perspectives for cruise ship and container issues

PORT SECURITY

CAPT David B. Moskoff, USMS

Professor of Marine Transportation

Master Mariner – U.S.C.G. Unlimited

United States Merchant Marine Academy

MARAD – U.S. Department of Transportation

U.S. Maritime Administration–OAS Port Security

DOT Complementary Positioning, Navigation, and Timing Tiger Team Member (CPNT3)

Academic Consultant – U.S. Coast Guard Cyber Command (USCGCC)

Senior Advisor – DoD Purposeful Interference Response Team (PIRT)

Senior Expert - NATO Transport Group Ocean Shipping (TG OS)

https://gcaptain.com/youtuber-chases-ships-drone-footage-spectacular/?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+Gcaptain+%28gCaptain.com%29

The opinions expressed are his own and not necessarily those of any government entity.

Perspectives for Cruise Ship

and Container Issues

Hosted by

Inter-American Committee on Ports (CIP) Within OAS,

Port of Miami, USCG and USCG Port Security Program

Miami 25-28 April 2017

https://gcaptain.com/youtuber-chases-ships-drone-footage-spectacular/?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed:+Gcaptain+(gCaptain.com)













Port Security

Protection

Defense

Law Enforcement Activities

Within the port areas and nearby maritime

domain

Includes land and water areas, cargo,

vessels, people, more…..

U.S. has over 3700 Cargo and Passenger

Terminals at over 300 Sea and River Ports

Perspectives for Cruise Ship and Container Issues CAPT D. Moskoff 27 April 2017 Miami at Port of Miami


What is it?














Port Security

Spheres of Security

Sometimes separate

Sometime overlapping

Physical Security…..

Control: Perimeters, Areas, Spaces

Answer: Gates, Guns and Guards

Technological Security…...
















Technology and Port Security

Systems:

Computers and Networks (Cyber)

Command and Control, Communications,

Automation, Materials Handling, Tracking,

Monitoring/Surveillance, Navigation, etc.

Equipment

Knowledge

Training

Understanding

Foreseeability


Technology – The Double-Edged Sword


Benefits Evolving

Awareness Assessment Action

Technology and Port Security

Knowledge

Training, Practice and Experience

Understanding and Awareness

Foreseeability – Ability to look ahead

Technological Questioning: What if…..?

Lose public electricity to terminal

Lose pier freeboard to flooding

Lose access to berth (ship sunk)

Lose access to deep channel

Lose access to computer network

Get hacked

But what if……Lose GPS/GNSS? Perspectives for Cruise Ship and Container Issues CAPT D. Moskoff 27 April 2017 Miami at Port of Miami

Overview

(Remainder of Presentation)

Port Security and Technology

Cruise Ships and Containers – GPS Vulnerabilities

Terms : Wireless vs. Wired Transfer, Radio Frequency (RF), Maritime Domain – Military vs. Commercial, GNSS Signals, GNSS Jammers, eLORAN System: Co-complement to GPS PNT

Cyber Concerns for Ports and Port Facilities

GPS/GNSS Users in the Maritime Domain

GPS/GNSS Vulnerabilities and Options - eLORAN

Conclusion: Maritime RF Cyber Security Resilience
















Cruise Ships – U.S.

Port Security
















Cruise Ships - Miami
















Cruise Ships - Caribbean
















Container Terminals
















GPS – Automated Materials Handling
















GPS Disruption – Halts Operations



At a public meeting last month, US Coast Guard officials described how interference with GPS signals disrupted operations for seven hours at a major east coast port last year.

You can watch the entire meeting below, the port disruption discussion begins at 48.51.

During a January 15th meeting to discuss development of maritime cybersecurity standards, an official from the Coast Guard’s Cyber Command indicated that most ports rely on GPS for many functions, including moving containers.

The problem is that when the cranes don’t know where they are, they can’t find containers to pick up, and don’t know where to put the ones they have. Reverting from automated to manual operation is so time consuming that a port is effectively shut down.

GPS disruption is also a severe problem for ship navigation, port security, and “maritime domain awareness” that lets ships and officials ashore know the location of most vessels.

At a public meeting last month, US Coast Guard officials described how interference with GPS signals disrupted operations for seven hours at a major east coast port last year. You can watch the entire meeting below, the port disruption discussion begins at 48.51. During a January 15th meeting to discuss development of maritime cybersecurity standards, an official from the Coast Guard’s Cyber Command indicated that most ports rely on GPS for many functions, including moving containers. The problem is that when the cranes don’t know

where they are, they can’t find containers to pick up,

and don’t know where to put the ones they have.

Reverting from automated to manual operation is so

time consuming that a port is effectively shut down.

GPS disruption is also a severe problem for ship navigation, port security, and “maritime domain awareness” that lets ships and officials ashore know the location of most vessels.














DHS – Seaport Operations - Cyber

















Do We Need a Crystal Ball?

Yes….

and No

What’s New

is Old

What’s Old

is New

Foreseen

vs.

Unforeseen

Recent Major Attack


A map of Friday's massive

DDoS attack and the internet

outages involved. Credit: Downdetector

Recent Major Attack


Chinese firm admits its hacked DVRs, cameras were behind Friday's massive DDoS attack

Botnets created from the

Mirai malware were involved

in Friday's cyber attack.

COMMENTS Michael Kan IDG News Service Oct 23, 2016 12:14 PM

A Chinese electronics component manufacturer says its

products inadvertently played a role in a massive cyber attack

that disrupted major internet sites in the U.S. on Friday.

http://www.pcworld.com/article/3134039/hacking/chinese-firm-admits-its-hacked-products-were-behind-fridays-massive-ddos-attack.html

http://www.pcworld.com/article/3134039/hacking/chinese-firm-admits-its-hacked-products-were-behind-fridays-massive-ddos-attack.html

http://www.pcworld.com/author/Michael-Kan/

Yahoo! Massive account breach - 500 million users 22 September 2016 - they believe account info stolen

September, 2016 Fear Attack, Newsweek, i-dressup

Recent types of attacks from HACKMAGEDDON: Unknown Type

Unknown Vulnerability

Targeted Attacks

DoS, DDoS

Account Hijacking

SEO Poisoning

Malware i.e. Ransomware

Site Defacements

Other Recent Cyber Attacks


Maritime Industry and Cyber World:

Emerging Technologies and Services

Examples:

• High Speed Connectivity – Mobile Broadband - VSAT

• Information and Communication Technologies (ICT)

• Maritime Big Data Transfer and Communication

• Cloud Connections/Services – eNavigation w/Shore

• Concepts of Digital Transformation, Networked Society

• Contracts for Managed Cloud Services, Hybrid Cloud

• Remote Access Monitoring (RAM) – Fuel, Engine, Equip.

• Integrated Ship Navigation Bridges (IBS)

• Autonomous Ships/Vessels (AS/AV)

• Autonomous Underwater Vehicles (AUV)

• Drones – Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) - UAV


Drones

Drones:


Drones Have Already Become Invaluable


Transportation System Vehicles

Simple Definition of vehicle: a machine that is used to carry people or goods from one place to another

Ships or Vessels

Planes or Aircraft

Trains or Rail Cars

Trucks and Busses

Cars or Automobiles

What do all these machines have in common? They are all mobile….they go from one place to another!

Mobility requires them to be wireless.


What do we mean when we say

they are wireless?

Positioning (except visual)

Communication to and from

Sensors and recognition tools

A Critical Difference: Wireless vs. Wired

Wireless systems are inherently more vulnerable to problems which occur due to radio frequency (RF) issues including unintentional and intentional radio frequency (RF) interference (jamming) and spoofing.


Terms: Cyber Risk

The risk R is the product of the likelihood L of a cyber security incident occurring times the impact I that will be incurred to the organization due to the incident, that is:

R = L × I

Risk = Likelihood x Impact

Risk = Threats x Vulnerabilities x Impact

(Likelihood = Threats x Vulnerabilities)


Terms: Cyber Threat, Cyber Attack

Cyber Threat:

Foreseeable and unforeseeable cyber event which may cause unwanted outcomes, with resulting harmful effects. Threats typically originate from individuals or organizations, externally or internally, deliberately or accidentally. However extreme earth and space weather may also pose unique threats to the maritime community due to RF interference.

Cyber Attack: Known or unknown effort directed toward “manipulation of, access to, or impairment to the integrity, confidentiality, security, or availability of data, an application, or a organization’s system, without lawful authority”. Also illegal, unlawful, prohibited act.


Terms: RF Cyber Threat

What Poses an RF Cyber Threat?

Natural

Unintentional

Intentional

RF Threat Impact Areas?

Targeted

Nontargeted


Presentation Focus: RF Cyber Threat

1. RF Cyber Threat Within Maritime Domain

2. RF Cyber Threat: Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) Signal Interference including jamming (particularly commercial systems where previously sole-source PNT, now integrated)

3. Resilience Offered by Co-complementary PNT



Emerging Threats and Vulnerabilities

Examples:

• Viruses, Malware, Rootkits, Worms – i.e. Shamoon

• Zero-Day-Exploits, Logic Bombs, Spyware

• Ransomware, Advanced Persistent Threats

• Phishing Schemes, Social Engineering

• Network Attack/Interference – DoS/DDoS

• Hackers/Hacktivists – White, Grey, Black Hat

PNT*/Connectivity/Network Issues

• Wireless Signal Interference/Interruption

• RF Signal Interference (Jamming/Spoofing)

*PNT (Position/Navigation and Timing)



Recent GNSS*, Jamming and Spoofing Events

*GNSS – Global Navigation and Satellite System

• Examples:

• North Korea – Jamming out to 200 miles - ongoing • China – South China Sea GPS jamming drones, etc. • Russia – Spoofing GPS at Kremlin, Cell towers jam • Iran – Two U.S. Navy patrol boats taken – PNT??? • U.S. – Drone on Whitehouse Lawn/facilities ??? • Japan – Drone w/ radioactive material on roof • UK GPS Jamming Tests – Sentinel System • University of Houston Spoofing Tests • U.S. Navy 2016 CA Jamming Event Cancelled • GPS Error – January 2016 impact 12 hours • Glonass Error – April 2014 impact 12 hours


Breaking News - 27 September 2016

U.S. House of Representatives Unanimously Passed Bill for GPS Backup: eLORAN System


Sources of Intentional Cyber Threats (partial list in alphabetical order)

Botnetwork operators Business competitors Criminal groups Enemy Units [Military] Foreign nation states Hackers Hacktivists Insiders [disgruntled insider] International corporate Phishers Spammers Spyware/malware authors Terrorists /asymmetric warfare


Types of Traditional Cyber Attacks

Collateral damage Cross-site scripting Denial of service attack Unauthorized access

Eavesdropping attack Exploit tools Logic bomb Malicious code (malware) Passive wiretapping Pharming Phishing Reconnaissance attack Rogue device Sniffer

Spamming Spoofing Spyware Trojan horse

Virus War-dialing

Distributed denial of service (DDOS) attack Structured Query Language (SQL) injection Unauthorized use of assets, resources, or information


Category Breakdown for Cyber Attacks*


Indiscriminate attacks

Destructive attacks

Cyberwarfare

Government espionage

Corporate espionage

Stolen credit card and financial data

Stolen medical-related data

Stolen e-mail addresses and login credentials

Hacktivism *from Wikipedia

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_cyber-attacks
















Maritime Cyber Attack

Most definitions of “cyber attack” include the purposeful attack against the telecommunications network. The network is usually defined as the communication links for data and information flow between computers. In the marine environment, information and data are usually transferred via radio frequency (RF). One of the easiest ways to conduct an attack against the maritime sector is through RF interference against the information transfer.

A cyber attack against the RF network supplying GPS/GNSS information to the ships’ integrated computer systems controlling navigation, collision avoidance, steering, communications, etc. essentially accomplishing a Denial of Service (DOS) attack. This RF attack may be viewed as similar to a wireless sensor network (WSN) or Wi-Fi attack constituting a DOS-type attack.


International Maritime Community

• Ports – Rivers, Channels, Anchorages, Locks, Lift Bridges, Basins, Aids (AToNs), etc.

• Port Facilities – Piers, Terminals, Shipyards, etc. • Offshore Facilities – Rig Fields, Lightering, Wind • Inland Vessels • Coastal Vessels • Ocean-Going Vessels • Maritime Business Organizations • Maritime Law Enforcement Organizations • Maritime Govt. Administrative Organizations • Maritime Military Units - Navies and Coast Guards


RF Applications - Ports and Port Facilities

• RFID (Radio Frequency Identification) • SCADA Systems and ICS (Suprvsry Contrl & Data Acq)

• Wireless Sensor Networks (WSN) • RAM (Remote Access Monitoring) • GPS/GNSS Security Tracking • GPS/GNSS Positioning • AIS (Automatic Identification System) • Cellular Communications • VHF, Wi-Fi, UHF Communications • Dynamic Positioning • Anti-Theft Tracking Systems (i.e. LoJack, etc.) • eLORAN and other LF Systems


RF Applications Examples Vessels, Offshore Facilities, Environment

• SCADA Systems and ICS (Suprvsry Contrl & Data Acq)

• Wireless Sensor Network (WSN)

• RAM (Remote Access Monitoring)

• GPS/GNSS Positioning (Vessels ECDIS/ECS)

• AIS (Automatic Identification System)

• Dynamic Positioning

• Cellular Communications

• Satellite Communications

• VHF, UHF and Wi-Fi

• eLORAN and other LF Systems Perspectives for Cruise Ship and Container Issues CAPT D. Moskoff 27 April 2017 Miami at Port of Miami

What Maritime Cyber Security Threat Should Be a Top Concern Due to Potential to

Inflict Serious Damage? (But Can Be Neutralized with Co-Primary LF Terrestrial System)

Jammers in Port/Offshore Areas

Closure of a major world port could cost…

+/- $US 1,000,000,000 /day – Direct Costs

(Billion w/B, not Million w/M)

Multiply by Factor of 7 for Indirect Costs


Global PNT Systems – GNSS in 2016


GPS/NavStar – The U.S. Satellite System

Some Known Vulnerabilities of GPS/GNSS Systems:

1. Low power signal strength - inherent weakness

2. Potential for unintentional interference

3. Potential for intentional jamming or interference

4. Potential for spoofing (hacking) and meaconing

5. Potential for EMP to destroy receiver electronics

6. Technical failure(s) of satellites (constellation)

7. Exposure of satellites to kinetic or laser attacks

Video example: http://www.youtube.com/v/Uk7DVpCkgwQ&hl=en


http://www.youtube.com/v/Uk7DVpCkgwQ&hl=en

Why Conduct Intentional Activities? A. PNT Signal is Critical to Infrastructure

• Criminals – PNT regulates Banking and Finance

• Hackers – Government, IT, Defense, Commercial

• Terrorists - Defense, Government, Energy, IT, Communications, Nuclear Industry, Banking, Transportation (Waterborne, Air and Rail), Water, Chemical, Agriculture and Food, Emergency Services, Finance, more

• Extremists - ??????????????????????????

• Military – Electronic Warfare (EW) & Cyber

• Pirates – Hijack Ship, Ground Ship, Steal Cargo Perspectives for Cruise Ship and Container Issues CAPT D. Moskoff 27 April 2017 Miami at Port of Miami

Radio Frequency Spectrum


GNSS Electromagnetic Spectrum [source: esa.int/ESA]


Maritime RF Cyber Threat

Occurrences Posing an RF Cyber Threat to GNSS like GPS (NAVSTAR), GLONASS, Galileo, BeiDou

Natural…………….Extreme Space Weather, Solar and Ionospheric Activities (High Impact)

Unintentional…..…Accidental Acts, System Failures and Anomalies, Spectrum Competition, Radio Frequency Interference, etc.

Intentional.……Signal Blockage, Interference, Jamming, Spoofing, Counterfeit, Meaconing, EMP


Easy to Purchase GPS Jamming Devices (from U.S. DOT’s RITA Group – Position, Navigation and Timing (PNT)

Growing market for low-cost GPS jammers - Sold as “privacy protectors” Many devices are battery-operated or can be plugged into a cigarette lighter

Examples: gpsjammers.net, jammer-store.com, chinavision.com, others Manufactured in China, Europe


High power GPS\GSM jammer (2011) This device will jam all GPS and GSM signals up to a distance of 50 metres. When activated, it immediately blocks all types of tracking and navigational devices. This model comes complete with built in Ni MH battery and charger and can also be powered by mains voltage or cigarette lighter adaptor.

Specifications:

Effective range: Up to 50 meters

radius Input power: 12.0v internal

rechargeable battery

Output signal strength: 1 watt

System: All systems worldwide

Signal source: synthesized


Ultra High Power GPS Jammer (2012) Product Description: This

is the most powerful GPS

Jammer, anti tracking, high

power up to a distance

of 300 metres. It simply

plugs into an ordinary car

cigarette lighter socket

and is active immediately

blocking all types of

tracking and navigational

devices. Effective range: Up to 300 meters

Input power: 110-240V

Output signal strength: 25W

System: All systems worldwide Specifications:


http://www.alibaba.com/product-gs/386981063/EST_808LC_Portable_Military_

blocker.html

High Power Mobile Phone & GPS(L1)/WiFi/Bluetooth Signal Jammer

Output power is 320 watts.

The shielding radius is from 300-500 meters... Model Number: KTC-VU Jammer 2.0 Pelican Min. Order: 5 Pieces Port: Shenzhen Supply Ability: 50 Piece/Pieces per Day


Broadband Jammer (2013)

http://www.alibaba.com/product-gs/386981063/EST_808LC_Portable_Military_blocker.html




http://www.alibaba.com/about/en/Common/index.html

High power GPS\GSM jammer (2011)

This device will jam all GPS and GSM signals up to a distance of 50 metres. When activated, it immediately blocks all types of tracking and navigational devices. This model comes complete with built in Ni MH battery and charger and can also be powered by mains voltage or cigarette lighter adaptor.

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GNSS and Broadband Jammers (2014)

Specifications: ”The frequency band could be added as

customer's requirements”

Jamming Frequency: 20 MHz-6000 MHz

Total output power: Up to 1000 watt

Jamming range: up to 200-600m, (Signal strength <= -75dbm)

Power supply: AC110-240V


Ultimate Vehicle Jammers (2015) 1,500 Watts Continuous Output RF Jamming Power

Vehicle Mounted – Concealed

8,000 Watts Power Generation on Board

Battery Backup for up to 2 Hours at Full Power

30 Frequency Bands can be Individually Turned On/Off


VME

Terminator

Ultimate Vehicle Jammers September 2016


Ultimate Jammers 2017



The terminals will also implement Kalmar SmartPath tracking system on the new terminal tractors after delivery. Kalmar SmartPath improves efficiency by using location-based job assignments. Equipment is automatically assigned to the closest job, which reduces driving distances and fuel consumption, and speeds up the operations.

SPRC Container Terminal Cartagena Columbia

For Example:

CARNIVAL MAGIC

130,000 GT 1004 Feet (306 Meters) 3690 Guests

1367 Crew


QUANTUM OF THE SEAS


26.5 knots

Gross Tonnage 168,666

Length 1,141 ft

Max Beam 136 ft

Draft 28 ft

Passengers Crew

4,905 1,500

Ship’s E-Nav Bridge Equipment Technology Recently Much More Sophisticated

• ECDIS (Electronic Chart Display and Information System)

• AIS (Automatic Identification System)

• Radar/ARPA (Radio Direction and Ranging)

(Automatic Radar Plotting Aid)

• Compass (Gyro, Fluxgate, GPS and others)

• Steering (Computerized Automatic Steering System)

• VDR (Voyage Data Recorder –”Black Box”)

• GMDSS (Global Maritime Distress and Safety System)

• Numerous other advanced units and systems


ECDIS Definition An Electronic Chart Display and Information System is:

• computer-based navigation system-complies with IMO

• can be used as an alternative to paper navigation charts

• integrates a variety of real-time information

• automated decision aid - continuously determining

ship’s position in relation to land, charted objects,

navigation aids and unseen hazards

An ECDIS includes electronic navigational charts (ENC)

and integrates position information from the Global

Positioning System (GPS) and other navigational sensors,

such as radar, fathometer and automatic identification

systems (AIS). It may also display additional navigation-related information, such as sailing directions.


“WARNING: The prudent mariner will not rely solely on any single aid to navigation…”

(printed on all U.S. navigation charts)


Integrated Equipment at Risk


IBS (Integrated Bridge System) Solo Watchstanding


Examples: Other ENav/GPS Concerns

• ECDIS is a Computer Subject to Viruses, etc.

• IT Attacks Against Ship (i.e. Spearfishing) http://www.transas.com/support/chart_corrections/

http://www.transis.com/support/chart_corrections/

• Military Using Commercial GPS – C/A Code • http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fVxDVUsiejQ&feature=related http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LeEF7nMG7JE

• Lack of Low Frequency(LF) Terrestrial - Type Backup/Complementary like eLoran

• Electromagnetic Pulse Attack (EMP) Kills All?


http://www.transas.com/support/chart_corrections/





http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fVxDVUsiejQ&feature=related

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fVxDVUsiejQ&feature=related

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LeEF7nMG7JE

Quick Look at GPS and eLORAN

GPS: Weak Transmitting Signal Strength

High Frequency Bands – L1, L2, L5

Satellite Based – High Orbiting

Fairly Easy to Jam/Spoof

eLORAN: Powerful Transmitting Signal Strength

Low Frequency Band – 100 KHz

Terrestrial Based – Secure Stations

Virtually Impossible to Jam/Spoof

Both: Very High Accuracy


eLORAN and Differential eLORAN The Terrestrial Low Frequency System

Enhanced Loran (eLoran) and

Enhanced Differential Loran

What is it?

How does it work?

What are its benefits?

How much would it cost?

Why isn’t everyone funding it?

What’s the current status? Perspectives for Cruise Ship and Container Issues CAPT D. Moskoff 27 April 2017 Miami at Port of Miami

What Can Ships/Ports Do? Options?

• Obtain GPS/GNSS receivers (+$15) that detect jamming and spoofing to warn users. Obtain hand-held GPS/GNSS jammer detector/direction finder.

• Provide as many inputs to navigation positioning as possible – i.e. eLORAN - in coastal and shallow areas.

• Use Parallel Indexing and Cross Indexing Radar Techniques routinely. Ports can check this.

• Use ECDIS/ECS units with both a primary PNT and a secondary PNT input at all possible times in all available areas.

• Communicate needs to all stakeholders. Perhaps Port/Country could install secondary PNT system.

• Anti-Jamming techniques and equipment Perspectives for Cruise Ship and Container Issues CAPT D. Moskoff 27 April 2017 Miami at Port of Miami

What Can Ships/Ports Do? Options?

• Maintain Skillsets (ships): Piloting, Celestial, Instruments (fathometer, fathograph, IN)

• Audit and test ships/ports for jamming and other vulnerabilities. For ships, test in open water areas under controlled conditions when traffic not a factor. Consider purchase of handheld detector (especially PV).

• Conduct ship/port drills (like fire drills) on regular basis: MSCP, consider GNSS failure, GNSS/Broadband jamming, GNSS spoofing, equipment failures, EMP attack, etc.


Multiple Mode PNT is Cyber Resilience


United States Merchant

Marine Academy


Questions? Comments? Discussion?


CAPT David B. Moskoff, USMS

Professor of Marine Transportation

Master Mariner – U.S.C.G. Unlimited

United States Merchant Marine Academy

MARAD – U.S. Department of Transportation

[email protected]

516.726.5856

References* “ ANALYSIS OF CYBER SECURITY ASPECTS IN THE MARITIME SECTOR” November 2011 ENISA http://www.enisa.europa.eu/act/res/other-areas/cyber-security-aspects-in-the-maritime-sector/cyber-security-aspects-in-the-maritime-sector-1/at_download/fullReport Bland, Eric. "GPS 'spoofing' could threaten national security." 02 Oct. 2008.MSNBC.28 Nov. 2008 <gps 'spoofing' could threaten national security>. Brain, Marshall, and Tom Harris. "How GPS Receivers Work." 25 September 2006. HowStuffWorks.com. <http://electronics.howstuffworks.com/gadgets/travel/gps.htm> 18 April 2010. Cornell Chronicle Online - http://www.news.cornell.edu/stories/Sept08/GPSSpoofing.aj.html Cyber Resilience in the Maritime & Energy Sectors by Shauna Mullin 1 May 2014 http://www.templarexecs.com/category/cyber-security/ Ehrenfeld, Rachel Dr. “The Impact of Purposeful Interference on U.S. Cyber Interests” 19 February 2014 http://acdemocracy.org/purposeful-interference/ “How GPS Works” By Wooten Gough, Graham Billings, and Jason McMahon April 2010 http://www.unc.edu/~jdmc79/HowGPSWorks.html Humphreys, T.E., B.M. Ledvina, M.L. Psiaki, and P.M. Kitner, Jr. "Assessing the Spoofing Threat: Development of a Portable GPS Civilian Spoofer." Sept. 2008. Institution of Navigation. 28 Nov. 2008 Ju, Anne. "Spoofing GPS Receivers." Cornell Chronicle. 19 Sept. 2008.Cornell University.28 Nov. 2008 <http://www.news.cornell.edu/stories/sept08/gpsspoofing.aj.html>.


http://www.enisa.europa.eu/act/res/other-areas/cyber-security-aspects-in-the-maritime-sector/cyber-security-aspects-in-the-maritime-sector-1/at_download/fullReport





























http://electronics.howstuffworks.com/gadgets/travel/gps.htm

http://www.news.cornell.edu/stories/Sept08/GPSSpoofing.aj.html

http://www.news.cornell.edu/stories/Sept08/GPSSpoofing.aj.html

http://www.templarexecs.com/cyberresilience/

http://www.templarexecs.com/cyberresilience/

http://www.templarexecs.com/category/cyber-security/




http://acdemocracy.org/purposeful-interference/




http://www.unc.edu/~jdmc79/HowGPSWorks.html

http://www.unc.edu/~jdmc79/HowGPSWorks.html

<http:/www.news.cornell.edu/stories/sept08/gpsspoofing.aj.html

<http:/www.news.cornell.edu/stories/sept08/gpsspoofing.aj.html

References* (continued) GNSS Vulnerability — Jamming, Interference, Spoofing 31 December 2010C:\Users\moskoffd\Documents\A -NATO\GNSS Vulnerability — Jamming, Interference, Spoofing Inside GNSS.mht Goward, Dana “Finding Your Way – the Future of Federal Aids to Navigation” February 4h, 2104 http://transportation.house.gov/uploadedfiles/2014-02-04-goward.pdf GPS Jamming and its impact on maritime safety Dr. Alan Grant, Dr. Paul Williams & Dr. Sally Basker – Port Technology International January 2010 GPS Jamming and Interference Sparks UK Concerns, Technical Solutions Prof. David Last at DSKTN symposium March 2, 2010 Inside GNSS, March/April 2010 March/April 2010 issue Itlaw.wikia.com http://itlaw.wikia.com/wiki/Cyber_threat May 2014 Kramek, CDR Joseph “ The Critical Infrastructure Gap: U.S. Port Facilities and Cyber Vulnerabilities” July 2013 http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2013/07/02%20cyber%20port%20security%20kramek/03%20cyber%20port%20security%20kramek.pdf Locata Warns: Lessons to Be Learned from GLONASS Spasm by GPS World Staff 15 April 2014 http://gpsworld.com/locata-warns-lessons-to-be-learned-from-glonass-spasm/ Moskoff, David CAPT “ GPS jammers a top concern in maritime cyber readiness” May 2014 Professional Mariner Magazine http://www.professionalmariner.com/ “Protect Critical Infrastructure - A Resilient Navigation & Timing P3 RNT Foundation November 2013 http://rntfnd.org/wp-content/uploads/NTP3WhitePaper_Nov13.pdf


http://transportation.house.gov/uploadedfiles/2014-02-04-goward.pdf









http://www.insidegnss.com/node/1828

http://www.insidegnss.com/node/1828

http://itlaw.wikia.com/wiki/Cyber_threat

http://itlaw.wikia.com/wiki/Cyber_threat

http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2013/07/02 cyber port security kramek/03 cyber port security kramek.pdf

http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2013/07/02 cyber port security kramek/03 cyber port security kramek.pdf

http://gpsworld.com/locata-warns-lessons-to-be-learned-from-glonass-spasm/






















http://www.professionalmariner.com/

http://www.professionalmariner.com/

http://rntfnd.org/wp-content/uploads/NTP3WhitePaper_Nov13.pdf




References* (continued) Roundtable : 2014 Maritime Cyber Security “Exploring Cyber Vulnerabilities within the Global Supply Chain” 25 April 2014 Hosted by Combined Joint Operations from the Sea (CJOS) Center of Excellence Sentinel Project Report on GNSS Vulnerabilities by Chronos Technology 7 February 2014 http://www.chronos.co.uk/files/pdfs/gps/SENTINEL_Project_Report.pdf Sherri. "GPS Spoofing." Philosecurity. 7 Sept. 2008. 28 Nov. 2008 <http://philosecurity.org/2008/09/07/gps-spoofing>. The Aerospace Corporation (FFRDC): “How GPS Works” website May 2012 http://www.aero.org/education/primers/gps/howgpsworks.html "Trilateration Method." Circuits Today. Web. 18 Apr 2010. <http://www.circuitstoday.com/wp-content/uploads/2009/12/Trilateration-GPS.jpg>. Wagstaff, Jeremy. “All at sea: global shipping fleet exposed to hacking threat” 23 April 2014 http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/04/23/tech-cybersecurity-shipping-idUSL3N0N402020140423 Warner, Jon S., Ph.D. and Johnston, Roger G., Ph.D., CPP, GPS Spoofing Countermeasures: 2003 http://www.homelandsecurity.org/bulletin/Dual%20Benefit/warner_gps_spoofing.html Will GPS Jamming Cause Future Shipping Accidents? POSTED BY: Robert Charette / BLOGS // The Risk Factor Wed, February 22, 2012 * Please see numerous reference attributions noted directly on PPT slides for documents and photographs.


http://www.chronos.co.uk/files/pdfs/gps/SENTINEL_Project_Report.pdf

http://www.chronos.co.uk/files/pdfs/gps/SENTINEL_Project_Report.pdf

http://www.aero.org/education/primers/gps/howgpsworks.html

http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/04/23/tech-cybersecurity-shipping-idUSL3N0N402020140423








http://www.homelandsecurity.org/bulletin/Dual Benefit/warner_gps_spoofing.html

http://spectrum.ieee.org/blogs/

http://spectrum.ieee.org/blog/riskfactor