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n. 12 hiver | winter 2014-2015 www.rfiea.fr

perspectivesRseau franais des Instituts dtudes avancesJournal

ISSN 2263-1577

Where Informality stopsand corruption begins

Alena Ledeneva

Dossier Nouvelles influencesGabriel Abend, Giuseppe Longo & Barbara Allen

Le roman grec antiqueau XIXesicle

Ourania PolycandriotiDossier Europe

Alistair Cole, amar Pitch


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DITO

Monica Dietl | Directrice du programme COSTet membre du Conseil dadministration duRFIEA

Les instituts dtudes avancesfranais sont des lieux dchangepropices la crativit des cher-cheurs du monde entier qui ysont accueillis, chacun poursui-vant une politique scientifiquepropre en partie dtermine parsa situation locale et sa gensehistorique. Runis au sein dunrseau, le RFIEA, les IEA offrent la France une plateforme col-laborative spcifique dans desdisciplines les plus diverses etlui procurent une visibilit quirendent la France bien plus

attractive pour les chercheurs dumonde entier.Relis dautresIEA en Europe, ils forment unformidable rservoir dexpertiseet de savoirs qui couvre tous leschamps des sciences humaineset sociales.

Malheureusement, les SHSsouffrent dun manque dereconnaissance, quand ellesne se voient pas retirer mmejusqu leur scientificit. Or, parla diversit des sujets abords aucours des rsidences de cher-cheurs, les IEA dmontrent lavitalit et la ncessit des SHS :

des mathmatiques lconomie,de lanthropologie larcholo-gie, la sociologie et la psycholo-gie, sans oublier lhistoire et laculture, les SHS soccupent fon-damentalement de la diversithumaine.

Les recherches et lavancementdes connaissances dans ces dis-ciplines sont indispensables nos socits daujourdhui :leurs rsultats doivent guider leschoix des citoyens comme despolitiques un moment o unegrave crise traverse lEurope et le

monde. Les conditions daccueildes IEA permettent justementaux chercheurs de poursuivredes recherches au long cours,sans contrainte administrativeou budgtaire, au sein dunecommunaut scientifique plu-ridisciplinaire, afin daccder une meilleure comprhensiondes problmes scientifiquesposes et de faire clore de nou-velles ides.

Outre les IEA, il existe enEurope un autre espace delibert permettant la crationde plateformes dchanges :

lIntergovernamental Europeanframework for COoperation inScience and echnology, autre-ment appel COS, dont je suisla directrice. Depuis sa crationen 1971 par 19 pays vision-naires, COS offre aux cher-cheurs de toutes disciplines unespace de libert ncessaire audialogue, aux recherches avan-ces, la cration et lutili-sation dides dans dans tousles domaines de la science et

de la technologie. Les scienceshumaines et sociales y occupentune place prpondrante, et lesprojets couvrent des sujets aussidivers que la littrature, le mul-tilinguisme, la mmoire trans-culturelle, lthique en cas decatastrophes, ladaptation dessystmes de sant europens la diversit, la recherche surles conflits, larchitecture ou lesdroits de lhomme La mis-sion principale de COS estde favoriser linnovation scien-tifique menant de nouveaux

concepts et produits, afin decontribuer renforcer les capa-cits de recherche et dinnova-tion europenne.

COS poursuit trois objectifsmajeurs : (i) utiliser limmensepotentiel de lEurope en reliantles communauts scientifiquesde haut niveau sur le continentet de louvrir au monde, (ii)offrir des possibilits de mise enrseaux pour les chercheurs endbut de carrire et (iii) accrotrelimpact de la recherche sur lesdcideurs locaux, nationaux eteuropens, les organismes de

rglementation ainsi que sur lesecteur priv lchelle du conti-nent. Son esprit est rsolumentpan-Europen puisque 361paysparticipent son activit. COSoffre ainsi lEurope un lieu dedialogue et de confiance avecune approche trs simple, qui estde laisser les chercheurs se ren-contrer, se connatre, se runir,et dlaborer un langage com-mun permettant une mutuellecomprhension propice lavancement des ides et desconnaissances. La dimensioninternationale simpose tout

naturellement, et lattractivitde lEurope et de chacun de sespays stablit sans difficult nientrave.

linstar de COS, les IEAdmontrent galement quelespace et les principes quilsproposent intressent les cher-cheurs du monde entier, car lessujets tels quils y sont traits,les cultures des lieux o ils sontsitus, les environnements scien-tifiques stimulants quils offrentsont une opportunit uniquepour chaque chercheur de seposer pendant un temps dfini

et de travailler sereinement dansun environnement stimulant la rencontre dautres esprits. Demanire marginale mais nonmoins ncessaire, on y apprendla gnrosit, la tolrance etlentente mutuelle, valeurs ga-lement essentielles lvolutionde notre monde

1. 35 Pays membres et un tatcoopratif

DOSSIER NOUVELLES INFLUENCESSCIENCE, PROBLEM SOLVING

AND BIBLIOMETRICS 3

Giuseppe Longo | rsident lIEA de Nantes

WHAT THE SCIENCE OF MORALITY

DOESNT SAY ABOUT MORALITY 6

Gabriel Abend | rsident lIEA de Paris

THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION

OF NON-KNOWLEDGE 9

Barbara Allen | rsidente lIMRA de Marseille

DOSSIER EUROPETERRITORIAL GOVERNANCE IN WESTERN

EUROPE BETWEEN CONVERGENCE AND

CAPACITY 10

Alistair Cole | rsident au Collegium de Lyon

SECURITY POLITICS AND

CITIZENSHIP IN THE EU 13

Tamar Pitch | rsidente lIEA de Nantes

LA RCEPTION DU ROMAN GREC

ANTIQUE AU XIXESICLE 16

Ourania Polycandrioti | rsidente lIMRA de Marseille

THE AMBIVALENCE OF BLURRED

BOUNDARIES: WHERE INFORMALITY

STOPS AND CORRUPTION BEGINS? 19

Alena Ledeneva | rsidente lIEA de Paris

RSIDENTS 2014 2015 ET MISCELLANES 23

COLONISATION, GLOBALISATION

ET VITALIT DU FRANAIS 24

Salikoko Mufwene et Ccile B. Vigouroux | anciens rsidentsdu Collegium de Lyon

perspectivesn. 12

ISSN 2263-1577Parution : novembre 2014Directeur de la publication : Olivier Bouindition : Julien ndosCrdits photos : ous les portraits des rsidents ont t raliss par Christophe Delory.Lquipe du RFIEA tient remercier chaleureusement pour leur contribution : GabrielAbend, Barbara Allen, Alistair Cole, Monica Dietl, Alena Ledeneva, Giuseppe Longo,Salikoko Mufwene, amar Pitch, Ourania Polycandrioti et Ccile B. Vigouroux, ainsique Marie-Jeanne Barrier, Marie-Trse Cerf, Pascale Hurtado, Aspasia Nanaki etJana Diklic pour leur collaboration.

ous droits rservs pour tous pays.


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seminal paper on morphogenesis(1952), had little or no followers

for about 20 years! An earlyrevitalization can be found in(Fox-Keller, Segel, 1970).

Tese are not exceptions: thisis how scientific thought isformed. Te exception is whenan innovative theory is quicklyaccepted: Einsteins Relativityis probably the unique case ofa rapid success and diffusionof a novel approach. I am notexpressing by this the romanticmyth of the isolated, revolutio-nary scientist. Tese revolutionsor novelties are always made

possible by and within strongscientific schools. Te modernscientific revolution maturedin the intellectually very livelycontext of Italian Renaissance.It crossed the invention of theperspective in painting, a neworganization of human space,including, later, the spaces ofastronomy (van Fraassen, 1970;Angelini, Lupacchini, 2013;Longo, 2011). Naturalism origi-nated then by a new way of loo-king at phenomena and at ourhumanity, by inventing a newmetaphysics, from Leonardosdrawings to Nicolas Cusanuss

proposal of an infinite universe(Zellini, 2005). Tese processesalways required a change ofviewpoint, with respect to theofficial theory, also within anexcellent school, yet against thatvery school.

Galileo, in his youth, worked onthe physics of Hell, (Galilei,1588), a possible path towardsthe naturalization of a reli-gious ontology and, by this, ofknowledge. As a matter offact, a common fashion, in theth century, was, for excellent

physicists and mathematicians,the heirs of Pacioli, Cardanoand Bombelli, to solve the manyproblems posed by the materialstructure of Hell. Galileo tur-ned one of these problems intoa seminal theory, that is intoscience.2

Tis juvenile work gave Galileoa sufficient bibliometric index toget tenure in Pisa in 1589, whenhe stopped working on theHell and, some time later, gotin touch with Kepler. enure isfundamental to allow free thin-king, even though, in some his-

torical contexts, it may be insuf-ficient to protect this freedom,when the novel theoretical pro-posal is too audacious, too muchagainst the main stream - andminority thinking, thus scienti-fic thinking, is not allowed to gobeyond certain metaphysical orpolitical limits.

In this case and in all the othersI mentioned above, the newtheoretical frame does emerge

within a st rong scientific schooland a relatively free debate - it

is allowed to emerge as long asthe novelty does not contradicta dominating metaphysics. Yet,even within a school, the furtherchange is due to a few who dareto go further, or, more precisely,to think differently. It is theschool that produces the pos-sibility of thinking deeply anddifferently; it is not a matter ofisolated individualities.

We have to promote schools,but their strength will residealso or mostly in the amountof freedom they allow to side-

track approaches. No one couldthink freely in Soviet Union,except in Mathematics and inTeoretical Physics (but not inBiology) within the Academyof Sciences. And remarkableand original work, in Mathema-tics and Physics, was producedin that singular context. Some,local, space of dissent may suf-fice for science, if circumstancesallow (for example, the socialprivileges accorded to scientistsin the Soviet Union-SU). Butdissent is needed for science.

Bibliometrics is the apparently

democratic analog of theChurchs dominating metaphy-sics in the thcentury or thePartys truth in the SU. Teserulers were not elected, butother majority rulers were elec-ted, such as Hitler or Salazar. Itsuffices then to kill the opposingideas and democracy looses itsmeaning - and science disap-pears, like in Germany after1933. Te majority vote, per se,is not democracy. Democracyrequires also and crucially theenablement or even the pro-motion of a thinking and active

minority. Bibliometrics forbidsminority thinking, where newscientific ideas always occur bydefinition, as history teaches us.If a scientist has to write on topof his/her CV his/her bibliome-tric indices, that is the evalua-tion by the majority of scientistsof his/her work, and present itin all occasions, this will pre-vent the search for a differentapproach, to dare to explore anew path that may require 60,20 or 10 years to be quoted, asin the examples I gave above.And he/she is constantly pus-hed to develop as much as pos-

sible technical tools in a familiarand well established theoreticalframe, as they may allow othersto write more papers, where thetechnique may be quoted.

We all need to be evaluated inscience and severely so. But anew idea, an apparently absurdexploration may be accepted bya majority of two or three in acommittee of three or five collea-gues giving tenure. Te success

may require several applications,but the candidate with too origi-

nal ideas may finally encountera small group of open mindedcolleagues, who do not look apriori at the bibliometric index,but dare to understand and eva-luate contents. Tis also applies

to publishing in good journals.If the editor does not care ofthe expected impact factor ofthe journal (a next two yearsquotation criterion!), but is ableto find open minded referees, anapparently strange, non-senseor non-common sense idea

may find its way to publication.So, after six or more attempts,even the 1971 seminal paper byRuelle and akens on chaoticdynamics could find a publisher,and, after several years of fai-lures, in the 1990s, Galleses,Rizzolatis and collaboratorsunexpected results on MirrorNeurons were at last published(see references)3. Both paperswere too original to be imme-diately accepted, yet a couple of

audacious editors finally daredto publish them.

If, instead, each evaluation refersto a global majority vote, thatis to the opinion expressed bythe largest number of quota-tions or expected quotations(the short term impact factor)

by all scientists in the disciplineon Earth, science is at the end.Or we will have a new form oftechno-science, the one mana-gers can easily judge and finance:short term problem solving andtechniques within clearly esta-blished frames, the problems

that the majority in a disciplinecan easily understand, that evenmanagers can grasp. But noradically new theory will everpose its own, internal problemsthat cannot even be seen fromthe dominating perspective.

NETWORKS, DIVERSITYAND THE NORMComputer networks give usa tool comparable to writing,another of our extraordinary

inventions. Tey were bothmotivated by metaphysics and

philosophy. In Mesopota-mia, five thousands years ago,humans made visible the invi-sible, language and thought,in a dialogue with the Gods,(Herrenschmidt, 2007). Te

human interaction was suddenlyenriched by this new tool andby the magic of the permanentsign, thus the explicitly symbolictransmission of myths, historyand knowledge. A new form ofexchange modified our commu-nicating community.

In the last century, Hilberts phi-losophical questions, originatingfrom his theory on the Foun-dations of Mathematics, wereanswered by Gdel, Church,Kleene and uring by propo-sing Computability Teory andabstract Logical ComputingMachines (uring). Later, ourinteracting humanity connectedconcrete computing machinesin networks and started a search

SCIENCE, PROBLEM SOLVING AND BIBLIOMETRICS


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for suitable theories of thisnew level of communication.

Networks, todays computernetworks in particular, allowmankind to access knowledgeand memory of mankind, anextraordinary enhancement ofour interactive thinking. We can

access to diversity, collaborate atdistance, appreciate differences,enrich cultures by endlesshybridisations.

Yet, these networks may alsobe used also for normalizinghumanity. Tey may be used for

averaging everybody. Just force aunique criterion for excellence;replace the network structure bya totally ordered line of values,a uniform scale of points, thesame for everybody. Ten thenetworks richness in confron-ting diversity may be used toforbid the variance from theimposed norm. ransform thenetwork of exchange of Univer-sity or of researchers into a totalorder, on the grounds of a few

(often perfectly stupid or mana-gerial) criteria, and diversity is

lost.

Hybridisation and contamina-tions are at the origin of mostnovelties in evolution, both bio-logical and human or cultural

evolution. But no hybridisationnor contamination is possiblein absence of diversity, inclu-ding the hopeful monsters,the wrong paths continuallyexplored by phylogenesis,(Goldschmidt, 1940; Gould,1989). We have to accommo-

date errors, wrong paths, if wewant diversity and, by it andwithin it, the novelty of science.

Self-appointed agencies ofmanagers propose criteria andtechnical tools for averaging theworld of knowledge, to norma-lize thinking according to com-mon sense values. We shouldoppose to this unique scale ofvalues some sort of index ofdiversity. Tey are already used

by biologists to assess the dyna-mics of an ecosystem: when

diversity decreases, the situa-tion in general worsens, majorextinctions happen or are expec-ted. Diversity guarantees theever changing dynamics that isessential to life and to human

cultures. By normalizing evalua-tions, forcing identity of aims,of metrics and, thus, of culturalcontents, we are killing the per-manent variations on themesas well as the radical changes inperspective that constitute theever changing path of scientific

knowledge.

Networks allow collaborations,today as never before. Yet, theymay be used to force mainlycompetition on the grounds offixed values and observables,by accounting criteria with nocontent. Competition is mucheasier, in science, than collabo-ration. It may even be based oncheating, on announcing falseresults, declaring non existing

experimental protocols, on stea-ling results, organizing networks

of reciprocal, yet fake quota-tions. Collaboration instead isvery hard: good scientists arevery selective in accepting colla-borators and diversity makes thedialogue difficult, while produ-cing the most relevant novelties.A research activity mainly basedon competing for projects andprizes, on competitive evalua-tions, destroys the chances foropen collaborations, closes themind to the others. Occasio-nally, we may need to competefor a job, a grant. Te point isto avoid turning this inevitable

fact of life into the main atti-tude in scientific work, that isto make competition and nor-malizing evaluations the drivingforce and the guidelines of ourscientific activity, which insteadshould be based on collabora-ting diversities.

References1.Invited Lecture, Academia Euro-paea Conference on Use and Abuseof Bibliometrics, Stockholm, May2013. Proceedings, Wim Blockmanset al. (eds), Portland Press, 2014.2. Hell is a cone of a 60 base angle,whose vertex is at the center of the

Earth. Tis poses a major challenge,dear to the Churchs and Universitiesmanagers of the time, who wantedscientists to solve problems and clai-med to be opened to the new sciences:how thick must be the Earths archcovering the Hell as a dome? In orderto obtain an estimate of this value,Galileo referred to the structuralproperties of Brunelleschis dome ofSanta Maria del Fiore. But he didnot use its ratio of sizes, instead hemade an original computation withan intuition of scaling effects: whilehe obtains, as for the thickness of theHells roof, one height of the Earth

radius, he observes that a small domeof 30 braccia (arm length) mayneed only one or even one-half brac-cia, (Galilei, 1588). Galileo was alsopuzzled by the scaling of the Devil,a further challenge she is 1,200meters tall, with the same propor-tions of a human impossible (see(Lvy-Leblond, 2006 and 2008) fora historical discussion and a possiblesolution for the now widely acceptedDevils violation of scaling equa-tions). Tis problem opened the wayto Galileos seminal work on scalingand its fundamental equations, 50years later, which extends also to bio-logy: the section of bones gives their

strength, it must thus grow like thecube of their length, not as the square,since the animals weight grows likethe cube (Galilei, 1638; Longo, Mon-tvil, 2013, chapter 2). Te paths ofknowledge construction are unpre-dictable and may even pass throughthe Hell, (Lvy-Leblond, 2008), if ascientist is allowed to think theoreti-cally and with sufficient freedom, thatis to deal with a problem by theorybuilding, in full scientific generality.3. David Ruelle mentioned this story

in several lectures; Galleses personalcommunication.

4. (see also http://www.di.ens.fr/users/longo )

BibliographyAngelini A., Lupacchini R. (eds) Te

Art of Science: Exploring Symme-tries between the Renaissance andQuantum Physics, Springer, 2013(in print).

Bachelard G., La Philosophie du non,PUF, 1940.

Bailly F., Longo G.,Mathematics andthe natural sciences; Te PhysicalSingularity of Life. Imperial Col-lege Press, 2011 (original version inFrench, Hermann, 2006).

Editors, Bibliometrics and the cura-tors of orthodoxy, Math. Struct.in Comp. Science, vol. 19, pp. 14,Cambridge Univ. Press, 2009http://www.di.ens.fr/users/longo/files/editorsMSCS.pdf

van Fraassen B.C.,An introduction tothe Philosophy of Space and ime,Random House, New York, 1970.

Fox-Keller E., Segel L.A., SlimeMold Aggregation Viewed as anInstability, Journal of TeoreticalBiology, 26, 399415, 1970.

Galilei G., Due lezioni circa la figura,sito e grandezza dellInferno diDante, 1588 (Edizione di riferi-mento: Galileo Galilei, Scritti, a

cura di Alberto Chiari, Le Monnier,Firenze 1970)

Galilei G., Discorsi e dimostrazionimatematiche, intorno a due nuovescienze, 1638.

Gallese V. et al., Action recognition inthe premotor cortex. Brain 119:593-609, 1996.

Goldschmidt R., Te Material Basisof Evolution, Yale University Press,New Haven, 1940.

Gould S. J., Wonderful Life, Norton &Co., 1989.

Herrenschmidt Cl., Les trois critures,Gallimard, 2007.

Lvy-Leblond J-M., La Vitesse de

lombre. Aux limites de la science,Seuil, 2006.Lvy-Leblond J-M., De lEnfer de

Dante au Purgatoire de la science.Postface aux Deux le ons sur lEn-

fer de Dante (Galilei, 1588), trad.L. Degryse, pp. 137175, Fayard,2008.

Longo G., Mathematical Infinityin prospettiva and the Spaces ofPossibilities, Visible, a Semiotics

Journal, n. 9, 2011Longo G., Montvil M., Perspectives

on Organisms: Biological ime,Symmetries and Singularities,Springer, 2013 (in print).

Rizzolati G. et al., Neurons related

to reach-grasping arm movementsin the rostral part of area 6 (area6a), Experimental Brain Search,vol. 82, 1990.

Ruelle D., akens F., On the natureof turbulence in Commun. Math.Phys. 20, 167-192 (1971) and 23,343-344, 1971.

Zellini, P., A Brief History of Infinity,NewYork: Peguin Book, 2005.

Weyl H., Symmetry,Princeton U. P.,1952.


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IIn recent years scientists havedevoted increasing efforts to thestudy of morality. As neuros-cientist Moll and his colleagues(2003, p. 299) say, morality hasbeen at the center of informaltalks and metaphysical discus-sions since the beginning ofhistory. Recently, converginglines of evidence from evolu-tionary biology, neuroscienceand experimental psychology

have shown that morality isgrounded in the brain. In thisarticle I ask what exactly thisnew science of morality canand cant claim to have discove-red about morality; what it canand cant tell us about moralityon the basis of the work it hasdone. I argue that the object ofstudy of much recent work isnot morality, but a particularkind of individual moral judg-ment. Most data and analysesare about something very spe-cific: an individuals judgmentabout the rightness, appropria-teness, or permissibility of an

action, made in response to astimulus at a particular pointin time. But this is a small andpeculiar sample of morality,whose incidence in peoplesactual moral lives is uncertain.Tere are many things that aremoral, yet not moral judgments.Tere are also many things thatare moral judgments, yet not ofthat particular kind. If moralthings are various and diverse,then empirical research aboutone kind of individual moraljudgment doesnt warrant theo-retical conclusions about mora-

lity in generali.e., moralitysnature, functioning, origins,causes, or effects. If that kind ofindividual moral judgment is apeculiar and rare thing, then itis not obvious what it tells usabout other moral things. Whatis more, it is not obvious whatits theoretical importance is tobegin withi.e., why we shouldcare about it at all.

Tus, my arguments raise ques-tions about the theoreticalmeaning and value of researchabout individual moral judg-ment. My claim is not that the

numerous new experimentalfindings about this object willnecessarily turn out to be incon-sequential or uselessthat wecant know at this point. But atpresent its not very clear whatlarger conclusions follow fromthem, nor what their implica-tions for a scientific theory ofmorality are, much less whattheir practical or policy impli-cations might be (if any). Inthis respect, the literature is rife

with questionable claims andnon sequiturs. Indeed, severalrecent papers seem unaware ofthe crucial distinction betweenindividual moral judgment andmorality, or contain problematicargumentative transitions frommoral judgment to the ambi-guous moral decision-making.

In what follows, I begin byidentifying what I call moraljudgment-centric approaches

(MJA), i.e., research approachesthat have individual moral judg-ment (MJ) at their methodolo-gical center. Ten, I spell out myclaim that MJ is a peculiar moralthing and theres much morallife beyond it. Last, I argue fora pluralism of methods andobjects of inquiry in the scien-tific investigation of morality,so that it transcends its proble-matic overemphasis on a parti-cular kind of individual moraljudgment.

IIScientists of morality have

done a great deal of researchthat revolves around individualsmaking moral judgments. Sub-jects may be in the lab, insidethe scanner, or at home on theircomputer. In most studies theyare healthy (or normal) per-sons, but in some they havebrain damage or a psychiatriccondition. In a few studies theirbrains activity or chemistry hasbeen manipulated, but in mostit hasnt. Te subjects task is tomake a moral judgment aboutstatements or situations theyare presented with. Oftentimes

these studies elicit judgmentsspecifically about moral dilem-mas. Tat is, subjects are pre-sented with a situation wheretwo or more courses of actionare possible, or, more often, asituation where the two alterna-tives are doing a certain thing orabstaining from doing it. Tensubjects are asked questionssuch as: Would it be permissiblefor person A to do action X insituation S1?; Would it be okayfor you to do Y in S2?; or some-thing along these lines. Teseanswers are their moral judg-ments. For example, It is not

permissible for A to do X in S1,is a subjects moral judgment.

Te most famous of these moraldilemmas is the trolley pro-blem, originally crafted by phi-losopher Philippa Foot (2002).But psychologists and neuros-cientists have conducted experi-ments using many other dilem-mas, some of which they drewfrom the ethics literature, andsome of which they expressly

designed to manipulate variablesof interest. For instance, JudithTomsons loop and fat manvariants on the trolley problem;more recent reformulations byMarc Hauser and John Mikhail;Joshua Greenes crying babyand infanticide dilemmas; inearlier moral psychology Kohl-bergs Heinz dilemma and thecaptains dilemma; and Jona-than Haidts ingenious cases(although not dilemmas) about

sex among siblings, eating onesdog, or wiping the toilet with anational flag.

Te research questions that thesestudies have sought to addressare diverse, but some of the mainones are as follows. What brainareas are activated, recruited,implicated, responsible for,or associated with makingmoral judgments? What brainareas or circuits subserve parti-cular kinds of moral judgments(e.g., deontological and conse-quentialist ones)? What arethe neural correlates, basis,

foundations, underpinnings,or substrates of moral judg-ment, decision-making, andemotions? What are the specificfunctional roles of specific brainareas? What causes individualsmoral judgments: hot intuition,affect, and emotion, or rathercold reason and reasoning? Isthere a moral faculty, organ, oruniversal grammar, comparableto the language faculty, organ, oruniversal grammar?

What is common to most ofthese research projects, though,

is that individual moral judg-ment (MJ) is at their metho-dological center. What subjectsdo is to make moral judgments.What researchers account for,predict, and find neural corre-lates of are moral judgments.Indeed, the focus is not just onmoral judgment, but on a speci-fic kind of moral judgment. Itsprototypical features as found inthis literature are: a moral judgment is madeby and is an attribute of oneindividual its made in response to aspecific stimulus the stimulus is an imaginarysituation and a question about it the judgment is about anaction (rather than, say, a personor state of affairs) a moral judgment is a state-ment (indicative mood) it is in essence an utteranceor speech act (even if not in factuttered) it makes use of thin ethicalconcepts only (okay, appropriate,

permissible, acceptable, wrong,etc.) its fixed, settled, verdict-like its clear (not conceptuallyor semantically muddled, inco-herent, etc.) its made at a specific, pre-cise, discrete point in time

I argue that MJ is a peculiar kindof moral thing, hence not a goodsample of moral things. Its oneamong the many moral things

that are part of peoples morallives. I further argue that theresno reason to suppose that all ofthe members of the moral classwork the same way. It followsthat investigations about MJwhat I call moral judgment-centric approaches (MJA)dont have the resources tomake claims about the natureand functioning of morality asa whole. Evidently, what is andisnt part of peoples moral livesis an empirical question, not anarmchair one. Further, it cantbe answered unless you spe-cify just what persons, because

this seems to vary from societyto society, as well as historicalperiod, social class, age, gender,and many other variables. Itsalso an empirical question whe-ther, given a group of people,MJ is a relatively small part oftheir lives, or rather is a large orthe largest one. My aim here issimply to make some sugges-tions as to what other moralthings there might be besidesMJ. Future workboth empi-rical investigations and retros-pective reviewsshould put mysuggestions to test, and specify

where, to whom, and to whatextent they apply (if at all). Atthis stage, plausibility is theirmain test.

So, what else might there be?wo kinds of things: (i) thingsthat are moral, or reasonablycalled moral, yet not moraljudgments; and (ii) things thatare moral judgments, yet notof the particular MJ kindi.e.,they dont meet one or moreof the above conditions. In thenext section I suggest somedistinctions that compare andcontrast the MJA picture with

what it leaves out of sight. Evenbefore the empirical evidencecomes in, I believe that leavingthese things out of morality byfiat, without a convincing argu-ment, is unacceptable. But this isprecisely what MJA have done.

IIIIn the recent empirical work,MJ is conceived of as a declara-tive sentence. I argue that moralquestions and exhortations are

different from judgments intheoretically important respects.Consider these three types ofsentences: (i) Declarative: It ismorally permissible/right forA to ; (ii) Interrogative: Is itmorally permissible/right for Ato ? / What ought A to do,morally speaking?; (iii) Impera-tive: ! / You must/ought to !Not only is MJ conceived of as adeclarative sentence in the indi-cative mood, such as sentences

of type (i). I think its also assu-med that moral judgments arein essence utterances or speechacts. Even if in practice subjectscheck boxes, push buttons, orleft-click, they would be prepa-red to utter something like (i)under the appropriate speech-act conditions.

I argue that, besides judgments,one component of peoplesmoral lives may be questions,including but not limited toquestions such as (ii). Tesequestions people pose to andabout other people in ordinary

conversations and personalruminations, and, perhaps moreimportantly, to and about them-selves. Moral questions may ormay not lead to answers, such asthe MJ that the experimentersor survey researchers questionleads to. Sometimes they mayremain unanswered, yet stillfunction as tentative guides tothought and action, because theysuggest whats important, wor-risome, worth thinking about.Or they may remain unanswe-red without really guiding any-thingjust obstinately live on

in ones mind. Phenomenolo-gically, the experience of havingor posing or struggling witha moral question is arguably adistinct one, and surely muchunlike uttering a moral judg-ment. Tus, moral questions area distinct kind of moral phe-nomenon, worth attending toin and of themselves. Considera few more concrete examples.Should I regularly give moneyto charity? Why would I noteat meat if I like it? Why wouldsomeone who likes eating meatnot eat it? Is it wrong for me tohave an abortion? Is she a good

spouse? Why am I doing whatIm doing with my life? Whatsreally important to me? Is lifefair to me? Is he such-and-suchkind of person?

Moral exhortationssen-tences (iii) aboveseem to beyet another kind of empiricalphenomenon and work in yetanother way. Your saying toyour friend, Dont lie to yourspouse!, is presumably based on

WHAT THE SCIENCE OF MORALITY DOESNT SAY ABOUT

Gabriel Abend | rsident lIEA de Paris

Gabriel Abend is an Assistant Professor of Sociology at New York University. His book,Te Moral Background: An Inquiry into the History of BusinessEthics, was published in April 2014 by Princeton University Press. Tis text is an abridged version of an article originally published in 2013 in Philosophy ofthe Social Sciences, volume 43, number 2, pp. 157-200.


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MORALITY

a judgment, belief, conviction,or feeling to the effect that itd

be morally wrong or bad for herto lie to him (for the sake of theargument, I set aside non-moralreasons she might have). Besidesexhortations, theres also whatone might call self-exhorta-tionse.g., Let me improvethis aspect of my life!, or Ireally shouldnt do that thinganymore! Tey, too, are pres-umably based on some sort ofjudgment to the effect that thatis a morally bad thing to have ordo. However, neither exhorta-tions nor self-exhortations seemreducible to or understandable

in terms of the judgments thatapparently underlie them. Forone, as empirical phenomena,exhortations and judgmentsdont look alike at all. Nor doesthe first-person experience,phenomenologically speaking.Conceptually, they have a dif-ferent aim, job, or point; assu-ming speech, a different speechact. Although exhortationsimplicitly or explicitly containtheoretical evaluations, theirpoint is practical in a straight-forward and unmediated man-ner: they try to bring about a spe-cific thing. Moralityhowever

defined or understoodseemsto have to do primarily withpractice and action, and onlysecondarily or derivatively withtheory about practice and action(more on this below). In thisrespect, exhortations fare betterthan judgments, whose practicalaim is less direct. Why are moraljudgments but not exhortationsempirically studied?

Finally, there are narratives. Asextensive literatures in socio-logy, psychology, anthropology,history, and communication

have shown, human beings arenarrative creatures. People tellstories about themselves andabout others, about their livesand identities, about their com-munity, its past and its origins.For our purposes, its importantthat narratives cant be decom-posed or analyzed into a set ofjudgments, rules, points, argu-ments, questions, or thoughts. Anarratives meaning is tied to itsunity. Te meaning of one partdepends on its relationship tothe meaning of other partsmuch like indexicals, networks,and relational properties in

general. Some particular typesof narratives, such as fables,conclude with a moral or arule of conduct. Yet, again, itsunclear what the morals mea-ning would be, were its narra-tive context to disappear, andthus the moral remained as aself-standing sentence. Alongthese lines, you could arguethat all real-life moral judg-ments are embedded in a nar-rative contextisolated moral

judgments never occur, or evenarent possible at all. Similarly,you could raise these empiricalquestions about peoples morallives: Do they go about makingindependent judgments aboutthings, one after the other? Or,rather, do they go about concoc-ting and telling stories and bitsof stories, to make sense ofthings and weave them together,

and in the context of which theymorally evaluate things?

IVId like now to consider whatMJA might be neglecting inlight of three traditional dis-tinctions in moral philosophy:(i) the right v. the good v. thevirtuous; (ii) permissible v. obli-gatory v. supererogatory; and(iii) ethics of doing v. ethics ofbeing. As mentioned above, MJ

are about what itd be okay,appropriate, wrong, morallywrong, permissible, morallypermissible, or morally accep-table for someone to do. Teseare the concepts that the expe-rimental tasks employ. All ofthese questions try to get atsome undoubtedly relevantmoral things: rightness, accep-tability, permissibility, okay-

ness, etc. Yet, might they allbe missing some other relevantmoral things? Perhaps in somesocieties questions about wron-gness and permissibility are pro-minent in some peoples morallives. Te practical significanceof the concepts of rightness,wrongness, permissibility, andimpermissibility in contempo-rary Western societies is evident,for example, in their ubiqui-tous institutional and cultural

incarnations. Besides, as a mat-ter of fact, these concepts havehad an elective affinity with aparticular form: rules or law-likeprinciples.

However, there is a differentsort of moral relationship thatpeople can have to thingsviz., finding them not morallyright but morally good, either

in themselves, or as means tofurther moral ends. You can saythat people are after these moralgoods, even when they lack aplan as to how to get them andthis is a matter of practical sense.Tese are things that someonemay hold dear; they arent hermere desires and preferences, butthings she finds worthy of beinghad, desired, preferred, sought,cherished, or chosen. Peopleseem to have moral projects,

hopes, aspirations, ideals, andcommitments, where goods andthe good play the key role.Some examples of goods ofdiverse types are: liberty, truth,knowledge, community, solida-rity, faith, health, wealth, honor,pleasure, excellence, love, family,friendship, security, ataraxia,work, self-expression. Further,there is a plurality of goods and

of conceptions of the good, evenwithin a single moral commu-nity, which at times are incom-mensurable. Moreover, besidesdoing whats right and avoidingwhats wrong, people may wishto live a good, fulfilling, life; liveit well, not misspend it. Somepeople might even have oneproject or commitment that isthe most important of all. Forexample: have a family, writea novel, become rich, help the


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poor, find God, fight against evil,reach a state of contentment and

serenity, or bring about the revo-lution. None of these things areencompassed by the conceptsof rightness and permissibility;MJA are blind to them.

Nor do these concepts encom-pass the moral relationshipof admiration, and the classof acts known as supereroga-tory. When presented withmorally extraordinary people,acts, or states of affairs, peoplemay feel or express admira-tion. Consider the lives of thesaints and the heroes. Teir

acts are obviously permis-sible and obviously not obli-gatory. But that doesnt helpus describe and account forhow people seem to react andrelate to them. Te same canbe said about abhorrent, abo-minable, and despicable actsand people. Te experienceand social consequences of themorally admirable/heroic anddespicable/monstrous dontseem understandable in thesame terms as the good/bad,much less the right/wrong.

Tey are not quantitativelymore intense, but qualitatively

different.

Ive suggested that MJA missthe good and the superero-gatory completely or almostcompletely. I believe it doesntcover, either, peoples judg-ments about character, virtue,and, more generally, what someethicists call ethics of being. Itseems that sometimes peoplesmoral judgments, questions,and experiences are not aboutwhat to do, but about what orhow to be. Someone may bereferred to as a bad, good, self-

absorbed, vain, generous, fair,open-minded, or irresponsibleperson. Or as someone whohas guts, or is depraved, or sly,or manipulative, which in turnmay become reasons for action(e.g., I decided not to engagein business with Jones, becausehes an irresponsible fellow; or,ry to help him if you canhes a good man). Interestingly,these judgments about beingare presumably based, inducti-vely, on individual instances ofdoing. But they are nonethelessnot reducible to them. Moreo-ver, there is a sort of stickiness

to judgments about being orcharacter, precisely because theyare seen as referring to relati-vely stable traits or dispositions.Indeed, a judgment about howsomeone is might shape futureinstances of judgment aboutwhat they do. In addition, moraljudgments and questions aboutyourself, and moral exhortationsto yourself, may come in thelanguage of being and charac-ter, not in the language of doing.

You may hope and strive to bean honest, courageous, pious,

or respectful person, withoutit being possible to translatethis into a set of concrete andexhaustive judgments, prin-ciples, or action-maxims. Yourmoral self-conception or iden-titywhat kind of person yousee yourself as, what kind ofperson you hope to become,who are your moral heroes andantiheroesis missed by talkabout right, wrong, permissible,and forbidden, which is whatMJA investigate.

Furthermore, you may be unable

(or unwilling) to bracket the factthat moral life and moral actionare (1) the moral life and moralaction of particular people,which (2) necessarily take placewithin a context. As its beenoften observed, agent-neutralethical theories such as utili-tarianism fail to take this into

account. So does a methodo-logical approach such as MJA.o return to the example of thetrolley-problem experiments,without any (social, cultural,religious, legal) context, it mightbe hard for subjects to decidewhat the r ight thing to do is, oreven to find the question mea-ningful and see its point at all.Well, it really, really depends,they may think to themselves. In

addition, subjects may wonderwhether the fat man to be sacri-ficed for the greatest good ofthe greatest number is an HIV/AIDS researcher who may dis-cover a cure for it, or a ruthlessUruguayan dictator. Not beinganalytic philosophers, subjectsmay ask themselves: what inthe world does it mean that heis nobody in particularneithera medical researcher nor a dic-tator, neither kind nor unkind,neither old nor young?

Ive been making some empiri-cal conjectures about ordinary

peoples moral lives, and spe-cifically whether MJA may bemissing some of its components.I have not been talking aboutthe academic field of moralphilosophy and its normativeand metaethical debates. Yet,many of my points have mutatismutandis a counterpart in moralphilosophy. For instance, if thegood ought to have priority overthe right, if the law concep-tion of ethics is misguided, if

Kantians can accommodate theconcept of the supererogatory,

if utilitarians can accommodatethe concepts of identity andintegrity. More precisely, manyof my points have a counterpartin several strands of criticismsleveled at mainstream analyticethics. Tis is not a mere coin-cidence. For MJAs conceptionof morality heavily draws on theparticular conception of mora-lity that consequentialism anddeontology share, yet which isnot shared by other traditions.For instance, a pragmatist, exis-tentialist, communitarian, par-ticularist, Buddhist, or virtue

ethicist would probably see thedisputes between consequenti-alism and deontology as point-less. odays scientists of mora-lity have framed their questionand modeled their object ofinquiry after these two schools,thereby unwittingly taking sideson a substantive issue in ethics.

VIn this paper Ive asked whatmoral judgment-centricapproaches (MJA) in psycho-logy and neuroscience tell usabout morality. Ive argued thattheir object of study, MJ, is nota good sample of moral things.Tere are many things that aremoral, yet not moral judgments.Tere are also many things thatare moral judgments, yet not

of the particular MJ kind (asdefined above). If these argu-ments are correct, it follows thatMJA research doesnt licensetheoretical conclusions aboutmorality in general. Rather, itonly licenses conclusions aboutthe specific moral object it hasactually investigated. o be sure,many suggestive experimentalfindings about this object havebeen reported. But I dont thinkenough thought has been givento what to make of them theo-retically, what social phenomenathey illuminate, what neural cor-relates are correlates of, or what

to do with these findings tobuild a satisfactory understan-ding of morality. o be sure, thenew science of morality is stillin its infancy. But that doesntmake unwarranted or unclearclaims any more acceptable.

Here a pluralist approachwould argue that if moralityis made up of many differentkinds of things, then a compel-ling science of morality should

consider all of them as objectsof inquiry, and take them all into

account when making claimsabout what morality is or howmorality works. Because theyare different kinds of things,they call for different questionsand methods. Further, they mayyield theoretical claims thatarent subsumable under a single,comprehensive theory of mora-lity, or parsimonious principleabout the nature of morality. Atleast, you shouldnt start withthe assumptions that: (a) thereis one such theory or principle;and (b) there is a basic micro-unit, common to all moral

things.I think such pluralist view is onthe right track. Whatever thetheoretical meaning and valueof MJA findings turn out to be,they are about and shed lighton one particular kind of moralthing. In order to make claims

about morality in general, manyother objects must be included.And many other methods mustbe used: psychological and neu-roscientific, as well as anthro-pological, historical, and socio-logical. For example, for certainresearch questions theres noway around the ethnographicobservation of action and inte-raction in their natural setting.For certain research questions

theres no way around statisti-cally representative surveys ofa population. If you intend touse scientific knowledge aboutmorality to make practicalrecommendations to policy-makers, then an organizationalanalysis is unavoidableindi-vidual-level differences may beinconsequential or even irrele-vant. In some social situations,its not individuals automaticintuitions or reactions to stimuli,but deliberation and debate thatcarry the day regarding whatends up being done and evenwhat ends up being believed and

felt by those very individuals.Similarly, if youre interested inmoral narratives, youll have topatiently listen to them or readthem, give people some time andfreedom to express themselves,and figure out their meanings.

In sum, I believe that there isneither a single best methodto study morality, nor a singleobject of inquiry on the basisof which to make claims about

morality. Nor is there a singlepath toward an understanding

or theory of morality. Tere-fore, a plurality of theoreticaland methodological approachesshould coexist, each aware ofits strengths, but also of itspartial perspective and limitedscope. In practice, there shouldbe more variation in objects ofinquiry and methods. Individualjudgment about rightness andwrongness is one among manyobjects of inquiry scientists ofmorality need to do research on;so are moral questions, ques-tions about good rather thanright, questions about being

rather than doing, thick judg-ments, narratives, institutions,and behavior in natural settings.Neuroimaging and experimentalmethods are two among manymethods scientists of moralityneed to use; so are surveys, eth-nographic observation, and thehistory of moral concepts andpractices.

In these respects, moral psy-chologists and neuroscientistscan benefit from more engage-ment with historians, anthro-pologists, and sociologists ofmorality. Certainly, in one sense

its entirely sensible that therebe a division of labor between,say, neuroscience, sociology, andhistory. However, this divisionof labor entails two perils. First,its a consistent historical pat-tern that scientific disciplinestend to forget the incomple-teness of their standpoint anddisregard findings that dont fitwith their approach. Second,some of the phenomena andprocesses of interest to a scienceof morality cant be brokeninto separate partse.g., thesocial and the neuralbecause

these parts mutually influenceor even constitute each other.Hence, studying them sepa-rately may lead to misleadingresults. Unfortunately, a pluralistscience of morality entails costs,too. First, its accounts and theo-ries are unlikely to be simpleand parsimonious, much likeother versions of methodologi-cal, explanatory, and ontologicalpluralism in science. Second,as in politics, this sort of plu-ralism is time-consuming andhard to realize. For it requiresinteractions among people whodiffer not just in the content of

their answers, but in the form ofthe questions they ask, and inthe questions they find worthasking to begin with. Yet, just asin politics, this might still be thebest way to prevent oversightsand build a robust scientificunderstanding of morality, notjust of a particular kind of indi-vidual moral judgment.

WHAT THE SCIENCE OF MORALITY DOESNT SAY ABOUT MORALITY

I argue that the object of study of much recent work is not morality, buta particular kind of individual moral judgment. But this is a small andpeculiar sample of morality. There are many things that are moral, yet notmoral judgments. There are also many things that are moral judgments,

yet not of that particular kind.


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Following the Mediterra-nean coastline driving west

out of Marseille about 30km,one reaches the beginning ofone of Frances largest indus-trial regions. Te Fos-sur-mer/Etang de Berre area is hometo almost 430 installations,including: chemical plants, oilrefineries, natural gas facilities,and steel production. Te Fos-Lavera-Berre chemical park,for example, prides itself inbeing the largest in southernEurope, producing 40% of allFrench-produced ethylene and60% of butadiene not to men-tion the adjacent oil port, one of

the biggest in the world, whichsupports a local network of refi-neries. Tis impressive assem-blage of industry belches outtons of toxic air pollutants, cau-sing an eerie yellow-brown veilover the region and the sunsetsto be other-worldly, particularlywhen the mistral winds are stil l.

Te region also has incrediblebeauty. It extends for morethan 50km from the airport atVitrolles past the picturesqueEtang be Berre lagoon to thewetlands of the Camargue, wes-tern Europes largest river delta

and home to over 400 speciesof birds. Te inland industrialregion extends northward tothe Crau, an expansive allu-vial fan and important pasturelands for sheep and cattle sinceancient times. Te area is alsohome to about 400,000 peopleliving in 30 towns throughoutthe vast hybrid landscape. Whatlies beneath this mixture ofbeauty and dreadthe sacredand the profaneis a sense of

underlying unease and appre-hension about the impact ofpollution on human health. Itis an awkward mlange of wan-ting to know, of not wanting toknow, of suspecting knowing,but feeling disempowered orafraid to act.

Understanding this publicmalaise requires understandingthe calculus of environmentalpower in the region: namely

who has authority over the land,the air, and the water. In 1965 alaw was passed demarcating thecoastal part of this region as theAutonomous Port of Marseillenow called the Grand MaritimePort of Marseille (GPMM),the largest port in France. Itsreach encompasses, not onlythe actual port of Marseille,but includes the ports and adja-cent land extending throughFos-sur-mer all the way to themouth of the Rhne, includingthe town of Port-St-Louis.Te GPMM designation hashad a significant impact on the

towns of this region as the laweffectively removed all deci-sion-making authority from thecitizens and their elected offi-cials and transferred it to thestatespecifically the public-private partnership that com-prises the GPMM.

In the last 12 years, the twolargest controversies over thesiting of new hazardous facili-ties in the region happened inthe port town of Fos-sur-mer:1) the siting of a large Gaz deFrance LNG terminal on the

Fos public beach (opened 2005)and, 2) an incinerator designedto burn all the garbage of Mar-seille, the second largest city inFrance (opened 2010). Tesewere hugely unpopular projectsin the eyes of the Fos and othernearby residents and servedto catalyze the environmen-tal community. On the face ofit, the controversies were moreabout power (or lack thereof)and environmental degrada-tion than about human health.However, the debates didprompt residents to ask ques-tions that were present but not

previously vocalized: what werethe combination emissionsfrom all the local polluting faci-lities doing to their health?

o situate the environmentalhealth quest in an illumina-ting framework, it is helpfulto know something about therecently growing research field,the sociology of ignorance,which is also called, the socialconstruction of non-knowledge.

Ignorance, is not what is notstudied or a byproduct ofscienceignorance is activelyproduced and is shaped by thesocial, scientific, and politicalinstitutions themselves. Testudy of non-knowledge, there-fore, is a view into the values andcultural biases at work in scien-tific knowledge practices. Teways in which non-knowledgecan be actively constructed aremany, but in the case of envi-

ronmental health data, there aretwo common forms. Te first isthe production of vast amountsof uninterpreted data presentedas an impenetrable wall ofnumbers, basically insuring thepublics dependence on stateexperts. Or conversely, the over-aggregation of data that can beused to either, show nothing(i.e. no effect), or to argue forcontinued expert studies untilsomething can be known.

Following are some examplesin the case of Fos. In the caseof the incinerator siting contro-

versy, the local associationsfighting the project were givenvolumes of technical data aboutthe proposed installation. Itwas an overwhelming amountof information and it was diffi-cult for the citizens to ascertainexactly what the environmentaland health impacts were. Alter-natively, data over-aggrega-tion is the norm in the variousFrench agencies and associa-tions tasked with collecting andmonitoring health statistics.From cancer to asthma, healthstatistics are revealed to the

public covering such large geo-graphic areas, that it is impos-sible for a town to know if theirhealth is adversely impactedby their adjacency to pollutingindustries.

Ignorance is also actively pro-duced through institutionalnorms, pressures, rules, andlogics.1 Disciplinary cultureshave preferences for doinghealth science certain ways andnot others. Tis can reinforcenon-knowledge, but it can alsothwart non-traditional ways ofdoing science to insure that the

knowledge remains unknown.One example of the institutio-nal shaping of knowledge gapsis the recent study conductedby the Agence Rgionale deSant (ARS). Tese scientistswere committed to, and had thesupport of, local environmen-tal activists in trying to answerthe industrial zone residentsquestions regarding illness intheir neighborhoods. Te studytracked hospital admittance as

the measure to assess the rateof cancer, asthma, and car-diac illness. o understand theprevalence of asthma or theincidence of cancer in a town,hospital admittance is not thebest measure because a hos-pital stay is typically for themost extreme asthma attack oradvanced stages of certain can-cers. Hospital admission num-bers, however, were the datathat the ARS scientists could

more easily obtain given thefact that public health data onthese kinds of illnesses were notreadily available. Tus ease ofacquisition and cost considera-tions circumscribed the studythat was possible.

In the end, the study showedno higher rates of hospitaladmission for either asthmaor most cancers for residentsliving in the industrial region.Te citizens were unhappy withthe study as their primary ques-tions remained unanswered:what are the rates of incidence

of illness of those living closestto industry? Te scientistsexplained that they regrettedthey could not answer the rightquestions. Tey explained thatthe availability of data was theproblem. For example, while 13regions in France have a cancerregistry, this region does not.Additionally, while elevatedrates of pediatric cancer wouldbe an important indicator ofenvironmental health impacts,this data is only maintained, inaggregate, at the larger regionallevel. And finally, the state-fun-

ded scientists were unable tostudy auto-immune and relateddiseases, such as diabetes type1, as there is no classificationfor such diseases in the nume-rous data collection institutionsin France. Even though manymedical professionals believethese kinds of illness are envi-ronmentally triggered, statedata collection is more focusedon illnesses with large econo-mic impact, thus auto-immuneand related disease incidencerates remain unknown. Tesecollection and classificationnorms form organisationally

determined domains of unrea-lized knowledge, and this non-knowledge flows from onegovernment domain to ano-ther and eventually reaches thepublic whose basic questionscontinue to be unanswered.

In the case of the residents ofFos, there is yet another kindof non-knowledge produced.Tis could be called subvertingthe question or non-answering

though the rubric of risk. Tecitizens have questions suchas: how prevalent is the respi-ratory illnesses and cancer intheir town, or what is the healthimpact of the large variety oftoxins in their air? Instead ofattempting to answer thesequestions in a way that includes,and hopefully, satisfies the resi-dents, the state funds numeroustechnical risk studies. Pollutionexposure is then categorized by

such terms as: exposure base-lines, threshold values, emissionprofiles, and biomarker persis-tence. Te local people foundthese studies very strange,according to one public healthofficial, and did not know whythey were conducted. Anotherspokesperson for a local mayorconcurred and added, manyresidents say that the rightthings were not studied as therewere no studies begun froma human perspective, not justcalculating risk using thresholdvalues as people will not trustthese studiesbecause they say

they are certainly sick.

Te shape of knowledge absenceas it intersects with the spa-tial and political geography ofwest Provence can be mappedonto specific historical, social,and organisational contexts.2From the absolute power of theGPMM to the back office ofa state bureaucrat determininghealth classification categories,the topography of ignorancetakes complex and consequen-tial shapes. In the case of theFos/Etang residents, it may

require thinking outside of theboxusing new health studymethods not yet recognized bystate experts. It may be time fornot only the peoples questionsto be at the center of a study,but for the people themselvesto be asked: what is your healthstatus? Tis kind of lay sciencewhich uses local voices andtheir health responses as datamight finally be able to answerthe questions that two decadesof state studies have yet toaddress.

References1. Frickel, Scott, Not Here andEverywhere: Te Non-Production ofScientific Knowledge, in Kleinman,D. and Moore, K., eds., RoutledgeHandbook of Science, echnology andSociety, London: Routledge/aylorand Francis Press, 2014..2. Frickel, Scott, Absenses: Metho-dological Note about Nothing, inParticular, Social Epistemology,Vol. 28: 1, pp. 8695, 2014. .

THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF NON-KNOWLEDGE

Barbara Allen | rsidente lIMRA de Marseille

Barbara Allen teaches graduate courses in the social study of science and technology at Virginia echs Washington DC-area campus in Falls Church, Virginia.Most recently she has taught courses on social study of science and technology, sociology of knowledge and risk, public participation in S+, qualitative researchmethods, and advanced social theory.

BarbaraAllen,2013

ChristopheDelory


10/24perspectivesn. 12 hiver | winter 2014-2015

Are States in contemporaryEurope driven to enforce newforms of territorial convergenceunder the impact of economiccrisis, enhanced European stee-ring and international moni-toring? Or is the evolution ofsub-national governance lar-gely driven by endogenouspressures? Tis very significantresearch question get to theheart of contemporary Euro-pean States through a focus on

the interplay between territorialcapacities, domestic veto playersand exogenous constraints. Tearticle reports interim findingsfrom a research project suppor-ted by the UKs Leverhulmerust and the Collegium ofLyon on erritorial Governancein Western Europe betweenConvergence and Capacity1.Te empirical data is focusedmainly on four second orderstrong identityregions: Anda-luca (Spain), Brittany (France),Wales (UK) and Wallonia (Bel-gium). Tese regions share manycharacteristics. Tese hybrid

regions are economically chal-lenged yet have a distinctive anddeveloped territorial capacity.Tey each have ingrained tradi-tions of social-democratic partycontrol. Tey are regions facingstark economic challenges andproblems of economic adapta-tion. Tey are traditionally pro-European regions, or at leastregions benefiting from subs-tantial EU investment. Teyare regions with a strong senseof territorial identity. Tey havevariable degrees of decentralisedauthority: as a minimum, each

has a directly elected regionalAssembly with powers rangingfrom a general competencyto partial legislative authority.Te four regions exist in statesthat cover the range of logicalpossibilities for comparison: aloose federal state (Belgium), ahybrid state with some federalcharacteristics (Spain), a predo-minantly unitary state modifiedby forms of asymmetrical devo-lution (United Kingdom) anda decentralised but still unitarystate (France). Te EU contextprovides the core similaritybetween these states, with three

of the four participating in theeuro and signed up to thereatyon Stability, Coordination andGovernance in the Economicand Monetary Union (SCG).Te research involves sustai-ned empirical investigation ofsub-national governments andgovernance communities in thefour regions over an 18 monthperiod from November 2012 toMay 2014.

TERRITORIALGOVERNANCE ANDECONOMIC CRISIS:CONVERGENCE ANDDIVERGENCEHow did our regions face up tothe combined pressures of eco-nomic crisis and political decen-tralisation2? Is the economiccrisis recentralising previouslydecentralised functions, or isthere no linkage between these

two phenomena? Are conver-gence anddivergence best consi-dered as part of agency drivenprocesses of adaptation and asstrategic choices exercised byactors in regional governments?Tese questions were investiga-ted via a series of semi-structu-red interviews with comparablepanels of actors (of around 25interlocutors) in each of ourfour regions. Identical questionswere asked of our interlocutorsin each region3.

HAS ECONOMICCRISIS PRODUCED A

RECENTRALISATION OFPUBLIC FINANCES?Te most obvious effect ofeconomic crisis has involvedmoves to strengthen centralgovernment control over regionaland local government financialcircuits. As central governmentsare now threatened with stifffines if they do not respectthe revised budget and debtcriteria, enshrined in the reatyon Stability, Coordination andGovernance, they are less willingto tolerate spendthriftlocal andregional authorities. In some

instances, in Spain notably,regions have attempted tohand back competencies tocentral government. In Franceand Spain, the proportion oflocal and regional governmentexpenditure directly transferredby central government grantshas been rising (usually withforms of hypothecation).Enhanced centralisation oflocal financial circuits could beobserved in France, for example,mainly as the result of a majortax reform in 2010 that involvedthe abolition of the localcollection and setting of business

rates and its replacement bya more centralised formula-based method of tax collection(Steckel, 2012). In Spain,though many competencieshave been devolved or are sharedwith the central state, 80% ofthe autonomous communitiesfinancial resources aretransferred by the central state(Harguindguy, et al, 2014).Our investigation in Andalucarevealed a region under

sustained financial pressure,suffering budgetary cuts fromcentral government, a decreasingperformance of regional taxesand a drying up of bank loans.Even more than in France andSpain, public finance remains ahighly centralised policy fieldwithin the UK. Te Welshpolicy community demandedenhanced fiscal autonomy, butpoliticians were careful not tocall into question the core block

grant mechanism of financingdevolution, based on the Barnettformula. Key actors involved seelittle prospect for significantchange or reform, even in theevent of Scottish independence.4

Te case of Belgium stands apart(de Visscher and Laborderie,2013). Once the sixth reform ofthe State has been fully imple-mented (in theory in 2014),

the Federal government budgetwill be limited to servicing thenational debt and funding partof social security, with all otherfunctions having been regio-nalised. Te Belgian case raisesthe issue of the relative lack oflinkage between the post-2008economic crisis and changes tothe institutional architecture ofthe state; the causes of ever dee-pening decentralisation are lin-ked to community competition,

communitarisation and regiona-lisation that have their roots inBelgiums uneven history. TeBelgian case demonstrated ahigh degree of polarisation oninstitutional questions betweenthe main Flemish and franco-phone communities. Retainingcredibility as a good Europeanplayer, however, incited the mainactors to agree on key measuresof budgetary retrenchment;

controlling the public debt wasexperienced less as an intole-rable constraint than as a gaugeof managerial credibility.

HAS ECONOMIC CRISISRECENTRALISEDDECENTRALISATION?Rather more general analysisof the impact of the economiccrisis on the decentralised anddevolved forms of governmentrevealed contrasting findings

in our regions. Wales and Wal-lonia, in rather different ways,were tied up with endogenousprogrammes of state reform,and socio-economic issues ofeconomic crisis were given lesssaliency than in either Anda-luca or Brittany. In the cases ofWales and Wallonia, surprisin-gly little indication was provi-ded in fieldwork of the impactof economic crisis on prospects

TERRITORIAL GOVERNANCE IN WESTERN EUROPE BETWEEN

Alistair Cole | rsident au Collegium de Lyon

Alistair Cole est docteur en science politique de luniversit dOxford et professeur de sciences politiques luniversit de Cardiff depuis 1999. Nomm Fellowdelacadmie des sciences sociales de Grande-Bretagne en 2009, il co-prside la commission de science politique de l ESRC, le conseil de recherche scientifique britan-nique. Ses thmes principaux de recherches sont centrs sur la politique en France et en Grande-Bretagne ; lEtat, l administration publique, la dcentralisationet la gouvernance en France et en Europe; laction publique, les partis politiques et les mouvements sociaux territorialiss.

This European treemap visualization shows hierarchies in which the rectangular screen space is divided into about 1000 European NUTS2 regions. Each region belongs to a country in the

The size of the rectangle refers to Total Population while the colour attribute represents elderly population in Europe age group 65+ in %. When the colour and size dimensions are cor

Germany has a high rate of eldery people while, for example, Poland has a younger representation. Dashboard Demonstrator: http://mitweb.itn.liu.se/GAV/dashboard/#story=data/nuts-reg

The RFIEA warmly thanks the National Center for Visual Analytics of the Linkpig University, Sweden, for allowing us to use this map.


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CONVERGENCE AND CAPACITY

for devolved government. InWales, at the time of empirical

investigation (November 2012July 2013) the Welsh Govern-ment had begun a process ofstreamlining public service pro-vision, encouraging collabora-tion between service providersand introducing timid perfor-mance management measures.But local government spendingon frontline services had beensheltered from the worst of thecuts and public service provi-ders acknowledged that condi-tions might deteriorate. Welshpolitical debates were tied upin constitutional futures: wha-

tever happened in the ScottishIndependence referendum andits aftermath would have animpact on Wales. Likewise, thepanel in Wallonia (interviewedin early 2014), though touchedby economic crisis, was preoc-cupied with implementing thesixth state reform programmeand deeply anxious about theprospect of further institutional

and political deadlock after the2014 federal elections.

Te French and Spanish regions,on the other hand, were morefully engaged with enduringeconomic crisis and the effectsof the economic downturn onthe broader territorial model.In both regions, a general senseof pessimism was shared byrepresentatives of all parties,employers organisations, asso-ciations and trade unions. Terewas heightened consciousness ofthe crisis. In Brittany, there wasa deep sense of pessimism aboutthe future of the Breton model

of intensive agriculture, inspiredby the massive layoffs or plantclosures in 2013 at food produ-cers Doux, illy Sabco and Gad.In Andaluca, the atmospherewas also generally pessimistic;the crisis had highlighted thecontradictions of the state ofautonomies. When forced tochoose, Andalucan elites pre-ferred solidarity between regions(using the historical debt of

Spain towards Andaluca as anargument for continuing trans-

fers) over differentiation andenhanced autonomy.

CONVERGINGEUROPEANISATION? ANEND OF THE EUROPE OFTHE REGIONS?Is what direction is the rela-tionship between Europeanintegration and regional govern-ments heading? Does the Euro-pean Union still provide a struc-ture of opportunities for a thirdtier of regional government? Or,on the contrary, does the field-work suggest scepticism towards

the Europe of the Regions?Europe is an important strandof regional governance. Allthe selected regions have beenkey beneficiaries of EU struc-tural funds and the CommonAgricultural Policy. All regionsought to be pro-European.

Te field of European inte-gration appears as one of cleardifferentiation between these

traditionally pro-Europeanregions. Te principal cause of

variation related, first, to whe-ther or not a region is withinthe Eurozone and, second, tothe degree of influence exer-cised domestically in relation tomonetary policy (a highly Euro-peanised policy domain). Euro-peanisation might be unders-tood as an independent variable,in the sense of the definitiongiven by Cole and Drake (2000),where the direction of changeand causality runs clearly fromthe European Union (and itsmultiple institutions) to mem-ber-states and regions. Te Fis-

cal Compact reaty (SCG),agreed in December 2011 andsigned in 2012 by 25 of the 27EU member states, strengthe-ned the automatic penalties tobe paid by states who are unableto control their debt, or to bringinto line their budgets to zerodeficits by 2015. Te SCGcame after a significant fiscaland budgetary tightening in theform of the Six Pack and thewo Pack, allowing the Euro-pean Commission, through theEuropean Semester process, amuch more intrusive oversightinto national budgets (inclu-

ding commenting upon natio-nal budgets before they havepassed the parliamentary stage).Te European Semester pro-cess produces annual reports onthe strengths and, more usually,structural weaknesses of all EUstates (including those, such asthe UK and the Czech Republic,not having signed the SCG).Te details of these reports fil-ter down into fields such as thehousing market, wage indexa-tion, pension ages the core oftraditional economic soverei-gnty. Numerous competencies

dealt with by local and regionalauthorities are concerned; espe-cially in those areas of infras-tructure and investment such asroad building, urban transportor education that required long-term capital investment.

Interlocutors in our three euro-zone states expressed varyingdegrees of engagement with theEuropean project. In Brittany,interviewees stressed their fun-damentally pro-European sen-timent: Europe was part of theBreton DNA. One of the corenovelties of the 2013 round of

interviews related to disillusionwith the European Union as aninstitution (though not with theEuropean ideal). Te neo-libe-ralEuropean model of the Bar-roso Commission was contrastedunfavorably, in interviews, withthe traditional Breton modelof partnership, cooperation andsupport for public services. Tesense of relative deprivation wasaggravated by the EU Com-mission placing obstacles in

the way of direct aids from theFrench government. Andaluca

is also traditionally a stronglypro-European region and a keybeneficiary of EU structuralfunds and the CAP. Against abackdrop of diminishing enthu-siasm for the European pro-ject, fieldwork uncovered twotypes of response to the EUquestion. First, intervieweeslamented diminishing resourcesfrom the EU. Second, the PP-led government in Madrid wasblamed for using the crisis as anargument to recentralise controlover a number of policy sectorsand tighten budgetary stee-

ring. Belgium offered anotherinteresting case. Intervieweesin Wallonia and Belgium ove-rwhelmingly backed the Euro-pean ideal: in the words of oneinterlocutor, Belgians were thelast Europeans, now that evenneighbouring Netherlands andFrance had moved in a less pro-European direction. One inter-viewee believed Belgians to benave, however; the Europeansemester process and the recom-mendations made by Brusselsto stop indexing salaries withinflation were met with conster-nation by the Belgian govern-

ment. Te commitment to zerodeficit budgets by 2015 wasproving extremely difficult forBelgiums regions and commu-nities, as well as its local autho-rities; another interlocutor pre-dicted damaging consequencesfor the level of infrastructuralinvestment.

Te exception is most obviouslypresented by Wales, part of thesterling zone. Te UKs positionoutside of the Eurozone andthe SCG effectively sheltersWales from enhanced Euro-

pean budgetary supervision. Incontrast to Scotland, Wales hasno immediate existential choicesto make and does not have toconsider whether it might haveto join the EU as a new memberstate. Welsh Government rheto-ric remains staunchly pro-Euro-pean. Te EU remains seen as abenevolent fund-provider; therewere clear signs of internal ten-sion with UK premier Cameronand the commitment to hold areferendum in 2017 on the UKsfuture membership of the EU.

Even in the Belgian case, the

fieldwork suggested dimi-nishing enthusiasm for theEurope of the Regions. Againstthis general conclusion, somedistinctions can be drawn,the most obvious of which isbetween: Spain and Belgium,whose regions were at the fore-front of attempts at budgetarydiscipline, and Brittany andWales, somewhat further remo-ved. Membership of the euro-zone certainly played itself out

ierarchy. This colourful presentations accommodates thousands of statistical data items in a meaningfully organized display allowing patterns and exceptions to be spotted immediately.

elated in some way with the tree structure, one can often easily see patterns that would be difficult to spot in other ways, such as if a certain colour is particularly relevant. We see that

ons-ageing-population-in-europe-2010.xml&layout=[map,treemap]


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as one of the key differentiatingvariables between our regions.Beyond the UK exception, threepositions were identified: one(Wallonia) of Europeanisationfacilitating coordination acrosscommunity divides and, in somesense, empowering regions toparticipate in budgetary ret-renchment; a second (Anda-luca) whereby the sacrificesrequired to conform to budge-

tary adjustment as a result of theeconomic crisis were deeply felt(but Madrid was principally bla-med), and a third, that of tradi-tionally pro-European Brittany,feeling a sense of (temporary)betrayal. Overall, we concludethat the economic crisis is pro-ducing tensions between theEU, central governments andsecond order strong identityregions.

THE FUTURES OFREGIONAL GOVERNANCETe financial crisis has providedevidence of some recentraliza-

tion of decentralization, and thelatest phase of EU integrationhas forced central governmentsin most instances to attempt toexercise a tighter supervisionover local and regional govern-ment expenditures. Europeani-sation has produced a lesseningof divergence in legal systemsand in the provenance of muchpublic policy. But domestic statestructures, party systems andthe political rules of the game

still make sense nationally, lea-ding writers such as Schmidt(2006) to diagnose a dangerousgap between (national) politicalcompetition and (European)policy formulation.

Over and above distinctivenational institutional structuresand territorial assymetries, oursurvey demonstrated a highlevel of convergence in relation

to the futures of regional gover-nance. Each of our 100 interlo-cutors was asked to identify thethree principal challenges facedby the region over the next fiveyear period. Tis measure wasintended to capture how ourpanels of comparable actorsenvisaged the future of their res-pective regions. We conclude thisarticle by observing the consi-derable regularities in terms offuture policy challenges for oursample of European regions:

UNEMPLOYMENT, ANDESPECIALLY YOUTH

UNEMPLOYMENT(WALES, ANDALUCA,BRITTANY, BELGIUM).Te pressing state of unem-ployment was recognised ineach of the four regions as thetoughest challenge. Te levelsof youth unemployment inparticular were presented as amajor challenge. Te exampleof Brussels, a city with a strongimmigrant population and ahigh level of social deprivation,

was instructive in this res-pect: the young unemployed of

immigrant origin were prima-rily affected by socio-economicissues, their interest overloo-ked in the community basedrivalry between Flemings andWalloons.

ECONOMICRECONVERSIONAND THE CAPACITYOF ESTABLISHEDTERRITORIAL MODELS(WALES, ANDALUCA,BRITTANY, BELGIUM)In each region, there was soul-searching about the capacity of

the existing territorial modelto cope with economic crisisand the challenges of reconver-sion. Members of our Bretonpanel described a peripheralregion facing a huge crisis ofreconversion. Te traditionalpillars of the Breton economy(agriculture, agro-alimentary)were crumbling and the modelof social-economic concerta-tionwas failing. Rather similarnarratives emerged in each ofour regions.

Education and levels of basicskills was a common theme in

Wales, and Andaluca, to somedegree in francophone Belgiumand Brittany also. In Wales andAndaluci, raising the generaleducational level was identifiedas a vital priority. Te Brittanyregion and Brussels-WalloniaFederation, starting from a muchhigher base, acknowledged pro-blems of unequal educationalperformance.

POLITICALDECENTRALISATION;CHALLENGES ANDOPPORTUNITIES

Te saliency of forms of politicaldevolution came after the firstthree socio-economic issues. Inthe case of Brittany, the per-ceived crisis of 2013 was linkedby many respondents with acase for more political decen-tralisation and a thorough-going regionalisation. In Anda-luca, the PSOE-IU led regionwas caught between resistingMadrids sustained drive atrecentralisation in educationand arguing in favour of sustai-ned solidarityand continuingfinancial transfers from richerregions (such as Catalonia). In

Wales, the future of devolutionwas a major preoccupation, butjudgement was suspended whileawaiting the outcome of theScottish referendum. In Wal-lonia, there was no appetite forfuture decentralisation, but rea-lisation that a new push fromthe Flemings would probablytake place after the May 2014elections.

PRESERVING PUBLICSERVICES

Tese social-democratic regionsall identified the preservationof public services (especiallyhealth and education) as core topreserving their own territorialmodel. Interviewees in the Spa-nish region were proud of theAndalucian modelof welfare,based on fiscal transfers fromricher regions to Andalucain the name of solidarity (andon transfers within Andalucafrom the more affluent citiesto the PSOE-led small towns).Te panel in Brittany, likewise,used economic crisis to argue in

favour of central state aid (for-thcoming in the Breton plan ofDecember 2013). In the caseof Wales, fiscal transfers viathe Barnett formula were givenmore importance than fiscalautonomy; recognising Welshpublic service needs (and rela-tive deprivation) was amongstthe top priorities. In Wallonia,finally, defending public servicesin the name of solidarity wasgiven a high priority.

Tese core chal lenges were suf-ficiently similar to support aconclusion based on ideational

soft convergence. Certainly, thecore challenges identified byregional decision-makers werenot those, in general, that werereadily amenable to regionalinfluence. Our second orderstrong identity regions hadlimited control over core macro-economic levers, and each deve-loped different versions of amode of territorial action basedon influencing central govern-ment and the EU, in a pattern ofmulti-level governance.Each ofour regions had different mixesof territorial political capacity,

and ways of exercising influence;other regions not included inthe survey would not neces-sary share these priorities. Temost significant distinction wasbetween the two regions caughtup in a process of ongoing poli-tical decentralisation (Wales andWallonia) and the French andSpanish regions, which appea-red more directly affected by thedirection of economic crisis andwhose territorial models strug-gled to cope with change.

References1. Leverhulme rust (IN-2012-109),

2012-15 erritorial Governance inWestern Europe: between Conver-gence and CapacityLeverhulmerust International Network award,2012-2015. Te PI extends his gra-teful support to the trust. Te projectLa gouvernance territoriale en Europeentre convergence et capacit is alsosupported by the Collegium of Lyon.2. For a robust general discussion, seeLe Gals (2013)3. Around 100 interviews were car-ried out in fieldwork from Novem-

ber 2012 to March 2014 in Wales,Brittany, Andaluca and Wallonia.

We used a common interview sche-dule designed to elucidate the causalmechanisms that produce divergenceand convergence (identified as beingadministrative, economic, epistemic,institutional, normative, interest-based or multi-level in character). Acommon interview schedule includedquestions that dealt with the impactof the economic crisis on decentra-lisation; on the direct effect of EUregulatory frameworks and the EUmore generally; on best practiceinpublic services (including that pro-moted by the EU or by index ran-king such as PISA); on patterns of

intra- and inter-regional cooperationand policy learning; on inter-govern-mental relations, territorial politicaltraditions and party linkages. Equi-valent panels were contacted in eachregion, composed of three cognategroups: devolved government, regio-nal or regional state actors; repre-sentatives of professional and policycommunities in the fields of publicfinance and secondary education andelected representatives with compe-tence in the field, controlled for byparty affiliation. Interviews are beingtranscribed, data input into N-Vivo10 and will be deposited with the UKData Archive.

4.Tis view was expressed notablyby Gerald Holtham at the BritishAcademy conference of May 31st2013. Reported in S. anburn, (2013)Wales, the United Kingdom andEurope, London: British Academy,pp. 1415.

BibliographyCole, A. and Drake, H., Te Euro-

peanisation of French Polity?Continuity, Change and Adap-tation, Journal of European PublicPolicy7: 1, pp. 2643, 2000.

De Visscher, C. and Laborderie, V.,Belgique: stop ou encore ? Entre

fdralisme, confdralisme etsparatisme, Politique trangre 4,pp. 2335, 2013.

Harguindguy, J.B., Pasquier, R. andCole, A. (2014) La gouvernanceterritoriale espagnole lpreuvede la crise conomique. Vers larecentralisation ? Critique Inter-nationale, 2014.

Le Gals, P., La gouvernance ter-ritoriale sous pression de la criseet de la restructuration de ltat.In Pasquier, R., Simoulin, V. andWeisbein, J. (eds) La Gouvernanceterritoriale. Pratiques, discours etthories, Paris: LGDJ, pp. 289300, 2013.

Schmidt, V., Democracy in Europe,Oxford: Oxford University Press,2006.

Steckel, M.-C., Une autonomiefinancire altre. In Regourd, S.,Carles, J. and Guignard, D. (eds)Rformes et mutations des collectivi-ts territoriales, Paris: lHarmattan,pp. 217235, 2012.

anburn, S., Wales, the UnitedKingdom and Europe, London:British Academy, 2013.

TERRITORIAL GOVERNANCE IN WESTERN EUROPE BETWEEN CONVERGENCE AND CAPACITY

AlistairCole,2013

ChristopheDelory


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In this brief article I want topose a few questions aboutthe possible effects of securitypolitics on the construction of

a European citizenship. First,I shall define security andcitizenship, by referring bothto the existing literature and tothe social and political processesthis literature analyzes. I shallthen describe some of the legaland political measures adop-ted by the EU in the name ofsecurity, principally, but notonly, concerning migrants fromthird countries. Tese measures,combined with national andlocal legislations and rhetoric,I shall argue, tend to constructcitizenship (at all levels: Euro-pean, national, local) in exclusio-

nary terms, around fear ratherthan solidarity, using an us vsthem logic. Tis constructionis at odds with other ways toconceive citizenship at both theEuropean and national levels:the Charter of fundamentalrights, but also many nationalconstitutions, by recognizingmost rights independently oflegal citizenship, de facto adoptand promote a citizenshipwhich is in principle inclusive

and based on what is called theEuropean social model.

SECURITY

Since the early 1990s, a ghostis haunting most of Europe:security has become the focusof much public rhetoric andpolicies at the local, nationaland EU levels, and at the sametime has become the object of aconstantly growing specializedscientific literature. Yet, wellbefore these years the questionof security had been studiedfrom the point of view of crimi-nology, the sociology of devianceand social control, the sociologyof law. Sociologists and crimino-logists described and analyzed ashift in the political understan-

ding and management of crimeand deviance in Western demo-cracies which was being justifiedin the name of security. Suchshift may be summarized as fol-lows: 1) causes of crime anddeviance, whether economic,social, cultural, or (even) psy-chological came to be conside-red of little, if any, importance,in designing crime preventionor war on crime policies. Nei-ther the social and economic

environment, nor the minds ofwould be criminals need there-fore to be changed: rather, poli-cies should aim to make it more

difficult to commit an illegal act,and to incapacitate those whocommit them; 2) the attentionshifted from criminals to vic-tims, especially potential ones,i.e., the good citizens who mustbe defended from crime. Vic-tims get center stage in dealingwith the criminal question (Iexplored the close relationshipbetween victim and the neoli-beral subject in Pitch, 2010; seealso Brown, 2006 and Foessel,2010); 3) measures to deal withcrime and deviance came to a)be based on risk evaluations andthe profiling of potentially dan-

gerous populations, with theadoption of so-called situationalprevention, i.e. measures gearedto diminish the risk of beingcriminally victimized (CCV,enclosure of public spaces, gatedcommunities, zero tolerancelocal policies), and b) the mul-tiplication of criminal offensesand the increase of penalties(the literature is enormous,see for example Cohen, 1985,OMalley, 1992, Feeley, Simon,

1994, Garland, 2001). In short,security, risk prevention and riskminimization became the newkey words and safety and the

containment of dangerousn

perspectives 12

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