansard, 24 May 1993, c. 575.
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troops in Bosnia in combat roles; beyond this, there was considerable breadth of opinion
concerning what might be acceptable uses of Western ground or air forces.161 Certain
forms of military intervention, if carefully managed, might serve the larger the purpose,
but the nature and extent of those forms was seen very differently in Europe and in the
United States. For its part, the US flatly refused to consider deploying US soldiers to
Bosnia, in any role. Bush maintained that the US was „not going to rule anything in … [or]
… out‟, but he made it clear that he was „not interested in seeing one single United States
soldier pinned down in some kind of a guerrilla environment‟.162 The idea of sending
troops as part of the humanitarian mission was briefly floated, but offers of participation
were quickly scaled back to include only naval and air assets.163 According to Samantha
Power, an early decision was made at the highest levels in the administration „that there
would be no U.S. military intervention in Bosnia. This was a fact, not a forecast‟.164
In practical terms, this policy did not change under the Clinton administration, as
shown for example in Clinton‟s response to the (first) Srebrenica crisis, in April 1993:
Q. Mr. President, we understand that Srebrenica is about to fall and some 60,000
Bosnian Muslims may be evacuated or surrender on your watch. That must be
pretty painful.
The President. I regret that it‟s happening. We met and discussed this morning
what our other options are and whether our allies might now be willing to take
further action. We may know some more before the end of the day.
Q. Do you expect some military action to do something about this?
The President. We‟re looking at a number of options. I don‟t want to role [sic] in
or out any, except that we‟ve never considered the introduction of American
ground forces as you know. But I hope that the gravity of the situation will
develop a consensus among the United Nations partners. We‟ll see.165
161 Naval units, it should noted, were engaged in relation to the sanctions regime; see below, Chapter 5. 162 George H. W. Bush, „The President‟s News Conference With Foreign Journalists‟, 2 July 1992. TAPP,
www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=21186 (accessed 8 October 2006). 163 Eric Schmitt, „U.S. Would Send Troops Only in a Relief Role‟, New York Times, 12 June 1992; Eric Schmitt,
„U.S. Is Shying From Bosnian Conflict‟, New York Times, 19 July 1992. 164 Power, Problem from Hell, 267. Bush repeatedly suggested that he might consider using US forces if the
situation changed, but never showed any sign of actually doing so. See, for instance, „Remarks at the United States Military Academy in West Point, New York‟, 5 January 1993. TAPP, www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=20414 (accessed 8 October 2006). Burg and Shoup report that „[a]ccording to Robert Hutchings, then director of European affairs at the [NSC], “The Department of Defense and the Joint Chiefs were at pains to exclude the military option a priori and, fresh from the military triumph in the Gulf, their opinions carried even more weight in admin councils than usual.” The military believed that the use of force would inevitably lead to ground combat‟. Burg and Shoup, The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 200. See also Touval, Mediation, 112.
165 William J. Clinton, „Exchange with Reporters Prior to Discussions with Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa
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The Clinton administration did relax its position to the extent that it was willing to consider
the use of US ground forces in Bosnia to assist in enforcing a mutually-agreed peace
settlement. When asked to clarify the administration‟s thinking, White House spokesman
George Stephanopoulos confirmed that the US was more likely to „contribute troops to a
peacekeeping force in Bosnia after a peace settlement and on the assumption that the lamb
has lied down with the lion‟:
I think we‟re trying to move towards a situation where if all the parties agree on a
settlement, we will be willing to participate in a multilateral force to enforce that
settlement. We don‟t foresee going in to create any kind of a settlement.166
This became the standard position from 1993 onwards; the US would only consider
sending troops to Bosnia after the fighting had stopped, not before. They were reluctant to
commit even to this much in advance, despite the urgings of the ICFY co-chairmen, who
were certain that a US commitment to send a large contingent would help in achieving a
peace settlement.167
What the US was willing to do, and actively pushed for under both Bush and
Clinton, was to apply Western air power in Bosnia. There were two aspects to this, the first
being the use of air power to enforce the “no-fly zone” over Bosnia, imposed by the UN in
October 1992 largely as the result of US initiatives in the Security Council.168 The initial
resolution, however, only called for UN forces in Bosnia to „monitor compliance with the
ban‟, and by mid-March 1993, the no-fly zone had been breached at least 456 times.169
Washington had repeatedly urged more robust action against such breaches, for example in
December 1992, but its calls had been ignored.170 It was not until March 1993 that the
Security Council passed Resolution 816 to actually authorise enforcement, and even then
the rules of engagement were extremely restrictive.171
of Japan‟, 16 April 1993. TAPP, www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=46437 (accessed 9 October 2006).
166 „Press Briefing by George Stephanopoulos‟, 9 March 1993. TAPP, www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=60128 (accessed 10 October 2006). 167 Paul Lewis, „Bosnia Mediators Urging U.S. to Join Peace Force‟, New York Times, 5 February 1993. The US
did contribute about six hundred troops to the UNPREDEP mission in Macedonia, a largely successful and unprecedented experiment in the preventive deployment of peacekeepers, before violence had erupted.
168 The ban was clearly aimed at the Serbs, the only side in the war which was operating military aircraft. 169 UN Security Council Resolution 781, 9 October 1992, para. 2; Almond, Europe‟s Backyard War, 288. 170 Elaine Sciolino, „U.S. May Seek the Use of Force To Stop Serbs‟ Flights Over Bosnia‟, New York Times, 4
December 1992. 171 Edgar O‟Ballance, Civil War in Bosnia 1992-1994 (New York: St. Martin‟s Press, 1995), 159; UNSC
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The enforcement provisions were never terribly effective. Clinton claimed some
success for the ban by October, telling Congress that „we have seen no recurrence of air-
to-ground bombing of villages or other air-to-ground combat activity‟.172 At literally the
same time, though, he admitted that „nearly 400 violations have occurred‟ since
enforcement began, something which he minimised by adding that „most have been by
rotary-wing aircraft‟ and were „militarily insignificant‟.173 The BSA, it seemed, had „learned
the limits of our rules of engagement (ROE) and … become adept at playing "cat-and-
mouse" games with the interceptors‟.174 It was not until April 1994 that NATO warplanes
first used force in support of the no-fly zone, and even that did not signal any real change
in policy. Following Serbian air attacks on Croat and Muslim troops using planes based at
an air base in Serb-controlled Croatia in November 1994, for example, Richard Holbrooke
urged Washington to respond forcefully:
The next day, NATO released photographs of large holes made in the runway at
Udbina, and proudly announced that it had launched the largest air raid in Europe
since the end of World War II. Twenty-four hours later it became apparent that
the "massive attack" was simply a series of minor airstrikes … The runway could
be repaired within a day or two, and was.175
The Clinton administration also advocated using air power against Serb forces on
the ground, to blunt their military advantage over the government forces. This was most
often presented as one half of a “lift-and-strike” policy, which involved combining the air
strikes with lifting the arms embargo (discussed below in chapter 5). Upon taking office,
Clinton dispatched his new Secretary of State, Warren Christopher, to Europe to make the
argument for this policy. The mission did not go well, however, and Christopher reported
„stiff resistance‟ from the Europeans.176 Lift-and-strike was never adopted, but it remained
a central part of the Clinton administration‟s preferred response to the war.
European governments resisted either use of air power, primarily because, along
with Canada and other countries but unlike the US, they did provide troops for the UN
mission in the former Yugoslavia. France and Britain contributed the two largest
Resolution 816, 31 March 1993.
172 „Letter to Congressional Leaders Reporting on the No-Fly Zone in Bosnia-Herzegovina‟, 13 October 1993. TAPP, www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=47200 (accessed 10 October 2006).
173 Ibid. 174 Ibid. 175 Holbrooke, To End a War, 61. 176 Madeleine Albright, Madam Secretary (New York: Miramax Books, 2003), 180.
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contingents to UNPROFOR, with over 7000 troops between them at the mission‟s peak.
Peacekeeping in Bosnia was not risk-free – over two hundred peacekeepers were killed
between 1992 and 1995177 – and their significant presence in UNPROFOR meant that
France and Britain were much more exposed than the US to potential retaliation by military
forces in Bosnia.178 The British defence secretary neatly encapsulated the problem in mid-
1993: „Every single UN soldier in Bosnia is within range of Serb artillery. If there were
attacks on Serb positions, it is entirely within the power of the Serbs to retaliate by shelling
British forces‟.179 The French were in full agreement with the British position.180 Whether
the risk to their troops was a reason or an excuse for opposing the use of air power,
however, is open to question; as Brendan Simms points out, „Britain had passionately
opposed the use of air power long before her first soldier set foot in Bosnia‟.181
The question was whether it was actually possible to safely deploy peacekeepers
while using air power, and the positions taken by the UK and France indicate that they did
not believe that it was. France‟s opposition to Washington‟s December 1992 proposal for
action was on the grounds that „it would pose enormous problems for the protection of
the civilian population and could lead to reprisals against U.N. forces‟.182 David Owen
claims that Mitterrand „specifically warned‟ him „of the dangers of aggressive force against
the Serbs and ruled out air strikes‟.183 Owen himself, it is worth remembering, was in 1992
„the leading apostle of precisely the sort of limited but decisive military intervention which
Bosnian sympathizers in Britain and the United States demanded throughout the war‟, and
only converted to the anti-interventionist side after his appointment as co-chair of the
ICFY, a change that Brendan Simms attributes „simpl[y] … to the insidious “education” he
received from Whitehall‟.184 John Major explained his thinking in his memoirs:
If we bombed, our soldiers would be at risk from reprisals. The Bosnian Serbs had
repeatedly made clear that they would retaliate against UN troops from NATO
countries on the ground (and indeed all UN and aid-agency workers), and in
December 1992 I received a letter from the Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic
to this effect. This reinforced concerns the military had raised: protection from
177 See, for instance, „2 French Troops Killed in Attack on U.N. Convoy‟, New York Times, 9 September 1992. 178 This is explored in more detail in chapter 6. 179 Quoted in Almond, Europe‟s Backyard War, 297. 180 Lepick, „French Perspectives‟, 81. 181 Simms, Unfinest Hour, 70. 182 Deputy Foreign Minister Georges Kiejman, quoted in Alan Riding, „France Opposes Air Strikes‟, New
York Times, 17 December 1992. 183 Owen, Balkan Odyssey, 25. 184 Simms, Unfinest Hour, 135-9.
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such threats was impossible in the conditions in which the troops were working
without massive reinforcements.185
It is questionable, though, whether this was [simply] an excuse for a policy which Britain
favoured in any case. Former US diplomat John Fox recalls that the British embassy in
Washington fought hard against State Department proposals for a bombing campaign in
the spring and summer of 1992, before the deployment of any British troops to Bosnia.186
As a result, the British and French even opposed enforcement of the no-fly zone –
an unsurprising response in light of the well-founded contention that „Britain and France
had only agreed to [the no-fly zone] in the first place provided that no force was used to
impose it‟.187 The French position was somewhat flexible; the defence minister was „far
from ruling out‟ enforcement, but President Mitterrand thought otherwise and overruled
his minister.188 Douglas Hurd agreed that while „there should be a no-fly zone‟, it was
unclear how it would be best enforced; „it may be … that the best way of ensuring that is
to have monitors on the ground‟, not planes in the air.189 Two months later, he argued that
a distinction had to be made between „attack missions‟ and other breaches of the exclusion
zone, and that the latter did not merit concern.190 Douglas Hogg equated enforcement of
the no-fly zone with the simple presence of RAF and other Western aircraft in the vicinity,
even if they did nothing but observe and record violations.191
These conflicting positions on acceptable uses of military forces effectively created
a deadlock on the question of military intervention in Bosnia. The US favoured the use of
air power, but refused to consider the deployment of ground troops even in a
peacekeeping or humanitarian context until the fighting stopped. The Europeans were
willing to participate in the UN actions, but therefore opposed any serious use of air
power. All parties agreed that active intervention in the war was best avoided. But while
both the US and European governments welcomed this deadlock, it did not deal with the
problem of public pressure to militarily intervene to stop the fighting.192
Because it was politically untenable to simply stand back and refuse to intervene in
185 Major, Autobiography, 541. 186 Simms, Unfinest Hour, 59. 187 Almond, Europe‟s Backyard War, 288. 188 Owen, Balkan Odyssey, 25; see also William Drozdiak, „France Facing Pressure for Intervention in Bosnia‟,
Washington Post, 23 December 1992. 189 Hansard, 25 September 1992, c. 123. 190 Hansard, 25 November 1992, c. 854. 191 Hansard, 24 May 1993, c. 576. 192 On the question of public opinion and pressure to take military action, see, inter alia, Burg and Shoup, The
War in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 162-4.
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the atrocities in Bosnia without presenting some other policy as an alternative, Western
governments embraced the humanitarian mission and the peace talks. These responses
were perfectly calculated to minimise calls for military intervention, no matter how ill-
suited they were to the purpose of ending the war and the atrocities. Neither policy
required military forces for its execution (aside from the UN peacekeepers, who were
deployed under very restrictive rules of engagement). On the contrary, they both actually
reinforced the arguments against Western military involvement in a variety of ways.
Emphasising human rights abuses in Bosnia would only increase demands to intervene
from Western publics and media. Bringing up these issues with the relevant parties in
Bosnia would generate animosity, perhaps destroy any pretence of Western neutrality in
mediation, and jeopardise the cooperation of the armies in the delivery of desperately
needed humanitarian aid. The peace talks gave the appearance of constructive engagement
even as they failed over and over to deliver any concrete results, and the purported need to
keep all parties at the table gave an easy argument to those who opposed the use or threat
of air strikes or ground-based military forces. Even the delivery of the humanitarian aid in
itself was not so much a goal as a means to the end of limiting the consequences of the
war, keeping refugees in place, and not incidentally providing a convenient target for
threats to use against calls for military intervention.193
Both policies were essentially aimed not directly at ending the conflict, but at
containing it, thus reducing pressure for military intervention. They were very effective in
this role. The war and its fallout were largely restricted to Bosnia itself, or at least to the
former Yugoslavia. The fighting did not spread to Macedonia, Greece, Bulgaria, Turkey,
and Hungary, as many feared it would. The vast majority of people displaced and left
homeless by the war were kept in Bosnia or the neighbouring republics, and prevented
from going further abroad. Perhaps more importantly, the effects of the war on those
people were (to the extent that it was possible) minimised and mitigated. Mass starvation
and deaths from exposure were successfully avoided, which was good both in itself and in
what was therefore not available to be shown on television. In order to achieve these ends,
however, these policies required compromises and decisions that proved disastrous in
terms of human rights.
V. Conclusion
A massive increase in human rights abuses – both in number, type, and severity –
193 These issues are discussed in greater detail in Chapter 6.
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accompanied the outbreak of war in Bosnia. The level of awareness concerning those
abuses in Western capitals was considerable. The implications of these facts will be
explored more fully in the following two chapters, but there are certain observations which
can be made at this point.
First, it was very early in the Bosnian war that the shift in the meaning of “human
rights abuses” initiated during the Croatian war reached its furthest extent. The term no
longer referred to Azem Vllasi‟s political trial or the removal of Kosovo‟s provincial
autonomy, nor even the discriminatory actions of the Croatian government against the
Croatian Serbs or the lack of democratisation in Yugoslavia. The basic terminology
remained the same, but it now referred to far more extreme actions and issues: ethnic
cleansing, mass rape, military attacks on civilian populations, detention camps, and
refugees. The other violations were still being committed, but failed even to register in
comparison with the much more severe and widespread abuses in Bosnia. The primary
issue between 1990 and early 1992 was the essentially geopolitical problem of Yugoslavia‟s
dissolution, which undeniably had human rights aspects in its progression, and in the
Western response. After April 1992, the nature of the problem changed dramatically.
Geopolitics did not disappear, but human rights abuses – up to and including crimes
against humanity, war crimes, and even genocide – became the central problem in their
own right, the primary issue which required a response. These abuses were amply
documented and widely known in Western capitals.
But the Western response neither directly addressed those abuses nor prioritised
ending them. Instead, Western policies revolved around the need or desire to minimise the
risk of being drawn into the war by way of military intervention. By publicly and
repeatedly announcing that there was no chance that they would become militarily
involved, Western governments alleviated any fears on the part of all sides in the conflict
that such action might be taken, and sacrificed the sole means of pressure which might have
forced a quicker end to the violence. To say this is not to argue that any military
intervention would have been simple, uncontroversial, or even successful, but the pre-
emptive disavowal of the possibility carried with it serious consequences, particularly with
regard to human rights. Speed mattered in this case; every day that the fighting continued,
more people died and more abuses were committed. For all its problems, by the time war
broke out in Bosnia, military pressure – or at least the threat of it – was the only response
which even potentially offered a rapid solution.
The third point concerns the relative level of attention being given to human rights
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in Western foreign policy. As noted above, despite the increase in abuses, there was no
corresponding increase in attention from the West. In certain respects this is not surprising;
even if human rights in Yugoslavia were conceived of as an “interest” for Western states,
they were at best one such interest among many. And the increasing seriousness of the
situation had contradictory effects; although more severe violations might, in principle,
merit more attention and a larger place in the policymaking process, they also pose greater
potential costs and risks for involvement, discouraging action on the part of the West. In
the event, the latter effect proved more significant. But the important point to make here is
that, in the context of the tremendous increase in violations, even the maintenance of
human rights concerns at their previous level would in effect have represented a decline in
their importance. And there was no such maintenance of concern. On the contrary, the
attention given to human rights in Bosnia by policymakers did not even match the attention
which they had received in the earlier periods of Yugoslavia‟s dissolution. The greater the
scale of the abuses, the more Western governments sought to avoid and downplay them in
order to justify and maintain their chosen policies. This process is the topic of the next
two chapters.
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Chapter 5
Passive Coercion: Human Rights, Arms Embargos, and Economic Sanctions
This chapter examines from a human rights perspective the use of an arms
embargo and economic sanctions by the West as part of its attempt to manage the
Yugoslav crisis. After considering the background and relevant literature, it looks at the
arms embargo and economic sanctions in turn, discussing each policy‟s rationale, conduct,
effects, and success or failure. It argues that both of these policies were severely flawed in
terms of human rights, particularly as they were applied to the conflict in Bosnia. The use
of sanctions and the embargo indicate that Western policymakers did not sustain even the
relatively high level of importance, at least rhetorically, that they gave to human rights
during the debate over recognition. Both policies had significant human rights
repercussions, but human rights concerns played little role in the policymaking decisions.
I. Background
Early in the process of Yugoslavia‟s dissolution, Western governments attempted to
influence developments via economic, financial, and (in the form of an arms embargo)
military sanctions. First imposed during the war in Croatia, these measures were continued
and extended during the Bosnian conflict. The West intended that both the economic
sanctions and the arms embargo would render continuing violence less appealing or less
feasible to decision-makers in Belgrade, Zagreb, Sarajevo, Pale, and Mostar, but there were
important differences between the two policies. The arms embargo applied to all of the
former Yugoslavia, while sanctions were imposed only on the FRY. The embargo was
supposed to directly reduce the violence in Bosnia by limiting the military resources of all
the combatants. The sanctions were meant to indirectly pressure Serbia to end its overt and
covert support of the Croatian and Bosnian Serbs. The embargo was the subject of
considerable disagreement between the Europeans (who mostly supported it) and the US
(which often argued in favour of ending it, at least for the Bosnian government). The
sanctions, on the other hand, were relatively uncontroversial, with broad support on both
sides of the Atlantic.
There were also similarities between the two policies. Both were a species of what
might be termed passive coercion. They required minimal action and exposure to risk on
the part of the international community. They imposed penalties and restrictions that
Western governments hoped would prove unbearable, but ultimately left it up to those
130
affected to decide when the costs were too much to bear. Both policies were relatively
ineffective, being vulnerable to smuggling and other sorts of sanctions busting, and both
failed to achieve their declared ends. The fighting did not slacken for lack of arms and
ammunition, and the sanctions did not induce the Serbian government to change its
behaviour (except possibly, and marginally, in 1995).
Both the arms embargo and the sanctions also came at a high cost in human rights.
Due to the distribution of military power and resources, the arms embargo left the Bosnian
Muslim population largely at the mercy of the Serbian campaign of ethnic cleansing. The
economic sanctions inflicted considerable hardships on the civilian population of Serbia by
reducing access to food, medical care, and shelter, and did long-term human rights damage
to Serbian society. They were both very slow methods of influencing the conflict,
suggesting a distinct lack of urgency in the West for ending first the ethnic conflict in
Croatia and then the much greater abuses in Bosnia described in chapter 4. Most of all, the
evidence indicates that the likely failure of the policies was also well-known and accepted
by the policymakers, meaning that their human rights costs were not even being imposed in
the sincere belief that they would bring an equal or greater human rights benefit in
exchange.
Arms embargoes are usually discussed as a response to human rights abuses rather
than as human rights issues in themselves. An example of this is the arms embargo that the
EC placed on China following the Tiananmen Square massacre in 1989. A debate is
currently underway concerning the possibility of imposing a similar embargo on Burma
due to its poor human rights record. Neither of these cases is directly concerned with the
human rights impact of the embargo itself.1 More generally, critics sometimes question the
sale of Western arms to countries that then directly employ them to carry out human rights
abuses in the course of repressive military campaigns such as that of Turkey against the
Kurds or the Indonesian invasion and occupation of East Timor.2 The arms embargo on
the former Yugoslavia, however, had direct human rights effects in itself due to the
1 See, for instance, Steve Tsang, „Why the EU Arms Embargo Should Stay‟, Far Eastern Economic Review, Vol.
168, Issue 3 (March 2005), 43; „EU Trade Rep Suggests Arms Sales to China‟, United Press International, 30 September 2009; Human Rights Watch, „Human Rights Watch Evidence Submitted for Consideration in the Inquiry into “The European Union and China”„, 17 April 2009 (available from www.hrw.org; accessed 27 October 2009); John Heilprin, „At UN, Myanmar Blasts Sanctions, Pledges Democracy‟, Associated Press, 28 September 2009; Human Rights Watch, „Burma: Security Council Should Impose Arms Embargo‟, 9 October 2007 (available from www.hrw.org; accessed 27 October 2009).
2 See, for instance, Edip Yuksel, „Yes, I Am a Kurd‟, Journal of International Law & Practice 7.3 (Fall, 1998), 361-2; John Tirman, Spoils of War: the Human Cost of America‟s Arms Trade (New York: FreePress, 1997); John Pilger, „On Her Majesty‟s Blood Service‟, New Statesman & Society 7, No. 290 (18 February 1994); „Addicted to the Arms Trade‟, The Economist, 18 September 1999, 61-2; Indonesia: Arms Trade to a Military Regime, ed. Martin Broek (Amsterdam: European Network Against Arms Trade, 1997).
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circumstances in which it was imposed and maintained. The rights aspects of the
Yugoslavian embargo are usually framed in terms of the right of Bosnia-Herzegovina to
self-defence as a recognised member of the United Nations, but this is an inadequate frame
in which to consider the issues.3 The embargo had a significant impact on the course of the
war that must be considered in terms of human rights more broadly defined.
Experts on human rights have given much more attention to the relationship
between human rights and economic sanctions. A 1997 UN study on „the relationship
between economic sanctions and respect for economic, social and cultural rights‟ warned
that sanctions „almost always have a dramatic impact on the rights recognized in the
Covenant‟.4 The study pointed out that „the collateral infliction of suffering upon the most
vulnerable groups‟ in targeted countries must be taken into account because such rights
„cannot be considered to be inoperative, or in any way inapplicable, solely because a
decision has been taken that considerations of international peace and security warrant the
imposition of sanctions‟. 5 The UN Commission on Human Rights stated in 2000 that
The United Nations [sic] purpose of promoting and encouraging respect for
human rights set out in article 1, paragraph 3, necessarily limits sanctions.…
Sanctions that directly or indirectly cause deaths would be a violation of the right
to life. Other human rights could also be violated by sanctions regimes, such as the
rights to security of the person, health, education or employment.6
The document continues on to cite articles 3, 5, and 25 of the UDHR, articles 11, 12, and
13 of the ICESCR, and articles 4 and 6 of the ICCPR as being threatened by sanctions.7
3 The June 1993 World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna, for example, called for the repeal of the
embargo on these grounds. See „Pakistan: Draft Special Declaration on Bosnia and Herzegovina‟, UN doc. A/CONF.157/L.2, para. 6, 21 June 1993. Available from www.un.org/en/documents/ (accessed 10 October 2009).
4 United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment 8, UN doc. E/C.12/1997/8, 12 December 1997, 2, para. 3. Available from www.un.org/en/documents/ (accessed 25 August 2009).
5 Ibid., 2, para. 4, 4, para. 7. 6 UN Commission on Human Rights, Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human
Rights, The adverse consequences of economic sanctions on the enjoyment of human rights: working paper prepared by Mr. Marc Bossuyt, UN doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2000/33, 21 June 2000, 8, para. 26. Available from www.un.org/en/documents/ (accessed 25 August 2009).
7 Ibid., 9, paras. 30, 31. These problems were known at the time of the Yugoslav conflict, at least generally speaking; one study of the issue points out that the UN Secretary General‟s Supplement to An Agenda for Peace warned that „because they are a blunt instrument that causes indiscriminate suffering in the targeted state, [sanctions] raise ethical questions‟; see Michael Rossignol, Sanctions: The Economic Weapon in the New World Order (Ottawa: Political and Social Affairs Division, Government of Canada), October 1993, rev. January 1996. Available from dsp-psd.tpsgc.gc.ca/Collection-R/LoPBdP/BP/bp346-e.htm (accessed 12 August 2009).
132
The problem, as political scientist Adeno Addis warns, is that „economic sanctions
as they are currently applied … do not project an image of an international community
whose central identity is defined by respect for, and defense of, human rights‟.8 This was
certainly the case for the sanctions imposed in the course of Yugoslavia‟s dissolution, and
brings up a number of issues. The first is to what extent Western governments took into
account the potential human rights costs of imposing sanctions on Serbia and Montenegro.
The second is the Western response to the effects of the sanctions once they had been
imposed. Third, the reliance on sanctions – a very slow and unreliable means of influence
– poses questions about the importance of stopping the atrocities in Bosnia to Western
governments. Finally, in contrast to the arms embargo, it is important to note that the
human rights impact of the sanctions was felt by – and was intended to be felt by – the
population of Serbia and the FRY.
II. Human Rights and the International Arms Embargo
Here in the Balkans all that matters is the sheer, brute balance of force. A strong armed force in the hands
of the legal government of Bosnia-Herzegovina would have deterred much of the fighting. Not arming the
legal government has meant more ethnic cleansing, more massacres, more refugees.
- Milos Vasic 9
On 5 July 1991, the European Community imposed an arms embargo as „a means
of registering [its] grave concerns‟ with the course of events in Yugoslavia.10 The action
was aimed specifically at the Yugoslav military leadership, which the West feared, based on
the actions of the JNA and its commanders in Croatia and Slovenia, was slipping out of
civilian control. The embargo was a bid to encourage the military to remain subordinate to
the federal government, by „show[ing] that there is a price to be paid if the Yugoslav
military acts on its own‟.11 On 25 September, the UN augmented the European effort with
Security Council Resolution 713, which declared that „all states shall, for the purposes of
establishing peace and stability in Yugoslavia, immediately implement a general and 8 Adeno Addis, „Economic Sanctions and the Problem of Evil‟. Human Rights Quarterly, Vol. 25, No. 3
(August, 2003), 610. 9 A Belgrade military analyst and journalist; quoted in Ian Traynor, „Bosnia‟s Looking-Glass War‟, Guardian,
3 November 1992. 10 Ian Traynor and Ed Vulliamy, „Yugoslavia Hesitates At Brink‟, Guardian, 4 July 1991. Mark Almond singles
out Sweden, which had arms contracts with Belgrade, for being responsible for the fact that „even the imposition of an arms embargo took weeks to secure‟; Europe‟s Backyard War, 242.
11 John M. Goshko and David Hoffman, „West Considering Yugoslav Arms Embargo, Aid Cutoff ‟, Washington Post, 4 July 1991. As the situation developed, of course, it became clear that the actions taken by the JNA were fully in line with the policies of the Milosevic government in Belgrade; see Snyder, From Voting to Violence, 209.
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complete embargo on all deliveries of weapons and military equipment to Yugoslavia‟.12
When the independence of the breakaway republics was internationally recognised in early
1992, this embargo was simply extended to the new states. It was done on the same
premise which had been used to justify the imposition of the embargo in the first place,
which was simply that there would be less – and less destructive – fighting if the
combatants had fewer military resources with which to fight.13
Most Western policymakers believed that the embargo „would be largely
psychological in its impact‟.14 The Serbian military, in particular, had ample arms and
ammunition, and the embargo would take a long time to have an impact. In part, this was
for the obvious reason that they inherited most of the stocks that had been built up by the
JNA. The Serbs augmented these supplies by seizing stockpiles in Croatia and other
republics as early as 1990.15 Serbia also controlled most of the large Yugoslav domestic
armaments industry, one of the largest in Eastern Europe.16 This left the Serbian forces so
well-equipped that Belgrade was actually able to increase its international arms sales in 1991
to some $460 million.17
Slovenia and Croatia too were supposedly not expected to be much affected by the
embargo because, as some Western officials argued, they had „access to large caches of
arms‟, in spite of reports that the federal army had emptied most supply dumps in those
republics before fighting broke out.18 Slovenia‟s armed forces were in reasonably good
shape, with the government having successfully „retain[ed] control over at least 40 per cent
of the arms assigned to the local territorial defence forces‟.19 In Croatia, in contrast, those
same forces had been effectively disarmed by the JNA in 1990.20 Whether or not they had
access to such supplies, both governments had been importing arms from a variety of
12 UN Security Council Resolution 713, paragraph 6, 25 September 1991. 13 The legality of this decision has been questioned; see Simms, Unfinest Hour, 72-3. 14 Ibid. 15 Marcus Tanner and Chris McGreal, „Croatia Battles to Arm Its Soldiers‟, Independent, 17 September 1991;
Champion, „Armies Meet…‟. 16 Tony Barber, „EC Sanctions Unlikely to Affect Serbs‟, Independent, 21 September 1991. It has also been
alleged that the Soviet Union/Russia, always a fierce critic of Yugoslav dissolution and strong supporter of the Serbs, had committed to delivering arms to the Belgrade government; Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, 156; Ramet, Balkan Babel, 254. Mark Mazower argues that worries within the JNA about „ losing further territory, especially the sophisticated facilities at Bihac air base and several major armaments production centres‟ played a role in the JNA support of the Serb side in Bosnia; The War in Bosnia, 2.
17 Bennett, Yugoslavia‟s Bloody Collapse, 177, fn.16. Mark Almond adds that these sales were „used to pay for hard currency imports like oil and luxuries for Milosevic loyalists‟; Europe‟s Backyard War, 224.
18 Goshko and Hoffman, „West Considering…‟. Both republics had stolen or otherwise acquired some military supplies from the JNA, but it was not as extensive as claimed; see John M. Goshko, „U.N. Imposes Arms Embargo on Yugoslavia‟, Washington Post, 26 September 1991.
19 Cviic, „Slovene and Croat Perspectives‟, 131. 20 Ibid; Almond, Europe‟s Backyard War, 28, 214.
134
sources for some time.21 Croatia also attempted to produce weaponry and ammunition
domestically, and, once the fighting in Slovenia had ended, bought some arms from that
republic.22
It quickly became clear, however, that the embargo was having a significant effect
in Yugoslavia that was very damaging in terms of human rights principles. It was not a
neutral measure or one with only psychological effects, and has in fact been called „the first
sign that the “international community” was in effect backing the Serb side‟.23 It sustained
and reinforced a severe military imbalance between the different parties, to the great
advantage of the Serbs.24 As Western officials were subsequently willing to anonymously
admit, the embargo amounted to little more than „an effort to prevent Croatia and other
successionist republics from buying arms from other countries‟.25 The Serbian force
fighting in Croatia consisted of some 180,000 men, equipped with nearly two thousand
tanks, three hundred warplanes, and numerous artillery pieces and other heavy equipment;
well-equipped irregular forces further augmented this strength.26 The Croats, in contrast,
were less numerous and poorly equipped, primarily with hunting and World War II-era
military rifles, improvised armoured personnel carriers, and very little in the way of any
heavy weaponry.27 In these circumstances, given their demonstrated willingness to resort to
violence and human rights abuses, any expectation that Serbia and the Croatian Serbs
would cease pursuing their aims by military means was unrealistic in the extreme. Western
governments recognised this reality even as they increasingly blamed the Serbs for the lion‟s
share of the violence, and indeed the Serbian military offensive accelerated and grew more
21 Thomas L. Friedman, „War in Yugoslavia Feared by Baker‟, New York Times, 4 July 1991; Goshko and
Hoffman, „West Considering…‟; Tanner and McGreal, „Croatia Battles…‟; Goshko, „U.N. Imposes…‟; Donia and Fine, Bosnia and Hercegovina, 215; Almond, Europe‟s Backyard War, 223.
22 Tanner and McGreal, „Croatia Battles…‟. 23 Almond, Europe‟s Backyard War, 223. 24 This goes some way towards explaining why the Serb-dominated Yugoslav government had taken the
unusual step of requesting the imposition of the embargo on itself; see Weller, „The International Response‟, 578; also „U.N. Bars Weapon Sales to Yugoslavia‟, New York Times, 26 September 1991. Some scholars suggest that the British government suggested that Belgrade request the embargo, but regardless of the source of the idea, it was apparent to all that the Serbs would be the primary beneficiaries of the policy; see Gow, Triumph, 92-3. Despite this, there was little or no attempt to examine or question the motivations of Belgrade in making such a request.
25 Stephen Engelberg and Eric Schmitt, „Serbs Easily Outflank U.N. Arms Embargo‟, New York Times, 5 July 1992; „U.N. Bars Weapon Sales…‟.
26 According to Sabrina Ramet (citing a news story of May 1991), the JNA as a whole had „138,000 troops on active duty and 400,000 tooops in the reserves. … 1,850 battle tanks … 2,000 towed artillery pieces, 500 armored personnel carriers, and other Soviet-made weaponry. The navy commanded 10,000 troops, with 4 frigates, 59 patrol and coastal craft, and 5 small submarines at its disposal. The 32,000-strong air force had 455 combat aircraft, including MiG-29s, and 198 helicopters‟; Balkan Babel, 51-2.
27 Barber, „EC Sanctions…‟. According to Ramet, „Slovenia had a small militia comprising around 20,000 troops as of June 1991, but both Slovenia and Croatia claimed to be able to mobilize about 200,000 troops on short order. Slovenia and Croatia also possessed an unspecified number of tanks, antitank weapons, and other weaponry‟; Balkan Babel, 52.
135
brutal in this period. The sieges of the Croatian cities of Dubrovnik and Vukovar, for
example, both commenced in the autumn of 1991.28
With the outbreak of war in Bosnia, however, some observers began to question
the decision to impose the embargo on the whole of the former Yugoslavia; as Madeleine
Albright pointed out, „[u]nlike Belgrade, the government in newly independent Sarajevo
had done nothing to warrant UN sanctions‟.29 But supporters of the embargo argued that
Bosnia was „awash with arms.... We would not do any service to the people of Bosnia-
Herzegovina … if we increased the supply of arms into that chaotic country‟.30 The West,
according to Douglas Hurd, „should be in the business of trying to stop the war and not
equipping the parties to fight it out‟.31 The Bush administration agreed, at least initially. As
Bush told reporters in August 1992, „I don‟t think the area needs more arms. I think it
needs less arms.... we‟ve got to stop the killing some way. I don‟t know that it‟s enhanced by
more and more arms‟.32 Even after two disastrous years of war, François Mitterrand was
still warning that the West must be careful to „not contribute … to the worsening‟ and
possible widening of the war by lifting the embargo.33 The British went so far as to claim
that the Bosnian government itself did not want the embargo lifted because that would
mean the end of the UN mission in Bosnia.34 UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, on the
other hand, later harshly criticised the decision to leave „a Member State of the United
Nations … largely defenceless as a result of an arms embargo imposed upon it by the United
Nations‟ while it „was being dismembered by forces committed to its destruction‟.35
Proponents of this argument did not acknowledge that, while there were indeed
large quantities of arms in Bosnia, they were not evenly distributed. The Bosnian Serbs
began the war with a huge military advantage over their opponents.36 The JNA and the
government in Belgrade had ensured that military equipment in Bosnia came under Serb
rather than Bosnian government control as tensions rose, and ethnic Serb troops
28 „U.N. Bars Weapon Sales…‟. For more detail on Vukovar and Dubrovnik, see above, 54-5. 29 Albright, Madam Secretary, 179. 30 Douglas Hurd, Hansard, 25 November 1992, c. 855. 31 Hansard, 23 April 1993, c. 1173. 32 George H. W. Bush, „The President‟s News Conference in Kennebunkport, Maine‟, 8 August 1992. TAPP,
www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=21309 (accessed 8 October 2006). 33 Author‟s translation („Ma position est simple: le refus de la levée de l‟embargo sur les armes s‟explique par
le souci de ne pas contribuer, aussi peu que ce soit, à envenimer - si l‟on peut employer cette expression, les choses sont déjà allées très loin - la guerre de Bosnie et à ne pas nous trouver devant une situation qui irait se généralisant.‟) Ambassadorial reception at l‟Elysée, 31 August 1994; Mitterrand, En Toutes Lettres, 405.
34 Simms, Unfinest Hour, 76-7. On the arguments used to justify the embargo (from a specifically British perspective), see ibid, 74-9..
35 Srebrenica Report, point 491 (original emphasis); quoted in Simms, Unfinest Hour, 339. 36 As was well-known in the West; see, for example, Hansard, 14 July 1993, c. 976. See also Donia and Fine,
Bosnia and Hercegovina, 238-40.
136
withdrawing from Croatia were redeployed into Bosnia, where they became the
professional core of the Bosnian Serb Army.37 In 1990 and 1991 the Serbian government,
in the person of Deputy Minister of the Interior, Mihalj Kertes, was directly involved in
supplying arms and materiel to the Bosnian Serbs.38 In contrast, both the Bosnian Croat
and government forces were initially very ill-equipped. The Croats, however, benefited
from overt and covert support from Croatia; this left the Bosnian government forces the
weakest of the three factions by a considerable margin. They had little equipment beyond
light arms at the start of the war and no friendly neighbouring state to look to for outside
support and supplies. And though the embargo was very porous and was breached by all
sides, even its imperfect implementation adversely affected the Bosnian government.39
Predictions that ammunition shortages would reduce the violence never materialised, and
there were reports as early as February 1992 of large-scale arms shipments to Serbia and
Croatia which included tanks and aircraft.40 It was not until late 1992 or early 1993 that the
Bosnian government began importing significant quantities of arms, and it never achieved
parity with its opponents.41 This did not prevent one British MP from complacently
announcing to Parliament in May 1995 that „[t]he Muslims … have taken the opportunity
to rearm, and it is clear that they are re-equipped and rearmed with all that they need apart
from tanks, heavy armour and aircraft‟, a statement that Brendan Simms rightfully ridicules
as being „rather like a builder saying that a house was ready except for the roof, front door,
and walls‟.42
This imbalance left the Bosnian government at a severe disadvantage. Izetbegovic
complained in May 1992 that „[m]any people here are ready to go to the defense of Bosnia
and Herzegovina. But we haven‟t the weapons. We never prepared for a military struggle.
37 Rieff, Slaughterhouse, 81-2; Blaine Harden, „Yugoslav Army Says It Will Not Leave War-Torn Bosnia‟,
Washington Post, 30 April 1992; Malcolm, Bosnia, 230; Donia and Fine, Bosnia and Hercegovina, 215-16; Mazower, The War in Bosnia, 3;
Western observers worried that the JNA would simply „hand … effective control of most of [the army‟s] troops to the militias‟, a development which „could make things worse, since there‟ll [sic] now be even less likely to respond to appeals for a cease-fire‟; see Chuck Sudetic, „Bosnia Is Seeking Foreign Military Aid‟, New York Times, 5 May 1992.
38 Malcolm, Bosnia, 225; Mazower, The War in Bosnia, 4-6. 39 On the efficacy of the embargo in Bosnia, see Simms, Unfinest Hour, 75-6. 40 David Binder, „Military Analysts Detect Some Signs That the War in Bosnia Is Receding‟, New York Times,
19 September 1992; Blaine Harden, „Croatia Acquiring Warplanes From European Countries, Air Force Chief Says‟, Washington Post, 11 February 1992; Ian Traynor, „Croatian Air Force “Ready to Fly Within Weeks””, Guardian, 11 February 1992.
41 Holbrooke, To End a War, 50-1; original emphasis. See also Hansard, 23 April 1993, c. 1171; O‟Ballance, Civil War, 92-3. For more on the preparations made by all sides for the war, see Burg and Shoup, The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 74-5. Western governments mostly turned a blind eye to smuggling of arms by and for the Bosnian government, and in the case of the US at times actively assisted the process; Holbrooke, To End a War, 51.
42 Conservative MP Peter Viggars, quoted in Simms, Unfinest Hour, 285.
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We believed in a political solution…. The very survival of people here is in jeopardy‟.43
Although his portrayal of Sarajevo‟s lack of preparation as the result of virtue was clearly
self-serving, his description of the situation was essentially accurate, and more to the point,
Western governments knew it. US Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian
Affairs Thomas Niles seemed almost surprised to be asked in early August 1992 whether
the situation in Bosnia was „a fair fight in any sense‟.44 „Of course it‟s not a fair fight‟, he
replied, „You have an organized force, conducted by … the Serbian government, attacking
essentially unarmed people in Bosnia-Hercegovina‟.45 In the UK, critics repeatedly
challenged the government to defend a policy which „den[ied] the victims of aggression
any outside assistance and refuse[d] to let them have access to the means of self-defence‟,46
and Douglas Hogg conceded that the Serb forces were „more heavily armed and better
equipped‟.47 French Foreign Minister Alain Juppé likewise acknowledged – even as he
dismissed calls to lift the embargo in the spring of 1993 – that there was a considerable
disparity between Bosnian government and Bosnian Serb forces.48 After the Dayton
Agreement finally ended the fighting in 1995, a State Department official candidly admitted
that „one of the reasons for this horrible conflict was the great military disadvantage of the
federation forces‟.49
The Bosnian government tried hard to secure an exemption from the embargo,
repeatedly requesting its suspension in 1992 and 1993. Izetbegovic directed his requests
first to the EC and then to the US, saying that his forces had „the disadvantage of being
unarmed. We need weapons. We need them urgently, and I ask this of the United States in
the name of our fundamental right to self-defense‟.50 The Bosnian Muslims did not see
humanitarian aid as an appropriate alternative. As the Bosnian Muslim town commander in
Gorazde told a journalist in late summer 1992, „[s]end a message to your governments.
Thank them for their food and medicines. Tell them that at least we will die with full
stomachs‟.51 Sarajevo made further attempts to have the embargo lifted in late September
43 Izetbegovic, quoted in Sudetic, „Bosnia Is Seeking…‟. On Sarajevo‟s lack of military preparations, see
Malcolm, Bosnia, 230; Mazower, The War in Bosnia, 14. 44 „Hearing of the Europe and Middle East Subcommittee of the House Foreign Affairs Committee on
Developments in Yugoslavia‟, Federal News Service, 4 August 1992. 45 Ibid. 46 Hansard, 14 July 1993, c. 976; see also Hansard, 25 November 1993, c. 854, 855. 47 Hansard, 23 April 1993, c. 1173. 48 R. W. Apple Jr., „Clinton Says U.S. Must Harden Line Toward the Serbs‟, New York Times, 23 April 1993. 49 Ambassador John Kornblum, „USIA Foreign Press Center Briefing on the Dayton Peace Plan:
Implementation‟, Federal News Service, 15 December 1995. 50 Craig R. Whitney, „Three factions in Bosnia Begin Talks in London‟, New York Times, 28 July 1992; John F.
Burns, „Bosnian leader Says He Needs Arms, Not Just Food and Medicine‟, New York Times, 8 August 1992.
51 Quoted in Simms, Unfinest Hour, 35.
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1992, May 1993, and at the Vienna Human Rights Conference in June 1993.52 In September
1993, Izetbegovic made a dramatic plea to the UN Security Council – „Defend us, or let us
defend ourselves‟ – only to be met with an embarrassed silence.53 Only US Ambassador
Madeleine Albright spoke in support of his request, describing the failure of the British
and French to respond as „just sad‟.54
The Europeans opposed lifting the embargo on the grounds that it would simply
increase the level of violence. The British government had taken this position throughout
the war, and have been „rightly singled out‟ as the main opposition to lifting the embargo.55
Douglas Hurd openly ridiculed the suggestion, saying it would only „level … the killing
fields‟ in Bosnia, and a leaked May 1993 Foreign Office memo called lifting the embargo a
„lunatic idea‟.56 Many opposition MPs also supported the policy, which bolstered the
government‟s position on the issue.57 The French were generally in accord with the British
view, notwithstanding incidents such as Bernard Kouchner‟s January 1993 insistence that
the Bosnians should be armed. Even as Kouchner asked „[h]ow much longer will we leave
the Bosnian Muslims without defence?‟, Mitterrand only agreed to „consider‟ the request,
and Opposition leader Edouard Balladur opposed the idea.58 Alain Juppé‟s assertion that
„[l]ifting the arms embargo is the solution of despair‟ was a much more typical view among
policymakers. Such was the conclusion of Mitterrand and Balladur; in a joint statement
issued in November 1994, they warned that „any encouragement given to the reconquest of
territory by force – and notably the prospect of lifting the arms embargo – is vain and
dangerous‟.59
Opposition to the embargo in Europe derived in part from a conviction that the
Bosnian Muslims and the Bosnian government had a right to self-defence. In response to
public pressure, the German government forcefully but unsuccessfully pushed for lifting
52 John F. Burns, „Bosnia, in Arms Plea to U.N., Says Sarajevo May Fall Soon‟, New York Times, 29 September
1992; Richard Beeston, „Refugees Say Only Arms Will Bring Them Peace‟, The Times, 3 May 1993; „Bosnia challenges all nations…‟.
53 Peter Pringle, „Izetbegovic Plea to UN Met With Deafening Silence‟, Independent, 9 September 1993. 54 Ibid. Bosnian demands for the lifting of the embargo diminished in frequency and urgency after late
1993, possibly because arms smuggling had succeeded in greatly reducing the differential in military capabilities, or possibly out of recognition that it would accomplish nothing. On Bosnian government efforts to ameliorate the effects of the embargo on its forces, see Malcolm, Bosnia, 243, Ramet, Balkan Babel, 252.
55 Simms, Unfinest Hour, 71-2. 56 Quoted in Stephen Engelberg, „What to Do in Bosnia? 3 Hard Choices for Clinton‟, New York Times, 29
April 1993; quoted in Almond, Europe‟s Backyard War, 403. 57 See, for instance, Hansard, 23 April 1993, c. 1172, 1194; Hansard, 23 June 1993, c. 311. 58 Quoted in „France Vows to Liberate Prison Camps‟, Globe and Mail, 11 January 1993. 59 Quoted in Lepick, „French Perspectives‟, 83.
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the embargo at the June 1993 EC summit.60 The German position was not necessarily
taken out of any great concern for the Bosnian Muslims, however, although the practical
effect would have been the same.61 Hans van den Broek, in contrast, was clearly focused on
Bosnia when he asked, „[i]f you do not see any possibility of helping these people out, how
can you morally deny them the right of letting them arm themselves‟?62 In Britain,
Margaret Thatcher argued that the embargo left the Bosnian Muslims „defenseless in the
path of a determined dictator-aggressor‟, and MP Jim Marshall informed Parliament that
Thatcher was „not alone in believing that the present arms embargo plays into the hands of
the Croats and the Serbs‟.63 The Bosnian Muslims, he declared, should „at least be able to
defend themselves against the atrocities being committed against their nation‟.64 In a
lengthy debate late in the evening on 26 July 1993, initiated by the opposition and with no
press in attendance, more than a dozen MPs from all parties argued for reopening the
issue.65
What this stance on maintaining the embargo meant in terms of human rights was
that the Europeans were collectively advocating a course which left the Bosnian Muslim
population (and indeed Croat and Serb civilians who supported the Sarajevo government)
at the mercy of aggressors who were known to be committing gross human rights abuses,
up to and including genocide.66 The British and French succeeded in persuading the EU as
a whole to adopt their position. Every member state, including Germany and the
Netherlands, abstained from a UN General Assembly resolution in December 1992 calling
for the use of force and suspension of the embargo in Bosnia.67 John Major successfully
argued against the German position at Copenhagen in June 1993, despite „some wavering‟
on the part of Mitterrand, and managed to keep even the words “arms embargo” out of
the summit communiqué.68 Neither France nor the UK voted in favour of a Security
60 Calic, German Perspectives‟, 71; Hodge, Britain and the Balkans, 72. See also Simms, Unfinest Hour, 91-2. 61 David Owen claims that the Germans „in their hearts … were always in favour of lifting the arms
embargo for the Croats‟, and only „by extension for the Muslims‟; Balkan Odyssey, 189. 62 Quoted in ibid., 192. 63 Quoted in William E. Schmidt, „Thatcher Assails West‟s Bosnia Policy‟, New York Times, 15 April 1993;
Hansard, 23 April 1993, c. 820. 64 Hansard, 23 April 1993, c. 820. 65 Hansard, 26 July 1993, c. 837-872. Those who spoke included members of Labour, the Liberals, the
Scottish National Party, the Conservatives, and Independents. 66 As US Vice-President Al Gore put it in April 1993, „[t]he world community has in essence sided with
Serbia … They have unlimited ammunition … The world community is preventing the other side from arming itself ‟; quoted in Almond, Europe‟s Backyard War, 299. Exactly what effect lifting the embargo would have had on the conflict is considered further below.
67 „U.N. Assembly Backs Force in Bosnia‟, Washington Post, 19 December 1992. Canada also abstained from the motion.
68 Murray Ritchie, „EC Backs Major‟s Line to Continue Arms Embargo‟, Glasgow Herald, 23 June 1993; Hodge, p. 72.
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Council resolution to lift the embargo at the end of June.69
To maintain this pro-embargo position, however, European governments needed to
find a politically palatable way to counter claims that lifting the embargo would „giv[e] the
Muslims the chance to defend themselves against the more heavily armed and better
equipped Serbs‟.70 They did so by arguing that lifting the embargo would in fact
disadvantage the Bosnian Muslims even more.71 Two somewhat contradictory assumptions
underpinned this argument. The first was that, as Major later put it, „the likely result of
lifting [the embargo] would be the Serbs deciding to launch a full-scale war, to capture as
much territory as possible before the new weapons came into the equation.... Bosnia would
go under before the new weapons even arrived‟.72 Lifting the embargo would simply
provoke the Bosnian Serbs into an all-out assault before new arms could change the
military equation. The second argument was that „if the embargo is relaxed for one party,
in practice it will have to be relaxed for all‟, and such an action would therefore yield no
advantage to Sarajevo.73 All the parties would acquire more arms, leaving them in the same
relative position but with more firepower, which would only make the situation worse.
Hurd warned that arms intended for the Bosnian Army could „go astray‟ and end up in the
hands of their opponents, and he believed that „faced with the arming of the Bosnian
Muslims, the traditional friends of Serbia would rearm the Bosnian Serbs‟.74 David Owen
echoed this warning in a letter to the EC foreign ministers dated 24 April 1993, claiming
that
this would be a profound mistake.… far from helping tilt the balance toward the
Bosnian Muslims, the almost inevitable supplies of 1990s weapons from the
former Soviet Union to the JA are more likely to tilt the balance even further
towards the Serbs.75
In this version of events, arms would indeed get through to the Bosnian government
forces, but the Serb forces would receive as much or more, thus again leaving them with
69 Mark Tran & Ian Traynor, „US Throws Weight Behind Move to Lift Arms Embargo‟, Guardian, 30 June
1993. 70 Owen, Balkan Odyssey, 141. 71 Douglas Hurd, Hansard, 25 November 1993, c. 855. 72 Major, Autobiography, 541-2. See also Douglas Hogg, Hansard, 23 April 1993, c. 820, 1173. 73 Douglas Hurd, Hansard, 25 November 1993, c. 855. 74 Hansard, 23 February 1993, c. 781. Hurd and his colleague Douglas Hogg returned to this theme in
debates a few months later; see Hansard, 23 April 1993, c. 820, 1173. 75 Owen, Balkan Odyssey, 141-2. On Owen‟s opposition to lifting the embargo, see Simms, Unfinest Hour, 161-
3.
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the advantage.76
Even some harsh critics of Western policies in Bosnia agreed that the embargo
should stay, albeit not for the same reasons. David Rieff, for instance, dismissed calls for
suspension of the embargo as „the greatest irrelevancy of all‟, partly because he agreed that
„the Serb and Croat enemies of Bosnia were [not] just going to stand around as the balance
of force on the battlefield was radically altered‟. However, to Rieff this was not in itself the
real problem. The real obstacle to lifting the embargo, he argued, was that the Serb and
Croat resistance to arming the Bosnian government would mean that „NATO soldiers
would have had to kill and die to get the weapons in‟, something their governments were
manifestly unwilling to consider.77 Since there was no chance that this would happen, lifting
the embargo would only make matters worse.
The Bush administration initially supported the European stance on maintaining
the embargo. When asked in early August 1992, Richard Boucher refused to endorse the
idea of lifting the embargo. While admitting that „the idea is out there‟ and that „there have
been statements, requests by the Bosnians about that‟, he would only say that the US
„position is that we don‟t want to do anything that would only lead to more violence and
bloodshed‟.78 The Pentagon, however, issued a report the same month that advised arming
the Bosnian forces.79 There was also considerable Congressional support for lifting the
embargo. A bipartisan group of senators had begun urging the UN Security Council to
„reconsider‟ the embargo, „with particular reference to the importance of arming the,
generally defenseless, Bosnians‟.80 Before the legislative session ended, the Senate
authorised the president to lift the embargo and supply up to $50 million worth of military
assistance to Bosnia.81 By October the administration was seriously considering doing so,
unilaterally if necessary. Opposition from senior officials eventually scuttled that plan, but 76 Other lines of argument were occasionally used to buttress these claims. The British, for instance,
repeatedly argued that lifting the embargo would be „incompatible in practice with the humanitarian effort‟ in Bosnia; see Douglas Hurd, Hansard, 23 February 1993, c. 781; 23 April 1993, c. 1173; John Major, Hansard, 23 June 1993, c. 310. See Chapter 6, for a more in-depth consideration of the place of the humanitarian mission in Western policy. Other observers wondered whether lifting the embargo would, as Clinton put it, „help to get a settlement and bring about peace‟, but the proposal to lift the embargo was first and foremost a response to the fact that there was no peace, and that largely defenceless people were dying and being turned out of their homes in the meantime; „Excerpts from Clinton News Conference: “The U.S. Should Lead” on Bosnia‟, New York Times, 24 April 1993; see also Hansard, 23 April 1993, c. 1180.
77 Rieff, Slaughterhouse, 13, 155. 78 „State Department Regular Briefing‟, Federal News Service, 6 August 1992. 79 Elaine Sciolino, „Bush Asks France and Britain to Back Force of Monitors in Kosovo‟, New York Times, 25
November 1992. 80 „News Conference on Plans to Introduce a Resolution Calling for a Special Meeting of the United
Nations on Bosnia and Former Yugoslavia‟, Federal News Service, 5 August 1992. 81 Hendrickson, The Clinton Wars, 72. This did not, of course, deal with the issue that doing so would involve
violating the UN embargo.
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the White House continued to keep the option in mind.82 In mid-December, the US voted
in favour of the UN General Assembly resolution to lift the embargo, but quickly
abandoned the plan when faced with European opposition.83
Clinton‟s anti-embargo inclinations seemed much more firmly grounded in
conviction than those of the Bush administration. While still a candidate, he had declared
himself „impressed‟ with the Senate Foreign Relation Committee‟s arguments in favour of
unilaterally ending the embargo, and predicted that such a course „may be an alternative if
we can‟t get our allies to go along‟.84 People like Richard Holbrooke encouraged him in this
stance, arguing in September 1992 that „changing the rules‟ of the embargo might let „the
Bosnians … obtain more weapons with which to defend themselves‟.85 Holbrooke returned
to the issue in a January 1993 memo to the President-elect which restated his long-standing
support for lifting the embargo on Bosnia „if it can gain UN Security Council approval‟,
and even urged that the US „allow covert arms supply to the Bosnian Muslims ... this might
be the best way to help the Bosnians quickly without provoking a new round of escalatory
steps from the Serbs‟.86
The Clinton administration began advocating this policy soon after taking office.
Clinton dispatched his new Secretary of State, Warren Christopher, to sound out the
Europeans on his “lift and strike” proposal. Their response, as discussed in chapter 4, was
decidedly unenthusiastic, and Christopher returned to Washington having failed to secure
the support of any of the European states. Nevertheless, the administration refused to
abandon the idea; Assistant Secretary of State John Shattuck assured the Vienna
Conference on Human Rights in June 1993 that Clinton „reaffirmed his view … that the
arms embargo should be lifted.... We are actively engaged in consultations on this crucial
issue to persuade others to join us‟.87 The US alone among the permanent members of the
Security Council voted in favour of lifting the embargo at the end of the month, an
82 Eric Schmitt, „U.S. Weighs Sending Arms to Muslims in Bosnia‟, New York Times, 11 October 1992. 83 Michael R. Gordon, „Military Step: West Is Wary‟, New York Times, 22 December 1992; „U.N. Assembly
Backs Force…‟. 84 Gwen Ifill, „Clinton Takes Aggressive Stances On Role of U.S. in Bosnia Conflict‟, New York Times, 10
August 1992. 85 Holbrooke, To End a War, 39-40. 86 Holbrooke, To End a War, 52; original emphasis. The United States did eventually (beginning in the spring
of 1994) do exactly as Holbrooke had suggested in 1992/1993. A series of articles in the New York Times in 1996 brought these activities to public notice; see Chris Hedges, „A Secret Arms Deal Between Iran and Croatia Comes to Light‟, 24 April 1996; Elaine Sciolino, „Aid to Bosnia: A Secret U.S. Plan and Its Repercussions‟, 26 April 1996; Tim Weiner, „No U.S. Arms Role in Bosnia, Holbrooke Says‟, 22 May 1996; Tim Weiner and Raymond Bonner, „Gun-Running in the Balkans: C.I.A. and Diplomats Collide‟, 29 May 1996; Raymond Bonner, „Arms Case Taints a Diplomat‟s Future‟, 30 May 1996.
87 Ian Traynor and Mark Tran, „US Insists It Will Try to Enforce Bosnia‟s Right to Arm Itself ‟, Guardian, 25 June 1993.
143
expression of „its belief that [Bosnia] … has a right to defend itself ‟ and that the embargo
had „had an unintended yet devastating effect in favor of the aggressor‟.88 Lifting the
embargo was still a prominent part of US policy in mid-1994, and in August 1995, in the
aftermath of the massacre at Srebrenica, sixty-nine senators called for the US to unilaterally
violate the UN embargo to arm the Bosnian government.89
The conviction that its „impact was uneven‟ and unfairly punished the Bosnian
government and its people certainly formed a part of Washington‟s motivation for lifting
the embargo.90 But there were more self-interested reasons at work as well. Many politicians
thought it to be „a less painful choice‟ which didn‟t „involve as much engagement‟ as
outright military intervention.91 Some policymakers were also concerned about the reaction
of the Muslim world to the perceived abandonment of a Muslim nation by the West.
Noting the main source of Bosnia‟s illegal arms shipments, Richard Holbrooke argued that
the US should arm the Muslims instead, „so that Bosnia‟s outside support no longer comes
from the Islamic nations‟.92 By early January 1993, nations such as Iran were openly
threatening to defy the embargo and supply the Bosnian army with weaponry if the
fighting was not stopped within two weeks.93
The US stance showed at least some concern for the human rights ramifications of
the arms embargo, but the European position carried the day.94 The arguments the
European governments used to defend the embargo in the face of its clear negative effects
betrayed a certain lack of concern for human rights in Bosnia, as did Washington‟s ultimate
willingness to abandon its efforts to change the policy. The failure to reconsider the
embargo when its effects started to become evident, and certainly before it was reinforced
by the UN action, was perhaps one of the greatest failures of European leadership in this
88 Tran and Traynor, „US throws weight …‟; „Explanation of U.S. Vote on Lifting Arms Embargo Against
Bosnia‟, Dispatch, Vol. 4, No. 27, 5 July 1993. It is worth noting, however, that the draft resolution was proposed by the Non-Aligned Caucus (not the US), as a response to „what they saw as the flawed concept underlying UNSC Resolution 836‟; Hodge, Britain and the Balkans, 70.
89 Major, Autobiography, 543-4; Tim Zimmermann, Samantha Power, Bruce B. Auster, and Kenneth T. Walsh, „Taking Sides in Bosnia‟, U.S. News & World Report, 7 August 1995.
90 Albright, Madam Secretary, 179. 91 „Press Briefing by George Stephanopoulos‟, 28 April 1993. TAPP, www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=60151. See below, Chapter 6, for more in-depth consideration of this
motive in Western policymaking. 92 Holbrooke, To End a War, 52. 93 Hella Pick, „Edinburgh Briefing: Yugoslavia‟, Guardian, 10 December 1992; Holbrooke, To End a War, 50;
O‟Ballance, Civil War, 92-3; Roger Boyes, „Geneva Negotiators Press On In Hope of Peace On Paper‟, The Times, 2 January 1993.
94 Jim Baker, for example, cited Serbia‟s „repression and … use of force‟ as behaviours which justified the imposition of the UN embargo; quoted in Goshko, „U.N. Imposes Arms Embargo…‟. The Senate in turn questioned whether the „continuation of the arms embargo against Bosnia can be morally justified‟ if the West continued to refuse „to help defend Bosnian civilians‟; „News Conference on Plans to Introduce a Resolution…‟, 5 August 1992.
144
period. It effectively ensured the continuation of Serbian military dominance in the former
Yugoslavia, with all of the readily apparent risks that carried for basic human rights. It was
a critical missed opportunity because there were not yet significant numbers of European
troops serving as peacekeepers and monitors in the former Yugoslavia. As will be seen
later, the potential for retaliation against Western personnel in Croatia and Bosnia became
one of the strongest arguments used by European governments against lifting the
embargo. Unsurprisingly, they had no wish to stir up a war in which their troops were
embedded, but this condition did not yet apply in late 1991.
In the face of nearly overwhelming ethnic Serb military superiority, the West‟s
insistence on maintaining the embargo ensured that the main victims of atrocities were left
largely defenceless. The importance of this point is not diminished by the fact that the
embargo was relatively porous; the policy must be judged by its intention, not its flawed
execution. If Western governments had had their way, no weaponry at all would have been
brought into the former Yugoslavia, at least until the US began ignoring or facilitating
smuggling into Bosnia and Croatia. It should be recalled that Western governments
concluded quite early in the war that the Serbs were responsible for the majority (though
not all) of human rights violations in the wars, particularly in Bosnia. They were therefore
very well aware of the implications of supporting the embargo and locking in their military
superiority. It was a conscious decision with the practical effect of assisting the worst
human rights offenders. As Clinton charged in May 1993, at a time when the US was still
pushing to change the policy,
the practical impact … was to give the entire weaponry of the Yugoslav Army to
the Serbian Bosnians and deprive any kind of equal weaponry to the people
fighting against them. So the global community …, not on purpose, but
inadvertently, has had a huge impact on the outcome of that war in ways that have
been very bad.95
He was nearly correct; his only error was in saying the impact was inadvertent, when in fact
it was clearly understood.
Supporters of the embargo justified this position by arguing that more weapons
would simply worsen the violence, but while superficially true, the contention was
meaningless without an acknowledgement of just how that would occur: by equalising, at
95 „Remarks and a Question-and-Answer Session With High School Students in Bensonville, Illinois‟, 11 May
1993. TAPP, www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=46542 (accessed 10 October 2006).
145
least to a degree, the military imbalance between the Serb forces and their opponents in
Croatia and Bosnia. Once the war began in Bosnia, Western policymakers knew that the
most likely effect of the embargo was not a quicker negotiated settlement, but instead an
ethnic Serb victory and the de facto or de jure dismemberment of Bosnia. Lifting the
embargo might put the Bosnian government on an equal enough footing with the BSA that
Sarajevo might insist on continuing the fight rather than quickly capitulating; this possibility
is what worried many in the West. Douglas Hogg admitted that a „major objective‟ of
British policy was to get the Bosnian government to „accept‟ that they had been defeated,
„that land has been seized by force … there has to be a degree of acceptance of that fact
… the military option has to be abandoned‟.96 David Owen spoke in February 1993 of the
need to „shatter the Muslims‟ illusion‟ that they would ever receive significant military aid.97
This lends credence to Mark Almond‟s contention that the embargo was simply the means
for the West to carry out its „real policy of turning the screw on Bosnia … until the
Bosnians were so weak that they gave in of their own accord to Serbian demands‟.98 But
lifting the embargo would allow the Bosnian government forces to fight back on something
approaching equal terms, which would (and later did) discourage them from accepting the
proffered peace terms, which invariably accepted, either implicitly or explicitly, the results
of ethnic cleansing, and thus endorsed the consequences of massive human rights abuses.
The threat of the war continuing on more equal terms carried with it the possibility
that „[i]t could, more than any option seriously being considered, threaten an extension of
the conflict into other parts of the former Yugoslavia or beyond‟.99 Observers feared that
if the Bosnian conflict became more properly a war and less a one-sided siege or massacre,
it would be liable to spread, bringing in Kosovo, Macedonia, and possibly even
neighbouring countries such as Greece and Bulgaria, setting the whole region aflame.
Given the West‟s desire to avoid military involvement in the war in Bosnia, an expanded
conflict was a nightmare scenario on many levels. This possibility outweighed any concerns
that ending the embargo would „far from ending the suffering … aggravate it‟.100 The idea
that lifting the embargo would lead to „a humanitarian catastrophe‟ was farcical given what
was happening in Bosnia; the catastrophe was already in progress.101 The New York Times
was quite correct when it reported in May 1993 that the US had „dropped its campaign to
96 Quoted in Simms, Unfinest Hour, 30. 97 Quoted in Simms, Unfinest Hour, 148. 98 Almond, Europe‟s Backyard War, 326. 99 Ibid. 100 Douglas Hurd, Hansard, 23 April 1993, c. 1173. 101 Major, Autobiography, 542.
146
turn the Balkan war into a fair fight between the Bosnian Serbs and Muslims and … set a
much more limited goal of containing the war within Bosnia‟s borders‟.102 This was the
embargo‟s purpose, and if human rights had to be ignored to avoid accomplish it, it was a
price Western governments were willing to pay.
From a human rights perspective, there is a serious dilemma at the core of the
embargo issue. The effects of maintaining the embargo on the human rights of the
Bosnian people are clear. But it is also seems clear that lifting the embargo, in part or in
whole, would indeed have resulted in an increase in the level of violence in Bosnia, and
hence in more deaths and greater destruction. Is it reasonable to suggest that this would
have been an acceptable way to defend Bosnian human rights? There is no straightforward
answer to this question, and reasonable people can and do arrive at different conclusions.
But whatever the consequences may have been from lifting the embargo, maintaining it left
the Bosnian Muslims and the government in Sarajevo largely at the mercy of the Bosnian
Serbs, amply supplied by Serbia, with known disastrous results. Given that the current
approach was demonstrably not working to restrain the atrocities and gave a decisive
advantage to the worst perpetrators, an argument could be made that lifting the embargo
would have done no worse and might have done better. And finally, to return to the
language of rights, the right of self-defence is meaningless if those being attacked are not
permitted to meet force with force when necessary.
III. Economic Sanctions and Human Rights in Serbia and Bosnia
Is this what the West calls human rights? Depriving us of heating oil, food, medicine, an economy? Is that
your democracy?
- Ljiljana Danilovic 103
European leaders began considering the imposition of economic sanctions on
Serbia in early August 1991, but there was no consensus on their use or potential
effectiveness. Hans van den Broek, for example, at the time a member of the EC troika,
expressed doubts about their utility, while Hans-Dietrich Genscher was a strong
advocate.104 Douglas Hogg, a supporter of sanctions, conceded in mid-October that „the
102 Elaine Sciolino, „U.S. Goal on Bosnia: Keeping War Within Borders‟, New York Times, 19 May 1993. 103 A Serbian pensioner in Belgrade, quoted in Roger Thurow, „Cash a Hot Potato to Serbs‟, Globe and Mail, 9
August 1993. 104 Gardner and Silber, „France Seeks…‟. Human Rights Watch, it might be noted, had called in its 1990
World Report for the use of sanctions on human rights grounds „against the federal government of Yugoslavia and, when possible, against the government of the republic of Serbia‟, and urged that they „be
147
trouble is that sanctions are a blunt instrument, which is why … we are trying to devise a
selective approach to that matter‟.105
The EC finally enacted sanctions against Serbia on 8 November 1991. The US
followed suit the next day. These sanctions included the termination of financial aid and
trade agreements, removal of duty-free status for Yugoslav exports, and suspension of
landing rights for the Yugoslav national airline.106 An oil embargo was discussed but
dropped, even though Yugoslavia was dependent on outside sources of petroleum and
„disruption of supplies would have a severe impact on the country‟s economy‟.107 Douglas
Hogg argued that „there are substantial practical difficulties in the way of an early oil
embargo‟, and that anyway the Yugoslav military already had „substantial reserves‟.108
Perhaps more importantly, many observers thought that it was largely unnecessary.
American policymakers concurred with this assessment. As Principal Deputy Assistant
Secretary of State Ralph Johnson remarked in October, „the Yugoslavs have effectively
imposed an oil embargo on themselves‟; an official embargo would do nothing more to
restrict oil imports and was thus pointless.109
The sanctions had no noticeable effect on the Serbian government‟s policies in
Croatia, but they did have a strong impact within Serbia. Rather than reducing popular
support for Milosevic, however, the sanctions strengthened his regime, an effect that was
both a result of the sanctions‟ negative human rights impact and the cause of further
negative effects. To begin with, sanctions weakened the organised opposition to the
Belgrade government by cutting off access to information and resources from abroad that
were desperately needed to challenge the regime.110 This imposed isolation, with its
attendant reductions in freedom of expression and the press, as well as economic hardship,
further encouraged the emigration of precisely those better-educated and politically
moderate segments of the population that were most likely to oppose Milosevic‟s policies,
thus further bolstering the strength of the regime and, by extension, both the likelihood
and severity of future human rights abuses.111 The strictly economic effects of the
applied in the future to any republic engaged in egregious human rights abuses‟. See also Calic, „German Perspectives‟, 68.
105 Hansard, 3 July 1991, c. 328. 106 For an overview of the EC/US sanctions, see Richard Garfield, Economic Sanctions, Health, and Welfare in
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 1990-2000 (Belgrade: OCHA/UNICEF, 2001), 15. 107 „US Efforts to Promote a Peaceful Settlement…‟. See also Barber, „EC Sanctions…‟; Simms, Unfinest Hour,
4-5. 108 Hansard, 3 July 1991, c. 328. 109 „US Efforts to Promote a Peaceful Settlement…‟. 110 Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, 232. It is worth noting Ivan Vejvoda‟s contention that „a free press developed
in Belgrade and remained more or less uncurbed until 1994‟; „Serbian Perspectives‟, 107. 111 Ibid., 144. See also Vejvoda, „Serbian Perspectives‟, 109-10; Ramet, Balkan Babel, 202-4. On the repression
148
sanctions similarly increased the government‟s power, by „increas[ing] the regime‟s control
over the economy by increasing the importance of state-owned businesses or those allied
with the regime. Meanwhile, smaller privately owned firms failed, effectively reducing the
social and financial support available to regime opponents‟.112
In spite of their lack of positive effect, there were no calls from Western
governments to lift the sanctions. This did not change after the recognition of Croatia and
Slovenia in January 1992, and the West led the push to tighten and extend the sanctions
regime after the outbreak of war in Bosnia. Reversing a momentary move towards
removing the sanctions at the time of Bosnia‟s recognition, the US and EC announced new
sanctions in late May.113 These were quickly supplemented or superseded by the passage on
30 May 1992 of UN Security Council Resolution 757, which „banned all flights to and from
[the FRY] and … blocked assets and prohibited imports and exports of all commodities
and products except for supplies intended strictly for medical purposes and foodstuffs
approved by the Sanctions Committee‟.114 It included restrictions on oil imports, and
suspended cultural, sporting and scientific exchanges. On 18 June, Resolution 760 extended
the exceptions for humanitarian supplies „to include trade in commodities or financial
transactions for essential humanitarian purposes‟.115 Resolution 787, passed on 18
November, tightened the sanctions further, in particular addressing the problem of
strategic goods which were supposedly being shipped through Serbia, but which often
never left the country after entering.116 With the exception of the cultural, sport, and air
traffic embargoes, which were relaxed in 1994, these sanctions were maintained up to and
beyond the signing of the Dayton Accords in November 1995.
Western governments claimed that the sanctions were meant to pressure the
and control of Serbian media, see Ramet, Balkan Babel, 207; and especially Thompson, Forging War, 51-133.
112 Gordon N. Bardos, „International Policy in Southeastern Europe: A Diagnosis‟, in Yugoslavia Unraveled, 143.
113 David Buchan, „EC to Recognize Bosnia and Lift Serbia Sanctions‟, Financial Times, 7 April 1992; Barbara Crossette, „After Weeks of Seeming Inaction, U.S. Decides to Punish Belgrade‟, New York Times, 23 May 1992; Alan Riding, „Europeans Impose a Partial Embargo on Belgrade Trade‟, New York Times, 28 May 1992. Serbia and Montenegro had announced the creation of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) in late April 1992, and it was this state which was the target of the UN sanctions. Occasional threats were made to extend them to include Croatia, but this was never actually done; see, inter alia; John Carvel, „EC Takes Soft Line On Croat Sanctions‟, Guardian, 20 July 1993.
114 Garfield, Economic Sanctions, 15. Resolution 757 also reduced the number of diplomatic staff at embassies, and suspended „sporting, cultural, and scientific exchanges‟, but for the purpose of this study, it is the economic and financial sanctions which are most important. For an overview of the UN sanctions regime, see A Brief Overview of Security Council Applied Sanctions: an informal background paper prepared by the United Nations Sanctions Secretariat, Department of Political Affairs, December 2000, 22-5. Available from www.un.org/en/documents/ (accessed 26 August 2009).
115 Garfield, Economic Sanctions, 15. 116 Ibid., 16.
149
Milosevic regime to change its policies, end its support for the Bosnian Serbs, and assist in
finding a negotiated solution to the crisis. Either the regime would change its behaviour out
of concern over the effects of the sanctions on the Serbian population, or the population
would force a change in policy out of their own self-interest. Resolution 757 simply stated
that the sanctions were „adopt[ed] … with the sole objective of achieving a peaceful
solution and encouraging the efforts taken by the European Community and its member
states‟. Portuguese Foreign Minister Joao de Deus Pinheiro described them as perhaps „the
only instrument we have to make them [the Serbs] behave‟.117 David Owen called sanctions
„the one lever we had‟ to exert pressure on the Serbs; they were „a way of demonstrating [to
Serbia] that war had a cost‟.118 John Major insisted that „our [the UK and US] attitude to
sanctions would depend on rapid and radical change of policy by Serbia‟.119 Western
diplomats repeatedly emphasised, in line with the wording of the resolution, that sanctions
„are not designed to punish. They are designed to persuade and to bring about a change of
policy‟.120 A Clinton administration official lucidly summed up their purpose in April 1993:
Essentially the purpose of the sanctions as we understand them is to try to create
a frame of mind in Belgrade. And that frame of mind ideally is one which says
that the costs and benefits of continuing to engage in what they have been
engaging in are shifting. So the more effective the sanctions are, at least in our
theoretical constructs, the more likely we are to be able to engender in their minds
a different attitude towards how important it is to be reasonable and to be quick in
the negotiating process.121
It is worth noting, however, that it was never made clear to the Serbian government, either
by the UN Security Council or by Western governments more directly, exactly what policy
changes on Milosevic‟s part would have sufficed to have the sanctions lifted.
Support for the sanctions in the West was virtually unanimous. Germany and the
US were the main proponents in the months leading up to the UN resolution, but Douglas
117 Quoted in Ian Traynor, Martin Walker, and John Palmer, „West Threatens Diplomatic Sanctions Against
Serbia‟, Guardian, 23 April 1992. 118 Michael Simmons and Hella Pick, „World “Paralysed” in Face of Human Rights Crises‟, Guardian, 25
November 1992; Owen, Balkan Odyssey, 208. 119 Quoted in George H. W. Bush, „Remarks with Prime Minister John Major of the United Kingdom and an
Exchange with Reporters‟, 20 December 1992. TAPP, www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=21788 (accessed 8 October 2006).
120 British UN Ambassador David Hannay, quoted in Alan Ferguson, „NATO Jets Get Go-Ahead to Open Fire in Bosnia‟, Toronto Star, 1 April 1993.
121 „Background Briefing by Senior Administration Officials‟, 26 March 1993. TAPP, www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=59996 (accessed 10 October 2006).
150
Hurd praised it as „contain[ing] one of the most comprehensive series of measures ever
adopted by the United Nations‟.122 The British prime minister „strongly supported the
binding sanctions.... on the substantive question, we stick with the sanctions, and we make
them tough‟.123 France was a more reluctant supporter, though it had „constantly repeated
that it [was] not opposed to sanctions being imposed on Serbia as long as they are part of a
policy aimed at achieving a negotiated solution within the framework of ex-Yugoslavia‟.124
As of March 1993, the State Department maintained that „there [were] no differences‟
between the French and American positions on the sanctions.125 This situation remained
essentially unchanged for the duration of the war. Loosening the sanctions was
occasionally considered, either for humanitarian reasons or in exchange for Serbian
concessions, but Vance and Owen felt that sanctions were a crucial part in getting the
parties to agree to the VOPP in early 1993.126 In January 1994, the US explicitly linked any
possible relaxation of sanctions with Serbian cooperation in war crimes trials, and in July,
the Contact Group foreign ministers agreed to urge the Security Council „to extend … and
tighten enforcement‟ of sanctions on the FRY.127
Some observers nevertheless expressed serious doubts about the effectiveness and
consequences of economic sanctions both before they were imposed and during their
operation. A senior State Department official speaking for the Bush administration
admitted in April 1992 that „financial leverage is often very difficult to find or to apply....
I‟m very pessimistic on the effects of economic sanctions. They tend to be very porous‟.128
The Europeans were „without much enthusiasm‟ for sanctions only two weeks before the
122 Terrence Petty, „Germany Vows Intense International Pressure on Serbia‟, Associated Press, 22 April 1992;
Hansard, 2 June 1992, c. 714. 123 Quoted in George H. W. Bush, „The President‟s News Conference with Prime Minister John Major of the
United Kingdom at Camp David‟, 7 June 1992. TAPP, www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=21059 (accessed 8 October 2006).
124 Riding, „Europeans Impose…‟. France acceded to the sports ban, for instance, only in exchange for „for language clarifying that the Serbs are not solely responsible for the crisis in the Balkans‟; Paul Lewis, „U.N. Votes 13-0 For Embargo On Trade With Yugoslavia‟, New York Times, 31 May 1992.
125 Roger Cohen, „Mitterrand Leaves for Sarajevo, Hoping to Shock His Serbian Ally‟, New York Times, 28 June 1992; „Background Briefing by Senior Administration Official‟, 8 March 1993. TAPP, www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=59988 (accessed 10 October 2006).
126 See, inter alia, David Binder, „U.S. May Loosen Embargo‟, New York Times, 1 October 1992; Almond, Europe‟s Backyard War, 301; Owen, Balkan Odyssey, 52, 125, 214; George Brock and Joel Brand, „Europe to Offer Belgrade Sanctions Deal for Peace‟, The Times, 23 November 1993. Regarding Vance and Owen, see William Drozdiak, „Bosnia Peace Negotiations End in Failure‟, Toronto Star, 31 January 1993; Paul Lewis, „Serbs Urged to Agree on Bosnia Map‟, New York Times, 9 February 1993.
127 David B. Ottaway, „U.S. Warns Serbia on War Trials‟, Washington Post, 17 January 1994; „Communiqué, Foreign Ministers Contact Group Meeting on Bosnia-Herzegovina‟, Dispatch, Vol. 5, No. 33, 15 August 1994. The sanctions were also an issue at the Dayton negotiations, with Milosevic wanting them lifted immediately while the Contact Group insisted they should remain for some time.
128 „State Department Background Briefing on Yugoslavia‟, Federal News Service, 24 April 1992; see also Chuck Sudetic, „Sanctions Will Bring Hardships‟, New York Times, 31 May 1992.
151
passage of Resolution 757: „We all know trade embargoes can be easily circumvented‟, one
German official observed.129 A 1993 Canadian government report noted the failure of
sanctions to end the fighting thus far, and warned that „[w]here the opposing sides are
hellbent on defending their cause, sanctions alone, even where the effects are considerable,
really have little chance of persuading enemies to seek peace, at least in the short term‟.130
Even Milosevic‟s domestic opponents did not believe that he would be defeated by political
and economic sanctions: „He has the television, the police, the army, the apparatus,‟ said
one opposition leader. „Finally he can only be beaten by force, internal or external‟.131
Whatever threat the sanctions might have posed to Milosevic was greatly reduced
by their initial ineffectiveness; the doubters were quite correct in this respect. There was
large-scale smuggling along the Serbian-Romanian border, as well as from Greece and,
further afield, Ukraine.132 Western governments were well aware of this.133 Their impact on
the population of Belgrade, at least in 1992, was slight. Another of Milosevic‟s Serbian
critics predicted that „[b]efore we run out of Coca-Cola here in Belgrade, there will be no
water to drink in Sarajevo‟, and a British visitor in November had no „sense that there was a
war on‟.134
The almost complete lack of enforcement mechanisms contributed greatly to the
initial ineffectiveness of the sanctions. This lack may have been partly the result of an
unrealistic expectation that enforcement would not be necessary; that the mere declaration
of the sanctions would suffice. On 2 July 1992, when Douglas Hurd was queried about the
possibility of establishing „a blockade to make sanctions work‟, he airily reminded
Parliament that „there is an obligation on all members of the United Nations to comply
with the resolution … We shall have to see what happens … but it is premature to assume
that people will not comply with their obligations‟.135 A more plausible explanation,
however, lies in the desire to avoid military engagement in the wars; actually enforcing the
129 Ironically, this was on much the same grounds as the insistence that the arms embargo applied to all of
the former Yugoslavia; namely „that it would be impossible to prevent goods sent to one former Yugoslav republic from being forwarded to Serbia‟. Paul Lewis, „U.N. Rules Out A Force to Halt Bosnia Fighting‟, New York Times, 14 May 1992; Alan Riding, „Europe, Weary and Burned, Is Limiting Its Risk in Bosnia‟, New York Times, 17 May 1992.
130 Rossignol, Sanctions. 131 Traynor, „Serbia‟s All Too Immovable Object…‟. 132 Jean-Baptiste Naudet, „Fissures dans l‟Embargo Anti-Serbe‟, Le Monde, 22 September 1992; David Gow,
„Germany to Call for War Crimes Trials‟, Guardian, 20 August 1992. Neighbouring states such as Greece, Romania, and Bulgaria, whose own economies were adversely affected by the sanctions, called for their lifting in 1993; Ramet, Balkan Babel, 255.
133 See, inter alia, John M. Goshko, „Allies Move to Plug Trade Leaks to Serbia‟, Washington Post, 5 September 1992.
134 Michael T. Kaufman, „A Sanction Minuet‟, New York Times, 9 June 1992; Claire Messud, „A Light in the Darkness‟, Guardian, 28 December 1992.
135 Hansard, 2 June 1992, c. 717.
152
embargo might come too close to taking sides. NATO and WEU naval units were
dispatched to the Adriatic, but they were authorised only to monitor violations of the
sanctions, not to intervene to stop them.136 This state of affairs elicited repeated calls for
improvements, from Germany in August 1992, the US from mid to late 1992, and the UK
in April and December 1993.137 Resolution 787 authorised a naval blockade in the Adriatic
and on the Danube River, but „no one … was prepared to say‟ how far they would go in
enforcing the blockade.138 Western states also dispatched „sanctions assistance missions‟ to
bordering states to assist with enforcement.139 Despite all of this activity, the sanctions
regime never came close to being watertight and took a long time to have a noticeable
impact.140
The sanctions did eventually begin to take a serious toll on Serbia, although it is
difficult to separate their effects from the other pressures on the Serbian economy, which
was already suffering from the costs of the Croatian war, high foreign debt, low foreign
reserves, and inflation of at least forty percent per month.141 Overall, industrial production
fell 65% between 1989 and 1993, as compared to a decline in GDP of 40% in the same
period.142 It is important to remember, though, that these dry economic statistics described
136 Stephen Kinzer, „Germany to Send Force to Balkans‟, New York Times, 16 July 1992; Craig R. Whitney,
„Europe‟s Caution on Bosnia Provokes Growing Criticism‟, New York Times, 1 August 1992. 137 Gow, „Germany to Call…‟; „US position and proposed actions concerning the Yugoslav crisis – address by
Assistant Secretary for European and Canadian Affairs Thomas M. T. Niles‟, Dispatch, Vol. 3, No. 33, 17 August 1992; „Aggression by the Serbian regime – statement by Ambassador Edward J. Perkins before the United Nations Security Council, 30 May 1992‟, Dispatch, Vol. 3, No. 23, 8 June 1992.; Elaine Sciolino, „U.S. Seeking Tighter U.N. Sanctions on Serbia‟, New York Times, 11 November 1992; Ian Black, „Britain Opposes Intervention‟, Guardian, 7 April 1993; John Major in Hansard, 13 December 1993, c. 689.
138 Frank J. Piral, „U.N. Tightens Curbs on Belgrade By Authorizing a Naval Blockade‟, New York Times, 17 November 1992; see also Alan Riding, „NATO Agrees to Use Warships to Enforce Yugoslav Brigade‟, New York Times, 19 November 1992.
139 „Containment of the Bosnian Conflict – statement by Stephen A. Oxman, Assistant Secretary for European and Canadian Affairs, 21 July 1993‟, Dispatch, Vol. 4, No. 32, 9 August 1993.
140 For an assessment of the enforcement regime, see Pietro Pirani and Mario Zucconi, „Poor Enforcement of Sanctions: Lack of Political Will?‟, in The Effects of Economic Sanctions: the Case of Serbia, ed. Mario Zucconi (Milano: FrancoAngeli, 2001), 43-62. See also Vejvoda, „Serbian Perspectives‟, 103-4.
141 Mark J. Porubcansky, „Economy a Major Victim in Yugoslav Civil War‟, Associated Press, 6 February 1992; Chuck Sudetic, „Serbia‟s Economy Collapsing From War Cost‟, New York Times, 9 February 1992; „Hearing of the House Foreign Affairs Committee on Post Cold War Intelligence‟, Federal News Service, 25 February 1992; Traynor, „Serbia‟s All Too Immovable Object…‟; „State Department Background Briefing…‟, 24 April 1992. On the effects of the sanctions, see Stojan Babic, „The Political Economy of Adjustment to Sanctions: The Case of Serbia‟, in The Effects of Economic Sanctions, 78-82. On the difficulty of assessing the effects of the sanctions, see Mario Zucconi, „Introduction: Eight Years of Economic Sanctions against Serbia‟, in ibid, 10-13. Only four months after the introduction of sanctions, Douglas Hurd claimed that „industrial production in Serbia has been roughly halved, overall trade is down by 50 to 75 per cent. and oil imports are down by more than 80 per cent‟; Hansard, 25 September 1992, c. 121. Ironically, the drop in industrial activity did „improve … the quality of Yugoslav rivers‟ between 1991 and 1995 because of lower pollution inputs; see Janos Krizan & Mirjana Vojinovic-Miloradov, „Water Quality of Yugoslav Rivers (1991-1995), Wat. Res., Vol. 31, No. 11 (1997), 2914-2917.
142 Per capita income declined some 60% between 1989 and 1993, although it then recovered slightly; Garfield, Economic Sanctions, 29. The GDP decline was sharpest during the first two years of the sanctions, falling 27.9% in 1992 and 30.8% in 1993. It increaded 2.5% in 1994; see Sofia Tipaldou, „International
153
the effect of the sanctions on the living conditions of the population of Serbia, and were
thus directly relevant to the human rights aspects of the policy. By 1994, „60 per cent of
the workforce was jobless or on unpaid leave … Real household incomes had dropped to
one-tenth of 1990 levels and a family needed four people‟s salaries for food needs alone‟.143
An anonymous Serbian official lamented in April 1993 that „[w]e have become a nation of
petty criminals ruled by an elite of master criminals…. Here we can have no work ethic
because there is nothing to work for. All we can do is debase ourselves‟.144 „Law and order‟,
a Western diplomat added, „have broken down in Belgrade, and only the strong can
survive‟.145 The sanctions created bread queues and increasing rates of malnutrition.146 The
effects of the sanctions on medical care, according to a UNICEF official working in
Belgrade, „violate[d] the UN Convention of the Rights of the Child … the process is so
difficult that the child dies before the drug gets here‟.147
In spite of their simultaneous doubts about the sanctions‟ effectiveness, Western
governments were happy to tout these results. They were initially cautious in their claims;
the State Department, for instance, would only admit to finding it „a little bit encouraging‟
in early June 1992 to be receiving
reports of increased panic buying in Belgrade of food and fuel. The price of
gasoline has doubled. The Belgrade regime is preparing ration coupons for
gasoline and eventually, it is our understanding, basic food and supplies. The
regime may freeze wages and prices.148
By August, though, they were claiming that sanctions were „having a very, very pronounced
Intervention in Serbia and Its Effects on the Country‟s Democratization‟ (Institut Universitari d‟Estudis Europeus, Universidad Autonoma de Barcelona, 2008), 12. Available from www.sisp.it/files/papers/2008/sophia-tipaldou-international-intervention-in-serbia-and-its-effects-on-the-countrys-democratization.pdf (accessed 23 August 2009). One study concluded that sanctions were the single most significant factor in the sharp drop in industrial production and foreign trade during this period, responsible for 14.8% and 20.4% of the decline respectively; the next highest impact was attributed to hyperinflation, at 12.1% and 8.4%, which was itself affected by the sanctions. See Vladimir Goati et al, Sanctions now help only Milosevic (Belgrade: Center for Policy Studies, 2000). Available from www.sane-boston.org/articles/fry/sanctions.html (accessed 20 August 2009).
143 Peter Walker, „Sanctions: A Blunt Weapon‟, Magazine of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, 1995. Available from www.redcross.int/EN/mag/magazine1995_3/18-19.html (accessed 19 August 2009). See also Ramet, Balkan Babel, 204-5
144 Quoted in Bruce Wilson, „The Misery of Belgrade‟, The Advertiser, 12 April 1993. 145 Ibid. 146 Henry Kamm, „In Yugoslavia, Austerity Drifts into Despondency‟, New York Times, 23 August 1993. 147 Quoted in Scheherezade Faramarzi, „How Serbs Lose Out on UN Aid‟, Globe and Mail, 9 December 1993. 148 „State Department Regular Briefing‟, Federal News Service, 8 June 1992. See also „State Department Regular
Briefing‟, Federal News Service, 3 June 1992.
154
negative impact‟, and Serbia was „under pressure because of ‟ them.149 Lawrence
Eagleburger thought that it was „clear [sanctions] have made some real impact on the
Serbian economy. The Serbs are looking at a winter that‟s going to be tough‟.150 Clinton
contended that „we have hurt [the Serbs] very badly economically‟, and Douglas Hogg
asserted in May that „[t]he Serbian economy has been devastated by sanctions‟, and that
„[s]anctions have been a great deal more effective than has commonly been allowed. The
Serbian economy has been devastated by sanctions‟.151 Press reports generally confirmed
these assessments and drew a gloomy picture of the impact of the sanctions on Serbia.152
The situation was bad enough that in September 1993, even Serbian opposition leader Vuk
Draskovic requested that the sanctions be relaxed.153
Lost in the statistics and economic terminology was the fact that sanctions do not
inflict hardship on a state; they inflict hardship on the population of a state in the hopes of
influencing its government of that state. By definition, sanctions work by imposing
suffering on people, either to induce their government to change its policies of its own
accord to end their suffering, or to inspire the people to rebel and somehow force their
government to alter its behaviour to end the sanctions. The sanctions on the FRY were not
“targeted”, aimed specifically against the elites or those portions of the populace which
actively supported the government.154 From the standpoint of effectiveness, morality aside,
this was not a drawback; according to some analyses, sanctions are „most efficient when
greatest costs fall on heretofore “innocent bystander” groups within the target‟.155 They
therefore inescapably had serious human rights implications. As one commentator has
observed, „[h]umane sanctions necessarily will be ineffective while effective sanctions
cannot avoid being inhumane‟.156 An unusually candid Canadian government report
149 „Hearing of the Europe and Middle East Subcommittee…‟, 4 August 1992; „News Conference on Plans
to Introduce a Resolution…‟, 5 August 1992. 150 „Acting Secretary Eagleburger: Agreements reached at the London Conference (Remarks on the
MacNeil/Lehrer Newshour, 28 August 1992)‟, Dispatch Supplement Vol. 3, No. 7, 15 September 1992. 151 William J. Clinton, „Question-and-Answer Session with the American Society of Newspaper Editors in
Annapolis‟, 1 April 1993. TAPP, www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=46393 (accessed 10 October 2006); Hansard, 24 May 1993, c. 574. See also Solomon Major and Anthony J. McGann, „Caught in the Crossfire: “Innocent Bystanders” as Optimal Targets of Economic Sanctions‟, Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 49, No. 3 (2005), 339.
152 See, inter alia, Stephen Kinzer, „Sanctions Driving Yugoslav Economy Into Deep Decline‟, New York Times, 31 August 1992; Roger Cohen, „Yugoslav Sanctions Taking High Toll‟, New York Times, 6 September 1992; Wilson, „The Misery of Belgrade‟; Thurow, „Cash a Hot Potato…‟; Kamm, „In Yugoslavia, Austerity…‟.
153 Prentice, „Draskovic Pleads…‟. 154 Rodney G. Allen, Martin Cherniack, George J. Andreopoulos, „Refining War: Civil Wars and Humanitarian
Controls‟, Human Rights Quarterly 18 (1996), 777-8. 155 Major & McGann, „Caught in the Crossfire‟, 338-9. 156 Thomas G. Weiss, „Sanctions as a Foreign Policy Tool: Weighing Humanitarian Impulses‟, Journal of Peace
Research, Vol. 36, No. 5 (September, 1999), 507. See also Marrack Goulding, Peacemonger (London: John Murray Publishers, 2002), 19; United Nations Commission on Human Rights, Sub-Commission on the
155
described sanctions as „basically the twentieth century‟s equivalent of the long and cruel
sieges of cities during the Middle Ages‟, and as such they „inevitably affect the lives of
ordinary citizens in the targeted states‟.157
Although Western leaders could talk about the effects of the sanctions “on Serbia”
in terms of percentages of GDP and the exchange rate of the dinar, their impact was felt
by the Serbian population in much more concrete ways. Post-Milosevic Serbian Prime
Minister Zoran Zivkovic later blamed the sanctions for a „ruined economy, hospitals
lacking of medicaments, tens of thousands of people with no salary, families in need of
food and electricity‟.158 A 2001 study stated that „[s]urvival depended increasingly on
political or family connections, charitable help from humanitarian organisations or black-
marketeering‟.159 Mortality rates rose virtually across the board, reflecting the shortages of
food, heat, and especially medicine.160 Exemptions for humanitarian supplies, which „[i]t is
commonly assumed … ensure basic respect for economic, social and cultural rights within
the targeted country‟, were supposed to remedy these problems.161 Another study
concluded, however, that
these exemptions do not have this effect. Moreover, the exemptions are very
limited in scope. They do not address, for example, the question of access to
primary education, nor do they provide for repairs to infrastructures which are
essential to provide clean water, adequate health care, etc.162
It is possible that the economic disruption caused by the sanctions, and hence the damage
to the society as a whole, „paled in comparison to the unanticipated impact‟ of lifting the
sanctions in 1996. Rather than „a return to “business as usual” … the result was often no
business at all‟.163
The sanctions had other serious indirect, delayed, and long-term human rights
Promotion and Protection of Human Rights. The adverse consequences of economic sanctions on the enjoyment of human rights: working paper prepared by Mr. Marc Bossuyt, UN doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2000/33, 21 June 2000. Available from www.un.org/en/documents/ (accessed 20 August 2009).
157 Weiss, „Sanctions‟, 501. See also Rossignol, Sanctions, and Allen et al, „Refining War‟, 777-8. 158 Zoran Zivkovic, Transition in Serbia – Achievements and Challenges, Lecture at the London School of
Economics, 23 January 2004, 6. Available from www2.lse.ac.uk/PublicEvents/events/2004/20040108t1219z001.aspx (accessed 23 August 2009). 159 Garfield, Economic Sanctions, 12; this study provides an excellent survey of the effects of sanctions on the
former Yugoslavia between 1990 and 2000. See also Zivkovic, Transition, 1-2. 160 Vlajinovic et al, „Trends in Mortality in Serbia, excluding the provinces, 1973-1994‟, Srp Arh Celok Lek,
(2000 Sep-Oct; 128(9-10)), 309-15; abstract available on PubMed Index. This is disputed; see Garfield, Economic Sanctions, 35, 53.
161 CESCR General comment 8, E/C.12/1997/8, para. 4. 162 Ibid., para. 5. 163 Garfield, Economic Sanctions, 13.
156
effects in the FRY. Their effect on the domestic opposition to Milosevic during the
Croatian war has already been described.164 These effects continued during the Bosnian
crisis; Zivkovic later described how Milosevic „used the circumstances to radicalize his fight
against us, the opposition, treating us as traitors‟.165 In terms of reinforcing his popular
support, the sanctions provided the regime with „a kind of external scapegoat‟ to blame for
Serbia‟s already poor economic conditions.166 Calum Macdonald even argued that they
provided Milosevic with a positive economic incentive to continue his policies:
The more that sanctions threaten economic collapse in Serbia, the more that …
Milosevic will be compelled to continue his policy of ethnic cleansing and
territorial consolidation. Carving out a greater Serbia is about the only means of
economic growth and the only source of political credibility and legitimacy
available to Milosevic‟s regime.167
By encouraging the growth of smuggling and black markets, the sanctions contributed
greatly to a marked criminalisation in Serbian society that had long-lasting negative
effects.168 Paramilitary leaders like Zeljko Raznatovic (better known as “Arkan”) profited
hugely from this market, as did Milosevic and those surrounding him, getting „rich by
legalizing smuggling operations and gaining control over them‟.169 The end result was a
retardation of the long-term process of democratisation in Serbia and Montenegro, which,
it will be recalled, was (within the context of Yugoslavia as a whole) a major focus of
Western policies in 1989 and 1990.170
Western governments expected and predicted the impact of the sanctions; they did
164 See above, 148-9. 165 Zivkovic, Transitions, 6. See also Goati et al, Sanctions only help Milosevic; which provides a list of 8 points to
support this contention. 166 „State Department Background Briefing …‟, 24 April 1992. A later report concluded that „If unchecked,
the humanitarian impact of sanctions may in fact relieve the targeted governments from some of the political pressure of the sanctions. Therefore, the humanitarian impact of sanctions hardly can be seen as "collateral damage", unavoidable under the circumstances and not relevant to the effectiveness of sanctions regimes. On the contrary, the proper management of the humanitarian impact of sanctions appears central to an efficient management of sanctions and, therefore, to their success.‟ Claude Bruderlein, Coping with the Humanitarian Impact of Sanctions (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 1998). Available from www.reliefweb.int/ocha_ol/pub/sanctions.html (accessed 21 August 2009).
167 Hansard, 26 July 1993, c. 839. 168 For a detailed look at this issue in relation to Yugoslavia, see Peter Andreas, „Criminalizing Consequences
of Sanctions: Embargo Busting and Its Legacy‟, International Studies Quarterly 49 (2005), 335-360. 169 Bill Schiller, „Alleged War Criminal Courts Serbian Voters‟, Toronto Star, 17 December 1993; Zivkovic,
Transition, 2, 6; Andreas, „Criminalizing Consequences‟, 342-3. 170 Tipaldou, „International Intervention‟ ; Goati et al, Sanctions only help Milosevic.
157
not simply become aware of them as they occurred.171 US Ambassador Edward Perkins
informed the UN on 8 June 1992, barely a week after the UN sanctions were put in place,
that „[w]e regret the inevitable impact that the measures we are taking today will have on
the people of Serbia and Montenegro‟.172 A year later, a British MP drew a comparison
with Iraq, „where our sanctions … are punishing women and children and making the
population poor‟, pointing out that the same observation „can easily be applied to the
former Yugoslavia‟.173 And as Calum Macdonald‟s warning indicated, Western governments
were also aware of the possible political ramifications of the sanctions but simply ignored
them. Lawrence Eagleburger admitted in February 1993 that he had known that the
sanctions would likely increase support for Milosevic before the December 1992 Serbian
elections: „Yeah, of course I did [know] and I don‟t give a hoot … I‟m sure it helped … I
think he would have won anyway, but yes, I think I gave him some more votes‟.174
The relevant question, however, was not whether the sanctions had succeeded in
destroying the Serbian economy, but whether they were helping to improve the situation in
Bosnia. This was after all the ostensible aim of the policy, and given the need to justify the
human rights costs which the sanctions were exacting in Serbia, it was far from an
academic question. To the contrary, it was crucial, because as the Rossignol report pointed
out to the Canadian government, the sanctions were „justifiable only as long as their
positive effects on international peace and security and respect for human rights
outweigh[ed] their negative effects on ordinary citizens‟.175 Evidence that the sanctions
were having any effect in Bosnia, however, was distinctly lacking. Some observers believed
that the slackening in violence in late April 1992 was due to the fear of sanctions, but the
lull did not last.176 This was nearly the last claim made for the success of the sanctions in
Bosnia until 1995, when the evidence indicates that they did play a role in the split between
Belgrade and the RS and thus to Milosevic‟s relative cooperativeness at the Dayton
negotiations.177
171 As Thomas Weiss observes, since „dislocations are a necessary part of economic coercion, those states
approving sanctions can not feign surprise at suffering‟. Weiss, „Sanctions‟, 505. 172 „Aggression by the Serbian regime…‟, Dispatch, Vol. 3, No. 23, 8 June 1992. The pain the sanctions would
cause to Serbia‟s trading partners was also noted and addressed; see, inter alia, Lawrence Eagleburger, „Acting Secretary Eagleburger: Intervention at the London Conference on the Former Yugoslavia‟, Dispatch Supplement Vol. 3, No. 7, 15 September 1992, and UN General Assembly, Strengthening of Humanitarian and Disaster Relief Assistance of the United Nations, Including Special Economic Assistance: Special Economic Assistance to Individual Countries or Regions, UN doc. A/50/423, 12 September 1995. Available from www.un.org/en/documents/ (accessed 23 August 2009).
173 Sir Russell Johnston, Hansard, 26 July 1993, c. 847. 174 Quoted in Almond, Europe‟s Backyard War, 292-3, 331. 175 Rossignol, Sanctions. 176 Ian Traynor, „Bosnia Fighting Abates As Serbs Avert Sanctions‟, Guardian, 27 April 1992. 177 See, for example, Pavkovic, Fragmentation, 175; Roberts, „Communal Conflict‟, 194. Mark Mazower credits
158
Judging by their public statements, Western governments had difficulty grasping
this distinction, and hence repeatedly confused the means (i.e., the damage to Serbia) with
the ends (i.e., resolving the Bosnian conflict). This tendency was particularly well
represented in a series of White House press briefings in March and April 1993, though it
was hardly unique to the US. White House spokesperson George Stephanopoulos, when
challenged to defend calling the sanctions „successful‟ when „they don‟t seem to have had
any particular effect‟ on the violence in Bosnia, replied that „over time, [we] will be
inhibiting their effect [sic] to carry on the aggression‟, but admitted that he was unable to
show „any slowdown in the aggression … as a result of sanctions‟.178
The press returned to the question in mid-April, against the background of the first
crisis in Srebrenica and renewed debate on further sanctions at the UN.179 Stephanopoulos
and Clinton press secretary Dee Dee Myers did their best to avoid answering the question
of what effect the sanctions were having in Bosnia, as opposed to Serbia. On 15 April, the
following exchange occurred:
MS. MYERS: Well, we think it is having some effect. We‟re going to continue to
tighten sanctions. As you know, we support the omnibus resolution. We expect
that to come to a vote on the 26th.
Q: You say it‟s having an effect -- can you give us any documentation?
MS. MYERS: I‟d be happy to provide somebody to talk to you about the impact
of the sanctions and things like that.
Q: There‟s been no -- you have not been able to provide anybody who can tell us
that the sanctions have had any effect in Bosnia. Serbia, yes; in Bosnia, no.
MS. MYERS: I think that they‟ve had effect in Serbia and we think they‟ve had
some effect in Bosnia. And again, I‟ll be happy to provide somebody to walk you
through the details of that, if you‟d like.
Q: We would like to hear from someone who can show us what the effect has
been in Bosnia. We had the briefing on all of the terrible things that are happening
in Belgrade, but we haven‟t seen anything that indicates an impact on the fighting.
Can you provide something along those lines?
the threat of sanctions in the spring of 1992 for the appointment of Milan Panic as Yugoslav prime minister, „a clear indication of Milosevic‟s sensitivity to international pressure‟; The War in Bosnia, 25. Sabrina Ramet asserts that „desperat[ion] for an easing of the sanctions‟ caused Milosevic to adopt a more cooperative attitude as early as the start of 1994; Balkan Babel, 207.
178 „Press Briefing by George Stephanopoulos‟, 5 March 1993. TAPP, www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=60126 (accessed 10 October 2006). 179 See above, 122; for more on the Western response to the 1993 Srebrenica crisis, see below, 189-90.
159
MS. MYERS: I will see what I can get you.180
Later the same day, Stephanopoulos tried to deny that Myers had „said she would be able to
provide some administration officials who could document the effect the sanctions are
having in Bosnia‟, and again tried to direct attention to the effect in Belgrade, while
admitting that he didn‟t know „what kind of effect that will eventually have on the Bosnian
Serbs‟.181
On 16 April, President Clinton simply refused to engage with an assertion „that
sanctions have obviously not had any effect on the Serbian behavior, even though they‟ve
had an effect on the Serbian economy‟.182 Stephanopoulos was unable to explain „[w]hat
makes us think that sanctions would have any impact on Serbian behavior? While we‟ve
been told the sanctions have had an impact on the Serbian economy, it has not lessened the
fighting, the fighting has increased since talk of tougher sanctions‟.183 The press,
meanwhile, tried to hold Myers to her commitment to „make someone available‟ to discuss
the matter, as long as she understood that „we‟re talking about the impact in Bosnia…. It‟s
the fighting we‟re interested in. That‟s what you‟re trying to stop, is it not?‟184
Finally, on 21 April, the continued questioning forced into the open the essential
hollowness of the claim that the sanctions were successful. Disputing a claim that Western
inaction had doomed Srebrenica, Myers offered a list of things which the West had done,
emphasising the sanctions and including humanitarian aid, the no-fly zone, and attempts to
„isolate Serbia‟. Her audience was unconvinced:
Q: Dee Dee, I assume you would -- maybe you would -- would you argue with the
suggestion that having done all that, and granted that you‟ve done all that, you still
have had no effect on what‟s going on in Bosnia. You have talked, you‟ve applied
pressure, you‟ve applied sanctions, all those other things but you haven‟t affected
anything.
MS. MYERS: Well, clearly the fighting has not stopped. Clearly, the danger to
people living in Eastern Bosnia and other parts of that country has not been
180 „Press Briefing by Dee Dee Myers‟, 15 April 1993. TAPP, www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=59946 (accessed 10 October 2006). 181 „Press Briefing by George Stephanopoulos‟, 15 April 1993. TAPP, www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=60143 (accessed 10 October 2006). 182 William J. Clinton, „The President‟s News Conference with Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa of Japan‟, 16
April 1993. TAPP, www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=46438 (accessed 10 October 2006). 183 „Press Briefing by George Stephanopoulos‟, 16 April 1993. TAPP, www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=60144 (accessed 10 October 2006). 184 „Press Briefing by Dee Dee Myers‟, 16 April 1993. TAPP, www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=59947
(accessed 10 October 2006).
160
removed and the results are tragic and the President is very concerned about that.
I don‟t think we can claim that we have solved the problems in Bosnia, no.185
A realistic expectation that the sanctions would soon work might have at least
partially compensated for this lack of results, but there was no such expectation. Western
policymakers admitted very early on in the Bosnian war that they had no idea when or if
the sanctions might begin to have an effect. Shortly after the passage of Resolution 757,
Richard Boucher was asked if „anyone [had] a time line on how long you think it might take
for the sanctions to begin to have an effect‟; he replied that „it‟s hard to predict‟.186 British
MP Calum Macdonald made the same point in a more critical manner a few weeks later,
when he wrote that „[s]anctions have never been shown to work quickly and effectively in
the past, and it is unlikely they will do so now‟.187 Lawrence Eagleburger conceded the
point plainly in a television interview in September 1992:
Q: Excuse me. What I meant was, you said it yourself; there has been deal after
deal after deal, and nothing happens.
Acting Secretary Eagleburger: Yes, and it‟s also quite clear that very often sanctions
as an instrument of bringing somebody to change his policy – you cannot
guarantee they‟re going to work.... If, in fact, those sanctions are really clamped
down, there is, at least, some, I think, substantial reason to believe that that‟s going
to force real change in the attitudes of the Serbian Government and, hopefully, the
Serbian people. And there is no question.
Q: By when?
Acting Secretary Eagleburger: I don‟t know. I can‟t tell you how long.188
Eagleburger never found an answer to that question, and neither did anyone else. More
than six months later, Bill Clinton was still expressing frustration at the slow pace of the
sanctions effects, and still could not offer a guess as to when they would work.189
None of the reasons for maintaining the sanctions until 1996, in the face of these
failures, improve the human rights bona fides of the policy. In part, it was possible to 185 „Press Briefing by Dee Dee Myers‟, 21 April 1993. TAPP, www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=59950
(accessed 10 October 2006). 186 „State Department Regular Briefing‟, Federal News Service, 3 June 1992. 187 „Yugoslavia‟, The Times, 19 June 1992. 188 „Agreements reached at the London Conference‟, Dispatch, 15 September 1992. 189 „Press Briefing by Dee Dee Myers‟, 12 May 1993. TAPP, www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=59959
(accessed 10 October 2006). It is possible that the process might have worked more quickly had Western governments been more explicit regarding what changes on Belgrade‟s part were required for the sanctions to be lifted; see above, 150.
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continue the sanctions because the effects were so slow and the timeline was so unclear:
policymakers could still hope that they would eventually start working. And to be fair, as
noted above, they have been credited with helping to bring Milosevic to the Dayton
negotiations in a cooperative frame of mind.190 In part, Western governments maintained
the policy simply because they needed to be seen to be doing something in response to the
atrocities in Bosnia, and they could think of nothing else, or at least nothing else that was
acceptable in Western capitals. As one British parliamentarian asked in 1993, „what else can
one do? There is only military action that we have been talking about, but there is a lack of
will to do that‟.191 There is also the simple explanation that „the low domestic political cost
coupled with the minimal loss of credibility in case of failure … render sanctions … a
particularly attractive option‟.192 Finally, a report issued by the anti-Milosevic Belgrade
Center for Policy Studies speculated in 2000 that perhaps „the US Administration is less
than honest when it says it wants to see Milosevic removed from power‟.193
All of these reasons may have played a part, but there was more to it than this. A
suggestion as to the deeper reasons is to be found in a US government report of April
1993, which summed up „the key objectives‟ of the sanctions as „(1) register the
international community‟s displeasure with Serbia-Montenegro‟s aggressive policies, (2)
demonstrate its resolve to stop them, and (3) apply pressure on Serbia-Montenegro to meet
UN demands to cease outside aggression and interference in Bosnia and Herzegovina‟.194
The significance of this passage lies in the fact that only one of those objectives, the third,
was actually concerned with the official, publicly declared purpose of the sanctions; i.e.,
changing Serbian policy on Bosnia. The first two, on the other hand, were essentially
symbolic (perhaps less so in the case of the second), and aimed at establishing the moral
position of the international community in opposition to Serbian behaviour.195 This was
not a new strategy; dissociation from abusive regimes had been a common human rights
strategy since the 1970s, but the complete failure (at least until mid-1995) of the sanctions
190 See above, 151 (fn.157); 158 (fn. 177). 191 Sir Russell Johnston, Hansard, 26 July 1993, c. 847. 192 Allen et al, „Refining War‟, 777. 193 Goati et al, Sanctions only help Milosevic . While superficially plausible, however, there is no real evidence to
support the contention either that the sanctions were deliberately set up to fail or that any Western governments actually preferred to have Milosevic in control of Serbia over any of the alternatives.
194 US General Accounting Office, Serbia-Montenegro: Implementation of UN Economic Sanctions, GAO/NSIAD-93-174, April 1993, 4. Available from www.gao.gov (accessed 20 August 2009).
195 Adeno Addis identifies these as, respectively, „instrumentalist‟ and „identitarian‟ justifications; the former „are instruments by which the behavior or policy of the target state are sought to be altered‟, while the latter are „a process through which the sanctioning community (party) defines its identity through the act of dissociating itself from the target regime that it considers to be "the troublesome or the evil other”„; „Economic Sanctions‟, 577-8.
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to change Serbian government actions, openly acknowledged by the West, suggests that the
symbolic value of the sanctions had much more importance than was admitted at the time.
Even if not articulated in these terms in Western capitals, the sanctions were, as Addis puts
it, „a process through which the sanctioning community … defines its identity through the
act of dissociating itself from the target regime‟; it is a way of „avoiding collaboration with
evil‟.196
Viewed from this perspective, the sanctions were an exercise in image management
as much or more than they were a sincere and realistic effort to resolve the crisis in Bosnia,
which makes the policy much more troubling from a human rights perspective. Symbolic
purposes are not sufficient justification for the infliction of real suffering; sanctions must
produce real results at least equal to, and preferably greater than, their human rights costs.
In the case of the former Yugoslavia, the real results were completely lacking and, more
important for evaluating the role of human rights in policymaking, they were known to be
completely lacking. Not even those most invested in making the sanctions appear
successful could credibly claim that they had had any discernible effect in Bosnia. Western
governments knew that the sanctions were doing nothing in Bosnia and could offer no
suggestion of when they might begin to do so, though they continued to insist that they
would – at some point – have an effect. They knew that they could not offer any
suggestion of when they might begin to do so. They knew the real-life effects the sanctions
were having in Serbia and Montenegro, both on the living conditions of the population and
on the political position of the Milosevic regime. The human rights costs in Serbia were
counterbalanced by nothing at all.
A final point concerns the evident acceptability, both to governments and to
publics, of the human rights cost of the economic sanctions. Unlike the arms embargo,
there was very little demand for lifting the sanctions; they were generally accepted as a
reasonable and proportionate response to Serbia‟s actions in Croatia and especially
Bosnia.197 Yet it had considerable flaws from a human rights perspective which were readily
evident at the time. It was much easier to ignore the human rights aspects of the sanctions
because they were being imposed on Serbs. Rightly or wrongly, the picture the media and
governments created of the war painted “the Serbs”, as the villains of the piece, without 196 Ibid., 578. It might also be noted that sanctions were never imposed on Croatia, although UN Security
Council Resolution 752 (15 May 1992) specifically mentioned „elements of the Croatian Army‟ in its demand that „all forms of interference from outside Bosnia and Herzegovina … cease immediately‟ and that such forces be either withdrawn, made „subject to the authority of the Government‟ of Bosnia, or „disbanded and disarmed‟.
197 Even Human Rights Watch cautiously endorsed the use of economic sanctions in Yugoslavia; 1990 World Report.
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adequately distinguishing between, for instance, the Serbian government, the Bosnian Serb
leadership, the Bosnian Serbs (whether supporters of the Republika Srpska or of the
Bosnian government), or the population of Serbia proper (again, whether supporters or
opponents of Milosevic). Little if any distinction was drawn between the Bosnian Serbs
who were actually carrying out ethnic cleansing, the Serbian government and military elites
in Belgrade which were overtly and covertly supporting them, and the general population
of Serbia and Montenegro. Nobody in a position of authority and influence was willing to
stand up to defend the human rights of the Serbian population in the face of widespread
international condemnation.198
IV. Conclusion
Collectively, the leading Western governments gave little consideration to the
human rights aspects of the arms embargo and the economic sanctions. Opposition to the
embargo by some elements in the Bush and Clinton administrations was based in part on
concerns over the right to self-defense and in honest revulsion for what was happening in
Bosnia. The same could be said of many European opponents of the policy. But embargo
opponents in Europe and in the US Congress never dictated government policy. The
Clinton administration, though apparently sincere in its opposition and never officially
abandoning its support for lifting the embargo, nevertheless quickly dropped its efforts to
do so in the face of solid European opposition. And the sanctions were never seriously
questioned by the government in any of the key Western capitals in terms of their human
rights impact. These policies were seen as politically low-cost responses to the increasing
violence of Yugoslavia‟s dissolution. They filled the requirement of appearing to do
something, without requiring any great investment of time, energy or resources. The actual
consequence or effectiveness of the policies seemed secondary at best. Both were
essentially all-or-nothing propositions: if they worked as their supporters claimed they
would, well and good, but if they did not, they accomplished nothing positive whatsoever.
Even if they did work, they would do so very slowly; neither offered any chance of having
a swift impact on the growing violence in the former Yugoslavia, making them
inappropriate responses to the fast-moving and expanding crisis in the former Yugoslavia.
And successful or not, each policy carried with it some very damaging consequences for
human rights.
Since these policies spanned a period of years, they again put in question the 198 Russia, Serbia‟s main international champion, was an unlikely candidate to make a human rights-based
defense of the Serbs.
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importance or weight accorded to human rights in the Western response to the Yugoslav
crisis. The arms embargo, through its objective military support of Serbia and the Serbs
more generally, demonstrated a willingness on the part of the West to passively condone
the continuation of grave human rights abuses and a disregard for the right of the state of
Bosnia-Herzegovina to self-defence. There were many practical difficulties which would
have been involved in suspending the embargo, but these were not the primary grounds
given for refusing to do so. The concerns were focused more on how an increase in arms
might contribute to an uncontrollable – by the West – increase or change in the nature of
the fighting in Bosnia, threatening the viability of the West‟s non-interventionist stance. In
the cases of France and Britain, among others, they also concerned the risk that lifting the
embargo might pose to their troops serving in the UN forces and the humanitarian
mission, as discussed in the next chapter. There is no denying that lifting the embargo in
such a way as to benefit the Bosnian government would have been at best difficult and
complicated and at worst impossible. But there is also no denying the effects that
maintaining the embargo did and would continue to have on the war.
If the embargo implicitly sanctioned human rights abuses carried out by others, the
sanctions went considerably further, by directly exacting their own human rights costs. This
was a significant development in terms of the Western response to the Yugoslav situation.
The counterproductive attention to Kosovo, the pressure over democratisation, the
proffered concessions in the 1991 peace talks: all of these involved indirect human rights
costs, which required only that the West not interfere with the actions of others. But with
the economic sanctions, Western governments were willing to take a further step and, in
essence, to commit human rights abuses directly in pursuit of their political aims. It is very
difficult, at best, to square this action with any presumed increase in the importance of
human rights in the post-Cold War period.199
Western policymakers generally tried to avoid human rights language when they
discussed the embargo and sanctions. Human rights per se were never directly cited as a
reason for either suspending or maintaining the embargo. The closest the debate ever came
was when it touched on the “right” of self-defence which belonged to the newly-sovereign
state of Bosnia-Herzegovina, as for instance in the proposed UN Security Council
199 Military intervention too would have had its human rights costs, but it might also have worked to reduce
the violence overall; furthermore, the potential human rights costs of military intervention did not figure prominently in the arguments used against such action. The sanctions, as shown above, were imposing serious costs for no apparent benefit at the time and for some years. The sanctions did play a not insignificant role in bringing Milosevic to the table in 1995, but as shown here, nobody in the West could predict when or even if this would occur.
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Resolution in June 1993.200 Opponents of the embargo frequently referred to the atrocities
being committed, and argued that „[i]f there were any justice in this world, we would offer
our support to the victims and allow them to defend themselves with arms‟.201 Supporters
in turn expressed a great deal of worry about the potential risks to the humanitarian
mission.202 But neither side explicitly framed their argument, pro or contra, in terms of the
human rights of the Bosnian people. A similar tendency was visible in the discussions of
the sanctions; even when policymakers acknowledged the costs, they did so in humanitarian
terms, and certainly not in terms of the human rights of the Serbian populace. The process
of “humanitarianising” the war, and of minimising the human rights aspects, is the subject
of the next chapter.
200 See above, 132, fn. 3. 201 Hansard, 25 November 1993, c. 855. See also, inter alia, Hansard, 23 April 1993, c. 820. 202 See, inter alia, Hansard, 23 February 1993, c. 781; Hansard, 23 April 1993, c. 1173.
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Chapter 6
Containment: Human Rights, Humanitarianism, and Peace Talks
For most of the first two years of the war in Bosnia, a period that encompassed the
initial surge in human rights abuses and atrocities as well as the grinding stalemate that
ensued, Western responses revolved around two main policies, both of which had major
implications for the place of human rights in Western policymaking. The first was an
intensive diplomatic effort in pursuit of a negotiated settlement or peace plan; the second
was a massive effort to deliver humanitarian aid to the Bosnian people.1 Although each was
a separate policy, the humanitarian response and the peace talks were intended to work
together. Humanitarian aid was intended to ameliorate the impact of the war on the
population of Bosnia, allowing time for the peace talks to arrive at a satisfactory and
mutually agreeable solution to the conflict. These policies did address basic human rights
concerns, albeit with important limitations. But they also detrimentally affected the human
rights situation in ways that directly contributed to human rights violations, and in ways
that indicated an indifference to or a willingness to condone or accept human rights
violations.
I. Background: Aid, Negotiations, and Human Rights
[T]he humanitarian effort that has been the focus of the outside world‟s concern deals with the consequences
– not the cause – of this catastrophe. Obscured in the debate over whether the U.N. should authorize force
to deliver relief to existing victims is the fact that there is no debate and no plan to prevent more victims
from being created.
- Richard Holbrooke 2
The EC made two attempts in 1992 to resolve the tensions in Bosnia through
negotiations. The first attempt, made before the war broke out, produced the so-called
Lisbon Agreement in early 1992. This agreement envisaged a Bosnian republic which was
1 The Western response was not limited to these elements, but these were the dominant elements for the
first two years of the war, and other policies only developed or came to be significant in the latter part of the war in 1994 and 1995. For example, UN Security Council Resolutions 808 and 827, which called for and then established the ICTY, were passed in February and May 1993, but it was only with the appointment of Richard Goldstone as chief prosecutor in August 1994 that it began to play a real role in the Western response to the Yugoslav crisis. There were also symbolic acts such as the suspension of the FRY from the CSCE, which the US State Department insisted would cost Yugoslavia „legitimacy … [and] some countries care about legitimacy‟, but it had little if any real impact; „State Department Regular Briefing‟, Federal News Service, 15 April 1992.
2 Richard Holbrooke, „Bosnia: The “Cleansing” Goes On‟, Washington Post, 16 August 1992.
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officially a unitary state, but which consisted „of areas based on ethnic background of the
populace‟.3 Initially signed by all three sides and hailed by Karadzic for „remov[ing] the
possibility of an outbreak of civil war‟ in Bosnia, the accord collapsed when the Bosnian
government withdrew its agreement.4 The London Conference, held in late August,
likewise failed to resolve the conflict. „On paper‟, the agreement which resulted „looked like
a decisive breakthrough‟, but in practice, „[n]o side kept its promises‟ and „[t]he Serb
delegation never honoured any undertakings it made at all‟.5 As John Major remarked, the
West „soon learned that an "agreement" made with states of the former Yugoslavia is one
of history‟s less useful pieces of paper‟.6 That Major had little or no interest in providing
the Bosnian government with military assistance either directly (by Western military
intervention) or indirectly (by lifting the embargo) has already been demonstrated. But
given the long history of failed agreements and ceasefires in Bosnia – usually, though not
always, violated by the Serbs – the statement is nonetheless accurate.7 The one concrete
outcome of the London Conference was the establishment of the International
Conference on the Former Yugoslavia (ICFY) as a „permanent process‟ for the conduct of
further negotiations.8
The seemingly endless and endlessly frustrating negotiations at the ICFY produced
two proposals: the Vance-Owen Peace Plan (VOPP) in late 1992 and the Owen-Stoltenberg
Plan in August 1993. Both plans were premised on the ethnic division of Bosnia. To allow
the ethnic communities an adequate level of separation and autonomy, the VOPP
envisioned ten cantons (three for each ethnic group, with multiethnic Sarajevo forming the
3 Ivan Stefanovic, „Bosnian Leaders Reach General Agreement on Makeup of Ethnic State‟, Associated Press,
18 March 1992. James Gow argues that the Lisbon Plan‟s admission of „the principle of ethnically determined territorial units was a cardinal mistake, since it bestowed approval on Serbian ambition and was in effect a charter for “ethnic cleansing”‟; Triumph, 81.
4 Ibid; Owen accuses the US of encouraging Sarajevo to reject the plan; Owen, Balkan Odyssey, 94. Touval argues that „the impression … that [it] did not enjoy the support of all EC governments‟ also played a role, adding that „German officials considered it “a disaster”„; Mediation, 110. As Silber and Little observe, however, the chances of the Lisbon Agreement resulting in a bloodless partition of Bosnia were minimal in any case; Death, 219.
5 Major, Autobiography, 538. 6 Referring to the London Conference; ibid. There was one further proposal from the ICFY following
Owen-Stoltenberg, the EU Action Plan, in November 1993, but it did not even come as close as the previous two to implementation.
7 Saadia Touval argues that the ICFY did not in fact prioritise a ceasefire: „Being committed to achieving a just settlement, consistent with the London Principles, the ICFY decided not to press for a ceasefire because the ceasefire lines might become frozen … Faced by potential contradiction between putting an early end to the war and thus reducing the number of casualties, and the pursuit of a just settlement … the ICFY gave precedence to justice over saving lives‟; Mediation, 115; see also 132-3.
8 See „Agreements reached at the London Conference‟, Dispatch, 15 September 1992. The ICFY was to be chaired by former British Foreign Secretary David Owen as the designated EC/EU representative, and former American Secretary of State Cyrus Vance (later replaced by former Norwegian Foreign Minister Thorvald Stoltenberg) representing the UN. The ICFY remained the primary venue for peace talks until it was effectively supplanted by the Contact Group approach in 1994.
168
tenth) under a nominally unified national government. The Owen-Stoltenberg Plan took
the principle of partition even further. Bosnia was to be divided into what were in effect
three separate ethnically based republics, responsible for virtually everything except foreign
policy and trade.9 The national government in Sarajevo was to have responsibility for
human rights standards, but would have no national army or police force with which to
enforce them. Both plans failed. US officials strong-armed Karadzic into signing the VOPP
at a meeting in Athens in early May 1993, but the Bosnian Serb Assembly rejected it in
spite of efforts by both Karadzic and Milosevic to encourage its ratification.10 The Bosnian
government rejected the Owen-Stoltenberg Plan, which Izetbegovic claimed amounted to
„political vivisection‟ for Bosnia and lacked international guarantees for its implementation
without which it would „become worthless for peace and of value only to further legitimise
the aggressor‟.11
The sole significant diplomatic success of this period was the formation of a
Muslim-Croat Federation in early 1994, the result of independent US mediation between
the two sides. Unable to make headway in settling the war overall, the Clinton
administration reasoned that a resolution to the Muslim-Croat conflict would reduce the
levels of violence in Bosnia and allow the Muslims and Croats to present a (theoretically)
united front to the Bosnian Serbs. While never functioning as well in practice as was hoped,
the Federation did eventually succeed in ending most of the Muslim-Croat fighting.12
Hoping to capitalise on this achievement, Western governments proposed the so-
called Contact Group plan.13 Also premised on partition, it officially preserved Bosnia‟s
international identity: the Croat-Muslim Federation would control 51 per cent of the
country, the Republika Srpska the remaining 49 per cent. This division required the
Bosnian Serbs to voluntarily relinquish approximately one-third of the territory they
controlled at the time (some 70 per cent of the country) and furthermore to renounce any
long-term intention to merge their territory with Serbia proper.14 The presentation of the
9 In his memoirs, Owen calls the plan „the Union of Three Republics‟; Balkan Odyssey, 190. 10 See Warren Christopher and Madeleine Albright in „Situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina‟, Dispatch, Vol. 4, No.
20, 17 May 1993; Tim Judah, „Serb Leaders‟ Referendum Call Rejected by Bosnia Rebels‟, The Times, 12 May 1993; Marcus Tanner and Christopher Bellamy, „Serb Forces Fire at Aid Drops in “Safe Areas”„, Independent, 18 May 1993.
11 Peter Pringle, „Izetbegovic Rejects “Vivisection”„, Independent, 8 October 1993. 12 See „Bosnia and Croatia: The Challenge of Peace and Reconstruction‟, Dispatch, Vol. 5, No. 14, 4 April
1994. The reduction in Muslim-Croat violence was a slow process, and fighting between the two sides actually worsened substantially in the weeks following the signing of the Agreement; see Jonathan C. Randal, „Croat-Muslim Combat in Bosnia Reaches New Ferocity‟, Washington Post, 21 April 1993.
13 The Contact Group consisted of the United States, France, Germany, Russia, and Britain. Italy was later included as well.
14 The Bosnian Croats had formally given up their goal of union with Croatia in the Washington Agreement.
169
plan in July 1994 on „take-it-or-leave-it‟ terms failed; Karadzic and the Bosnian Serbs
rejected it as an „American diktat‟.15
Although they were not characterised in such terms, the peace plans were
fundamentally indivisible from human rights issues, because they were all attempts to deal
with the goals, results, and conduct of ethnic cleansing. Each plan was an effort to find an
acceptable division of power and territory in Bosnia between the Serbs, Croats, and
Muslims. Each of them failed because no agreement could be reached on these issues, in
large part because, as John Fine puts it, the plans all „adopted the ethnic terms of the
aggressors and provided partition schemes completely undercutting the multiethnic
Bosnian government‟s insistence on multiethnicity‟.16 The way the negotiations were
conducted – which issues they addressed, which they ignored, the pace at which they
worked, and the pressures that were employed to try to gain agreement from all three
parties – reveals a great deal about the place of human rights concerns in the Western
response to the crisis. It is noteworthy, for example, that Tadeusz Mazowiecki, the UN
Special Rapporteur on Human Rights in the Former Yugoslavia, was not consulted about
the human rights provisions of the VOPP.17
Parallel with these negotiations, the West initiated a massive humanitarian aid
mission in Bosnia, working through the UNHCR and drawing on the resources of many
humanitarian NGOs. In launching the humanitarian mission, Western governments were at
least in part responding to pleas for aid from the Bosnian government itself. Haris Silajdzic
was in Washington a week after the outbreak of war:
This is not anymore a political thing. This is now an [sic] humanitarian appeal to
stop the massacres because children, women and men civilians, noncombatants are
being massacred … This is a humanitarian matter. This is not politics. This is to
save the lives of civilians.18
15 Helen Leigh-Pippard, „The Contact Group on (and in) Bosnia: An exercise in conflict mediation?‟,
International Journal, Vol. 53 (Spring, 1998), 308. The West did not abandon the Contact Group plan after its rejection, and it served as the basis for continuing negotiations well into 1995. Disagreements within the Contact Group over the proper approach to take on the arms embargo, sanctions, and negotiations over territory – as well as the intransigence of the Bosnian Serbs and, later, the government in Sarajevo – led to its ultimate failure. It was nominally the Contact Group that sponsored the Dayton negotiations in November 1995, although in practice the United States was the driving force. For a discussion of the various peace plans, see, inter alia, Touval, Mediation, 117-30.
16 Fine, „Heretical Thoughts‟, 185. 17 Simms, Unfinest Hour, 158. 18 „News Conference with Dr. Haris Silajdzic‟, Federal News Service, 14 April 1992. Note too the confusion
inherent in this comment of the difference between humanitarianism and human rights.
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Twice more in Washington in May 1992 alone, at a Congressional hearing and a high-
profile press conference, Silajdzic emphasised the need for huge amounts of aid to prevent
mass deaths from starvation and exposure.19 These appeals produced some quick results;
by 16 April, for instance, the US announced its intention to dispatch two military cargo
planes to Sarajevo with food and blankets, while officials „review[ed] on an urgent basis
other emergency humanitarian relief measures that we as a government can take‟.20
Western governments quickly seized on the humanitarian mission as their
overriding concern in Bosnia. George Bush laid out his administration‟s position clearly in
July 1992:
Our interest is in terms of trying to get humanitarian support in there…. We first
work the humanitarian question, and then you do what you try to do in preconflict
situations or conflict situations and try to use your best diplomatic effort.21
In other words, they made the delivery of humanitarian aid the primary goal, and
resolution of the conflict became a secondary consideration. In terms of immediate needs
this policy made sense, but it amounted to treating the symptoms rather than the
underlying disease. More importantly, as will be seen, the emphasis on the humanitarian
mission actually made resolving the underlying conflict more difficult. The Clinton
administration continued this policy. Describing his recent efforts in mid-1993, Warren
Christopher could still accurately note that „the discussion focused on the need for
additional humanitarian relief ‟.22 The European response was broadly similar. A French
official in May 1992, for example, cited as priorities measures which were needed in
support of aid deliveries, specifically the opening of Sarajevo airport and protection for aid
convoys.23 Most dramatically, French President François Mitterrand achieved a
humanitarian breakthrough of sorts with his flight into Sarajevo at the end of June, which
did result in the semi-reliable opening of the airport for aid deliveries to the city.24
This emphasis on aid was understandable. The scale of the crisis was immense,
19 „Hearing of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe‟, Federal News Service, 12 May 1992;
„News Conference with Haris Silajdzic‟, Federal News Service, 19 May 1992. 20 „State Department Regular Briefing by Margaret Tutwiler‟, Federal News Service, 16 April 1992. 21 Bush, „News Conference in Munich, Germany‟, 8 July 1992. 22 „Press Briefing by Secretary of State Warren Christopher and Secretary of Treasury Lloyd Bentsen‟, 7 July
1993. TAPP, www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=60173 (accessed 10 October 2006). 23 Listed third was „keeping open lines of communication‟ for the peace talks; Riding, „Europe, Weary and
Burned…‟. 24 John F. Burns, „U.N. Takes Control of Airport At Sarajevo as Serbs Pull Back‟, New York Times, 30 June
1992. See Silber and Little, Death, 254 on the willingness of Bosnian Serb leaders to allow this.
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creating a huge need for humanitarian assistance. A CIA document dated 9 September
1992 cited the following UNHCR estimates for Bosnian aid needs for the winter of 1992-
3: „180,000 metric tons (mt) of food…. New or repaired shelters for 160,000 people.
Survival aids (e.g., blankets) for 600,000 people. Plastic sheeting (to cover damaged
windows/walls) throughout [Bosnia], including 140,000 apartments in Sarajevo,‟ as well as
medical needs of more „modest‟ tonnage. The document concluded that even in the „best
case‟, the targets would not be met, and in the „worst case‟, daily food deliveries would
„probably not be more than a few hundred mt – only enough for a few tens of thousands
of people. Death rates will rise from malnutrition and exposure‟.25 Conditions were even
worse the following year. According to a CIA National Intelligence Estimate:
If fighting continues as we expect, the Bosnian population in need will be double
that of last winter – or about 2.8 million people. Total relief requirements during
the next six months will be an estimated 390,000 metric tons … about 80 percent
of which will be food.... And if the fighting stops … requirements could total as
high as 270,000 MT of aid over the next six months.26
Western governments proudly touted their responses to this need. British Defence
Secretary Malcolm Rifkind praised the role of British forces in „escorting some 147
convoys which have delivered 11,775 tonnes of aid‟ between November 1992 and mid-
January 1993.27 At the end of 1993, Warren Christopher announced Washington‟s
willingness
to double the number of U.S. flights that are part of the multi-nation Sarajevo
airlift. This effort, in which the United States now flies roughly one-third of all
missions, has launched a total of 6,000 flights during its 500-day history. This
airborne lifeline, the principal means of supply for Sarajevo, has now exceeded in
duration the Berlin airlift of 1948.28
The mission delivered impressive amounts of aid: 172,000 metric tons of food aid in the
first eight months of 1993, for example, rising to 247,000 tons over the same period in
25 CIA, Assessment of Humanitarian Situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 26 CIA, Global Humanitarian Emergencies, 1993-94, NIE 93-36, 10-11. Available from www.foia.cia.gov
(accessed 24 August 2009). 27 Hansard, 14 January 1993, c. 1057. 28 „The CSCE Vision: European Security Rooted in Shared Values‟, Dispatch, Vol. 4, No. 50, 13 December
1993.
172
1994.29 In monetary terms, too, Western contributions appeared generous. By August 1992,
„[t]otal G-24 contributions [were] $472 million, including $254 million in new pledges since
July 1. The United States has pledged a total of $53 million‟.30 Just under a year later,
„developed nations had contributed over $950 million in disaster relief to the former
Yugoslavia as of June 1993; the United States contributed some $354 million of the total‟.31
The US figure had climbed to over $400 million by December, with a further pledge of
$150 million.32 According to the US General Accounting Office, total US spending for
„Yugoslav peace operations‟ totalled some $2186.9 million through fiscal year 1995.33 The
German humanitarian contribution in 1993 totalled some DM 115 million; by October
1994, the German figure had reached a total of DM 725 million for the duration of the
crisis.34
The diplomatic and humanitarian responses to the war did address certain human
rights concerns. The peace talks were of course directed at ending the fighting, and the
successful achievement of a peace agreement would have saved many lives and ended the
ethnic cleansing. The human rights benefits of the talks would only accrue if and when
they were successful, but simply stopping the major fighting and atrocities, even without
achieving a comprehensive settlement for the war, would have radically improved the
human rights situation in Bosnia. More concretely, the international attention to the
negotiations may have acted to restrain some of the worst excesses in Bosnia; certainly the
camps were being phased out by the autumn of 1992, largely in response to the
international attention they had received. The humanitarian response addressed human
rights concerns more immediately, by providing desperately needed food, medicine, and
shelter to millions of refugees and internally displaced persons. Both parts of the response
clearly touched on the basic right to life as described in Article 3 of the UDHR and Article
6.1 of the ICCPR. The aid can also be seen as responding to or fulfilling the rights to
shelter, medical care, and food.35 It kept many thousands of people alive who would
otherwise have died, from all ethnic groups. Such accomplishments were important.
Even at this most basic level of human rights, however, the Western response had 29 CIA, Global Humanitarian Emergencies, 1995, Vol. II: Country Estimates, NIE 94-33 V2, December 1994, 9.
Available from www.foia.cia.gov (accessed 24 August 2009). 30 Niles, „US position and proposed actions…‟. 31 CIA, Global Humanitarian Emergencies, 1993-94, 5. 32 „The CSCE Vision‟, Dispatch, 13 December 1993. 33 US General Accounting Office, Peace Operations: U.S. Costs in Support of Haiti, Former Yugoslavia, Somalia, and
Rwanda, GAO/NSIAD-96-38, March 1996, 2. Available from www.gao.gov (accessed 20 August 2009). 34 Calic, „German Perspectives‟, 70. The figures cited by Calic for 1993, it should be noted, included DM 65
million „to finance the embargo surveillance‟; whether funds for this purpose should rightly be included in a calculation of support for the humanitarian mission is questionable.
35 UDHR, Article 25.1; ICESCR, Articles 11.1, 12.1.
173
major flaws. The ICFY and Contact Group negotiations, of course, did not lead to a peace
agreement, nor even reduce the violence in Bosnia. Their human rights benefits remained
purely speculative. The humanitarian mission, while it did save lives, was nonetheless never
adequate to the need, and thus only partially addressed those basic human rights to shelter,
food, medicine, and life which appeared to be its strong point. Whatever the amount which
was provided in absolute terms, as described above, it must be put into the context of
needs. Six thousand supply flights over five hundred days sounds impressive, were it not
that the CIA estimate for the tonnage required for the winter of 1993-4 alone, in the event
of continued fighting, was „the equivalent of 19,500 C-130H flights at maximum payload‟.36
Over a period of sixteen months, in other words, the West had flown less than one-third
the number of supply flights needed to meet Bosnian needs for a single winter, perhaps
five months. In monetary terms, the same document cites UNHCR estimates that the cost
of the required aid – even if the fighting were to stop – would still be approximately $200
million.37 This was for a single six-month period. Put another way, a British opposition MP
pointed out that „the entire United Nations peacekeeping budget for 1992, covering its
tasks in the Balkans, Cambodia, Angola and elsewhere, was less than the combined budgets
of the New York City fire and police departments for the same year‟.38
Second, operational difficulties limited the positive effects of the aid that was
delivered. It was very unevenly distributed; the majority of the supplies went to Sarajevo
and central Bosnia, which were relatively accessible and, in spite of the siege of Sarajevo,
relatively peaceful (in the sense that full-scale combat operations were not a regular
occurrence). Substantially less aid reached enclaves such as Gorazde, Tuzla, and Srebrenica,
or other parts of eastern and western Bosnia that were the sites of active military
operations and were most desperately in need of supplies.39 Active fighting, hundreds of
roadblocks, and the seizure of supplies by military and paramilitary personnel severely
hampered aid delivery to these areas.40 As early as May 1992, there were calls to deploy UN
peacekeepers in Bosnia to protect the delivery of humanitarian aid, a move which UN
Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali opposed.41 Aid deliveries also predictably
36 CIA, NIE 93-36, 11. 37 Ibid. 38 Hansard, 26 July 1993, c. 840-1. 39 Hodge, Britain and the Balkans, 80. 40 Blaine Harden, „Bosnia Siege Endangers Relief Effort‟, Washington Post, 28 April 1992. 41 Leonard Doyle, „UN Split Over Aid for Bosnians‟, Independent, 26 May 1992. This step was eventually
taken in UN Security Council Resolution 770 on 13 August, but was largely ineffectual, as is discussed further below.
174
diminished in the harsh Balkan winters, at precisely the time that they were most needed.42
Third, Western governments were perfectly willing to cut aid, or to allow it to be
cut by the UNHCR, when it proved convenient for them, putting their real commitment to
assist the people of Bosnia in doubt. A representative case occurred in the summer of
1993, when UNHCR spokesman Peter Kessler announced that „United Nations-distributed
food rations for more than 1.4 million people in Bosnia and Herzegovina are being cut in
half and food aid for the 380,000 residents of besieged Sarajevo reduced by 20 percent‟.43
The primary reason that he gave for this action was the „shortages in food supplies and lack
of money‟, which was „a result of a marked drop in contributions for relief operations in
the former Yugoslavia‟.44 According to Kessler, European funding for the aid effort had
dropped from 73 percent of the 1992 budget, to only 12 percent (in the first half of the
year) of the 1993 budget, and while the Americans had been „very generous … no one
[was] making up the difference‟.45 An official in another aid organisation concluded that
„[t]he Europeans are clearly writing off the country. The pledges are down from last year.
It‟s not only donor fatigue, it‟s battle fatigue‟.46
Beyond this most basic level the situation was considerably more complex in
human rights terms, and the Western response was much more problematic. Against the
positive aspects just listed must be balanced the costs of the Western response. These can
be divided into what can be termed indirect and direct categories. Into the first of these
falls, for instance, the willingness of Western governments to tolerate continuing human
rights abuses in exchange for the continuation of the humanitarian mission and the peace
talks, or to accept the results of ethnic cleansing in exchange for a peace deal. The latter
category includes direct contributions which these policies made to human rights abuses in
Bosnia, such as the role of humanitarian aid in extending the war or the human rights costs
of the safe areas policy, as well as the implications of Western policies for the human rights
of refugees. At issue was not only how Western policies functionally touched on human
rights, but the ways in which human rights concerns did or did not play an active role in the
formulation and adoption of those policies.
42 CIA, NIE 93-36, 11. For a thorough assessment of the humanitarian mission, see United States General
Accounting Office, Humanitarian Intervention: Effectiveness of U.N. Operations in Bosnia, GAO/NSIAD 94-156BR, April 1994. Available from www.gao.gov (accessed 20 August 2009).
43 Quoted in Chuck Sudetic, „U.N. Relief Agency to Cut Food Rations to Bosnia‟, New York Times, 1 July 1993.
44 Ibid. 45 Ibid. 46 Ibid.
175
II. Humanitarian Aid as Military Assistance
Bosnia is a country where every boy grows up with the dream that someday he will own his own checkpoint.
- General Rupert Smith 47
Of the direct negative human rights aspects of the Western response, the most
straightforward was the part humanitarian aid played in sustaining the war, and hence the
human rights abuses which accompanied it. It did this quite simply by supplying the
military forces of all three sides, something that Western politicians understood full well
was happening.48 Douglas Hurd, for instance, admitted in 1992 that „much of the food …
is syphoned off by the local military to support the war‟.49 Former British defence minister
Archie Hamilton told a conference at Cambridge in September 1993 that „we have been
feeding the armies which have been fighting. We may have prolonged the war, rather than
shortened it‟.50 By late 1993 a consensus seemed to be emerging, with even David Owen
admitting that the aid had fueled the war; perhaps „a price worth paying … if peace is near,
if negotiations are serious. But if all sides are just waiting to launch new offensives, what
price humanitarian aid?‟.51
There were two parts to this problem, the lesser of which was simply that there was
no way to isolate military personnel from the rest of their societies. As a result, as one UN
official put it, „[s]oldiers from the warring factions fight during the day, and then go home
to be fed by wives and mothers‟.52 This issue was of relatively minor significance in the
scheme of things. It was largely unsolvable and perhaps even expected and legitimate, and
at least permitted the distribution of the aid to the civilian population. It would have been
contradictory, for example, to feed the civilian population of Sarajevo and yet starve those
who were defending the city as soldiers in the Bosnian Army. The government forces were
best positioned to take advantage of this situation, since they were largely on the defensive
in and around their population centres and both needed and received the majority of the
47 Quoted in Holbrooke, To End a War, 187. 48 According to one commentator, over fifty percent of the aid sent to Bosnia ended up supplying the
armed forces of all sides; Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, 319. To be clear, this is only in reference to civilian supplies such as food and medicine; military supplies are another issue altogether and are discussed below. As Edgar O‟Ballance points out, the aid was „thus keeping the soldiers alive and well and prolonging a war in which an aim of all sides was to starve their enemies‟; Civil War, 228.
49 Quoted in ibid., 228. 50 Quoted in ibid., 185; see also Hodge, Britain and the Balkans, 58. 51 Quoted in Ian Traynor, „Aid saves lives but keeps the war going‟, Guardian, 25 November 1993; see also
Françoise Bouchet-Saulnier, „How Aid Can Abet a War‟, Independent, 22 November 1993; Andy Pollak, „Owen Warns Bosnia Aid May Fuel War‟, Irish Times, 9 November 1993.
52 Quoted in O‟Ballance, Civil War, 228. Although well aware of the situation, UN officials did not advertise the fact; ibid., 185.
176
aid, but it applied to all three sides. Given the importance placed on the humanitarian
response, it is difficult to see any way in which this type of diversion could have been
prevented.
Much more significant was the seizure of humanitarian aid by military forces from
relief convoys attempting to deliver supplies to Sarajevo and to more isolated parts of the
country. Only a week after the UNHCR launched its mission in Bosnia, „Serbian irregulars
… hijacked six 22-ton trucks loaded with United Nations food aid … One group is said to
have threatened to kill a United Nations official who complained‟.53 At the end of April,
UNHCR official Fabrizio Hochschild complained that „[e]very time we move something,
one of two trucks is stopped, one of 10 is taken‟, and added that Serb forces had been
responsible for all the thefts.54 The problem grew so severe so quickly that the head of the
UNHCR in Bosnia, Jose Maria Mendiluce, announced a short-lived suspension of aid
convoys on 22 May: „I will not put at risk my staff, drivers or the staff of other non-
governmental organizations or the security of the food itself.... In this context, we will not
undertake any new operations‟.55 A US government investigation concluded in January
1993 that the Bosnian Serb military was seizing 23% of the aid sent to Bosnia.56 The
increase in Croat-Muslim tensions and fighting in 1993 made the overall situation worse,
and led to the obstruction of deliveries by Croat as well as Serb forces.57
Since Western governments insisted both that military intervention was out of the
question and that the humanitarian mission must be continued, they had no effective
response to this problem. They thus effectively acquiesced to their role in directly
supporting the continuation of the war and its atrocities. Richard Holbrooke accused the
UN (and by extension, its member states) of becoming „an unintentional accomplice of
Serb policy‟ and condemned its willingness to negotiate over deliveries. „It was as if the
U.N. were negotiating with the city‟s executioners as to whether Sarajevo‟s death would be
by starvation or freezing, slow or fast‟, he said.58 The presence of UNPROFOR forces
made no difference; the UNHCR chief in central Bosnia, Larry Hollingworth, derisively
commented that the peacekeepers were „sent in not to be tough but simply to look tough‟.59
The use of force specifically to support the humanitarian mission was debated and
53 Chuck Sudetic, „Intense Fighting in Sarajevo Threatens U.S. Aid Flights‟, New York Times, 18 April 1992. 54 Quoted in Harden, „Bosnia Siege…‟. See also „Convoy Held Up By Serbs, UN Says Truckloads of Fuel
Taken at Gunpoint‟, Globe and Mail, 1 July 1993. 55 Quoted in Crossette, „After Weeks…‟, 23 May 1992. 56 Michael R. Gordon, „U.S. Finds Serbs Skimming 23% of Bosnian Aid‟, New York Times, 13 January 1993. 57 Hodge, Britain and the Balkans, 80. 58 Holbrooke, To End a War, 48. 59 Quoted in Simms, Unfinest Hour, 22.
177
even authorised relatively soon after the outbreak of the war.60 By the end of June 1992,
intense debate was going on over proposals to use military force to break the BSA
blockade around Sarajevo. François Mitterrand declared that „Italy, backed by France,
believe[d] in the use of force, at least sufficient to guarantee the security of deliveries of
humanitarian aid‟.61 The British were more reluctant to sanction any use of force, but
announced their willingness to participate if such a course was taken.62 German Foreign
Minister Klaus Kinkel noted the „constitutional and historical difficulties‟ which Germany
faced with regard to its own participation in such an operation, but pledged to „do
everything in our power to provide assistance and help in any possible way‟.63 Meanwhile,
President Bush declared that the US was „pretty much in accord with the E.C.‟, and
Defense Secretary Dick Cheney outlined Washington‟s willingness to provide „naval and air
support‟ to „other forces involved on the ground‟ in support of the humanitarian effort.64
Although the immediate crisis concerning Sarajevo passed, calls continued for the
UN to authorise the use of force specifically to facilitate aid delivery. On 6 August, Bush
announced that he had „directed the Secretary of State to press hard for quick passage of
[a] UN Security Council resolution authorizing the use of all necessary measures to
establish conditions necessary for, and to facilitate the delivery of, humanitarian assistance
to Bosnia-Hercegovina‟.65 This „absolutely critical‟ resolution would „authorize the
international community to use force, if necessary, to deliver humanitarian relief supplies‟,
although his „heartfelt hope [was] that it [would] not prove necessary‟.66 Resolution 770,
passed a week later, „call[ed] upon States to take … all measures necessary to facilitate in
coordination with the United Nations the delivery … of humanitarian assistance to
Sarajevo and wherever needed in other parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina‟. But in practice it
remained a dead letter, and delivery of aid remained subject to the whims of whichever
faction controlled the roads or airports. This failure to act on the Resolutions is what lay
behind Bush‟s call in October 1992 to „maintain and broaden the relief effort through
cooperation, not only with our partners … but also with the parties to the conflict.... For all
concerned, this is surely the preferred way of getting help to hundreds of thousands of
60 See the discussion in Chapter 4. 61 Craig R. Whitney, „Europe Backs U.N. On Sarajevo Force‟, New York Times, 28 June 1992. 62 Ibid. 63 „Questions and Answers with Secretary of State James Baker and German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel‟,
Federal News Service, 30 June 1992. 64 Eric Schmitt, „Bush Calls Allies On a Joint Effort To Help Sarajevo‟, New York Times, 29 June 1992; Eric
Schmitt, „Cheney Talks of an Air Role in Bosnia‟, New York Times, 1 July 1992. 65 „Containing the crisis in Bosnia and the former Yugoslavia, remarks by President George Bush, 6 August
1992‟, Dispatch, Vol. 3, No. 32, 10 August 1992. 66 Ibid.
178
victims‟.67 More than a year later, in November 1993, the British prime minister was still
telling parliament that „[w]e are seeking credible assurances from the warring factions that
they will not block access routes‟.68
In human rights terms, the military seizure of supplies was more serious than the
diversion of aid that had been successfully delivered and properly distributed. First, it
affected a greater proportion of aid in terms of absolute numbers, as suggested by the US
report cited above. Second, since most of the seizures were carried out by Bosnian Serb
forces, the majority of the stolen aid went directly to the worst offenders with regard to
atrocities and ethnic cleansing. Third, it wholly negated the humanitarian and most basic
human rights benefits of the aid programme (i.e., keeping non-military victims of the war
alive) because these direct seizures of supplies meant that the aid never reached its
intended civilian beneficiaries at all. Fourth, it was at least theoretically possible to respond
to this problem, unlike the civilian diversions described above, by acting to enforce existing
resolutions and authorising UNPROFOR to act in support of the convoys.
The problem was not with the idea of delivering humanitarian aid in Bosnia, but
with how it operated in practice. There was a real need for aid, and it served both
humanitarian and, on certain levels, human rights ends. The way the policy was
implemented, however, produced human rights costs that must be balanced against the
mission‟s positive results, and it is far from clear that the policy was a net positive in human
rights terms. In responding to some of the results of the conflict, the humanitarian
mission both directly fueled the violence and, as is discussed below, made it more difficult
for Western governments to come to grips with the conflict‟s root causes and to directly
confront the massive human rights abuses which derived from those causes.
III. Safe Areas
If the United States can be persuaded to send troops, then the Brits will join and we can think seriously
about taking control of enough territory to provide safe havens around Sarajevo and other cities. Otherwise,
we are going to end up with a Palestinian-type situation in the middle of Europe.
- A „top French official‟ 69
The second direct negative human rights aspect of these Western responses is to be
67 „US humanitarian assistance to Bosnia-Hercegovina – address by President George Bush‟, Dispatch, Vol. 3,
No. 33, 17 August 1992. 68 Hansard, 1 November 1993, c. 19. 69 Quoted in Drozdiak, „France Facing Pressure‟.
179
found in the consequences of the creation of the so-called “safe areas” in Bosnia, which
were supposed to provide refuge and safety to the civilian inhabitants. This policy, the idea
for which had been circulating since early in the war, was intended to both allow and
encourage the residents to remain in place, while supposedly making better provision for
their safety and well-being.70 From a human rights perspective, however, the
implementation of the policy had some troubling aspects. The West made no genuine
commitment to use force in defence of the safe areas or the populations within them,
providing instead a façade of safety without the reality (as discussed below). Also relevant
to human rights issues were the implications of the policy concerning the acceptance of
ethnic cleansing, the treatment of refugees, and its potential to increase rather than
decrease the levels of violence in Bosnia. Opponents of the policy addressed some of
these concerns. The British warned against the possibility of „Gaza-style camps‟.71 They
worried also that the policy might itself promote ethnic cleansing, and that the means for
actually establishing and securing the havens were unclear at best.72 David Owen, among
others, argued that by creating safe havens, „we would make ourselves accomplices to this
evil of ethnic cleansing … No compromises are possible on this‟.73
Supporters of the policy, which included many of those doing humanitarian work
in Bosnia, argued that, in Tadeusz Mazowiecki‟s words, there was „no alternative‟ to creating
safe areas.74 Alain Destexhe, the Secretary-General of Médecins Sans Frontières, called on
the UN in November 1992 to „set up a „„haven‟‟ for the civilian population in Bosnia,
similar to the one established for the Kurds in Iraq‟.75 ICRC president Cornelio
Sommaruga seconded this call.76 Mazowiecki wrote in late November that
it is imperative to establish safety areas in Bosnia-Herzegovina under the control
70 Haris Silajdzic suggested the creation of „security zones‟ in May 1992; see Paul Lewis, „Security Council
Adopts Measure to Pursue Peace Efforts in Bosnia‟, New York Times, 16 May 1992. The French government lent its support to the idea at a UNHCR conference called by Sadako Ogata at the end of July, as an alternative to Germany‟s call for a quota system for accepting refugees; see Stephen Kinzer, „Germany Chides Europe About Balkan Refugees‟, New York Times, 29 July 1992. In early August 1992, the US State Department denied any knowledge of proposals for „establishing a security zone‟ in Bosnia, but Bush‟s National Security Adviser, Brent Scowcroft, later recalled that the US had „looked hard‟ at the idea in the summer of 1992 but decided that they „couldn‟t justify‟ the scale of the necessary operation; „State Department Regular Briefing‟, Federal News Service, 6 August 1992; Scowcroft quoted in Western, Selling Intervention, 161.
71 Andrew Marshall, „Bosnians May Get Safe Havens‟, Independent, 31 July 1992. 72 Ibid. 73 Quoted in Hella Pick, „Fighting to Give Peace a Chance‟, Guardian, 5 December 1992. 74 Ian Traynor, „UN Ponders Safe but Unsound Havens for Bosnia‟, Guardian, 28 November 1992. 75 „Call for UN Haven in Yugoslavia‟, The Times, 20 November 1992. 76 Mercier, Crimes Without Punishment, 61 „The Search for a Safe Haven in the Kingdom of Death‟, Economist,
21 November 1992.
180
of United Nations troops. This would be only a provisional solution, but it is
essential for the saving of lives. It is argued by some that this would amount to
acceptance of the policy of ethnic cleansing. Yet to allow the present situation to
continue would be far worse.77
The advocates were persuasive enough that the UN Security Council „invite[d]‟ Secretary
General Boutros Boutros-Ghali to look into the idea.78
Notwithstanding these developments, the idea was essentially dropped until the
first crisis in Srebrenica in March and April 1993, which one journalist called „an outrage in
a land of outrages‟.79 The Srebrenica enclave was home to some 60,000 Muslim residents
and refugees from ethnic cleansing elsewhere in Bosnia. Its imminent fall to the BSA after
a yearlong siege became a symbol of the ineffectualness of the West in Bosnia. Nearly a
sixth of the residents had „given written notice‟ to the UN by early March that they wished
to leave, a number which was expected to increase.80 The UNPROFOR commander in
Bosnia, French Lieutenant-General Philippe Morillon, had made the relief of the city a
personal priority, but he was only able to get supplies in and, eventually, evacuate 2000
people after conceding to Bosnian Serb demands for the disarming of the Bosnian Muslim
defenders.81 In early April, the UN announced plans to evacuate 15-20,000 Bosnian
Muslims from the city, insisting that it was „not involved in ethnic cleansing, but in saving
lives‟.82 The Bosnian government complained that the UN was assisting the Serbs rather
than protecting Srebrenica, and the commander of government forces in the enclave,
Naser Oric, forced a convoy of UN vehicles to leave empty rather than permit the removal
of Muslim civilians.83 The Security Council did not welcome the plan either. Sadako Ogata‟s
request for effective intervention to either stop the siege or carry out a massive evacuation
garnered „no support … only embarrassment‟.84 In the end, the evacuation plan was
abandoned.
Instead, the Security Council opted for words over action, hoping that declaring the
77 Tadeusz Mazowiecki, „Witness to Horror‟, Washington Post, 29 November 1992. 78 UN Security Council Resolution 787, 16 November 1992, para. 19. In December, NATO agreed to assist
the UN in planning for the possible creation of safe areas; see Paul Lewis, „NATO to Help U.N. on Yugoslav Plans‟, New York Times, 16 December 1992.
79 Paul Koring, „Srebrenica: An Outrage in Land of Outrages‟, Globe and Mail, 30 March 1993. 80 Chuck Sudetic, „Serbs Again Agree to Allow Evacuation of Muslims‟, New York Times, 9 March 1993. 81 See, inter alia, Silber and Little, Death, 265-75. 82 Ian Traynor and John Palmer, „UN Plans Bosnia Rescue‟, Guardian, 6 April 1993; John F. Burns, „U.N.
Plans to Evacuate 20,000 Trapped Muslims‟, New York Times, 6 April 1993. 83 David B. Ottaway, „Bosnian Muslims Bar Bid to Evacuate Town‟, Washington Post, 7 April 1993. This was in
fact the second time he had done this; see Burns, „Muslim Officer Stops …‟. 84 Susan Chira, „Sadako Ogata: Japanese Diplomat Puts Refugees Before Politics‟, New York Times, 7 April
1993.
181
enclave a „safe area which should be free from any armed attack or any other hostile act‟
would protect Srebrenica and its residents.85 While it sidestepped the issue of assisting in
Srebrenica‟s evacuation, this alternative left the UN „monitoring an enclave overflowing
with displaced persons who live under the permanent threat of renewed hostilities and
extermination‟.86 The city‟s defenders „agreed to be disarmed by United Nations forces in
return for a token United Nations presence of nearly 150 Canadian peacekeeping soldiers
and a promise by the Serbs not to enter the town‟.87 But having achieved the
demilitarisation of Srebrenica, the Serbs did not keep to their side of the agreement. They
refused to allow journalists and medical personnel into the city, cut off water and power
supplies, and left their forces in position around the city.88 A Security Council mission to
Srebrenica in late April described the city as „“an open jail” where Serbian forces were
planning “slow-motion genocide”‟.89 One member of the delegation said that „[i]t
confirmed our worst fears. The Serbs are consolidating their position. It‟s clear they have
no intention of withdrawing‟.90 Their report concluded that „[t]he Srebrenica arrangement
cannot be a model but should inspire action by the Security Council to prevent the fall of
further enclaves and territories … which demand immediate action‟.91
Contrary to this advice, however, Western governments were attracted to the idea
of applying the model elsewhere. Their preference was largely due to the policy‟s apparent
success in avoiding the unpalatable option of evacuation and (however temporarily)
improving conditions for those trapped in Srebrenica with a minimal commitment of
resources. According to David Owen, France initiated the discussion by circulating a
deniable, officially non-existent „non-paper‟ to the British, Americans, and Russians that
suggested „sanctuariz[ing]‟ certain areas rather than giving them full military protection,
with the expectation that this would require only 10-12,000 troops (as opposed to 50-
60,000 for the more robust option), and recommended the inclusion of both US and
Russian forces.92 The British welcomed the proposal, albeit cautiously.93 Both governments
agreed that the proposal could not involve „UN troops fighting their way into safe
85 Security Council Resolution 819, 16 April 1993. 86 Marc Weller, „Security Council Stumbles Over “Safe Havens”„, The Times, 21 April 1993. 87 Paul Lewis, „UN Visitors Say Srebrenica Is “an Open Jail”„, New York Times, 26 April 1993. 88 Ibid. 89 Ibid. 90 Ibid. 91 Report of the Security Council Mission Established Pursuant to Resolution 819 (1993), UN doc. S/25700, 30 April
1993, 6, para. 16. See also Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to General Assembly Resolution 53/35: The Fall of Srebrenica, UN document A/54/549, 15 November 1999, 19-20, paras. 59-65. Both available from www.un.org/en/documents/ (accessed 10 July 2007).
92 Owen, Balkan Odyssey, 164-5. 93 Hansard, 23 April 1993, c. 1173.
182
havens‟.94 The US was slower to accept the idea, although a State Department report
concluded in April that „[t]he declaration and enforcement of safe havens‟ could have „a
beneficial impact‟.95 Even the Bosnian government welcomed the idea, at least as a gesture.
In response to BSA assaults on the town of Zepa, Bosnia‟s UN ambassador, Mohamed
Sacirbey, declared on 5 May that „[o]ur minimum request is for the creation of a safe area as
a symbolic blanket of protection for the people of Zepa, who are helpless and desperate‟, a
call which was supported by Venezuelan ambassador Diego Arria, who had led the mission
to Srebrenica.96 On 6 May 1993, Security Council Resolution 824 declared Sarajevo, Tuzla,
Zepa, Gorazde, and Bihac to be safe areas along with Srebrenica.97 The Security Council
supplemented this declaration with a further resolution on 4 June which authorised
UNPROFOR, „acting in self-defence, to take the necessary measures, including the use of
force‟ to defend the areas.98
There was, however, never any serious intention to defend the safe areas. The first
suggestion of this lies in the term “safe areas” itself. The language in the UN resolutions
used this term rather than “safe haven” because, as Silber and Little point out, the latter
term „had a precise definition in international law and implied immunity from attack for all
who sought refuge there‟.99 Although the resolutions offered the option of using force to
defend the safe areas, there was no explicit duty to do so. On the contrary, as Douglas
Hurd reassured the British public, „the protection is for UNPROFOR troops if they were
attacked‟.100 The United States agreed only „to help protect UNPROFOR forces in the
event they are attacked and request such action‟.101 The New York Times noted the following
day that „[t]he joint allied strategy calls for the United States to use air power if necessary to
protect United Nations peacekeepers guarding‟ the safe areas, but there was no similar
commitment to using force to protect the residents.102 Given the extreme reluctance of the
94 Douglas Hurd, quoted in Colm Boland, „Hurd, Spring Hopeful Athens Meeting Could Make Bosnian
Serbs Reconsider Peace Plan‟, Irish Times, 1 May 1993. 95 „Humanitarian Assessment Team Reports on Bosnia-Herzegovina – Department Statement, Executive
Summary, 15 April 1993‟, Dispatch, Vol. 4, No. 16, 19 April 1993. 96 Alan Ferguson, „70,000 Troops May Be Too Few for Bosnian Peace, U.N. Says‟, Toronto Star, 5 May 1993. 97 Security Council Resolution 824, 6 May 1993. 98 Security Council Resolution 836, 4 June 1993, para. 9. UNPROFOR‟s mandate was extended to „enable it
… to deter attacks against the safe areas, to monitor the cease-fire, to promote the withdrawal of military or paramilitary units … and to occupy some key points on the ground, in addition to‟ supporting the humanitarian effort; ibid, para. 5. The US-driven Joint Action Plan, announced on 22 May in the aftermath of the failure of the VOPP, prominently featured the safe area concept; see „Excerpts From Allied Communiqué on Bosnia‟, New York Times, 23 May 1993.
99 Silber and Little, Death, 274. 100 From an interview on “The World This Weekend”, BBC Radio 4, 23 May 1993; quoted in Almond,
Europe‟s Backyard War, 313. 101 „Excerpts…‟, 23 May 1993. 102 Chuck Sudetic, „Leader of Bosnia Denounces New Allied Plan to Limit Fighting‟, New York Times, 24 May
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West to become militarily involved, there could be little hope that this vague commitment
would truly act as a deterrent. This is why one observer called the safe areas policy little
more than „a policy of attempting … to internalize refugee movements within the country
of origin‟.103
To properly defend the safe areas would have required a considerable increase in
the size of UNPROFOR, along with a significant expansion of its mandate. The UN
Secretariat called for 32,000 new troops to implement the policy, but Resolution 824 itself
only provided for „an additional 50 United Nations military observers‟ to assist in
monitoring its implementation, and the call for an increase was met with widespread
opposition.104 The British were the most outspoken, basing their position on the alleged
success of the tiny Canadian contingent at Srebrenica.105 Douglas Hurd recalls instructing
the British UN Ambassador to „water down the phrasing of the motion so that it carried
less of an unrealistic commitment‟.106 In case they were unsuccessful, they made it clear
that „[t]he United Kingdom is, of course … already making a full contribution‟, and „the
call … for more troops … should be met by those countries that have not yet
contributed‟.107 The Russians, meanwhile, „show[ed] every sign of ducking their
responsibility‟, which along with the reluctance of EU states to contribute more troops,
jeopardised an anticipated contribution from Sweden and Norway.108 The US still flatly
refused to consider deploying ground troops even to protect the safe areas, an idea Clinton
dismissed as putting „our people in there basically in a shooting gallery‟.109 Nearly six
months later, less than half of the promised and needed troops had been deployed.110 The
authorisation of force under Resolution 836, and its call for reinforcing UNPROFOR, was
essentially meaningless.
This response to the call for troops to enforce the safe areas illustrated one of the
primary criticisms of the policy, which was that, whatever its benefits in theory, it would fail
1993.
103 Duffield and Stork, „Bosnia is the Classic Case‟, 20. 104 Resolution 824, para. 6. In the end, „a minimal troop reinforcement of 7,600‟ was agreed to, which „could
not in itself guarantee the defence of the safe areas, but would provide a basic level of deterrence, assuming the consent and cooperation of the Parties‟; Report of the Secretary General Pursuant to Resolution 844 (1993), S/1994/555, 2, para. 6. Available from www.un.org/en/documents/ (accessed 10 July 2007).
105 Hodge, Britain and the Balkans, 70. See also comments by Paddy Ashdown, Hansard, 23 April 1993, c. 1196. 106 Hodge, Britain and the Balkans, 70. 107 John Major, Hansard, 23 June 1993, c. 310; John Major, Hansard, 12 June 1993, c. 677. 108 Owen, Balkan Odyssey, 181. See also Mark Frankland, „Russia Shuts Its Ears to Pleas of Serb Nationalism‟,
Observer, 23 May 1993; Elaine Sciolino, „Moscow Won‟t Send More Troops to Balkans‟, New York Times, 12 June 1993.
109 William J. Clinton, „Exchange with Reporters on Bosnia‟, 21 May 1993. TAPP, www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=46594 (accessed 10 October 2006). 110 Pollak, „Owen Warns...‟, 9 November 1993.
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due to lack of material support. David Owen later condemned „embarking on the path of
enforcement with no intention of backing it with the necessary resources‟ as „the most
irresponsible decision taken during my time as Co-Chairman‟ of the ICFY.111 The UN
official in charge of peacekeeping in the former Yugoslavia, Shashi Tharoor, noted that it
„would require means … that peace-keepers do not have. The safe area resolution therefore
… carried the risk that it would be unimplementable‟.112 British opposition MP Clare Short
pointed out that NATO officials had claimed that „all it took to enforce the safe areas
strategy was the commitment of 8,000 troops and a change in the rules of engagement‟.113
Her colleague Calum Macdonald agreed that „[i]t represents an appalling abdication of the
responsibility of European Governments … that they have absolutely failed to fulfil the
request for the minimum number of troops required to enforce the safe areas policy‟.114 EC
external relations commissioner Hans van den Broek insisted on the need for „credible‟
military threats to protect the safe areas, adding that the refusal to consider the use of force
had crippled European policy from the start.115 The problems became almost immediately
apparent when BSA troops refused to allow UN forces access to Zepa following its
designation as a safe area, and „fired upon some residents as they tried to retrieve‟ air-
dropped supplies in Srebrenica, among other obstructive actions.116
Also important, however, were concerns about the safe areas policy in terms of its
relation to ethnic cleansing, and hence to human rights issues. David Owen‟s criticisms of
the idea on these grounds have already been mentioned.117 The Bosnian president also
disliked the ethnic cleansing implications of the policy, fearing that it would not permit
Muslims to return to their homes.118 The UN Secretariat bolstered these concerns with a
report that concluded that the plan could be seen as „legitimizing ethnic cleansing‟ because
it did not mandate Serb military withdrawals.119 „Several‟ NATO defence ministers refused
to approve the plan because their governments feared that „the plan will inevitably
consolidate Serbian territorial gains because it does not immediately address the issue of
reversing them‟.120 The British, on the other hand, only moderated their opposition to the
111 Owen, Balkan Odyssey, 178. 112 Quoted in Silber and Little, Death, 274. 113 Hansard, 26 July 1993, c. 840. 114 Ibid. 115 Ian Black, „UN to Back Muslim Safe Areas Despite Doubts‟, Guardian, 4 June 1993. 116 Ian Traynor and Yigal Chazan, „Bosnians Serbs Bar UN from Town‟, Guardian, 8 May 1993; Tanner and
Bellamy, „Serb Forces Fire…‟. 117 See above, 180. 118 Peter Pringle, „UN Plan Needs More Troops‟, Independent, 25 May 1993; Sudetic, „Leader of Bosnia…‟. 119 Paul Lewis, „UN Aides Cite Drawbacks To Bosnia Safe-Haven Plan‟, New York Times, 30 May 1993. 120 Chuck Sudetic, „Sarajevo Sets Conditions on Latest Peace Proposal‟, New York Times, 27 May 1993.
According to Owen, Germany was one of the plan‟s fiercest critics on these grounds; Balkan Odyssey, 179.
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safe areas with the understanding that they were to be „the first stage toward a
cantonisation of Bosnia into three separate ethnic regions‟, a position that one
commentator condemned as „legitimiz[ing] much of the Serbian conquests in Bosnia‟.121
Many observers were also concerned that the safe areas would actually act as an
incitement to further violence. This possibility was most obvious in reference to the Serbs
as the primary practitioners of ethnic cleansing. Owen feared that their establishment
would make it easier or more acceptable for the Serbs to create more refugees: „we [i.e., he
and his ICFY co-chair Cyrus Vance] thought that to make it apparent that Muslims pushed
out of their homes could go into safe areas would be to flash a green light to the Serbs that
ethnic cleansing could go ahead‟.122 Once in the safe areas, most of which were enclaves
surrounded by Serb-controlled territory, they were at risk of further violence because „the
victims are weakened and rendered helpless … Such areas constrain their rights and
freedom and make them obvious targets for attack‟.123 It simultaneously gave the Serbs a
place to send the victims of their ethnic cleansing campaigns and gave those victims an
incentive to move, in the hopes that at least they would be safe at their destination. But by
concentrating them in locations that were themselves in dispute, the safe areas made the
refugees more vulnerable to further ethnic cleansing. This is exactly what happened in both
Srebrenica and Zepa in July 1995, when both towns fell to the Bosnian Serb army.
Gorazde, although also targeted, did not fall, and remained in government hands at the end
of the war, although virtually surrounded by territory controlled by the RS.
Owen and others also worried that the safe areas might promote an increase in
violence from Bosnian Muslims and government forces. The issue in this case was that the
safe areas might provide them with secure bases from which to continue to fight the Serbs.
Sarajevo had an interest in ensuring that the existing „confrontation line‟ did not become
permanent and launching attacks from „under UN cover‟ was a means to this end.124 There
were repeated instances of government forces using the safe areas as bases for attacks
against the Bosnian Serbs, which were subsequently used as excuses for Serb military
action.125 The minimal UN forces were unable to enforce the agreements concerning either
demilitarisation within the enclaves or withdrawal of the besieging Serb forces, leaving 121 Craig R. Whitney, „What Price Bosnia?‟, New York Times, 10 August 1992; Leslie Gelb, „False
Humanitarianism‟, New York Times, 6 August 1992. 122 Owen, Balkan Odyssey, 66. 123 Chaloka Beyani, „Human Rights: A Crusade for Sanctuary Emerges from the Debris‟, Independent, 11 June
1993. 124 Owen, Balkan Odyssey, 199. 125 Report of the Secretary General Pursuant to Resolution 844, 4, para. 13; Report of the Secretary General Pursuant to
Resolution 959 (1994), S/1994/1389, 12-13, paras. 34-7. Available from www.un.org/en/documents (accessed 10 July 2007).
186
them vulnerable to unpredictable flare-ups of violence.126 As a result, the safe areas were, as
one history of the war puts it, „among the most profoundly unsafe places in the world‟.127
Critiques of the safe areas based on human rights issues apart from those related
directly to ethnic cleansing were less common, but they did exist. Tony Land, the chief
UNHCR official in Croatia, incorporated both practicalities and human rights in his
criticisms:
The Safe Havens policy could work under certain circumstances, I suppose, but
not unless the people in those places can be assured some reasonable quality of
life. There is no water in Srebrenica. If the Serbs won‟t let us restore it, does that
mean we will have to truck it in? … the question is under what set of principles we
are meant to be operating here. I ask you, is water a human right for these people?
You journalists talk about human rights as if it is only a question of not being
beaten to a pulp by the police every week. Or you talk, rightly, about rape and
ethnic cleansing. But what about education? Or electricity? And what about trying
to restore these things in a situation where fighting and ethnic cleansing and rape
are still going on all around? Again, the question comes down, as it has from the
beginning, to what we are in fact trying to accomplish here. We have to decide, and
even after two years we haven‟t done that yet.128
Some NGOs focused on the policy‟s potential impact on the right to asylum. The Lawyers
Committee for Human Rights, for example, saw the safe areas as part of a larger effort to
„to keep asylum seekers from coming into [wealthy countries‟] territory‟ and worried that it
might „compromise asylum‟.129 The president of the Canadian Council for Refugees
worried that the UNHCR‟s policies gave „an easy way out‟ for governments wishing to limit
refugee claims, and observed that, „[w]hile we appreciate the role Mrs. Ogata has been
playing in Bosnia, here in Canada the UNHCR is sometimes more of a hindrance than a
help to us‟.130
The implementation of the safe areas policy validated the criticisms and doubts. In
126 Frances Pilch and Joseph Derdzinski, „The UN Response to the Balkan Wars‟, in Reflections on the Balkan
Wars: Ten Years After the Break Up of Yugoslavia, Jeffrey S. Morton et al, eds. (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2004), 105; The authors correctly note that „[i]mplicit in the "safe area" concept was the idea that these enclaves would be demilitarized, and not used as bases of operations for any of the parties to the conflict‟; 99.
127 Silber and Little, Death, 274. 128 Quoted in Rieff, Slaughterhouse, 208. 129 Allan Thompson, „Trailblazer Expands U.N. Struggle for Refugees‟, Toronto Star, 25 May 1993. The human
rights aspects of the West‟s refugee policies are discussed below. 130 Ibid.
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a report submitted to the Security Council in May 1994, the UN Secretary General
concluded that the results had varied widely depending on the circumstances of each area
individually.131 While the report maintained that the policy had worked fairly well in
Srebrenica and Zepa, it noted that negotiations concerning Gorazde had suffered from the
„shortage of troops and the resultant inability to place United Nations troops in the area,
coupled with the unwillingness of the parties to negotiate‟.132 It concluded that „many safe
areas were not safe … their existence appeared to thwart only one army in the conflict,
thus jeopardizing UNPROFOR‟s impartiality‟.133 A second report, submitted in December
1994, found that ensuing events, particularly in the Bihac safe area, had „demonstrated once
again, and even more strikingly, the inherent shortcomings of the current safe-area
concept, at the expense of the civilian population, who have found themselves in a pitiable
plight‟.134 After discussing at some length the shortcomings of the policy, it concluded that
there was „a need to reconsider the safe area concept‟.135
Tadeusz Mazowiecki came to similar conclusions, writing in February 1994 that the
safe areas were „for the most part drastically overcrowded, short of basic food and medical
resources and subject to indiscriminate shelling and military attacks. To a large extent they
have become „safe‟ only on paper‟.136 Although NATO did use air strikes around Gorazde
in April 1994, and the UN declared heavy weapons exclusion zones around Gorazde,
Srebrenica, Zepa, Bihac, and Tuzla, Mazowiecki‟s reports made it clear that these measures
were both tardy and insufficient. In his final report, he stated that the safe areas „could not
be equated with a protected zone within the meaning of international humanitarian law …
a peace-enforcement concept was implemented as if it were merely a peace-keeping one‟.137
He blamed negotiations which resulted in the disarming of the Bosnian Muslims in
Srebrenica and Zepa for the catastrophes that befell those towns in July 1995, and
concluded that „lack of determination on the part of the international community and
prolongation of the war resulted in the collapse of [the safe areas] concept [and] brought
tragedy, loss of life and serious human rights violations to the inhabitants of those areas‟.138
The safe area concept in itself was not necessarily faulty, but the way it was implemented
nearly guaranteed its failure, at a high cost in terms of human rights.
131 Report of the Secretary General Pursuant to Resolution 844, 2-3, paras. 7-9. 132 Ibid., 3, para. 9. 133 Ibid., 5, para. 15. 134 Report of the Secretary General Pursuant to Resolution 959, 8, para. 26. 135 Ibid., 13, para. 40. 136 Sixth Periodic Report, 46, para. 296. 137 Final Periodic Report, 17-18, para. 87. 138 Ibid., 18, paras 89, 93.
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IV. The Refugee Crisis
At what moment must we authorize the evacuation of a Muslim or a Croat? That the facade of his house
is pocked with bullets, that he is injured or assaulted in the street, that he trembles in fear is not enough.
No, he must be in danger of death: A grenade must explode in his kitchen; he must be explicitly
threatened with murder, his wife must be raped. Excellent criteria. Only, sometimes, we get there too late .
- An anonymous aid worker 139
The indirect effects of the Western response to the Bosnian war were as significant
as the direct effects, and revealed the ambivalent role of human rights concerns in the
formulation of Western humanitarian and diplomatic policies. Perhaps the most obvious
of these were the implications of the Western response to the refugee crisis which very
quickly developed in Bosnia. Keeping this refugee situation under control, in a number of
ways, was crucial to the Western goal of avoiding military entanglement in the war.140 A
variety of international legal instruments and declarations govern the treatment of
refugees, beginning with the declaration of the UDHR that „[e]veryone has the right to
seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution‟.141 The 1951 UN Convention
Relating to the Status of Refugees states that the Convention applies to, among others,
persons with a „well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion,
nationality, membership in a particular social group or political opinion‟ who find
themselves „outside the country of [their] nationality and … unable or, owing to such fear
… unwilling to avail [themselves] of the protection of that country‟.142 Where these criteria
are met, states are not permitted to „expel a refugee lawfully in their territory save on
grounds of national security or public order‟, and more specifically „may not expel or
return … a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life
or freedom would be threatened on account‟ of the reasons listed above.143
While not overtly denying these obligations, Western countries endeavoured to
contain the refugee problem within the former Yugoslavia, and when possible within
Bosnia itself. Those who had already been displaced were to be supported within Bosnia or
in neighbouring countries, and those who had not were to be discouraged from fleeing by
139 Speaking from Banja Luka, April 1993; quoted in Pierre Hazan, Justice in a Time of War: The True Story
Behind the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, translated by James Thomas Snyder (College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 2004), 22.
140 Gow, Triumph, 110-11. 141 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 14.1. 142 UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, Article 1, paragraph A(2). 143 Ibid., Articles 32 & 33.
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the provision of aid in their besieged enclaves.144 This strategy helped to minimise the
pressure for military intervention in two ways. First, it improved the living conditions of
those refugees still in the former Yugoslavia, as well as of besieged but not yet displaced
populations. Heavy media coverage of Bosnia, and the vivid television images in particular,
played a large part in shaping public opinion. The worse off the Bosnian population
appeared to be, the greater the pressure for intervention. It was therefore in the interests of
Western governments to improve the material conditions in which the refugees were living,
by providing them with food, medicine, and shelter. However minimally these efforts
assisted in practice, they performed the critical function of appearing to be doing something
to assist them. Just as important was the role the aid played in keeping the refugees in
Bosnia or other ex-Yugoslav states rather than in the West, where they would have imposed
unwelcome financial, cultural, political, and societal costs. The presence of large numbers
of refugees in Western states would only have increased the calls from the media and the
public to intervene effectively and quickly in Bosnia.145 In addition to the immediate and
short-term costs, there was also real concern in that refugees might permanently settle in
the West, potentially setting „an unwelcome precedent‟ for refugees from other trouble
spots.146
Western leaders and UN officials framed their response as a positive way of
combating ethnic cleansing, claiming that humanitarian aid served a human rights end.147
Providing aid was, in other words, something that Britain and other countries could do to
„help the people of Bosnia to resist the ethnic cleansers‟.148 Sadako Ogata, the official
ultimately responsible for managing the humanitarian mission in Bosnia, insisted from the
start that „we must help people where they are‟, in order that „the great majority of refugees
can eventually return to their homes in safety and dignity‟.149 Britain and the US were
strongly in favour of this policy. According to Baroness Chalker, the British Overseas
Development Minister,
the UN and international community should work on the principle of relief zones
and relief centres. Not enclaves or camps, but areas of concentration of the
displaced where they can feel secure, where international assistance can reach them
144 Hella Pick, „Refugees “Need Political Solution”‟, Guardian, 30 July 1992. 145 Hodge, Britain and the Balkans, 45. 146 Sean Flynn, „A Washing of Hands Over Refugee Crisis Now Facing Europe‟, Irish Times, 31 July 1992. 147 See, for instance, Barbara Crossette, „Relief Aides Find U.S. Slow To Accept Balkan Refugees‟, New York
Times, 14 October 1992. 148 Douglas Hurd, Hansard, 25 November 1992, c. 1854. 149 Quoted in Mercier, Crimes Without Punishment, 51.
190
and of centres which can be focal points for the land convoys.150
The policy, she insisted, was „what is best for the refugees themselves and not what is easier
for us‟.151 Warren Zimmermann, then the director of refugee programs at the State
Department, spelled out Washington‟s position at a Senate hearing on 23 July 1992: The
US, he stated, assumed that the refugees would „ultimately want to return to their homes‟,
so the policy should be designed to keep them nearby to facilitate their eventual return.152
The Clinton administration retained this basic position, and continued to direct aid
primarily towards providing assistance and services in Bosnia and its neighbouring
countries.153 According to Hurd, „the international community [was] broadly agreed that
refugees should be looked after as close to their homes as possible‟.154
As the largest refugee crisis Europe had faced since the 1940s, it was very difficult
to keep under control. The initial refugee flows went to Bosnia‟s neighbours, where they
added to the numbers of those who had earlier fled the war in Croatia. Serbia, already host
to over 200,000 refugees, was reportedly denying entry to new arrivals by late April.155
Croatia was sheltering nearly half a million refugees by late May, at a cost to the country of
approximately $50 million a month.156 Numbers like these rapidly overwhelmed the
capacity of these governments to cope. In mid-July, Croatia warned that „[a]t this moment
there is absolutely no possibility of accommodating a single new refugee from Bosnia and
Herzegovina‟.157 Rather than simply close its borders, however, Zagreb announced that it
would send new arrivals on to Slovenia, Austria, and Italy.158 The announcement was a
warning to the rest of Europe that it needed to do more to deal with the crisis.159 Ogata
acknowledged at the end of that month that „[t]he burden on the host countries is
becoming unbearable‟.160 Later in the year, Croatia did stop admitting refugees, in violation
150 Alan Mcgregor and James Bone, „Britain Refuses to Open the Door to Refugees‟, The Times, 30 July 1992. 151 Flynn, „A Washing of Hands…‟. 152 „Hearing of the Senate Judiciary Committee on US Refugee Programs for FY 1993‟, Federal News Service,
23 July 1992. 153 See for example „Admission to the US of Bosnian Refugees‟, Dispatch, Vol. 4, No. 14, 5 April 1993; „US
Assistance for Victims of Violence in the Former Yugoslavia‟, Dispatch, Vol. 4, No. 16, 19 April 1993. 154 Hansard, 25 September 1992, c. 124. 155 „Bosnia Peace Initiatives…‟. 156 Chuck Sudetic, „5,000 Refugees Are Allowed to Leave Sarajevo‟, New York Times, 22 May 1992. See also
Stephen Kinzer, „Croatian Aid Staggered By Steady Refugee Pace‟, New York Times, 30 August 1992. 157 Michael T. Kaufman, „Europeans worry; As Yugoslavia Breaks Up, Millions of Refugees Seek Haven
from War‟, New York Times, 19 July 1992. 158 Ibid. 159 Slovenia, in fact, turned back trains of refugees from Croatia, leaving them effectively in limbo, with
nowhere to go; see Kaufman, „Croatia Warns...‟. 160 Henry Kamm, „Yugoslav Refugee Crisis Europe‟s Worst Since 40‟s‟, New York Times, 24 July 1992.
191
of its own international human rights obligations and despite UN pleas to the contrary.161
Under current European agreements, refugees were entitled to seek asylum only in
the first country that they reached. Those countries geographically nearest to the former
Yugoslavia therefore felt the impact of the refugee problem first and had good reason to
be concerned that other European states would be „content to sit on the sidelines‟ rather
than share the burden.162 This applied both to EC member-states and non-members. Italy,
with its three thousand miles of coastline, was particularly vulnerable to refugee
movements.163 Faced with a mere five thousand refugees in May 1992, the Italians warned
the rest of Europe that they „refuse[d] to accept a de facto attitude that only the countries
bordering the ex-Yugoslavia should take care of the refugee problem‟.164 Austria effectively
closed its borders on 2 July through stringent visa requirements, although the government
maintained it was still admitting legitimate refugees.165 A month later, with more than fifty
thousand refugees in Austria, the government stepped back from even that claim,
announcing that „[n]ow it‟s time for somebody else to take a turn, not us‟.166 France arrived
at a similar point in November. Having also taken in about fifty thousand refugees, „fears
about uncontrolled immigration‟ were contributing to „the growing strength of right-wing
extremism‟, leaving the French government reluctant to accept any more.167
British refugee policy was particularly restrictive, with the government announcing
in July 1992 that it would not admit more than 1300 refugees into the country.168 A decision
to deport thirty-six asylum seekers in August (albeit to third countries such as Germany
and Belgium rather than back to Bosnia) was widely condemned. The London UNHCR
spokesperson claimed it was „not in keeping with the spirit of international burden-
sharing‟, and the deputy director of a British refugee NGO characterised it as saying „if you
want to get asylum, go somewhere else‟.169 In October, the British director of Amnesty
International criticised the government for showing „little if any flexibility‟ on asylum
161 Chuck Sudetic, „U.N. Asks Croatia To Admit Bosnians‟, New York Times, 4 November 1992. Despite their
interest in keeping the refugees in the former Yugoslavia, Western states were slow to come up with aid to that end; a meeting on the problem in late May produced only $7 million from Italy and $3 million from Austria; see Sudetic, „5,000 Refugees…‟. This total was improved on at the UNHCR conference at the end of July, which produced pledges of $114.5 million; see Henry Kamm, „Aid but Not Homes Offered To Refugees From Balkans‟, New York Times, 30 July 1992.
162 William E. Schmidt, „Britain Deports 36 Seeking Asylum From Balkans‟, New York Times, 13 August 1992; „Solving Europe‟s Refugee Crisis‟, New York Times, 27 July 1992.
163 Alan Cowell, „Italy Cautious on Bosnia Refugees‟, New York Times, 24 May 1992; Alan Cowell, „Italy Faces Peril of Unwanted Balkan Refugees‟, New York Times, 7 June 1992.
164 Immigration Minister Margherita Boniver, quoted in Cowell, „Italy Cautious…‟. 165 „Refugees Fleeing War Rejected by Austria‟, Globe and Mail, 14 July 1992. 166 Whitney, „Europe‟s Caution…‟. 167 Michael Binyon, „Europe Stands Accused of Forsaking Bosnia Victims‟, The Times, 18 November 1992. 168 Mcgregor and Bone, „Britain Refuses...‟. 169 Schmidt, „Britain Deports...‟.
192
seekers, and again questioned Britain‟s willingness to do its fair share.170 Even Austria,
overwhelmed early by refugee numbers, was more willing than Britain to accept new
arrivals, giving refuge in November to a group which the UK had rejected.171 Home
Secretary Kenneth Clarke justified the rejection by claiming that the group in question did
not have the „pressing humanitarian needs‟ or family ties which would justify entry to
Britain, and reiterated that Britain would not permit „an unrestricted flow into this country
of everyone displaced by the war‟.172 By mid-1993, Britain had „received 250 ex-detainees
and 424 dependants‟ out of a respective one thousand and three thousand which it had
agreed to accept six months earlier.173 Most of that quota was still not filled by 1995.174
Washington‟s policy was similarly restrictive, although Bush did claim to be
concerned about refugees „burdening other countries‟.175 Owing to distance, there were
fewer would-be asylum seekers for the US to deal with, and Washington did not go out of
its way to encourage applications. At the height of the refugee crisis in the summer of
1992, Zimmermann was unable to even give the Senate Judiciary Committee a clear answer
as to how many applications were being received, or where or how refugees could apply for
entry to the US.176 When the UN was seeking visas for camp survivors in October, the US
initially refused to consider accepting more than a hundred Bosnians „for medical
treatment‟; under pressure, it agreed to take up to a thousand detainees, plus their family
members.177 Richard Boucher announced a further expansion of the programme in April
1993: up to three thousand refugees might now be resettled, and less restrictive eligibility
requirements meant that that number might now include „women victims of violence,
victims of torture, [and] Bosnian Muslim relatives of US citizens‟, among others.178 It was
not a generous offer at a time when the crisis had created more than three million
refugees.179 Zimmermann, in an address to Congress in July 1993, cited a number of four
million, and further noted that the administration‟s budget request for FY1994 included
170 Michael Simmons, „Britain “Lets Down” Those Fleeing War‟, Guardian, 23 October 1992. 171 Philip Webster, „Austria Opens Doors to Bosnian Refugees Turned Away by Britain‟, The Times, 18
November 1992. 172 Eugene Robinson, „European Nations Coordinate Limits On Refugee Influx‟, Washington Post, 1
December 1992. 173 Hansard, 26 July 1993, c. 862. 174 Hodge, Britain and the Balkans, 45. 175 George H. W. Bush, „Exchange with Reporters Prior to Discussions with Prime Minister Jozsef Antall of
Hungary in Helsinki, Finland‟, 10 July 1992. TAPP, www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=21215 (accessed 8 October 2006).
176 „Hearing of the Senate Judiciary Committee…‟, Federal News Service, 23 July 1992. 177 Crossette, „Relief Aides...‟, 14 October 1992; John F. Burns, „Attacks by Croatian Force Put New Strains
on Bosnian Government‟s Unity‟, New York Times, 27 October 1992. 178 „Admission to the US of Bosnian Refugees‟, Dispatch, 5 April 1993. 179 Ibid.
193
funding sufficient only „to support the admission of approximately 120,000 refugees for
resettlement in this country‟.180
The depth of Western reluctance to accept refugees, and the lack of concern for
the people it affected in Bosnia, was clearly visible in the poor response regarding the
survivors of the Bosnian Serb detention camps in the autumn of 1992. By late October,
roughly six thousand out of eight thousand survivors were still being detained in the very
camps which had so outraged the West in August.181 Their captors had made it clear they
would release the prisoners when they were given a valid visa to travel to a foreign country,
but few were forthcoming. Only about a thousand visas had been made available to that
point, leaving thousands of prisoners still stuck in the camps, under Bosnian Serb
control.182 As already mentioned, the US only reluctantly agreed to accept a thousand
detainees, plus their family members. For their part, the EC immigration ministers met in
late November 1992, and „stated that "in principle" they [were] willing to admit refugees
from the former Yugoslavia, but only "temporarily" and "in accordance with national
possibilities”‟.183
Germany was for some time a notable exception to the restrictive anti-refugee
policies of the major powers. Already host to a considerable number of Yugoslav
immigrants, the country was unsurprisingly a popular destination for those fleeing the
fighting. By mid-summer 1992, Germany had already taken in around 200,000 refugees, a
figure which doubled over the course of the next year. The German government
aggressively pushed its European colleagues to do more for the refugees, promoting a
quota system to establish an equitable sharing of the burden. Klaus Kinkel called on „[a]ll
E.C. nations [to] do their part by accepting refugees‟ and suggested that aid flights
returning empty from Sarajevo might be used to evacuate children in need of medical
care.184 Chancellor Kohl argued that it was „extremely important that all European
Community member states accept refugees from the former Yugoslavia for a limited time.
The task before us cannot be done if only a few members of the community participate‟.185
Bonn failed to convince its neighbours, however, and began to feel the strain of 180 „Addressing the Needs of Refugees: A High Priority in the Post-Cold War Era‟, Dispatch, Vol. 4, No. 28, 12
July 1993. In an unusual twist of logic, Zimmermann had testified the previous year that „[w]e don‟t have a resettlement program for Yugoslavs because the potential problem is so enormous that taking in a few hundred or a few thousand wouldn‟t … even begin to scratch it. „Hearing of the Senate Judiciary Committee…‟, 23 July 1992.
181 M. Douglas Stafford, UNHCR deputy director, quoted in Stephen Kinzer, „Few Nations Agree to Accept Freed Bosnian Prisoners as Refugees‟, New York Times, 1 November 1992.
182 Ibid. 183 Robinson, „European Nations...‟. 184 Quoted in Kinzer, „Germany Chides...‟. See also O‟Ballance, Civil War, 75. 185 Kinzer, „Germany Chides...‟.
194
maintaining its policy in isolation. By mid-1993, as David Owen puts it, „[k]eeping the
refugees … out of Germany … had become for the Germans a national interest which
they began to protect staunchly‟.186 By February and March 1994, the prospective
deportation of refugees was being hotly debated in Germany.187
Keeping the victims and targets of ethnic cleansing in place in Bosnia or the
former Yugoslavia could not be reconciled with human rights concerns. As a June 1993
opinion piece in The Independent argued, „[a]sylum is the ultimate means of human rights
protection for people whose lives and rights are at risk owing to armed conflicts‟, and
therefore
[t]he commitment of Western states to the protection of human rights in the
context of the conflicts in the former territories of Yugoslavia and the Soviet
Union must be judged by their willingness to provide asylum to refugees who are
victims of ethnic conflicts in the heart of Europe.188
Such a willingness was largely lacking, and the attempt to „internalize refugee movements
within the country of origin‟ was, in the absence of a real will to protect the refugees,
„correctly [seen] as a lethal trap‟.189 Ironically, this aspect of the policy was seen most clearly
by those who were directly charged with carrying out the humanitarian mission. Of all the
international personnel in Bosnia, aid workers and officials had the clearest view of what
was happening, and many of them had serious doubts about their role and the mission
they were carrying out.190 They were directly confronted with the incompatibility between
the mission they had been given and basic respect for human rights.
The humanitarian community came to this realisation quite quickly. UNHCR
spokesman Ron Redmond warned in July 1992 that „[n]o one should be so naive as to
believe that these refugees are going to be able to go home any time soon. The hatred is
not going to dissipate‟.191 In August, ICRC president Cornelio Sommaruga told the London
Conference that
[t]he way in which hostilities are being conducted in Bosnia-Herzegovina leaves no 186 Owen, Balkan Odyssey, 208. 187 Craig R. Whitney, „Germany Relents on Expulsion of 100,000 Croatian Refugees‟, New York Times, 11
February 1994; Tony Barber, „German Deportations Criticised‟, Independent, 9 March 1994; Andrew Marshall, „Massive Repatriation of Kosovo Refugees Feared‟, Independent, 18 March 1994.
188 Beyani, „Human Rights: A Crusade…. 189 Duffield and Stork, „Bosnia is the Classic Case‟, 20. 190 O‟Ballance, Civil War, 228. 191 Blaine Harden, „U.N. Pleads for Help for Bosnian Refugees‟, Washington Post, 23 July 1992.
195
room for humanity.... This unacceptable situation cannot go on. The humanitarian
organizations have done everything within their power to bring about more
humanity in this conflict, but I can only say that this is not enough. The time has
come for the international community of States to assume its responsibilities.192
He suggested a series of interim measures to help the victims of the war in the short term,
including evacuating them from their homes, and questioned the chances of returning
them to normal lives any time soon. His colleague Thierry Germond explicitly called for
the Red Cross to prioritise saving the lives of individuals. This course would mean getting
caught up in „the vicious circle of “ethnic cleansing”, but in the present state of affairs no
other solution is possible‟.193 In January 1993, the High Commissioner for Refugees
publicly questioned her own initial insistence on helping the refugees in place: „if you take
these people you are an accomplice to ethnic cleansing. If you don‟t, you are an accomplice
to murder‟.194
As one anonymous aid worker complained, aid workers were left in the position of
„becoming collaborators. It‟s blackmail. The choice we face is either to become agents of
ethnic cleansing or to leave tens of thousands of people to continue living their
nightmare‟.195 In such circumstances, an increasing number of them opted for saving lives.
The UNHCR-organised evacuation of hundreds of Bosnian Muslims from Zvornik in
May 1992 was an early example. As journalist David Rieff later described it, Bosnian
UNHCR head Jose-Maria Mendiluce had saved many lives by adopting this course, but
only at the cost of assuring the success of Serb ethnic cleansing in Zvornik.196
Faced with similar circumstances a year later, Mendiluce was unapologetic about his
decisions. He argued that „[w]hen we are trapped, as we are in Srebrenica, by all sorts of
complications, the only thing we can do is to save the people who are asking us to save
them‟.197 His agency‟s role was to save lives, and it would do so even at the cost of
accommodating Serbian military objectives, because he „prefer[red] thirty thousand
evacuees to thirty thousand bodies‟.198 Michael Minning, the Red Cross mission head in
Banja Luka, concurred: „[t]he war will continue as long as there are minorities in Serbian-,
Croatian- and Muslim-held areas. What we need to do is evacuate these minorities. You 192 „Statement by Dr. Cornelio Sommaruga‟, 26 August 1992, in B. G. Ramcharan, ed., The International
Conference on the Former Yugoslavia: Official Papers, Vol. 1 (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1997), 122. 193 Quoted in Mercier, Crimes Without Punishment, 61. 194 Quoted in ibid., 123. 195 An anonymous aid worker, quoted in Silber and Little, Death, 247. 196 Rieff, Slaughterhouse, 201. 197 Burns, „UN Plans to Evacuate…‟. 198 Ibid; quoted in Rieff, Slaughterhouse, 208.
196
might call it ethnic cleansing, but I call it rescue operations. It‟s the only solution‟.199 Even
the Bosnian Muslims themselves were divided over these actions. As a UNHCR worker put
it, „[e]veryone wants to get the hell out of Srebrenica [because they] know there‟s no future
here‟, but a Bosnian soldier condemned the work as „just ethnic cleansing. The UNHCR is
doing the Serbs‟ work for them‟.200
Mendiluce was probably the most prominent and outspoken official to publicly
conclude that humanitarian aid was not an appropriate response to events in Bosnia. In
May 1992, he described „what is happening in Bosnia‟ as „[past] all imagination.... This war
has to be stopped. The outside world must find the political means to put an end to this
state of horror‟.201 He unequivocally condemned the humanitarian mission he was running:
„You don‟t reply to fascism with relief supplies, and you don‟t counter ethnic cleansing with
reception centres for the displaced‟.202 As Rieff puts it, Mendiluce believed that „states
needed to act more morally. When the limits of humanitarianism were reached, it was time
for the soldiers to act‟.203 After leaving his position in Bosnia, Mendiluce stated that „[i]f we
were not ready to intervene, it would have been better if we had stayed at home. But we
were present, we did undertake a humanitarian intervention, and we created false
expectations‟.204
V. Peace Talks and Ethnic Cleansing
Why did we have a war if Bosnia should stay unified?
- Radovan Karadzic 205
The diplomatic response, for its part, was more important for what it indicated
about the Western willingness to accept the continuing commission of human rights
abuses in Bosnia than for its own actual violations of human rights principles. The content
of the peace plans and the Western efforts to coerce agreement from the belligerents
revealed both implicit and explicit assumptions about how important human rights were
and how they should be accommodated in any negotiated settlement. By insisting that a
settlement must be reached at the negotiating table, Western governments displayed a
199 Quoted in Yigal Chazan, „UN Urged to Aid Evacuation‟, Guardian, 24 June 1993. 200 Both quoted in Rieff, Slaughterhouse, 209. 201 Quoted in Robert Evans, „UN Envoy Tells of Civilians Enduring “Horror”„, Glasgow Herald, 13 May 1992. 202 Quoted in Rieff, A Bed for the Night, 144. 203 Ibid., 146. 204 Quoted in Rieff, Slaughterhouse, 214. 205 Quoted in Chuck Sudetic, „Britain Warns Serbs of Risk of Armed Intervention‟, New York Times, 31
December 1992.
197
distinct lack of urgency concerning the ongoing atrocities, which continued unabated while
the talks dragged on. Nobody was under the illusion that this approach would quickly end
the war, depending as it did on bitter enemies reaching an agreement in the absence of any
serious international pressure. Lawrence Eagleburger vividly expressed the West‟s passivity
in September 1992:
I have said this 38,000 times … This tragedy is not something that can be settled
from outside and it‟s about damn well time that everybody understood that. Until
the Bosnians, Serbs, and Croats decide to stop killing each other, there is nothing
the outside world can do about it.206
Douglas Hogg somewhat more decorously expressed the same attitude almost a year later:
the role of the West was to be a facilitator, to help „create the circumstances in which [the
belligerents] are capable of coming to an agreement‟, but under no circumstances able to
„compel people‟ to do so.207 But when asked what would happen if no political solution was
reached, General John Galvin, the NATO commander in Europe (SACEUR), could only
say „I don‟t know. I don‟t know. I know that … there‟ll be a lot of suffering‟.208 As late as
February 1994, only days before the mortar attack on the Sarajevo marketplace killed sixty-
eight and wounded nearly 150, Hurd was still insisting that, although „[a]ll three sides have
committed atrocities … the point that is emerging more and more clearly … is that a
negotiated settlement is needed‟.209
Western lack of attention to human rights was problematic with respect to the
content of the negotiations as well. All of the Western-proposed and promoted peace
plans were premised on an explicit or implicit willingness to discard human rights concerns
in exchange for an agreement. The exact nature of this willingness varied, depending
largely on whether it was the Bosnian Serbs or the government in Sarajevo that was balking
at signing on to the latest plan. In many respects, Sarajevo was the most problematic,
because for much of the war its reasons for being uncooperative were harder to refute.
Although self-interest and calculation were clearly factors in the Bosnian government‟s
attitude, it could justifiably claim that it was largely in the right and relatively blameless.
Sarajevo was also very adept at playing the “victim card”, hiring Western public relations
firms and, according to some observers, not above killing its own people to generate
206 Quoted in Holbrooke, To End a War, 23. 207 Hansard, 26 July 1993, c. 1872. 208 „USIA Foreign Press Center Briefing‟, Federal News Service, 19 June 1992. 209 Hansard, 2 February 1994, c. 880.
198
international sympathy.210 But the near-universal agreement that it was in fact the Serbs who
were the primary aggressors aided the perception of the Bosnian Muslims as victims.
Notwithstanding the position of the Bosnian Muslims as the main victims of the
war, many people in Western governments and the UN felt strongly that the real problem
was Sarajevo‟s refusal to concede defeat. If Izetbegovic, Silajdzic, and the rest would just
accept reality and make the best of it, the thinking went, the whole problem – for the West,
at least – would go away. Human rights concerns were strictly secondary.211 The early
consensus was that this would happen by way of a quick Bosnian Serb victory; as
Holbrooke observed in January 1993, „[n]o one with whom I talked last August expected
the Bosnians to last this long‟.212 Douglas Hogg insisted that the Bosnian government „have
to recognise defeat when it stares them in the face, that land has been seized by force, and
that there has to be a degree of acceptance of that fact … The other thing that they must
accept is that the military option has to be abandoned‟.213 Getting the government in
Sarajevo to recognise this state of affairs was a „major objective of British policy.214
According to ICFY spokesman John Mills, „[t]he message to the Muslims is negotiate or perish
… If they want to be practical they can secure a solid future‟.215
Many Europeans blamed the United States for sustaining the Bosnian government‟s
hopes and thus delaying an agreement. David Owen‟s view was representative; in a
telegram to the British ambassador in Washington about the VOPP, he complained that the
US had made statements which „could not but stiffen those Muslims who want to continue
the war.... the US administration has [told them] that they should not feel any need to sign‟
and had even warned Croatia against putting pressure on Sarajevo to do so.216 In Owen‟s
opinion, „loose talk about using force‟ was counterproductive, and the US should „make it
clear to Izetbegovic that he‟s got no real alternative to these negotiations‟.217 In a veiled
reference to Washington‟s policy, Hogg observed that since the UN‟s member states were
not „prepared to put combat troops into Bosnia to wage war … people must not encourage
the Bosnian Muslims to suppose something different‟.218 Sector Sarajevo commander Lewis
210 See, inter alia, Harden, „Can the West Stop…‟; Rieff, Slaughterhouse, pp. 101-2; Fiona Barton, „Massacre on
Market Day‟, Mail on Sunday, 6 February 1994; Pavkovic, Fragmentation, 170. 211 Rieff, Slaughterhouse, 127. 212 Holbrooke, To End a War, 50. 213 Quoted in Simms, Unfinest Hour, 30. 214 Ibid. 215 Quoted in Almond (emphasis included), Europe‟s Backyard War, 317; originally from The Times, 28 July
1993. 216 Owen, Balkan Odyssey, 105. 217 Quoted in R. W. Apple Jr., „Mediator Is Upset at U.S. Reluctance Over Bosnia Talks‟, New York Times, 3
February 1993. 218 Hansard, 14 July 1993, c.976.
199
Mackenzie concurred, arguing that intervention of any sort whatsoever „won‟t do anything
but escalate the violence and get more people killed … as long as there is any hint of
[foreign] intervention‟, the Bosnians „will not talk to the other side‟.219
European leaders therefore looked for ways to compensate for and counteract
Washington‟s encouragement of Sarajevo. In Britain, ministers publicly mused that their
patience was not endless, and that „[i]f the UN effort collapsed … then it might be a
situation in which the friends of each side said: “Here‟s the kit. Fight it out”‟.220 In a more
blatant effort to pressure the government in Sarajevo, they threatened to end the
humanitarian mission (albeit not very credibly in view of the importance of that mission to
the West):
If the present political vacuum and lack of cooperation persists, the parties cannot
expect the humanitarian commitment … to continue indefinitely. It is unrealistic to
suppose that this effort can be expected to go on forever and ever and ever when
it is not receiving local co-operation and there is no progress towards a political
settlement.221
As Liberal Democrat leader Paddy Ashdown put it, he „never thought to hear a British
Foreign Minister use humanitarian aid to blackmail the victim of aggression into
capitulation‟.222 France quietly supported the UK line, maintaining the close working
relationship on Balkan policy between the two countries that lasted for much of the war.223
Sarajevo was only one part of the equation; the Bosnian Serbs (and Serbia proper)
were also frequently unwilling participants in the peace talks, and gaining their cooperation
required different tactics from those applied to the Bosnian government. Threats to
withdraw aid and diplomatic support and admonishments to accept reality and make the
best of it were of little use against Pale and Belgrade. The Republika Srpska had little
diplomatic support to begin with, was not nearly so dependent on aid to keep its
population alive, and was militarily dominant for most of the war. Sanctions on Serbia were
already in place. The West‟s solution was therefore to offer the Bosnian Serbs positive
concessions, „act[ing] on the principle of regressive mediation, always offering to bargain 219 Quoted in Barton Gellman, „U.S. Military Fears Balkan Intervention‟, Washington Post, 12 August 1992. A
mirror image of this attitude was expressed by British opposition MPs, who argued that European „vacillat[ion]‟ on whether to leave troops in Bosnia or withdraw them „encourage[d] Serbs and Croats to maintain their aggressive stance in Bosnia‟; MP John Cunningham, Hansard, 2 February 1994, c. 881.
220 Hurd, July 1993, quoted in Simms, Unfinest Hour, 31. 221 Hurd, November 1993, quoted in ibid. 222 Paddy Ashdown, „Abandoning Bosnia to Its Fascist Fate‟, Guardian, 17 December 1993. 223 Hodge, Britain and the Balkans, 13.
200
on the basis of the most recent gains of the aggressor‟.224 In an unedifying spectacle,
Western governments attempted to buy Bosnian Serb agreement to a peace plan with
offers of favourable territorial divisions and political structures, while simultaneously
threatening and browbeating their main victims.225
The most prominent issue was the status of ethnically cleansed territory, which was
intimately bound up with human rights issues. Officially, Western leaders insisted that
ethnic cleansing could not and would not be permitted to stand. The language they used
was reminiscent of the earlier Western insistence that the use of force in the dissolution of
Yugoslavia was illegitimate and unacceptable. According to Douglas Hurd, for instance, the
British would never
accept the partition of Bosnia by force. The idea that simply because you or your
friends have occupied swathes of territory, the world simply packs up and accepts
that, will be shown to be wrong.... You cannot just ratify what has happened.226
A senior US official warned both Serbia and Croatia in July 1993 that „any notion they
might have had that they could achieve a military victory and have sanctions and/or rejoin
the family of nations is simply not a possibility‟.227 This stance was certainly partly based on
a recognition of the practical dangers of setting international precedents, but it was at
times explicitly framed in terms of human rights, such as when David Owen boasted about
the „human rights provisions and safeguards that we had built in [to the VOPP] with the
express purpose of reversing ethnic cleansing‟.228 The declarations regularly issued by such
organisations as the CSCE, the G-7, and NATO, as well as multiple UN Security Council
resolutions, said much the same.229
In practice, Western dedication to this principle was considerably more flexible and
much less absolute. The temptation to sacrifice human rights and opposition to ethnic
224 Spyros Economides and Paul Taylor, „Former Yugoslavia‟, in The New Interventionism 1991-1994: United
Nations Experience in Cambodia, former Yugoslavia and Somalia, James Mayall, ed.(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 84.
225 Another part of this effort was the offer of sanctions relief to Belgrade; see above, chapter 5. 226 Quoted in Simms, Unfinest Hour, 20. 227 „Background Briefing by Senior Administration Official‟, 8 July 1993. TAPP,
www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=59963 (accessed 10 October 2006). 228 Owen, Balkan Odyssey, 107. 229 See, inter alia, UN Security Council Resolution 787, 16 November 1992; NATO, Press Communiqué M-
NACC-1(93)39, 11 June 1993 (available from www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/index.htm; accessed 20 February 2008); G-7, Tokyo Summit Political Declaration: Striving for a More Secure and Humane World, 8 July 1993 (available from www.g8.utoronto.ca/summit/1993tokyo/political.html; accessed 9 October 2006); CSCE, CSCE and the New Europe – Our Security is Indivisible: Decisions of the Rome Council Meeting, 1 December 1993 (available from www.osce.org/documents/; accessed 19 August 2009).
201
cleansing in exchange for a quick end to the war grew stronger over time because the
longer the ethnic cleansing was allowed to continue, the harder it was to conceive of a way
to turn the clock back to even an approximation of the pre-war situation. The chief
negotiators fully recognised the scope of this problem. Owen was correct when he later
described the situation at the time of the ICFY‟s creation in the following terms:
the urgency for a peace settlement within Bosnia-Herzegovina [was] even greater
than Cy Vance had impressed upon me in August in New York. For every week
and month that went by without a settlement, ethnic cleansing was going to be
harder to reverse, and the polarization and divisions would partition not just the
country territorially but the minds of its people.230
Warren Christopher acknowledged in February 1993 that because „early and forceful …
actions were not taken [to deter ethnic cleansing], we now face a much more intractable
situation with vastly more difficult options‟.231 Owen resignedly commented later that year
that „we have to live with what has happened on the ground‟.232
There were nonetheless significant differences in the positions and actions taken by
individual countries, which are important for what they reveal about the differences in
thinking concerning ethnic cleansing and human rights in the West. The US, for all of the
ineffectualness of its overall approach and its outright refusal to consider sending troops in
any capacity whatsoever, was the least willing of the major Western states to simply accept
the post-ethnic cleansing status quo. Washington took this position in spite of the fact that
accepting and ratifying ethnic cleansing probably offered the quickest path to ending the
war, and hence to ensuring that the conflict did not expand to the point where military
intervention could no longer be avoided. While the absence of US forces in Bosnia no
doubt made this an easier position for Washington to take than it would have been for the
Europeans, it nevertheless indicates that human rights concerns were playing a role in US
policymaking. As Madeleine Albright later put it, „we could not achieve a permanent cease-
fire because that was unacceptable to the Bosniaks and would reward ethnic cleansing‟.233
US opposition to “cantonisation” along ethnic lines, and its repetitive insistence on a „just
and lasting settlement‟ enshrined in a „mutually agreed upon treaty‟ was not merely empty
230 Owen, Balkan Odyssey, 87-8. 231 Warren Christopher, „New Steps Toward Conflict Resolution in the Former Yugoslavia: Opening
Statement at a News Conference, 10 February 1993‟, Dispatch, Vol. 4, No. 7, 15 February 1993. 232 Paul Koring, „Muslims Urged to Accept Carve-Up of Bosnia‟, Globe and Mail, 18 June 1993. 233 Albright, Madam Secretary, 184.
202
rhetoric.234 This insistence was precisely why the Europeans blamed the US for impeding a
peace deal.
Even so, such an assessment must be carefully qualified. While the US insisted on
the need for a mutually agreeable settlement, it nonetheless participated in (or at a
minimum did not directly oppose) the progressively worse peace plans between 1992 and
1995. Washington also tended to evade the hard questions concerning how such a
settlement might be reached and what it might actually look like given the realities on the
ground. A representative example occurred in August 1992, when a reporter asked if a
ceasefire would not just „lock in Serbian control of some large proportion of [Bosnia]‟.
Richard Boucher‟s response was to simply ignore the whole issue, responding simply that
„we are in favor of a cease-fire and a political solution that‟s negotiated peacefully by the
parties‟.235 On another level, concern for the human rights implications of accomplished
ethnic cleansing is difficult to reconcile with the apparent acceptance of continuing human
rights violations as the war, ethnic cleansing, and genocide continued.
The Europeans, with their greater involvement in the negotiations (the ICFY was,
after all, a joint EU/UN project), were considerably more forthright about the negotiability
of human rights, a stance which was clearest in the context of the various peace plans. The
VOPP, which Owen himself openly admitted was deeply unfair and without „a lot of
honour‟, had strong European support, and for German foreign minister Klaus Kinkel, its
apparent failure could only be accepted „with gritted teeth‟.236 This was the response, it
should be remembered, to a plan that was welcomed by the Serb and Croat leaderships as
giving them more or less what they wanted in Bosnia. Haris Silajdzic, on the other hand,
described it as an „injustice which disgraces us all … The lines drawn in blood will now be
confirmed on paper under the auspices of the international community‟.237 Izetbegovic
warned that it would inevitably lead to „a new wave of ethnic cleansing, because you can‟t
234 „State Department‟s Statement on Bosnia and Macedonia‟, US Department of State Dispatch, Vol. 3, No. 34,
24 August 1992; „Eagleburger: Intervention at the London Conference‟, Dispatch, 15 September 1992 ; „Press Briefing by Dee Dee Myers‟, 3 May 1993. TAPP, www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=59957 (accessed 10 October 2006).
235 „State Department Regular Briefing by Richard Boucher‟, Federal News Service, 6 August 1992. 236 Koring, „Muslims Urged…‟. At the same time, Germany was very slow to condemn Croatia, regarded as
its closest ally in the area, for its role in ethnic cleansing. It was not until early 1993 that the Croatian government‟s policies regarding the Croatian Serbs elicited a warning that Croatia „ran the risk of its behaviour being equated with that of Serbia‟, and it was June before Germany threatened to „lift its protective hand‟ if Zagreb did not „behave as the EC expected it to‟, and ceased assisting the Bosnian Croats in their ethnic cleansing efforts. See David Gow, „Germany Calls on Croatia to Halt Its Military Offensive‟, Guardian, 28 January 1993; David Gow, „Atrocities Deepen Germany‟s Doubts About Policy Towards Croatian Ally‟, Guardian, 13 May 1993; Ian Traynor, „Zagreb Backs Removal of Thousands of Muslims‟, Guardian, 19 July 1993.
237 Quoted in Koring, „Muslims Urged…‟.
203
draw three lines through Bosnia and divide it into ethnic entities because we‟re all
intermingled‟.238 Owen‟s response was to warn that the Bosnian government would „be
well-advised to look very closely at these proposals and to negotiate.... It can be adjusted,
but it needs to be looked at seriously by anybody who wants to bring the war to an end‟.239
The subsequent plans confirmed the lack of regard for the human rights of the
Bosnian Muslims. In human rights terms, the Owen-Stoltenberg plan in August, with its
near-complete devolution of power to three ethnic mini-republics with borders based on
the current front lines, was even worse than the VOPP. When it foundered on Bosnian
government objections, Germany and France proposed the basis for what became the
European Action Plan. A purely European initiative (as the name suggests), the Franco-
German proposal did call for territorial concessions from the Bosnian Serbs, potentially
indicating a change in attitude towards the results of ethnic cleansing. The details, however,
do not support this interpretation. In exchange for the promised removal of UN sanctions
– which they could not guarantee – the plan required the Bosnian Serbs to return a mere
three percent of the republic to the Bosnian government, leaving Sarajevo with control of
one-third of the country.240 The EU collectively „agreed to study‟ the plan, but its
acceptance even in the West was doubtful.241 The doubts, however, concerned the wisdom
of lifting the sanctions on Serbia, not the human rights implications of largely condoning
Bosnian Serb ethnic cleansing.242 The plan still left the large majority of the country under
Bosnian Serb control, a state of affairs the Europeans were clearly willing to accept,
notwithstanding their official positions, if it meant the end of the fighting.243
VI. Humanitarianism and Hostages
We [could not] use significant force to punish the Bosnian Serbs because UN peacekeepers might be taken
hostage and the humanitarian mission derailed.
- Madeleine Albright 244
On a more subtle level, the Western emphasis on the importance of the diplomatic
238 Quoted in ibid. 239 Ibid. 240 David B. Ottaway, „Bosnians Resume Peace Talks‟, Washington Post, 30 November 1993. 241 „Catastrophe Warning After Raid on Bosnian Arms Plant‟, Glasgow Herald, 9 November 1993. 242 „Serbs “Will Not Give Up Land”„, Independent, 29 November 1993. 243 While ending the war would certainly have had some human rights benefits for the Bosnian Muslim
population, ending it in this fashion – even if that could have been achieved – would have been yet another instance of Western policies addressing the human rights effects of the conduct of the conflict at the expense of the human rights issues fundamental to the nature of the conflict.
244 Albright, Madam Secretary, 184.
204
and humanitarian responses encouraged Western governments to overlook the human
rights violations being committed in Bosnia, because criticisms might provoke their targets
to interfere with these policy responses. The crucial factor was that both policies
fundamentally depended on the continuing cooperation of all sides in the war, which were
all well aware of the importance Western governments attributed to them. Under the
circumstances, the West had given the belligerents a powerful tool to influence Western
words and actions. One of the primary effects was to dissuade Western policymakers from
concentrating on human rights issues. According to David Owen, for example, it was only
in November 1993, a year and a half after the war began and the worst abuses were
committed, that war crimes were first brought up at the ICFY.245
In the case of the peace talks, this dissuasion functioned in two ways. Most directly,
the Bosnian Serbs frequently threatened, or hinted that they might threaten, to withdraw
from the talks to shut down criticism of the atrocities that their forces were carrying out.
They had, for instance, „reacted "very angrily" to accounts of atrocities given‟ by Bosnian
Muslims who had been taken to Britain for medical care in autumn 1992.246 According to
John Major, the insistence by the Dutch that the London Conference „condemn … the
Serbs for their atrocities … threatened to wreck the conference and give the Serbs and
excuse for not getting around the table in future‟.247 For Douglas Hogg, when addressing
the culpability of Bosnian Serb leaders for war crimes, the question that needed to be asked
was „what is the priority; is it to bring people to trial or is it to make peace‟?248 The latter, he
strongly suggested, merited the sacrifice of the former, if necessary.
Since Western governments wanted to avoid at all costs a comprehensive failure of
the talks, the Bosnian Serb actions strongly encouraged them to avoid commenting on the
human rights aspects of the conflict. Concern about derailing the peace talks explains why
Lawrence Eagleburger‟s naming of Bosnian Serb leaders as potential war criminals in
December 1992 upset so many people; it might provoke Karadzic and his colleagues to
walk out, and so put the talks in jeopardy.249 The Bosnian government, on the other hand,
used Bosnian Serb (and at times Croat) atrocities either to justify their own obstructionism
at the talks or to try to generate international pressure on the other sides. Haris Silajdzic
justified his refusal to sit down and talk with the Bosnian Serb leaders in July 1992 by
245 Owen, Balkan Odyssey, 230. 246 Mark Tran and Hella Pick, „UN to Set Up Commission to Investigate Atrocities in Former Yugoslavia‟,
Guardian, 7 October 1992. 247 Major, Autobiography, 537. 248 Quoted in Hodge, Britain and the Balkans, 46. 249 See Hazan, Justice in a Time of War, 30. Similar criticisms were later directed at the ICTY; see Hazan, 61-2.
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saying that „[w]e are not prepared to talk at gunpoint while we are being besieged … while
our streets are strewn with unburied bodies‟.250 Renewed BSA attacks on Sarajevo in July
1993 similarly delayed talks concerning what was to become the Owen-Stoltenberg Plan.251
This use of human rights-based complaints more obliquely reinforced the Western
tendency to downplay human rights, as any increase in attention to atrocities simply gave
Sarajevo more justification for such uncooperativeness.
The humanitarian mission was hostage to the cooperation of the warring parties on
a much more direct and literal level. Deployment in Bosnia was not without some
substantial amount of risk. As Boutros-Ghali pointed out in December 1994,
UNPROFOR was „a lightly armed, highly dispersed force that can neither be tactically
deployed nor secure its lines of communications‟, and therefore suffered from „extreme
and unavoidable vulnerability … to being taken hostage and to other forms of
harassment‟.252 Humanitarian workers were also at risk, being entirely unarmed and thus
even more vulnerable than the UNPROFOR troops. The dangers were very real. One UN
official said in mid-May 1992 that „[a]bout all we‟ve been able to accomplish in Bosnia is to
keep from getting any of our people killed‟, but that was not to remain the case.253
Beginning only days later, there were multiple instances of Red Cross and other NGO
relief workers coming under fire and resulting in injuries and death.254 The ICRC mission
chief in Sarajevo, Frederic Maurice, was assassinated on 18 May. Four people were killed
with the downing of the Italian cargo plane in early September. Two French peacekeepers
were killed when a convoy they were accompanying came under fire that same week.255 By
March 1993, French forces alone had suffered a dozen deaths and over a hundred
wounded.256
Western governments with troops in the former Yugoslavia were acutely aware of
these risks and used them as an excuse to limit their engagement in Bosnia.257 In June 1992,
John Major reminded parliament that „[i]t would take only one ground-launched missile to
cause serious loss of life‟.258 The defence secretary repeated the warning a year later: „Every
250 Blaine Harden, „New Surge of Bosnian Refugees Feared‟, Washington Post, 29 July 1992. 251 „Heavy Serb Attack on Sarajevo Stalls Effort for Renewed Talks‟, Globe and Mail, 23 July 1993. 252 Report of the Secretary General Pursuant to Resolution 959, 11, para. 30. 253 John F. Burns, „As Cannons Roar, U.N. Leaves Bosnia‟, New York Times, 17 May 1992. 254 See, for instance, John F. Burns, „After Bosnia, Peacekeepers Weigh Their Purpose‟, New York Times, 19
May 1992; Sudetic, „Serbs Hold 5,000 Hostages…‟; „State Department Regular Briefing by Richard Boucher‟, Federal News Service, 3 June 1992.
255 „2 French Troops Killed…‟. 256 Clinton, „News Conference with President François Mitterrand…‟. 257 Malcolm Rifkind was candid about the fact that the humanitarian mission was intended to derail calls for
intervention; Hodge, Britain and the Balkans, 41. 258 Quoted in Almond, Europe‟s Backyard War, 296-7.
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single UN soldier in Bosnia is within range of Serb artillery. If there were attacks on Serb
positions, it is entirely within the power of the Serbs to retaliate by shelling British forces
… They are, I repeat, all within range of Serb artillery‟.259 Douglas Hurd made the British
stance explicit on 16 June 1993, when he said that the troops should stay as long as they
were „helping to keep people alive‟, but only „[s]o long as … there is no undue risk to them
… if the situation deteriorated further to the point at which we and others felt that the risk
had become undue, they would have to be withdrawn‟.260 Fear of incurring risks to its
peacekeepers was a key factor in France‟s resistance to political and popular pressures for
intervention in the summer and autumn of 1992.261 During the debate over air strikes in
December 1992, Deputy Foreign Minister Georges Kiejman warned that such action „could
lead to reprisals against U.N. forces‟.262 The US, of course, was so unwilling to put its
troops in jeopardy that it refused to deploy any ground forces as part of the UN mission.263
Bush noted the dangers faced by US aircrews in the airlift operation, but overall the US
government had little to say on the subject.264
This state of affairs allowed the worst human rights offenders in Bosnia to exert
pressure on the West, because while Western governments did not wish to expose their
people to excessive risks, they also needed to continue the humanitarian mission. The
vulnerability of UNPROFOR and the NGO personnel accordingly led policymakers like
Madeleine Albright to worry that „the humanitarian mission [might be] derailed‟.265 Threats
to disrupt the aid deliveries, whether explicitly made or simply implicit in the military and
territorial situation, were a powerful disincentive for Western governments to squarely
address the human rights abuses that were being carried out, even those that related
directly to the interference with the aid. The behaviour of the UN and Western
governments made it clear that – notwithstanding the passage of resolutions authorising
“all necessary measures” to deliver the aid, or threatening air strikes to protect the safe
areas – there was virtually no risk that those words would be acted on. For the British, for
instance, it all came down to the fact that „[w]e have 2,400 troops there, and those troops
are not an abstraction. There is a fair chance that any retaliation by the Serbs would be
259 Quoted in ibid., 297. 260 Hansard, 16 June 1993, c. 858. 261 Lepick, „French Perspectives‟, 81. 262 Riding, „France Opposes Air Strikes‟. 263 See above, 122-7, for a discussion of the US position with regard to the use of military forces. For more
on this see, inter alia, Albright, Madam Secretary, 180-85; Halberstam, War in a Time of Peace, 39-40; Western, Selling Intervention, 149-72.
264 George H. W. Bush, „Statement on Humanitarian Assistance to Bosnia‟, 2 October 1992. TAPP, www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=21560. 265 Albright, Madam Secretary, 184.
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visited on them. That‟s the single most important factor‟.266
The frequent decisions to suspend the aid mission, whenever its administrators
decided the threats had become too serious, demonstrated the power of this concern.
General Mackenzie ordered the suspension of flights into Sarajevo on 21 July 1992 upon
the collapse of an EC-negotiated ceasefire, although they resumed the next day amidst
continued shelling of the airport.267 The downing of an Italian plane flying aid into the
capital on 3 September prompted another suspension.268 This pause lasted a full month and
was only lifted reluctantly, given that the threat remained.269 Flights were again suspended in
early December 1992 and March/April 1993.270 The airlift was literally subject to Bosnian
Serb control. Richard Boucher openly admitted that „the airport can be opened if the right
decisions are made by the Serbian leadership to do that.... The airport has been opened to
selected flights when they wanted to make it possible‟.271 As for the convoys, Jose-Maria
Mendiluce first cited the threat level as a reason to suspend operations in May 1992.272
Fighting in Vitez threatened in October 1992 to force the UN to close a key warehouse
used to hold supplies trucked in from the coast en route to central Bosnia.273 Muslims in
the city of Mostar were almost entirely cut off from aid for more than two months in the
summer of 1993, and in the Tuzla safe area the reduction of aid to a trickle produced riots
and the sacking of a UNHCR warehouse around the same time.274 UNHCR spokesman
Peter Kessler cited security problems as one of the main reasons for a ten-week „reduction
in rations‟ for aid recipients in the summer of 1993, along with „shortages in food supplies
and lack of money‟, and Sadako Ogata worried that UN relief operations would have to be
reduced or ended altogether if conditions did not improve.275
266 An aide to Douglas Hurd, quoted in Eugene Robinson, „Europeans Indecisive On Bosnia‟, Washington
Post, 22 December 1992. 267 John F. Burns, „Sarajevo Airlift Suspended by U.N. After Truce Fails‟, New York Times, 21 July 1992; John
F. Burns, „UN Resumes Relief Flights to Sarajevo‟, New York Times, 22 July 1992. 268 Chuck Sudetic, „U.N. Relief Plane Reported Downed On Bosnia Mission‟, New York Times, 4 September
1992. 269 John F. Burns, „US Plane Lands in Sarajevo to Resume Airlift of Aid to Bosnia War Victims‟, New York
Times, 4 October 1992. 270 For, respectively, nine days and approximately two weeks. John F. Burns, „Serbs Free Road to Bosnia
Airport‟, New York Times, 10 December 1992; „UN Resumes Airlift to Sarajevo‟, Globe and Mail, 5 April 1993.
271 „State Department Regular Briefing, Federal News Service, 3 June 1992. 272 Crossette, „After Weeks of Seeming Inaction…‟. It is worth noting that Mendiluce‟s superiors at the
UNHCR denied that all aid operations in Bosnia had been suspended. 273 John F. Burns, „U.N. May Have to Close a Key Relief Warehouse‟, New York Times, 21 October 1992. 274 „Heavy Serb Attack on Sarajevo…‟; Tony Barber, „Saving Sarajevo‟, Independent, 28 July 1993. Mark
Almond argues that the airfield at Tuzla could in fact have been used, but that the more cumbersome convoys were a means „of avoiding unreasonable danger‟ to UN personnel. He points out that it „suddenly ... was used‟ during the 1993 Srebrenica crisis for the benefit of UN forces, but never utilised for aid; Europe‟s Backyard War, 274. See also Mazower, The War in Bosnia, 29.
275 Sudetic, „U.N. Relief Agency to Cut…‟; Tony Barber, „Sarajevo May Be Left to Its Fate‟, Independent, 17
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The other weak point of the highly dispersed deployment of aid personnel and
humanitarian workers was its vulnerability to literal hostage taking. The very real risks of
the aid operation lent weight and credibility to the threats that the Bosnian Serb, Croatian
Serb, and Serbian leadership, military, and paramilitaries directed at foreign personnel in
Bosnia, Croatia, and Serbia. The experience of Canadian civilian police officers serving in
the mission in Croatia and Serbia in September 1993 was typical:
We know that if they do air strikes we‟re dead. We‟re not going to be hostages;
they‟re going to kill us.... The local police and the military have told us that if the
U.S. does air strikes we‟ll be sacrificed.... there are Serbians at the checkpoint
before you get to the border. They‟ve told us they‟ll never let us through, that
they‟ll shoot us.... The UN says they‟ve got evacuation plans to get us out. They‟ve
got to understand, we‟re in Serbia.... Who are they kidding? The police and military
have told us that if there are air strikes they‟ll take us out, one at a time for every
strike, and shoot us. It‟s as simple as that. They mean it. And there‟s nothing we
can do about it.276
UN military forces in isolated pockets such as Srebrenica were in an equally precarious
position. As Malcolm Rifkind observed, while „the 150 Canadian troops [in Srebrenica] are
doing a very important job … that is because the Serbs have so far chosen not to use their
weapons against them‟.277 In December 1993, Bosnian Serb fighters subjected eleven
Canadian soldiers to a „mock execution‟; by that point, twenty-nine UN troops (including
nine Canadians) had been killed in Bosnia.278 The Serbs took hostages in response to the
NATO bombing of the Udbina airfield in neighbouring Serbian-controlled Croatia in
November 1994, and when NATO bombed BSA ammunition dumps in Bosnia in May
1995, they retaliated by taking over 340 UN personnel hostage and imprisoning them in
military depots to dissuade further action.279
The vulnerability of the aid delivery to military pressure and of UNPROFOR to
hostage taking, in combination with the reluctance of Western governments to
July 1993.
276 Quoted in Peter Moon, „Mounties Fear Execution if U.S. Strikes‟, Globe and Mail, 27 September 1993. Despite its significant contributions to UN operations in the former Yugoslavia, Canada played a largely secondary role in shaping the overall Western response to the crisis.
277 Hansard, 23 April 1993, c. 1197. 278 Chuck Sudetic, „Canadians Endure Mock Execution‟, New York Times, 28 December 1993. 279 Albright, Madam Secretary, 185; Roger Cohen, „Serbs Call and Raise‟, New York Times, 27 May 1995. The
chief UN official in Bosnia, Yasushi Akashi, had opposed the air strikes on precisely these grounds; Jonathan C. Randal, „Serbs Backing Off at NATO Deadline‟, Washington Post, 24 April 1994.
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countenance risks to their people, created a serious problem for the West. Western leaders
had repeatedly argued that a massive humanitarian response was essential, that humanity
and morality required it, and that it was the least they could do for the suffering peoples of
Bosnia. As a result, and entirely unsurprisingly, the aid programme had rapidly acquired a
domestic political importance that made it exceedingly difficult to either question its
continuation or take actions that might jeopardise it. Having initially chosen to respond to
the war in humanitarian terms, and with endless press coverage to reinforce the images of
starving and homeless Bosnians, the idea that the aid might be counter-productive from a
wider perspective was very difficult to sell. While the actual level of support and
commitment varied from country to country and at different times, the basic premise –
that the humanitarian mission must continue – was virtually untouchable, at least at the
policymaking level. Anything that might put it jeopardy, such as confronting the Serbs with
their human rights abuses, was therefore extremely unwelcome, and encouraged the use of
humanitarian rather than human rights language in reference to the conflict.280 Britain and
France, for example, actively worked to water down the US proposal for a war crimes
tribunal in the autumn of 1992, explicitly on the grounds that it might hamper
„communication‟ with the Bosnian Serb leadership, and Britain refused to publicly release
the information which it had gathered on potential war crimes in Bosnia.281
The continued emphasis on humanitarian over human rights concerns, and the
minimising of abuses when they could not be ignored, amounted to a denial of the human
rights aspects of ethnic cleansing and the atrocities by which it was carried out.
Confronting the Serbs with their actions might have rendered the humanitarian mission
impossible, and that could not be allowed. Humanitarianism, as Bernard Kouchner later
admitted, only „sanitis[ed] ethnic cleansing‟, which meant that it inescapably sanitised
human rights abuses.282 This was certainly the opinion of Tadeusz Mazowiecki. Nobody
was better informed than he about every aspect of the human rights situation in the
280 See, for instance, President Bush‟s insistence on the need for „international inspection[s]‟ of the camps – a
humanitarian response – over any discussion of the deeper human rights issues implicit in the camps‟ very existence; George H. W. Bush, „Remarks on the Situation in Bosnia and an Exchange with Reporters in Colorado Springs‟, 6 August 1992. TAPP, www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=21303 (accessed 8 October 2006); George H. W. Bush, „The President‟s News Conference‟, 7 August 1992. TAPP, www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=21306 (accessed 8 October 2006). Lawrence Eagleburger conceded that „the evidence is unpleasant conditions. A terrible thing to have happen‟, but nothing more than that; quoted in David Binder, „U.S. Finds No Proof of Mass Killing at Serb Camps‟, New York Times, 23 August 1992. Another example is the repeated downplaying by the British of the severity of abuses committed in the course of BSA attacks on Zepa, Bihac, and Srebrenica; Simms, Unfinest Hour, 24.
281 Rather than the tribunal which the US envisioned, the outcome of this move was the Commission of Experts. Tran and Pick, „UN to Set Up Commission…‟.
282 Quoted in Davey, Indifferent Memory, 21.
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former Yugoslavia, but after making numerous recommendations for actions that he felt
could and should be taken to ameliorate the abuses, he informed his superiors in late July
1995 that his next report would be his last. The immediate cause for his action were
„[e]vents in recent weeks in Bosnia and Herzegovina‟, specifically the fact that „the United
Nations has allowed Srebrenica and Zepa to fall [to Bosnian Serb forces], along with the
horrendous tragedy which has beset the population of those "safe havens" guaranteed by
international agreements‟, which for him was emblematic of „the reality of the human
rights situation today‟.283 But while the fall of the two safe areas was the proximate cause of
his decision, it was grounded more generally in what he saw as the lack of any real
international effort to defend human rights anywhere in the former Yugoslavia.
Research and reporting were a necessary starting point for any response to human
rights abuses in Bosnia, but they were useless in themselves. In his resignation letter,
Mazowiecki recalled that he had accepted his position with the goal of „not simply …
writing reports but helping the people themselves‟, but had arrived at the conclusion that
„[o]ne cannot speak about the protection of human rights with credibility when one is
confronted with the lack of consistency and courage displayed by the international
community and its leaders‟.284 After describing the dismal situation in the former
Yugoslavia, including reference to the deaths of UN soldiers and aid workers, he concluded
by saying that „[t]he character of my mandate only allows me to further describe crimes and
violations of human rights.... And [I] cannot continue to participate in the pretence of the
protection of human rights‟.285 The careful documentation he had provided on virtually
every aspect of ethnic cleansing – detention camps, rape, refugees, genocide – had
produced very little in the way of concrete preventative or redressive action. Indeed, in the
cases of Zepa and Srebrenica (at least until the full scale of the massacre in the latter came
to light in August 1995 and forced a response) the West was willing after more than three
years of brutality to look away and tolerate yet another round of ethnic cleansing, this time
in supposedly UN-guaranteed safe areas.
Humanitarianism as applied in Bosnia did not even attempt to come to grips with
either the causes of the war or its most fundamental human rights abuses. At best, it
addressed some of the human rights consequences of the belligerents‟ policies –
homelessness, starvation – but not those that were inherent in the intent and conduct of
those policies (i.e., ethnic cleansing). As one observer commented trenchantly, „mercy
283 Final Periodic Report, 26. 284 Ibid. 285 Ibid.
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fail[ed] to bring relief ‟.286 Humanitarianism focused on the symptoms, not on the disease.
US Senator Bob Dole offered an apt description of the Bosnian situation three years later,
though he was speaking at the time about the worsening crisis in Kosovo. „The problem,‟
he said, „is not by definition a humanitarian one. It is a political and military crisis, whose
most visible symptoms are humanitarian‟.287 Overall, Western policies in Bosnia failed to
recognise this distinction.
VII. Conclusion
On one level, the Bosnian war bore out the idea that human rights would have a
new and greater importance in the post-Cold War world, simply because the human rights
issues and abuses in Bosnia were of such great magnitude. The Western response, however,
demonstrated clearly that the prominence of human rights concerns in Bosnia was
distinctly unwelcome in Western capitals. While both the humanitarian response and the
diplomatic initiative to reach a negotiated settlement incorporated some human rights
elements in terms of their intent and, particularly for the former, in terms of execution,
human rights were not given much consideration in the adoption of these policies. Western
governments chose these policies not because they were the most appropriate responses to
the ethnic cleansing and atrocities of the war, but rather because policymakers expected
that they would facilitate the avoidance of large-scale military involvement. The
humanitarian aid would actually improve conditions somewhat for some of the victims of
the war, and thus reduce the pressure for forceful intervention. The peace talks would
(hopefully) lead to a mutually-agreeable end to the fighting, thus removing the need for
intervention. Both policies served a public relations need, as highly visible evidence that the
West was not simply ignoring the crisis.
However, these policies represented a diminution in the importance which Western
governments gave to human rights in the policymaking process. Aside from the most basic
(and not unimportant) human rights concerning the right to life, shelter, food, and
medicine, these policies required a downgrading of human rights concerns in order to be
maintained. Western leaders were obliged to accept the results of past human rights
violations and condone their continuation for an indefinite period of time, for example in
their treatment of ethnic cleansing in the peace plans. In the form of the diversion of
humanitarian aid to military purposes, Western states actively contributed to the violations
being committed by all sides in Bosnia. And in their response to the refugee crisis, Western 286 Ian Traynor, „Why Mercy Fails to Bring Relief ‟, Guardian, 15 April 1993. 287 Robert Dole, „We Must Stop the Kosovo Terror‟, Washington Post, 14 September 1998.
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governments collectively attempted to evade their responsibilities under the Refugee
Convention, and actively worked to keep the victims of ethnic cleansing in situations of
continued danger and privation.
In so doing, these policies illustrated again that human rights concerns are not
necessarily always compatible, either with other human rights concerns or with
humanitarian or political goals. While it is easy to condemn the lack of concern for many
human rights issues in the humanitarian and diplomatic responses to the Bosnian war, it is
more difficult to prescribe alternatives that would have been both more practical and less
questionable on similar grounds. Political calculations about public reactions aside, would it
really have been preferable to cut off the humanitarian mission on the grounds that it was
supporting the war? Would it not have amounted to complicity in ethnic cleansing to
permit and encourage the removal of large numbers of Bosnian Muslims from Bosnian
into the West, and would that not have diminished the chances of their ever returning to
their homes? How should these concerns have been balanced against both the costs of
leaving the population in place and the stated desires of many Bosnian Muslims to leave?
Given the basic unwillingness of the West to intervene militarily – a policy which would
have had many problems of its own, both moral and practical – there were only choices
between a variety of poor options, and no easy solutions.
Finally, the Western response in this period suggests that, perhaps paradoxically, the
greater the human rights stakes, the less appealing it was for Western governments to
squarely address them. Particularly when the spectre of genocide is raised, to admit the
problem is to admit responsibility for responding to and ending it; that is, after all, an
obligation that applies to all signatories of the Genocide Convention. But any major
human rights catastrophe, such as the ethnic cleansing in Bosnia, poses severe risks of
growing into an uncontrollable commitment for any government that responds to the
crisis. Hence the Western interest, in the case of Bosnia, in minimising the scale of the
problems and the attention given to them, in stark contrast to the earlier stages of
Yugoslavia‟s dissolution. The political repression and lack of democracy which were the
characteristic human rights issues in the earlier stages of Yugoslavia‟s disintegration had a
much more prominent role in Western policymaking precisely because such issues were less
likely to lead to calls for military intervention. Such a response would have been completely
unsuitable as a solution for those concerns. But military force was much more plausible as
a response to genocide and ethnic cleansing in Bosnia, thus increasing the risk for Western
governments in directly addressing those issues.
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Chapter 7
Conclusion: A ‘Pretence of the Protection of Human Rights’? 1
Western policies in Bosnia began to change radically in early 1994, in ways that had
profound implications in terms of the relationship of those policies to human rights. First,
atrocities such as the mortar bombing of the Markale market in Sarajevo on 5 February
(which killed at least sixty-eight people), combined with renewed Bosnian Serb Army
offensives against enclaves such as the Gorazde “safe area” in April finally broke down the
prohibition on the part of both the Europeans and the Americans against the use of active
military force to intervene in the conflict. After the market bombing, for instance, the first
response came from the Europeans on 7 February, calling for the siege of Sarajevo to be
immediately lifted. This was followed on 8 February by a US demand that Serb heavy
weapons be withdrawn beyond out of range of civilian targets, and on the following day by
a NATO ultimatum reiterating this call and threatening air strikes against any weapons not
so withdrawn.2 The shooting down of four Serb aircraft by NATO jets on 28 February was
not only the first Western military intervention in the former Yugoslavia, but also the first
combat action in NATO‟s history. This action was followed by air strikes against BSA
positions around Gorazde in April, and later in the year by strikes on Udbina airport in
Serb-held Croatian territory; strikes of this sort grew in number and intensity throughout
the remainder of the war. Once the threat of their use had been followed through with
action, the threat of air strikes proved to be a useful tool in restraining Serb ethnic
cleansing.
Concurrently, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
(ICTY) overcame lukewarm international support and its initial difficulties of staffing and
resources to begin bringing indictments for war crimes, crimes against humanity, and
genocide. The majority of those served with indictments were ethnic Serbs from Bosnia,
but the list also came to include Bosnian Croats and Muslims, Croatians, Serbians, and
(later in the decade) Kosovo Albanians. While subject to accusations of partisanship from
all sides, and viewed by some in the West as counterproductive to ending the fighting, the
1 A phrase used by Mazowiecki in his resignation letter; Final Periodic Report, 27. 2 Burg and Shoup, The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 145. While a full examination of these developments and
others through 1994 and 1995 is beyond the scope of this dissertation, it is worth noting here that the newly forceful Western policy was not simply an adoption of the US “lift and strike” policy. Any action by NATO, for instance, despite the US dominance in that organisation, required the active agreement of the major European states. In addition, of course, the embargo (the “lift” portion of the US policy) was not formally removed, although the West turned a blind eye or even actively colluded in assisting its evasion by the Bosnian government; see above, 143 (fn. 86).
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ICTY eventually developed a high public profile. That Western governments were willing
to tolerate and even support its activities even when they potentially interfered with peace
negotiations was indicative of a return to prominence for human rights concerns in the
Western response to the Yugoslav crisis.
The Dayton Peace Agreement of November 1995, which finally ended the fighting
in Bosnia (and in Croatia), was more ambiguous with regard to human rights. It did end the
mass atrocities, but at the cost of leaving the Bosnian Serbs in possession of a great deal
of territory they had gained and held by means of ethnic cleansing. The strength and
viability of its human rights provisions for the post-war structure of Bosnia was also open
to question. Of particular concern was the lack of a mandate and obligation on the part of
the international UN forces to track down and arrest alleged war criminals.
These developments would all repay analysis from a human rights perspective (as
would Western policies in Bosnia after Dayton, the response to the resurgence of the Serb-
Albanian conflict in Kosovo in the latter half of the decade, and the international
administration of Kosovo after the NATO intervention of 1999).3 For example, although
the change of policy concerning military action starting in 1994 was clearly connected to
human rights concerns such as the fate of the residents of the safe areas and the continued
shelling of civilians in Sarajevo and elsewhere, did it truly represent the “arrival” of human
rights as a policy-driving concern, or was it driven by domestic and international political
calculations concerning the costs of continuing to ignore such atrocities? Similarly, did the
growing support for and profile of the ICTY reflect an increase in the importance given to
human rights in the policymaking process, a growing recognition of the tribunal‟s potential
as a public relations tool, or its possible uses as a means of putting pressure on chosen
targets (including its use to encourage cooperation through the decision not to lay charges
against figures such as Milosevic)? Regardless of the motivations, though, these policies
had important consequences for human rights in Bosnia (and the former Yugoslavia more
generally) which merit examination.
This dissertation has argued that Western responses to events in Yugoslavia from
1989 until early 1994 present a decidedly mixed picture from a human rights perspective.
At times, human rights played a large and explicit role in Western policies. The earliest
3 Beyond the former Yugoslavia, this approach would be suitable for studies of Western policies towards
the crises in Rwanda, Congo, and Darfur, among others. It might also prove useful for analysing Western relations towards certain states in more sustained, less “crisis”-oriented circumstances, such as North Korea and Burma.
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period, when the focus was on Serbian repression in Kosovo and the process of
democratisation, is one example. Human rights again played an important – though not
decisive – part in the debates over recognition in late 1991 and early 1992. In contrast,
from mid-1990 to mid-1991, when the West was focused on holding Yugoslavia together,
policymakers devoted much less attention to human rights. This neglect was even more
marked during the war in Bosnia, when a massive increase in the scale and severity of
human rights abuses was accompanied by determined efforts in the West to avoid
confronting them.
Yet in terms of the effects of Western policies on human rights in Yugoslavia,
there was no obvious correlation between the amount of explicit policy attention given to
human rights issues and positive human rights outcomes. The attention given to Kosovo
and democratisation produced few human rights improvements while contributing
substantially to the fragmentation of the country and the outbreak of war, with the
attendant human rights abuses that came with those developments. The inclusion of
human rights standards in the terms for recognising the independence of the breakaway
republics was largely ineffectual and made little difference on the ground, though it may
turn out to have value as a precedent for future situations. Perhaps the most effective in
this regard was actually the humanitarian mission, which for all its negative effects in terms
of attempts to end the violence overall did provide the means of life – food, shelter,
medical care – for hundreds of thousands of Bosnians of all ethnicities.
The importance given by policymakers to human rights did not vary strictly
according to which state or states took the lead. The US prioritised human rights in its
policies focusing on Kosovo and democratisation in 1989 and early 1990. In the latter half
of 1991, the EC contradictorily highlighted human rights issues in the debates over
recognition whilst simultaneously pursuing a peace process that, at best, put considerably
less emphasis on human rights in its process by effectively condoning and accepting
horrific abuses and their territorial and political consequences. No Western state
consistently highlighted human rights during the first two year of the Bosnian conflict, but
there were exceptions within this broad rule. Germany, for example, took its obligations
concerning refugees more seriously than any of the other major powers, and the advocacy
of the US government for lifting the arms embargo owed something to human rights
concerns. But the emphasis on humanitarian aid and peace talks from 1992 to 1994
indicated a widespread willingness in the West to tolerate continuing atrocities, and the
peace plans which emerged from the negotiations all accepted, to varying degrees, the
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consequences of ethnic cleansing. Sanctions were universally supported, and their human
rights impact dismissed or ignored.
Despite the changes in leadership and emphasis, and the hugely varying
circumstances in Yugoslavia which Western policies were designed to address, a discernible
“Western” stance with regard to the place of human rights in foreign policy did emerge,
even if it showed largely as a negative. Western governments only weakly incorporated
human rights into their calculations of national interest. What this meant in practice was
essentially the subordination of human rights concerns to more purely humanitarian
concerns such as the aid mission and especially to the avoidance of military involvement in
Bosnia. Broadly speaking, and allowing for isolated exceptions, Western policymakers only
prioritised human rights when and if they dovetailed neatly with other policy goals. There
was no Western “human rights policy”. There was instead a disparate and constantly
changing collection of policies that interacted with human rights in different ways at
different times. Human rights concerns were only rarely the primary focus of Western
governments, and the impact of policies on human rights was rarely if ever a determinative
factor in their adoption or abandonment.
But examining the place of human rights in Western policies in the former
Yugoslavia is not the same thing as looking at Western human rights policy in the former
Yugoslavia. Many of the policies discussed in the previous chapters – the use of sanctions,
the humanitarian mission, the peace talks – are not examples of human rights policies. But
human rights concerns did at times play a substantial role in Western motivations. More
importantly, these policies all had major implications for the state of human rights
throughout the former Yugoslavia. Some of these were positive; for instance, the role of
the humanitarian aid mission in keeping alive tens or hundreds of thousands of Bosnian
men, women, and children. Some of them were negative: the role of that same aid in
sustaining the war effort of all sides, for example, or the condoning and tacit acceptance of
ethnic cleansing. Whether or not the policies in question were, strictly speaking, human rights
policies was irrelevant. One of the primary goals of this thesis has been to draw attention to
the human rights aspects of what were in many cases not self-evidently human rights-based
or connected policy choices.
The course of events in Yugoslavia illustrates a shift in the meaning that was
attached to the phrase “human rights abuses” which became increasingly important in the
post-Cold War era. This shift consists essentially of a move away from what might be
termed “peacetime” human rights concerns of traditionally conceived civil and political
217
rights such as freedom of the press, ethnic discrimination, freedom of speech, freedom of
political participation, or abuse of military and police powers. These abuses, while not by
any means limited to peacetime circumstances, had been commonplace during the Cold
War, not least in the communist states in Europe, including Yugoslavia. These were the
sorts of issues, in Kosovo, in Croatia, and in Yugoslavia as a whole, that were the focus of
Western attention in the earliest period discussed in this thesis, up to mid-1991.
As the crisis in Yugoslavia developed, these issues faded in importance, to be
replaced by what might be termed “wartime” human rights issues. More basic, elemental
issues – the right to life, for instance, or the right to medical care, shelter, and food – began
to crowd out the more traditional concerns with the outbreak of war in Croatia in June
1991, and had completely done so by the summer of 1992, when the Serb assault in Bosnia
reached its early peak. Human rights abuses in Bosnia were inseparable from an open state
of war: mass rape, targeting of civilian populations, collective punishment, massive refugee
flows, genocide. Practically by definition, these sorts of abuses, on such a scale, do not
occur outside of a state of war, whether civil or international, undeclared or open.4
However, the fact that the kinds of civil and political abuses mentioned above were
also being carried out in Bosnia – by all sides – is a reminder that this shift was not, strictly
speaking, a change in the sort of human rights abuses which were being committed. It was
rather a change in what was deemed worthy of attention, what became the primary focus
of Western attention. In terms of actual commission, it was an additive process: the more
violent wartime abuses were added to the political and civil abuses. They did not replace
them. But in terms of the focus of Western governments, the more severe abuses crowded
out the less severe; although the latter continued to be committed, they did not merit the
attention they once had. The “peacetime” issues were barely a peripheral concern in
Bosnia. Their continued commission in Kosovo and Croatia, not to mention Serbia proper,
was largely forgotten.
The shift in the meaning or content of international human rights concerns in
Yugoslavia must be kept in mind when considering the much-heralded increase in attention
to human rights issues following the end of the Cold War. On certain levels, and for a
while, there was indeed more attention devoted to human rights concerns. Such concerns
were central to Western involvement in Yugoslavia in 1989 and 1990, in a way and to a
degree that differed significantly from the Cold War treatment of the country. But this
4 This is not to deny that there were extra-judicial killings in Kosovo, for example, but such violence was
relatively small scale, and was in some ways more a symptom and a means of the political and civil abuses, not the core issue in itself.
218
attention was very contingent on circumstances, specifically the change in Yugoslavia‟s
place in the international system with the collapse of the Soviet bloc. The reduction in
Yugoslavia‟s international importance permitted Western states to more openly criticise its
human rights record. This increased attention, however, quickly faded when the
developments in Yugoslavia changed calculations concerning national self-interest in
Western capitals.
Taken as a whole, the Yugoslav case from 1989 to early 1994 does not support the
contention that there was a sustained, broad increase in the importance of human rights in
Western policymaking in the wake of the Cold War.5 The change from peacetime to
wartime concerns dictated a change in terms of which abuses were getting attention, not
the overall amount of that attention. As topics of concern, the continuing Serbian
repression in Kosovo, and the abuses being committed in Croatia by both the government
and the Croatian Serbs, largely disappeared with the outbreak of the Bosnian war and its
mass atrocities. The latter were not added to the former; rather, the attention given to the
Bosnian abuses came at the expense of attention given to abuses elsewhere. But given the
greatly increased severity of abuses in Bosnia, even the same level of attention effectively
represented a diminution of their importance in Western decision-making. And as argued
in chapters 5 and 6, Western governments did not even maintain the same level of
attention on human rights issues. On the contrary, they attempted to avoid confronting
these issues to the extent possible.
But while it is easy to condemn Western governments for their approach, the
Yugoslav conflict demonstrated some of the many difficulties and dilemmas involved in
trying to incorporate human rights concerns into foreign policy. The replacement of
peacetime by wartime concerns is one example. In an ideal world, the prior issues would
have remained a topic of active concern while the latter were added on top as in need of
more urgent action. But Western states did not have unlimited time or resources to devote
to the former Yugoslavia, and the more severe abuses completely displaced the lesser ones
in Western policymaking even as a topic of discussion and rhetorical concern, let alone as
the subject of forceful and effective action. The Europeans were preoccupied with what
seemed to be more significant (and potentially threatening) developments in Central and
Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. The US withdrawal from leadership on Yugoslavia
was a result of similar concerns, and the situation in Iraq and Kuwait. Choices had to be
made, and it was not always clear which situations required the most attention. 5 Whether this was still the case during 1994 and 1995 is an open question, but one which cannot be
answered here.
219
Second, even the inclusion of human rights concerns in Western policies was not
always effective, a reminder that the West could only (at best) influence, not control, events
in Yugoslavia. The prominent inclusion of human rights standards in the European policy
concerning the recognition of Yugoslav republics as independent states illustrates this
problem. While this policy showed a concern for human rights in the former Yugoslavia,
and attempted to put in place guarantees to protect them, there was little or no effect on
the ground. The Croatian government in particular made promises about its behaviour and
its proposed constitution that it then proceeded to ignore. Discrimination against Croatian
Serbs continued unabated for years with little effect on the international legitimacy of the
Croatian government or state.6
Third, the course of events in Yugoslavia amply demonstrated the risk of
unintended human rights consequences from what seemed to be well-reasoned and
justifiable policies. Early examples of this were the results of the increased pressure in 1989
and 1990 over Kosovo and democratisation. These seemed to be reasonable policies, and
they did draw attention to ongoing, long-standing, serious human rights abuses and
shortcomings. But they failed to take into account the specific ethnic and political
circumstances in Yugoslavia, and contributed directly to the increase in abuses that
accompanied the country‟s disintegration. Another instance is the humanitarian mission.
Though not framed in such terms, the provision of aid did address some very basic human
rights problems produced by ethnic cleansing in Bosnia. Balanced against this must be the
negative effect of the humanitarian mission on the willingness of Western leaders to
6 Christopher Cviic describes an accumulated „democratic deficit‟ under Tudjman, including „state
interference‟ with the judicial system; „human rights violations‟ of both ethnic Serbs and Croats; „[m]anipulation of state-controlled television‟; „[a]ttempts to muzzle the printed media‟; and „[p]ersistent abuse of the HDZ majority in the Croatian parliament to push through important new laws without proper scrutiny or even debate‟; „Croatia‟, 211. For example, Human Rights Watch reported in 1996 (on events in 1995) that „[v]iolations of civil and political rights also continued in Croatia, with the Croatian military again perpetrating most of the human rights abuses in the country, both on and off the battlefield‟, citing actions such as „[f]orcible evictions from state-owned housing, and the violence that often accompanied such evictions‟ and noting that „the Croatian government took virtually no action to address the human rights abuses associated with the evictions‟. The following year, Human Rights Watch reported that „the human rights situation in Croatia remained poor ... In particular, the few ethnic Serbs who remained in Croatia after [successful Croatian military campaigns of 1995] faced discrimination and mistreatment by the government‟, which also „frequently sought to suppress domestic political opponents and independent media‟. While noting a „modest turnaround‟ in 1997, „Serbs continued to face discrimination and ill-treatment by representatives of the state‟, which continued to „crack ... down on all political dissent and criticism‟. It was only following the death of Franjo Tudjman in December 1999 that Croatia reached „a turning point in [its] post-independence respect for human rights‟, according to Human Rights Watch‟s 2001 Report, and even then the new government „often failed to confront entrenched ethnic Croat nationalists obstructing reform, particularly on issues of impunity for war-time abuses and the return of Serb refugees‟, as reported the following year. See also Human Rights Watch, Broken Promises: Impediments to Refugee Return to Croatia, 2003, available at www.hrw.org/en/reports/2003/09/02/broken-promises; Magas, „Franjo Tudjman – Obituary‟
220
squarely confront the human rights problems at the root of the war itself and the role aid
played in directly sustaining the war.
In conclusion, it is worth asking just what would have been, in human rights terms,
“good” policies under the circumstances that existed in the former Yugoslavia. Or, even
more fundamentally, whether there were any such policy choices. Did the West simply fail to
identify good policies, or were there none to be had? There was certainly room for
improvement. There is still value, for example, in condemning human rights abuses even if
the condemnation is not accompanied by substantive action to end them. This is the case
even if a state or government had, in theory, the military or political power to take more
forceful action. This is part of the process through which political and cultural norms are
established, maintained, and strengthened. Western governments were willing to do this
early on, but as the severity of the abuses grew, along with the threat of the need or
demands for military intervention and the risks to UN personnel in Bosnia, there was a
decreasing willingness to openly address and condemn the conduct of the belligerents.
Policymakers could also perhaps have been more cognizant of the human rights
implications of their chosen policies, and even openly confronted the dilemmas rather than
trying to ignore or minimise them.7 They displayed a tendency to avoid the difficult
questions, which does a disservice both to human rights and to the difficult foreign policy
decisions that had to be made. But these are relatively peripheral issues that do not affect
the core of the policies in question.
Bismarck once famously declared that politics is the art of the possible. At first
glance, this seems to be a useful and appropriate description of Western attempts to
respond to the Yugoslav crisis. There were very real political, cultural, social, economic, and
material constraints that limited Western options in the former Yugoslavia. That some of
them – most prominently the refusal to threaten or employ military intervention – were to
some extent self-imposed did not make them any less real or significant factors in the
policymaking process. Western states did not and could not dictate what happened in the
former Yugoslavia. Given the constraints – both self-imposed and otherwise – that they
were dealing with, perhaps they did all that was possible. As one study of intervention in
the former Yugoslavia concluded, the actions of the international community „probably
had the effect of prolonging the crisis at a lower level of engagement, and discouraged a
more rapid conclusion at a higher level. But this was the best that could have been
7 It is of course possible and even likely that this was done in private, but the necessary material to evaluate
this is not yet available. Furthermore, there would have been value in publicly facing such difficulties.
221
achieved‟, for a variety of reasons.8
But the economist John Kenneth Galbraith allegedly took issue with Bismarck‟s
dictum, and refined it in a manner that is even more appropriate to the human rights
aspects of Western responses to the Yugoslav crisis. „Politics‟, Galbraith said, „is not the art
of the possible. It consists in choosing between the disastrous and the unpalatable‟.
Western governments may have done all that was possible given their self-imposed
restrictions concerning, most prominently, military intervention. But even if they had been
willing to commit the kind of military force that would have been required simply to stop
the fighting, much less “settle” the conflict, there were still no good choices that were clear,
workable, had the requisite domestic and international support, and did not conflict with
other policies that were deemed to be more central to the national interest of the states in
question. Not all of the objections to military intervention discussed above were merely
excuses not to act. There was, furthermore, only a limited selection of poor choices.
Whether the actual choices made by Western governments tended more towards the
unpalatable or the disastrous is a matter of opinion and continuing debate, and will
undoubtedly continue to be so for a long time to come.
8 Economides and Taylor, „Former Yugoslavia‟, 89.
222
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