personal, relational and beautiful: education, technologies and john macmurray’s philosophy
TRANSCRIPT
This article was downloaded by: [University of Cambridge]On: 10 October 2014, At: 00:43Publisher: RoutledgeInforma Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registeredoffice: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK
Oxford Review of EducationPublication details, including instructions for authors andsubscription information:http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/core20
Personal, relational and beautiful:education, technologies and JohnMacmurray’s philosophyKeri Facer aa University of Bristol , UKPublished online: 07 Dec 2012.
To cite this article: Keri Facer (2012) Personal, relational and beautiful: education,technologies and John Macmurray’s philosophy, Oxford Review of Education, 38:6, 709-725, DOI:10.1080/03054985.2012.744194
To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03054985.2012.744194
PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE
Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all the information (the“Content”) contained in the publications on our platform. However, Taylor & Francis,our agents, and our licensors make no representations or warranties whatsoever as tothe accuracy, completeness, or suitability for any purpose of the Content. Any opinionsand views expressed in this publication are the opinions and views of the authors,and are not the views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis. The accuracy of the Contentshould not be relied upon and should be independently verified with primary sourcesof information. Taylor and Francis shall not be liable for any losses, actions, claims,proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages, and other liabilities whatsoever orhowsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with, in relation to or arisingout of the use of the Content.
This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Anysubstantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing,systematic supply, or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden. Terms &Conditions of access and use can be found at http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions
Personal, relational and beautiful:
education, technologies and John
Macmurray’s philosophy
Keri Facer*University of Bristol, UK
Fifty years ago, the philosopher John Macmurray responded to calls for education to redesign
itself around the exigencies of international competition with a robust rebuttal of such
instrumentalism. He argued instead that the purpose of education was ‘learning to be human’.
This paper explores how Macmurray’s ideas might be applied to contemporary use of technology
in education. In so doing, it argues that the use of technologies in education should be guided by
the aspiration to create socio-technical practices that are personal (located with the person),
relational (a resource for friendship and collaboration) and beautiful (designed to promote
reflection and contemplation).
Keywords: technology: future; ethics; philosophy; data; visualisation; mobile
Introduction
Fifty years ago, John Macmurray, the subject of this Special Issue, responded to
calls for education to redesign itself around the exigencies of international
competition with a robust rebuttal of instrumentalism. Addressing the government
(at that time demanding that universities teach sciences rather than the arts
because ‘this is what Russia is doing’) Macmurray made the case in his 1958
Moray House Public Lecture that the purpose of education was ‘from the
standpoint of its victims, learning to be human’ (Macmurray, 1958, p. 1).
As European leaders increasingly justify domestic Education legislation with
reference to PISA scores and international comparisons (Martens, 2007; Grek,
2009), Macmurray’s insistence that education’s purpose is instead to enable
young people to ‘learn to be human’ seems increasingly radical. Indeed,
Macmurray’s concept of the embodied, interdependent, Self as Agent provides a
potentially disruptive counter-point to the ‘unfinished cosmopolitan’ of global
*Graduate School of Education, University of Bristol, 35 Berkeley Square, Bristol BS8 1JA.
Email: [email protected]
Oxford Review of Education
Vol. 38, No. 6, December 2012, pp. 709–725
ISSN 0305-4985 (print)/ISSN 1465-3915 (online)/12/060709–17
� 2012 Taylor & Francis
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03054985.2012.744194
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Uni
vers
ity o
f C
ambr
idge
] at
00:
43 1
0 O
ctob
er 2
014
education policy discourses (Popkewitz, 2008). This possibility is what inspires
much of the writing in this Special Issue and what has informed Fielding’s use of
Macmurray to shape the powerful concept of the person-centred school (Fielding,
2007).
Contemporary analyses of education that draw on Macmurray, however, are often
characterised by a principled resistance to the perceived dehumanising tendencies of
digital contemporary cultures, which leads to a silence on the question of
socio-technical change (see, for example, Fielding & Moss, 2011). This silence risks
leaving important gaps in our analysis of the conditions of contemporary schooling
and risks positioning Macmurray’s contribution to the education debate as a
nostalgic desire to return to another era rather than a challenging voice adequate to
grappling with contemporary conditions.
In this paper, therefore, I want to explore whether Macmurray’s ideas can be
put into dialogue with contemporary debates surrounding the use of technology in
education today. The socio-technical in education, however, is a rich and complex
field encompassing everything from MRI scanners to CCTV cameras, from
biometrics to learning analytics, all of which raise profound questions about
humanity and identity. I focus, therefore, in this paper on two broad areas of
socio-technical practice: the use of data technologies to facilitate performance
measurement and rankings and the use of mobile phones by young people. Clearly
the boundaries between these technologies are porous——mobile devices, for
example, can easily be used to gather data for performance purposes. Both sets of
technologies, however, engender what Illich calls ‘symbolic fallout’ (Illich in
Cayley, 1992), namely, they function not only as tools for changing social
practices, but also as metaphors that can be used as justification for a changing
way of life. Such metaphors facilitate certain patterns of thought about social rela-
tionships, identity and meaning and as a consequence act as sites of significant
social and political contention. While these technologies are not necessarily
bounded, then, their ‘symbolic fallout’ tends to be treated separately in the
research literature. Data systems, for example, are a focus of research attention
primarily in education policy, governance and sociology (e.g. Ball, 2003; Martens,
2007; Grek & Ozga, 2010); while mobile technology use is a focus of research
attention primarily in relation to children’s health, learning sciences and youth
cultures (e.g. Katz, 2003; Naismith et al., 2004; Stald, 2009). If researchers using
Macmurray are interested in ‘learning to be human’, then, these are two important
terrains in which that struggle needs to be examined.
This paper therefore comprises three sections. First, I explore the features of
Macmurray’s ‘Self as Agent’ that are important in understanding his view of
education as ‘learning to be human’. In so doing I draw in particular upon his 1958
Moray House Annual Public Lecture and upon his 1961 book Persons in relation. I
also draw on Fielding’s (2007) use of Macmurray in his conceptualisation of the per-
son-centred school. In the second section, I explore how these ideas might be used
to examine the use of data and mobile technologies in education. Finally, the paper
concludes with a more speculative section that asks how Macmurray’s concept of
710 K. Facer
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Uni
vers
ity o
f C
ambr
idge
] at
00:
43 1
0 O
ctob
er 2
014
‘learning to be human’ might help us to think carefully about how education might
respond to the growing convergence of mobile and data technologies.
Learning to be human as the development of the Self as Agent
John Macmurray’s idea of the human being was born out of the horrors of the First
and Second World Wars and in response to the rising totalitarianism in Russia and
growing consumerism in the West; he (for it usually is a he, notwithstanding
Macmurray’s embryonic critique of ‘natural’ sex roles in some papers) is also
defined against the Rational and Romantic philosophical traditions of the self
(Fielding, 2007). Macmurray’s idea of the human, then, takes shape between the
extremisms of blind obedience to traditional roles, the atomised individual of the
consumer-subject, and the wholly subjugated self of the organic ‘society’. Before
exploring how this idea confronts the conditions of digital modernity, however, I
want to explore the three elements of Macmurray’s idea of humanity in more detail:
embodiment, interdependence and agency.
Embodiment
Macmurray’s writing on the body is lyrical, displaying a practical affection and a
reverent respect for the role of the senses.
We can use our eyes for the sake of seeing; our ears for the joy of hearing; we can look
and we can listen, not merely see and hear, and we can do so without any arriere pensee,
without any notion of making something from it. This, I believe, is what the Greek
philosophers meant by ‘contemplation’ and it is a distinct and important part of ‘being
human’. (Macmurray, 1958, p. 7)
For Macmurray, the body is the means by which we generate the data that allow
us to identify repeated patterns, to generate information and ‘facts’ about the
world. This means that the body is the precondition for scientific knowledge.
Perhaps more important, however, is the role of the body in enabling reflection. It
is through the senses, Macmurray argues, that we come to reflect on the world
outside ourselves. And it is only through such contemplation that it is possible to
counteract egocentricity and to allow us to perceive the Other as Other, as unique
and different from us:
Contemplation … centres our emotional capacities upon the object in a search for its
uniqueness and reality. (Macmurray, 1958, p. 8)
Without such contemplation of the Other as unique and different from ourselves,
Macmurray argues, the person, the Self, would not exist. Finally, the body is also
essential to Macmurray’s idea of the person as an active agent in the world. The
body is understood as the ‘means to action. It is, for example, an instrument or
tool, like the poker with which we stir the fire’ (Macmurray, 1961, p. 82). The
body then, is precondition for the Self——it is a means of knowing the world,
recognising the other and acting in and on the world.
Education, technologies and John Macmurray’s philosophy 711
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Uni
vers
ity o
f C
ambr
idge
] at
00:
43 1
0 O
ctob
er 2
014
Interdependence
Second, Macmurray’s concept of the Self is fundamentally relational. The Self, for
Macmurray, is produced only through relations of both dependence upon and
resistance from others, only through relations of love for and fear of the other.
Without interdependence with others it is simply not possible to live:
We need one another to be ourselves. This complete and unlimited dependence of each
of us upon the others is the central and crucial fact of personal existence. … Here is
the basic fact of our human condition (Macmurray, 1933, p. 137)
At the same time, without the resistance of other people, without the recognition
of others as distinct agents separate from ourselves and with motives potentially
different from our own, it is not possible to come to know oneself as a person.
The Self, for Macmurray then, is produced in relations through and with others.
In particular, Macmurray’s ‘Self’ is produced through a distinctive idea of
friendship which assumes relations of freedom and equality between people, which
assumes relations of care for each other and which allows individuals to take risks
to reveal themselves even while knowing they depend on the other. Learning to be
human, Macmurray argues, is coming to know the fear and love that comes from
this intertwined relationship of dependence and resistance, of freedom and equality
through friendship.
Agency
Finally, at the heart of Macmurray’s analysis of what it means to be human is
his emphasis on Agency, which he uses to distinguish between Persons and
Objects. To make sense of this, it is useful to explore his arguments about
knowledge.
He argues that there are two types of knowledge of people: Objective knowledge
and Personal knowledge. Objective knowledge can be understood as ‘information
about’ the Other, treating the other as Object. In contrast, Personal knowledge is
an understanding that can only be gained by encounter and engagement with the
other as a Person; it is the knowledge of the Others’ intentions and motives, which
can only be attained by coming to know that person. For Macmurray, such
personal knowledge is at the heart of friendship. Knowledge of the other that
precludes knowledge of them as a person is merely functional, treating the Other
not as agent, but as means to an end.
A second key distinction between Objective and Personal knowledge for
Macmurray is in relation to temporality. Objective knowledge is understood as
historic, while Personal knowledge is always future-facing, dealing with the Other
as agent:
The distinction we have drawn between a personal and an ‘objective’ knowledge of one
another rests upon this, that all objective knowledge is knowledge of matter of fact only
and necessarily excludes any knowledge of what is matter of intention. […] In general
this means, for our present purpose, that an objective knowledge of other persons
712 K. Facer
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Uni
vers
ity o
f C
ambr
idge
] at
00:
43 1
0 O
ctob
er 2
014
cannot treat them as agents, but only as determinate objects, that is, as continuants.
(Macmurray, 1961, p. 39)
This foregrounds a key element of Macmurray’s idea of the human being, namely,
that a person is not simply a product of her past, but is person with motives and
intentions that drive her action in the world. She is a source and subject of change in
the world. This understanding brings with it implications for personal relations; in
other words, it implies that personal relations are only personal when they recognise
the freedom of the person to change in ways shaped by their intentions and motives:
If one person treats another person impersonally, he treats him as if he were an object
and not a person. He negates the personal character of the other, then, that is to say,
his freedom as an agent, and treats him as completely conditioned in his behaviour, as
if he were not free but determined. (Macmurray, 1961, p. 34)
Friendship, for Macmurray, is the relationship through which people come to
know each other as agents, as beings with aspirations, dreams and motives that
may be distinct from their own. Importantly, however, this agency is not the
agency of late consumer culture, the ‘just do it’ of Nike capitalism or the constant
self-reproduction of the lifelong learner. Instead, it is essentially produced in
relation with the Other through seeking knowledge of the Other as a person, and
through recognising interdependence with that person through friendship.
Recognising that the self only comes into being through relations with the Other,
this concept of agency is profoundly relational, it is heterocentric, it directs
attention away from the self towards an attempt to recognise and value the agency
of the Other, and through that recognition, to build one’s own agency in relation.
Or, as Macmurray put it more simply: ‘we are our relations’ (Macmurray, 1961).
The different fates of data and mobile technologies in education
Having outlined the key contours of Macmurray’s idea of what it might mean to
‘learn to be human’ through friendship, the body and agency, I now turn to the
question of the changing socio-technical landscape to which this paper seeks to
apply his ideas. In particular, to the recent uses of data and mobile technologies in
education.
Over the last decade, data technologies have come to provide the infrastructure
that underpins a new global education discourse of international metrics, compari-
sons and performance assessment (Novoa & Yariv-Mashal, 2003; Martens, 2007;
Grek, 2009; Grek & Ozga, 2010; Grek, 2012; Ozga, 2012). Such technologies are
the carrier mechanisms of what Levin (1998) calls the ‘epidemic’ of education
reform.
While the gathering of data about young people and teachers has been a part
of education for years, the intensification of such processes and their
internationalisation has been significantly facilitated by data technologies (Ball,
2003). These tools facilitate micro-level record keeping, they allow the rapid
collation and analysis of massive amounts of data, they allow modelling and
Education, technologies and John Macmurray’s philosophy 713
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Uni
vers
ity o
f C
ambr
idge
] at
00:
43 1
0 O
ctob
er 2
014
projection of ‘ideal’ trajectories and they allow comparisons between schools,
students and countries, all on an ongoing basis. Without networked data
technologies, the system of international performance management, scrutiny and
micro-surveillance would arguably be impossible in schools. What is noticeable is
that such technologies have, today, become so pervasive as to be almost invisible
in schools——they are banal, unremarkable, the subject of no newspaper articles or
press releases.
In contrast, young people’s use of mobile technologies is regarded with profound
mistrust in most schools, policies are established to prevent their introduction into
the classroom and legislation changed to allow teachers to eradicate data kept on the
phone. Indeed, the mobile phone is regarded with such hostility that the 2011 Edu-
cation Act, following hot on the heels of the UK’s summer riots, explicitly allows
teachers to confiscate and delete information held on phones (Education Act, 2011).
These two areas of socio-technical practice in education are subjects of signifi-
cant debate in education policy studies, youth studies and learning sciences where
questions range from implications for governance to strategies for mathematics
teaching. Working with Macmurray, however, encourages the researcher to ask dif-
ferent questions about these socio-technical changes: If education is concerned with
‘learning to be human’, what happens to embodiment when these tools are used
routinely? What happens to friendship in an age of data and mobile technologies?
How is young people’s agency constructed through the social practices that grow
up around these tools? It is to these questions that I now turn to explore whether
they bring distinctive perspectives to the current debates.
What happens to the body of the learner in an era of data and mobile technologies?
What does a database do to the body of the child in education? Arguably, nothing.
Unlike wireless and mobile devices, there are no risks of radiation to create news
headlines. Rather, it is in the discursive and symbolic domain that such data tech-
nologies begin to do something to the body of the child. The technology of the
database, through its instantiation in league tables and school information manage-
ment systems, radically fragments the body of the student and seeks, in fact, to
eradicate it. The student becomes visible to the school manager increasingly
through the units of data that are captured about her and, in turn, the student
becomes known through these tools as a collation of these discrete interconnected
fragments; in them she is the red mark on the spreadsheet, the ‘borderline case’ in
the C/D boundary. While such data have always been gathered about children in
schools, these tools allow now for the statistical comparison of the individual child
to their ideal fictional Other in similar schools or different locations. This
comparator is now, no longer, their colleague in the classroom, but an
international standardised globalised schoolchild, the PISA-victorious Finnish,
Singaporean or Canadian child (Grek, 2009, 2012).
The symbolic fallout of these data technologies is to reconstruct the student as
a system made up of discrete functioning parts——capacities in science, capacities
714 K. Facer
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Uni
vers
ity o
f C
ambr
idge
] at
00:
43 1
0 O
ctob
er 2
014
in mathematics, capacities in English at ages 11, 14 or 16. The child is no longer
an embodied person, but a cybernetic system that results from inputs (teaching
strategies/school factors) and which generates outputs (results). In the
development field, Illich argues, the symbolic fallout from such technologies of
measurement and comparison has resulted in the analysis of the person as a set
of disaggregated requirements (the person as system) (Cayley, 1992, p. 168). As
a consequence, the primary problematic for the field shifts from a concern with
the hungry person to a concern with ‘providing sufficient calories’. In education,
we might see a parallel shift away from the education of the human being, to the
‘raising of standards’, a context in which the development of the person becomes
of less importance than the technical challenge of closing a disembodied
‘attainment gap’.
This construction of the child as system of inputs and outputs, notably, is
emerging at the same time as the pharmaceutical industry is recasting mental ill
health as a disorder of neurotransmitters amenable to pharmaceutical intervention
(Rose, 2004). Such co-occurance of cybernetic child in education with
psychopharmacological society begins to lay the groundwork for the treatment of
the child’s body, in particular the child’s brain, as the site for targeted interven-
tions, or what Lee & Motzkau (2013) call ‘tweaks’, to correct and nudge results
back into the right figure for international comparison. The discursive and
symbolic fallout from the proliferation of data technologies may then, in time,
come to have material and biological implications for the child’s body.
The implications of mobile technologies for the body, in contrast, are manifold.
While the jury is still out on the effects of electromagnetic radiation on children’s
brains (Aydin et al., 2012) the more subtle changes that mobile use encourages in
perception of person/machine boundaries is well documented. For the last decade,
researchers studying children and young people’s use of mobile phones have
observed the blurring of human-machine boundaries that characterises responses
to and uses of these devices. As one researcher described them, these are
‘machines that become us’ (Katz, 2003). Stald (2009) for example, describes how,
for the young people she studied, the phone became a form of ‘digital double’ that
extended, reflected and held their identity. For them, it was a place of storage of
personal records and a place for performance of identities. For these young people,
the phone became a ‘shell’, a means of incorporating a whole range of experiences
and relationships as part of a new framing of the body.
Finnish researchers have described the ways in which some young people
anthropomorphise their mobile devices, seeing them as almost human, apologising
to the devices for ‘hurting them’, and seeing them as representing their friends and
family. They describe how children saw the device almost as another ‘body part’
(Oksman & Rautiainen, 2003). And indeed, the mobile phone can now be under-
stood as a radical augmentation of the senses. At its most basic level, it acts as a
recording device, capturing images, movement, geographical location and sounds.
Increasingly, it can be used as a way of ‘seeing’ information encoded in the
environment that the un-augmented body cannot read. Consider common phone
Education, technologies and John Macmurray’s philosophy 715
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Uni
vers
ity o
f C
ambr
idge
] at
00:
43 1
0 O
ctob
er 2
014
applications such as Shazam, a system for ‘listening’ to any piece of music, which
then automatically tells you the name of the musician and title of the piece.
The use of data and mobile technologies does strange things to the body; it
explodes the symbolic body of the child into micro-representations on screens and
comparisons on spreadsheets, it extends the body into devices with new capabilities.
What place is there for friendship in data and mobile technologies?
The gathering of performance data and its re-presentation in performance manage-
ment systems and league tables has little to do with friendship produced through
relationships of interdependence. Rather, these processes tend to atomise the indi-
vidual, extracting them from their relationships to the extent that researchers and
policy makers now have to try to ‘add back in’ such information through remedial
strategies such as ‘value-added’ test scores designed to make visible various indices
of human relationships (Goldstein, 2001). The database presents the student as an
autonomous figure, as separate from rather than as fundamentally dependent upon
and interdependent with the other students and people that surround her.
Indeed, these technologies encourage the child to ignore the externalities which
might shape them and encourage them instead to inhabit the description of
themselves offered by the spreadsheet. As Reay and Wiliam have documented, the
child comes to know themselves as a ‘six’ or a ‘nothing’ (Reay & Wiliam, 1999).
As currently used in education, data technologies could at best be seen as blind to
relations of friendship and interdependence, at worst, they might be seen as hostile
to notions of the Self as produced in relation with others.
Mobile technologies bring more ambiguous implications for interdependence
and friendship. The last decade of research in this area documents the evident fact
that young people are using these phones for maintaining and managing relation-
ships with each other and with family. Green (2003), Ling & Yttri (2001) and
Skelton (1989) describe how phones can be used to support communication
between friends; while Gillard et al. (1998) show how phones enable relationships
to be played out across private and public spaces.
Other studies also describe the intricate processes by which social relationships
are negotiated through the use of the phone: this includes the use of social
networking sites and contacts lists as reassuring evidence of ongoing connection
with others; the use of pilaris or ‘no call-calls’ as a means of flagging ongoing
attention; the use of the phone to share news, support friendship and build an
archive of shared experiences (Stald, 2009). Mobile phones are used by young
people as tools for exploring, developing and negotiating their relationships with
each other. It is a key contemporary mechanism for managing acceptance and
rejection, support and autonomy (Green, 2003; Oksman & Rautiainen, 2003).
The phone’s promise of constant connectivity, support and reassurance,
however, is balanced by its function as a source of interruption, anxiety and the
need to manage multiple conflicting demands and places at the same time. The
mobile phone might therefore be understood as an important contemporary site
716 K. Facer
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Uni
vers
ity o
f C
ambr
idge
] at
00:
43 1
0 O
ctob
er 2
014
through which young people are learning to manage the tensions of interdepen-
dence, to confront the resistance of others and the support of others, which
Macmurray describes as critical to the formation of the Self.
More recently, however, Turkle has argued that this process of managing interde-
pendence via the mediation of these technologies is ossifying in ways that limit
encounters with others. The phone as ‘shell’ is seen by Turkle as a shield, a defence
against interaction with others. She describes how mobile devices are used to dip in
and out of social settings, to extract oneself from encounters that one wants to
avoid. She describes how older adults, herself included, are using mobile devices to
avoid the difficulties of the voice, of the conversation. In phrases reminiscent of
Macmurray she articulates the loss that such erosion of conversation might bring:
… connecting in sips doesn’t work as well when it comes to understanding and knowing
one another. In conversations we tend to one another. (The word itself is kinetic; it’s
derived from words that mean to move together.) We can attend to tone and nuance, we
are called upon to see things from another’s point of view. […] And we use conversation
with others to learn to converse with ourselves. So our flight from conversation can mean
diminished chances to learn skills of self-reflection. (Turkle, 2011)
Where Turkle sees diminished chances to learn ‘skills of self-reflection’,
Macmurray might argue for diminishing opportunities to create and know the Self
at all. For without the reciprocity and mutuality of conversation and of friendship
undertaken in the spirit of care for, rather than defence against, the Other, he
might argue, the chances of developing the Self are diminished entirely.
Data technologies, mobiles and Self as Agent
When thinking about the relationship between digital technologies and Macmurray’s
concept of the Self as Agent, it is helpful to return to his distinction between objec-
tive and personal knowledge of the Other. Objective knowledge, he argues, is
knowledge which treats the person as object, is always historical and is concerned
with facts and observable information. Personal knowledge, in contrast, is concerned
with coming to know the person’s motivations, intentions and anticipations. In
theory then, an education that is concerned with ‘learning to be human’ would be an
education that is concerned with building not only Objective but also Personal
knowledge of and between young people.
In this context, it is not possible to conceive of contemporary data technologies
and their cluster of associated practices of performance management and interna-
tional comparison as providing anything other than the knowledge that constitutes
the student as object rather than person. The purpose of data collection is
egocentric, the data are gathered for the purposes of telling schools and national
education systems about themselves, to promote schools in the marketplace and to
manage teacher conduct (Ball, 2003; Ozga, 2012). The search for such knowledge
is not heterocentric; it does not have as its purpose the desire to engage with
students on their own terms and to understand their own trajectories and
aspirations. However much data such technologies provide about each student,
Education, technologies and John Macmurray’s philosophy 717
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Uni
vers
ity o
f C
ambr
idge
] at
00:
43 1
0 O
ctob
er 2
014
therefore, their current use must be understood as inadequate for supporting and
sustaining the development of the young person as a future-facing Agent.
The use of mobile technologies as resources for building the Self as Agent is
potentially less clear-cut. Notwithstanding Turkle’s analysis, there is evidence that
mobile technologies can and are being used to underpin relations of friendship
and mutual concern that enable young people to navigate educational experiences
(Green, 2003; Stald, 2008). Intertwined with social media tools, they are used to
help navigate the complexities of what it means to be a student today (Selwyn,
2009). They are now one part of the suite of tools that can be used for participa-
tion in and with others in constructing their identities and their societies (Jenkins
et al., 2007; Carrington & Marsh, 2009). Used in this way, they are potentially
powerful resources through which young people can learn about each others’
motivations, aspirations and ideas and share their own with others.
As mobile technologies converge with data technologies, however, the potential
for such tools to be used as simply another means of gathering data for performance
and management purposes significantly increases. Indeed, these tools which have
the potential to support the interdependent, contemplative and participative
relationships of friendship in action are potentially a means by which young people
can become active participants in their own objectification.
Consider, for example, the range of ways in which personal mobile devices are
becoming tools for monitoring and surveillance of the self. First, the body itself is
being transformed into a site of ‘data collection’. There are now commercially
available ‘tracking devices’ in the form of bracelets that keep a record of individ-
ual’s sleep patterns, movement, activity, pulse, heart-rate, sweat responses and so
forth.1 Second, commercial and academic research organisations are working hard
to develop means of documenting daily lives in ever more detail, from people’s
energy consumption to their social media use, to their interactions in the home.2
Third, we are seeing the development of sensor technologies that begin to make it
practically feasible to gather rich biological and environmental data on an ongoing
basis.3 At the same time sensors embedded in city streets are already beginning to
gather information on everything from levels of particulates in the atmosphere to
the movement of mobile phones around the city.4
This massive proliferation of biological, ambient environmental data gathered
about the person is being seen, in the words of the World Economic Forum
(2011) as a new ‘economic asset class’ that will open up new forms of social and
economic analysis, and new possibilities for targeted delivery of services and goods.
This level of interest suggests that, over the next few years, there will be significant
funding going into ensuring that gathering and analysing rich data becomes an
integral part of contemporary life. What might this mean for an education
conceived as learning to be human?
Rose’s analysis of a growing pharmacological culture in developed nations
sounds an important note of caution. He describes how the combination of
pharmaceutical company investment in research and development and product
marketing, combined with a new availability of ‘targeted’ pharmaceuticals, has
718 K. Facer
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Uni
vers
ity o
f C
ambr
idge
] at
00:
43 1
0 O
ctob
er 2
014
created a psychopharmacological culture in which practices of constant self-
observation are encouraged (Rose, 2004, p. 27). The development of personal
digital sensor tools to enable constant bodily and environmental self-scrutiny
potentially allows for the radical amplification of this process. In this context,
agency risks being conceived as the ability to constantly monitor, tweak and work
on the self to adapt to changing conditions and comply with the latest standards.
The young learner becomes Popkewitz’s ‘unfinished cosmopolitan’ with bio-digital
bells on, constantly scrutinising the self for changes and seeking digital and
bio-augmentations to competitively adapt to the environment.
Macmurray and the machines: alternative futures
Feminist and actor network theory from Butler (1990), Haraway (2000) and Latour
(1993) onwards has explored changing conceptions of identity and agency when the
mind and body are extended into digital tools. In these analyses, agency is
understood as distributed across assemblages of biological, social and technological
actors, and diffused in a constant performance of myriad, shifting identities.
Macmurray’s work may predate post-structuralism and actor network theory by
decades, and yet he was in many ways beginning to struggle with similar questions.
Indeed, he was working at a time when atomic theory was challenging our
assumptions about rationality and the body far more than the recent neuro-
scientific analyses of brain flow. For example, he describes the challenge of
thinking about what it means to be embodied in a system made up of ‘automatic
activities of our own for which we disclaim all personal responsibility. They are
and yet they are not our own. […] So we saddle our bodies with the responsibility
that we disown’ (1961, p. 83).
In looking at the complexities of personhood in the age of the microscope,
however, Macmurray reaches very different conclusions about humanity from the
actor network theorists. He refuses the dissolution of agency and argues instead
that the defining feature of personhood and humanity should be understood as
residing in the capacity to care for others (1961, p. 84). This capacity to care,
premised upon contemplation of the Other and recognition of their difference in
relations of friendship is, in Macmurray’s analysis, the source for all Agency.
I want to conclude, then, with a reflection on where such an analysis of what it
means to be human in the age of biological machines might take education, and
how it might impact on the ways in which education appropriates or resists the
new mobile and data technologies increasingly at its disposal.
Fielding’s use of Macmurray in his analysis of the person-centred school
provides a useful precedent for such an approach. In his analysis, he argues for a
rethinking of the relationship between functional and personal relations. He argues
that functional relations (those which, if you like, allow people to ‘get things done’
by treating others as objects and which produce knowledge of others as objects)
are important in education but should not be pre-eminent. Personal relations,
those which produce the person as agent and which enable people to learn to live
Education, technologies and John Macmurray’s philosophy 719
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Uni
vers
ity o
f C
ambr
idge
] at
00:
43 1
0 O
ctob
er 2
014
in community, need instead to take precedence. But the functional remains critical
in support of this; objective knowledge is a necessary precondition for personal
knowledge. The challenge then, as Fielding puts it, is twofold. First, to restate the
primacy of the personal and resist the dominance of the functional/objective. And
second, to explore how the functional——the way of doing things——might in fact
become expressive of the personal. Consider Fielding’s description of the
expressive mode of schools as person-centred learning communities. He argues
that the ‘organisational architecture’ of such schools ‘is informed by manifest
interpersonal intentions’ (Fielding, 2007, p. 403).
The question that might be asked, then, is how might the increasing conver-
gence of mobile and data technologies in education be reimagined in ways that are
expressive of human relations defined by the capacity to contemplate and care for
the other? How might they be reconfigured in ways that would be ‘informed by
manifest interpersonal intentions’? How, in other words, might the socio-technical
organisation of education be reimagined in ways that are expressive of the aim of
learning to be human? Such questions offer very different avenues for inquiry and
practice from much of the work that has recognised the distribution of the self
across multiple artefacts and which has, instead, focused primarily on the
distribution of cognition across people and machines (e.g. Salomon, 1990).
These questions suggest, perhaps, that for data technologies to become
expressive of the personal and the relational rather than the functional, it would be
important to find ways for data to become a site of contemplation, reflection and
perception of the Other. The world of rich and personal data might be reconceived
as the development of a new ‘sense’ to enable a new form of sensibility, a new way
of looking at the world. In other words, it might be possible to find ways to make
data——and the contemplation of data——beautiful; to draw attention to the beauty,
specificity and difference of the Other:
Contemplation it is, and not the intellectual manipulation of facts, which gives us our
direct and personal knowledge of the world. But to learn to live in our senses is to learn
to enjoy both our seeing and hearing and what we see and hear. (Macmurray, 1958)
The aesthetics of data is therefore a critical consideration if they are to become a
resource for contemplation, for personal expression, for friendship and for the
cultivation of sensibility. Such a pleasurable contemplation of the rich data
environment would act as a powerful bulwark against the reduction of data to
mere information and regulation of the person, or to a new ‘economic asset class’
that can be strip-mined by the corporations of the knowledge economy.
Experiments in this area are already proliferating as the challenges and beauty of
living with rich data are becoming visible. These range from the growth of
information visualisation as an academic discipline to data visualisation as an
expressive and artistic practice. Web artist Jonathan Harris is doing more than
most to show how ambient ongoing data collection might be reimagined as a
source for looking afresh at the world, at ourselves and at each other. Consider,
for example, his beautiful project Whale Hunt5 which, through 3,214 photographs
720 K. Facer
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Uni
vers
ity o
f C
ambr
idge
] at
00:
43 1
0 O
ctob
er 2
014
taken at five-minute intervals or more, offers myriad perspectives for exploring this
traditional activity. Or his project, WeFeelFine.org, which harvests data from
millions of blogs and re-presents them in ways that allow the user to explore how
people around the globe say they are feeling at different times, places or weather
conditions. Such artworks provoke attention to both common experiences and to
the unique and distinctive voices of individuals.
In themselves, such experiments are not adequate as an educational resource for
learning to be human in an era of rich data. They do, however, begin to offer
alternatives to the deadening world of the spreadsheet and gant chart and outline
possibilities for transforming the way young people might gather and represent
data on a daily basis through their own recording tools and experiences.
The second way by which functional socio-technical practices might become
expressive of personal relations is to turn the ownership of data in education on its
head. At present, as I have already discussed, data collection is conceived as an
institutional responsibility, gathering information for the egocentric purposes of
the institution. Instead, it might be possible to see data collection as a personal
activity, held by the person, and revealed by the person as appropriate to different
people and institutions. Turning the use of data on its head in education, starting
from the assumption of young people as authors of rich accounts of themselves,
would bring a new onus on educators to work with young people to discuss
patterns in their data trails, explore alternative narratives, construct different
descriptions of themselves, explore how individual narratives relate to those of
other people or other periods. Such a process, as Goodson & Biesta (2010) have
observed in their learning lives research and Fielding & Kirby (2009) in their work
on student-led reviews in special schools have demonstrated, may be important in
enabling young people to narrate their experiences in ways that enable critical
reflection upon the conditions in which they find themselves.
This relates, finally, to the third point, which is that if learning to be human is
about developing relations of reciprocity and care in conditions of friendship, then
the use of tools for communication and gathering of information need to be
reimagined in ways that support conversation and dialogue. The proliferation of
personal data risks becoming, as Turkle and Rose both warn, a narcissistic means
of selective self-monitoring and self-representation as well as a bulwark against
personal interaction. The challenge, therefore, is to explore how the convergence
of personal and data technologies can become the basis not for egocentric
self-reflection, but for conversation and for reciprocal revelation within conditions
of friendship. As Macmurray argues:
communal knowledge … involves a characteristic mutuality. It is necessarily reciprocal.
If Peter knows Paul, then Paul knows Peter. This reciprocity is necessary because this
kind of knowledge is by revelation. One can know another person, in this sense, only
so far as he reveals himself. (Macmurray, 1965, p. 6)
Reciprocal revelation might mean challenging the precepts which underpin how
data are currently used in education——in other words, which assigns the capacity
Education, technologies and John Macmurray’s philosophy 721
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Uni
vers
ity o
f C
ambr
idge
] at
00:
43 1
0 O
ctob
er 2
014
to look across different sources only to educators, to those defined in the words of
data legislation as ‘data managers’. Instead, it might mean creating the conditions
in which rich data trails were understood as part of the many resources that young
people would have at their disposal to represent themselves to and with others.
Such ideas commonly take poor form today in tools such as ‘learning portfolios’.
Increasingly, however, the capacity to represent and analyse data in increasingly
rich modalities may begin to create a much more sophisticated set of resources by
which young people can choose to reveal themselves to friends, to educators, to
families in conditions of mutual trust and exchange. Imagine, for example, the
child who is able to explain the day-to-day lived reality of caring for an ill parent,
or the passionate experience of playing with an orchestra, as part of the
conversations they are able to have with their friends and educators.
The development of relations of trust and reciprocity, however, will never be a
product of particular technologies alone. Rather, they will emerge from choices
about how to use these tools. Even before the era of rich data recording and data
analytics emerges, then, it may make sense for educators to work with young
people to understand how and when the ways in which they record, communicate
and share ideas about their lives through existing mobile devices support relations
of mutuality, care and respect. This would suggest that, rather than banning
mobile devices and giving teachers free reign to delete data held on them, the
tensions surrounding their use need to be brought out of the shadows and made
the subject of critical, reflective conversation in schools.
Conclusion
Macmurray’s concept of the embodied, interdependent self as agent provides a
radical challenge to the ‘unfinished cosmopolitan’ identified by Popkewitz as the
ideal citizen of much contemporary education discourse. Macmurray’s emphasis
upon embodiment, interdependence and friendship as at the heart of learning to be
human disrupts educational discourses that take the autonomous self-monitoring
individual as their lodestar. Such an emphasis, however, might be dismissed as
nostalgia for a safer, smaller, more intimate world if it is not put into dialogue with
the lived experience of contemporary conditions. In this paper, I have attempted to
do so. I have described how Macmurray’s idea of the human can act as a lens
through which to ask questions about how contemporary educational appropria-
tions of digital technologies are reshaping the bodies, friendship and agency of the
child in education. I have also argued that Macmurray’s educational philosophy
can be used as a framework for thinking about future possibilities and for mapping
out potential routes for the design of new educational technologies.
In particular, I have argued that if education is to be concerned with learning to
be human, the challenge remains to reimagine socio-technical practices in
education in ways that can be expressive of relations of friendship and mutuality,
relations that are premised upon heterocentric contemplation of and care for
others. Such reimagination, I would suggest, may be facilitated by demanding the
722 K. Facer
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Uni
vers
ity o
f C
ambr
idge
] at
00:
43 1
0 O
ctob
er 2
014
use of some old words for new technologies; by exploring how the convergence of
mobile and data technologies might be reimagined as resources for the personal,
the relational and the beautiful.
Notes
1. http://jawbone.com/up, http://replaymyday.info/
2. http://www.homenetworks.ac.uk/, http://wegov-project.eu/, http://www.ted.com/talks/deb_-
roy_the_birth_of_a_word.html
3. http://www.bodymedia.com/ http://www.media.mit.edu/galvactivator/
4. http://www.sensaris.com/smartcities/ http://cityware.ac.uk
5. www.number27.org/whalehunt.html
Notes on contributor
Keri Facer is Professor of Educational and Social Futures at the University of
Bristol and Leadership Fellow for the Arts and Humanities Research Council
Connected Communities Programme. She works in particular on
understanding the relationship between formal educational institutions and
wider society in relation to technological, social and environmental disruption.
Her most recent book is Learning futures: education, technology and social change
(Routledge, 2011).
References
Aydin, D., Feychting, M., Schuz, J. & Roosli, M (2012) Childhood brain tumours and use of
mobile phones: comparison of a case-control study with incidence data, Environmental
Health, 11–35. DOI:10.1186/1476-069X-11-35.
Ball, S. (2003) The teacher’s soul and the terrors of performativity, Journal of Education Policy,
18(2), 215–228.
Butler, J. (1990) Gender trouble: feminism and the subversion of identity (New York & London,
Routledge).
Carrington, V. & Marsh, J. (2009) ‘Forms of literacy’, Review for the Beyond Current Horizons
Programme (Bristol, Futurelab). Available online at: www.beyondcurrenthorizons.org.uk/
evidence/knowledge-creativity-and-communication/ (accessed June 2012).
Cayley, D. (1992) Ivan Illich in conversation (Toronto, House of Anansi Press).
Fielding, M. (2007) The human cost and intellectual poverty of high performance schooling:
radical philosophy, John Macmurray and the remaking of person-centred education, Journal
of Education Policy, 22(4), 383–409.
Fielding, M. & Kirby, P. (2009) Developing student-led reviews, an exploration of innovative
practice in primary, special and secondary schools. Paper presented at the New Developments
in Student Voice Conference, London, Institute of Education, November.
Fielding, M. & Moss, P. (2011) Radical education and the common school: a democratic alternative
(London, Routledge).
Gillard, P., Wale, K. & Bow, A. (1998) The friendly phone, in: S. Howard (Ed.) Wired up:
young people and the electronic media (London, UCL/Taylor and Francis).
Goldstein, H. (2001) Using pupil performance data for judging schools and teachers: scope and
limitations, British Educational Research Journal, 27(4), 433–442.
Goodson, I. & Biesta, G. (2010) Learning lives (London, Routledge).
Education, technologies and John Macmurray’s philosophy 723
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Uni
vers
ity o
f C
ambr
idge
] at
00:
43 1
0 O
ctob
er 2
014
Green, N. (2003) Outwardly mobile: young people and mobile technologies, in: J. Katz (Ed.)
Machines that become us: the social context of personal communication technology (New
Brunswick, New Jersey, Transaction Publishers).
Grek, S. (2009) Governing by numbers: the PISA ‘effect’ in Europe, Journal of Education Policy,
24(1), 23–37.
Grek, S. (2012) What PISA knows and can do: studying the role of national actors in the
making of PISA, European Educational Research Journal, 11(2), 243–254.
Grek, S. & Ozga, J. (2010) Governing education through data: Scotland, England and the
European education policy space, British Educational Research Journal, 36(6), 937–952.
Haraway, D. (2000) A cyborg manifesto: science, technology and socialist feminism in the late 20th
century, in: D. Bell & B. Kennedy (Eds) The cybercultures reader (London, Routledge), 291–325.
HMSO (2011) Education Act. Available online at: http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2011/21/
contents/enacted.
Jenkins, H. with Clinton, K., Purushotma, R., Robison, A. & Weigel, M. (2007) Confronting the
challenges of participatory culture: media education for the twenty-first century. Occasional
paper on digital media and learning for the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation.
Katz, J. (Ed.) (2003) Machines that become us: the social context of personal communication
technology (New Brunswick, New Jersey, Transaction Publishers).
Latour, C. (1993) We have never been modern (trans. Katherine Porter) (Cambridge, MA,
Harvard University Press).
Lee, N. & Motzkau (2013 forthcoming) Tweak: biosocial imagination and educational futures,
International Journal of Education Research.
Levin, B. (1998) An epidemic of education policy: what can we learn from each other?
Comparative Education, 34(2), 131–142.
Ling, R. & Yttri, B. (2002) Hyper-coordination via mobile phones in Norway, in: J.E. Katz &
M. Aakhus (Eds) Perpetual contact: mobile communication, private talk, public performance
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press).
Macmurray, J. (1933) Interpreting the universe (London, Faber).
Macmurray, J. (1958) Learning to be human. Moray House Annual Public Lecture, 5 May,
unpublished 10-page manuscript.
Macmurray, J. (1961) Persons in relation: Vol. II of the Form of the personal (London, Faber &
Faber).
Macmurray, J. (1965) Reflections on the notion of an educated man. Transcript of a talk given
at University of Bristol, 17 November, unpublished 11 page manuscript (transcribed by
Michael Fielding, 30 May 2011).
Martens, K. (2007) How to become an influential actor——the ‘comparative turn’ in OECD
education policy, in: K. Martens, A. Rusconi & K. Lutz (Eds) Transformations of the state
and global governance (London, Routledge), 40–56.
Naismith, L., Lonsdale, P., Vavoula, G. & Sharples, M. (2004) Literature review in mobile
technologies and learning (Bristol, Futurelab).
Novoa, A. & Yariv-Mashal, T. (2003) Comparative research in education: a mode of
governance or a historical journey? Comparative Education, 39(4), 423–438.
Oksman, V. & Rautiainen, P. (2003) Perhaps it is a body part: how the mobile phone became
an organic part of the everyday lives of Finnish children and teenagers, in: J. Katz (Ed.)
Machines that become us: the social context of personal communication technology (New
Brunswick, New Jersey, Transaction Publishers).
Ozga, J. (2012) Assessing PISA, European Educational Research Journal, 11(2), 166–171.
Ozga, J., Dahler-Larsen, P., Segerholm, C. & Simola, H. (2011) Fabricating quality in education:
data and governance in Europe (London, Routledge).
Popkewitz, T. (2008) Education sciences, schooling and abjection: recognising difference and
the making of inequality? South African Journal of Education, 28, 301–319.
724 K. Facer
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Uni
vers
ity o
f C
ambr
idge
] at
00:
43 1
0 O
ctob
er 2
014
Popkewitz, T., Olsson, U. & Petersson, K. (2006) The learning society, the unfinished
cosmopolitan, and governing education, public health and crime prevention at the beginning
of the twenty-first century, Educational Philosophy and Theory, 38(4), 431–449.
Reay, D. & Wiliam, D. (1999) ’I’ll be a nothing’: structure, agency and the construction of
identity through assessment, British Educational Research Journal, 25(3), 343–354.
Rose, N. (2004) Becoming neurochemical selves, in: N. Stehr (Ed.) Biotechnology, commerce and
civil society (New Brunswick, Transaction Press).
Salomon, G. (1990) Distributed cognitions: psychological and educational considerations (Cambridge,
Cambridge University Press).
Selwyn, N. (2009) Faceworking: exploring students’ education-related use of Facebook,
Learning, Media and Technology, 34 (2), 157–174. DOI: 10.1080/17439880902923622.
Skelton, F. (1989) Teenagers and the telephone, Australian Journal of Communications, 15, 21–24.
Stald, G. (2008) Mobile identity: youth, identity, and mobile communication media, in:
D. Buckingham (Ed.) Youth, identity, and digital media: the John D. and Catherine
T. MacArthur Foundation series on digital media and learning (Cambridge, MA, MIT Press),
143–164.
Turkle, S. (2011) Alone together: why we expect more from technology and less from each other (New
York, Basic Books).
World Economic Forum (2011) Personal data: the emergence of a new asset class (Geneva, World
Economic Forum). Available online at: http://www.weforum.org/reports/personal-data-
emergence-new-asset-class (accessed 22 December 2011).
Education, technologies and John Macmurray’s philosophy 725
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
Uni
vers
ity o
f C
ambr
idge
] at
00:
43 1
0 O
ctob
er 2
014