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Perspectives for Financial and Capital Markets

Review 1st quarter 2020 and Outlook 2nd quarter 2020

Zurich, 01 April 2020

Foreword 2

Foreword

At the beginning of the year, the overall

economic indicators were largely in order.

We saw emerging signs of a recovery in

Europe, a continuing solid services sector

and robust consumer demand. This nar-

rowly allowed us to maintain a cautiously

optimistic view of the economy despite re-

duced growth expectations and increased

risks of recession.

In our last quarterly report, we listed a

number of risk factors for the economy.

We also focused on a potential future par-

adigm shift due to undesirable develop-

ments in the past, which will eventually

catch up with society. However, we had

not expected a pandemic and such mas-

sive consequences for the global economy

and the financial and capital markets. With

the first cases outside of China, a correc-

tion with unprecedented speed was set in

motion. The markets plunged from all-time

highs into a so-called “bear market”. The

price of gold remained stable despite

some volatility. The reaction of central

banks and governments is also extraordi-

nary. The measures already far exceed

those of the financial crisis in terms of

scope and speed.

First and foremost, the world is facing a

pandemic that is placing a heavy burden

on the economy. The current economic cy-

cle, which was one of the longest and

showed certain symptoms of illness, is

greatly endangered. The supply side was

already damaged (trade conflict) and the

pandemic then brought demand practically

to a standstill. Central banks and govern-

ments provide the oxygen to breathe for a

partly heavily indebted economy to avoid a

collapse. The medium to longer-term con-

sequences are unclear.

Such situations are part of life and will al-

ways surprise investors. But they also

open up opportunities and chances for the

patient investor.

Our investment policy was already quite

cautious at the beginning of the year, with

a maximum neutral allocation to equities,

the lowest possible allocation to high-yield

bonds and an above-average weighting of

physical gold. We even more than usual

stuck to our investing guidelines of quality,

liquidity and transparency. We have re-

duced the risks associated with equities

and bonds and further increased the gold

allocation.

Bank von Roll Ltd

Bleicherweg 37

CH-8027 Zurich

This information does not constitute an offer or aninvitation to submit an offer, but is solely intended to provide guidance and present possible business activities. This information does not purport to be complete and is therefore not binding. The opinions expressed herein are subject to change without notice. Where statements were made with respect to prices, interest rates orother indications, these solely refer to the time when the information was prepared and do not imply any forecasts about future development, particularly regardingfuture gains or losses. In addition, this information does not constitute advice or are commendation and doesnot replace a product-specific consultation tailored to the customer’s individual needs. This information isconfidential and exclusively intended for the addressee de-scribed herein. Any use by parties other than the addressee is not permissible without our approval. This particularly applies to reproductions, translations, microfilms, saving and processing in electronic media as well as publishing the entire contents or parts thereof.

Review 1st quarter 2020 3

Review 1st quarter 2020 Unprecedented change of direction

Economy - A sudden crash

At the beginning of the year, we expected a moderate growth for the current year. The

manufacturing sector continued to stabilise at a low level, but the situation remained

tense even in the USA. The services sector and consumers kept the economy afloat. The

only cause for concern was the fact that key consumption indicators could hardly improve

at all. Consumer confidence was at a record high, the unemployment rate was at a record

low, and the shortage of qualified workers and the number of vacancies was increasing.

Our recession model for the US indicated that the US economy had slightly reduced the

margin to a possible recession (on a time horizon of about one year). At the beginning of

February, the corona virus emerged as an additional risk factor for the global economy.

The past showed that such events generally had a limited and short-term impact on eco-

nomic growth. The speed of the virus's spread, the increasing number of deaths from the

virus, the enormous health care problems and above all the draconian measures taken by

governments to contain the spread of the virus ultimately caused our economic expecta-

tions to tip over. If one looks at the chaotic situation and the measures taken by the gov-

ernments with "lock-downs", curfews, border closures, etc., it is clear that the effects will

be substantial with effects for both the short-term and the full year. Some first indications

about the damage can be read from economic data from China, as well as from the flash

surveys on consumer confidence and the purchasing managers' indices. These provide a

devastating picture, as the free fall is manifesting itself in the manufacturing sector and

even more so in the services sector:

One can only slowly approach and determine the amount of damage done, as events fol-

low in quick succession. The simultaneous occurrence of a supply and a demand shock is

an immense challenge for all economic entities. All the more so as the shock hits an econ-

omy that is battered by the trade conflict initiated by the USA and that was only able to

survive in the USA thanks to ever-increasing debt and in Europe thanks to record low inter-

est rates.

Fig. 1 Source: Refinitive, own representation


0

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Mär19

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Jun19

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Okt19

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Jan20

Feb20

Economic Indicators China - Free Fall

Retail Industry Investments PMI (rhs)


Monetary and fiscal policy - More than "bazookas”

We started the year with the believe that the central banks would remain supportive, but

would tend to stay on the sidelines and only intervene if the economy did not develop as

expected. In view of the low interest rates, fiscal policy had to take on a stronger role in

order to support the economy, which was recessive in some parts (automotive industry).

The “Corona virus” risk factor caused central banks to move much more quickly off the

sidelines. For example, we had expected two to three interest rate cuts (0.25% each) for

the USA. By the beginning of March, the US-Fed had implemented already six reductions

bringing the lead interest rate to basically 0%! In addition, governments are putting to-

gether new packages of enormous proportions at an unprecedented pace, which are

eclipsing even the measures taken during the financial crisis. Here is a non-exhaustive list

of some of the measures taken to date:

Country Monetary policy Fiscal policy

Switzerland Refinancing facility, participation in

internationally coordinated

schemes, foreign exchange inter-

ventions

Package of measures amounting to CHF

40 bn

Europe ECB: Buying up bonds in the

amount of around EUR 1000 bn

Total in the range of EUR 1500 bn

EU: EUR 37 bn liquidity programme, sof-

tening of stability pact

Germany: EUR 750 bn package

France: EUR 380 bn package

Italy: EUR 30 bn package

Austria: EUR 38 bn package

Spain: EUR 200 bn package

USA Interest rate reductions

USD 1500 billion liquidity for banks

Unlimited Quantitative Easing

and purchases of corporate bonds

and loans; other facilities

USD 2000 billion package

"Helicopter money"

England Purchase of bonds in the amount

of USD 230 billion

Interest rate reduction

USD 37 bn package

Lower capital requirements for banks, al-

lowing additional lending of USD 390 bn

South Korea USD 80 bn package

Japan USD 550 bn package

Financial and capital markets - from all-time high to bear market

In January, the financial and capital markets showed their sunny side after an already very

positive year 2019. "Risk-on" prevailed and many markets showed certain overbought

tendencies. The volatilities of the various asset classes fell to very low levels again. When

it became clear that the virus would spread outside China, the number of victims in Eu-

rope started to rose exponentially and the problem was finally being taken seriously also

in the USA, sentiment changed at an unprecedented rate of speed. The oil price war be-

tween Saudi Arabia and Russia caused additional concern. As a result, volatility rose rap-

idly in all markets and the slight euphoria was followed by panic, which has still not sub-

sided properly. Prices of financial instruments declining like a waterfall was the rule.


Increasingly, emergency sales

from margin calls could be ob-

served, both from private individ-

uals and from leveraged ex-

change-traded index products.

The situation and the rapid drying

up of the markets were probably

also accelerated by computer

trading ("Algos"). Only the crash in

the autumn of 1987 showed a

similar development to what mar-

ket participants had to experience

this time.

Interest Rates/Bonds

On the interest rate markets, some developments in the US-yield curve and in credit

spreads were particularly worth noting. The yield curve in the USA had returned to a more

or less normal structure at the beginning of the year. With the emerging panic and the

flight to liquid and supposedly safe havens, the curve inverted while at the same time in-

terest rates fell rapidly. Only the intervention of the US-Fed in shorter-term maturities was

able to re-install a rather normally shaped yield curve again. This is a strong sign of a very

weak economic condition. In Eu-

rope, it seems to have been con-

cluded that even more negative

interest rates would do more

harm than good. Here, the effect

of rising risk premia was at the

forefront. With the progression of

the pandemic, the yield differen-

tials between the core and the pe-

ripheral countries increased sig-

nificantly, after they had – once

again – reached unreasonably

low levels. Finally, risk premia also increased significantly in the area of corporate debt.

Corporate debt has grown at an above-average rate in recent years, driven by the hunt for

yield from private and institutional investors and debt-financed share buybacks to opti-

mise the balance sheet and profits of corporates especially in the USA. The widening of

the credit risk premium in the USA has also been much more pronounced than in the euro-

zone, whose companies are overall of better quality. In this respect, many bonds have

also lost value, contrary to the logic that bond prices should rise when interest rates fall.

As the demand for liquidity in the real economy grew rapidly, this also affected substitute

products for savings accounts or supposedly safe investments and fueled selling pres-

sure on bonds, even from good quality borrowers.




Equities

The stock markets were strongly momentum-driven until the trend reversal. The equity

markets seemed to assume an early-cyclical recovery after a dent, which in our view was

at odds with the rather late-cyclical nature of the now longest expansion phase in the real

economy. Many individual stocks and especially the US-indices showed signs of a para-

bolic price trend in some cases. As a result, valuations had risen significantly and were

back at the level seen at the beginning of 2018. In our view, share prices priced in a rela-

tively high degree of hope, which had to be confirmed with rising profits. Given the already

high margins and the uncertain economic environment, we had some doubts. Neverthe-

less, at that time, equities offered comparative advantages over bonds, whose future re-

turns seemed to be completely exhausted and the risks were not really compensated ade-

quately anymore. The fall of equities from all-time highs into a bear market was brutal. All

sectors were affected, but to varying degrees.

Defensive sectors, quality companies

and – benefiting from the situation –

technology companies lost less in this

environment than companies from the

doubly hit energy sector, the tourism

and aviation industry, the banks suffer-

ing from low interest rates or other cy-

clical sectors. From a country perspec-

tive, the relatively good performance of

the Chinese stock markets was surpris-

ing. Furthermore, the Swiss market benefited in an international comparison from the

three defensive heavyweights Nestlé, Novartis and Roche, and the NASDAQ from the high

proportion of technology companies operating in oligopolistic and sometimes monopolis-

tic markets.

Precious metals and raw materials

Among the commodities, the crash of the oil price was particularly noticeable. The drop in

the oil price was favored by the emerging effects of the pandemic and the price war that

had been initiated between Saudi Arabia and Russia. But other commodities such as in-

dustrial metals, natural gas and agricultural commodities also suffered from the looming

economic downturn.

In the case of precious metals, the development of the gold price and the silver price di-

verged rather strongly. Gold is one of the few asset classes that have shown a positive

performance in the current year. The price development more or less follows that of the

financial crisis, but in a time-lapse: a rather sharp rise when the problems slowly became

visible, followed by a correction when market players sought liquidity and sold or had to

sell liquid assets at almost any price. With the announcement of the measures taken by

central banks (i.e. "unlimited quantitative easing") and governments, the price of gold be-

gan to rise quite sharply again. What is new is that problems in the physical market for

gold are increasingly becoming apparent, for example due to the high demand from pri-

vate investors and from the US-futures markets. Since a large part of the physical gold is

traded in London and the capacities of the gold refineries and transport facilities have de-

creased, this has led, among other things, to unusually high price differences between the

price of gold paid on the European and the US markets. From a fundamental perspective,


Performance per 31.3.2020 since: 31.12.2019 30.09.2019 31.03.2019

MSCI World Health Care -11.48 0.65 0.89

MSCI World Technology -13.16 -1.03 7.15

MSCI World Consumer Staples -13.31 -11.07 -4.95

MSCI World Utilities -13.83 -12.06 -4.03

MSCI World Communication Services -17.46 -10.94 -5.73

MSCI World Consumer Discretionaries -21.95 -16.63 -11.94

MSCI World Real Estate -23.30 -22.40 -18.71

MSCI World Industrials -26.13 -20.70 -17.49

MSCI World Materials -26.35 -19.98 -18.92

MSCI World Financials -31.82 -25.84 -21.06

MSCI World Energy -44.79 -42.03 -46.23


the expected decline in demand from the jewellery sector due to the weakening economy

should be more than compensated by an increasing demand from investors and central

banks.

In the case of silver, the higher share of industrial use clearly a negative and the price of

silver subsequently moved more in line with the industrial metals. But here too, we

watched distortions in the physical market, so that for example prices for silver bars

traded with a very high premium to those in the financial markets.

In the context of precious metals, we would like to take a brief look at the performance of

gold mining stocks. Despite the

strong gold price, they were only

able to decouple themselves

from the development of the

stock markets to a very limited

extent. During the sharp fall,

share prices of gold mining

stocks lost at some point in time

even more than the stock mar-

kets. Two reasons were given to

explain the rather disappointing

development: The companies are

heavily indebted and margin calls

of leveraged index products. We

cannot agree with the first argument, as the gold mining sector has gone through a phase

of debt reduction and disinvestments and is now in a much better position. The margin

calls are only a temporary development and have nothing to do with the positive outlook

for the industry. On the contrary, these fire sales offer the opportunity to buy cheaply gold

mining stocks. The fundamental outlook for the sector has improved further, because in

addition to the rising gold price, energy costs have fallen, which should have a two-way

positive effect on corporate margins.

Currencies

The year started quietly for most currencies. Movement came to the markets when the

US-Fed began to cut interest rates towards the end of February. As the interest rate differ-

ential with other currency areas narrowed, the USD came under heavy pressure and lost

up to 6%. But when liquidity was needed, the USD recovered and the old exchange rates

were restored. The same applies to the exchange rate of the CHF against the EUR. The

Swiss National Bank has successfully defended the mark EUR/CHF at 1.06.


Outlook 2nd quarter 2020 8

Outlook 2nd quarter 2020 Global recession in the first semester

What next?

We are in for some serious chaos. An economy that was somewhat intact but already ail-

ing is being hit hard by the pandemic. The measures taken to reduce the contagion are

leading to an unprecedented crash in the real economy and in the financial and capital

markets. The measures taken by governments and central banks are taking place just as

quickly and on an unprecedented scale to provide the economy with a basis for a rapid re-

covery, but without giving much thought to the medium to longer-term consequences.

The quicker the number of infections can be contained and minimised, the quicker the

economy and people's lives can return to normal and the lower the costs will be. Current

developments in China show that this is possible. The infection numbers in Europe finally

show first signs of stabilization while the USA is probably only at the beginning of the ex-

ponential development of the contagions.

It is a balancing act and certain conflict between economic and healthcare policy inter-

ests, because a premature relaxation of measures could trigger a new wave of infections.

President Trump is likely to be playing a high stakes game against the background of the

November elections. Moreover, not to be forgotten are the other hotspots that have been

pushed into the background by the Corona crisis, but which could become even more

acute in this situation, such as the trade conflict, the explosive situation in the Middle

East, tendencies towards deglobalisation, populism and nationalism, record levels of debt,

dwindling trust in money and institutions.

Possible scenarios for the economy

It is still too early for reliable estimates. Some first scenario analyses are available that al-

low an assessment of the possible consequences for the economy. The well-known and

respected ifo-Institute, for example, has drawn up the consequences for the German

economy in relation to its impact on gross domestic product, job cuts and short-time

working depending on the duration of the shutdown (from «Die volkswirtschaftlichen

Kosten des Corona-Shutdown für Deutschland: Eine Szenarienrechnung», completed on

Global development of daily contagions ex China

(lab results)

Fig. 7 Source: European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control


22 March 2020; translated from original in

german):

"With a shutdown duration of two months,

the costs reach between 255 and 495 billion

euros, depending on the scenario, and

reduce the annual growth rate of GDP by

between 7.2 and 11.2 percentage points;

with a shutdown duration of three months

they already reach 354 to 729 billion euros

(10.0 to 20.6 percentage points growth

loss). On the labour market, up to 1.8 million

jobs subject to social security contributions

(1.35 million full-time equivalents) could be

cut and more than 6 million employees

could be affected by short-time working.

Without taking into account the extensive

planned guarantees and loans, public

budgets will be burdened by up to EUR 200

billion. Of particular relevance for political

decisions is the question of what costs will

be incurred if the shutdown is extended.

Here it can be seen that a single week

extension will cause additional costs of 25

to 57 billion euros and thus a decline in GDP

growth of 0.7 to 1.6 percentage points.

Given these costs, it is particularly urgent to

develop strategies to make the resumption

of economic activity compatible with

containing the corona epidemic".

The size of the rescue packages, as seen further above, also indicates that the situation is

precarious and the people in charge are expecting a lock-down of 2-3 months. For Europe

this would mean a normalisation of the situation during June, for the USA correspondingly

later. All of this on the assumption that economic activity can be resumed without a new

wave of infection. It is therefore a given that the global economy will be in recession in the

first half of the year. The last global recessions date back to 2009, 1991, 1982, 1975.

Whether this will also happen in 2020 is not yet entirely decided; there are still about 9

months until the end of the year in which a lot can happen, for the better or the worse.

Part of the lost economic value will be undoubtably compensated in the coming monhs

(e.g. investments, consumer durables), another part will definitely be lost (e.g. restaurant

visits, holidays). Given the ifo- Institute's scenarios mentioned above, it will only be possi-

ble to avert a global recession for the entire year with luck and a short shutdown. We do

not want to completely rule out a so-called "V"-shaped recovery at this point in time, but

give this scenario only a very small probability. There are nonetheless also some positive

points worth mentioning in the whole misery:

• Central banks are extremely expansionary and will ensure liquidity in the system and

the flow of credit to the economy. Key interest rates will remain very low overall. The

Fig.8-10 Source: ifo-institut, own representation


central banks appear to be working in an internationally coordinated and targeted

manner.

• We are seeing a very strong fiscal policy response even from countries that have been

very conservative so far and have enough financial firepower.

• Low oil prices have always been a strong stimulus for the economy, especially for

those in the oil-importing regions of Asia and Europe.

• It is premature to speak of a structural downturn at this stage. The recovery of the

economy is not a question of "if" but of "when".

• Presidential elections in the US and a US president determined to show a good econ-

omy and good stock markets in order to be reelected.

• If central banks and governments overshoot the mark, the long-awaited inflation could

become a reality and remove the deflationary spectre that has haunted us since the

financial crisis.

Financial and capital markets remain in difficult waters for the time being

In view of the very negative short-term and unclear longer-term effects of this crisis on

economic factors and individual companies, statements on the further development of

the financial and capital markets are subject to corresponding uncertainty.

Risky investments such as equities and corporate bonds are again available at signifi-

cantly lower prices and even appear attractive at first glance. However, this implies a rea-

sonably rapid return to normality and the avoidance of a "lockdown" and drying up of the

credit market. In the current situation, other priorities are at the forefront of the various

economic entities, above all securing liquidity. It is of no use to investors if the valuation

of a stock or the credit risk premium of a bond is favorable, but the company lacks the ox-

ygen – so the liquidity – to breathe and survive in the short-time.

Recently, market interest rates have partially decoupled themselves from the development

of the key interest rates of the central banks. Market participants are demanding higher

risk and liquidity premia even for supposedly first-class debtors. For example, the yield of

the Nestle bond in CHF and maturing in 2028 has risen from -0.4% to +0.8% during the

time between 9th and 25th of March 2020, which corresponds to a 10%-decline in the price

of the bond. Positively formulated: risks are being compensated more adequately again.

After the rapid and deep plunge, we are seeing more and more short-term buy signals on

the stock markets due to a completely oversold market situation. We have already

watched some first "bottom-fishing" by so-called value investors. We currently doubt

whether this is already sufficient for a sustained recovery. This is why it is reasonable to

assume so-called “bear market rallies” for the time being. With a certain amount of cau-

tion (use of stop-loss limits) and in certain sectors, one can take advantage of opportuni-

ties arising. Bear market rallies can be severe, as the jump on 24 th March 2020 in US eq-

uity markets, the largest since 1933, showed. Overall, we believe that equity markets have

now stabilised in a zone that leaves room for both a positive and a negative scenario. In

the best-case scenario, the bottom has actually been reached. However, if there is a deep

recession to follow, there is still significant potential for further corrections, as previous

recessions have shown. The implied volatilities for equities do not yet show any real eas-

ing, unfortunately. Gold could become the big beneficiary of the current situation. The

measures taken are leading to an even bigger wave of money and debt. This is likely to

further erode confidence in money and institutions. Physical gold is own property, has no

credit risk and has been able to maintain its value in phases of deflation and inflation.

Strategic cornerstones for the 2nd quarter 2020 11

Strategic cornerstones for the 2nd quarter 2020

Looking at the overall environment soberly, one concludes that the next weeks and

months are likely to remain turbulent. There will be investment opportunities that do not

come too often in an investor's life. Until then, our investment policy will be guided by the

following strategic cornerstones:

• We started the year with a rather cautious allocation to equities, very low exposure to

high yield bonds, an overweight in gold and no exposure to illiquid asset classes such

as hedge funds, leveraged loans, private debt, etc. in line with our basic guidelines for

quality, transparency and liquidity.

• In the course of February/March we started to further reduce the equity allocation and

finally also reduced the bond allocation due to the anticipated illiquidity of the bond

markets.

• We are only exposed to a very limited extent in the airline, tourism, automobile,

transport, leisure and banking sectors, which are among the most affected ones.

Given the still explosive situation in the Middle East with the potential for a sudden

rise in oil prices, we maintain a certain allocation to oil companies, which we have

even increased slightly.

• We have increased our overweight in gold to the maximum. Gold mining stocks as an

addition to the physical gold and after the correction appear very attractive.

• We have increased our liquidity position accordingly in order to remain flexible.

• Our asset allocation looks as follows:

Liquidity: Overweight

Bonds: Underweight, very low exposure to high yield bonds,

Inflation-linked bonds as core position

Stocks: Underweight, clear focus on quality names

Gold: Strong overweight position

Currencies: Hold rather low foreign currency positions

• We do not intend to sell shares completely, as the situation has some positive as-

pects. As suddenly as the correction has hit the markets, there may be a recovery.

• We are prepared to further reduce the risks if things get even more negative.

Market Overview 2020 12

Market Overview 2020Source: Reuters per 31.03.2020 / Equity M arkets in local currency

Econom ic Indicators per Close Close prev. year YTDUniversity o f M ichigan Consumer Sentiment Index 31.03.2020 89.1 99.3 -10.2

ISM M anufacturing PM I SA 29.02.2020 50.1 47.8 2.3

ISM Non-M anufacturing NM I 29.02.2020 57.3 54.9 2.4

US Leading Indictor Index 29.02.2020 112.1 111.2 0.9

ZEW Eurozone Expectation of Economic Growth 31.03.2020 -49.5 11.2 -60.7

Ifo Pan Germany Business Climate 31.03.2020 79.7 93.8 -14.1

S&P CoreLogic Case-Shiller 20-City Comp. Home Price NSA Index31.01.2020 218.6 218.7 -0.1

Currency vs. CHF per Close Close prev. Year YTDEUR 31.03.2020 1.0603 1.0852 -2.3%

USD 31.03.2020 0.9608 0.9678 -0.7%

GBP 31.03.2020 1.1938 1.2828 -6.9%

SEK 31.03.2020 9.6600 10.3300 -6.5%

JPY 31.03.2020 0.8933 0.8908 +0.3%

AUD 31.03.2020 0.5896 0.6789 -13.2%

Currency vs. EURUSD 31.03.2020 1.1033 1.1215 -1.6%

CHF 31.03.2020 0.9437 0.9217 +2.4%

GBP 31.03.2020 1.1257 1.1829 -4.8%

SEK 31.03.2020 0.0914 0.0953 -4.0%

JPY 31.03.2020 0.8427 0.8208 +2.7%

AUD 31.03.2020 0.5561 0.6261 -11.2%

Equity Markets in loca l currency per Close Close prev. Year YTDM SCI World Index (USD) 31.03.2020 1’852.7 2’358.5 -21.4%

M SCI Emerging M arkets Index (USD) 31.03.2020 848.6 1’114.7 -23.9%

Dow Jones (USD) 31.03.2020 21’917.2 28’538.4 -23.2%

S&P 500 (USD) 31.03.2020 2’584.6 3’230.8 -20.0%

Nasdaq Composite (USD) 31.03.2020 7’700.1 8’972.6 -14.2%

Russell 3000 (USD) 31.03.2020 1’489.6 1’892.2 -21.3%

Brasilien BOVESPA (BRL) 31.03.2020 73’019.8 118’573.1 -38.4%

DAX (EUR) 31.03.2020 9’935.8 13’385.9 -25.8%

EuroStoxx50 (EUR) 31.03.2020 2’786.9 3’745.2 -25.6%

IBEX 35 (EUR) 31.03.2020 6’785.4 9’549.2 -28.9%

SPI (CHF) 31.03.2020 11’319.5 12’938.7 -12.5%

SM I (CHF) 31.03.2020 9’311.9 10’699.8 -13.0%

FTSE (GBP) 31.03.2020 5’672.0 7’542.4 -24.8%

RTS (USD) 31.03.2020 1’014.4 1’564.2 -35.1%

Nikkei 225 (JPY) 31.03.2020 18’917.0 23’204.9 -18.5%

China Shanghai Comp. (CYN) 31.03.2020 2’750.3 3’050.1 -9.8%

Indien BSE 30 (INR) 31.03.2020 29’468.5 41’253.7 -28.6%

Australia S&P/ASX200 (AUD) 31.03.2020 5’076.8 6’684.1 -24.0%

In terest Rates and Bond Markets per Close Close prev. Year YTD3-M onth Euribor 30.03.2020 -0.35% -0.38% 0.03%

10-Years Germany Generic Government 31.03.2020 -0.46% -0.19% -0.27%

10-Years EUR Swap 31.03.2020 -0.02% 0.21% -0.23%

3-M onth ICE USD-Libor 30.03.2020 1.43% 1.91% -0.48%

10-Years US Generic Government 31.03.2020 0.70% 1.91% -1.21%

10-Years USD Swap 31.03.2020 0.71% 1.87% -1.16%

3-M onth ICE CHF-Libor 30.03.2020 -0.66% -0.69% 0.02%

10-Years Switzerland Generic Government 31.03.2020 -0.35% -0.56% 0.21%

10-Years CHF Swap 31.03.2020 -0.16% -0.12% -0.04%

IBOXX Euro Government 3-5 Jahre 31.03.2020 209.0 209.7 -0.3%

REX Performance Index (Deutsche Staatsanleihen) 31.03.2020 497.6 492.6 +1.0%

IBOXX Euro Corporates 3-5 Jahre 31.03.2020 223.0 237.7 -6.2%

Swiss Bond Index AAA-BBB 31.03.2020 140.0 144.2 -2.9%

Emerging M arkets Hard Currency in USD (ETF) 31.03.2020 96.7 114.6 -15.6%

Emerging M arkets Local Currency in USD (ETF) 31.03.2020 37.4 43.9 -14.7%

CS High Yield Index II 31.03.2020 1’226.2 1’411.4 -13.1%

Alternative Investm ents per Close Close prev. Year YTDVIX-Index (Volatility S&P500) 31.03.2020 53.5 13.8 +288.5%

RICI Commodity Index (Total Return, USD) 31.03.2020 129.3 196.6 -34.2%

Gold in USD/Oz 31.03.2020 1’571.1 1’517.0 +3.6%

Gold in CHF/kg 31.03.2020 1’509.8 1’468.2 +2.8%

Gold in EUR/Oz 31.03.2020 1’424.2 1’352.8 +5.3%

Silver in USD/Oz 31.03.2020 14.0 17.8 -21.6%

Crude Oil Brent USD (Future) 31.03.2020 22.7 66.0 -65.5%

Copper (Future) 31.03.2020 224.0 279.4 -19.8%

Baltic Dry Index 31.03.2020 626.0 976.0 -35.9%

HFRX Global Hedge Fund Index (USD, ETF) 31.03.2020 94.0 96.0 -2.1%

LPX50 (Private Equity) 31.03.2020 1’995.8 2’870.7 -30.5%

perspectives for financial and capital markets review 1st quarter 2020 and outlook … bvr... ·...

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