persons digest

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Tanada v. Tuvera GR L-63915, 29 December 1986 (146 SCRA 446) Facts: On 24 April 1985, the Court affirmed the necessity for the publication to the OfficialGazette all unpublished presidential issuances which are of general application, and unless so published, they shall have no binding force and effect. Decision was concurred only by 3 judges.Petitioners move for reconsideration / clarification of the decision on various questions. Solicitor General avers that the motion is a request for advisory opinion. February Revolution took place,which subsequently required the new Solicitor General to file a rejoinder on the issue (under Rule 3, Section 18 of the Rules of Court). Issue: Whether publication is still required in light of the clause ³unless otherwise provided´. Held: The clause ³unless it is otherwise provided,´ in Article 2 of the Civil Code, refers to thedate of effectivity and not to the requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any event beomitted. This clause does not mean that the legislature may make the law effective immediatelyupon approval, or on any other date, without its previous publication. The legislature may in itsdiscretion provide that the usual fifteen-day period shall be shortened or extended. Publicationrequirements applies to (1) all statutes, including those of local application and private laws; (2) presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the President in the exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated by the legislature or directlyconferred by the Constitution; (3) Administrative rules and regulations for the purpose of enforcing or implementing existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation; (4) Charter of a citynotwithstanding that it applies to only a portion of the national territory and directly affects onlythe inhabitants of

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Page 1: Persons Digest

Tanada v. Tuvera

GR L-63915, 29 December 1986 (146 SCRA 446)

Facts:

On 24 April 1985, the Court affirmed the necessity for the publication to the OfficialGazette all unpublished presidential issuances which are of general application, and unless so published, they shall have no binding force and effect. Decision was concurred only by 3 judges.Petitioners move for reconsideration / clarification of the decision on various questions. Solicitor General avers that the motion is a request for advisory opinion. February Revolution took place,which subsequently required the new Solicitor General to file a rejoinder on the issue (under Rule 3, Section 18 of the Rules of Court).

Issue:

Whether publication is still required in light of the clause ³unless otherwise provided´.

Held:

The clause ³unless it is otherwise provided,´ in Article 2 of the Civil Code, refers to thedate of effectivity and not to the requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any event beomitted. This clause does not mean that the legislature may make the law effective immediatelyupon approval, or on any other date, without its previous publication. The legislature may in itsdiscretion provide that the usual fifteen-day period shall be shortened or extended. Publicationrequirements applies to (1) all statutes, including those of local application and private laws; (2) presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the President in the exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated by the legislature or directlyconferred by the Constitution; (3) Administrative rules and regulations for the purpose of enforcing or implementing existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation; (4) Charter of a citynotwithstanding that it applies to only a portion of the national territory and directly affects onlythe inhabitants of that place; (5) Monetary Board circulars to ³fill in the details´ of the CentralBank Act which that body is supposed to enforce. Further, publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its purpose is to inform the public of the contents of the laws.

Reasoning:

The Supreme Court declared that all laws as above defined shall immediately upontheir approval, or as soon thereafter as possible, be published in full in the Official Gazette, to become effective only after 15 days from their publication, or on another date specified by thelegislature, in accordance with Article 2 of the Civil Code

People vs Que Po Lay

TITLE: People of the Phils v Que Po Lay

Page 2: Persons Digest

CITATION: 94 Phil 640 | GR No. 6791, March 29, 1954

FACTS:

The appellant was in possession of foreign exchange consisting of US dollars, US checks and US money orders amounting to about $7000 but failed to sell the same to the Central Bank as required under Circular No. 20.

Circular No. 20 was issued in the year 1949 but was published in the Official Gazette only on Nov. 1951 after the act or omission imputed to Que Po Lay.

Que Po Lay appealed from the decision of the lower court finding him guilty of violating Central Bank Circular No. 20 in connection with Sec 34 of RA 265 sentencing him to suffer 6 months imprisonment, pay fine of P1,000 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.

ISSUE: Whether or not publication of Circular 20 in the Official Gazette is needed for it to become effective and subject violators to corresponding penalties.

HELD:

It was held by the Supreme Court, in an en banc decision, that as a rule, circular and regulations of the Central Bank in question prescribing a penalty for its violation should be published before becoming effective. This is based on the theory that before the public is bound by its contents especially its penal provisions, a law, regulation or circular must first be published for the people to be officially and specifically informed of such contents including its penalties.

Thus, the Supreme Court reversed the decision appealed from and acquit the appellant, with costs de oficio.

Philippine International Trading Co. vs Angeles

20 11 2010

1 Vote

263 scra 420

Publication – Administrative Orders

PITC issued Administrative Order No. SOCPEC 89-08-01 under which applications to the PITC for importation from the People’s Republic of China must be accompanied by a viable and confirmed export program of Philippine products. PITC barred Remington and Firestone from importing products from China on the ground that they were not able to comply with the requirement of the said administrative order. Thereafter they filed a petition for prohibition and mandamus against the said order of PITC in which the trial court upheld and declared to be null and void for being unconstitutional. The court

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contends further authority to process and approve applications for imports SOCPEC and to issue rules and regulations pursuant to LOI 144 has already been repealed by EO 133 issued on February 27, 1987. Hence, the PITC filed a certiorari seeking the reversal of the said decision.

ISSUE: Whether or not PITC’s Administrative Order 89-08-01 is valid.

HELD: The Supreme Court held that PITC is empowered to issue such order; nevertheless, the said AO is invalid within the context of Article 2 of the New Civil Code. The Court cited Tanada vs Tuvera which states that all statues including those of local application and private laws shall be published as condition for their effectivity, which shall begin 15 days after publication in the Official Gazette or a newspaper of general circulation unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature. The AO under consideration is one of those issuances which should be published for its effectivity since it is punitive in character.

Municipal Government of Coron, Palawan vs. Cariño154 SCRA 216

FACTS:Sometime in 1976, an action was filed by the petitionerbefore the Court of First Instance of Palawan and Puerto PrincesaCity. The action sought to demolish the structures built by theprivate respondents alongside the rock causeway of the petitioners'wharf.After a series of postponements, the trial court, on January 16,1979 reset the hearing for the lat time for three consecutive dates,March 20, 21 and 22, 1979 with further warning to the privaterespondents that no more postponements shall be allowed. On March20, 1979 despite proper notice, the private respondents and theircounsel failed to appear at the scheduled hearing.

The petitioner then moved that private respondents' non-appearancebe considered as a waiver on their parts and rights to be heard. Theprivate respondents went to the appellate court for certiorari butthe petition was dismissed due to lack of merit.

On appeal, the private respondents were required "to submit theforty (40) printed copies of their record on appeal together withthe proof of service of fifteen (15) copies thereof with appellee."However, the respondents still failed to comply with therequirements even after the sixty (60) days extension.

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A resolution, dated September 27, 1982, dismissing the privaterespondents appeal had became final and executory. The respondents,in their supplemental motion argued that since under the presentlaw, printed records on appeal are no longer required, their rightto be heard on appeal must be upheld instead of the rule ontechnicalities.

ISSUE/S:

Whether or not the procedural rules invoked by the privaterespondents be given retroactive effect?HELD:NO, because the Supreme Court have resolved the issue as tothe extent of the retroactive application of Section 18 of theInterim Rules of Court. It reiterated that "Statutes regulating theprocedure of the courts will be construed as applicable to actionspending and undetermined at the time of their passage. Procedurallaws are retrospective in that sense and to that extent.WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The resolution ofthe respondent appellate court dated July 29, 1983 is SET ASIDE.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT

Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. L-60316 January 31, 1983

VIOLETA ALDAY and ERNESTO Yu, petitioners,

vs.

HONORABLE SERAFIN E. CAMILON, as Judge temporarily presiding over Branch XXV of the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Pasig), SHERIFF OF PASIG, respondents.

Moises B. Boquia for petitioners.

Acebes, Del Carmen, Cecilio, Cinco & Ferrer Law Office for respondent Aboitiz.

R E S O L U T I O N

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MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:

The issue for resolution is whether or not respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion in issuing a Writ of Execution to enforce the Decision in Civil Case No. 31725 of his Court for a sum of money entitled Aboitiz & Co Inc. v Violets Alday and Ernesto Yu, notwithstanding the fact that petitioners, as defendants aid the losing party below, had timely filed a Notice of Appeal and posted a cash appeal bond, but did not submit any Record on Appeal.

There is no question that the Decision of the lower Court adverse to petitioners was rendered on August 13, 1981. Copy thereof was received by them on September 1, 1981. Within time, petitioners filed on September 4, 1981 a Notice of Appeal and a cash appeal bond, but without a Record on Appeal. On March 25, 1982, respondent Judge issued the questioned Order granting execution since petitioners had not perfected an appeal within the reglementary period for failure on their part to file a Record on Appeal within the prescribed period,

Petitioners justify the non-filing of the Record on Appeal by invoking section 39 of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 (Batas Pambansa Blg. 129) providing that "no record on appeal shall, be required to take an appeal." They claim that the Act was approved on August 14, 1981 and Section 48 thereof specifically provides that it was to take effect immediately.

Petitioners overlook, however, Section 44 of BP Blg. 129 specifically providing that its provisions were to be immediately carried out in accordance with an Executive Order to be issued by the President and that the old Courts would continue to function until the completion of the reorganization as declared by the President. Moreover, it will be recalled that on September 3, 1981, a Petition questioning the constitutionality of that law was instituted before this Court (De la Llana vs. Alba, G.R. No. L-57883). The constitutionality of that law was upheld in our Decision of March 12, 1982 (112 SCRA 294). Consequently, prior to that date, and before the issuance of Executive Order No. 864, dated January 17, 1983, declaring the completion of the reorganization of the Judiciary, BP Big. 129 could not be said to have been in force and effect. It was prematurely for petitioners to have invoked that law to justify their stand in not filing a Record on Appeal, and respondent Judge cannot be faulted with grave abuse of discretion for having authorized the issuance of the Writ of Execution since, for lack of compliance with the procedure for taking an appeal under the former Rules of Court, the lower Court Decision would have become final.

Nonetheless, in Executive Order No. 864, dated January 17, 1983, the President of the Philippines had declared that the former Courts were deemed automatically abolished as of 12:00 o'clock midnight of January 17, 1983. The reorganization having been declared to have been completed, BP Blg. 129 is now in full force and effect. A Record on Appeal is no longer necessary for taking an appeal. The same proviso appears in Section 18 of the Interim Rules aid Guidelines issued by this Court on January 11, 1983. Being

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procedural in nature, those provisions may be applied retroactively for the benefit of petitioners, as appellant.

Statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will be construed as applicable to action's pending and undetermined at the time of their passage. Procedural laws are retrospective in that sense and to that extent (People vs. Sumilang, 77 Phil. 764 [1946]).

ACCORDINGLY, the Order of respondent Judge (now an Associate Justice of the Intermediate Appellate Court) granting the issuance of the Writ of Execution is hereby set aside and the branch of the Regional Trial Court to whom the case below has been assigned is hereby directed to give due course to petitioners' appeal even without a Record on Appeal. The temporary Restraining Order heretofore issued by this Tribunal enjoining the enforcement of the Writ of Execution issued by the lower Court is hereby made permanent.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC

DECISION

July 30, 1914

G.R. No. L-9243

GUILLERMO DE LOS SANTOS, petitioner-appellee,

vs.

FELIX DE LA CRUZ, respondent-appellant.

Valerio Fontanilla for appellant.

Pedro n. Liongson for appellee.

TORRES, J.:

This is an appeal raised through a bill of exceptions from the decision of May 31, 1913, whereby the Honorable James A. Ostrand, judge, overruled the objection of Felix de la Cruz and decreed the

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adjudication and registration of all the land in question in favor of the conjugal partnership of Guillermo de los Santos and Maria Yuson.

By a written petition dated September 5, 1912, Guillermo de los Santos applied to the Court of Land Registration for registration of a tract of land belonging to them, situated in the place called Apunan-auac, barrio of Calubasan, municipality of Bamban, Province of Tarlac. The said tract is bounded on the north by property of Felipe Lagman, on the southeast by Dolores Singian, on the south by Agaton Lugtu, on the west by Alberto Rivera, and on the northeast by Felipe de la Cruz. It measures 152.468 square meters and its description and bounderies are set forth in detail in the attached plan; it was last assessed for the purpose of the land tax at $140, being free from any kind of encumbrance and no person was entitled to participate therein; that the said land had acquired by purchase from the spouses Nicolas Maristela and Friolana Magtoto and that he is now occupying it; that he has been married since October 27,1909, to Maria Yuson. In case his application should not be proper under the Land Registration Act he laid claims to the benefits of Chapter VI of Act No. 926, especially as he had been in possession of the land since 1911, having built a fence around it and used it for the cultivation of rice and garden truck for more than a year.

On April 3, 1913, counsel for Felix de la Cruz objected in writing to the foregoing application, alleging that the lot indicated by the letter A in the plan ought not to be registered, as the applicant claims, because he is the absolute and exclusive owner thereof; and he prays that the application and registration to be denied by reference to the lot marked “A.”

After trial of the case on the same date and examination of the evidenced adduced by the parties, together with the documents exhibited, the trial court rendered the judgment set forth. The respondent Cruz excepted thereto and prayed for a reopening of the case and the holding of a new trial. This motion was overruled, with exception on the part of the respondent, whose counsel in due time presented the corresponding bill of exceptions, requesting that the documents and evidence submitted at the trial form a part thereof, and, having been approved and certified by the court, it was forwarded with the record of the case to the clerk of this court in virtue of the appeal filed.

The opposition set up by Felix de la Cruz to the application for inscription in the property register requested by Guillermo de los Santos of land situate in Apunan-auac, as hereinbefore set forth, is based n the improper inclusion of a portion of his land in the plan, Exhibit A, which is the lot indicated by letter A on the western side of the said tract. To this end the respondent presented at the hearing of the case the notarial document, Exhibit 1, executed on October 7, 1904, and ratified under oath by the interested parties before a notary on this same date. In this document it appears that the spouses Jose Torres Pamintuan and Carmen Tizon sold absolutely to Felix de la Cruz a parcel of land situate in Tibag or Dungan Tapayan, a place included in the municipality of Bamban, Tarlac, of approximately 27 balitas in extent of area, bounded on the north by the property of Fernando Manipun, on the by Mariano Ocampo, on the south by Alberto Rivera, and on the west by Basilio Macale.

There can be no doubt that the respondent’s land is bounded on the east by that of the petitioner.

Page 8: Persons Digest

It appears in the case that the petitioner Santos acquired his tract by purchase from the spouses Nicolas Maristela and Froilana Magtoto, who in turn had acquired it from Mariano Ocampo; and that according to the notarial deed of sale executed by the spouses Torres and Tizon in favor of the purchaser Cruz the land acquired by the latter from them is bounded on the east by that of Mariano Ocampo, the original owner of the land sold by him to Maristela couple afterwards purchased from them by the petitioner Santos; wherefore it is beyond all doubt that the petitioner’s land is east of the respondent’s, just as this is in turn situated on the west of the said land of the applicant.

These very important facts appear to be fully proven in the case, so, far from the proper and just punishment of the controversy it is of the greatest importance to determine the boundery line between the two tracts, for according to the way this is fixed so will it appear whether a certain portion of the land belonging to Felix de la Cruz was really included in the plan, Exhibit A, presented by the petitioner Guillermo de los Santos.

The contention of the respondent Cruz that a certain portion of his tract was included in the plan prepared by the petitioner is confirmed by Isidro Ocampo, son of the original owner of the tract, Mariano Ocampo.

Nevertheless, this witness, as well as those of the petitioner, asserts that the boundery line between the two tracts was the byroad that passes along the line drawn from Nos. 12 to 13 on the said plan. One of them, Pablo Rivera, added that the land which now belongs to Felix de la Cruz was originally his father’s and passed to the spouses Domiciano Tizon and Dolores Singian, from whom Felix de la Cruz later acquired it. The byroad located on the line 12 to 13 of the plan, which separates the two tracts as a boundery line, does not at the present time exist. The other witness, Nicolas Maristela, former owner of the petitioner’s land stated that while he was in possession of it he had no question with any one over said boundery line, and pointed out that the land which had belonged to Singian is west of the old byroad, while the petitioner’s land is east thereof. Although the respondent Cruz affirms that the boundery line between his land and the petitioner’s runs along the dotted line 1 to 2, still this affirmation does not appear to be supported by any evidence in the case.

In the face of such evidence, notoriously favorable to the petitioner, the trial court held in the decision appealed from that the small excess, 70 ares in area, which is to be noticed in the application with reference to the set forth in the petitioner’s titles, can be attributed to defects incurred in making the old survey, and it is impossible to reject this finding when it is considered that the respondent did not present the plan of his land, wherein he might have specified in detail the portion of the land of which he was deprived and which was unduly included in the petitioner’s plan, nor has he proven the exact and true area of the part of his property he now claims; while it appear to be proven in the record that Guillermo de los Santos is in possession of all the land comprised in plan A, including the part of the lot A in question, and therefore no legal grounds exists whereby the respondent’s claim can be justified, especially when it is impossible without good legal ground to set aside the opinion formed by the trial court in passing upon the merits of evidence adduced in the case by both parties.

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The respondent is also a claimant and as such cannot escape the obligation to prove the allegations contained in his exception to the application of the party who alleges that he is the owner of the land sought to be registered, and if the respondent Cruz has not succeeded in disproving with evidence the allegations of Santos, who has proved his ownership of the land, then the registration sought by the latter is proper under the law.

For the foregoing reasons, whereby the errors assigned to the judgment appealed from are held to be refuted, affirmation of the same is proper, as we do hereby affirm it; with the costs against the appellant.

Arellano, C.J., Johnson, Carson, Moreland and Araullo, JJ., concur.

ALLIED BANKING CORPORATION

vs

. CA and POTENCIANO L.GALANIDAG.R. No. 144412November 18, 2003

Carpio, J.

Facts:Private respondent is an employee of petitioner, hired as anaccountant-bookkeeper and eventually promoted as an assistantmanager which included his transfer to several branches ninetimes. His appointment was covered by a “Notice of PersonnelAction” which provides as one of the conditions of employment theprovision on petitioner’s right to transfer employees on as a regularappointment as the need arises in the interest of maintaining smoothand uninterrupted service to the public.Effecting a rotation/movement of officers assigned inthe Cebu homebase, petitioner listed respondent as second in theorder of priority of assistant managers to be assigned outside of Cebu City. However, private respondent refused to be transferredto Bacolod City in a letter by reason of parental obligations, expenses,and the anguish that would result if he is away from his family. Hethereafter filed a complaint before the Labor Arbiter for constructivedismissal.Subsequently, petitioner informed private respondent that hewas to report to the Tagbilaran City Branch, however, privaterespondent again refused. As a result, petitioner warned and requiredhim to follow the said orders; otherwise, he shall be penalized underthe company’s discipline policy. Furthermore, private respondent wasrequired to explain and defend himself. The latter replied stating thatwhether he be suspended or dismissed, it would all the moreestablish and fortify his complaint pending before the NLRC andfurther charges petitioner with discrimination and favoritism inordering his transfer. He further alleges that the management’sdiscriminatory act of transferring only the long staying accountants of Cebu in the guise of its exercise of management prerogative when intruth and in fact, the ulterior motive is to accommodate some newofficers who happen to enjoy favorable connection with management.As a result, petitioner, through a Memo, informed privaterespondent that Allied Bank is terminating him. The reasons given forthe dismissal were: (1) continued refusal to be transferred from the Jakosalem, Cebu City branch; and (2) his refusal to report for workdespite the denial of his application for additional vacation leave. The Labor Arbiter held that petitioner had abused itsmanagement prerogative in ordering private respondent’s transferand the refusal by the latter did not amount to insubordination.

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TheNLRC likewise ruled that: (1) petitioner terminated the privaterespondent without just cause considering family considerations; (2)the transfer is a demotion since the Bacolod and Tagbilaran brancheswere smaller than the Jakosalem branch, a regional office, andbecause the bank wanted him, an assistant manager, to replace anassistant accountant in the Tagbilaran branch; (3) the terminationwas illegal for lack of due process as no hearing appears to have beenconducted and that petitioner failed to send a termination notice andinstead issued a Memo merely stating a notice of termination wouldbe issued, but petitioner did not issue any notice; and (4) petitionerdismissed private respondent in bad faith, tantamount to an unfairlabor practice as the dismissal undermined the latter’s right tosecurity of tenure and equal protection of the laws. The ruling of NLRC was later affirmed by the Court of Appeals.Issues:1.WHETHER THERE IS LEGAL BASIS IN PETITIONER’SEXERCISE OF ITS MANAGEMENT PREROGATIVE.

2.

WHETHER PRIVATE RESPONDENT’S REFUSAL TO TRANSFER CONSTITUTES VIOLATIONS OF COMPANY RULESWARRANTING THE PENALTY OF DISMISSAL.3.WHETHER PETITIONER DISCRIMINATED AGAINST PRIVATERESPONDENT IN DIRECTING HIS TRANSFER.

4.

WHETHER PRIVATE RESPONDENT’S TRANSFERCONSTITUTES A DEMOTION.5.WHETHER PETITIONER IS COMMITTED ULP.6.WHETHER ALLIED BANK AFFORDED PRIVATE RESPONDENTDUE PROCESS.Held:

1.

Yes. The rule is that the transfer of an employee ordinarilylies within the ambit of the employer’s prerogatives. Theemployer exercises the prerogative to transfer an employee forvalid reasons and according to the requirement of its business,provided the transfer does not result in demotion in rank ordiminution of the employee’s salary, benefits and other

privileges. In illegal dismissal cases, the employer has the burdenof showing that the transfer is not unnecessary, inconvenient andprejudicial to the displaced employee.

2.

Yes. Private respondent was well aware of petitioner’spolicy of periodically transferring personnel to differentbranches. The assignment to the different branches of AlliedBank was a condition of his employment and he consented to thiscondition when he signed the Notice of Personnel Action. The Court cannot accept the proposition that when anemployee opposes his employer’s decision to transfer him toanother work place, there being no bad faith or underhandedmotives on the part of either party, it is the employee’s wishesthat should be made to prevail. The refusal to obey a valid transfer order constituteswillful disobedience of a lawful order of an employer. Employeesmay object to, negotiate and seek redress against employers forrules or orders that they regard as unjust or illegal. However,until and

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unless these rules or orders are declared illegal orimproper by competent authority, the employees ignore ordisobey them at their peril. Therefore, privaterespondent’s continued refusal to obey Allied Bank’s transferorders warrants just cause in his dismissal in accordance withArticle 282 (a) of the Labor Code and thus not entitled toreinstatement or to separation pay.

3.

No. Allied Bank’s letter of 13 June 1994 showed that atleast 14 accounting officers and personnel from variousbranches, including private respondent, were transferred to otherbranches. Allied Bank did not single him out. The same letterexplained that he was second in line for assignmentoutside Cebu because he had been in Cebu for seven yearsalready. It must be noted that none of the other transferees joined private respondents in his complaint or corroborated hisallegations of widespread discrimination and favoritism.

4.

No. No evidence was presented showing that the transferwould diminish his salary, benefits, or privileges. On the contrary,petitioner’s letter of 13 June 1994 assured private respondentthat he would not suffer any reduction in rank or grade, and thatthe transfer would involve the same rank, duties and obligations.

5.

No. Unfair labor practices relate only to violations of “theconstitutional right of workers and employees to self-organization” and are limited to the acts enumerated in Article248 of the Labor Code, none of which applies to the presentcase. There is no evidence that private respondent took part informing a union, or even that a union existed in Allied Bank.

6.

Yes. To be effective, a dismissal must comply with Section2 (d), Rule 1, Book VI of the Omnibus Rules Implementing theLabor Code which provides:For termination of employment based on just causesas defined in Article 282 of the Labor Code:(i)A written notice served on the employee specifyingthe ground or grounds of termination, and givingsaid employee reasonable opportunity within whichto explain his side.(ii)A hearing or conference during which theemployee concerned, with the assistance of counsel if he so desires is given opportunity torespond to the charge, present his evidence, orrebut the evidence presented against him.

(iii)

A written notice of termination served onthe employee indicating that upon dueconsideration of all the circumstances, groundshave been established to justify his termination. The first written notice was embodied in Allied Bank’s letterof 13 June 1994. The first notice required private respondent toexplain why no disciplinary action should be taken against him for hisrefusal to comply with the transfer orders. On the requirement of ahearing, the Court has held that the essence of due process is simplyan

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opportunity to be heard. An actual hearing is not necessary. Theexchange of several letters gave him an opportunity to respond to thecharges against him. The Memo, although captioned “Transfer and Reassignment,”did not preclude it from being a notice of termination. The Court hasheld that the nature of an instrument is characterized not by the titlegiven to it but by its body and contents. Moreover, private respondenthimself regarded the Memo as a notice of termination. The Memoshows that it unequivocally informed private respondent of AlliedBank’s decision to dismiss him and discussed the findings of theInvestigation Committee that served as grounds for the dismissal. Inaddition, the Memo also refuted the charges of discrimination anddemotion.However, the Memo suffered from certain errors. Althoughthe Memo stated that termination was to be effective as of 1

September 1994, the Memo bore the date 8 September 1994. Moreimportantly, private respondent only received a copy of the Memoon 5 October 1994, or more than a month after the supposed date of his dismissal. To be effective, a written notice of termination mustbe served on the employee. Allied Bank could not terminate him on 1September 1994 because he had not received as of that date thenotice of Allied Bank’s decision to dismiss him. The dismissal couldonly take effect on 5 October 1994, upon his receipt of the Memo. Forthis reason, private respondent is entitled to backwages for theperiod from 1 September 1994 to 4 October 1994.Fallo:CA and NLRC affirmed. Case is remanded to the Labor Arbiter forthe computationof the backwages, inclusive of allowances and otherbenefits, due to private respondent from 1 September 1994 until 4October 1994.Labor Arbiter Dominador A. Almirante and Atty. Loreto M. Duranoare ADMONISHED to be more careful in citing the decisions of theSupreme Court in the future (

Dosch v. NLRC)

PEOPLE VS. NOEL TUDTUD AND DINDO BOLONG

G.R. No. 144037, Sept.ember 26, 2003

Facts: Solier informed the police that Tudtud would come back with new stocks of marijuana. Policemen saw two men alighted from the bus, helping each other carry a carton/ box, one of them fitted the description of Tudtud. They approached the two and Tudtud denied that he carried any drugs. The latter opened the box, beneath dried fish where two bundles, one wrapped in a plastic bag and another in newspapers. Policemen asked Tudtud to unwrap the packages and contained what seemed to the police as marijuana leaves. The two did not resist the arrest. Charged with illegal possession of prohibited drugs, they pleaded not guilty and interposed the defense that they were framed up. The trial court convicted them with the crime charged and sentenced them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

Issue: Whether or not searches and seizures without warrant may be validly obtained.

Held: The rule is that a search and seizure must be carried out through or with a judicial warrant; otherwise such “search and seizure” becomes reasonable within the meaning of the constitutional provision, and any evidence secured thereby will be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding. Except with the following instances even in the absence of a warrant: 1) Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest, 2) Search in evidence in plain view, 3) Search of a moving vehicle, 4)

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Consented warrantless search, 5) Customs search, 6) Stop and frisk and 7) Exigent and emergency circumstances.

The long –standing rule in this jurisdiction, applied with a degree of consistency, is that, a reliable information alone is not sufficient to justify a warrantless arrest. Hence, the items seized were held inadmissible, having been obtained in violation of the accused’s constitutional rights against unreasonable searches and seizures.

THE PROVINCE OF MISAMIS ORIENTAL represented by its PROVINCIAL TREASURER v. CAGAYAN ELECTRICPOWER AND LIGHT COMPANYG.R. No. L-45355. January 12, 1990FACTS

Cagayan Electric Power and Light Company, Inc. (CEPALCO) was granted a franchise on June 17, 1961 under Republic Act 3247. It was amended by Republic Act 3570 and Republic Act 6020. On June 28, 1973, the Local Tax Codewas promulgated which provides that the province may impose a tax on businesses enjoying franchise. Pursuant thereto,the Province of Misamis enacted Provincial Revenue Ordinance No. 19. It demanded payment. CEPALCO refused to pay,alleging that it is exempt from all taxes except the franchise tax required by Republic Act 6020. The provincial fiscalupheld the ordinance. CEPALCO paid under protest. On appeal to the Secretary of Justice, ruled in favor of CEPALCO.The province filed a petition with the trial court but was dismissed. Thus, the petition.

ISSUE

Whether CEPALCO is exempt from paying the provincial franchise tax.

RULING

Yes. First off, there is no provision in PD No. 231 expressly or impliedly amending or repealing sec. 3 of RA 6020which exempts CEPALCO. The rule is that a special and local statute applicable to a particular case is not repealed by a later statute which is general in its terms, provisions and application even if the terms of the general act are broadenough to include the cases in the special law unless there is manifest intent to repeal or alter the special law.The franchise of CEPALCO expressly exempts it from payment of “all taxes of whatever authority” except 3% taxon its gross earnings. Such exemption is part of the inducement for the acceptance of the franchise and the rendition of public service by the grantee.Local Tax Regulation No. 3-75 issued by the Secretary of Finance on June 26, 1976, has made it crystal clear that the franchise tax provided in the Local Tax Code (P.D. No. 231, Sec. 9) may only be imposed on companies with franchises that do not contain the exempting clause “in-lieu-of-all-taxes

GR No. L-30061 (February 27, 1974)

People vs. Jabinal

FACTS:

Jabinal was found guilty of the crime of Illegal Possession of Firearm and Ammunition.

Page 14: Persons Digest

The accused admitted that on September 5, 1964, he was in possession of the revolver and the ammunition described in the complaint, without the requisite license or permit. He, however, claimed to be entitled to exoneration because, although he had no license or permit, he had an appointment as Secret Agent from the Provincial Governor of Batangas and an appointment as Confidential Agent from the PC Provincial Commander, and the said appointments expressly carried with them the authority to possess and carry the firearm in question.

The accused contended before the court a quo that in view of his above-mentioned appointments as Secret Agent and Confidential Agent, with authority to possess the firearm subject matter of the prosecution, he was entitled to acquittal on the basis of the Supreme Court’s decision in People vs. Macarandang(1959) and People vs. Lucero(1958) and not on the basis of the latest reversal and abandonment in People vs. Mapa (1967).

ISSUE:

Whether or not appellant should be acquitted on the basis of the court’s rulings in Macarandang and Lucero, or should his conviction stand in view of the complete reversal of the MAcarandang and Lucero doctrine in Mapa.

RULING:

Decisions of this Court, under Article 8 of the New Civil Code states that “Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system … .” The settled rule supported by numerous authorities is a restatement of legal maxim “legis interpretatio legis vim obtinet” — the interpretation placed upon the written law by a competent court has the force of law.

Appellant was appointed as Secret Agent and Confidential Agent and authorized to possess a firearm pursuant to the prevailing doctrine enunciated in Macarandang and Lucero under which no criminal liability would attach to his possession of said firearm in spite of the absence of a license and permit therefor, appellant must be absolved. Certainly, appellant may not be punished for an act which at the time it was done was held not to be punishable.

The appellant was acquitted.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC

DECISION

May 17, 1955

Page 15: Persons Digest

G.R. No. L-7862

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.

HON. MAXIMO ABAÑO, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, et al., respondents.

Albino L. Figueroa, Gelasio L. Dimaano and Consolacion L. Rivas-Abejuro for petitioner.

Francisco M. Ramos for respondent.

Padilla, J.:

An information charging Zacarias Suñga with attempted rape was filed in the court of first Instance of Pampanga (Crim. Case No. 1831). At the trial of the defendant held on 26 and 27 May 1954 two witnesses for the prosecution testified. The trial was continued and the resumption thereof was set for 1 June. On 31 May the assistant provincial fiscal filed a petition for continuance of the trial for the reason that Atanacia L. Mallare, the complaining witness, was suffering from chololelithiasis and right ureterolithiasis and confined in the Mary Chiles Hospital in Manila. A verified medical certificate issued by Dr. Martin Santos, the attending physician, was attached to the petition. Before acting on the petition for continuance the respondent judge inquired from the Director of the Provincial Hospital of Pampanga about the ailment from which the complainant claimed she was suffering, and directed the clerk of court to call up the Director of the Mary Chiles Hospital in Manila by long distance telephone to find out whether the complaining witness was really confined there. The clerk reported that she was. In spite of the objection of the assistant provincial fiscal to an early resumption of the trial because of the inability of the complainant to leave the hospital before two or three weeks, as stated in the attending physician’s affidavit (Annex B-1), the resumption of the trial was set for 12 June. On 11 June the assistant provincial fiscal moved for continuance of the trial because the complainant was still sick and confined in the Sacred Heart Hospital in Manila. The resumption of the trial was set for 15 June. On this day the private prosecutor moved for continuance of the trial because of complainant’s sickness and confinement in the hospital. The motion was denied and because of the inability of the prosecution to produce further evidence, counsel for the defense moved for the dismissal of the case. Before the end of the trial on that day the prosecution announced its intention to file a petition for a writ of certiorari and injunction in this Court. After the respondent judge had reserved his resolution on the motion to dismiss, on that same day he dismissed the case.

The prosecution filed this petition to annul and set aside the order of the respondent judge which denied the motion for continuance of the trial on the ground that it was a grave abuse of discretion.

After a perusal of the documents attached to the petition for a writ of certiorari, we fail to find an abuse of discretion committed by the respondent judge. He took pains to inquire about the nature of the ailment from which the complaining witness claimed she was suffering. He continued the trial three times, to wit: on 27 May, 1 and 12 June. The defendant was entitled to a speedy trial. When on 15 June, the last day set for the resumption of the trial, the prosecution failed to secure continuance thereof and

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could not produce further evidence because of the absence of the complaining witness, the respondent judge was justified in dismissing the case upon motion of the defense. Even if the denial of the motion for continuance be deemed an error, still it does not amount to a grave abuse of discretion. An error committed by a competent court in ruling on interlocutory or incidental matters or in deciding a case does not divest it of its jurisdiction. Neither does such an error render the ruling or judgment null and void. The defendant was placed in jeopardy of punishment for the offense charged in the information and the annulment or setting aside of the order of dismissal would place him twice in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense.

The petition for a writ of certiorari is denied and the writ of preliminary injunction to prevent the respondent judge from further proceeding with the trial of the defendant issued ten days after the order of dismissal of the case had been entered is dissolved. No costs shall be taxed.

Bengzon, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, and Reyes, J.B.L., JJ., concur.

IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF STEPHANIE NATHY ASTORGA GARCIAHONORATO B. CATINDIG, Petitioner

G.R. No. 148311. March 31, 2005Facts:On August 31, 2000,

Honorato B. Catindig

, herein petitioner, filed a petition to adopthis minor illegitimate child

Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia

. He alleged therein, amongothers, that Stephanie was born on June 26, 1994; that her mother is

Gemma Astorga Garcia

;that Stephanie has been using her mother's middle name and surname; and that he is now awidower and qualified to be her adopting parent. He prayed that Stephanie's middle nameAstorga be changed to '

Garcia

, her mother's surname, and that her surname '

Garcia

be changedto '

Catindig

, his surname. Finding the petition to be meritorious, the same is

GRANTED

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. Henceforth, StephanieNathy Astorga Garcia is hereby freed from all obligations of obedience and maintenance withrespect to her natural mother, and for civil purposes, shall henceforth be the petitioner'slegitimate child and legal heir. Pursuant to Article 189 of the Family Code of the Philippines, theminor shall be known as STEPHANIE NATHY CATINDIG.On April 20, 2001, petitioner filed a motion for clarification and/or reconsiderationpraying that Stephanie should be allowed to use the surname of her natural mother (GARCIA) asher middle name.Issue:Whether or not, an illegitimate child, upon adoption by her natural father,

use thesurname of her natural mother

as

her middle name

?Held:

Notably, the law is likewise silent as to what middle name an adoptee may use.

Article 10 of the New Civil Code provides that: In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail.

WHEREFORE

, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision is partly MODIFIEDin the sense that Stephanie should be allowed to use her mother's surname 'GARCIA as her middle name.Let the corresponding entry of her correct and complete name be entered in the decree of adoption

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT

Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. L-68470 October 8, 1985

ALICE REYES VAN DORN, petitioner,

vs.

HON. MANUEL V. ROMILLO, JR., as Presiding Judge of Branch CX, Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Region Pasay City and RICHARD UPTON respondents.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:\

In this Petition for certiorari and Prohibition, petitioner Alice Reyes Van Dorn seeks to set aside the Orders, dated September 15, 1983 and August 3, 1984, in Civil Case No. 1075-P, issued by respondent

Page 18: Persons Digest

Judge, which denied her Motion to Dismiss said case, and her Motion for Reconsideration of the Dismissal Order, respectively.

The basic background facts are that petitioner is a citizen of the Philippines while private respondent is a citizen of the United States; that they were married in Hongkong in 1972; that, after the marriage, they established their residence in the Philippines; that they begot two children born on April 4, 1973 and December 18, 1975, respectively; that the parties were divorced in Nevada, United States, in 1982; and that petitioner has re-married also in Nevada, this time to Theodore Van Dorn.

Dated June 8, 1983, private respondent filed suit against petitioner in Civil Case No. 1075-P of the Regional Trial Court, Branch CXV, in Pasay City, stating that petitioner's business in Ermita, Manila, (the Galleon Shop, for short), is conjugal property of the parties, and asking that petitioner be ordered to render an accounting of that business, and that private respondent be declared with right to manage the conjugal property. Petitioner moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the cause of action is barred by previous judgment in the divorce proceedings before the Nevada Court wherein respondent had acknowledged that he and petitioner had "no community property" as of June 11, 1982. The Court below denied the Motion to Dismiss in the mentioned case on the ground that the property involved is located in the Philippines so that the Divorce Decree has no bearing in the case. The denial is now the subject of this certiorari proceeding.

Generally, the denial of a Motion to Dismiss in a civil case is interlocutory and is not subject to appeal. certiorari and Prohibition are neither the remedies to question the propriety of an interlocutory order of the trial Court. However, when a grave abuse of discretion was patently committed, or the lower Court acted capriciously and whimsically, then it devolves upon this Court in a certiorari proceeding to exercise its supervisory authority and to correct the error committed which, in such a case, is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. 1 Prohibition would then lie since it would be useless and a waste of time to go ahead with the proceedings. 2 Weconsider the petition filed in this case within the exception, and we have given it due course.

For resolution is the effect of the foreign divorce on the parties and their alleged conjugal property in the Philippines.

Petitioner contends that respondent is estopped from laying claim on the alleged conjugal property because of the representation he made in the divorce proceedings before the American Court that they had no community of property; that the Galleon Shop was not established through conjugal funds, and that respondent's claim is barred by prior judgment.

For his part, respondent avers that the Divorce Decree issued by the Nevada Court cannot prevail over the prohibitive laws of the Philippines and its declared national policy; that the acts and declaration of a foreign Court cannot, especially if the same is contrary to public policy, divest Philippine Courts of jurisdiction to entertain matters within its jurisdiction.

For the resolution of this case, it is not necessary to determine whether the property relations between petitioner and private respondent, after their marriage, were upon absolute or relative community

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property, upon complete separation of property, or upon any other regime. The pivotal fact in this case is the Nevada divorce of the parties.

The Nevada District Court, which decreed the divorce, had obtained jurisdiction over petitioner who appeared in person before the Court during the trial of the case. It also obtained jurisdiction over private respondent who, giving his address as No. 381 Bush Street, San Francisco, California, authorized his attorneys in the divorce case, Karp & Gradt Ltd., to agree to the divorce on the ground of incompatibility in the understanding that there were neither community property nor community obligations. 3 As explicitly stated in the Power of Attorney he executed in favor of the law firm of KARP & GRAD LTD., 336 W. Liberty, Reno, Nevada, to represent him in the divorce proceedings:

xxx xxx xxx

You are hereby authorized to accept service of Summons, to file an Answer, appear on my behalf and do an things necessary and proper to represent me, without further contesting, subject to the following:

1. That my spouse seeks a divorce on the ground of incompatibility.

2. That there is no community of property to be adjudicated by the Court.

3. 'I'hat there are no community obligations to be adjudicated by the court.

xxx xxx xxx 4

There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the States of the United States. The decree is binding on private respondent as an American citizen. For instance, private respondent cannot sue petitioner, as her husband, in any State of the Union. What he is contending in this case is that the divorce is not valid and binding in this jurisdiction, the same being contrary to local law and public policy.

It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, 5 only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to our concept of public police and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. 6 In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from the standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage. As stated by the Federal Supreme Court of the United States in Atherton vs. Atherton, 45 L. Ed. 794, 799:

The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the bond of matrimony by a court of competent jurisdiction are to change the existing status or domestic relation of husband and wife, and to free them both from the bond. The marriage tie when thus severed as to one party, ceases to bind either. A husband without a wife, or a wife without a husband, is unknown to the law. When the law provides, in the nature of a penalty. that the guilty party shall not marry again, that party, as well as the other, is still absolutely freed from the bond of the former marriage.

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Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the Decision of his own country's Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own representation before said Court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property.

To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner has to be considered still married to private respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to private respondent. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is granted, and respondent Judge is hereby ordered to dismiss the Complaint filed in Civil Case No. 1075-P of his Court.

Without costs.SO ORDERED.

Roehr vs. GarciaGR No. 142820June 20, 2003

Facts :Petitioner Wolfgang Roehr, a German citizen, married a Filipina,Carmen Rodriguez in Germany. The marriage was ratified in Tayasan, Negros Oriental.. Private respondent filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage before the RTC of Makati. Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss but was denied by the trial court. The petitioner obtained a decree of divorce from the Cout of First Instance of Hamburg-Blankenese and granting the custody of the children to the father.

Issue: Whether or not the legal effects of a divorce obtained from a foreign country such as support and custody of the children can be determined in our courts

Held: Yes. In order to take effect, a foreign judgment must clearly showthat the opposing party has been given ample opportunity to do so under the Rules of Civil Procedure. Accordingly, the respondent was not given the opportunity to challenge the judgment of the German Court, therefore, legal effects of divorce must be determined in our courts. The court held that the trial court has jurisdiction over the issue between the parties as to who has parental costudy.