TheProjectGutenbergEBookofPersonalMemoirsofU.S.Grant,VolumeTwobyUlyssesS.Grant

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Language:English

***STARTOFTHISPROJECTGUTENBERGEBOOKGENERALGRANT,VOL.II.***

ProducedbyGlenBledsoe.AdditionalproofingbyDavidWidger

PERSONALMEMOIRSOFU.S.GRANT

VOLUMEII.

CONTENTS.

CHAPTERXL.FIRSTMEETINGWITHSECRETARYSTANTON—GENERALROSECRANS

—COMMANDINGMILITARYDIVISIONOFMISSISSIPPI—ANDREWJOHNSON'SADDRESS

—ARRIVALATCHATTANOOGA.

CHAPTERXLI.ASSUMINGTHECOMMANDATCHATTANOOGA—OPENINGALINEOF

SUPPLIES—BATTLEOFWAUHATCHIE—ONTHEPICKETLINE.

CHAPTERXLII.CONDITIONOFTHEARMY—REBUILDINGTHERAILROAD—GENERAL

BURNSIDE'SSITUATION—ORDERSFORBATTLE—PLANSFORTHEATTACK—HOOKER'S

POSITION—SHERMAN'SMOVEMENTS.

CHAPTERXLIII.PREPARATIONSFORBATTLE—THOMASCARRIESTHEFIRSTLINEOF

THEENEMY—SHERMANCARRIESMISSIONARYRIDGE—BATTLEOFLOOKOUTMOUNTAIN

—GENERALHOOKER'SFIGHT.

CHAPTERXLIV.BATTLEOFCHATTANOOGA—AGALLANTCHARGE—COMPLETEROUTOF

THEENEMY—PURSUITOFTHECONFEDERATES—GENERALBRAGG—REMARKSON

CHATTANOOGA.

CHATTANOOGA.

CHAPTERXLV.THERELIEFOFKNOXVILLE—HEADQUARTERSMOVEDTONASHVILLE

—VISITINGKNOXVILLE—CIPHERDISPATCHES—WITHHOLDINGORDERS.

CHAPTERXLVI.OPERATIONSINMISSISSIPPI—LONGSTREETINEASTTENNESSEE

—COMMISSIONEDLIEUTENANT-GENERAL—COMMANDINGTHEARMIESOFTHEUNITED

STATES—FIRSTINTERVIEWWITHPRESIDENTLINCOLN.

CHAPTERXLVII.THEMILITARYSITUATION—PLANSFORTHECAMPAIGN—SHERIDAN

ASSIGNEDTOCOMMANDOFTHECAVALRY—FLANKMOVEMENTS—FORRESTATFORT

PILLOW—GENERALBANKS'SEXPEDITION—COLONELMOSBY—ANINCIDENTOFTHE

WILDERNESSCAMPAIGN.

CHAPTERXLVIII.COMMENCEMENTOFTHEGRANDCAMPAIGN—GENERALBUTLER'S

POSITION—SHERIDAN'SFIRSTRAID.

CHAPTERXLIX.SHERMANSCAMPAIGNINGEORGIA—SIEGEOFATLANTA—DEATHOF

GENERALMCPHERSON—ATTEMPTTOCAPTUREANDERSONVILLE—CAPTUREOFATLANTA.

CHAPTERL.GRANDMOVEMENTOFTHEARMYOFTHEPOTOMAC—CROSSINGTHE

RAPIDAN—ENTERINGTHEWILDERNESS—BATTLEOFTHEWILDERNESS.

CHAPTERLI.AFTERTHEBATTLE—TELEGRAPHANDSIGNALSERVICE—MOVEMENTBY

THELEFTFLANK.

CHAPTERLII.BATTLEOFSPOTTSYLVANIA—HANCOCK'SPOSITION—ASSAULTOF

WARREN'SANDWRIGHT'SCORPS—UPTONPROMOTEDONTHEFIELD—GOODNEWSFROM

BUTLERANDSHERIDAN.

CHAPTERLIII.HANCOCK'SASSAULT—LOSSESOFTHECONFEDERATES—

CHAPTERLIII.HANCOCK'SASSAULT—LOSSESOFTHECONFEDERATES—PROMOTIONS

RECOMMENDED—DISCOMFITUREOFTHEENEMY—EWELL'SATTACK—REDUCINGTHE

ARTILLERY.

CHAPTERLIV.MOVEMENTBYTHELEFTFLANK—BATTLEOFNORTHANNA—AN

INCIDENTOFTHEMARCH—MOVINGONRICHMOND—SOUTHOFTHEPAMUNKEY

—POSITIONOFTHENATIONALARMY.

CHAPTERLV.ADVANCEONCOLDHARBOR—ANANECDOTEOFTHEWAR—BATTLEOF

COLDHARBOR—CORRESPONDENCEWITHLEERETROSPECTIVE.

CHAPTERLVI.LEFTFLANKMOVEMENTACROSSTHECHICKAHOMINYANDJAMES

—GENERALLEE—VISITTOBUTLER—THEMOVEMENTONPETERSBURG

—THEINVESTMENTOFPETERSBURG.

CHAPTERLVII.RAIDONTHEVIRGINIACENTRALRAILROAD—RAIDONTHEWELDON

RAILROAD—EARLY'SMOVEMENTUPONWASHINGTON—MININGTHEWORKSBEFORE

PETERSBURG—EXPLOSIONOFTHEMINEBEFOREPETERSBURG—CAMPAIGNINTHE

SHENANDOAHVALLEY—CAPTUREOFTHEWELDONRAILROAD.

CHAPTERLVIII.SHERIDAN'SADVANCE—VISITTOSHERIDAN—SHERIDAN'SVICTORY

INTHESHENANDOAH—SHERIDAN'SRIDETOWINCHESTER—CLOSEOFTHECAMPAIGN

FORTHEWINTER.

CHAPTERLIX.THECAMPAIGNINGEORGIA—SHERMAN'SMARCHTOTHESEA—WAR

ANECDOTES—THEMARCHONSAVANNAH—INVESTMENTOFSAVANNAH—CAPTUREOF

SAVANNAH.

CHAPTERLX.THEBATTLEOFFRANKLIN—THEBATTLEOFNASHVILLE

CHAPTERLXI.EXPEDITIONAGAINSTFORTFISHER—ATTACKONTHEFORT—FAILURE

FAILURE

OFTHEEXPEDITION—SECONDEXPEDITIONAGAINSTTHEFORT—CAPTUREOFFORT

FISHER.

CHAPTERLXII.SHERMAN'SMARCHNORTH—SHERIDANORDEREDTOLYNCHBURG

—CANBYORDEREDTOMOVEAGAINSTMOBILE—MOVEMENTSOFSCHOFIELDANDTHOMAS

—CAPTUREOFCOLUMBIA,SOUTHCAROLINA—SHERMANINTHECAROLINAS.

CHAPTERLXIII.ARRIVALOFTHEPEACECOMMISSIONERS—LINCOLNANDTHEPEACE

COMMISSIONERS—ANANECDOTEOFLINCOLN—THEWINTERBEFOREPETERSBURG

—SHERIDANDESTROYSTHERAILROAD—GORDONCARRIESTHEPICKETLINE—PARKE

RECAPTURESTHELINE—THEBATTLEOFWHITEOAKROAD.

CHAPTERLXIV.INTERVIEWWITHSHERIDAN—GRANDMOVEMENTOFTHEARMYOFTHE

POTOMAC—SHERIDAN'SADVANCEONFIVEFORKS—BATTLEOFFIVEFORKS—PARKE

ANDWRIGHTSTORMTHEENEMY'SLINE—BATTLESBEFOREPETERSBURG.

CHAPTERLXV.THECAPTUREOFPETERSBURG—MEETINGPRESIDENTLINCOLNIN

PETERSBURG—THECAPTUREOFRICHMOND—PURSUINGTHEENEMY—VISITTO

SHERIDANANDMEADE.

CHAPTERLXVI.BATTLEOFSAILOR'SCREEK—ENGAGEMENTATFARMVILLE

—CORRESPONDENCEWITHGENERALLEE—SHERIDANINTERCEPTSTHEENEMY.

CHAPTERLXVII.NEGOTIATIONSATAPPOMATTOX—INTERVIEWWITHLEEAT

MCLEAN'SHOUSE—THETERMSOFSURRENDER—LEE'SSURRENDER—INTERVIEWWITH

LEEAFTERTHESURRENDER.

CHAPTERLXVIII.MORALEOFTHETWOARMIES—RELATIVECONDITIONSOFTHE

NORTHANDSOUTH—PRESIDENTLINCOLNVISITSRICHMOND—ARRIVALAT

WASHINGTON—PRESIDENTLINCOLN'SASSASSINATION—PRESIDENTJOHNSON'S

POLICY.

CHAPTERLXIX.SHERMANANDJOHNSTON—JOHNSTON'SSURRENDERTOSHERMAN

—CAPTUREOFMOBILE—WILSON'SEXPEDITION—CAPTUREOFJEFFERSONDAVIS

—GENERALTHOMAS'SQUALITIES—ESTIMATEOFGENERALCANBY.

CHAPTERLXX.THEENDOFTHEWAR—THEMARCHTOWASHINGTON—ONEOF

LINCOLN'SANECDOTES—GRANDREVIEWATWASHINGTON—CHARACTERISTICSOF

LINCOLNANDSTANTON—ESTIMATEOFTHEDIFFERENTCORPSCOMMANDERS.

CONCLUSION

APPENDIX

CHAPTERXL.

FIRSTMEETINGWITHSECRETARYSTANTON—GENERALROSECRANS—COMMANDING

MILITARYDIVISIONOFMISSISSIPPI—ANDREWJOHNSON'SADDRESS—ARRIVALAT

CHATTANOOGA.

Thereply(tomytelegramofOctober16,1863,fromCairo,announcingmyarrivalatthatpoint)cameonthemorningofthe17th,directingmetoproceedimmediatelytotheGaltHouse,Louisville,whereIwouldmeetanofficeroftheWarDepartmentwithmyinstructions.IleftCairowithinanhourortwoafterthereceiptofthisdispatch,goingbyrailviaIndianapolis.JustasthetrainIwasonwasstartingoutofthedepotatIndianapolisamessengercamerunninguptostopit,sayingtheSecretaryofWarwascomingintothestationandwantedtoseeme.

IhadnevermetMr.Stantonuptothattime,thoughwehadheldfrequentconversationsoverthewirestheyearbefore,whenIwasinTennessee.

OccasionallyatnighthewouldorderthewiresbetweentheWarDepartmentandmyheadquarterstobeconnected,andwewouldholdaconversationforanhourortwo.OnthisoccasiontheSecretarywasaccompaniedbyGovernorBroughofOhio,whomIhadnevermet,thoughheandmyfatherhadbeenoldacquaintances.Mr.StantondismissedthespecialtrainthathadbroughthimtoIndianapolis,andaccompaniedmetoLouisville.

UptothistimenohinthadbeengivenmeofwhatwaswantedafterIleftVicksburg,exceptthesuggestioninoneofHalleck'sdispatchesthatIhadbettergotoNashvilleandsuperintendtheoperationoftroopssenttorelieveRosecrans.SoonafterwestartedtheSecretaryhandedmetwoorders,sayingthatImighttakemychoiceofthem.Thetwowereidenticalinallbutoneparticular.Bothcreatedthe"MilitaryDivisionofMississippi,"(givingmethecommand)composedoftheDepartmentsoftheOhio,theCumberland,andthe

command)composedoftheDepartmentsoftheOhio,theCumberland,andtheTennessee,andalltheterritoryfromtheAlleghaniestotheMississippiRivernorthofBanks'scommandinthesouthwest.Oneorderleftthedepartmentcommandersastheywere,whiletheotherrelievedRosecransandassignedThomastohisplace.Iacceptedthelatter.WereachedLouisvilleafternightand,ifIrememberrightly,inacold,drizzlingrain.TheSecretaryofWartoldmeafterwardsthathecaughtacoldonthatoccasionfromwhichheneverexpectedtorecover.Heneverdid.

AdaywasspentinLouisville,theSecretarygivingmethemilitarynewsatthecapitalandtalkingaboutthedisappointmentattheresultsofsomeofthecampaigns.Bytheeveningofthedayafterourarrivalallmattersofdiscussionseemedexhausted,andIleftthehoteltospendtheeveningaway,bothMrs.Grant(whowaswithme)andmyselfhavingrelativeslivinginLouisville.InthecourseoftheeveningMr.

StantonreceivedadispatchfromMr.C.A.Dana,theninChattanooga,informinghimthatunlesspreventedRosecranswouldretreat,andadvisingperemptoryordersagainsthisdoingso.

Asstatedbefore,afterthefallofVicksburgIurgedstronglyuponthegovernmenttheproprietyofamovementagainstMobile.GeneralRosecranshadbeenatMurfreesboro',Tennessee,withalargeandwell-equippedarmyfromearlyintheyear1863,withBraggconfrontinghimwithaforcequiteequaltohisownatfirst,consideringitwasonthedefensive.ButaftertheinvestmentofVicksburgBragg'sarmywaslargelydepletedtostrengthenJohnston,inMississippi,whowasbeingreinforcedtoraisethesiege.IfrequentlywroteGeneralHallecksuggestingthatRosecransshouldmoveagainstBragg.Bysodoinghewouldeitherdetainthelatter'stroopswheretheywereorlayChattanoogaopentocapture.GeneralHalleckstronglyapprovedthesuggestion,andfinallywrotemethathehadrepeatedlyorderedRosecranstoadvance,butthatthelatterhadconstantlyfailedtocomplywiththeorder,andatlast,afterhavingheldacouncilofwar,hadrepliedineffectthatitwasamilitarymaxim"nottofighttwodecisivebattlesatthesametime."Iftrue,themaximwasnotapplicableinthiscase.Itwouldbebadtobedefeatedintwodecisivebattlesfoughtthesameday,butitwouldnotbebadtowinthem.I,however,wasfightingnobattle,andthesiegeofVicksburghaddrawnfromRosecrans'frontsomanyoftheenemythathischancesofvictoryweremuchgreaterthantheywouldbeifhewaiteduntilthesiegewasover,whenthesetroopscouldbereturned.Rosecranswasorderedtomoveagainstthearmythatwasdetaching

returned.Rosecranswasorderedtomoveagainstthearmythatwasdetachingtroopstoraisethesiege.

Finallyhedidmove,onthe24thofJune,buttendaysafterwardsVicksburgsurrendered,andthetroopssentfromBraggwerefreetoreturn.

ItwasatthistimethatIrecommendedtothegeneral-in-chiefthemovementagainstMobile.IknewtheperiltheArmyoftheCumberlandwasin,beingdepletedcontinually,notonlybyordinarycasualties,butalsobyhavingtodetachtroopstoholditsconstantlyextendinglineoverwhichtodrawsupplies,whiletheenemyinfrontwasasconstantlybeingstrengthened.Mobilewasimportanttotheenemy,andintheabsenceofathreateningforcewasguardedbylittleelsethanartillery.Ifthreatenedbylandandfromthewateratthesametimetheprizewouldfalleasily,ortroopswouldhavetobesenttoitsdefence.ThosetroopswouldnecessarilycomefromBragg.Myjudgmentwasoverruled,andthetroopsundermycommandweredissipatedoverotherpartsofthecountrywhereitwasthoughttheycouldrenderthemostservice.

SoonitwasdiscoveredinWashingtonthatRosecranswasintroubleandrequiredassistance.TheemergencywasnowtooimmediatetoallowustogivethisassistancebymakinganattackinrearofBragguponMobile.

Itwasthereforenecessarytoreinforcedirectly,andtroopsweresentfromeveryavailablepoint.

RosecranshadveryskilfullymanoeuvredBraggsouthoftheTennesseeRiver,andthroughandbeyondChattanooga.Ifhehadstoppedandintrenched,andmadehimselfstrongthere,allwouldhavebeenrightandthemistakeofnotmovingearlierpartiallycompensated.Buthepushedon,withhisforcesverymuchscattered,untilBragg'stroopsfromMississippibegantojoinhim.ThenBraggtooktheinitiative.

Rosecranshadtofallbackinturn,andwasabletogethisarmytogetheratChickamauga,somemilessouth-eastofChattanooga,beforethemainbattlewasbroughton.Thebattlewasfoughtonthe19thand20thofSeptember,andRosecranswasbadlydefeated,withaheavylossinartilleryandsomesixteenthousandmenkilled,woundedandcaptured.

ThecorpsunderMajor-GeneralGeorgeH.Thomasstooditsground,whileRosecrans,withCrittendenandMcCook,returnedtoChattanooga.Thomasreturnedalso,butlater,andwithhistroopsingoodorder.Braggfollowedand

returnedalso,butlater,andwithhistroopsingoodorder.BraggfollowedandtookpossessionofMissionaryRidge,overlookingChattanooga.HealsooccupiedLookoutMountain,westofthetown,whichRosecranshadabandoned,andwithithiscontroloftheriverandtheriverroadasfarbackasBridgeport.TheNationaltroopswerenowstronglyintrenchedinChattanoogaValley,withtheTennesseeRiverbehindthemandtheenemyoccupyingcommandingheightstotheeastandwest,withastronglineacrossthevalleyfrommountaintomountain,andwithChattanoogaCreek,foralargepartoftheway,infrontoftheirline.

Onthe29thHallecktelegraphedmetheaboveresults,anddirectedalltheforcesthatcouldbesparedfrommydepartmenttobesenttoRosecrans.LongbeforethisdispatchwasreceivedShermanwasonhisway,andMcPhersonwasmovingeastwithmostofthegarrisonofVicksburg.

Aretreatatthattimewouldhavebeenaterribledisaster.Itwouldnotonlyhavebeenthelossofamostimportantstrategicpositiontous,butitwouldhavebeenattendedwiththelossofalltheartillerystillleftwiththeArmyoftheCumberlandandtheannihilationofthatarmyitself,eitherbycaptureordemoralization.

AllsuppliesforRosecranshadtobebroughtfromNashville.TherailroadbetweenthisbaseandthearmywasinpossessionofthegovernmentuptoBridgeport,thepointatwhichtheroadcrossestothesouthsideoftheTennesseeRiver;butBragg,holdingLookoutandRaccoonmountainswestofChattanooga,commandedtherailroad,theriverandtheshortestandbestwagon-roads,bothsouthandnorthoftheTennessee,betweenChattanoogaandBridgeport.Thedistancebetweenthesetwoplacesisbuttwenty-sixmilesbyrail,butowingtothepositionofBragg,allsuppliesforRosecranshadtobehauledbyacircuitousroutenorthoftheriverandoveramountainouscountry,increasingthedistancetooversixtymiles.

Thiscountryaffordedbutlittlefoodforhisanimals,nearlytenthousandofwhichhadalreadystarved,andnotenoughwerelefttodrawasinglepieceofartilleryoreventheambulancestoconveythesick.

Themenhadbeenonhalfrationsofhardbreadforaconsiderabletime,withbutfewothersuppliesexceptbeefdrivenfromNashvilleacrossthecountry.TheregionalongtheroadbecamesoexhaustedoffoodforthecattlethatbythetimetheyreachedChattanoogatheyweremuchintheconditionofthefewanimalsleftalivethere—"onthelift."Indeed,thebeefwassopoorthatthesoldierswere

leftalivethere—"onthelift."Indeed,thebeefwassopoorthatthesoldierswereinthehabitofsaying,withafaintfacetiousness,thattheywerelivingon"halfrationsofhardbreadandBEEFDRIEDONTHEHOOF."

Nothingcouldbetransportedbutfood,andthetroopswerewithoutsufficientshoesorotherclothingsuitablefortheadvancingseason.

Whattheyhadwaswellworn.ThefuelwithintheFederallineswasexhausted,eventothestumpsoftrees.Therewerenoteamstodrawitfromtheoppositebank,whereitwasabundant.Theonlywayofsupplyingfuel,forsometimebeforemyarrival,hadbeentocuttreesonthenorthbankoftheriverataconsiderabledistanceupthestream,formraftsofitandfloatitdownwiththecurrent,effectingalandingonthesouthsidewithinourlinesbytheuseofpaddlesorpoles.Itwouldthenbecarriedontheshouldersofthementotheircamps.

Ifaretreathadoccurredatthistimeitisnotprobablethatanyofthearmywouldhavereachedtherailroadasanorganizedbody,iffollowedbytheenemy.

OnthereceiptofMr.Dana'sdispatchMr.Stantonsentforme.FindingthatIwasouthebecamenervousandexcited,inquiringofeverypersonhemet,includingguestsofthehouse,whethertheyknewwhereIwas,andbiddingthemfindmeandsendmetohimatonce.Abouteleveno'clockIreturnedtothehotel,andonmyway,whennearthehouse,everypersonmetwasamessengerfromtheSecretary,apparentlypartakingofhisimpatiencetoseeme.IhastenedtotheroomoftheSecretaryandfoundhimpacingthefloorrapidlyinhisdressing-gown.

Sayingthattheretreatmustbeprevented,heshowedmethedispatch.IimmediatelywroteanorderassumingcommandoftheMilitaryDivisionoftheMississippi,andtelegraphedittoGeneralRosecrans.IthentelegraphedtohimtheorderfromWashingtonassigningThomastothecommandoftheArmyoftheCumberland;andtoThomasthathemustholdChattanoogaatallhazards,informinghimatthesametimethatIwouldbeatthefrontassoonaspossible.ApromptreplywasreceivedfromThomas,saying,"Wewillholdthetowntillwestarve."IappreciatedtheforceofthisdispatchlaterwhenIwitnessedtheconditionofaffairswhichpromptedit.Itlooked,indeed,asifbuttwocourseswereopen:onetostarve,theothertosurrenderorbecaptured.

Onthemorningofthe20thofOctoberIstarted,withmystaff,andproceededasfarasNashville.Atthattimeitwasnotprudenttotravelbeyondthatpointby

farasNashville.Atthattimeitwasnotprudenttotravelbeyondthatpointbynight,soIremainedinNashvilleuntilthenextmorning.HereImetforthefirsttimeAndrewJohnson,MilitaryGovernorofTennessee.Hedeliveredaspeechofwelcome.Hiscomposureshowedthatitwasbynomeanshismaideneffort.Itwaslong,andIwasintorturewhilehewasdeliveringit,fearingsomethingwouldbeexpectedfrommeinresponse.Iwasrelieved,however,thepeopleassembledhavingapparentlyheardenough.Atalleventstheycommencedageneralhand-shaking,which,althoughtryingwherethereissomuchofit,wasagreatrelieftomeinthisemergency.

FromNashvilleItelegraphedtoBurnside,whowasthenatKnoxville,thatimportantpointsinhisdepartmentoughttobefortified,sothattheycouldbeheldwiththeleastnumberofmen;toAdmiralPorteratCairo,thatSherman'sadvancehadpassedEastport,Mississippi,thatrationswereprobablyontheirwayfromSt.Louisbyboatforsupplyinghisarmy,andrequestinghimtosendagunboattoconvoythem;andtoThomas,suggestingthatlargepartiesshouldbeputatworkonthewagon-roadtheninusebacktoBridgeport.

Onthemorningofthe21stwetookthetrainforthefront,reachingStevensonAlabama,afterdark.Rosecranswasthereonhiswaynorth.

Hecameintomycarandweheldabriefinterview,inwhichhedescribedveryclearlythesituationatChattanooga,andmadesomeexcellentsuggestionsastowhatshouldbedone.Myonlywonderwasthathehadnotcarriedthemout.WethenproceededtoBridgeport,wherewestoppedforthenight.FromherewetookhorsesandmadeourwaybyJasperandoverWaldron'sRidgetoChattanooga.Therehadbeenmuchrain,andtheroadswerealmostimpassablefrommud,knee-deepinplaces,andfromwash-outsonthemountainsides.IhadbeenoncrutchessincethetimeofmyfallinNewOrleans,andhadtobecarriedoverplaceswhereitwasnotsafetocrossonhorseback.Theroadswerestrewnwiththedebrisofbrokenwagonsandthecarcassesofthousandsofstarvedmulesandhorses.AtJasper,sometenortwelvemilesfromBridgeport,therewasahalt.GeneralO.O.Howardhadhisheadquartersthere.FromthispointItelegraphedBurnsidetomakeeveryefforttosecurefivehundredroundsofammunitionforhisartilleryandsmall-arms.Westoppedforthenightatalittlehamletsometenortwelvemilesfartheron.ThenextdaywereachedChattanoogaalittlebeforedark.IwentdirectlytoGeneralThomas'sheadquarters,andremainingthereafewdays,untilIcouldestablishmyown.

Duringtheeveningmostofthegeneralofficerscalledintopaytheirrespectsandtotalkabouttheconditionofaffairs.Theypointedoutonthemaptheline,

andtotalkabouttheconditionofaffairs.Theypointedoutonthemaptheline,markedwitharedorbluepencil,whichRosecranshadcontemplatedfallingbackupon.Ifanyofthemhadapprovedthemovetheydidnotsaysotome.IfoundGeneralW.F.SmithoccupyingthepositionofchiefengineeroftheArmyoftheCumberland.IhadknownSmithasacadetatWestPoint,buthadnorecollectionofhavingmethimaftermygraduation,in1843,uptothistime.HeexplainedthesituationofthetwoarmiesandthetopographyofthecountrysoplainlythatIcouldseeitwithoutaninspection.Ifoundthathehadestablishedasaw-millonthebanksoftheriver,byutilizinganoldenginefoundintheneighborhood;and,byraftinglogsfromthenorthsideoftheriverabove,hadgotoutthelumberandcompletedpontoonsandroadwayplankforasecondbridge,oneflyingbridgebeingtherealready.Hewasalsorapidlygettingoutthematerialsandconstructingtheboatsforathirdbridge.InadditiontothishehadfarunderwayasteamerforplyingbetweenChattanoogaandBridgeportwheneverwemightgetpossessionoftheriver.Thisboatconsistedofascow,madeoftheplanksawedoutatthemill,housedin,andasternwheelattachedwhichwaspropelledbyasecondenginetakenfromsomeshoporfactory.

ItelegraphedtoWashingtonthisnight,notifyingGeneralHalleckofmyarrival,andaskingtohaveGeneralShermanassignedtothecommandoftheArmyoftheTennessee,headquartersinthefield.Therequestwasatoncecompliedwith.

CHAPTERXLI.

ASSUMINGTHECOMMANDATCHATTANOOGA—OPENINGALINEOFSUPPLIES—BATTLE

OFWAUHATCHIE—ONTHEPICKETLINE.

Thenextday,the24th,Istartedouttomakeapersonalinspection,takingThomasandSmithwithme,besidesmostofthemembersofmypersonalstaff.Wecrossedtothenorthsideoftheriver,and,movingtothenorthofdetachedspursofhills,reachedtheTennesseeatBrown'sFerry,somethreemilesbelowLookoutMountain,unobservedbytheenemy.Hereweleftourhorsesbackfromtheriverandapproachedthewateronfoot.Therewasapicketstationoftheenemyontheoppositeside,ofabouttwentymen,infullview,andwewerewithineasyrange.Theydidnotfireuponusnorseemtobedisturbedbyour

withineasyrange.Theydidnotfireuponusnorseemtobedisturbedbyourpresence.Theymusthaveseenthatwewereallcommissionedofficers.

But,Isuppose,theylookeduponthegarrisonofChattanoogaasprisonersofwar,feedingorstarvingthemselves,andthoughtitwouldbeinhumantokillanyofthemexceptinself-defence.

ThatnightIissuedordersforopeningtheroutetoBridgeport—acrackerline,asthesoldiersappropriatelytermedit.Theyhadbeensolongonshortrationsthatmyfirstthoughtwastheestablishmentofalineoverwhichfoodmightreachthem.

ChattanoogaisonthesouthbankoftheTennessee,wherethatriverrunsnearlyduewest.Itisatthenorthernendofavalleyfiveorsixmilesinwidth,throughwhichChattanoogaCreekruns.TotheeastofthevalleyisMissionaryRidge,risingfromfivetoeighthundredfeetabovethecreekandterminatingsomewhatabruptlyahalfmileormorebeforereachingtheTennessee.OnthewestofthevalleyisLookoutMountain,twenty-twohundredfeetabove-tidewater.JustbelowthetowntheTennesseemakesaturntothesouthandrunstothebaseofLookoutMountain,leavingnolevelgroundbetweenthemountainandriver.TheMemphisandCharlestonRailroadpassesthispoint,wherethemountainstandsnearlyperpendicular.EastofMissionaryRidgeflowstheSouthChickamaugaRiver;westofLookoutMountainisLookoutCreek;andwestofthat,RaccoonMountains.LookoutMountain,atitsnorthernend,risesalmostperpendicularlyforsomedistance,thenbreaksoffinagentleslopeofcultivatedfieldstonearthesummit,whereitendsinapalisadethirtyormorefeetinheight.Onthegentlyslopingground,betweentheupperandlowerpalisades,thereisasinglefarmhouse,whichisreachedbyawagon-roadfromthevalleyeast.

TheintrenchedlineoftheenemycommencedonthenorthendofMissionaryRidgeandextendedalongthecrestforsomedistancesouth,thenceacrossChattanoogavalleytoLookoutMountain.LookoutMountainwasalsofortifiedandheldbytheenemy,whoalsokepttroopsinLookoutvalleywest,andonRaccoonMountain,withpicketsextendingdowntheriversoastocommandtheroadonthenorthbankandrenderituselesstous.InadditiontothistherewasanintrenchedlineinChattanoogavalleyextendingfromtherivereastofthetowntoLookoutMountain,tomaketheinvestmentcomplete.BesidesthefortificationsonMissionRidge,therewasalineatthebaseofthehill,withoccasionalspursofrifle-pitshalf-wayupthefront.Theenemy'spicketsextendedoutintothevalleytowardsthetown,sofarthatthepicketsofthetwo

extendedoutintothevalleytowardsthetown,sofarthatthepicketsofthetwoarmiescouldconverse.Atonepointtheywereseparatedonlybythenarrowcreekwhichgivesitsnametothevalleyandtown,andfromwhichbothsidesdrewwater.TheUnionlineswereshorterthanthoseoftheenemy.

Thustheenemy,withavastlysuperiorforce,wasstronglyfortifiedtotheeast,south,andwest,andcommandedtheriverbelow.Practically,theArmyoftheCumberlandwasbesieged.Theenemyhadstoppedwithhiscavalrynorthoftheriverthepassingofatrainloadedwithammunitionandmedicalsupplies.TheUnionarmywasshortofboth,nothavingammunitionenoughforaday'sfighting.

GeneralHalleckhad,longbeforemycomingintothisnewfield,orderedpartsofthe11thand12thcorps,commandedrespectivelybyGeneralsHowardandSlocum,Hookerincommandofthewhole,fromtheArmyofthePotomactoreinforceRosecrans.ItwouldhavebeenfollytosendthemtoChattanoogatohelpeatupthefewrationsleftthere.Theywereconsequentlyleftontherailroad,wheresuppliescouldbebroughttothem.Beforemyarrival,ThomasorderedtheirconcentrationatBridgeport.

GeneralW.F.SmithhadbeensoinstrumentalinpreparingforthemovewhichIwasnowabouttomake,andsoclearinhisjudgmentaboutthemannerofmakingit,thatIdeemeditbutjusttohimthatheshouldhavecommandofthetroopsdetailedtoexecutethedesign,althoughhewasthenactingasastaffofficerandwasnotincommandoftroops.

Onthe24thofOctober,aftermyreturntoChattanooga,thefollowingdetailsweremade:GeneralHooker,whowasnowatBridgeport,wasorderedtocrosstothesouthsideoftheTennesseeandmarchupbyWhitesidesandWauhatchietoBrown'sFerry.GeneralPalmer,withadivisionofthe14thcorps,ArmyoftheCumberland,wasorderedtomovedowntheriveronthenorthside,byabackroad,untiloppositeWhitesides,thencrossandholdtheroadinHooker'srearafterhehadpassed.FourthousandmenwereatthesametimedetailedtoactunderGeneralSmithdirectlyfromChattanooga.Eighteenhundredofthem,underGeneralHazen,weretotakesixtypontoonboats,andundercoverofnightfloatbythepicketsoftheenemyatthenorthbaseofLookout,downtoBrown'sFerry,thenlandonthesouthsideandcaptureordriveawaythepicketsatthatpoint.Smithwastomarchwiththeremainderofthedetail,alsoundercoverofnight,bythenorthbankoftherivertoBrown'sFerry,takingwithhimallthematerialforlayingthebridgeassoonasthecrossingwassecured.

Onthe26th,HookercrossedtheriveratBridgeportandcommencedhiseastwardmarch.Atthreeo'clockonthemorningofthe27th,Hazenmovedintothestreamwithhissixtypontoonsandeighteenhundredbraveandwell-equippedmen.SmithstartedenoughinadvancetobeneartheriverwhenHazenshouldarrive.ThereareanumberofdetachedspursofhillsnorthoftheriveratChattanooga,backofwhichisagoodroadparalleltothestream,shelteredfromtheviewfromthetopofLookout.

ItwasoverthisroadSmithmarched.Atfiveo'clockHazenlandedatBrown'sFerry,surprisedthepicketguard,andcapturedmostofit.Byseveno'clockthewholeofSmith'sforcewasferriedoverandinpossessionofaheightcommandingtheferry.Thiswasspeedilyfortified,whileadetailwaslayingthepontoonbridge.Byteno'clockthebridgewaslaid,andourextremeright,nowinLookoutvalley,wasfortifiedandconnectedwiththerestofthearmy.ThetwobridgesovertheTennesseeRiver—aflyingoneatChattanoogaandthenewoneatBrown'sFerry—withtheroadnorthoftheriver,coveredfromboththefireandtheviewoftheenemy,madetheconnectioncomplete.Hookerfoundbutslightobstaclesinhisway,andontheafternoonofthe28themergedintoLookoutvalleyatWauhatchie.HowardmarchedontoBrown'sFerry,whileGeary,whocommandedadivisioninthe12thcorps,stoppedthreemilessouth.Thepicketsoftheenemyontheriverbelowwerenowcutoff,andsooncameinandsurrendered.

TheriverwasnowopenedtousfromLookoutvalleytoBridgeport.

BetweenBrown'sFerryandKelly'sFerrytheTennesseerunsthroughanarrowgorgeinthemountains,whichcontractsthestreamsomuchastoincreasethecurrentbeyondthecapacityofanordinarysteamertostemit.Togetuptheserapids,steamersmustbecordelled;thatis,pulledupbyropesfromtheshore.ButthereisnodifficultyinnavigatingthestreamfromBridgeporttoKelly'sFerry.ThelatterpointisonlyeightmilesfromChattanoogaandconnectedwithitbyagoodwagon-road,whichrunsthroughalowpassintheRaccoonMountainsonthesouthsideoftherivertoBrown'sFerry,thenceonthenorthsidetotheriveroppositeChattanooga.TherewereseveralsteamersatBridgeport,andabundanceofforage,clothingandprovisions.

OnthewaytoChattanoogaIhadtelegraphedbacktoNashvilleforagoodsupplyofvegetablesandsmallrations,whichthetroopshadbeensolongdeprivedof.Hookerhadbroughtwithhimfromtheeastafullsupplyoflandtransportation.Hisanimalshadnotbeensubjectedtohardworkonbadroads

transportation.Hisanimalshadnotbeensubjectedtohardworkonbadroadswithoutforage,butwereingoodcondition.InfivedaysfrommyarrivalinChattanoogathewaywasopentoBridgeportand,withtheaidofsteamersandHooker'steams,inaweekthetroopswerereceivingfullrations.Itishardforanyonenotaneye-witnesstorealizethereliefthisbrought.Themenweresoonreclothedandalsowellfed,anabundanceofammunitionwasbroughtup,andacheerfulnessprevailednotbeforeenjoyedinmanyweeks.Neitherofficersnormenlookeduponthemselvesanylongerasdoomed.Theweakandlanguidappearanceofthetroops,sovisiblebefore,disappearedatonce.Idonotknowwhattheeffectwasontheotherside,butassumeitmusthavebeencorrespondinglydepressing.Mr.DavishadvisitedBraggbutashorttimebefore,andmusthaveperceivedourconditiontobeaboutasBraggdescribeditinhissubsequentreport."Thesedispositions,"hesaid,"faithfullysustained,insuredtheenemy'sspeedyevacuationofChattanoogaforwantoffoodandforage.Possessedoftheshortestroutetohisdepot,andtheonebywhichreinforcementsmustreachhim,weheldhimatourmercy,andhisdestructionwasonlyaquestionoftime."Butthedispositionswerenot"faithfullysustained,"andIdoubtnotbutthousandsofmenengagedintryingto"sustain"themnowrejoicethattheywerenot.TherewasnotimeduringtherebellionwhenIdidnotthink,andoftensay,thattheSouthwasmoretobebenefitedbyitsdefeatthantheNorth.Thelatterhadthepeople,theinstitutions,andtheterritorytomakeagreatandprosperousnation.Theformerwasburdenedwithaninstitutionabhorrenttoallcivilizedpeoplenotbroughtupunderit,andonewhichdegradedlabor,keptitinignorance,andenervatedthegoverningclass.

Withtheoutsideworldatwarwiththisinstitution,theycouldnothaveextendedtheirterritory.Thelaborofthecountrywasnotskilled,norallowedtobecomeso.Thewhitescouldnottoilwithoutbecomingdegraded,andthosewhodidweredenominated"poorwhitetrash."Thesystemoflaborwouldhavesoonexhaustedthesoilandleftthepeoplepoor.Thenon-slaveholderswouldhaveleftthecountry,andthesmallslaveholdermusthavesoldouttohismorefortunateneighbor.Soontheslaveswouldhaveoutnumberedthemasters,and,notbeinginsympathywiththem,wouldhaverisenintheirmightandexterminatedthem.ThewarwasexpensivetotheSouthaswellastotheNorth,bothinbloodandtreasure,butitwasworthallitcost.

Theenemywassurprisedbythemovementswhichsecuredtousalineofsupplies.Heappreciateditsimportance,andhastenedtotrytorecoverthelinefromus.HisstrengthonLookoutMountainwasnotequaltoHooker'scommandinthevalleybelow.FromMissionaryRidgehehadtomarchtwicethedistancewehadfromChattanooga,inordertoreachLookoutValley;butonthenightof

wehadfromChattanooga,inordertoreachLookoutValley;butonthenightofthe28thand29thanattackwasmadeonGearyatWauhatchiebyLongstreet'scorps.Whenthebattlecommenced,HookerorderedHowardupfromBrown'sFerry.HehadthreemilestomarchtoreachGeary.Onhiswayhewasfireduponbyrebeltroopsfromafoot-hilltotheleftoftheroadandfromwhichtheroadwascommanded.Howardturnedtotheleft,chargedupthehillandcaptureditbeforetheenemyhadtimetointrench,takingmanyprisoners.Leavingsufficientmentoholdthisheight,hepushedontoreinforceGeary.Beforehegotup,Gearyhadbeenengagedforaboutthreehoursagainstavastlysuperiorforce.Thenightwassodarkthatthemencouldnotdistinguishonefromanotherexceptbythelightoftheflashesoftheirmuskets.InthedarknessanduproarHooker'steamstersbecamefrightenedanddesertedtheirteams.Themulesalsobecamefrightened,andbreakingloosefromtheirfasteningsstampededdirectlytowardstheenemy.Thelatter,nodoubt,tookthisforacharge,andstampededinturn.Byfouro'clockinthemorningthebattlehadentirelyceased,andour"crackerline"wasneverafterwarddisturbed.

InsecuringpossessionofLookoutValley,Smithlostonemankilledandfourorfivewounded.Theenemylostmostofhispicketsattheferry,captured.Inthenightengagementofthe28th-9thHookerlost416

killedandwounded.Ineverknewthelossoftheenemy,butourtroopsburiedoveronehundredandfiftyofhisdeadandcapturedmorethanahundred.

Afterwehadsecuredtheopeningofalineoverwhichtobringoursuppliestothearmy,Imadeapersonalinspectiontoseethesituationofthepicketsofthetwoarmies.AsIhavestated,ChattanoogaCreekcomesdownthecentreofthevalleytowithinamileorsuchamatterofthetownofChattanooga,thenbearsoffwesterly,thennorth-westerly,andenterstheTennesseeRiveratthefootofLookoutMountain.Thiscreek,fromitsmouthuptowhereitbearsoffwest,laybetweenthetwolinesofpickets,andtheguardsofbotharmiesdrewtheirwaterfromthesamestream.AsIwouldbeundershort-rangefireandinanopencountry,Itooknobodywithme,except,Ibelieve,abugler,whostayedsomedistancetotherear.Irodefromourrightaroundtoourleft.

WhenIcametothecampofthepicketguardofourside,Iheardthecall,"Turnouttheguardforthecommandinggeneral."Ireplied,"Nevermindtheguard,"andtheyweredismissedandwentbacktotheirtents.Justbackofthese,andaboutequallydistantfromthecreek,weretheguardsoftheConfederatepickets.Thesentinelontheirpostcalledoutinlikemanner,"Turnouttheguardforthe

Thesentinelontheirpostcalledoutinlikemanner,"Turnouttheguardforthecommandinggeneral,"and,Ibelieve,added,"GeneralGrant."Theirlineinamomentfront-facedtothenorth,facingme,andgaveasalute,whichIreturned.

Themostfriendlyrelationsseemedtoexistbetweenthepicketsofthetwoarmies.Atoneplacetherewasatreewhichhadfallenacrossthestream,andwhichwasusedbythesoldiersofbotharmiesindrawingwaterfortheircamps.GeneralLongstreet'scorpswasstationedthereatthetime,andworeblueofalittledifferentshadefromouruniform.

Seeingasoldierinblueonthislog,Irodeuptohim,commencedconversingwithhim,andaskedwhosecorpshebelongedto.Hewasverypolite,and,touchinghishattome,saidhebelongedtoGeneralLongstreet'scorps.Iaskedhimafewquestions—butnotwithaviewofgaininganyparticularinformation—allofwhichheanswered,andIrodeoff.

CHAPTERXLII.

CONDITIONOFTHEARMY—REBUILDINGTHERAILROAD—GENERALBURNSIDE'S

SITUATION—ORDERSFORBATTLE—PLANSFORTHEATTACK—HOOKER'SPOSITION

—SHERMAN'SMOVEMENTS.

HavinggottheArmyoftheCumberlandinacomfortableposition,Inowbegantolookaftertheremainderofmynewcommand.BurnsidewasinaboutasdesperateaconditionastheArmyoftheCumberlandhadbeen,onlyhewasnotyetbesieged.Hewasahundredmilesfromthenearestpossiblebase,BigSouthForkoftheCumberlandRiver,andmuchfartherfromanyrailroadwehadpossessionof.Theroadsbackwereovermountains,andallsuppliesalongthelinehadlongsincebeenexhausted.Hisanimals,too,hadbeenstarved,andtheircarcasseslinedtheroadfromCumberlandGap,andfarbacktowardsLexington,Ky.

EastTennesseestillfurnishedsuppliesofbeef,breadandforage,butitdidnotsupplyammunition,clothing,medicalsupplies,orsmallrations,suchascoffee,sugar,saltandrice.

ShermanhadstartedfromMemphisforCorinthonthe11thofOctober.

Hisinstructionsrequiredhimtorepairtheroadinhisrearinordertobringupsupplies.Thedistancewasaboutthreehundredandthirtymilesthroughahostilecountry.Hisentirecommandcouldnothavemaintainedtheroadifithadbeencompleted.Thebridgeshadallbeendestroyedbytheenemy,andmuchotherdamagedone.Ahostilecommunitylivedalongtheroad;guerillabandsinfestedthecountry,andmoreorlessofthecavalryoftheenemywasstillintheWest.OftenSherman'sworkwasdestroyedassoonascompleted,andheonlyashortdistanceaway.

TheMemphisandCharlestonRailroadstrikestheTennesseeRiveratEastport,Mississippi.KnowingthedifficultyShermanwouldhavetosupplyhimselffromMemphis,IhadpreviouslyorderedsuppliessentfromSt.Louisonsmallsteamers,tobeconvoyedbythenavy,tomeethimatEastport.Thesehegot.InoworderedhimtodiscontinuehisworkofrepairingroadsandtomoveonwithhiswholeforcetoStevenson,Alabama,withoutdelay.ThisorderwasbornetoShermanbyamessenger,whopaddleddowntheTennesseeinacanoeandfloatedoverMuscleShoals;itwasdeliveredatIukaonthe27th.InthisShermanwasnotifiedthattherebelsweremovingaforcetowardsCleveland,EastTennessee,andmightbegoingtoNashville,inwhicheventhistroopswereinthebestpositiontobeatthemthere.Sherman,withhischaracteristicpromptness,abandonedtheworkhewasengageduponandpushedonatonce.Onthe1stofNovemberhecrossedtheTennesseeatEastport,andthatdaywasinFlorence,Alabama,withtheheadofcolumn,whilehistroopswerestillcrossingatEastport,withBlairbringinguptherear.

Sherman'sforcemadeanadditionalarmy,withcavalry,artillery,andtrains,alltobesuppliedbythesingletrackroadfromNashville.AllindicationspointedalsototheprobablenecessityofsupplyingBurnside'scommandinEastTennessee,twenty-fivethousandmore,bythesameroute.Asingletrackcouldnotdothis.Igave,therefore,anordertoShermantohaltGeneralG.M.Dodge'scommand,ofabouteightthousandmen,atAthens,andsubsequentlydirectedthelattertoarrangehistroopsalongtherailroadfromDecaturnorthtowardsNashville,andtorebuildthatroad.TheroadfromNashvilletoDecaturpassesoverabrokencountry,cutupwithinnumerablestreams,manyofthemofconsiderablewidth,andwithvalleysfarbelowtheroad-bed.Allthebridgesoverthesehadbeendestroyed,andtherailstakenupandtwistedbytheenemy.Allthecarsandlocomotivesnotcarriedoffhadbeendestroyedaseffectuallyastheyknewhowtodestroythem.Allbridgesandculvertshadbeendestroyed

theyknewhowtodestroythem.AllbridgesandculvertshadbeendestroyedbetweenNashvilleandDecatur,andthencetoStevenson,wheretheMemphisandCharlestonandtheNashvilleandChattanoogaroadsunite.TherebuildingofthisroadwouldgiveustworoadsasfarasStevensonoverwhichtosupplythearmy.FromBridgeport,ashortdistancefarthereast,theriversupplementstheroad.

GeneralDodge,besidesbeingamostcapablesoldier,wasanexperiencedrailroadbuilder.Hehadnotoolstoworkwithexceptthoseofthepioneers—axes,picks,andspades.Withthesehewasabletointrenchhismenandprotectthemagainstsurprisesbysmallpartiesoftheenemy.AshehadnobaseofsuppliesuntiltheroadcouldbecompletedbacktoNashville,thefirstmattertoconsiderafterprotectinghismenwasthegettinginoffoodandforagefromthesurroundingcountry.Hehadhismenandteamsbringinallthegraintheycouldfind,oralltheyneeded,andallthecattleforbeef,andsuchotherfoodascouldbefound.Millersweredetailedfromtherankstorunthemillsalongthelineofthearmy.Whenthesewerenotnearenoughtothetroopsforprotectiontheyweretakendownandmoveduptothelineoftheroad.

Blacksmithshops,withalltheironandsteelfoundinthem,weremovedupinlikemanner.Blacksmithsweredetailedandsettoworkmakingthetoolsnecessaryinrailroadandbridgebuilding.Axemenwereputtoworkgettingouttimberforbridgesandcuttingfuelforlocomotiveswhentheroadshouldbecompleted.Car-buildersweresettoworkrepairingthelocomotivesandcars.Thuseverybranchofrailroadbuilding,makingtoolstoworkwith,andsupplyingtheworkmenwithfood,wasallgoingonatonce,andwithouttheaidofamechanicorlaborerexceptwhatthecommanditselffurnished.Butrailsandcarsthemencouldnotmakewithoutmaterial,andtherewasnotenoughrollingstocktokeeptheroadwealreadyhadworkedtoitsfullcapacity.Therewerenorailsexceptthoseinuse.TosupplythesedeficienciesIorderedeightofthetenenginesGeneralMcPhersonhadatVicksburgtobesenttoNashville,andallthecarshehadexceptten.

IalsoorderedthetroopsinWestTennesseetopointsontheriverandontheMemphisandCharlestonroad,andorderedthecars,locomotivesandrailsfromalltherailroadsexcepttheMemphisandCharlestontoNashville.Themilitarymanagerofrailroadsalsowasdirectedtofurnishmorerollingstockand,asfarashecould,bridgematerial.

GeneralDodgehadtheworkassignedhimfinishedwithinfortydaysafterreceivinghisorders.Thenumberofbridgestorebuildwasonehundredand

receivinghisorders.Thenumberofbridgestorebuildwasonehundredandeighty-two,manyofthemoverdeepandwidechasms;thelengthofroadrepairedwasonehundredandtwomiles.

Theenemy'stroops,whichitwasthoughtwereeithermovingagainstBurnsideorweregoingtoNashville,wentnofartherthanCleveland.

Theirpresencethere,however,alarmedtheauthoritiesatWashington,and,onaccountofourhelplessconditionatChattanooga,causedmemuchuneasiness.Dispatcheswereconstantlycoming,urgingmetodosomethingforBurnside'srelief;callingattentiontotheimportanceofholdingEastTennessee;sayingthePresidentwasmuchconcernedfortheprotectionoftheloyalpeopleinthatsection,etc.WehadnotatChattanoogaanimalstopullasinglepieceofartillery,muchlessasupplytrain.ReinforcementscouldnothelpBurnside,becausehehadneithersuppliesnorammunitionsufficientforthem;hardly,indeed,breadandmeatforthemenhehad.TherewasnoreliefpossibleforhimexceptbyexpellingtheenemyfromMissionaryRidgeandaboutChattanooga.

Onthe4thofNovemberLongstreetleftourfrontwithaboutfifteenthousandtroops,besidesWheeler'scavalry,fivethousandmore,togoagainstBurnside.Thesituationseemeddesperate,andwasmoreaggravatingbecausenothingcouldbedoneuntilShermanshouldgetup.

TheauthoritiesatWashingtonwerenowmorethaneveranxiousforthesafetyofBurnside'sarmy,andpliedmewithdispatchesfasterthanever,urgingthatsomethingshouldbedoneforhisrelief.Onthe7th,beforeLongstreetcouldpossiblyhavereachedKnoxville,IorderedThomasperemptorilytoattacktheenemy'sright,soastoforcethereturnofthetroopsthathadgoneupthevalley.Idirectedhimtotakemules,officers'horses,oranimalswhereverhecouldgetthemtomovethenecessaryartillery.Buthepersistedinthedeclarationthathecouldnotmoveasinglepieceofartillery,andcouldnotseehowhecouldpossiblycomplywiththeorder.NothingwaslefttobedonebuttoanswerWashingtondispatchesasbestIcould;urgeShermanforward,althoughhewasmakingeveryefforttogetforward,andencourageBurnsidetoholdon,assuringhimthatinashorttimeheshouldberelieved.AllofBurnside'sdispatchesshowedthegreatestconfidenceinhisabilitytoholdhispositionaslongashisammunitionheldout.

HeevensuggestedtheproprietyofabandoningtheterritoryheheldsouthandwestofKnoxville,soastodrawtheenemyfartherfromhisbaseandmakeit

westofKnoxville,soastodrawtheenemyfartherfromhisbaseandmakeitmoredifficultforhimtogetbacktoChattanoogawhenthebattleshouldbegin.LongstreethadarailroadasfarasLoudon;butfromtheretoKnoxvillehehadtorelyonwagontrains.Burnside'ssuggestion,therefore,wasagoodone,anditwasadopted.Onthe14thItelegraphedhim:

"Sherman'sadvancehasreachedBridgeport.HiswholeforcewillbereadytomovefromtherebyTuesdayatfarthest.IfyoucanholdLongstreetincheckuntilhegetsup,orbyskirmishingandfallingbackcanavoidseriouslosstoyourselfandgaintime,IwillbeabletoforcetheenemybackfromhereandplaceaforcebetweenLongstreetandBraggthatmustinevitablymaketheformertaketothemountain-passesbyeveryavailableroad,togettohissupplies.ShermanwouldhavebeenherebeforethisbutforhighwaterinElkRiverdrivinghimsomethirtymilesupthatrivertocross."

Andagainlaterintheday,indicatingmyplansforhisrelief,asfollows:

"YourdispatchandDana'sjustreceived.Beingthere,youcantellbetterhowtoresistLongstreet'sattackthanIcandirect.WithyourshowingyouhadbettergiveupKingstonatthelastmomentandsavethemostproductivepartofyourpossessions.EveryarrangementisnowmadetothrowSherman'sforceacrosstheriver,justatandbelowthemouthofChickamaugaCreek,assoonasitarrives.Thomaswillattackonhisleftatthesametime,andtogetheritisexpectedtocarryMissionaryRidge,andfromtherepushaforceontotherailroadbetweenClevelandandDalton.Hookerwillatthesametimeattack,and,ifhecan,carryLookoutMountain.Theenemynowseemstobelookingforanattackonhisleftflank.Thisfavorsus.Tofurtherconfirmthis,Sherman'sadvancedivisionwillmarchdirectfromWhitesidetoTrenton.TheremainderofhisforcewillpassoveranewroadjustmadefromWhitesidetoKelly'sFerry,thusbeingconcealedfromtheenemy,andleavehimtosupposethewholeforceisgoingupLookoutValley.

Sherman'sadvancehasonlyjustreachedBridgeport.Therearwillonlyreachthereonthe16th.Thiswillbringittothe19thastheearliestdayformakingthecombinedmovementasdesired.Informmeifyouthinkyoucansustainyourselfuntilthistime.IcanhardlyconceiveoftheenemybreakingthroughatKingstonandpushingforKentucky.Iftheyshould,however,anewproblemwouldbeleftforsolution.ThomashasorderedadivisionofcavalrytothevicinityofSparta.Iwillascertainiftheyhavestarted,andinformyou.Itwillbeentirelyoutofthequestiontosendyoutenthousandmen,notbecausetheycannotbespared,buthowwouldtheybefedaftertheygotevenonedayeastfromhere?"

howwouldtheybefedaftertheygotevenonedayeastfromhere?"

Longstreet,forsomereasonorother,stoppedatLoudonuntilthe13th.

Thatbeingtheterminusofhisrailroadcommunications,itisprobablehewasdirectedtoremainthereawaitingorders.HewasinapositionthreateningKnoxville,andatthesametimewherehecouldbebroughtbackspeedilytoChattanooga.ThedayafterLongstreetleftLoudon,ShermanreachedBridgeportinpersonandproceededontoseemethatevening,the14th,andreachedChattanoogathenextday.

MyordersforbattlewereallpreparedinadvanceofSherman'sarrival(*15),exceptthedates,whichcouldnotbefixedwhiletroopstobeengagedweresofaraway.ThepossessionofLookoutMountainwasofnospecialadvantagetousnow.HookerwasinstructedtosendHoward'scorpstothenorthsideoftheTennessee,thenceupbehindthehillsonthenorthside,andtogointocampoppositeChattanooga;withtheremainderofthecommand,Hookerwas,atatimetobeafterwardsappointed,toascendthewesternslopebetweentheupperandlowerpalisades,andsogetintoChattanoogavalley.

TheplanofbattlewasforShermantoattacktheenemy'srightflank,formalineacrossit,extendourleftoverSouthChickamaugaRiversoastothreatenorholdtherailroadinBragg'srear,andthusforcehimeithertoweakenhislineselsewhereorlosehisconnectionwithhisbaseatChickamaugaStation.Hookerwastoperformlikeserviceonourright.HisproblemwastogetfromLookoutValleytoChattanoogaValleyinthemostexpeditiouswaypossible;crossthelattervalleyrapidlytoRossville,southofBragg'slineonMissionaryRidge,formlinethereacrosstheridgefacingnorth,withhisrightflankextendedtoChickamaugaValleyeastoftheridge,thusthreateningtheenemy'srearonthatflankandcompellinghimtoreinforcethisalso.Thomas,withtheArmyoftheCumberland,occupiedthecentre,andwastoassaultwhiletheenemywasengagedwithmostofhisforcesonhistwoflanks.

Tocarryoutthisplan,ShermanwastocrosstheTennesseeatBrown'sFerryandmoveeastofChattanoogatoapointoppositethenorthendofMissionRidge,andtoplacehiscommandbackofthefoot-hillsoutofsightoftheenemyontheridge.TherearetwostreamscalledChickamaugaemptyingintotheTennesseeRivereastofChattanooga—NorthChickamauga,takingitsriseinTennessee,flowingsouth,andemptyingintotheriversomesevenoreightmileseast;whiletheSouthChickamauga,whichtakesitsriseinGeorgia,flowsnorthward,andemptiesintotheTennesseesomethreeorfourmilesabovethetown.

emptiesintotheTennesseesomethreeorfourmilesabovethetown.

TherewerenowonehundredandsixteenpontoonsintheNorthChickamaugaRiver,theirpresencetherebeingunknowntotheenemy.

Atnightadivisionwastobemarcheduptothatpoint,andattwoo'clockinthemorningmoveddownwiththecurrent,thirtymenineachboat.AfewweretolandeastofthemouthoftheSouthChickamauga,capturethepicketsthere,andthenlayabridgeconnectingthetwobanksoftheriver.TherestweretolandonthesouthsideoftheTennessee,whereMissionaryRidgewouldstrikeitifprolonged,andasufficientnumberofmentomantheboatsweretopushtothenorthsidetoferryoverthemainbodyofSherman'scommandwhilethoseleftonthesouthsideintrenchedthemselves.Thomaswastomoveoutfromhislinesfacingtheridge,leavingenoughofPalmer'scorpstoguardagainstanattackdownthevalley.LookoutValleybeingofnopresentvaluetous,andbeinguntenablebytheenemyifweshouldsecureMissionaryRidge,Hooker'sorderswerechanged.HisrevisedordersbroughthimtoChattanoogabytheestablishedroutenorthoftheTennessee.HewasthentomoveouttotherighttoRossville.

Hooker'spositioninLookoutValleywasabsolutelyessentialtoussolongasChattanoogawasbesieged.Itwasthekeytoourlineforsupplyingthearmy.Butitwasnotessentialaftertheenemywasdispersedfromourfront,orevenafterthebattleforthispurposewasbegun.Hooker'sorders,therefore,weredesignedtogethisforcepastLookoutMountainandChattanoogaValley,anduptoMissionaryRidge.BycrossingthenorthfaceofLookoutthetroopswouldcomeintoChattanoogaValleyinrearofthelineheldbytheenemyacrossthevalley,andwouldnecessarilyforceitsevacuation.Orderswereaccordinglygiventomarchbythisroute.Butdaysbeforethebattlebegantheadvantagesaswellasthedisadvantagesofthisplanofactionwereallconsidered.Thepassageoverthemountainwasadifficultonetomakeinthefaceofanenemy.Itmightconsumesomuchtimeastoloseustheuseofthetroopsengagedinitatotherpointswheretheyweremorewanted.AfterreachingChattanoogaValley,thecreekofthesamename,quiteaformidablestreamtogetanarmyover,hadtobecrossed.IwasperfectlywillingthattheenemyshouldkeepLookoutMountainuntilwegotthroughwiththetroopsonMissionaryRidge.BymarchingHookertothenorthsideoftheriver,thenceupthestream,andrecrossingatthetown,hecouldbegotinpositionatanynamedtime;wheninthisnewposition,hewouldhaveChattanoogaCreekbehindhim,andtheattackonMissionaryRidgewouldunquestionablycausetheevacuationbytheenemyofhislineacrossthevalleyandonLookoutMountain.Hooker'sorderwaschangedaccordingly.As

andonLookoutMountain.Hooker'sorderwaschangedaccordingly.Asexplainedelsewhere,theoriginalorderhadtoberevertedto,becauseofafloodintheriverrenderingthebridgeatBrown'sFerryunsafeforthepassageoftroopsattheexactjuncturewhenitwaswantedtobringallthetroopstogetheragainstMissionaryRidge.

ThenextdayafterSherman'sarrivalItookhim,withGeneralsThomasandSmithandotherofficers,tothenorthsideoftheriver,andshowedthemthegroundoverwhichShermanhadtomarch,andpointedoutgenerallywhathewasexpectedtodo.I,aswellastheauthoritiesinWashington,wasstillinagreatstateofanxietyforBurnside'ssafety.

Burnsidehimself,Ibelieve,wastheonlyonewhodidnotshareinthisanxiety.Nothingcouldbedoneforhim,however,untilSherman'stroopswereup.Assoon,therefore,astheinspectionwasover,ShermanstartedforBridgeporttohastenmatters,rowingaboathimself,Ibelieve,fromKelly'sFerry.ShermanhadleftBridgeportthenightofthe14th,reachedChattanoogatheeveningofthe15th,madetheabove-describedinspectiononthemorningofthe16th,andstartedbackthesameeveningtohurryuphiscommand,fullyappreciatingtheimportanceoftime.

Hismarchwasconductedwithasmuchexpeditionastheroadsandseasonwouldadmitof.Bythe20thhewashimselfatBrown'sFerrywiththeheadofcolumn,butmanyofhistroopswerefarbehind,andonedivision(Ewing's)wasatTrenton,sentthatwaytocreatetheimpressionthatLookoutwastobetakenfromthesouth.Shermanreceivedhisordersattheferry,andwasaskedifhecouldnotbereadyfortheassaultthefollowingmorning.NewshadbeenreceivedthatthebattlehadbeencommencedatKnoxville.Burnsidehadbeencutofffromtelegraphiccommunications.ThePresident,theSecretaryofWar,andGeneralHalleck,wereinanagonyofsuspense.Mysuspensewasalsogreat,butmoreendurable,becauseIwaswhereIcouldsoondosomethingtorelievethesituation.ItwasimpossibletogetSherman'stroopsupforthenextday.Ithenaskedhimiftheycouldnotbegotuptomaketheassaultonthemorningofthe22d,andorderedThomastomoveonthatdate.Buttheelementswereagainstus.Itrainedallthe20thand21st.Theriverrosesorapidlythatitwasdifficulttokeepthepontoonsinplace.

GeneralOrlandoB.Willcox,adivisioncommanderunderBurnside,wasatthistimeoccupyingapositionfartherupthevalleythanKnoxville—aboutMaynardville—andwasstillintelegraphiccommunicationwiththeNorth.Adispatchwasreceivedfromhimsayingthathewasthreatenedfromtheeast.The

dispatchwasreceivedfromhimsayingthathewasthreatenedfromtheeast.Thefollowingwassentinreply:"IfyoucancommunicatewithGeneralBurnside,saytohimthatourattackonBraggwillcommenceinthemorning.Ifsuccessful,suchamovewillbemadeasIthinkwillrelieveEastTennessee,ifhecanholdout.LongstreetpassingthroughourlinestoKentuckyneednotcausealarm.HewouldfindthecountrysobarethathewouldlosehistransportationandartillerybeforereachingKentucky,andwouldmeetsuchaforcebeforehegotthrough,thathecouldnotreturn."

Meantime,Shermancontinuedhiscrossingwithoutintermissionasfastashistroopscouldbegotup.ThecrossinghadtobeeffectedinfullviewoftheenemyonthetopofLookoutMountain.Onceover,however,thetroopssoondisappearedbehindthedetachedhillonthenorthside,andwouldnotcometoviewagain,eithertowatchmenonLookoutMountainorMissionaryRidge,untiltheyemergedbetweenthehillstostrikethebankoftheriver.ButwhenSherman'sadvancereachedapointoppositethetownofChattanooga,Howard,who,itwillberemembered,hadbeenconcealedbehindthehillsonthenorthside,tookuphislineofmarchtojointhetroopsonthesouthside.HiscrossingwasinfullviewbothfromMissionaryRidgeandthetopofLookout,andtheenemyofcoursesupposedthesetroopstobeSherman's.ThisenabledShermantogettohisassignedpositionwithoutdiscovery.

CHAPTERXLIII.

PREPARATIONSFORBATTLE—THOMASCARRIESTHEFIRSTLINEOFTHEENEMY

—SHERMANCARRIESMISSIONARYRIDGE—BATTLEOFLOOKOUTMOUNTAIN

—GENERALHOOKER'SFIGHT.

Onthe20th,whensomuchwasoccurringtodiscourage—rainsfallingsoheavilyastodelaythepassageoftroopsovertheriveratBrown'sFerryandthreateningtheentirebreakingofthebridge;newscomingofabattleragingatKnoxville;ofWillcoxbeingthreatenedbyaforcefromtheeast—aletterwasreceivedfromBraggwhichcontainedthesewords:"Astheremaystillbesomenon-combatantsinChattanooga,Ideemitpropertonotifyyouthatprudencewoulddictatetheirearlywithdrawal."Ofcourse,Iunderstoodthatthiswasadeviceintendedtodeceive;butIdidnotknowwhattheintendeddeceptionwas.

deviceintendedtodeceive;butIdidnotknowwhattheintendeddeceptionwas.Onthe22d,however,adesertercameinwhoinformedmethatBraggwasleavingourfront,andonthatdayBuckner'sdivisionwassenttoreinforceLongstreetatKnoxville,andanotherdivisionstartedtofollowbutwasrecalled.TheobjectofBragg'sletter,nodoubt,wasinsomewaytodetainmeuntilKnoxvillecouldbecaptured,andhistroopstherebereturnedtoChattanooga.

Duringthenightofthe21sttherestofthepontoonboats,completed,onehundredandsixteeninall,werecarrieduptoandplacedinNorthChickamauga.ThematerialfortheroadwayoverthesewasdepositedoutofviewoftheenemywithinafewhundredyardsofthebankoftheTennessee,wherethenorthendofthebridgewastorest.

HearingnothingfromBurnside,andhearingmuchofthedistressin

Washingtononhisaccount,Icouldnolongerdeferoperationsforhis

relief.Idetermined,therefore,todoonthe23d,withtheArmyofthe

Cumberland,whathadbeenintendedtobedoneonthe24th.

ThepositionoccupiedbytheArmyoftheCumberlandhadbeenmadeverystrongfordefenceduringthemonthsithadbeenbesieged.Thelinewasaboutamilefromthetown,andextendedfromCiticoCreek,asmallstreamrunningnearthebaseofMissionaryRidgeandemptyingintotheTennesseeabouttwomilesbelowthemouthoftheSouthChickamauga,ontheleft,toChattanoogaCreekontheright.Allcommandingpointsonthelinewerewellfortifiedandwellequippedwithartillery.Theimportantelevationswithinthelinehadallbeencarefullyfortifiedandsuppliedwithaproperarmament.Amongtheelevationssofortifiedwasonetotheeastofthetown,namedFortWood.ItoweditsimportancechieflytothefactthatitlaybetweenthetownandMissionaryRidge,wheremostofthestrengthoftheenemywas.FortWoodhadinittwenty-twopiecesofartillery,mostofwhichwouldreachthenearerpointsoftheenemy'sline.Onthemorningofthe23dThomas,accordingtoinstructions,movedGranger'scorpsoftwodivisions,SheridanandT.J.Woodcommanding,tothefootofFortWood,andformedthemintolineasifgoingonparade,Sheridanontheright,Woodtotheleft,extendingtoornearCiticoCreek.Palmer,commandingthe14thcorps,heldthatpartofourlinefacingsouthandsouthwest.

HesupportedSheridanwithonedivision(Baird's),whilehisotherdivisionunder

HesupportedSheridanwithonedivision(Baird's),whilehisotherdivisionunderJohnsonremainedinthetrenches,underarms,readytobemovedtoanypoint.Howard'scorpswasmovedinrearofthecentre.Thepicketlineswerewithinafewhundredyardsofeachother.Attwoo'clockintheafternoonallwerereadytoadvance.Bythistimethecloudshadliftedsothattheenemycouldseefromhiselevatedpositionallthatwasgoingon.ThesignalforadvancewasgivenbyaboomingofcannonfromFortWoodandotherpointsontheline.Therebelpicketsweresoondrivenbackuponthemainguards,whichoccupiedminoranddetachedheightsbetweenthemainridgeandourlines.Thesetoowerecarriedbeforehalting,andbeforetheenemyhadtimetoreinforcetheiradvanceguards.Butitwasnotwithoutlossonbothsides.Thismovementsecuredtousalinefullyamileinadvanceoftheoneweoccupiedinthemorning,andtheonewhichtheenemyhadoccupieduptothistime.Thefortificationswererapidlyturnedtofacetheotherway.Duringthefollowingnighttheyweremadestrong.Welostinthispreliminaryactionaboutelevenhundredkilledandwounded,whiletheenemyprobablylostquiteasheavily,includingtheprisonersthatwerecaptured.Withtheexceptionofthefiringofartillery,keptupfromMissionaryRidgeandFortWooduntilnightclosedin,thisendedthefightingforthefirstday.

Theadvantagewasgreatlyonoursidenow,andifIcouldonlyhavebeenassuredthatBurnsidecouldholdouttendayslongerIshouldhaverestedmoreeasily.Butweweredoingthebestwecouldforhimandthecause.

Bythenightofthe23dSherman'scommandwasinapositiontomove,thoughonedivision(Osterhaus's)hadnotyetcrossedtheriveratBrown'sFerry.ThecontinuousriseintheTennesseehadrendereditimpossibletokeepthebridgeatthatpointinconditionfortroopstocross;butIwasdeterminedtomovethatnightevenwithoutthisdivision.OrdersweresenttoOsterhausaccordinglytoreporttoHooker,ifhecouldnotcrossbyeighto'clockonthemorningofthe24th.Becauseofthebreakinthebridge,Hooker'sorderswereagainchanged,butthistimeonlybacktothosefirstgiventohim.

GeneralW.F.SmithhadbeenassignedtodutyasChiefEngineeroftheMilitaryDivision.TohimweregiventhegeneraldirectionofmovingtroopsbytheboatsfromNorthChickamauga,layingthebridgeaftertheyreachedtheirposition,andgenerallyallthedutiespertainingtohisofficeofchiefengineer.DuringthenightGeneralMorganL.Smith'sdivisionwasmarchedtothepointwherethepontoonswere,andthebrigadeofGilesA.Smithwasselectedforthedelicatedutyofmanningtheboatsandsurprisingtheenemy'spicketsonthesouthbank

dutyofmanningtheboatsandsurprisingtheenemy'spicketsonthesouthbankoftheriver.DuringthisnightalsoGeneralJ.M.Brannan,chiefofartillery,movedfortypiecesofartillery,belongingtotheArmyoftheCumberland,andplacedthemonthenorthsideoftheriversoastocommandthegroundopposite,toaidinprotectingtheapproachtothepointwherethesouthendofthebridgewastorest.HehadtouseSherman'sartilleryhorsesforthispurpose,Thomashavingnone.

Attwoo'clockinthemorning,November24th,GilesA.SmithpushedoutfromtheNorthChickamaugawithhisonehundredandsixteenboats,eachloadedwiththirtybraveandwell-armedmen.Theboatswiththeirpreciousfreightdroppeddownquietlywiththecurrenttoavoidattractingtheattentionofanyonewhocouldconveyinformationtotheenemy,untilarrivingnearthemouthofSouthChickamauga.Hereafewboatswerelanded,thetroopsdebarked,andarushwasmadeuponthepicketguardknowntobeatthatpoint.Theguardweresurprised,andtwentyoftheirnumbercaptured.Theremainderofthetroopseffectedalandingatthepointwherethebridgewastostart,withequallygoodresults.TheworkofferryingoverSherman'scommandfromthenorthsideoftheTennesseewasatoncecommenced,usingthepontoonsforthepurpose.Asteamerwasalsobroughtupfromthetowntoassist.TherestofM.L.Smith'sdivisioncamefirst,thenthedivisionofJohnE.

Smith.Thetroopsastheylandedwereputtoworkintrenchingtheirposition.Bydaylightthetwoentiredivisionswereover,andwellcoveredbytheworkstheyhadbuilt.

Theworkoflayingthebridge,onwhichtocrosstheartilleryandcavalry,wasnowbegun.Theferryingovertheinfantrywascontinuedwiththesteamerandthepontoons,takingthepontoons,however,asfastastheywerewantedtoputintheirplaceinthebridge.Byalittlepastnoonthebridgewascompleted,aswellasoneovertheSouthChickamaugaconnectingthetroopsleftonthatsidewiththeircomradesbelow,andalltheinfantryandartillerywereonthesouthbankoftheTennessee.

ShermanatonceformedhistroopsforassaultonMissionaryRidge.Byoneo'clockhestartedwithM.L.Smithonhisleft,keepingnearlythecourseofChickamaugaRiver;J.E.Smithnexttotherightandalittletotherear;andEwingstillfarthertotherightandalsoalittletotherearofJ.E.Smith'scommand,incolumn,readytodeploytotherightifanenemyshouldcomefromthatdirection.Agoodskirmishlineprecededeachofthesecolumns.Soonthefootofthehillwasreached;theskirmisherspusheddirectlyup,followedclosely

footofthehillwasreached;theskirmisherspusheddirectlyup,followedcloselybytheirsupports.

Byhalf-pastthreeShermanwasinpossessionoftheheightwithouthavingsustainedmuchloss.Abrigadefromeachdivisionwasnowbroughtup,andartillerywasdraggedtothetopofthehillbyhand.

Theenemydidnotseemtobeawareofthismovementuntilthetopofthehillwasgained.Therehadbeenadrizzlingrainduringtheday,andthecloudsweresolowthatLookoutMountainandthetopofMissionaryRidgewereobscuredfromtheviewofpersonsinthevalley.Butnowtheenemyopenedfireupontheirassailants,andmadeseveralattemptswiththeirskirmisherstodrivethemaway,butwithoutavail.Laterinthedayamoredeterminedattackwasmade,butthis,too,failed,andShermanwaslefttofortifywhathehadgained.

Sherman'scavalrytookupitslineofmarchsoonafterthebridgewascompleted,andbyhalf-pastthreethewholeofitwasoverbothbridgesandonitswaytostriketheenemy'scommunicationsatChickamaugaStation.AllofSherman'scommandwasnowsouthoftheTennessee.

DuringtheafternoonGeneralGilesA.Smithwasseverelywoundedandcarriedfromthefield.

Thomashavingdoneonthe23dwhatwasexpectedofhimonthe24th,therewasnothingforhimtodothisdayexcepttostrengthenhisposition.Howard,however,effectedacrossingofCiticoCreekandajunctionwithSherman,andwasdirectedtoreporttohim.WithtwoorthreeregimentsofhiscommandhemovedinthemorningalongthebanksoftheTennessee,andreachedthepointwherethebridgewasbeinglaid.

Hewentoutonthebridgeasfarasitwascompletedfromthesouthend,andsawShermansuperintendingtheworkfromthenorthsideandmovinghimselfsouthasfastasanadditionalboatwasputinandtheroadwayputuponit.Howardreportedtohisnewchiefacrossthechasmbetweenthem,whichwasnownarrowandinafewminutesclosed.

WhiletheseoperationsweregoingontotheeastofChattanooga,Hookerwasengagedonthewest.Hehadthreedivisions:Osterhaus's,ofthe15thcorps,ArmyoftheTennessee;Geary's,12thcorps,ArmyofthePotomac;andCruft's,14thcorps,ArmyoftheCumberland.GearywasontherightatWauhatchie,Cruftatthecentre,andOsterhausnearBrown'sFerry.Thesetroopswereall

Cruftatthecentre,andOsterhausnearBrown'sFerry.ThesetroopswereallwestofLookoutCreek.Theenemyhadtheeastbankofthecreekstronglypicketedandintrenched,andthreebrigadesoftroopsinthereartoreinforcethemifattacked.Thesebrigadesoccupiedthesummitofthemountain.GeneralCarterL.

Stevensonwasincommandofthewhole.Whyanytroops,exceptartillerywithasmallinfantryguard,werekeptonthemountain-top,Idonotsee.Ahundredmencouldhaveheldthesummit—whichisapalisadeformorethanthirtyfeetdown—againsttheassaultofanynumberofmenfromthepositionHookeroccupied.

ThesideofLookoutMountainconfrontingHooker'scommandwasrugged,heavilytimbered,andfullofchasms,makingitdifficulttoadvancewithtroops,evenintheabsenceofanopposingforce.Fartherup,thegroundbecomesmoreevenandlevel,andwasincultivation.Ontheeastsidetheslopeismuchmoregradual,andagoodwagonroad,zigzaggingupit,connectsthetownofChattanoogawiththesummit.

Earlyonthemorningofthe24thHookermovedGeary'sdivision,supportedbyabrigadeofCruft's,upLookoutCreek,toeffectacrossing.TheremainderofCruft'sdivisionwastoseizethebridgeoverthecreek,nearthecrossingoftherailroad.Osterhauswastomoveuptothebridgeandcrossit.ThebridgewasseizedbyGross'sbrigadeafteraslightskirmishwiththepicketsguardingit.ThisattractedtheenemysothatGeary'smovementfartherupwasnotobserved.Aheavymistobscuredhimfromtheviewofthetroopsonthetopofthemountain.Hecrossedthecreekalmostunobserved,andcapturedthepicketofoverfortymenonguardnearby.Hethencommencedascendingthemountaindirectlyinhisfront.Bythistimetheenemywasseencomingdownfromtheircampsonthemountainslope,andfilingintotheirrifle-pitstocontestthecrossingofthebridge.Byeleveno'clockthebridgewascomplete.Osterhauswasup,andaftersomesharpskirmishingtheenemywasdrivenawaywithconsiderablelossinkilledandcaptured.

Whiletheoperationsatthebridgewereprogressing,Gearywaspushingupthehillovergreatobstacles,resistedbytheenemydirectlyinhisfront,andinfaceofthegunsontopofthemountain.Theenemy,seeingtheirleftflankandrearmenaced,gaveway,andwerefollowedbyCruftandOsterhaus.SoonthesewereupabreastofGeary,andthewholecommandpushedupthehill,drivingtheenemyinadvance.BynoonGearyhadgainedtheopengroundonthenorth

enemyinadvance.BynoonGearyhadgainedtheopengroundonthenorthslopeofthemountain,withhisrightcloseuptothebaseoftheupperpalisade,buttherewerestrongfortificationsinhisfront.Therestofthecommandcomingup,alinewasformedfromthebaseoftheupperpalisadetothemouthofChattanoogaCreek.

ThomasandIwereonthetopofOrchardKnob.Hooker'sadvancenowmadeourlineacontinuousone.Itwasinfullview,extendingfromtheTennesseeRiver,whereShermanhadcrossed,upChickamaugaRivertothebaseofMissionRidge,overthetopofthenorthendoftheridgetoChattanoogaValley,thenalongparalleltotheridgeamileormore,acrossthevalleytothemouthofChattanoogaCreek,thenceuptheslopeofLookoutMountaintothefootoftheupperpalisade.Thedaywashazy,sothatHooker'soperationswerenotvisibletousexceptatmomentswhenthecloudswouldrise.Butthesoundofhisartilleryandmusketrywasheardincessantly.Theenemyonhisfrontwaspartiallyfortified,butwassoondrivenoutofhisworks.Duringtheafternoontheclouds,whichhadsoobscuredthetopofLookoutalldayastohidewhateverwasgoingonfromtheviewofthosebelow,settleddownandmadeitsodarkwhereHookerwasastostopoperationsforthetime.Atfouro'clockHookerreportedhispositionasimpregnable.Byalittleafterfivedirectcommunicationwasestablished,andabrigadeoftroopswassentfromChattanoogatoreinforcehim.ThesetroopshadtocrossChattanoogaCreekandmetwithsomeopposition,butsoonovercameit,andbynightthecommander,GeneralCarlin,reportedtoHookerandwasassignedtohisleft.InowtelegraphedtoWashington:"Thefightto-dayprogressedfavorably.ShermancarriedtheendofMissionaryRidge,andhisrightisnowatthetunnel,andhisleftatChickamaugaCreek.TroopsfromLookoutValleycarriedthepointofthemountain,andnowholdtheeasternslopeandapointhighup.Hookerreportstwothousandprisonerstaken,besideswhichasmallnumberhavefallenintoourhandsfromMissionaryRidge."ThenextdaythePresidentreplied:"YourdispatchesastofightingonMondayandTuesdayarehere.Welldone.Manythankstoall.RememberBurnside."AndHalleckalsotelegraphed:"Icongratulateyouonthesuccessthusfarofyourplans.

IfearthatBurnsideishardpushed,andthatanyfurtherdelaymayprovefatal.Iknowyouwilldoallinyourpowertorelievehim."

ThedivisionofJeffersonC.Davis,ArmyoftheCumberland,hadbeensenttotheNorthChickamaugatoguardthepontoonsastheyweredepositedintheriver,andtopreventallingressoregressofcitizens.Onthenightofthe24thhisdivision,havingcrossedwithSherman,occupiedourextremeleftfromtheupper

division,havingcrossedwithSherman,occupiedourextremeleftfromtheupperbridgeovertheplaintothenorthbaseofMissionaryRidge.Firingcontinuedtoalatehourinthenight,butitwasnotconnectedwithanassaultatanypoint.

CHAPTERXLIV.

BATTLEOFCHATTANOOGA—AGALLANTCHARGE—COMPLETEROUTOFTHEENEMY

—PURSUITOFTHECONFEDERATES—GENERALBRAGG—REMARKSONCHATTANOOGA.

Attwelveo'clockatnight,whenallwasquiet,Ibegantogiveordersforthenextday,andsentadispatchtoWillcoxtoencourageBurnside.

Shermanwasdirectedtoattackatdaylight.Hookerwasorderedtomoveatthesamehour,andendeavortointercepttheenemy'sretreatifhestillremained;ifhehadgone,thentomovedirectlytoRossvilleandoperateagainsttheleftandrearoftheforceonMissionaryRidge.

ThomaswasnottomoveuntilHookerhadreachedMissionaryRidge.AsIwaswithhimonOrchardKnob,hewouldnotmovewithoutfurtherordersfromme.

Themorningofthe25thopenedclearandbright,andthewholefieldwasinfullviewfromthetopofOrchardKnob.Itremainedsoallday.

Bragg'sheadquarterswereinfullview,andofficers—presumablystaffofficers—couldbeseencomingandgoingconstantly.

ThepointofgroundwhichShermanhadcarriedonthe24thwasalmostdisconnectedfromthemainridgeoccupiedbytheenemy.Alowpass,overwhichthereisawagonroadcrossingthehill,andnearwhichthereisarailroadtunnel,intervenesbetweenthetwohills.Theproblemnowwastogettothemainridge.Theenemywasfortifiedonthepoint;andbackfarther,wherethegroundwasstillhigher,wasasecondfortificationcommandingthefirst.Shermanwasoutassoonasitwaslightenoughtosee,andbysunrisehiscommandwasinmotion.Threebrigadesheldthehillalreadygained.MorganL.SmithmovedalongtheeastbaseofMissionaryRidge;Loomisalongthewest

SmithmovedalongtheeastbaseofMissionaryRidge;Loomisalongthewestbase,supportedbytwobrigadesofJohnE.Smith'sdivision;andCorsewithhisbrigadewasbetweenthetwo,movingdirectlytowardsthehilltobecaptured.Theridgeissteepandheavilywoodedontheeastside,whereM.L.Smith'stroopswereadvancing,butclearedandwithamoregentleslopeonthewestside.Thetroopsadvancedrapidlyandcarriedtheextremeendoftherebelworks.MorganL.SmithadvancedtoapointwhichcuttheenemyofffromtherailroadbridgeandthemeansofbringingupsuppliesbyrailfromChickamaugaStation,wherethemaindepotwaslocated.Theenemymadebraveandstrenuouseffortstodriveourtroopsfromthepositionwehadgained,butwithoutsuccess.Thecontestlastedfortwohours.Corse,abraveandefficientcommander,wasbadlywoundedinthisassault.ShermannowthreatenedbothBragg'sflankandhisstores,andmadeitnecessaryforhimtoweakenotherpointsofhislinetostrengthenhisright.FromthepositionIoccupiedIcouldseecolumnaftercolumnofBragg'sforcesmovingagainstSherman.EveryConfederategunthatcouldbebroughttobearupontheUnionforceswasconcentrateduponhim.J.E.Smith,withtwobrigades,chargedupthewestsideoftheridgetothesupportofCorse'scommand,overopengroundandinthefaceofaheavyfireofbothartilleryandmusketry,andreachedtheveryparapetoftheenemy.Helayhereforatime,buttheenemycomingwithaheavyforceuponhisrightflank,hewascompelledtofallback,followedbythefoe.AfewhundredyardsbroughtSmith'stroopsintoawood,wheretheywerespeedilyreformed,whentheychargedanddrovetheattackingpartybacktohisintrenchments.

Seeingtheadvance,repulse,andsecondadvanceofJ.E.SmithfromthepositionIoccupied,IdirectedThomastosendadivisiontoreinforcehim.Baird'sdivisionwasaccordinglysentfromtherightofOrchardKnob.Ithadtomarchaconsiderabledistancedirectlyundertheeyeoftheenemytoreachitsposition.Braggatoncecommencedmassinginthesamedirection.ThiswaswhatIwanted.Butithadnowgottobelateintheafternoon,andIhadexpectedbeforethistoseeHookercrossingtheridgeintheneighborhoodofRossvilleandcompellingBraggtomassinthatdirectionalso.

TheenemyhadevacuatedLookoutMountainduringthenight,asIexpectedhewould.IncrossingthevalleyheburnedthebridgeoverChattanoogaCreek,anddidallhecouldtoobstructtheroadsbehindhim.Hookerwasoffbrightandearly,withnoobstructionsinhisfrontbutdistanceandthedestructionabovenamed.HewasdetainedfourhourscrossingChattanoogaCreek,andthuswaslosttheimmediateadvantageIexpectedfromhisforces.HisreachingBragg's

losttheimmediateadvantageIexpectedfromhisforces.HisreachingBragg'sflankandextendingacrossitwastobethesignalforThomas'sassaultoftheridge.ButSherman'sconditionwasgettingsocriticalthattheassaultforhisreliefcouldnotbedelayedanylonger.

Sheridan'sandWood'sdivisionshadbeenlyingunderarmsfromearlymorning,readytomovetheinstantthesignalwasgiven.InowdirectedThomastoorderthechargeatonce(*16).Iwatchedeagerlytoseetheeffect,andbecameimpatientatlastthattherewasnoindicationofanychargebeingmade.ThecentreofthelinewhichwastomakethechargewasnearwhereThomasandIstood,butconcealedfromviewbyaninterveningforest.TurningtoThomastoinquirewhatcausedthedelay,IwassurprisedtoseeThomasJ.Wood,oneofthedivisioncommanderswhowastomakethecharge,standingtalkingtohim.IspoketoGeneralWood,askinghimwhyhedidnotchargeasorderedanhourbefore.Herepliedverypromptlythatthiswasthefirsthehadheardofit,butthathehadbeenreadyalldaytomoveatamoment'snotice.Itoldhimtomakethechargeatonce.Hewasoffinamoment,andinanincrediblyshorttimeloudcheeringwasheard,andheandSheridanweredrivingtheenemy'sadvancebeforethemtowardsMissionaryRidge.TheConfederateswerestronglyintrenchedonthecrestoftheridgeinfrontofus,andhadasecondlinehalf-waydownandanotheratthebase.Ourmendrovethetroopsinfrontofthelowerlineofrifle-pitssorapidly,andfollowedthemsoclosely,thatrebelandUniontroopswentoverthefirstlineofworksalmostatthesametime.Manyrebelswerecapturedandsenttotherearunderthefireoftheirownfriendshigherupthehill.Thosethatwerenotcapturedretreated,andwerepursued.

Theretreatinghordesbeingbetweenfriendsandpursuerscausedtheenemytofirehightoavoidkillingtheirownmen.Infact,onthatoccasiontheUnionsoldiernearesttheenemywasinthesafestposition.

Withoutawaitingfurtherordersorstoppingtoreform,onourtroopswenttothesecondlineofworks;overthatandonforthecrest—thuseffectuallycarryingoutmyordersofthe18thforthebattleandofthe24th(*17)forthischarge.

Iwatchedtheirprogresswithintenseinterest.Thefirealongtherebellinewasterrific.Cannonandmusketballsfilledtheair:butthedamagedonewasinsmallproportiontotheammunitionexpended.Thepursuitcontinueduntilthecrestwasreached,andsoonourmenwereseenclimbingovertheConfederatebarriersatdifferentpointsinfrontofbothSheridan'sandWood'sdivisions.TheretreatoftheenemyalongmostofhislinewasprecipitateandthepanicsogreatthatBraggandhisofficerslostallcontrolovertheirmen.Manywerecaptured,

thatBraggandhisofficerslostallcontrolovertheirmen.Manywerecaptured,andthousandsthrewawaytheirarmsintheirflight.

SheridanpushedforwarduntilhereachedtheChickamaugaRiveratapointabovewheretheenemycrossed.HemetsomeresistancefromtroopsoccupyingasecondhillinrearofMissionaryRidge,probablytocovertheretreatofthemainbodyandoftheartilleryandtrains.Itwasnowgettingdark,butSheridan,withouthaltingonthataccountpushedhismenforwardupthissecondhillslowlyandwithoutattractingtheattentionofthemenplacedtodefendit,whilehedetachedtotherightandlefttosurroundtheposition.Theenemydiscoveredthemovementbeforethesedispositionswerecomplete,andbeatahastyretreat,leavingartillery,wagontrains,andmanyprisonersinourhands.ToSheridan'spromptmovementtheArmyoftheCumberland,andthenation,areindebtedforthebulkofthecaptureofprisoners,artillery,andsmall-armsthatday.Exceptforhispromptpursuit,somuchinthiswaywouldnothavebeenaccomplished.

WhiletheadvanceupMissionRidgewasgoingforward,GeneralThomaswithstaff,GeneralGordonGranger,commanderofthecorpsmakingtheassault,andmyselfandstaffoccupiedOrchardKnob,fromwhichtheentirefieldcouldbeobserved.Themomentthetroopswereseengoingoverthelastlineofrebeldefences,IorderedGrangertojoinhiscommand,andmountingmyhorseIrodetothefront.GeneralThomasleftaboutthesametime.Sheridanontheextremerightwasalreadyinpursuitoftheenemyeastoftheridge.Wood,whocommandedthedivisiontotheleftofSheridan,accompaniedhismenonhorsebackinthecharge,butdidnotjoinSheridaninthepursuit.Totheleft,inBaird'sfrontwhereBragg'stroopshadmassedagainstSherman,theresistancewasmorestubbornandthecontestlastedlonger.IorderedGrangertofollowtheenemywithWood'sdivision,buthewassomuchexcited,andkeptupsucharoarofmusketryinthedirectiontheenemyhadtaken,thatbythetimeIcouldstopthefiringtheenemyhadgotwelloutoftheway.TheenemyconfrontingSherman,nowseeingeverythingtotheirleftgivingway,fledalso.Sherman,however,wasnotawareoftheextentofoursuccessuntilafternightfall,whenhereceivedorderstopursueatdaylightinthemorning.

AssoonasShermandiscoveredthattheenemyhadlefthisfronthedirectedhisreserves,Davis'sdivisionoftheArmyoftheCumberland,topushoverthepontoon-bridgeatthemouthoftheChickamauga,andtomoveforwardtoChickamaugaStation.HeorderedHowardtomoveupthestreamsometwomilestowheretherewasanoldbridge,repairitduringthenight,andfollowDavisatfouro'clockinthemorning.MorganL.

Davisatfouro'clockinthemorning.MorganL.

Smithwasorderedtoreconnoitrethetunneltoseeifthatwasstillheld.Nothingwasfoundtherebutdeadbodiesofmenofbotharmies.

TherestofSherman'scommandwasdirectedtofollowHowardatdaylightinthemorningtogetontotherailroadtowardsGraysville.

Hooker,asstated,wasdetainedatChattanoogaCreekbythedestructionofthebridgeatthatpoint.Hegothistroopsover,withtheexceptionoftheartillery,byfordingthestreamatalittleafterthreeo'clock.

Leavinghisartillerytofollowwhenthebridgeshouldbereconstructed,hepushedonwiththeremainderofhiscommand.AtRossvillehecameupontheflankofadivisionoftheenemy,whichsooncommencedaretreatalongtheridge.ThisthrewthemonPalmer.Theycouldmakebutlittleresistanceinthepositiontheywerecaughtin,andasmanyofthemascoulddosoescaped.Many,however,werecaptured.Hooker'spositionduringthenightofthe25thwasnearRossville,extendingeastoftheridge.Palmerwasonhisleft,ontheroadtoGraysville.

DuringthenightItelegraphedtoWillcoxthatBragghadbeendefeated,andthatimmediatereliefwouldbesenttoBurnsideifhecouldholdout;toHalleckIsentanannouncementofourvictory,andinformedhimthatforceswouldbesentupthevalleytorelieveBurnside.

BeforethebattleofChattanoogaopenedIhadtakenmeasuresforthereliefofBurnsidethemomentthewayshouldbeclear.ThomaswasdirectedtohavethelittlesteamerthathadbeenbuiltatChattanoogaloadedtoitscapacitywithrationsandammunition.Granger'scorpswastomovebythesouthbankoftheTennesseeRivertothemouthoftheHolston,andupthattoKnoxvilleaccompaniedbytheboat.Inadditiontothesuppliestransportedbyboat,themenweretocarryfortyroundsofammunitionintheircartridge-boxes,andfourdays'rationsinhaversacks.

InthebattleofChattanooga,troopsfromtheArmyofthePotomac,fromtheArmyoftheTennessee,andfromtheArmyoftheCumberlandparticipated.Infact,theaccidentsgrowingoutoftheheavyrainsandthesuddenriseintheTennesseeRiversomingledthetroopsthattheorganizationswerenotkepttogether,undertheirrespectivecommanders,duringthebattle.Hooker,ontheright,hadGeary'sdivisionofthe12thcorps,ArmyofthePotomac;Osterhaus's

right,hadGeary'sdivisionofthe12thcorps,ArmyofthePotomac;Osterhaus'sdivisionofthe15thcorps,ArmyoftheTennessee;andCruft'sdivisionoftheArmyoftheCumberland.Shermanhadthreedivisionsofhisownarmy,Howard'scorpsfromtheArmyofthePotomac,andJeffersonC.Davis'sdivisionoftheArmyoftheCumberland.Therewasnojealousy—hardlyrivalry.Indeed,Idoubtwhetherofficersormentookanynoteatthetimeofthefactofthisinterminglingofcommands.Allsawadefiantfoesurroundingthem,andtookitforgrantedthateverymovewasintendedtodislodgehim,anditmadenodifferencewherethetroopscamefromsothattheendwasaccomplished.

ThevictoryatChattanoogawaswonagainstgreatodds,consideringtheadvantagetheenemyhadofposition,andwasaccomplishedmoreeasilythanwasexpectedbyreasonofBragg'smakingseveralgravemistakes:first,insendingawayhisablestcorpscommanderwithovertwentythousandtroops;second,insendingawayadivisionoftroopsontheeveofbattle;third,inplacingsomuchofaforceontheplaininfrontofhisimpregnableposition.

ItwasknownthatMr.JeffersonDavishadvisitedBraggonMissionaryRidgeashorttimebeforemyreachingChattanooga.ItwasreportedandbelievedthathehadcomeouttoreconcileaseriousdifferencebetweenBraggandLongstreet,andfindingthisdifficulttodo,plannedthecampaignagainstKnoxville,tobeconductedbythelattergeneral.IhadknownbothBraggandLongstreetbeforethewar,thelatterverywell.WehadbeenthreeyearsatWestPointtogether,and,aftermygraduation,foratimeinthesameregiment.ThenweservedtogetherintheMexicanWar.IhadknownBragginMexico,andmethimoccasionallysubsequently.Icouldwellunderstandhowtheremightbeanirreconcilabledifferencebetweenthem.

Braggwasaremarkablyintelligentandwell-informedman,professionallyandotherwise.Hewasalsothoroughlyupright.Buthewaspossessedofanirascibletemper,andwasnaturallydisputatious.Amanofthehighestmoralcharacterandthemostcorrecthabits,yetintheoldarmyhewasinfrequenttrouble.Asasubordinatehewasalwaysonthelookouttocatchhiscommandingofficerinfringinghisprerogatives;asapostcommanderhewasequallyvigilanttodetecttheslightestneglect,evenofthemosttrivialorder.

IhaveheardintheoldarmyananecdoteverycharacteristicofBragg.

Ononeoccasion,whenstationedatapostofseveralcompaniescommandedbyafieldofficer,hewashimselfcommandingoneofthecompaniesandatthesametimeactingaspostquartermasterandcommissary.Hewasfirstlieutenant

sametimeactingaspostquartermasterandcommissary.Hewasfirstlieutenantatthetime,buthiscaptainwasdetachedonotherduty.Ascommanderofthecompanyhemadearequisitionuponthequartermaster—himself—forsomethinghewanted.Asquartermasterhedeclinedtofilltherequisition,andendorsedonthebackofithisreasonsforsodoing.Ascompanycommanderherespondedtothis,urgingthathisrequisitioncalledfornothingbutwhathewasentitledto,andthatitwasthedutyofthequartermastertofillit.Asquartermasterhestillpersistedthathewasright.InthisconditionofaffairsBraggreferredthewholemattertothecommandingofficerofthepost.

Thelatter,whenhesawthenatureofthematterreferred,exclaimed:"MyGod,Mr.Bragg,youhavequarrelledwitheveryofficerinthearmy,andnowyouarequarrellingwithyourself!"

Longstreetwasanentirelydifferentman.Hewasbrave,honest,intelligent,averycapablesoldier,subordinatetohissuperiors,justandkindtohissubordinates,butjealousofhisownrights,whichhehadthecouragetomaintain.Hewasneveronthelookouttodetectaslight,butsawoneassoonasanybodywhenintentionallygiven.

ItmaybethatLongstreetwasnotsenttoKnoxvilleforthereasonstated,butbecauseMr.Davishadanexaltedopinionofhisownmilitarygenius,andthoughthesawachanceof"killingtwobirdswithonestone."OnseveraloccasionsduringthewarhecametothereliefoftheUnionarmybymeansofhisSUPERIORMILITARYGENIUS.

IspeakadvisedlywhenIsawMr.Davispridedhimselfonhismilitarycapacity.Hesayssohimself,virtually,inhisanswertothenoticeofhisnominationtotheConfederatepresidency.SomeofhisgeneralshavesaidsointheirwritingssincethedownfalloftheConfederacy.

MyrecollectionisthatmyfirstordersforthebattleofChattanoogawereasfought.ShermanwastogetonMissionaryRidge,ashedid;HookertocrossthenorthendofLookoutMountain,ashedid,sweepacrossChattanoogaValleyandgetacrossthesouthendoftheridgenearRossville.WhenHookerhadsecuredthatpositiontheArmyoftheCumberlandwastoassaultinthecentre.BeforeShermanarrived,however,theorderwassochangedasthatHookerwasdirectedtocometoChattanoogabythenorthbankoftheTennesseeRiver.Thewatersintheriver,owingtoheavyrains,rosesofastthatthebridgeatBrown'sFerrycouldnotbemaintainedinaconditiontobeusedincrossingtroopsuponit.ForthisreasonHooker'sorderswerechangedbytelegraphbacktowhatthey

it.ForthisreasonHooker'sorderswerechangedbytelegraphbacktowhattheywereoriginally.———NOTE.—Fromthispointonthisvolumewaswritten(withtheexceptionofthecampaignintheWilderness,whichhadbeenpreviouslywritten)byGeneralGrant,afterhisgreatillnessinApril,andthepresentarrangementofthesubject-matterwasmadebyhimbetweenthe10thand18thofJuly,1885.

CHAPTERXLV.

THERELIEFOFKNOXVILLE—HEADQUARTERSMOVEDTONASHVILLE—VISITING

KNOXVILLE-CIPHERCIPHERDISPATCHES—WITHHOLDINGORDERS.

ChattanooganowbeingsecuretotheNationaltroopsbeyondanydoubt,IimmediatelyturnedmyattentiontorelievingKnoxville,aboutthesituationofwhichthePresident,inparticular,wasveryanxious.

Priortothebattles,IhadmadepreparationsforsendingtroopstothereliefofBurnsideattheveryearliestmomentaftersecuringChattanooga.Wehadtheretwolittlesteamerswhichhadbeenbuiltandfittedupfromtheremainsofoldboatsandputinconditiontorun.

GeneralThomaswasdirectedtohaveoneoftheseboatsloadedwithrationsandammunitionandmoveuptheTennesseeRivertothemouthoftheHolston,keepingtheboatallthetimeabreastofthetroops.

GeneralGranger,withthe4thcorpsreinforcedtomaketwentythousandmen,wastostartthemomentMissionaryRidgewascarried,andundernocircumstanceswerethetroopstoreturntotheiroldcamps.Withtheprovisionscarried,andthelittlethatcouldbegotinthecountry,itwassupposedhecouldholdoutuntilLongstreetwasdrivenaway,afterwhicheventEastTennesseewouldfurnishabundanceoffoodforBurnside'sarmyandhisownalso.

Whilefollowingtheenemyonthe26th,andagainonthemorningofthe27th,partofthetimebytheroadtoRinggold,IdirectedThomas,verbally,nottostartGrangeruntilhereceivedfurtherordersfromme;advisinghimthatIwasgoingtothefronttomorefullyseethesituation.IwasnotrightsurebutthatBragg's

tothefronttomorefullyseethesituation.IwasnotrightsurebutthatBragg'stroopsmightbeovertheirstampedebythetimetheyreachedDalton.InthatcaseBraggmightthinkitwelltotaketheroadbacktoCleveland,movethencetowardsKnoxville,and,unitingwithLongstreet,makeasuddendashuponBurnside.

WhenIarrivedatRinggold,however,onthe27th,Isawthattheretreatwasmostearnest.Theenemyhadbeenthrowingawayguns,caissonsandsmall-arms,abandoningprovisions,and,altogether,seemedtobemovinglikeadisorganizedmob,withtheexceptionofCleburne'sdivision,whichwasactingasrear-guardtocovertheretreat.

WhenHookermovedfromRossvilletowardRinggoldPalmer'sdivisiontooktheroadtoGraysville,andShermanmovedbythewayofChickamaugaStationtowardthesamepoint.AssoonasIsawthesituationatRinggoldIsentastaffofficerbacktoChattanoogatoadviseThomasoftheconditionofaffairs,anddirecthimbymyorderstostartGrangeratonce.FeelingnowthatthetroopswerealreadyonthemarchforthereliefofBurnsideIwasinnohurrytogetback,butstayedatRinggoldthroughthedaytoprepareforthereturnofourtroops.

Ringgoldisinavalleyinthemountains,situatedbetweenEastChickamaugaCreekandTaylor'sRidge,andabouttwentymilessouth-eastfromChattanooga.IarrivedjustastheartillerythatHookerhadleftbehindatChattanoogaCreekgotup.HismenwereattackingCleburne'sdivision,whichhadtakenastrongpositionintheadjacenthillssoastocovertheretreatoftheConfederatearmythroughanarrowgorgewhichpresentsitselfatthatpoint.Justbeyondthegorgethevalleyisnarrow,andthecreeksotortuousthatithastobecrossedagreatmanytimesinthecourseofthefirstmile.Thisattackwasunfortunate,andcostussomemenunnecessarily.Hookercaptured,however,3piecesofartilleryand230prisoners,and130rebeldeadwereleftuponthefield.

IdirectedGeneralHookertocollecttheflourandwheatintheneighboringmillsfortheuseofthetroops,andthentodestroythemillsandallotherpropertythatcouldbeofusetotheenemy,butnottomakeanywantondestruction.

AtthispointShermancameup,havingreachedGraysvillewithhistroops,wherehefoundPalmerhadprecededhim.Palmerhadpickedupmanyprisonersandmuchabandonedpropertyontheroute.IwentbackintheeveningtoGraysvillewithSherman,remainedthereovernightanddidnotreturntoChattanoogauntilthefollowingnight,the29th.IthenfoundthatThomashad

Chattanoogauntilthefollowingnight,the29th.IthenfoundthatThomashadnotyetstartedGranger,thushavinglostafulldaywhichIdeemedofsomuchimportanceindeterminingthefateofKnoxville.ThomasandGrangerwereawarethatonthe23dofthemonthBurnsidehadtelegraphedthathissupplieswouldlastfortenortwelvedaysandduringthattimehecouldholdoutagainstLongstreet,butifnotrelievedwithinthetimeindicatedhewouldbeobligedtosurrenderorattempttoretreat.Toeffectaretreatwouldhavebeenanimpossibility.Hewasalreadyverylowinammunition,andwithanarmypursuinghewouldnothavebeenabletogathersupplies.

FindingthatGrangerhadnotonlynotstartedbutwasveryreluctanttogo,hehavingdecidedforhimselfthatitwasaverybadmovetomake,IsentwordtoGeneralShermanofthesituationanddirectedhimtomarchtothereliefofKnoxville.Ialsogavehimtheproblemthatwehadtosolve—thatBurnsidehadnowbutfourtosixdayssuppliesleft,andthathemustberelievedwithinthattime.

Sherman,fortunately,hadnotstartedonhisreturnfromGraysville,havingsentoutdetachmentsontherailroadwhichrunsfromDaltontoClevelandandKnoxvilletothoroughlydestroythatroad,andthesetroopshadnotyetreturnedtocamp.IwasveryloathtosendSherman,becausehismenneededrestaftertheirlongmarchfromMemphisandhardfightingatChattanooga.ButIhadbecomesatisfiedthatBurnsidewouldnotberescuedifhisreliefdependeduponGeneralGranger'smovements.

ShermanhadlefthiscamponthenorthsideoftheTennesseeRiver,nearChattanooga,onthenightofthe23d,themenhavingtwodays'cookedrationsintheirhaversacks.Expectingtobebackintheirtentsbythattimeandtobeengagedinbattlewhileout,theytookwiththemneitherovercoatsnorblankets.Theweatherwasalreadycold,andatnighttheymusthavesufferedmoreorless.Thetwodays'rationshadalreadylastedthemfivedays;andtheywerenowtogothroughacountrywhichhadbeenrunoversomuchbyConfederatetroopsthattherewasbutlittleprobabilityoffindingmuchfood.Theydid,however,succeedincapturingsomeflour.Theyalsofoundagooddealofbraninsomeofthemills,whichthemenmadeupintobread;andinthisandotherwaystheyekedoutanexistenceuntiltheycouldreachKnoxville.

IwassoveryanxiousthatBurnsideshouldgetnewsofthestepsbeingtakenforhisrelief,andthusinducehimtoholdoutalittlelongerifitbecamenecessary,thatIdeterminedtosendamessagetohim.Ithereforesentamemberofmystaff,ColonelJ.H.Wilson,togetintoKnoxvilleifhecouldreporttoBurnside

staff,ColonelJ.H.Wilson,togetintoKnoxvilleifhecouldreporttoBurnsidethesituationfully,andgivehimalltheencouragementpossible.Mr.CharlesA.DanawasatChattanoogaduringthebattle,andhadbeenthereevenbeforeIassumedcommand.Mr.DanavolunteeredtoaccompanyColonelWilson,anddidaccompanyhim.IputtheinformationofwhatwasbeingdoneforthereliefofKnoxvilleintowriting,anddirectedthatinsomewayorotheritmustbesecretlymanagedsoastohaveacopyofthisfallintothehandsofGeneralLongstreet.Theymadethetripsafely;GeneralLongstreetdidlearnofSherman'scominginadvanceofhisreachingthere,andBurnsidewaspreparedtoholdoutevenforalongertimeifithadbeennecessary.

BurnsidehadstretchedaboomacrosstheHolstonRivertocatchscowsandflatsastheyfloateddown.Onthese,bypreviousarrangementswiththeloyalpeopleofEastTennessee,wereplacedflourandcorn,withforageandprovisionsgenerally,andwerethussecuredfortheuseoftheUniontroops.TheyalsodrovecattleintoKnoxvillebytheeastside,whichwasnotcoveredbytheenemy;sothatwhenreliefarrivedBurnsidehadmoreprovisionsonhandthanwhenhehadlastreported.

Ourtotalloss(notincludingBurnside's)inalltheseengagementsamountedto757killed,4,529woundedand330missing.Wecaptured6,142prisoners—about50percent.morethantheenemyreportedfortheirtotalloss—40piecesofartillery,69artillerycarriagesandcaissonsandover7,000standsofsmall-arms.Theenemy'slossinarmswasprobablymuchgreaterthanherereported,becausewepickedupagreatmanythatwerefoundabandoned.

IhadatChattanooga,inroundnumbers,about60,000men.Bragghadabouthalfthisnumber,buthispositionwassupposedtobeimpregnable.

Itwashisownfaultthathedidnothavemoremenpresent.HehadsentLongstreetawaywithhiscorpsswelledbyreinforcementsuptoovertwentythousandmen,thusreducinghisownforcemorethanone-thirdanddeprivinghimselfofthepresenceoftheablestgeneralofhiscommand.

Hedidthis,too,afterourtroopshadopenedalineofcommunicationbywayofBrown'sandKelly'sferrieswithBridgeport,thussecuringfullrationsandsuppliesofeverykind;andalsowhenheknewreinforcementswerecomingtome.KnoxvillewasofnoearthlyusetohimwhileChattanoogawasinourhands.IfheshouldcaptureChattanooga,Knoxvillewithitsgarrisonwouldhavefallenintohishandswithoutastruggle.Ihaveneverbeenabletoseethewisdomof

intohishandswithoutastruggle.Ihaveneverbeenabletoseethewisdomofthismove.

Then,too,afterShermanhadarrived,andwhenBraggknewthathewasonthenorthsideoftheTennesseeRiver,hesentBuckner'sdivisiontoreinforceLongstreet.Healsostartedanotherdivisionadaylater,butourattackhavingcommencedbeforeitreachedKnoxvilleBraggordereditback.Ithadgotsofar,however,thatitcouldnotreturntoChattanoogaintimetobeofservicethere.ItispossiblethislatterblundermayhavebeenmadebyBragghavingbecomeconfusedastowhatwasgoingononourside.Shermanhad,asalreadystated,crossedtothenorthsideoftheTennesseeRiveratBrown'sFerry,infullviewofBragg'stroopsfromLookoutMountain,afewdaysbeforetheattack.

Theythendisappearedbehindfoothills,anddidnotcometotheviewofthetroopsonMissionaryRidgeuntiltheymettheirassault.BraggknewitwasSherman'stroopsthathadcrossed,and,theybeingsolongoutofview,mayhavesupposedthattheyhadgoneupthenorthbankoftheTennesseeRivertothereliefofKnoxvilleandthatLongstreetwasthereforeindanger.Butthefirstgreatblunder,detachingLongstreet,cannotbeaccountedforinanywayIknowof.IfhehadcapturedChattanooga,EastTennesseewouldhavefallenwithoutastruggle.ItwouldhavebeenavictoryforustohavegotourarmyawayfromChattanoogasafely.Itwasamanifoldgreatervictorytodriveawaythebesiegingarmy;astillgreateronetodefeatthatarmyinhischosengroundandnearlyannihilateit.

Theprobabilitiesarethatourlossinkilledwastheheavier,asweweretheattackingparty.Theenemyreportedhislossinkilledat361:butashereportedhismissingat4,146,whileweheldover6,000ofthemasprisoners,andtheremusthavebeenhundredsifnotthousandswhodeserted,butlittlereliancecanbeplacedonthisreport.TherewascertainlygreatdissatisfactionwithBraggonthepartofthesoldiersforhisharshtreatmentofthem,andadispositiontogetawayiftheycould.Then,too,Chattanooga,followinginthesamehalfyearwithGettysburgintheEastandVicksburgintheWest,therewasmuchthesamefeelingintheSouthatthistimethattherehadbeenintheNorththefallandwinterbefore.IfthesamelicensehadbeenallowedthepeopleandpressintheSouththatwasallowedintheNorth,ChattanoogawouldprobablyhavebeenthelastbattlefoughtforthepreservationoftheUnion.

GeneralWilliamF.Smith'sservicesinthesebattleshadbeensuchthatIthoughthimeminentlyentitledtopromotion.IwasawarethathehadpreviouslybeennamedbythePresidentforpromotiontothegradeofmajor-general,butthatthe

namedbythePresidentforpromotiontothegradeofmajor-general,butthattheSenatehadrejectedthenomination.Iwasnotawareofthereasonsforthiscourse,andthereforestronglyrecommendedhimforamajor-generalcy.Myrecommendationwasheededandtheappointmentmade.

UpontheraisingofthesiegeofKnoxvilleI,ofcourse,informedtheauthoritiesatWashington—thePresidentandSecretaryofWar—ofthefact,whichcausedgreatrejoicingthere.ThePresidentespeciallywasrejoicedthatKnoxvillehadbeenrelieved(*18)withoutfurtherbloodshed.ThesafetyofBurnside'sarmyandtheloyalpeopleofEastTennesseehadbeenthesubjectofmuchanxietytothePresidentforseveralmonths,duringwhichtimehewasdoingallhecouldtorelievethesituation;sendinganewcommander(*19)withafewthousandtroopsbythewayofCumberlandGap,andtelegraphingmedaily,almosthourly,to"rememberBurnside,""dosomethingforBurnside,"andotherappealsofliketenor.HesawnoescapeforEastTennesseeuntilafterourvictoryatChattanooga.EventhenhewasafraidthatBurnsidemightbeoutofammunition,inastarvingcondition,oroverpowered:andhisanxietywasstillintenseuntilheheardthatLongstreethadbeendrivenfromthefield.

BurnsidefollowedLongstreetonlytoStrawberryPlains,sometwentymilesormoreeast,andthenstopped,believingthatLongstreetwouldleavetheState.Thelatterdidnotdoso,however,butstoppedonlyashortdistancefartheronandsubsistedhisarmyfortheentirewinteroffEastTennessee.FosternowrelievedBurnside.ShermanmadedispositionofhistroopsalongtheTennesseeRiverinaccordancewithinstructions.IleftThomasincommandatChattanooga,and,aboutthe20thofDecember,movedmyheadquarterstoNashville,Tennessee.

Nashvillewasthemostcentralpointfromwhichtocommunicatewithmyentiremilitarydivision,andalsowiththeauthoritiesatWashington.

WhileremainingatChattanoogaIwasliabletohavemytelegraphiccommunicationscutsoastothrowmeoutofcommunicationwithbothmycommandandWashington.

NothingoccurredatNashvilleworthyofmentionduringthewinter,(*20)soIsetmyselftothetaskofhavingtroopsinpositionsfromwhichtheycouldmovetoadvantage,andincollectingallnecessarysuppliessoastobereadytoclaimadueshareoftheenemy'sattentionupontheappearanceofthefirstgoodweatherinthespring.IexpectedtoretainthecommandIthenhad,andpreparedmyselfforthecampaignagainstAtlanta.Ialsohadgreathopesofhavingacampaign

forthecampaignagainstAtlanta.IalsohadgreathopesofhavingacampaignmadeagainstMobilefromtheGulf.IexpectedafterAtlantafelltooccupythatplacepermanently,andtocutoffLee'sarmyfromtheWestbywayoftheroadrunningthroughAugustatoAtlantaandthencesouthwest.IwaspreparingtoholdAtlantawithasmallgarrison,anditwasmyexpectationtopushthroughtoMobileifthatcitywasinourpossession:ifnot,toSavannah;andinthismannertogetpossessionoftheonlyeastandwestrailroadthatwouldthenbelefttotheenemy.

ButthespringcampaignagainstMobilewasnotmade.

TheArmyoftheOhiohadbeengettingsuppliesoverCumberlandGapuntiltheiranimalshadnearlyallstarved.Inowdeterminedtogomyselftoseeiftherewasanypossiblechanceofusingthatrouteinthespring,andifnottoabandonit.AccordinglyIleftNashvilleinthelatterpartofDecemberbyrailforChattanooga.FromChattanoogaItookoneofthelittlesteamerspreviouslyspokenofashavingbeenbuiltthere,and,puttingmyhorsesaboard,wentuptothejunctionoftheClinchwiththeTennessee.FromthatpointtherailroadhadbeenrepaireduptoKnoxvilleandouteasttoStrawberryPlains.IwentbyrailthereforetoKnoxville,whereIremainedforseveraldays.GeneralJohnG.FosterwasthencommandingtheDepartmentoftheOhio.Itwasanintenselycoldwinter,thethermometerbeingdownaslowaszeroeverymorningformorethanaweekwhileIwasatKnoxvilleandonmywayfromthereonhorsebacktoLexington,Kentucky,thefirstpointwhereIcouldreachrailtocarrymebacktomyheadquartersatNashville.

TheroadoverCumberlandGap,andbackofit,wasstrewnwithdebrisofbrokenwagonsanddeadanimals,muchasIhadfounditonmyfirsttriptoChattanoogaoverWaldron'sRidge.Theroadhadbeencutuptoasgreatadepthasclaycouldbebymulesandwagons,andinthatconditionfrozen;sothattherideofsixdaysfromStrawberryPlainstoLexingtonovertheseholesandknobsintheroadwasaverycheerlessone,andverydisagreeable.

Ifoundagreatmanypeopleathomealongthatroute,bothinTennesseeandKentucky,and,almostuniversally,intenselyloyal.Theywouldcollectinlittleplaceswherewewouldstopofevenings,toseeme,generallyhearingofmyapproachbeforewearrived.Thepeoplenaturallyexpectedtoseethecommandinggeneraltheoldestpersonintheparty.Iwasthenforty-oneyearsofage,whilemymedicaldirectorwasgray-hairedandprobablytwelveormoreyearsmysenior.Thecrowdswouldgenerallyswarmaroundhim,andthusgivemeanopportunityofquietlydismountingandgettingintothehouse.Italsogave

meanopportunityofquietlydismountingandgettingintothehouse.Italsogavemeanopportunityofhearingpassingremarksfromonespectatortoanotherabouttheirgeneral.Thoseremarkswereapttobemorecomplimentarytothecausethantotheappearanceofthesupposedgeneral,owingtohisbeingmuffledup,andalsoowingtothetravel-wornconditionwewereallinafterahardday'sride.IwasbackinNashvillebythe13thofJanuary,1864.

WhenIstartedonthistripitwasnecessaryformetohavesomepersonalongwhocouldturndispatchesintocipher,andwhocouldalsoreadthecipherdispatcheswhichIwasliabletoreceivedailyandalmosthourly.

UndertherulesoftheWarDepartmentatthattime,Mr.Stantonhadtakenentirecontrolofthematterofregulatingthetelegraphanddetermininghowitshouldbeused,andofsayingwho,andwhoalone,shouldhavetheciphers.Theoperatorspossessedoftheciphers,aswellastheciphersused,werepracticallyindependentofthecommanderswhomtheywereservingimmediatelyunder,andhadtoreporttotheWarDepartmentthroughGeneralStagerallthedispatcheswhichtheyreceivedorforwarded.

IwasobligedtoleavethetelegraphicoperatorbackatNashville,becausethatwasthepointatwhichalldispatchestomewouldcome,tobeforwardedfromthere.AsIhavesaid,itwasnecessaryformealsotohaveanoperatorduringthisinspectionwhohadpossessionofthisciphertoenablemetotelegraphtomydivisionandtotheWarDepartmentwithoutmydispatchesbeingreadbyalltheoperatorsalongthelineofwiresoverwhichtheyweretransmitted.AccordinglyIorderedthecipheroperatortoturnoverthekeytoCaptainCyrusB.

Comstock,oftheCorpsofEngineers,whomIhadselectedasawiseanddiscreetmanwhocertainlycouldbetrustedwiththecipheriftheoperatoratmyheadquarterscould.

TheoperatorrefusedpointblanktoturnoverthekeytoCaptainComstockasdirectedbyme,statingthathisordersfromtheWarDepartmentwerenottogiveittoanybody—thecommandinggeneraloranyoneelse.ItoldhimIwouldseewhetherhewouldornot.Hesaidthatifhedidhewouldbepunished.Itoldhimifhedidnothemostcertainlywouldbepunished.Finally,seeingthatpunishmentwascertainifherefusedlongertoobeymyorder,andbeingsomewhatremote(evenifhewasnotprotectedaltogetherfromtheconsequencesofhisdisobediencetohisorders)fromtheWarDepartment,heyielded.WhenIreturnedfromKnoxvilleIfoundquiteacommotion.The

yielded.WhenIreturnedfromKnoxvilleIfoundquiteacommotion.Theoperatorhadbeenreprimandedveryseverelyandorderedtoberelieved.IinformedtheSecretaryofWar,orhisassistantsecretaryinchargeofthetelegraph,Stager,thatthemancouldnotberelieved,forhehadonlyobeyedmyorders.Itwasabsolutelynecessaryformetohavethecipher,andthemanwouldmostcertainlyhavebeenpunishedifhehadnotdeliveredit;thattheywouldhavetopunishmeiftheypunishedanybody,orwordstothateffect.

ThiswasabouttheonlythingapproachingadisagreeabledifferencebetweentheSecretaryofWarandmyselfthatoccurreduntilthewarwasover,whenwehadanotherlittlespat.Owingtohisnaturaldispositiontoassumeallpowerandcontrolinallmattersthathehadanythingwhatevertodowith,heboldlytookcommandofthearmies,and,whileissuingnoordersonthesubject,prohibitedanyorderfrommegoingoutoftheadjutant-general'sofficeuntilhehadapprovedit.Thiswasdonebydirectingtheadjutant-generaltoholdanyordersthatcamefrommetobeissuedfromtheadjutant-general'sofficeuntilhehadexaminedthemandgivenhisapproval.Heneverdisturbedhimself,either,inexaminingmyordersuntilitwasentirelyconvenientforhim;sothatorderswhichIhadpreparedwouldoftenlietherethreeorfourdaysbeforehewouldsanctionthem.Iremonstratedagainstthisinwriting,andtheSecretaryapologeticallyrestoredmetomyrightfulpositionofGeneral-in-ChiefoftheArmy.Buthesoonlapsedagainandtookcontrolmuchasbefore.

AfterthereliefofKnoxvilleShermanhadproposedtoBurnsidethatheshouldgowithhimtodriveLongstreetoutofTennessee;butBurnsideassuredhimthatwiththetroopswhichhadbeenbroughtbyGranger,andwhichweretobeleft,hewouldbeamplypreparedtodisposeofLongstreetwithoutavailinghimselfofthisoffer.AsbeforestatedSherman'scommandhadlefttheircampsnorthoftheTennessee,nearChattanooga,withtwodays'rationsintheirhaversacks,withoutcoatsorblankets,andwithoutmanywagons,expectingtoreturntotheircampsbytheendofthattime.Theweatherwasnowcoldandtheyweresuffering,butstilltheywerereadytomakethefurthersacrifice,haditbeenrequired,forthegoodofthecausewhichhadbroughtthemintoservice.Sherman,havingaccomplishedtheobjectforwhichhewassent,marchedbackleisurelytohisoldcampontheTennesseeRiver.

CHAPTERXLVI.

CHAPTERXLVI.

OPERATIONSINMISSISSIPPI—LONGSTREETINEASTTENNESSEE—COMMISSIONED

LIEUTENANT-GENERAL—COMMANDINGTHEARMIESOFTHEUNITEDSTATES—FIRST

INTERVIEWWITHPRESIDENTLINCOLN.

SoonafterhisreturnfromKnoxvilleIorderedShermantodistributehisforcesfromStevensontoDecaturandthencenorthtoNashville;ShermansuggestedthathebepermittedtogobacktoMississippi,tothelimitsofhisowndepartmentandwheremostofhisarmystillremained,forthepurposeofclearingoutwhatConfederatesmightstillbeleftontheeastbankoftheMississippiRivertoimpedeitsnavigationbyourboats.HeexpectedalsotohavethecooperationofBankstodothesamethingonthewestshore.OfcourseIapprovedheartily.

Aboutthe10thofJanuaryShermanwasbackinMemphis,whereHurlbutcommanded,andgottogetherhisMemphismen,ororderedthemcollectedandsenttoVicksburg.HethenwenttoVicksburgandouttowhereMcPhersonwasincommand,andhadhimorganizehissurplustroopssoastogivehimabout20,000meninall.

ShermanknewthatGeneral(Bishop)PolkwasoccupyingMeridianwithhisheadquarters,andhadtwodivisionsofinfantrywithaconsiderableforceofcavalryscatteredwestofhim.Hedetermined,therefore,tomovedirectlyuponMeridian.

Ihadsentsome2,500cavalryunderGeneralSooySmithtoSherman'sdepartment,andtheyhadmostlyarrivedbeforeShermangottoMemphis.

Hurlbuthad7,000cavalry,andShermanorderedhimtoreinforceSmithsoastogivethelatteraforceofabout7,000withwhichtogoagainstForrest,whowasthenknowntobesouth-eastfromMemphis.Smithwasorderedtomoveaboutthe1stofFebruary.

WhileShermanwaswaitingatVicksburgforthearrivalofHurlbutwithhissurplusmen,hesentoutscoutstoascertainthepositionandstrengthoftheenemyandtobringbackalltheinformationtheycouldgather.WhenthesescoutsreturneditwasthroughthemthathegottheinformationofGeneralPolk'sbeingatMeridian,andofthestrengthanddispositionofhiscommand.

Forresthadabout4,000cavalrywithhim,composedofthoroughlywell-disciplinedmen,whoundersoablealeaderwereveryeffective.

Smith'scommandwasnearlydoublethatofForrest,butnotequal,mantoman,forthelackofasuccessfulexperiencesuchasForrest'smenhadhad.Thefactis,troopswhohavefoughtafewbattlesandwon,andfolloweduptheirvictories,improveuponwhattheywerebeforetoanextentthatcanhardlybecountedbypercentage.Thedifferenceinresultisoftendecisivevictoryinsteadofingloriousdefeat.Thissamedifference,too,isoftenduetothewaytroopsareofficered,andfortheparticularkindofwarfarewhichForresthadcarriedonneitherarmycouldpresentamoreeffectiveofficerthanhewas.

Shermangotoffonthe3dofFebruaryandmovedoutonhisexpedition,meetingwithnooppositionwhateveruntilhecrossedtheBigBlack,andwithnogreatdealofoppositionafterthatuntilhereachedJackson,Mississippi.Thislatterplacehereachedonthe6thor7th,Brandononthe8th,andMortononthe9th.Uptothistimehemovedintwocolumnstoenablehimtogetagoodsupplyofforage,etc.,andexpeditethemarch.Here,however,therewereindicationsoftheconcentrationofConfederateinfantry,andhewasobligedtokeephisarmyclosetogether.Hehadnoseriousengagement;buthemetsomeoftheenemywhodestroyedafewofhiswagonsaboutDecatur,Mississippi,where,bytheway,Shermanhimselfcamenearbeingpickedup.

HeenteredMeridianonthe14thofthemonth,theenemyhavingretreatedtowardDemopolis,Alabama.HespentseveraldaysinMeridianinthoroughlydestroyingtherailroadtothenorthandsouth,andalsoforthepurposeofhearingfromSooySmith,whohesupposedhadmetForrestbeforethistimeandhehopedhadgainedadecisivevictorybecauseofasuperiorityofnumbers.Hearingnothingofhim,however,hestartedonhisreturntriptoVicksburg.TherehelearnedthatSmith,whilewaitingforafewofhismenwhohadbeenice-boundintheOhioRiver,insteadofgettingoffonthe1stasexpected,hadnotleftuntilthe11th.SmithdidmeetForrest,buttheresultwasdecidedlyinForrest'sfavor.

ShermanhadwrittenalettertoBanks,proposingacooperativemovementwithhimagainstShreveport,subjecttomyapproval.IdisapprovedofSherman'sgoinghimself,becauseIhadotherimportantworkforhimtodo,butconsentedthathemightsendafewtroopstotheaidofBanks,thoughtheirtimetoremainabsentmustbelimited.Wemusthavethemforthespringcampaign.Thetrans-Mississippimovementprovedabortive.

Mississippimovementprovedabortive.

Myeldestson,whohadaccompaniedmeontheVicksburgcampaignandsiege,hadwhiletherecontracteddisease,whichgrewworse,untilhehadgrownsodangerouslyillthatonthe24thofJanuaryIobtainedpermissiontogotoSt.Louis,wherehewasstayingatthetime,toseehim,hardlyexpectingtofindhimaliveonmyarrival.WhileIwaspermittedtogo,Iwasnotpermittedtoturnovermycommandtoanyoneelse,butwasdirectedtokeeptheheadquarterswithmeandtocommunicateregularlywithallpartsofmydivisionandwithWashington,justasthoughIhadremainedatNashville.

WhenIobtainedthisleaveIwasatChattanooga,havinggonethereagaintomakepreparationstohavethetroopsofThomasinthesouthernpartofTennesseeco-operatewithSherman'smovementinMississippi.IdirectedThomas,andLoganwhowasatScottsboro,Alabama,tokeepupathreateningmovementtothesouthagainstJ.E.Johnston,whohadagainrelievedBragg,forthepurposeofmakinghimkeepasmanytroopsaspossiblethere.

IlearnedthroughConfederatesourcesthatJohnstonhadalreadysenttwodivisionsinthedirectionofMobile,presumablytooperateagainstSherman,andtwomoredivisionstoLongstreetinEastTennessee.SeeingthatJohnstonhaddepletedinthisway,IdirectedThomastosendatleasttenthousandmen,besidesStanley'sdivisionwhichwasalreadytotheeast,intoEastTennessee,andnotifiedSchofield,whowasnowincommandinEastTennessee,ofthismovementoftroopsintohisdepartmentandalsoofthereinforcementsLongstreethadreceived.MyobjectwastodriveLongstreetoutofEastTennesseeasapartofthepreparationsformyspringcampaign.

AboutthistimeGeneralFoster,whohadbeenincommandoftheDepartmentoftheOhioafterBurnsideuntilSchofieldrelievedhim(*21),advisedmethathethoughtitwouldbeagoodthingtokeepLongstreetjustwherehewas;thathewasperfectlyquietinEastTennessee,andifhewasforcedtoleavethere,hiswholewell-equippedarmywouldbefreetogotoanyplacewhereitcouldeffectthemostfortheircause.Ithoughttheadvicewasgood,and,adoptingthatview,countermandedtheordersforpursuitofLongstreet.

Onthe12thofFebruaryIorderedThomastotakeDaltonandholdit,ifpossible;andIdirectedhimtomovewithoutdelay.Findingthathehadnotmoved,onthe17thIurgedhimagaintostart,tellinghimhowimportantitwas,thattheobjectofthemovementwastoco-operatewithSherman,whowasmovingeastwardandmightbeindanger.Thenagainonthe21st,henotyethavingstarted,I

andmightbeindanger.Thenagainonthe21st,henotyethavingstarted,Iaskedhimifhecouldnotstartthenextday.Hefinallygotoffonthe22dor23d.Theenemyfellbackfromhisfrontwithoutabattle,buttookanewpositionquiteasstrongandfarthertotherear.Thomasreportedthathecouldnotgoanyfarther,becauseitwasimpossiblewithhispoorteams,nearlystarved,tokeepupsuppliesuntiltherailroadswererepaired.Hesoonfellback.

Schofieldalsohadtoreturnforthesamereason.Hecouldnotcarrysupplieswithhim,andLongstreetwasbetweenhimandthesuppliesstillleftinthecountry.Longstreet,inhisretreat,wouldbemovingtowardshissupplies,whileourforces,following,wouldberecedingfromtheirs.Onthe2dofMarch,however,IlearnedofSherman'ssuccess,whicheasedmymindverymuch.Thenextday,the3d,IwasorderedtoWashington.

Thebillrestoringthegradeoflieutenant-generalofthearmyhadpassedthroughCongressandbecamealawonthe26thofFebruary.MynominationhadbeensenttotheSenateonthe1stofMarchandconfirmedthenextday(the2d).IwasorderedtoWashingtononthe3dtoreceivemycommission,andstartedthedayfollowingthat.Thecommissionwashandedtomeonthe9th.ItwasdeliveredtomeattheExecutiveMansionbyPresidentLincolninthepresenceofhisCabinet,myeldestson,thoseofmystaffwhowerewithmeandandafewothervisitors.

ThePresidentinpresentingmycommissionreadfromapaper—stating,however,asapreliminary,andpriortothedeliveryofit,thathehaddrawnthatuponpaper,knowingmydisinclinationtospeakinpublic,andhandedmeacopyinadvancesothatImightprepareafewlinesofreply.ThePresidentsaid:

"GeneralGrant,thenation'sappreciationofwhatyouhavedone,anditsrelianceuponyouforwhatremainstobedoneintheexistinggreatstruggle,arenowpresented,withthiscommissionconstitutingyoulieutenant-generalintheArmyoftheUnitedStates.Withthishighhonor,devolvesuponyou,also,acorrespondingresponsibility.Asthecountryhereintrustsyou,so,underGod,itwillsustainyou.Iscarcelyneedtoadd,that,withwhatIherespeakforthenation,goesmyownheartypersonalconcurrence."

TothisIreplied:"Mr.President,Iacceptthecommission,withgratitudeforthehighhonorconferred.Withtheaidofthenoblearmiesthathavefoughtinsomanyfieldsforourcommoncountry,itwillbemyearnestendeavornottodisappointyourexpectations.Ifeelthefullweightoftheresponsibilitiesnowdevolvingonme;andIknowthatiftheyaremet,itwillbeduetothosearmies,

devolvingonme;andIknowthatiftheyaremet,itwillbeduetothosearmies,andaboveall,tothefavorofthatProvidencewhichleadsbothnationsandmen."

Onthe10thIvisitedtheheadquartersoftheArmyofthePotomacatBrandyStation;thenreturnedtoWashington,andpushedwestatoncetomakemyarrangementsforturningoverthecommandsthereandgivinggeneraldirectionsforthepreparationstobemadeforthespringcampaign.

IthadbeenmyintentionbeforethistoremainintheWest,evenifIwasmadelieutenant-general;butwhenIgottoWashingtonandsawthesituationitwasplainthatherewasthepointforthecommandinggeneraltobe.Nooneelsecould,probably,resistthepressurethatwouldbebroughttobearuponhimtodesistfromhisownplansandpursueothers.Idetermined,therefore,beforeIstartedbacktohaveShermanadvancedtomylateposition,McPhersontoSherman'sincommandofthedepartment,andLogantothecommandofMcPherson'scorps.Thesechangeswereallmadeonmyrecommendationandwithouthesitation.Mycommissionaslieutenant-generalwasgiventomeonthe9thofMarch,1864.Onthefollowingday,asalreadystated,IvisitedGeneralMeade,commandingtheArmyofthePotomac,athisheadquartersatBrandyStation,northoftheRapidan.IhadknownGeneralMeadeslightlyintheMexicanwar,buthadnotmethimsinceuntilthisvisit.IwasastrangertomostoftheArmyofthePotomac,ImightsaytoallexcepttheofficersoftheregulararmywhohadservedintheMexicanwar.

Therehadbeensomechangesorderedintheorganizationofthatarmybeforemypromotion.Onewastheconsolidationoffivecorpsintothree,thusthrowingsomeofficersofrankoutofimportantcommands.

MeadeevidentlythoughtthatImightwanttomakestillonemorechangenotyetordered.HesaidtomethatImightwantanofficerwhohadservedwithmeintheWest,mentioningShermanspecially,totakehisplace.Ifso,hebeggedmenottohesitateaboutmakingthechange.Heurgedthattheworkbeforeuswasofsuchvastimportancetothewholenationthatthefeelingorwishesofnoonepersonshouldstandinthewayofselectingtherightmenforallpositions.Forhimself,hewouldservetothebestofhisabilitywhereverplaced.IassuredhimthatIhadnothoughtofsubstitutinganyoneforhim.AstoSherman,hecouldnotbesparedfromtheWest.

ThisincidentgavemeevenamorefavorableopinionofMeadethandidhisgreatvictoryatGettysburgtheJulybefore.Itismenwhowaittobeselected,andnotthosewhoseek,fromwhomwemayalwaysexpectthemostefficient

andnotthosewhoseek,fromwhomwemayalwaysexpectthemostefficientservice.

Meade'spositionafterwardsprovedembarrassingtomeifnottohim.Hewascommandinganarmyand,fornearlyayearprevioustomytakingcommandofallthearmies,wasinsupremecommandoftheArmyofthePotomac—exceptfromtheauthoritiesatWashington.Allothergeneralofficersoccupyingsimilarpositionswereindependentintheircommandssofarasanyonepresentwiththemwasconcerned.ItriedtomakeGeneralMeade'spositionasnearlyaspossiblewhatitwouldhavebeenifIhadbeeninWashingtonoranyotherplaceawayfromhiscommand.IthereforegaveallordersforthemovementsoftheArmyofthePotomactoMeadetohavethemexecuted.Toavoidthenecessityofhavingtogiveordersdirect,Iestablishedmyheadquartersnearhis,unlesstherewerereasonsforlocatingthemelsewhere.Thissometimeshappened,andIhadonoccasionstogiveordersdirecttothetroopsaffected.Onthe11thIreturnedtoWashingtonand,onthedayafter,orderswerepublishedbytheWarDepartmentplacingmeincommandofallthearmies.

IhadleftWashingtonthenightbeforetoreturntomyoldcommandintheWestandtomeetShermanwhomIhadtelegraphedtojoinmeinNashville.

ShermanassumedcommandofthemilitarydivisionoftheMississippionthe18thofMarch,andweleftNashvilletogetherforCincinnati.IhadShermanaccompanymethatfaronmywaybacktoWashingtonsothatwecouldtalkoverthemattersaboutwhichIwantedtoseehim,withoutlosinganymoretimefrommynewcommandthanwasnecessary.ThefirstpointwhichIwishedtodiscusswasparticularlyaboutthecooperationofhiscommandwithminewhenthespringcampaignshouldcommence.Therewerealsootherandminorpoints,minorascomparedwiththegreatimportanceofthequestiontobedecidedbysanguinarywar—therestorationtodutyofofficerswhohadbeenrelievedfromimportantcommands,namelyMcClellan,BurnsideandFremontintheEast,andBuell,McCook,NegleyandCrittendenintheWest.

Sometimeinthewinterof1863-64Ihadbeeninvitedbythegeneral-in-chieftogivemyviewsofthecampaignIthoughtadvisableforthecommandunderme—nowSherman's.GeneralJ.E.JohnstonwasdefendingAtlantaandtheinteriorofGeorgiawithanarmy,thelargestpartofwhichwasstationedatDalton,about38milessouthofChattanooga.DaltonisatthejunctionoftherailroadfromClevelandwiththeonefromChattanoogatoAtlanta.

TherecouldhavebeennodifferenceofopinionastothefirstdutyofthearmiesofthemilitarydivisionoftheMississippi.Johnston'sarmywasthefirstobjective,andthatimportantrailroadcentre,Atlanta,thesecond.AtthetimeIwroteGeneralHalleckgivingmyviewsoftheapproachingcampaign,andatthetimeImetGeneralSherman,itwasexpectedthatGeneralBankswouldbethroughwiththecampaignwhichhehadbeenordereduponbeforemyappointmenttothecommandofallthearmies,andwouldbereadytoco-operatewiththearmieseastoftheMississippi,hispartintheprogrammebeingtomoveuponMobilebylandwhilethenavywouldclosetheharborandassisttothebestofitsability.(*22)TheplanthereforewasforShermantoattackJohnstonanddestroyhisarmyifpossible,tocaptureAtlantaandholdit,andwithhistroopsandthoseofBankstoholdalinethroughtoMobile,oratleasttoholdAtlantaandcommandtherailroadrunningeastandwest,andthetroopsfromoneorotherofthearmiestoholdimportantpointsonthesouthernroad,theonlyeastandwestroadthatwouldbeleftinthepossessionoftheenemy.ThiswouldcuttheConfederacyintwoagain,asourgainingpossessionoftheMississippiRiverhaddonebefore.Bankswasnotreadyintimeforthepartassignedtohim,andcircumstancesthatcouldnotbeforeseendeterminedthecampaignwhichwasafterwardsmade,thesuccessandgrandeurofwhichhasresoundedthroughoutalllands.

Inregardtorestoringofficerswhohadbeenrelievedfromimportantcommandstodutyagain,IleftShermantolookafterthosewhohadbeenremovedintheWestwhileIlookedoutfortherest.Idirected,however,thatheshouldmakenoassignmentuntilIcouldspeaktotheSecretaryofWaraboutthematter.IshortlyafterrecommendedtotheSecretarytheassignmentofGeneralBuelltoduty.Ireceivedtheassurancethatdutywouldbeofferedtohim;andafterwardstheSecretarytoldmethathehadofferedBuellanassignmentandthatthelatterhaddeclinedit,sayingthatitwouldbedegradationtoaccepttheassignmentoffered.IunderstoodafterwardsthatherefusedtoserveundereitherShermanorCanbybecausehehadrankedthemboth.

Bothgraduatedbeforehimandrankedhimintheoldarmy.Shermanrankedhimasabrigadier-general.Allofthemrankedmeintheoldarmy,andShermanandBuelldidasbrigadiers.Theworstexcuseasoldiercanmakefordecliningserviceisthatheoncerankedthecommanderheisorderedtoreportto.

Onthe23dofMarchIwasbackinWashington,andonthe26thtookupmyheadquartersatCulpeperCourt-House,afewmilessouthoftheheadquartersoftheArmyofthePotomac.

theArmyofthePotomac.

AlthoughhailingfromIllinoismyself,theStateofthePresident,InevermetMr.Lincolnuntilcalledtothecapitaltoreceivemycommissionaslieutenant-general.Iknewhim,however,verywellandfavorablyfromtheaccountsgivenbyofficersundermeattheWestwhohadknownhimalltheirlives.IhadalsoreadtheremarkableseriesofdebatesbetweenLincolnandDouglasafewyearsbefore,whentheywererivalcandidatesfortheUnitedStatesSenate.IwasthenaresidentofMissouri,andbynomeansa"Lincolnman"inthatcontest;butIrecognizedthenhisgreatability.

InmyfirstinterviewwithMr.Lincolnalonehestatedtomethathehadneverprofessedtobeamilitarymanortoknowhowcampaignsshouldbeconducted,andneverwantedtointerfereinthem:butthatprocrastinationonthepartofcommanders,andthepressurefromthepeopleattheNorthandCongress,WHICHWASALWAYSWITHHIM,forcedhimintoissuinghisseriesof"MilitaryOrders"—one,two,three,etc.Hedidnotknowbuttheywereallwrong,anddidknowthatsomeofthemwere.Allhewantedorhadeverwantedwassomeonewhowouldtaketheresponsibilityandact,andcallonhimforalltheassistanceneeded,pledginghimselftouseallthepowerofthegovernmentinrenderingsuchassistance.AssuringhimthatIwoulddothebestIcouldwiththemeansathand,andavoidasfaraspossibleannoyinghimortheWarDepartment,ourfirstinterviewended.

TheSecretaryofWarIhadmetoncebeforeonly,butfeltthatIknewhimbetter.

WhilecommandinginWestTennesseewehadoccasionallyheldconversationsoverthewires,atnight,whentheywerenotbeingotherwiseused.HeandGeneralHalleckbothcautionedmeagainstgivingthePresidentmyplansofcampaign,sayingthathewassokind-hearted,soaversetorefusinganythingaskedofhim,thatsomefriendwouldbesuretogetfromhimallheknew.IshouldhavesaidthatinourinterviewthePresidenttoldmehedidnotwanttoknowwhatIproposedtodo.ButhesubmittedaplanofcampaignofhisownwhichhewantedmetohearandthendoasIpleasedabout.HebroughtoutamapofVirginiaonwhichhehadevidentlymarkedeverypositionoccupiedbytheFederalandConfederatearmiesuptothattime.HepointedoutonthemaptwostreamswhichemptyintothePotomac,andsuggestedthatthearmymightbemovedonboatsandlandedbetweenthemouthsofthesestreams.WewouldthenhavethePotomactobringoursupplies,andthetributarieswouldprotectourflankswhilewemovedout.Ilistenedrespectfully,butdidnotsuggestthatthesamestreamswouldprotectLee'sflankswhilehewasshuttingusup.

thesamestreamswouldprotectLee'sflankswhilehewasshuttingusup.

IdidnotcommunicatemyplanstothePresident,nordidItothe

SecretaryofWarortoGeneralHalleck.

Marchthe26thmyheadquarterswere,asstated,atCulpeper,andtheworkofpreparingforanearlycampaigncommenced.

CHAPTERXLVII.

THEMILITARYSITUATION—PLANSFORTHECAMPAIGN—SHERIDANASSIGNEDTO

COMMANDOFTHECAVALRY—FLANKMOVEMENTS—FORRESTATFORTPILLOW—GENERAL

BANKS'SEXPEDITION—COLONELMOSBY—ANINCIDENTOFTHEWILDERNESS

CAMPAIGN.

WhenIassumedcommandofallthearmiesthesituationwasaboutthis:theMississippiRiverwasguardedfromSt.Louistoitsmouth;thelineoftheArkansaswasheld,thusgivingusalltheNorth-westnorthofthatriver.AfewpointsinLouisiananotremotefromtheriverwereheldbytheFederaltroops,aswasalsothemouthoftheRioGrande.

EastoftheMississippiweheldsubstantiallyallnorthoftheMemphisandCharlestonRailroadasfareastasChattanooga,thencealongthelineoftheTennesseeandHolstonrivers,takinginnearlyalloftheStateofTennessee.WestVirginiawasinourhands;andthatpartofoldVirginianorthoftheRapidanandeastoftheBlueRidgewealsoheld.Onthesea-coastwehadFortressMonroeandNorfolkinVirginia;Plymouth,WashingtonandNewBerneinNorthCarolina;Beaufort,FollyandMorrisislands,HiltonHead,PortRoyalandFortPulaskiinSouthCarolinaandGeorgia;Fernandina,St.Augustine,KeyWestandPensacolainFlorida.ThebalanceoftheSouthernterritory,anempireinextent,wasstillinthehandsoftheenemy.

Sherman,whohadsucceededmeinthecommandofthemilitarydivisionofthe

Sherman,whohadsucceededmeinthecommandofthemilitarydivisionoftheMississippi,commandedallthetroopsintheterritorywestoftheAlleghaniesandnorthofNatchez,withalargemovableforceaboutChattanooga.Hiscommandwassubdividedintofourdepartments,butthecommandersallreportedtoShermanandweresubjecttohisorders.Thisarrangement,however,insuredthebetterprotectionofalllinesofcommunicationthroughtheacquiredterritory,forthereasonthatthesedifferentdepartmentcommanderscouldactpromptlyincaseofasuddenorunexpectedraidwithintheirrespectivejurisdictionswithoutawaitingtheordersofthedivisioncommander.

IntheEasttheopposingforcesstoodinsubstantiallythesamerelationstowardseachotherasthreeyearsbefore,orwhenthewarbegan;theywerebothbetweentheFederalandConfederatecapitals.Itistrue,footholdshadbeensecuredbyusonthesea-coast,inVirginiaandNorthCarolina,but,beyondthat,nosubstantialadvantagehadbeengainedbyeitherside.Battleshadbeenfoughtofasgreatseverityashadeverbeenknowninwar,overgroundfromtheJamesRiverandChickahominy,nearRichmond,toGettysburgandChambersburg,inPennsylvania,withindecisiveresults,sometimesfavorabletotheNationalarmy,sometimestotheConfederatearmy;butineveryinstance,Ibelieve,claimedasvictoriesfortheSouthbytheSouthernpressifnotbytheSoutherngenerals.TheNorthernpress,asawhole,didnotdiscouragetheseclaims;aportionofitalwaysmagnifiedrebelsuccessandbelittledours,whileanotherportion,mostsincerelyearnestintheirdesireforthepreservationoftheUnionandtheoverwhelmingsuccessoftheFederalarmies,wouldneverthelessgenerallyexpressdissatisfactionwithwhatevervictoriesweregainedbecausetheywerenotmorecomplete.

ThatportionoftheArmyofthePotomacnotengagedinguardinglinesofcommunicationwasonthenorthernbankoftheRapidan.TheArmyofNorthernVirginiaconfrontingitontheoppositebankofthesameriver,wasstronglyintrenchedandcommandedbytheacknowledgedablestgeneralintheConfederatearmy.ThecountrybacktotheJamesRiveriscutupwithmanystreams,generallynarrow,deep,anddifficulttocrossexceptwherebridged.Theregionisheavilytimbered,andtheroadsnarrow,andverybadaftertheleastrain.Suchanenemywasnot,ofcourse,unpreparedwithadequatefortificationsatconvenientintervalsallthewaybacktoRichmond,sothatwhendrivenfromonefortifiedpositiontheywouldalwayshaveanotherfarthertothereartofallbackinto.

Toprovisionanarmy,campaigningagainstsoformidableafoethroughsuchacountry,fromwagonsaloneseemedalmostimpossible.Systemanddiscipline

country,fromwagonsaloneseemedalmostimpossible.Systemanddisciplinewerebothessentialtoitsaccomplishment.

TheUnionarmieswerenowdividedintonineteendepartments,thoughfourofthemintheWesthadbeenconcentratedintoasinglemilitarydivision.TheArmyofthePotomacwasaseparatecommandandhadnoterritoriallimits.Therewerethusseventeendistinctcommanders.

Beforethistimethesevariousarmieshadactedseparatelyandindependentlyofeachother,givingtheenemyanopportunityoftenofdepletingonecommand,notpressed,toreinforceanothermoreactivelyengaged.Ideterminedtostopthis.TothisendIregardedtheArmyofthePotomacasthecentre,andallwesttoMemphisalongthelinedescribedasourpositionatthetime,andnorthofit,therightwing;theArmyoftheJames,underGeneralButler,astheleftwing,andallthetroopssouth,asaforceinrearoftheenemy.Someoftheselatterwereoccupyingpositionsfromwhichtheycouldnotrenderserviceproportionatetotheirnumericalstrength.Allsuchweredepletedtotheminimumnecessarytoholdtheirpositionsasaguardagainstblockaderunners;wheretheycouldnotdothistheirpositionswereabandonedaltogether.InthiswaytenthousandmenwereaddedtotheArmyoftheJamesfromSouthCarolinaalone,withGeneralGillmoreincommand.ItwasnotcontemplatedthatGeneralGillmoreshouldleavehisdepartment;butasmostofhistroopsweretaken,presumablyforactiveservice,heaskedtoaccompanythemandwaspermittedtodoso.

Officersandsoldiersonfurlough,ofwhomthereweremanythousands,wereorderedtotheirpropercommands;concentrationwastheorderoftheday,andtohaveitaccomplishedintimetoadvanceattheearliestmomenttheroadswouldpermitwastheproblem.

AsareinforcementtotheArmyofthePotomac,ortoactinsupportofit,the9tharmycorps,overtwentythousandstrong,underGeneralBurnside,hadbeenrendezvousedatAnnapolis,Maryland.Thiswasanadmirablepositionforsuchareinforcement.ThecorpscouldbebroughtatthelastmomentasareinforcementtotheArmyofthePotomac,oritcouldbethrownonthesea-coast,southofNorfolk,inVirginiaorNorthCarolina,tooperateagainstRichmondfromthatdirection.InfactBurnsideandtheWarDepartmentboththoughtthe9thcorpswasintendedforsuchanexpeditionuptothelastmoment.

MygeneralplannowwastoconcentratealltheforcepossibleagainsttheConfederatearmiesinthefield.Therewerebuttwosuch,aswehaveseen,east

Confederatearmiesinthefield.Therewerebuttwosuch,aswehaveseen,eastoftheMississippiRiverandfacingnorth.TheArmyofNorthernVirginia,GeneralRobertE.Leecommanding,wasonthesouthbankoftheRapidan,confrontingtheArmyofthePotomac;thesecond,underGeneralJosephE.Johnston,wasatDalton,Georgia,opposedtoShermanwhowasstillatChattanooga.BesidethesemainarmiestheConfederateshadtoguardtheShenandoahValley,agreatstorehousetofeedtheirarmiesfrom,andtheirlineofcommunicationsfromRichmondtoTennessee.Forrest,abraveandintrepidcavalrygeneral,wasintheWestwithalargeforce;makingalargercommandnecessarytoholdwhatwehadgainedinMiddleandWestTennessee.WecouldnotabandonanyterritorynorthofthelineheldbytheenemybecauseitwouldlaytheNorthernStatesopentoinvasion.ButastheArmyofthePotomacwastheprincipalgarrisonfortheprotectionofWashingtonevenwhileitwasmovingonLee,soalltheforcestothewest,andtheArmyoftheJames,guardedtheirspecialtrustswhenadvancingfromthemaswellaswhenremainingatthem.Betterindeed,fortheyforcedtheenemytoguardhisownlinesandresourcesatagreaterdistancefromours,andwithagreaterforce.Littleexpeditionscouldnotsowellbesentouttodestroyabridgeortearupafewmilesofrailroadtrack,burnastorehouse,orinflictotherlittleannoyances.AccordinglyIarrangedforasimultaneousmovementallalongtheline.ShermanwastomovefromChattanooga,Johnston'sarmyandAtlantabeinghisobjectivepoints.(*23)Crook,commandinginWestVirginia,wastomovefromthemouthoftheGauleyRiverwithacavalryforceandsomeartillery,theVirginiaandTennesseeRailroadtobehisobjective.Eithertheenemywouldhavetokeepalargeforcetoprotecttheircommunications,orseethemdestroyedandalargeamountofforageandprovision,whichtheysomuchneeded,fallintoourhands.SigelwasincommandintheValleyofVirginia.Hewastoadvanceupthevalley,coveringtheNorthfromaninvasionthroughthatchannelaswellwhileadvancingasbyremainingnearHarper'sFerry.EverymileheadvancedalsogaveuspossessionofstoresonwhichLeerelied.ButlerwastoadvancebytheJamesRiver,havingRichmondandPetersburgashisobjective.

BeforetheadvancecommencedIvisitedButleratFortMonroe.ThiswasthefirsttimeIhadevermethim.BeforegivinghimanyorderastotheparthewastoplayintheapproachingcampaignIinvitedhisviews.

TheywereverymuchsuchasIintendedtodirect,andasIdiddirect(*24),inwriting,beforeleaving.

GeneralW.F.Smith,whohadbeenpromotedtotherankofmajor-general

GeneralW.F.Smith,whohadbeenpromotedtotherankofmajor-generalshortlyafterthebattleofChattanoogaonmyrecommendation,hadnotyetbeenconfirmed.IfoundadecidedprejudiceagainsthisconfirmationbyamajorityoftheSenate,butIinsistedthathisserviceshadbeensuchthatheshouldberewarded.Mywisheswerenowreluctantlycompliedwith,andIassignedhimtothecommandofoneofthecorpsunderGeneralButler.IwasnotlonginfindingoutthattheobjectionstoSmith'spromotionwerewellfounded.

InoneofmyearlyinterviewswiththePresidentIexpressedmydissatisfactionwiththelittlethathadbeenaccomplishedbythecavalrysofarinthewar,andthebeliefthatitwascapableofaccomplishingmuchmorethanithaddoneifunderathoroughleader.IsaidIwantedtheverybestmaninthearmyforthatcommand.Halleckwaspresentandspokeup,saying:"HowwouldSheridando?"Ireplied:"TheverymanIwant."ThePresidentsaidIcouldhaveanybodyIwanted.

Sheridanwastelegraphedforthatday,andonhisarrivalwasassignedtothecommandofthecavalrycorpswiththeArmyofthePotomac.ThisrelievedGeneralAlfredPleasonton.Itwasnotareflectiononthatofficer,however,forIdidnotknowbutthathehadbeenasefficientasanyothercavalrycommander.

BanksintheDepartmentoftheGulfwasorderedtoassembleallthetroopshehadatNewOrleansintimetojoininthegeneralmove,Mobiletobehisobjective.

AtthistimeIwasnotentirelydecidedastowhetherIshouldmovetheArmyofthePotomacbytherightflankoftheenemy,orbyhisleft.

Eachplanpresentedadvantages.(*25)Ifbyhisright—myleft—thePotomac,ChesapeakeBayandtributarieswouldfurnishusaneasyhaulingdistanceofeverypositionthearmycouldoccupyfromtheRapidantotheJamesRiver.ButLeecould,ifhechose,detachormovehiswholearmynorthonalineratherinteriortotheoneIwouldhavetotakeinfollowing.Amovementbyhisleft—ourright—wouldobviatethis;butallthatwasdonewouldhavetobedonewiththesuppliesandammunitionwestartedwith.Allideaofadoptingthislatterplanwasabandonedwhenthelimitedquantityofsuppliespossibletotakewithuswasconsidered.Thecountryoverwhichwewouldhavetopasswassoexhaustedofallfoodorforagethatwewouldbeobligedtocarryeverythingwithus.

Whilethesepreparationsweregoingontheenemywasnotentirelyidle.

Whilethesepreparationsweregoingontheenemywasnotentirelyidle.

IntheWestForrestmadearaidinWestTennesseeuptothenorthernborder,capturingthegarrisonoffourorfivehundredmenatUnionCity,andfolloweditupbyanattackonPaducah,Kentucky,onthebanksoftheOhio.Whilehewasabletoenterthecityhefailedtocapturethefortsoranypartofthegarrison.OnthefirstintelligenceofForrest'sraidItelegraphedShermantosendallhiscavalryagainsthim,andnottolethimgetoutofthetraphehadputhimselfinto.

Shermanhadanticipatedmebysendingtroopsagainsthimbeforehegotmyorder.

Forrest,however,fellbackrapidly,andattackedthetroopsatFortPillow,astationfortheprotectionofthenavigationoftheMississippiRiver.Thegarrisonconsistedofaregimentofcoloredtroops,infantry,andadetachmentofTennesseecavalry.Thesetroopsfoughtbravely,butwereoverpowered.IwillleaveForrestinhisdispatchestotellwhathedidwiththem.

"Theriverwasdyed,"hesays,"withthebloodoftheslaughteredfortwohundredyards.Theapproximatelosswasupwardoffivehundredkilled,butfewoftheofficersescaping.Mylosswasabouttwentykilled.ItishopedthatthesefactswilldemonstratetotheNorthernpeoplethatnegrosoldierscannotcopewithSoutherners."SubsequentlyForrestmadeareportinwhichheleftoutthepartwhichshockshumanitytoread.

AttheEast,also,therebelswerebusy.IhadsaidtoHalleckthatPlymouthandWashington,NorthCarolina,wereunnecessarytohold.ItwouldbebettertohavethegarrisonsengagedthereaddedtoButler'scommand.Ifsuccessattendedourarmsbothplaces,andotherstoo,wouldfallintoourhandsnaturally.TheseplaceshadbeenoccupiedbyFederaltroopsbeforeItookcommandofthearmies,andIknewthattheExecutivewouldbereluctanttoabandonthem,andthereforeexplainedmyviews;butbeforemyviewswerecarriedouttherebelscapturedthegarrisonatPlymouth.IthenorderedtheabandonmentofWashington,butdirectedtheholdingofNewBerneatallhazards.ThiswasessentialbecauseNewBernewasaportintowhichblockaderunnerscouldenter.

GeneralBankshadgoneonanexpeditionuptheRedRiverlongbeforemypromotiontogeneralcommand.Ihadopposedthemovementstrenuously,butacquiescedbecauseitwastheorderofmysuperioratthetime.BydirectionofHalleckIhadreinforcedBankswithacorpsofabouttenthousandmenfrom

HalleckIhadreinforcedBankswithacorpsofabouttenthousandmenfromSherman'scommand.Thisreinforcementwaswantedbackbadlybeforetheforwardmovementcommenced.ButBankshadgotsofarthatitseemedbestthatheshouldtakeShreveportontheRedRiver,andturnoverthelineofthatrivertoSteele,whocommandedinArkansas,toholdinsteadofthelineoftheArkansas.Ordersweregivenaccordingly,andwiththeexpectationthatthecampaignwouldbeendedintimeforBankstoreturnA.J.Smith'scommandtowhereitbelongedandgetbacktoNewOrleanshimselfintimetoexecutehispartinthegeneralplan.Buttheexpeditionwasafailure.Banksdidnotgetbackintimetotakepartintheprogrammeaslaiddown.NorwasSmithreturneduntillongafterthemovementsofMay,1864,hadbeenbegun.

Theservicesoffortythousandveterantroops,overandabovethenumberrequiredtoholdallthatwasnecessaryintheDepartmentoftheGulf,werethusparalyzed.ItisbutjusttoBanks,however,tosaythathisexpeditionwasorderedfromWashingtonandhewasinnowayresponsibleexceptfortheconductofit.Imakenocriticismonthispoint.Heopposedtheexpedition.

Bythe27thofAprilspringhadsofaradvancedastojustifymeinfixingadayforthegreatmove.OnthatdayBurnsideleftAnnapolistooccupyMeade'spositionbetweenBullRunandtheRappahannock.Meadewasnotifiedanddirectedtobringhistroopsforwardtohisadvance.

OnthefollowingdayButlerwasnotifiedofmyintendedadvanceonthe4thofMay,andhewasdirectedtomovethenightofthesamedayandgetasfaruptheJamesRiveraspossiblebydaylight,andpushonfromtheretoaccomplishthetaskgivenhim.HewasalsonotifiedthatreinforcementswerebeingcollectedinWashingtonCity,whichwouldbeforwardedtohimshouldtheenemyfallbackintothetrenchesatRichmond.ThesamedayShermanwasdirectedtogethisforcesupreadytoadvanceonthe5th.SigelwasinWinchesterandwasnotifiedtomoveinconjunctionwiththeothers.

ThecriticismhasbeenmadebywritersonthecampaignfromtheRapidantotheJamesRiverthatallthelossoflifecouldhavebeenobviatedbymovingthearmythereontransports.Richmondwasfortifiedandintrenchedsoperfectlythatonemaninsidetodefendwasmorethanequaltofiveoutsidebesiegingorassaulting.TogetpossessionofLee'sarmywasthefirstgreatobject.WiththecaptureofhisarmyRichmondwouldnecessarilyfollow.Itwasbettertofighthimoutsideofhisstrongholdthaninit.IftheArmyofthePotomachadbeenmovedbodilytotheJamesRiverbywaterLeecouldhavemovedapartofhisforcesbacktoRichmond,calledBeauregardfromthesouthtoreinforceit,and

forcesbacktoRichmond,calledBeauregardfromthesouthtoreinforceit,andwiththebalancemovedontoWashington.Then,too,Iorderedamove,simultaneouswiththatoftheArmyofthePotomac,uptheJamesRiverbyaformidablearmyalreadycollectedatthemouthoftheriver.

WhilemyheadquarterswereatCulpeper,fromthe26thofMarchtothe4thofMay,IgenerallyvisitedWashingtononceaweektoconferwiththeSecretaryofWarandPresident.Onthelastoccasion,afewdaysbeforemoving,acircumstanceoccurredwhichcamenearpostponingmypartinthecampaignaltogether.ColonelJohnS.Mosbyhadforalongtimebeencommandingapartisancorps,orregiment,whichoperatedintherearoftheArmyofthePotomac.Onmyreturntothefieldonthisoccasion,asthetrainapproachedWarrentonJunction,aheavycloudofdustwasseentotheeastoftheroadasifmadebyabodyofcavalryonacharge.Arrivingatthejunctionthetrainwasstoppedandinquiriesmadeastothecauseofthedust.Therewasbutonemanatthestation,andheinformedusthatMosbyhadcrossedafewminutesbeforeatfullspeedinpursuitofFederalcavalry.Hadheseenourtraincoming,nodoubthewouldhavelethisprisonersescapetocapturethetrain.Iwasonaspecialtrain,ifIremembercorrectly,withoutanyguard.

SincethecloseofthewarIhavecometoknowColonelMosbypersonally,andsomewhatintimately.HeisadifferentmanentirelyfromwhatIhadsupposed.Heisslender,nottall,wiry,andlooksasifhecouldendureanyamountofphysicalexercise.Heisable,andthoroughlyhonestandtruthful.TherewereprobablybutfewmenintheSouthwhocouldhavecommandedsuccessfullyaseparatedetachmentintherearofanopposingarmy,andsoneartheborderofhostilities,aslongashedidwithoutlosinghisentirecommand.

OnthissamevisittoWashingtonIhadmylastinterviewwiththePresidentbeforereachingtheJamesRiver.Hehadofcoursebecomeacquaintedwiththefactthatageneralmovementhadbeenorderedallalongtheline,andseemedtothinkitanewfeatureinwar.Iexplainedtohimthatitwasnecessarytohaveagreatnumberoftroopstoguardandholdtheterritorywehadcaptured,andtopreventincursionsintotheNorthernStates.Thesetroopscouldperformthisservicejustaswellbyadvancingasbyremainingstill;andbyadvancingtheywouldcompeltheenemytokeepdetachmentstoholdthemback,orelselayhisownterritoryopentoinvasion.Hisanswerwas:"Oh,yes!Iseethat.AswesayoutWest,ifamancan'tskinhemustholdalegwhilesomebodyelsedoes."

TherewasacertainincidentconnectedwiththeWildernesscampaignofwhich

TherewasacertainincidentconnectedwiththeWildernesscampaignofwhichitmaynotbeoutofplacetospeak;andtoavoidadigressionfurtheronIwillmentionithere.

AfewdaysbeforemydeparturefromCulpepertheHonorableE.B.

Washburnevisitedmethere,andremainedwithmyheadquartersforsomedistancesouth,throughthebattleintheWildernessand,Ithink,toSpottsylvania.HewasaccompaniedbyaMr.Swinton,whomhepresentedasaliterarygentlemanwhowishedtoaccompanythearmywithaviewofwritingahistoryofthewarwhenitwasover.Heassuredme—andIhavenodoubtSwintongavehimtheassurance—thathewasnotpresentasacorrespondentofthepress.Iexpressedanentirewillingnesstohavehim(Swinton)accompanythearmy,andwouldhaveallowedhimtodosoasacorrespondent,restricted,however,inthecharacteroftheinformationhecouldgive.WereceivedRichmondpaperswithaboutasmuchregularityasiftherehadbeennowar,andknewthatourpaperswerereceivedwithequalregularitybytheConfederates.Itwasdesirable,therefore,thatcorrespondentsshouldnotbeprivilegedspiesoftheenemywithinourlines.

ProbablyMr.Swintonexpectedtobeaninvitedguestatmyheadquarters,andwasdisappointedthathewasnotaskedtobecomeso.Atalleventshewasnotinvited,andsoonIfoundthathewascorrespondingwithsomepaper(Ihavenowforgottenwhichone),thusviolatinghiswordeitherexpressedorimplied.HeknewoftheassuranceWashburnehadgivenastothecharacterofhismission.IneversawthemanfromthedayofourintroductiontothepresentthatIrecollect.Heaccompaniedus,however,foratimeatleast.

ThesecondnightaftercrossingtheRapidan(thenightofthe5thofMay)ColonelW.R.Rowley,ofmystaff,wasactingasnightofficeratmyheadquarters.AshorttimebeforemidnightIgavehimverbalinstructionsforthenight.ThreedayslaterIreadinaRichmondpaperaverbatimreportoftheseinstructions.

Afewnightsstilllater(afterthefirst,andpossiblyafterthesecond,day'sfightingintheWilderness)GeneralMeadecametomytentforconsultation,bringingwithhimsomeofhisstaffofficers.Bothhisstaffandmineretiredtothecamp-firesomeyardsinfrontofthetent,thinkingourconversationshouldbeprivate.Therewasastumpalittletooneside,andbetweenthefrontofthetentandcamp-fire.

Oneofmystaff,ColonelT.S.Bowers,sawwhathetooktobeamanseatedonthegroundandleaningagainstthestump,listeningtotheconversationbetweenMeadeandmyself.HecalledtheattentionofColonelRowleytoit.Thelatterimmediatelytookthemanbytheshoulderandaskedhim,inlanguagemoreforciblethanpolite,whathewasdoingthere.ThemanprovedtobeSwinton,the"historian,"andhisrepliestothequestionwereevasiveandunsatisfactory,andhewaswarnedagainstfurthereaves-dropping.

ThenextIheardofMr.SwintonwasatColdHarbor.GeneralMeadecametomyheadquarterssayingthatGeneralBurnsidehadarrestedSwinton,whoatsomeprevioustimehadgivengreatoffence,andhadorderedhimtobeshotthatafternoon.Ipromptlyorderedtheprisonertobereleased,butthathemustbeexpelledfromthelinesofthearmynottoreturnagainonpainofpunishment.

CHAPTERXLVIII.

COMMENCEMENTOFTHEGRANDCAMPAIGN—GENERALBUTLER'SPOSITION

—SHERIDAN'SFIRSTRAID.

Thearmieswerenowallreadytomovefortheaccomplishmentofasingleobject.Theywereactingasaunitsofarassuchathingwaspossibleoversuchavastfield.Lee,withthecapitaloftheConfederacy,wasthemainendtowhichallwereworking.Johnston,withAtlanta,wasanimportantobstacleinthewayofouraccomplishingtheresultaimedat,andwasthereforealmostanindependentobjective.ItwasoflessimportanceonlybecausethecaptureofJohnstonandhisarmywouldnotproducesoimmediateanddecisivearesultinclosingtherebellionaswouldthepossessionofRichmond,Leeandhisarmy.Allothertroopswereemployedexclusivelyinsupportofthesetwomovements.Thiswastheplan;andIwillnowendeavortogive,asconciselyasIcan,themethodofitsexecution,outliningfirsttheoperationsofminordetachedbutcooperativecolumns.

Asstatedbefore,BanksfailedtoaccomplishwhathehadbeensenttodoontheRedRiver,andeliminatedtheuseoffortythousandveteranswhosecooperationinthegrandcampaignhadbeenexpected—tenthousandwithShermanandthirtythousandagainstMobile.

thirtythousandagainstMobile.

Sigel'srecordisalmostequallybrief.Hemovedout,itistrue,accordingtoprogramme;butjustwhenIwashopingtohearofgoodworkbeingdoneinthevalleyIreceivedinsteadthefollowingannouncementfromHalleck:"SigelisinfullretreatonStrasburg.Hewilldonothingbutrun;neverdidanythingelse."TheenemyhadinterceptedhimaboutNewMarketandhandledhimroughly,leavinghimshortsixguns,andsomeninehundredmenoutofhissixthousand.

TheplanhadbeenforanadvanceofSigel'sforcesintwocolumns.

Thoughtheoneunderhisimmediatecommandfailedingloriouslytheotherprovedmorefortunate.UnderCrookandAverellhiswesterncolumnadvancedfromtheGauleyinWestVirginiaattheappointedtime,andwithmorehappyresults.TheyreachedtheVirginiaandTennesseeRailroadatDublinanddestroyedadepotofsupplies,besidestearingupseveralmilesofroadandburningthebridgeoverNewRiver.HavingaccomplishedthistheyrecrossedtheAlleghaniestoMeadowBluffsandthereawaitedfurtherorders.

ButlerembarkedatFortMonroewithallhiscommand,exceptthecavalryandsomeartillerywhichmovedupthesouthbankoftheJamesRiver.

HissteamersmovedfirstupChesapeakeBayandYorkRiverasifthreateningtherearofLee'sarmy.Atmidnighttheyturnedback,andButlerbydaylightwasfaruptheJamesRiver.HeseizedCityPointandBermudaHundredearlyintheday,withoutlossand,nodoubt,verymuchtothesurpriseoftheenemy.

ThiswastheaccomplishmentofthefirststepcontemplatedinmyinstructionstoButler.Hewastoactfromhere,lookingtoRichmondashisobjectivepoint.IhadgivenhimtounderstandthatIshouldaimtofightLeebetweentheRapidanandRichmondifhewouldstand;butshouldLeefallbackintoRichmondIwouldfollowupandmakeajunctionofthearmiesofthePotomacandtheJamesontheJamesRiver.Hewasdirectedtosecureafootingasfarupthesouthsideoftheriverashecouldatasearlyadateaspossible.

Butlerwasinpositionbythe6thofMayandhadbegunintrenching,andonthe7thhesentouthiscavalryfromSuffolktocuttheWeldonRailroad.HealsosentoutdetachmentstodestroytherailroadbetweenPetersburgandRichmond,butnogreatsuccessattendedtheselatterefforts.HemadenogreatefforttoestablishhimselfonthatroadandneglectedtoattackPetersburg,whichwasalmostdefenceless.Aboutthe11thheadvancedslowlyuntilhereachedtheworksat

defenceless.Aboutthe11thheadvancedslowlyuntilhereachedtheworksatDrury'sBluff,abouthalfwaybetweenBermudaHundredandRichmond.InthemeantimeBeauregardhadbeengatheringreinforcements.Onthe16thheattackedButlerwithgreatvigor,andwithsuchsuccessastolimitverymateriallythefurtherusefulnessoftheArmyoftheJamesasadistinctfactorinthecampaign.IafterwardorderedaportionofittojointheArmyofthePotomac,leavingasufficientforcewithButlertomanhisworks,holdsecurelythefootinghehadalreadygainedandmaintainathreateningfronttowardtherearoftheConfederatecapital.

ThepositionwhichGeneralButlerhadchosenbetweenthetworivers,theJamesandAppomattox,wasoneofgreatnaturalstrength,onewherealargeareaofgroundmightbethoroughlyinclosedbymeansofasingleintrenchedline,andthataveryshortoneincomparisonwiththeextentofterritorywhichitthoroughlyprotected.HisrightwasprotectedbytheJamesRiver,hisleftbytheAppomattox,andhisrearbytheirjunction—thetwostreamsunitingnearby.Thebendsofthetwostreamsshortenedthelinethathadbeenchosenforintrenchments,whileitincreasedtheareawhichthelineinclosed.

PrevioustoorderinganytroopsfromButlerIsentmychiefengineer,GeneralBarnard,fromtheArmyofthePotomactothatoftheJamestoinspectButler'spositionandascertainwhetherIcouldagainsafelymakeanorderforGeneralButler'smovementincooperationwithmine,nowthatIwasgettingsonearRichmond;or,ifIcouldnot,whetherhispositionwasstrongenoughtojustifymeinwithdrawingsomeofhistroopsandhavingthembroughtroundbywatertoWhiteHousetojoinmeandreinforcetheArmyofthePotomac.GeneralBarnardreportedthepositionverystrongfordefensivepurposes,andthatIcoulddothelatterwithgreatsecurity;butthatGeneralButlercouldnotmovefromwherehewas,incooperation,toproduceanyeffect.HesaidthatthegeneraloccupiedaplacebetweentheJamesandAppomattoxriverswhichwasofgreatstrength,andwherewithaninferiorforcehecouldholditforanindefinitelengthoftimeagainstasuperior;butthathecoulddonothingoffensively.IthenaskedhimwhyButlercouldnotmoveoutfromhislinesandpushacrosstheRichmondandPetersburgRailroadtotherearandonthesouthsideofRichmond.Herepliedthatitwasimpracticable,becausetheenemyhadsubstantiallythesamelineacrosstheneckoflandthatGeneralButlerhad.Hethentookouthispencilanddrewasketchofthelocality,remarkingthatthepositionwaslikeabottleandthatButler'slineofintrenchmentsacrosstheneckrepresentedthecork;thattheenemyhadbuiltanequallystronglineimmediatelyinfrontofhimacrosstheneck;anditwasthereforeasifButlerwasinabottle.

infrontofhimacrosstheneck;anditwasthereforeasifButlerwasinabottle.Hewasperfectlysafeagainstanattack;but,asBarnardexpressedit,theenemyhadcorkedthebottleandwithasmallforcecouldholdthecorkinitsplace.Thisstruckmeasbeingveryexpressiveofhisposition,particularlywhenIsawthehastysketchwhichGeneralBarnardhaddrawn;andinmakingmysubsequentreportIusedthatexpressionwithoutaddingquotationmarks,neverthinkingthatanythinghadbeensaidthatwouldattractattention—asthisdid,verymuchtotheannoyance,nodoubt,ofGeneralButlerand,Iknow,verymuchtomyown.IfoundafterwardsthatthiswasmentionedinthenotesofGeneralBadeau'sbook,which,whentheywereshowntome,Iaskedtohavestrickenout;yetitwasretainedthere,thoughagainstmywishes.

Imakethisstatementherebecause,althoughIhaveoftenmadeitbefore,ithasneverbeeninmypoweruntilnowtoplaceitwhereitwillcorrecthistory;andIdesiretorectifyallinjusticethatImayhavedonetoindividuals,particularlytoofficerswhoweregallantlyservingtheircountryduringthetryingperiodofthewarforthepreservationoftheUnion.GeneralButlercertainlygavehisveryearnestsupporttothewar;andhegavehisownbesteffortspersonallytothesuppressionoftherebellion.

ThefurtheroperationsoftheArmyoftheJamescanbestbetreatedofinconnectionwiththoseoftheArmyofthePotomac,thetwobeingsointimatelyassociatedandconnectedastobesubstantiallyonebodyinwhichtheindividualityofthesupportingwingismerged.

BeforegivingthereaderasummaryofSherman'sgreatAtlantacampaign,whichmustconcludemydescriptionofthevariouscooperativemovementspreparatorytoproceedingwiththatoftheoperationsofthecentre,IwillbrieflymentionSheridan'sfirstraiduponLee'scommunicationswhich,thoughanincidentoftheoperationsonthemainlineandnotspecificallymarkedoutintheoriginalplan,attainedinitsbrilliantexecutionandresultsalltheproportionsofanindependentcampaign.

Bythusanticipating,inpointoftime,IwillbeabletomoreperfectlyobservethecontinuityofeventsoccurringinmyimmediatefrontwhenIshallhaveundertakentodescribeouradvancefromtheRapidan.

Onthe8thofMay,justafterthebattleoftheWildernessandwhenweweremovingonSpottsylvaniaIdirectedSheridanverballytocutloosefromtheArmyofthePotomac,passaroundtheleftofLee'sarmyandattackhiscavalry:tocutthetworoads—onerunningwestthroughGordonsville,Charlottesvilleand

thetworoads—onerunningwestthroughGordonsville,CharlottesvilleandLynchburg,theothertoRichmond,and,whencompelledtodosoforwantofforageandrations,tomoveontotheJamesRiveranddrawthesefromButler'ssupplies.ThismovetookhimpasttheentirerearofLee'sarmy.TheseorderswerealsogiveninwritingthroughMeade.

Theobjectofthismovewasthree-fold.First,ifsuccessfullyexecuted,anditwas,hewouldannoytheenemybycuttinghislineofsuppliesandtelegraphiccommunications,anddestroyorgetforhisownusesuppliesinstoreintherearandcomingup.Second,hewoulddrawtheenemy'scavalryafterhim,andthusbetterprotectourflanks,rearandtrainsthanbyremainingwiththearmy.Third,hisabsencewouldsavethetrainsdrawinghisforageandothersuppliesfromFredericksburg,whichhadnowbecomeourbase.Hestartedatdaylightthenextmorning,andaccomplishedmorethanwasexpected.ItwassixteendaysbeforehegotbacktotheArmyofthePotomac.

ThecourseSheridantookwasdirectlytoRichmond.BeforenightStuart,commandingtheConfederatecavalry,cameontotherearofhiscommand.

Buttheadvancekepton,crossedtheNorthAnna,andatBeaverDam,astationontheVirginiaCentralRailroad,recapturedfourhundredUnionprisonersontheirwaytoRichmond,destroyedtheroadandusedanddestroyedalargeamountofsubsistenceandmedicalstores.

Stuart,seeingthatourcavalrywaspushingtowardsRichmond,abandonedthepursuitonthemorningofthe10thand,byadetourandanexhaustingmarch,interposedbetweenSheridanandRichmondatYellowTavern,onlyaboutsixmilesnorthofthecity.SheridandestroyedtherailroadandmoresuppliesatAshland,andonthe11tharrivedinStuart'sfront.Asevereengagementensuedinwhichthelosseswereheavyonbothsides,buttherebelswerebeaten,theirleadermortallywounded,andsomegunsandmanyprisonerswerecaptured.

SheridanpassedthroughtheouterdefencesofRichmond,andcould,nodoubt,havepassedthroughtheinnerones.Buthavingnosupportsnearhecouldnothaveremained.AftercaringforhiswoundedhestruckfortheJamesRiverbelowthecity,tocommunicatewithButlerandtoresthismenandhorsesaswellastogetfoodandforageforthem.

HemovedfirstbetweentheChickahominyandtheJames,butinthemorning(the12th)hewasstoppedbybatteriesatMechanicsville.HethenturnedtocrosstothenorthsideoftheChickahominybyMeadowBridge.Hefoundthisbarred,

tothenorthsideoftheChickahominybyMeadowBridge.Hefoundthisbarred,andthedefeatedConfederatecavalry,reorganized,occupyingtheoppositeside.ThepaniccreatedbyhisfirstentrancewithintheouterworksofRichmondhavingsubsidedtroopsweresentouttoattackhisrear.

Hewasnowinaperilousposition,onefromwhichbutfewgeneralscouldhaveextricatedthemselves.ThedefencesofRichmond,manned,weretotheright,theChickahominywastotheleftwithnobridgeremainingandtheoppositebankguarded,totherearwasaforcefromRichmond.ThisforcewasattackedandbeatenbyWilson'sandGregg'sdivisions,whileSheridanturnedtotheleftwiththeremainingdivisionandhastilybuiltabridgeovertheChickahominyunderthefireoftheenemy,forcedacrossingandsoondispersedtheConfederateshefoundthere.Theenemywasheldbackfromthestreambythefireofthetroopsnotengagedinbridgebuilding.

Onthe13thSheridanwasatBottom'sBridge,overtheChickahominy.Onthe14thhecrossedthisstreamandonthatdaywentintocampontheJamesRiveratHaxall'sLanding.HeatonceputhimselfintocommunicationwithGeneralButler,whodirectedallthesupplieshewantedtobefurnished.

SheridanhadlefttheArmyofthePotomacatSpottsylvania,butdidnotknowwhereeitherthisorLee'sarmywasnow.Greatcautionthereforehadtobeexercisedingettingback.Onthe17th,afterrestinghiscommandforthreedays,hestartedonhisreturn.HemovedbythewayofWhiteHouse.ThebridgeoverthePamunkeyhadbeenburnedbytheenemy,butanewonewasspeedilyimprovisedandthecavalrycrossedoverit.Onthe22dhewasatAylett'sontheMatapony,wherehelearnedthepositionofthetwoarmies.Onthe24thhejoinedusonthemarchfromNorthAnnatoColdHarbor,inthevicinityofChesterfield.

SheridaninthismemorableraidpassedentirelyaroundLee'sarmy:encounteredhiscavalryinfourengagements,anddefeatedtheminall;recapturedfourhundredUnionprisonersandkilledandcapturedmanyoftheenemy;destroyedandusedmanysuppliesandmunitionsofwar;destroyedmilesofrailroadandtelegraph,andfreedusfromannoyancebythecavalryoftheenemyformorethantwoweeks.

CHAPTERXLIX.

SHERMAN'SCAMPAIGNINGEORGIA—SIEGEOFATLANTA—DEATHOFGENERAL

MCPHERSON—ATTEMPTTOCAPTUREANDERSONVILLE—CAPTUREOFATLANTA.

AfterseparatingfromShermaninCincinnatiIwentontoWashington,asalreadystated,whilehereturnedtoNashvilletoassumethedutiesofhisnewcommand.HismilitarydivisionwasnowcomposedoffourdepartmentsandembracedalltheterritorywestoftheAlleghanyMountainsandeastoftheMississippiRiver,togetherwiththeStateofArkansasinthetrans-Mississippi.ThemosteasterlyofthesewastheDepartmentoftheOhio,GeneralSchofieldcommanding;thenextwastheDepartmentoftheCumberland,GeneralThomascommanding;thethirdtheDepartmentoftheTennessee,GeneralMcPhersoncommanding;andGeneralSteelestillcommandedthetrans-Mississippi,orDepartmentofArkansas.

Thelast-nameddepartmentwassofarawaythatShermancouldnotcommunicatewithitveryreadilyafterstartingonhisspringcampaign,anditwasthereforesoontransferredfromhismilitarydivisiontothatoftheGulf,whereGeneralCanby,whohadrelievedGeneralBanks,wasincommand.

Themovementsofthearmies,asIhavestatedinaformerchapter,weretobesimultaneous,Ifixingthedaytostartwhentheseasonshouldbefarenoughadvanced,itwashoped,fortheroadstobeinaconditionforthetroopstomarch.

GeneralShermanatoncesethimselftoworkpreparingforthetaskwhichwasassignedhimtoaccomplishinthespringcampaign.McPhersonlayatHuntsvillewithabouttwenty-fourthousandmen,guardingthosepointsofTennesseewhichwereregardedasmostworthholding;Thomas,withoversixtythousandmenoftheArmyoftheCumberland,wasatChattanooga;andSchofield,withaboutfourteenthousandmen,wasatKnoxville.Withthesethreearmies,numberingaboutonehundredthousandmeninall,Shermanwastomoveonthedayfixedforthegeneraladvance,withaviewofdestroyingJohnston'sarmyandcapturingAtlanta.Hevisitedeachofthesecommandstoinformhimselfastotheircondition,anditwasfoundtobe,speakinggenerally,good.

Oneofthefirstmatterstoturnhisattentiontowasthatofgetting,beforethetimearrivedforstarting,anaccumulationofsuppliesforwardtoChattanooga,sufficientlylargetowarrantamovement.Hefound,whenhegottothatplace,

sufficientlylargetowarrantamovement.Hefound,whenhegottothatplace,thatthetrainsoverthesingle-trackrailroad,whichwasfrequentlyinterruptedforadayortwoatatime,wereonlysufficienttomeetthedailywantsofthetroopswithoutbringingforwardanysurplusofanykind.Hefound,however,thattrainswerebeingusedtotransportallthebeefcattle,horsesforthecavalry,andeventeamsthatwerebeingbroughttothefront.Heatoncechangedallthis,andrequiredbeefcattle,teams,cavalryhorses,andeverythingthatcouldtravel,eventhetroops,tobemarched,andusedtheroadexclusivelyfortransportingsupplies.Inthiswayhewasabletoaccumulateanabundancebeforethetimefinallyfixeduponforthemove,the4thofMay.

AsIhavesaidalready,JohnstonwasatDalton,whichwasnearlyone-fourthofthewaybetweenChattanoogaandAtlanta.ThecountryismountainousallthewaytoAtlanta,aboundinginmountainstreams,someofthemofconsiderablevolume.DaltonisongroundwherewaterdrainstowardsAtlantaandintooneofthemainstreamsrisingnorth-eastfromthereandflowingsouthwest—thisbeingthegeneraldirectionwhichallthemainstreamsofthatsectiontake,withsmallertributariesenteringintothem.Johnstonhadbeenpreparinghimselfforthiscampaignduringtheentirewinter.ThebestpositionsfordefencehadbeenselectedallthewayfromDaltonbacktoAtlanta,andverystronglyintrenched;sothat,ashemightbeforcedtofallbackfromoneposition,hewouldhaveanothertofallintoinhisrear.HispositionatDaltonwassoverystronglyintrenchedthatnodoubtheexpected,oratleasthoped,toholdShermanthereandpreventhimfromgettinganyfurther.Withalessskilfulgeneral,andonedisposedtotakenorisks,Ihavenodoubtthathewouldhavesucceeded.

Sherman'splanwastostartSchofield,whowasfarthestback,afewdaysinadvancefromKnoxville,havinghimmoveonthedirectroadtoDalton.

ThomaswastomoveouttoRinggold.IthadbeenSherman'sintentiontocrossMcPhersonovertheTennesseeRiveratHuntsvilleorDecatur,andmovehimsouthfromtheresoastohavehimcomeintotheroadrunningfromChattanoogatoAtlantaagooddistancetotherearofthepointJohnstonwasoccupying;butwhenthatwascontemplateditwashopedthatMcPhersonalonewouldhavetroopsenoughtocopewithJohnston,ifthelattershouldmoveagainsthimwhileunsupportedbythebalanceofthearmy.Inthishewasdisappointed.TwoofMcPherson'sveterandivisionshadre-enlistedontheexpressprovisionthattheyweretohaveafurlough.Thisfurloughhadnotyetexpired,andtheywerenotback.

Then,again,ShermanhadlentBankstwodivisionsunderA.J.Smith,thewinterbefore,toco-operatewiththetrans-Mississippiforces,andthiswiththeexpresspledgethattheyshouldbebackbyatimespecified,soastobepreparedforthisverycampaign.Itishardlynecessarytosaytheywerenotreturned.Thatdepartmentcontinuedtoabsorbtroopstonopurposetotheendofthewar.ThisleftMcPhersonsoweakthatthepartoftheplanaboveindicatedhadtobechanged.HewasthereforebroughtuptoChattanoogaandmovedfromthereonaroadtotherightofThomas—thetwocomingtogetheraboutDalton.Thethreearmieswereabreast,allreadytostartpromptlyontime.

ShermansoonfoundthatDaltonwassostronglyfortifiedthatitwasuselesstomakeanyattempttocarryitbyassault;andeventocarryitbyregularapproacheswasimpracticable.Therewasanarrowingupinthemountain,betweentheNationalandConfederatearmies,throughwhichastream,awagonroadandarailroadran.Besides,thestreamhadbeendammedsothatthevalleywasalake.Throughthisgorgethetroopswouldhavetopass.McPhersonwasthereforesentaroundbytheright,tocomeoutbythewayofSnakeCreekGapintotherearoftheenemy.

ThiswasasurprisetoJohnston,andaboutthe13thhedecidedtoabandonhispositionatDalton.

Onthe15ththerewasveryhardfightingaboutResaca;butourcavalryhavingbeensentaroundtotherightgotneartheroadintheenemy'srear.AgainJohnstonfellback,ourarmypursuing.ThepursuitwascontinuedtoKingston,whichwasreachedonthe19thwithverylittlefighting,exceptthatNewton'sdivisionovertooktherearofJohnston'sarmyandengagedit.Shermanwasnowobligedtohaltforthepurposeofbringinguphisrailroadtrains.Hewasdependingupontherailroadforallofhissupplies,andasofcoursetherailroadwaswhollydestroyedasJohnstonfellback,ithadtoberebuilt.Thisworkwaspushedforwardnightandday,andcausedmuchlessdelaythanmostpersonswouldnaturallyexpectinamountainouscountrywherethereweresomanybridgestoberebuilt.

ThecampaigntoAtlantawasmanagedwiththemostconsummateskill,theenemybeingflankedoutofonepositionafteranotherallthewaythere.

Itistruethiswasnotaccomplishedwithoutagooddealoffighting—someofitveryhardfighting,risingtothedignityofveryimportantbattles—neitherweresinglepositionsgainedinaday.Onthecontrary,weekswerespentatsome;and

singlepositionsgainedinaday.Onthecontrary,weekswerespentatsome;andaboutAtlantamorethanamonthwasconsumed.

Itwasthe23dofMaybeforetheroadwasfinisheduptotherearofSherman'sarmyandthepursuitrenewed.ThispursuitbroughthimuptothevicinityofAllatoona.Thisplacewasverystronglyintrenched,andnaturallyaverydefensibleposition.Anassaultuponitwasnotthoughtof,butpreparationsweremadetoflanktheenemyoutofit.Thiswasdonebysendingalargeforcearoundourright,bythewayofDallas,toreachtherearoftheenemy.Beforereachingthere,however,theyfoundtheenemyfortifiedintheirway,andthereresultedhardfightingforaboutaweekataplacecalledNewHopeChurch.Ontheleftourtroopsalsowerefortified,andascloseuptotheenemyastheycouldget.

Theykeptworkingstillfartheraroundtothelefttowardtherailroad.

Thiswasthecasemoreparticularlywiththecavalry.Bythe4thofJuneJohnstonfoundthathewasbeinghemmedinsorapidlythathedrewoffandAllatoonawasleftinourpossession.

Allatoona,beinganimportantplace,wasstronglyintrenchedforoccupationbyourtroopsbeforeadvancingfarther,andmadeasecondarybaseofsupplies.Therailroadwasfinisheduptothatpoint,theintrenchmentscompleted,storehousesprovidedforfood,andthearmygotinreadinessforafurtheradvance.Therains,however,werefallinginsuchtorrentsthatitwasimpossibletomovethearmybythesideroadswhichtheywouldhavetomoveuponinordertoturnJohnstonoutofhisnewposition.

WhileSherman'sarmylayhere,GeneralF.P.Blairreturnedtoit,bringingwithhimthetwodivisionsofveteranswhohadbeenonfurlough.

JohnstonhadfallenbacktoMariettaandKenesawMountain,wherestrongintrenchmentsawaitedhim.Atthislatterplaceourtroopsmadeanassaultupontheenemy'slinesafterhavinggottheirownlinesupclosetohim,andfailed,sustainingconsiderableloss.ButduringtheprogressofthebattleSchofieldwasgaininggroundtotheleft;andthecavalryonhisleftweregainingstillmoretowardtheenemy'srear.

Theseoperationswerecompletedbythe3dofJuly,whenitwasfoundthatJohnstonhadevacuatedtheplace.Hewaspursuedatonce.Shermanhadmadeeverypreparationtoabandontherailroad,leavingastrongguardinhisintrenchments.Hehadintended,movingoutwithtwentydays'rationsandplenty

intrenchments.Hehadintended,movingoutwithtwentydays'rationsandplentyofammunition,tocomeinontherailroadagainattheChattahoocheeRiver.Johnstonfrustratedthisplanbyhimselfstartingbackasabovestated.ThistimehefellbacktotheChattahoochee.

Aboutthe5thofJulyhewasbesiegedagain,ShermangettingeasypossessionoftheChattahoocheeRiverbothaboveandbelowhim.Theenemywasagainflankedoutofhisposition,orsofrightenedbyflankingmovementsthatonthenightofthe9thhefellbackacrosstheriver.

HereJohnstonmadeastanduntilthe17th,whenSherman'soldtacticsprevailedagainandthefinalmovementtowardAtlantabegan.Johnstonwasnowrelievedofthecommand,andHoodsupersededhim.

Johnston'stacticsinthiscampaigndonotseemtohavemetwithmuchfavor,eitherintheeyesoftheadministrationatRichmond,orofthepeopleofthatsectionoftheSouthinwhichhewascommanding.Theveryfactofachangeofcommandersbeingorderedundersuchcircumstanceswasanindicationofachangeofpolicy,andthatnowtheywouldbecometheaggressors—theverythingourtroopswanted.

Formyownpart,IthinkthatJohnston'stacticswereright.Anythingthatcouldhaveprolongedthewarayearbeyondthetimethatitdidfinallyclose,wouldprobablyhaveexhaustedtheNorthtosuchanextentthattheymightthenhaveabandonedthecontestandagreedtoaseparation.

Atlantawasverystronglyintrenchedallthewayaroundinacircleaboutamileandahalfoutsideofthecity.Inadditiontothis,therewereadvancedintrenchmentswhichhadtobetakenbeforeaclosesiegecouldbecommenced.

Sureenough,asindicatedbythechangeofcommanders,theenemywasabouttoassumetheoffensive.Onthe20thhecameoutandattackedtheArmyoftheCumberlandmostfuriously.Hooker'scorps,andNewton'sandJohnson'sdivisionsweretheprincipalonesengagedinthiscontest,whichlastedmorethananhour;buttheConfederateswerethenforcedtofallbackinsidetheirmainlines.Thelosseswerequiteheavyonbothsides.OnthisdayGeneralGresham,sinceourPostmaster-General,wasverybadlywounded.DuringthenightHoodabandonedhisouterlines,andourtroopswereadvanced.Theinvestmenthadnotbeenrelinquishedforamomentduringtheday.

Duringthenightofthe21stHoodmovedoutagain,passingbyourleftflank,

Duringthenightofthe21stHoodmovedoutagain,passingbyourleftflank,whichwastheninmotiontogetapositionfartherinrearofhim,andadesperatebattleensued,whichlastedmostofthedayofthe22d.AtfirstthebattlewentverymuchinfavoroftheConfederates,ourtroopsbeingsomewhatsurprised.Whileourtroopswereadvancingtheywerestruckinflank,andtheirflankwasenveloped.Buttheyhadbecometoothoroughveteranstobethrownintoirreparableconfusionbyanunexpectedattackwhenofftheirguard,andsoontheywereinorderandengagingtheenemy,withtheadvantagenowofknowingwheretheirantagonistwas.Thefieldofbattlecontinuedtoexpanduntilitembracedaboutsevenmilesofground.Finally,however,andbeforenight,theenemywasdrivenbackintothecity(*26).

ItwasduringthisbattlethatMcPherson,whilepassingfromonecolumntoanother,wasinstantlykilled.Inhisdeaththearmylostoneofitsablest,purestandbestgenerals.

GarrardhadbeensentoutwithhiscavalrytogetupontherailroadeastofAtlantaandtocutitinthedirectionofAugusta.Hewassuccessfulinthis,andreturnedaboutthetimeofthebattle.RousseauhadalsocomeupfromTennesseewithasmalldivisionofcavalry,havingcrossedtheTennesseeRiveraboutDecaturandmadearaidintoAlabama.Finally,whenhardpressed,hehadcomein,strikingtherailroadinrearofSherman,andreportedtohimaboutthistime.

Thebattleofthe22disusuallyknownastheBattleofAtlanta,althoughthecitydidnotfallintoourhandsuntilthe2dofSeptember.

Preparationswenton,asbefore,toflanktheenemyoutofhisposition.

Theworkwastedious,andthelinesthathadtobemaintainedwereverylong.OurtroopsweregraduallyworkedaroundtotheeastuntiltheystrucktheroadbetweenDecaturandAtlanta.Theselineswerestronglyfortified,aswerethosetothenorthandwestofthecity—allascloseuptotheenemy'slinesaspracticable—inordertoholdthemwiththesmallestpossiblenumberofmen,thedesignbeingtodetachanarmytomovebyourrightandtrytogetupontherailroaddownsouthofAtlanta.

Onthe27ththemovementbytherightflankcommenced.Onthe28ththeenemystruckourrightflank,GeneralLogancommanding,withgreatvigor.Loganintrenchedhimselfhastily,andbythatmeanswasenabledtoresistallassaultsandinflictagreatdealofdamageupontheenemy.Theseassaultswerecontinuedtothemiddleoftheafternoon,andresumedonceortwicestilllaterin

continuedtothemiddleoftheafternoon,andresumedonceortwicestilllaterintheday.Theenemy'slossesintheseunsuccessfulassaultswerefearful.

DuringthateveningtheenemyinLogan'sfrontwithdrewintothetown.

ThisnowleftSherman'sarmycloseuptotheConfederatelines,extendingfromapointdirectlyeastofthecityaroundbythenorthandwestofitforadistanceoffullytenmiles;thewholeofthislinebeingintrenched,andmadestrongereverydaytheyremainedthere.

InthelatterpartofJulyShermansentStonemantodestroytherailroadstothesouth,aboutMacon.Hewasthentogoeastand,ifpossible,releaseourprisonersaboutAndersonville.Therewerepainfulstoriescurrentatthetimeaboutthegreathardshipstheseprisonershadtoendureinthewayofgeneralbadtreatment,inthewayinwhichtheywerehoused,andinthewayinwhichtheywerefed.Greatsympathywasfeltforthem;anditwasthoughtthateveniftheycouldbeturnedlooseuponthecountryitwouldbeagreatrelieftothem.Buttheattemptprovedafailure.McCook,whocommandedasmallbrigade,wasfirstreportedtohavebeencaptured;buthegotback,havinginflictedagooddealofdamageupontheenemy.Hehadalsotakensomeprisoners;butencounteringafterwardsalargelysuperiorforceoftheenemyhewasobligedtodrophisprisonersandgetbackasbesthecouldwithwhatmenhehadleft.Hehadlostseveralhundredmenoutofhissmallcommand.Onthe4thofAugustColonelAdams,commandingalittlebrigadeofaboutathousandmen,returnedreportingStonemanandallbuthimselfaslost.ImyselfhadheardaroundRichmondofthecaptureofStoneman,andhadsentShermanword,whichhereceived.Therumorwasconfirmedthere,also,fromothersources.AfewdaysafterColonelAdams'sreturnColonelCapronalsogotinwithasmalldetachmentandconfirmedthereportofthecaptureofStonemanwithsomethinglessthanathousandmen.

ItseemsthatStoneman,findingtheescapeofallhisforcewasimpossible,hadmadearrangementsfortheescapeoftwodivisions.Hecoveredthemovementofthesedivisionstotherearwithaforceofaboutsevenhundredmen,andatlengthsurrenderedhimselfandthisdetachmenttothecommandingConfederate.Inthisraid,however,muchdamagewasinflictedupontheenemybythedestructionofcars,locomotives,armywagons,manufactoriesofmilitarysupplies,etc.

Onthe4thand5thShermanendeavoredtogetupontherailroadtoourright,whereSchofieldwasincommand,buttheseattemptsfailedutterly.GeneralPalmerwaschargedwithbeingthecauseofthisfailure,toagreatextent,bybothGeneralShermanandGeneralSchofield;butIamnotpreparedtosaythis,

bothGeneralShermanandGeneralSchofield;butIamnotpreparedtosaythis,althoughaquestionseemstohavearisenwithPalmerastowhetherSchofieldhadanyrighttocommandhim.Ifhedidraisethisquestionwhileanactionwasgoingon,thatactalonewasexceedinglyreprehensible.

AboutthesametimeWheelergotuponourrailroadnorthofResacaanddestroyeditnearlyuptoDalton.ThiscutShermanofffromcommunicationwiththeNorthforseveraldays.Shermanrespondedtothisattackonhislinesofcommunicationbydirectingoneupontheirs.

Kilpatrickstartedonthenightofthe18thofAugusttoreachtheMaconroadaboutJonesboro.Hesucceededindoingso,passedentirelyaroundtheConfederatelinesofAtlanta,andwasbackagaininhisformerpositiononourleftbythe22d.Theselittleaffairs,however,contributedbutverylittletothegrandresult.Theyannoyed,itistrue,butanydamagethusdonetoarailroadbyanycavalryexpeditionissoonrepaired.

Shermanmadepreparationsforarepetitionofhistactics;thatis,foraflankmovementwithaslargeaforceascouldbegottogethertosomepointintheenemy'srear.Shermancommencedthislastmovementonthe25thofAugust,andonthe1stofSeptemberwaswelluptowardstherailroadtwentymilessouthofAtlanta.HerehefoundHardeeintrenched,readytomeethim.Abattleensued,buthewasunabletodriveHardeeawaybeforenightsetin.Undercoverofthenight,however,Hardeeleftofhisownaccord.ThatnightHoodblewuphismilitaryworks,suchashethoughtwouldbevaluableinourhands,anddecamped.

ThenextmorningatdaylightGeneralH.W.Slocum,whowascommandingnorthofthecity,movedinandtookpossessionofAtlanta,andnotifiedSherman.Shermanthenmoveddeliberatelyback,takingthreedaystoreachthecity,andoccupiedalineextendingfromDecaturonthelefttoAtlantainthecentre,withhistroopsextendingoutofthecityforsomedistancetotheright.

Thecampaignhadlastedaboutfourmonths,andwasoneofthemostmemorableinhistory.Therewasbutlittleifanythinginthewholecampaign,nowthatitisover,tocriticiseatall,andnothingtocriticiseseverely.Itwascreditablealiketothegeneralwhocommandedandthearmywhichhadexecutedit.Shermanhadonthiscampaignsomebright,wide-awakedivisionandbrigadecommanderswhosealertnessaddedahosttotheefficiencyofhiscommand.

Thetroopsnowwenttoworktomakethemselvescomfortable,andtoenjoya

Thetroopsnowwenttoworktomakethemselvescomfortable,andtoenjoyalittlerestaftertheirarduouscampaign.ThecityofAtlantawasturnedintoamilitarybase.Thecitizenswereallcompelledtoleave.

Shermanalsoverywiselyprohibitedtheassemblingofthearmyofsutlersandtraderswhoalwaysfollowinthewakeofanarmyinthefield,ifpermittedtodoso,fromtradingwiththecitizensandgettingthemoneyofthesoldiersforarticlesofbutlittleusetothem,andforwhichtheyaremadetopaymostexorbitantprices.Helimitedthenumberofthesetraderstooneforeachofhisthreearmies.

ThenewsofSherman'ssuccessreachedtheNorthinstantaneously,andsetthecountryallaglow.ThiswasthefirstgreatpoliticalcampaignfortheRepublicansintheircanvassof1864.ItwasfollowedlaterbySheridan'scampaignintheShenandoahValley;andthesetwocampaignsprobablyhadmoreeffectinsettlingtheelectionofthefollowingNovemberthanallthespeeches,allthebonfires,andalltheparadingwithbannersandbandsofmusicintheNorth.

CHAPTERL.

GRANDMOVEMENTOFTHEARMYOFTHEPOTOMAC—CROSSINGTHERAPIDAN

—ENTERINGTHEWILDERNESS—BATTLEOFTHEWILDERNESS.

Soonaftermidnight,May3d-4th,theArmyofthePotomacmovedoutfromitspositionnorthRapidan,tostartuponthatmemorablecampaign,destinedtoresultinthecaptureoftheConfederatecapitalandthearmydefendingit.Thiswasnottobeaccomplished,however,withoutasdesperatefightingastheworldhaseverwitnessed;nottobeconsummatedinaday,aweek,amonth,singleseason.Thelossesinflicted,andendured,weredestinedtobesevere;butthearmiesnowconfrontingeachotherhadalreadybeenindeadlyconflictforaperiodofthreeyears,withimmenselossesinkilled,bydeathfromsickness,capturedandwounded;andneitherhadmadeanyrealprogressaccomplishingthefinalend.ItistruetheConfederateshad,sofar,heldtheircapital,andtheyclaimedthistobetheirsoleobject.ButpreviouslytheyhadboldlyproclaimedtheirintentiontocapturePhiladelphia,NewYork,andtheNationalCapital,andhadmadeseveralattemptstodoso,andonceortwicehadcomefearfullynearmakingtheirboastgood—toonearforcomplacentcontemplationbytheloyalNorth.Theyhadalsocomenearlosingtheirowncapitalonatleastoneoccasion.Soherewasastand-off.Thecampaignnowbegunwasdestinedtoresultinheavierlosses,tobotharmies,inagiventime,thananypreviouslysuffered;butthecarnagewastobelimitedtoasingleyear,andtoaccomplishallthathadbeenanticipatedordesiredatthebeginninginthattime.Wehadtohavehardfightingtoachievethis.

Thetwoarmieshadbeenconfrontingeachothersolong,withoutanydecisiveresult,thattheyhardlyknewwhichcouldwhip.

Tendays'rations,withasupplyofforageandammunitionweretakeninwagons.Beefcattleweredrivenwiththetrains,andbutcheredaswanted.Threedaysrationsinaddition,inhaversacks,andfiftyroundsofcartridges,werecarriedonthepersonofeachsoldier.

carriedonthepersonofeachsoldier.

Thecountryoverwhichthearmyhadtooperate,fromtheRapidantothecrossingoftheJamesRiver,isratherflat,andiscutbynumerousstreamswhichmaketheirwaytotheChesapeakeBay.Thecrossingsofthesestreamsbythearmyweregenerallymadenotfarabovetide-water,andwheretheyformedaconsiderableobstacletotherapidadvanceoftroopsevenwhentheenemydidnotappearinopposition.Thecountryroadswerenarrowandpoor.Mostofthecountryiscoveredwithadenseforest,inplaces,liketheWildernessandalongtheChickahominy,almostimpenetrableevenforinfantryexceptalongtheroads.AllbridgeswerenaturallydestroyedbeforetheNationaltroopscametothem.

TheArmyofthePotomacwascomposedofthreeinfantryandonecavalrycorps,commandedrespectivelybyGeneralsW.S.Hancock,G.K.Warren,(*27)JohnSedgwickandP.H.Sheridan.TheartillerywascommandedbyGeneralHenryJ.Hunt.Thisarmwasinsuchabundancethatthefourthofitcouldnotbeusedtoadvantageinsuchacountryasweweredestinedtopassthrough.Thesurpluswasmuchintheway,takingupasitdidsomuchofthenarrowandbadroads,andconsumingsomuchoftheforageandotherstoresbroughtupbythetrains.

The5thcorps,GeneralWarrencommanding,wasinadvanceontheright,andmarcheddirectlyforGermaniaFord,precededbyonedivisionofcavalry,underGeneralJ.H.Wilson.GeneralSedgwickfollowedWarrenwiththe6thcorps.GermaniaFordwasnineortenmilesbelowtherightofLee'sline.Hancock,withthe2dcorps,movedbyanotherroad,farthereast,directlyuponEly'sFord,sixmilesbelowGermania,precededbyGregg'sdivisionofcavalry,andfollowedbytheartillery.

Torbert'sdivisionofcavalrywasleftnorthoftheRapidan,forthetime,topickettheriverandpreventtheenemyfromcrossingandgettingintoourrear.Thecavalryseizedthetwocrossingsbeforedaylight,drovetheenemy'spicketsguardingthemaway,andbysixo'clockA.M.hadthepontoonslaidreadyforthecrossingoftheinfantryandartillery.ThiswasundoubtedlyasurprisetoLee.Thefactthatthemovementwasunopposedprovesthis.

Burnside,withthe9thcorps,wasleftbackatWarrenton,guardingtherailroadfromBullRunforwardtopreservecontrolofitincaseourcrossingtheRapidanshouldbelongdelayed.Hewasinstructed,however,toadvanceatonceonreceivingnoticethatthearmyhadcrossed;andadispatchwassenttohimalittleafteroneP.M.givingtheinformationthatourcrossinghadbeensuccessful.

afteroneP.M.givingtheinformationthatourcrossinghadbeensuccessful.

Thecountrywasheavilywoodedatallthepointsofcrossing,particularlyonthesouthsideoftheriver.Thebattle-fieldfromthecrossingoftheRapidanuntilthefinalmovementfromtheWildernesstowardSpottsylvaniawasofthesamecharacter.Thereweresomeclearingsandsmallfarmswithinwhatmightbetermedthebattle-field;butgenerallythecountrywascoveredwithadenseforest.Theroadswerenarrowandbad.Alltheconditionswerefavorablefordefensiveoperations.

Therearetworoads,goodforthatpartofVirginia,runningfromOrangeCourtHousetothebattle-field.ThemostsoutherlyoftheseroadsisknownastheOrangeCourtHousePlankRoad,thenorthernoneastheOrangeTurnpike.Therearealsoroadsfromeastofthebattle-fieldrunningtoSpottsylvaniaCourtHouse,onefromChancellorsville,branchingatAldrich's;thewesternbranchgoingbyPineyBranchChurch,Alsop's,thencebytheBrockRoadtoSpottsylvania;theeastbranchgoesbyGates's,thencetoSpottsylvania.TheBrockRoadrunsfromGermaniaFordthroughthebattle-fieldandontotheCourtHouse.AsSpottsylvaniaisapproachedthecountryiscutupwithnumerousroads,somegoingtothetowndirect,andotherscrossingsoastoconnectthefarmswithroadsgoingthere.

Lee'sheadquarterswereatOrangeCourtHouse.FromtheretoFredericksburghehadtheuseofthetworoadsabovedescribedrunningnearlyparalleltotheWilderness.Thisgavehimunusualfacilities,forthatcountry,forconcentratinghisforcestohisright.TheseroadsstriketheroadfromGermaniaFordintheWilderness.

Assoonasthecrossingoftheinfantrywasassured,thecavalrypushedforward,Wilson'sdivisionbyWildernessTaverntoParker'sstore,ontheOrangePlankRoad;GreggtothelefttowardsChancellorsville.

WarrenfollowedWilsonandreachedtheWildernessTavernbynoon,tookpositionthereandintrenched.SedgwickfollowedWarren.Hewasacrosstheriverandincamponthesouthbank,ontherightofWarren,bysundown.Hancock,withthe2dcorps,movedparallelwithWarrenandcampedaboutsixmileseastofhim.Beforenightallthetroops,andbytheeveningofthe5ththetrainsofmorethanfourthousandwagons,weresafelyonthesouthsideoftheriver.

Thereneverwasacorpsbetterorganizedthanwasthequartermaster'scorpswith

Thereneverwasacorpsbetterorganizedthanwasthequartermaster'scorpswiththeArmyofthePotomacin1864.Withawagon-trainthatwouldhaveextendedfromtheRapidantoRichmond,stretchedalonginsinglefileandseparatedastheteamsnecessarilywouldbewhenmoving,wecouldstillcarryonlythreedays'forageandabouttentotwelvedays'rations,besidesasupplyofammunition.Toovercomealldifficulties,thechiefquartermaster,GeneralRufusIngalls,hadmarkedoneachwagonthecorpsbadgewiththedivisioncolorandthenumberofthebrigade.Ataglance,theparticularbrigadetowhichanywagonbelongedcouldbetold.Thewagonswerealsomarkedtonotethecontents:ifammunition,whetherforartilleryorinfantry;ifforage,whethergrainorhay;ifrations,whether,bread,pork,beans,rice,sugar,coffeeorwhateveritmightbe.Emptywagonswereneverallowedtofollowthearmyorstayincamp.Assoonasawagonwasemptyitwouldreturntothebaseofsupplyforaloadofpreciselythesamearticlethathadbeentakenfromit.Emptytrainswereobligedtoleavetheroadfreeforloadedones.Arrivingnearthearmytheywouldbeparkedinfieldsnearesttothebrigadestheybelongedto.Issues,exceptofammunition,weremadeatnightinallcases.Bythissystemthehaulingofforageforthesupplytrainwasalmostwhollydispensedwith.Theyconsumedtheirsatthedepots.

IleftCulpeperCourtHouseafterallthetroopshadbeenputinmotion,andpassingrapidlytothefront,crossedtheRapidaninadvanceofSedgwick'scorps;andestablishedheadquartersfortheafternoonandnightinadesertedhouseneartheriver.

Ordershadbeengiven,longbeforethismovementbegan,tocutdownthebaggageofofficersandmentothelowestpointpossible.

NotwithstandingthisIsawscatteredalongtheroadfromCulpepertoGermaniaFordwagon-loadsofnewblanketsandovercoats,thrownawaybythetroopstolightentheirknapsacks;animprovidenceIhadneverwitnessedbefore.

Lee,whilehispicketsandsignalcorpsmusthavediscoveredataveryearlyhouronthemorningofthe4thofMay,thattheArmyofthePotomacwasmoving,evidentlydidnotlearnuntilaboutoneo'clockintheafternoonbywhatroutewewouldconfronthisarmy.ThisIjudgefromthefactthatat1.15P.M.,anhourandaquarterafterWarrenhadreachedOldWildernessTavern,ourofficerstookoffrebelsignalswhich,whentranslated,wereseentobeanordertohistroopstooccupytheirintrenchmentsatMineRun.

HereatnightdispatcheswerereceivedannouncingthatSherman,ButlerandCrookhadmovedaccordingtoprogramme.

OndiscoveringtheadvanceoftheArmyofthePotomac,LeeorderedHill,EwellandLongstreet,eachcommandingcorps,tomovetotherighttoattackus,HillontheOrangePlankRoad,Longstreettofollowonthesameroad.Longstreetwasatthistime—middleoftheafternoon—atGordonsville,twentyormoremilesaway.EwellwasorderedbytheOrangePike.HewasnearbyandarrivedsomefourmileseastofMineRunbeforebivouackingforthenight.

MyordersweregiventhroughGeneralMeadeforanearlyadvanceonthemorningofthe5th.WarrenwastomovetoParker'sstore,andWilson'scavalry—thenatParker'sstore—tomoveontoCraig'smeeting-house.

SedgwickfollowedWarren,closinginonhisright.TheArmyofthePotomacwasfacingtothewest,thoughouradvancewasmadetothesouth,exceptwhenfacingtheenemy.Hancockwastomovesouth-westwardtojoinontheleftofWarren,hislefttoreachtoShadyGroveChurch.

Atsixo'clock,beforereachingParker'sstore,Warrendiscoveredtheenemy.Hesentwordbacktothiseffect,andwasorderedtohaltandpreparetomeetandattackhim.Wright,withhisdivisionofSedgwick'scorps,wasordered,byanyroadhecouldfind,tojoinontoWarren'sright,andGettywithhisdivision,alsoofSedgwick'scorps,wasorderedtomoverapidlybyWarren'srearandgetonhisleft.ThiswasthespeediestwaytoreinforceWarrenwhowasconfrontingtheenemyonboththeOrangeplankandturnpikeroads.

Burnsidehadmovedpromptlyonthe4th,onreceivingwordthattheArmyofthePotomachadsafelycrossedtheRapidan.Bymakinganightmarch,althoughsomeofhistroopshadtomarchfortymilestoreachtheriver,hewascrossingwiththeheadofhiscolumnearlyonthemorningofthe5th.MeademovedhisheadquartersontoOldWildernessTavern,fourmilessouthoftheriver,assoonasitwaslightenoughtoseetheroad.IremainedtohastenBurnside'scrossingandtoputhiminposition.BurnsideatthistimewasnotunderMeade'scommand,andwashisseniorinrank.Gettinginformationoftheproximityoftheenemy,IinformedMeade,andwithoutwaitingtoseeBurnside,atoncemovedforwardmyheadquarterstowhereMeadewas.

Itwasmyplanthen,asitwasonallotheroccasions,totaketheinitiativewhenevertheenemycouldbedrawnfromhisintrenchmentsifwewerenot

whenevertheenemycouldbedrawnfromhisintrenchmentsifwewerenotintrenchedourselves.Warrenhadnotyetreachedthepointwherehewastohalt,whenhediscoveredtheenemynearby.Neitherpartyhadanyadvantageofposition.Warrenwas,therefore,orderedtoattackassoonashecouldprepareforit.Atnineo'clockHancockwasorderedtocomeuptothesupportofGetty.HehimselfarrivedatGetty'sfrontaboutnoon,buthistroopswereyetfarintherear.

Gettywasdirectedtoholdhispositionatallhazardsuntilrelieved.

AboutthishourWarrenwasready,andattackedwithfavorablethoughnotdecisiveresults.GettywassomewhatisolatedfromWarrenandwasinaprecariousconditionforatime.Wilson,withhisdivisionofcavalry,wasfarthersouth,andwascutofffromtherestofthearmy.Attwoo'clockHancock'stroopsbegantoarrive,andimmediatelyhewasorderedtojoinGettyandattacktheenemy.Buttheheavytimberandnarrowroadspreventedhimfromgettingintopositionforattackaspromptlyashegenerallydidwhenreceivingsuchorders.Atfouro'clockheagainreceivedhisorderstoattack,andGeneralGettyreceivedordersfromMeadeafewminuteslatertoattackwhetherHancockwasreadyornot.

HemettheenemyunderHethwithinafewhundredyards.

Hancockimmediatelysenttwodivisions,commandedbyBirneyandMott,andlatertwobrigades,Carroll'sandOwen's,tothesupportofGetty.

ThiswastimelyandsavedGetty.DuringthebattleGettyandCarrollwerewounded,butremainedonthefield.OneofBirney'smostgallantbrigadecommanders—AlexanderHays—waskilled.

IhadbeenatWestPointwithHaysforthreeyears,andhadservedwithhimthroughtheMexicanwar,aportionofthetimeinthesameregiment.

Hewasamostgallantofficer,readytoleadhiscommandwhereverordered.Withhimitwas"Come,boys,"not"Go."

Wadsworth'sdivisionandBaxter'sbrigadeofthe2ddivisionweresenttoreinforceHancockandGetty;butthedensityoftheinterveningforestwassuchthat,therebeingnoroadtomarchupon,theydidnotgetupwiththeheadofcolumnuntilnight,andbivouackedwheretheywerewithoutgettingintoposition.

DuringtheafternoonSheridansentGregg'sdivisionofcavalrytoTodd'sTaverninsearchofWilson.Thiswasfortunate.HefoundWilsonengagedwithasuperiorforceunderGeneralRosser,supportedbyinfantry,andfallingbackbeforeit.Togethertheywerestrongenoughtoturnthetablesupontheenemyandthemselvesbecomeaggressive.

TheysoondrovetherebelcavalrybackbeyondCorbin'sBridge.

FightingbetweenHancockandHillcontinueduntilnightputaclosetoit.Neithersidemadeanyspecialprogress.

Afterthecloseofthebattleofthe5thofMaymyordersweregivenforthefollowingmorning.WeknewLongstreetwith12,000menwasonhiswaytojoinHill'sright,neartheBrockRoad,andmightarriveduringthenight.Iwasanxiousthattherebelsshouldnottaketheinitiativeinthemorning,andthereforeorderedHancocktomakeanassaultat4.30

o'clock.Meadeaskedtohavethehourchangedtosix.DeferringtohiswishesasfarasIwaswilling,theorderwasmodifiedandfivewasfixedasthehourtomove.

Hancockhadnowfullyone-halfoftheArmyofthePotomac.Wadsworthwithhisdivision,whichhadarrivedthenightbefore,layinalineperpendiculartothatheldbyHill,andtotherightofHancock.Hewasdirectedtomoveatthesametime,andtoattackHill'sleft.

Burnside,whowascomingupwithtwodivisions,wasdirectedtogetinbetweenWarrenandWadsworth,andattackassoonashecouldgetinpositiontodoso.SedgwickandWarrenweretomakeattacksintheirfront,todetainasmanyoftheenemyastheycouldandtotakeadvantageofanyattempttoreinforceHillfromthatquarter.Burnsidewasorderedifheshouldsucceedinbreakingtheenemy'scentre,toswingaroundtotheleftandenveloptherightofLee'sarmy.Hancockwasinformedofallthemovementsordered.

Burnsidehadthreedivisions,butoneofthem—acoloreddivision—wassenttoguardthewagontrain,andhedidnotseeitagainuntilJuly.

LeewasevidentlyveryanxiousthatthereshouldbenobattleonhisrightuntilLongstreetgotup.ThisisevidentfromthefactthatnotwithstandingtheearlyhouratwhichIhadorderedtheassault,bothforthepurposeofbeingtheattackingpartyandtostrikebeforeLongstreetgotup,Leewasaheadinhis

attackingpartyandtostrikebeforeLongstreetgotup,Leewasaheadinhisassaultonourright.Hispurposewasevident,buthefailed.

Hancockwasreadytoadvancebythehournamed,butlearningintimethatLongstreetwasmovingapartofhiscorpsbytheCatharpinRoad,thusthreateninghisleftflank,sentadivisionofinfantry,commandedbyGeneralBarlow,withallhisartillery,tocovertheapproachesbywhichLongstreetwasexpected.Thisdispositionwasmadeintimetoattackasordered.HancockmovedbytheleftoftheOrangePlankRoad,andWadsworthbytherightofit.Thefightingwasdesperateforaboutanhour,whentheenemybegantobreakupingreatconfusion.

Ibelievedthen,andseenoreasontochangethatopinionnow,thatifthecountryhadbeensuchthatHancockandhiscommandcouldhaveseentheconfusionandpanicinthelinesoftheenemy,itwouldhavebeentakenadvantageofsoeffectuallythatLeewouldnothavemadeanotherstandoutsideofhisRichmonddefences.

GibboncommandedHancock'sleft,andwasorderedtoattack,butwasnotabletoaccomplishmuch.

Onthemorningofthe6thSheridanwassenttoconnectwithHancock'sleftandattacktheenemy'scavalrywhoweretryingtogetonourleftandrear.HemetthemattheintersectionoftheFurnaceandBrockroadsandatTodd'sTavern,anddefeatedthematbothplaces.Laterhewasattacked,andagaintheenemywasrepulsed.

HancockheardthefiringbetweenSheridanandStuart,andthinkingtheenemycomingbythatroad,stillfurtherreinforcedhispositionguardingtheentrancetotheBrockRoad.AnotherincidenthappenedduringthedaytofurtherinduceHancocktoweakenhisattackingcolumn.

WordreachedhimthattroopswereseenmovingtowardshimfromthedirectionofTodd'sTavern,andBrooke'sbrigadewasdetachedtomeetthisnewenemy;butthetroopsapproachingprovedtobeseveralhundredconvalescentscomingfromChancellorsville,bytheroadHancockhadadvancedupon,tojointheirrespectivecommands.At6.50o'clockA.M.,Burnside,whohadpassedWildernessTavernatsixo'clock,wasorderedtosendadivisiontothesupportofHancock,buttocontinuewiththeremainderofhiscommandintheexecutionofhispreviousorder.ThedifficultyofmakingawaythroughthedenseforestspreventedBurnsidefromgettingupintimetobeofanyserviceontheforenoon

preventedBurnsidefromgettingupintimetobeofanyserviceontheforenoonofthesixth.

HancockfollowedHill'sretreatingforces,inthemorning,amileormore.Hemaintainedthispositionuntil,alongintheafternoon,Longstreetcameuponhim.TheretreatingcolumnofHillmeetingreinforcementsthathadnotyetbeenengaged,becameencouragedandreturnedwiththem.Theywereenabled,fromthedensityoftheforest,toapproachwithinafewhundredyardsofouradvancebeforebeingdiscovered.FallinguponabrigadeofHancock'scorpsthrowntotheadvance,theysweptitawayalmostinstantly.TheenemyfolloweduphisadvantageandsooncameuponMott'sdivision,whichfellbackingreatconfusion.Hancockmadedispositionstoholdhisadvancedposition,butafterholdingitforatime,fellbackintothepositionthathehadheldinthemorning,whichwasstronglyintrenched.InthisengagementtheintrepidWadsworthwhiletryingtorallyhismenwasmortallywoundedandfellintothehandsoftheenemy.Theenemyfollowedup,butmadenoimmediateattack.

TheConfederateGeneralJenkinswaskilledandLongstreetseriouslywoundedinthisengagement.Longstreethadtoleavethefield,nottoresumecommandformanyweeks.HislosswasasevereonetoLee,andcompensatedinagreatmeasureforthemishap,ormisapprehensions,whichhadfallentoourlotduringtheday.

AfterLongstreet'sremovalfromthefieldLeetookcommandofhisrightinperson.Hewasnotable,however,torallyhismentoattackHancock'sposition,andwithdrewfromourfrontforthepurposeofreforming.HancocksentabrigadetoclearhisfrontofallremnantsthatmightbeleftofLongstreet'sorHill'scommands.ThisbrigadehavingbeenformedatrightanglestotheintrenchmentsheldbyHancock'scommand,sweptdownthewholelengthofthemfromlefttoright.Abrigadeoftheenemywasencounteredinthismove;butitbrokeanddisappearedwithoutacontest.

Firingwascontinuedafterthis,butwithlessfury.Burnsidehadnotyetbeenabletogetuptorenderanyassistance.Butitwasnowonlyaboutnineinthemorning,andhewasgettingintopositiononHancock'sright.

At4.15intheafternoonLeeattackedourleft.Hislinemoveduptowithinahundredyardsofoursandopenedaheavyfire.Thisstatuswasmaintainedforabouthalfanhour.ThenapartofMott'sdivisionandWard'sbrigadeofBirney'sdivisiongavewayandretiredindisorder.

divisiongavewayandretiredindisorder.

TheenemyunderR.H.Andersontookadvantageofthisandpushedthroughourline,plantingtheirflagsonapartoftheintrenchmentsnotonfire.ButowingtotheeffortsofHancock,theirsuccesswasbuttemporary.Carroll,ofGibbon'sdivision,movedatadoublequickwithhisbrigadeanddrovebacktheenemy,inflictinggreatloss.Fightinghadcontinuedfromfiveinthemorningsometimesalongthewholeline,atothertimesonlyinplaces.Thegroundfoughtoverhadvariedinwidth,butaveragedthree-quartersofamile.Thekilled,andmanyoftheseverelywounded,ofbotharmies,laywithinthisbeltwhereitwasimpossibletoreachthem.Thewoodsweresetonfirebytheburstingshells,andtheconflagrationraged.Thewoundedwhohadnotstrengthtomovethemselveswereeithersuffocatedorburnedtodeath.Finallythefirecommunicatedwithourbreastworks,inplaces.Beingconstructedofwood,theyburnedwithgreatfury.Butthebattlestillraged,ourmenfiringthroughtheflamesuntilitbecametoohottoremainlonger.

Leewasnowindistress.Hismenwereinconfusion,andhispersonaleffortsfailedtorestoreorder.Thesefacts,however,werelearnedsubsequently,orwewouldhavetakenadvantageofhisconditionandnodoubtgainedadecisivesuccess.Histroopswerewithdrawnnow,butIrevokedtheorder,whichIhadgivenpreviouslytothisassault,forHancocktoattack,becausehistroopshadexhaustedtheirammunitionanddidnothavetimetoreplenishfromthetrain,whichwasatsomedistance.

Burnside,Sedgwick,andWarrenhadallkeptupanassaultduringallthistime;buttheireffortshadnoothereffectthantopreventtheenemyfromreinforcinghisrightfromthetroopsintheirfront.

Ihad,onthe5th,orderedallthebridgesovertheRapidantobetakenupexceptoneatGermaniaFord.

ThetroopsonSedgwick'srighthadbeensenttoenforceourleft.Thisleftourrightindangerofbeingturned,andusofbeingcutofffromallpresentbaseofsupplies.Sedgwickhadrefusedhisrightandintrencheditforprotectionagainstattack.Butlateintheafternoonofthe6thEarlycameoutfromhislinesinconsiderableforceandgotinuponSedgwick'sright,notwithstandingtheprecautionstaken,andcreatedconsiderableconfusion.Earlycapturedseveralhundredprisoners,amongthemtwogeneralofficers.Thedefence,however,wasvigorous;andnightcomingon,theenemywasthrownintoasmuchconfusionasourtroops,engaged,were.EarlysaysinhisMemoirsthatifwehaddiscovered

ourtroops,engaged,were.EarlysaysinhisMemoirsthatifwehaddiscoveredtheconfusioninhislineswemighthavebroughtfreshtroopstohisgreatdiscomfort.Manyofficers,whohadnotbeenattackedbyEarly,continuedcomingtomyheadquartersevenafterSedgwickhadrectifiedhislinesalittlefarthertotherear,withnewsofthedisaster,fullyimpressedwiththeideathattheenemywaspushingonandwouldsoonbeuponme.

DuringthenightallofLee'sarmywithdrewwithintheirintrenchments.

Onthemorningofthe7thGeneralCusterdrovetheenemy'scavalryfromCatharpinFurnacetoTodd'sTavern.Picketsandskirmishersweresentalongourentirefronttofindthepositionoftheenemy.Somewentasfarasamileandahalfbeforefindinghim.ButLeeshowednodispositiontocomeoutofhisWorks.Therewasnobattleduringtheday,andbutlittlefiringexceptinWarren'sfront;hebeingdirectedaboutnoontomakeareconnoissanceinforce.Thisdrewsomesharpfiring,buttherewasnoattemptonthepartofLeetodrivehimback.

ThisendedtheBattleoftheWilderness.

CHAPTERLI.

AFTERTHEBATTLE—TELEGRAPHANDSIGNALSERVICE—MOVEMENTBYTHELEFTFLANK.

Moredesperatefightinghasnotbeenwitnessedonthiscontinentthanthatofthe5thand6thofMay.Ourvictoryconsistedinhavingsuccessfullycrossedaformidablestream,almostinthefaceofanenemy,andingettingthearmytogetherasaunit.Wegainedanadvantageonthemorningofthe6th,which,ifithadbeenfollowedup,musthaveprovenverydecisive.Intheeveningtheenemygainedanadvantage;butwasspeedilyrepulsed.Aswestoodattheclose,thetwoarmieswererelativelyinaboutthesameconditiontomeeteachotheraswhentheriverdividedthem.Butthefactofhavingsafelycrossedwasavictory.

OurlossesintheWildernesswereverysevere.ThoseoftheConfederatesmusthavebeenevenmoreso;butIhavenomeansofspeakingwithaccuracyuponthispoint.TheGermaniaFordbridgewastransferredtoEly'sFordtofacilitatethetransportationofthewoundedtoWashington.

ItmaybeaswellhereaselsewheretostatetwothingsconnectedwithallmovementsoftheArmyofthePotomac:first,ineverychangeofpositionorhaltforthenight,whetherconfrontingtheenemyornot,themomentarmswerestackedthemenintrenchedthemselves.Forthispurposetheywouldbuilduppilesoflogsorrailsiftheycouldbefoundintheirfront,anddigaditch,throwingthedirtforwardonthetimber.Thusthediggingtheydidcountedinmakingadepressiontostandin,andincreasedtheelevationinfrontofthem.Itwaswonderfulhowquicklytheycouldinthiswayconstructdefencesofconsiderablestrength.Whenahaltwasmadewiththeviewofassaultingtheenemy,orinhispresence,thesewouldbestrengthenedortheirpositionschangedunderthedirectionofengineerofficers.Thesecondwas,theusemadeofthetelegraphandsignalcorps.Nothingcouldbemorecompletethantheorganizationanddisciplineofthisbodyofbraveandintelligentmen.Insulatedwires—insulatedsothattheywouldtransmitmessagesinastorm,onthegroundorunderwater—werewounduponreels,makingabouttwohundredpoundsweightofwiretoeachreel.Twomenandonemuleweredetailedtoeachreel.Thepack-saddleonwhichthiswascarriedwasprovidedwitharacklikeasawbuckplacedcrosswiseofthesaddle,andraisedaboveitsothatthereel,with

sawbuckplacedcrosswiseofthesaddle,andraisedaboveitsothatthereel,withitswire,wouldrevolvefreely.Therewasawagon,suppliedwithatelegraphoperator,batteryandtelegraphinstrumentsforeachdivision,eachcorps,eacharmy,andoneformyheadquarters.Therewerewagonsalsoloadedwithlightpoles,aboutthesizeandlengthofawalltentpole,suppliedwithanironspikeinoneend,usedtoholdthewiresupwhenlaid,sothatwagonsandartillerywouldnotrunoverthem.Themulesthusloadedwereassignedtobrigades,andalwayskeptwiththecommandtheywereassignedto.Theoperatorswerealsoassignedtoparticularheadquarters,andneverchangedexceptbyspecialorders.

Themomentthetroopswereputinpositiontogointocampallthemenconnectedwiththisbranchofservicewouldproceedtoputuptheirwires.Amuleloadedwithacoilofwirewouldbeledtotherearofthenearestflankofthebrigadehebelongedto,andwouldbeledinalineparallelthereto,whileonemanwouldholdanendofthewireanduncoilitasthemulewasledoff.Whenhehadwalkedthelengthofthewirethewholeofitwouldbeontheground.Thiswouldbedoneinrearofeverybrigadeatthesametime.Theendsofallthewireswouldthenbejoined,makingacontinuouswireintherearofthewholearmy.Themen,attachedtobrigadesordivisions,wouldallcommenceatonceraisingthewireswiththeirtelegraphpoles.Thiswasdonebymakingaloopinthewireandputtingitoverthespikeandraisingthepoletoaperpendicularposition.Atintervalsthewirewouldbeattachedtotrees,orsomeotherpermanentobject,sothatonepolewassufficientataplace.Intheabsenceofsuchasupporttwopoleswouldhavetobeused,atintervals,placedatananglesoastoholdthewirefirminitsplace.Whilethiswasbeingdonethetelegraphwagonswouldtaketheirpositionsnearwheretheheadquarterstheybelongedtoweretobeestablished,andwouldconnectwiththewire.Thus,inafewminuteslongertimethanittookamuletowalkthelengthofitscoil,telegraphiccommunicationwouldbeeffectedbetweenalltheheadquartersofthearmy.Noorderseverhadtobegiventoestablishthetelegraph.

Thesignalservicewasusedonthemarch.Themencomposingthiscorpswereassignedtospecifiedcommands.Whenmovementsweremade,theywouldgoinadvance,orontheflanks,andseizeuponhighpointsofgroundgivingacommandingviewofthecountry,ifcleared,orwouldclimbtalltreesonthehighestpointsifnotcleared,andwoulddenote,bysignals,thepositionsofdifferentpartsofourownarmy,andoftenthemovementsoftheenemy.Theywouldalsotakeoffthesignalsoftheenemyandtransmitthem.Itwouldsometimestaketoolongatimetomaketranslationsofintercepteddispatchesforustoreceiveanybenefitfromthem.Butsometimestheygaveuseful

ustoreceiveanybenefitfromthem.Butsometimestheygaveusefulinformation.

Ontheafternoonofthe7thIreceivednewsfromWashingtonannouncingthatShermanhadprobablyattackedJohnstonthatday,andthatButlerhadreachedCityPointsafelyandtakenitbysurpriseonthe5th.Ihadgivenordersforamovementbytheleftflank,fearingthatLeemightmoverapidlytoRichmondtocrushButlerbeforeIcouldgetthere.

Myorderforthismovementwasasfollows:

HEADQUARTERSARMIESOFTHEU.S.,May7,1864,6.30A.M.

MAJOR-GENERALMEADE,CommandingA.P.

MakeallpreparationsduringthedayforanightmarchtotakepositionatSpottsylvaniaC.H.withonearmycorps,atTodd'sTavernwithone,andanotherneartheintersectionofthePineyBranchandSpottsylvaniaroadwiththeroadfromAlsop'stoOldCourtHouse.IfthismoveismadethetrainsshouldbethrownforwardearlyinthemorningtotheNyRiver.

IthinkitwouldbeadvisableinmakingthechangetoleaveHancockwhereheisuntilWarrenpasseshim.Hecouldthenfollowandbecometherightofthenewline.BurnsidewillmovetoPineyBranchChurch.SedgwickcanmovealongthepiketoChancellorsvilleandontohisdestination.BurnsidewillmoveontheplankroadtotheintersectionofitwiththeOrangeandFredericksburgplankroad,thenfollowSedgwicktohisplaceofdestination.

Allvehiclesshouldbegotoutofhearingoftheenemybeforethetroopsmove,andthenmoveoffquietly.

ItismorethanprobablethattheenemyconcentrateforaheavyattackonHancockthisafternoon.Incasetheydowemustbepreparedtoresistthem,andfollowupanysuccesswemaygain,withourwholeforce.Sucharesultwouldnecessarilymodifytheseinstructions.

Allthehospitalsshouldbemovedto-daytoChancellorsville.

U.S.GRANT,Lieut.-General.

Duringthe7thSheridanhadafightwiththerebelcavalryatTodd'sTavern,butroutedthem,thusopeningthewayforthetroopsthatweretogobythatrouteatnight.SoonafterdarkWarrenwithdrewfromthefrontoftheenemy,andwassoonfollowedbySedgwick.Warren'smarchcarriedhimimmediatelybehindtheworkswhereHancock'scommandlayontheBrockRoad.WithmystaffandasmallescortofcavalryIprecededthetroops.Meadewithhisstaffaccompaniedme.ThegreatestenthusiasmwasmanifestedbyHancock'smenaswepassedby.Nodoubtitwasinspiredbythefactthatthemovementwassouth.Itindicatedtothemthattheyhadpassedthroughthe"beginningoftheend"inthebattlejustfought.Thecheeringwassolustythattheenemymusthavetakenitforanightattack.Atalleventsitdrewfromhimafuriousfusilladeofartilleryandmusketry,plainlyheardbutnotfeltbyus.

MeadeandIrodeinadvance.Wehadpassedbutalittlewaybeyondourleftwhentheroadforked.Welookedtosee,ifwecould,whichroadSheridanhadtakenwithhiscavalryduringtheday.Itseemedtobetheright-handone,andaccordinglywetookit.Wehadnotgonefar,however,whenColonelC.B.Comstock,ofmystaff,withtheinstinctoftheengineer,suspectingthatwewereonaroadthatwouldleadusintothelinesoftheenemy,ifhe,too,shouldbemoving,dashedbyatarapidgallopandallalone.InafewminuteshereturnedandreportedthatLeewasmoving,andthattheroadwewereonwouldbringusintohislinesinashortdistance.Wereturnedtotheforksoftheroad,leftamantoindicatetherightroadtotheheadofWarren'scolumnwhenitshouldcomeup,andcontinuedourjourneytoTodd'sTavern,wherewearrivedaftermidnight.

MyobjectinmovingtoSpottsylvaniawastwofold:first,IdidnotwantLeetogetbacktoRichmondintimetoattempttocrushButlerbeforeIcouldgetthere;second,IwantedtogetbetweenhisarmyandRichmondifpossible;and,ifnot,todrawhimintotheopenfield.ButLee,byaccident,beatustoSpottsylvania.Ourwagontrainshadbeenorderedeasterlyoftheroadsthetroopsweretomarchuponbeforethemovementcommenced.Leeinterpretedthisasasemi-retreatoftheArmyofthePotomactoFredericksburg,andsoinformedhisgovernment.AccordinglyheorderedLongstreet'scorps—nowcommandedbyAnderson—tomoveinthemorning(the8th)toSpottsylvania.Butthewoodsbeingstillonfire,Andersoncouldnotgointobivouac,andmarcheddirectlyontohisdestinationthatnight.BythisaccidentLeegotpossessionofSpottsylvania.ItisimpossibletosaynowwhatwouldhavebeentheresultifLee'sordershadbeenobeyedasgiven;butitiscertainthatwewouldhavebeeninSpottsylvania,andbetweenhimandhiscapital.Mybeliefisthattherewould

inSpottsylvania,andbetweenhimandhiscapital.MybeliefisthattherewouldhavebeenaracebetweenthetwoarmiestoseewhichcouldreachRichmondfirst,andtheArmyofthePotomacwouldhavehadtheshorterline.Thus,twicesincecrossingtheRapidanwecamenearclosingthecampaign,sofarasbattleswereconcerned,fromtheRapidantotheJamesRiverorRichmond.ThefirstfailurewascausedbyournotfollowingupthesuccessgainedoverHill'scorpsonthemorningofthe6th,asbeforedescribed:thesecond,whenfirescausedbythatbattledroveAndersontomakeamarchduringthenightofthe7th-8thwhichhewasorderedtocommenceonthemorningofthe8th.Butaccidentoftendecidesthefateofbattle.

Sheridan'scavalryhadhadconsiderablefightingduringtheafternoonofthe7th,lastingatTodd'sTavernuntilafternight,withthefieldhisattheclose.HeissuedthenecessaryordersforseizingSpottsylvaniaandholdingthebridgeoverthePoRiver,whichLee'stroopswouldhavetocrosstogettoSpottsylvania.ButMeadechangedSheridan'sorderstoMerritt—whowasholdingthebridge—onhisarrivalatTodd'sTavern,andtherebylefttheroadfreeforAndersonwhenhecameup.Wilson,whowasorderedtoseizethetown,didso,withhisdivisionofcavalry;buthecouldnotholditagainsttheConfederatecorpswhichhadnotbeendetainedatthecrossingofthePo,asitwouldhavebeenbutfortheunfortunatechangeinMerritt'sorders.HadhebeenpermittedtoexecutetheordersSheridangavehim,hewouldhavebeenguardingwithtwobrigadesofcavalrythebridgeoverthePoRiverwhichAndersonhadtocross,andmusthavedetainedhimlongenoughtoenableWarrentoreinforceWilsonandholdthetown.

Andersonsoonintrenchedhimself—ifindeedtheintrenchmentswerenotalreadymade—immediatelyacrossWarren'sfront.Warrenwasnotawareofhispresence,butprobablysupposeditwasthecavalrywhichMerritthadengagedearlierintheday.Heassaultedatonce,butwasrepulsed.Hesoonorganizedhismen,astheywerenotpursuedbytheenemy,andmadeasecondattack,thistimewithhiswholecorps.Thistimehesucceededingainingapositionimmediatelyintheenemy'sfront,whereheintrenched.Hisrightandleftdivisions—theformerCrawford's,thelatterWadsworth's,nowcommandedbyCutler—drovetheenemybacksomedistance.

AtthistimemyheadquartershadbeenadvancedtoPineyBranchChurch.IwasanxioustocrushAndersonbeforeLeecouldgetaforcetohissupport.TothisendSedgwickwhowasatPineyBranchChurch,wasorderedtoWarren'ssupport.Hancock,whowasatTodd'sTavern,wasnotifiedofWarren's

support.Hancock,whowasatTodd'sTavern,wasnotifiedofWarren'sengagement,andwasdirectedtobeinreadinesstocomeup.Burnside,whowaswiththewagontrainsatAldrich'sonourextremeleft,receivedthesameinstructions.Sedgwickwasslowingettingupforsomereason—probablyunavoidable,becausehewasneveratfaultwhenseriousworkwastobedone—sothatitwasnearnightbeforethecombinedforceswerereadytoattack.EventhenallofSedgwick'scommanddidnotgetintotheengagement.Warrenledthelastassault,onedivisionatatime,andofcourseitfailed.

Warren'sdifficultywastwofold:whenhereceivedanordertodoanything,itwouldatonceoccurtohismindhowallthebalanceofthearmyshouldbeengagedsoasproperlytoco-operatewithhim.Hisideasweregenerallygood,buthewouldforgetthatthepersongivinghimordershadthoughtofothersatthetimehehadofhim.Inlikemanner,whenhedidgetreadytoexecuteanorder,aftergivingmostintelligentinstructionstodivisioncommanders,hewouldgoinwithonedivision,holdingtheothersinreserveuntilhecouldsuperintendtheirmovementsinpersonalso,forgettingthatdivisioncommanderscouldexecuteanorderwithouthispresence.Hisdifficultywasconstitutionalandbeyondhiscontrol.Hewasanofficerofsuperiorability,quickperceptions,andpersonalcouragetoaccomplishanythingthatcouldbedonewithasmallcommand.

LeehadorderedHill'scorps—nowcommandedbyEarly—tomovebytheveryroadwehadmarchedupon.Thisshowsthatevenearlyinthemorningofthe8thLeehadnotyetbecomeacquaintedwithmymove,butstillthoughtthattheArmyofthePotomachadgonetoFredericksburg.Indeed,heinformedtheauthoritiesatRichmondhehadpossessionofSpottsylvaniaandwasonmyflank.AndersonwasinpossessionofSpottsylvania,throughnoforesightofLee,however.EarlyonlyfoundthathehadbeenfollowinguswhenheranagainstHancockatTodd'sTavern.HiscomingdetainedHancockfromthebattle-fieldofSpottsylvaniaforthatday;buthe,inlikemanner,keptEarlybackandforcedhimtomovebyanotherroute.

HadIorderedthemovementforthenightofthe7thbymyleftflank,itwouldhaveputHancockinthelead.Itwouldalsohavegivenusanhourorearlierstart.IttookallthattimeforWarrentogettheheadofhiscolumntotheleftofHancockafterhehadgothistroopsoutoftheirlineconfrontingtheenemy.Thishour,andHancock'scapacitytousehiswholeforcewhennecessary,would,nodoubt,haveenabledhimtocrushAndersonbeforehecouldbereinforced.Butthemovementmadewastactical.Itkeptthetroopsinmassagainstapossibleassaultbytheenemy.Ourleftoccupieditsintrenchmentswhilethetwocorpsto

assaultbytheenemy.Ourleftoccupieditsintrenchmentswhilethetwocorpstotherightpassed.Ifanattackhadbeenmadebytheenemyhewouldhavefoundthe2dcorpsinposition,fortified,and,practically,the5thand6thcorpsinpositionasreserves,untilhisentirefrontwaspassed.Byaleftflankmovementthearmywouldhavebeenscatteredwhilestillpassingthefrontoftheenemy,andbeforetheextremerighthadgotbyitwouldhavebeenverymuchexposed.Then,too,Ihadnotyetlearnedthespecialqualificationsofthedifferentcorpscommanders.AtthattimemyjudgmentwasthatWarrenwasthemanIwouldsuggesttosucceedMeadeshouldanythinghappentothatgallantsoldiertotakehimfromthefield.AsIhavebeforesaid,Warrenwasagallantsoldier,anableman;andhewasbesidethoroughlyimbuedwiththesolemnityandimportanceofthedutyhehadtoperform.

CHAPTERLII.

BATTLEOFSPOTTSYLVANIA—HANCOCK'SPOSITION—ASSAULTOFWARREN'SANDWRIGHT'SCORPS—UPTONPROMOTEDONTHEFIELD—GOODNEWSFROMBUTLERANDSHERIDAN.

TheMattaponyRiverisformedbythejunctionoftheMat,theTa,thePoandtheNyrivers,thelastbeingthenorthernmostofthefour.IttakesitsriseaboutamilesouthandalittleeastoftheWildernessTavern.ThePorisessouth-westoftheplace,butfartheraway.Spottsylvaniaisontheridgedividingthesetwostreams,andwheretheyarebutafewmilesapart.TheBrockRoadreachesSpottsylvaniawithoutcrossingeitherofthesestreams.Lee'sarmycomingupbytheCatharpinRoad,hadtocrossthePoatWoodenBridge.WarrenandHancockcamebytheBrockRoad.SedgwickcrossedtheNyatCatharpinFurnace.BurnsidecomingbyAldrich'stoGates'shouse,hadtocrosstheNyneartheenemy.Hefoundpicketsatthebridge,buttheyweresoondrivenoffbyabrigadeofWillcox'sdivision,andthestreamwascrossed.Thisbrigadewasfuriouslyattacked;buttheremainderofthedivisioncomingup,theywereenabledtoholdtheirposition,andsoonfortifiedit.

AboutthetimeIreceivedthenewsofthisattack,wordcamefromHancockthatEarlyhadlefthisfront.HehadbeenforcedovertotheCatharpinRoad,crossingthePoatCorbin'sandagainatWoodenBridge.ThesearethebridgesSheridanhadgivenorderstohiscavalrytooccupyonthe8th,whileonedivisionshouldoccupySpottsylvania.ThesemovementsoftheenemygavemetheideathatLeewasabouttomaketheattempttogetto,ortowards,Fredericksburgtocutoffmy

wasabouttomaketheattempttogetto,ortowards,Fredericksburgtocutoffmysupplies.ImadearrangementstoattackhisrightandgetbetweenhimandRichmondifheshouldtrytoexecutethisdesign.IfhehadanysuchintentionitwasabandonedassoonasBurnsidewasestablishedsouthoftheNy.

ThePoandtheNyarenarrowlittlestreams,butdeep,withabruptbanks,andborderedbyheavilywoodedandmarshybottoms—atthetimewewerethere—anddifficulttocrossexceptwherebridged.Thecountryaboutwasgenerallyheavilytimbered,butwithoccasionalclearings.Itwasamuchbettercountrytoconductadefensivecampaigninthananoffensiveone.

Bynoonofthe9ththepositionofthetwoarmieswasasfollows:Leeoccupiedasemicirclefacingnorth,north-westandnorth-east,inclosingthetown.AndersonwasonhisleftextendingtothePo,Ewellcamenext,thenEarly.Warrenoccupiedourright,coveringtheBrockandotherroadsconvergingatSpottsylvania;SedgwickwastohisleftandBurnsideonourextremeleft.HancockwasyetbackatTodd'sTavern,butassoonasitwasknownthatEarlyhadleftHancock'sfrontthelatterwasordereduptoWarren'sright.HeformedalinewiththreedivisionsonthehilloverlookingthePoearlyintheafternoon,andwasorderedtocrossthePoandgetontheenemy'sflank.ThefourthdivisionofHancock'scorps,Mottcommanding,wasleftatTodd'swhenthecorpsfirstcameup;butintheafternoonitwasbroughtupandplacedtotheleftofSedgwick's—nowWright's—6thcorps.InthemorningGeneralSedgwickhadbeenkilledneartherightofhisintrenchmentsbyrebelsharpshooters.HislosswasasevereonetotheArmyofthePotomacandtotheNation.GeneralH.G.Wrightsucceededhiminthecommandofhiscorps.

Hancockwasnow,nineP.M.ofthe9thofMay,acrosstheleftflankofLee'sarmy,butseparatedfromit,andalsofromtheremainderofMeade'sarmy,bythePoRiver.ButforthelatenessofthehourandthedarknessofthenighthewouldhaveattemptedtocrosstheriveragainatWoodenBridge,thusbringinghimselfonthesamesidewithbothfriendandfoe.

ThePoatthepointswhereHancock'scorpscrossedrunsnearlydueeast.Justbelowhislowercrossing—thetroopscrossedatthreepoints—itturnsduesouth,andafterpassingunderWoodenBridgesoonresumesamoreeasterlydirection.DuringthenightthiscorpsbuiltthreebridgesoverthePo;butthesewereinrear.

ThepositionassumedbyHancock'scorpsforcedLeetoreinforcehisleftduringthenight.Accordinglyonthemorningofthe10th,whenHancockrenewedhis

thenight.Accordinglyonthemorningofthe10th,whenHancockrenewedhisefforttogetoverthePotohisfront,hefoundhimselfconfrontedbysomeofEarly'scommand,whichhadbeenbroughtfromtheextremerightoftheenemyduringthenight.Hesucceededineffectingacrossingwithonebrigade,however,butfindingtheenemyintrenchedinhisfront,nomorewerecrossed.

Hancockreconnoitredhisfrontonthemorningofthe10th,withtheviewofforcingacrossing,ifitwasfoundthatanadvantagecouldbegained.Theenemywasfoundstronglyintrenchedonthehighgroundoverlookingtheriver,andcommandingtheWoodenBridgewithartillery.Anderson'sleftrestedonthePo,whereitturnssouth;therefore,forHancocktocrossover—althoughitwouldbringhimtothesamesideofthestreamwiththerestofthearmy—wouldstillfartherisolatehimfromit.Thestreamwouldhavetobecrossedtwiceinthefaceoftheenemytounitewiththemainbody.Theideaofcrossingwasthereforeabandoned.

LeehadweakenedtheotherpartsofhislinetomeetthismovementofHancock's,andIdeterminedtotakeadvantageofit.Accordinglyinthemorning,orderswereissuedforanattackintheafternoononthecentrebyWarren'sandWright'scorps,Hancocktocommandalltheattackingforce.TwoofhisdivisionswerebroughttothenorthsideofthePo.GibbonwasplacedtotherightofWarren,andBirneyinhisrearasareserve.Barlow'sdivisionwasleftsouthofthestream,andMottofthesamecorpswasstilltotheleftofWright'scorps.Burnsidewasorderedtoreconnoitrehisfrontinforce,and,ifanopportunitypresented,toattackwithvigor.TheenemyseeingBarlow'sdivisionisolatedfromtherestofthearmy,cameoutandattackedwithfury.Barlowrepulsedtheassaultwithgreatslaughter,andwithconsiderablelosstohimself.Buttheenemyreorganizedandrenewedtheassault.Birneywasnowmovedtothehighgroundoverlookingtherivercrossingsbuiltbyourtroops,andcoveredthecrossings.Thesecondassaultwasrepulsed,againwithseverelosstotheenemy,andBarlowwaswithdrawnwithoutfurthermolestation.GeneralT.G.Stevensonwaskilledinthismove.

Betweenthelines,whereWarren'sassaultwastotakeplace,therewasaravinegrownupwithlargetreesandunderbrush,makingitalmostimpenetrablebyman.Theslopesonbothsideswerealsocoveredwithaheavygrowthoftimber.Warren,beforenoon,reconnoitredhisfronttwice,thefirsttimewithoneandthesecondwithtwodivisions.Hewasrepulsedonbothoccasions,butgainedsuchinformationofthegroundastoinducehimtoreportrecommendingtheassault.

Wrightalsoreconnoitredhisfrontandgainedaconsiderablyadvancedposition

Wrightalsoreconnoitredhisfrontandgainedaconsiderablyadvancedpositionfromtheonehestartedfrom.Hethenorganizedastormingparty,consistingoftwelveregiments,andassignedColonelEmoryUpton,ofthe121stNewYorkVolunteers,tothecommandofit.Aboutfouro'clockintheafternoontheassaultwasordered,Warren'sandWright'scorps,withMott'sdivisionofHancock'scorps,tomovesimultaneously.Themovementwasprompt,andinafewminutesthefiercestofstrugglesbegan.Thebattle-fieldwassodenselycoveredwithforestthatbutlittlecouldbeseen,byanyoneperson,astotheprogressmade.MeadeandIoccupiedthebestpositionwecouldget,inrearofWarren.

Warrenwasrepulsedwithheavyloss,GeneralJ.C.Ricebeingamongthekilled.Hewasnotfollowed,however,bytheenemy,andwastherebyenabledtoreorganizehiscommandassoonascoveredfromthegunsoftheenemy.Totheleftoursuccesswasdecided,buttheadvantagewaslostbythefeebleactionofMott.Uptonwithhisassaultingpartypushedforwardandcrossedtheenemy'sintrenchments.Turningtotherightandlefthecapturedseveralgunsandsomehundredsofprisoners.Mottwasorderedtohisassistancebutfailedutterly.Somuchtimewaslostintryingtogetupthetroopswhichwereintherightpositiontoreinforce,thatIorderedUptontowithdraw;buttheofficersandmenofhiscommandweresoaversetogivinguptheadvantagetheyhadgainedthatIwithdrewtheorder.Torelievethem,Iorderedarenewaloftheassault.BythistimeHancock,whohadgonewithBirney'sdivisiontorelieveBarlow,hadreturned,bringingthedivisionwithhim.HiscorpswasnowjoinedwithWarren'sandWright'sinthislastassault.Itwasgallantlymade,manymengettingupto,andover,theworksoftheenemy;buttheywerenotabletoholdthem.Atnighttheywerewithdrawn.Uptonbroughthisprisonerswithhim,butthegunshehadcapturedhewasobligedtoabandon.Uptonhadgainedanimportantadvantage,butalackinothersofthespiritanddashpossessedbyhimlostittous.BeforeleavingWashingtonIhadbeenauthorizedtopromoteofficersonthefieldforspecialactsofgallantry.BythisauthorityIconferredtherankofbrigadier-generaluponUptononthespot,andthisactwasconfirmedbythePresident.Uptonhadbeenbadlywoundedinthisfight.

BurnsideonthelefthadgotuptowithinafewhundredyardsofSpottsylvaniaCourtHouse,completelyturningLee'sright.Hewasnotawareoftheimportanceoftheadvantagehehadgained,andI,beingwiththetroopswheretheheavyfightingwas,didnotknowofitatthetime.Hehadgainedhispositionwithbutlittlefighting,andalmostwithoutloss.Burnside'spositionnowseparatedhimwidelyfromWright'scorps,thecorpsnearesttohim.Atnighthewasorderedtojoinontothis.Thisbroughthimbackaboutamile,andlosttous

wasorderedtojoinontothis.Thisbroughthimbackaboutamile,andlosttousanimportantadvantage.IattachnoblametoBurnsideforthis,butIdotomyselffornothavinghadastaffofficerwithhimtoreporttomehisposition.

Theenemyhadnotdaredtocomeoutofhislineatanypointtofollowuphisadvantage,exceptinthesingleinstanceofhisattackonBarlow.Thenhewastwicerepulsedwithheavyloss,thoughhehadanentirecorpsagainsttwobrigades.Barlowtookuphisbridgesinthepresenceofthisforce.

Onthe11ththerewasnobattleandbutlittlefiring;noneexceptbyMottwhomadeareconnoissancetoascertainiftherewasaweakpointintheenemy'sline.

IwrotethefollowinglettertoGeneralHalleck:

NEARSPOTTSYLVANIAC.H.,May11,1864—8.30A.M.

MAJOR-GENERALHALLECK,ChiefofStaffoftheArmy,Washington,D.C.

Wehavenowendedthe6thdayofveryhardfighting.Theresultuptothistimeismuchinourfavor.Butourlosseshavebeenheavyaswellasthoseoftheenemy.Wehavelosttothistimeelevengeneralofficerskilled,woundedandmissing,andprobablytwentythousandmen.Ithinkthelossoftheenemymustbegreater—wehavingtakenoverfourthousandprisonersinbattle,whilsthehastakenfromusbutfewexceptafewstragglers.IamnowsendingbacktoBellePlainallmywagonsforafreshsupplyofprovisionsandammunition,andpurposetofightitoutonthislineifittakesallsummer.

Thearrivalofreinforcementsherewillbeveryencouragingtothemen,andIhopetheywillbesentasfastaspossible,andinasgreatnumbers.MyobjectinhavingthemsenttoBellePlainwastousethemasanescorttooursupplytrains.IfitismoreconvenienttosendthemoutbytraintomarchfromtherailroadtoBellePlainorFredericksburg,sendthemso.

Iamsatisfiedtheenemyareveryshaky,andareonlykeptuptothemarkbythegreatestexertionsonthepartoftheirofficers,andbykeepingthemintrenchedineverypositiontheytake.

UptothistimethereisnoindicationofanyportionofLee'sarmybeingdetachedforthedefenceofRichmond.

U.S.GRANT,Lieut.-General.

U.S.GRANT,Lieut.-General.

Andalso,Ireceivedinformation,throughtheWarDepartment,fromGeneralButlerthathiscavalryunderKautzhadcuttherailroadsouthofPetersburg,separatingBeauregardfromRichmond,andhadwhippedHill,killing,woundingandcapturingmany.Alsothathewasintrenched,andcouldmaintainhimself.OnthissamedaycamenewsfromSheridantotheeffectthathehaddestroyedtenmilesoftherailroadandtelegraphbetweenLeeandRichmond,oneandahalfmillionrations,andmostofthemedicalstoresforhisarmy.

Onthe8thIhaddirectedSheridanverballytocutloosefromtheArmyofthePotomacandpassaroundtheleftofLee'sarmyandattackhiscavalryandcommunications,whichwassuccessfullyexecutedinthemannerIhavealreadydescribed.

CHAPTERLIII.

HANCOCK'SASSAULT-LOSSESOFTHECONFEDERATES—PROMOTIONSRECOMMENDED—DISCOMFITUREOFTHEENEMY—EWELL'SATTACK-REDUCINGTHEARTILLERY.

InthereconnoissancemadebyMottonthe11th,asalientwasdiscoveredattherightcentre.Ideterminedthatanassaultshouldbemadeatthatpoint.(*28)AccordinglyintheafternoonHancockwasorderedtomovehiscommandbytherearofWarrenandWright,undercoverofnight,toWright'sleft,andthereformitforanassaultatfouro'clockthenextmorning.Thenightwasdark,itrainedheavily,andtheroadwasdifficult,sothatitwasmidnightwhenhereachedthepointwherehewastohalt.Ittookmostofthenighttogetthemeninpositionfortheiradvanceinthemorning.Themengotbutlittlerest.Burnsidewasorderedtoattack(*29)ontheleftofthesalientatthesamehour.Isenttwoofmystaffofficerstoimpressuponhimtheimportanceofpushingforwardvigorously.Hancockwasnotifiedofthis.WarrenandWrightwereorderedtoholdthemselvesinreadinesstojoinintheassaultifcircumstancesmadeitadvisable.Ioccupiedacentralpositionmostconvenientforreceivinginformationfromallpoints.HancockputBarlowonhisleft,indoublecolumn,andBirneytohisright.MottfollowedBirney,andGibbonwasheldinreserve.

Themorningofthe12thopenedfoggy,delayingthestartmorethanhalfanhour.

Themorningofthe12thopenedfoggy,delayingthestartmorethanhalfanhour.

ThegroundoverwhichHancockhadtopasstoreachtheenemy,wasascendingandheavilywoodedtowithintwoorthreehundredyardsoftheenemy'sintrenchments.InfrontofBirneytherewasalsoamarshtocross.But,notwithstandingallthesedifficulties,thetroopspushedoninquicktimewithoutfiringagun,andwhenwithinfourorfivehundredyardsoftheenemy'slinebrokeoutinloudcheers,andwitharushwentuptoandoverthebreastworks.BarlowandBirneyenteredalmostsimultaneously.Hereadesperatehand-to-handconflicttookplace.Themenofthetwosidesweretooclosetogethertofire,butusedtheirgunsasclubs.Thehandconflictwassoonover.Hancock'scorpscapturedsomefourthousandprisonersamongthemadivisionandabrigadecommandertwentyormoregunswiththeirhorses,caissons,andammunition,severalthousandstandofarms,andmanycolors.Hancock,assoonasthehand-to-handconflictwasover,turnedthegunsoftheenemyagainsthimandadvancedinsidetherebellines.Aboutsixo'clockIorderedWarren'scorpstothesupportofHancock's.Burnside,ontheleft,hadadvancedupeastofthesalienttotheveryparapetoftheenemy.Potter,commandingoneofhisdivisions,gotoverbutwasnotabletoremainthere.However,heinflictedaheavylossupontheenemy;butnotwithoutlossinreturn.

Thisvictorywasimportant,andonethatLeecouldnotaffordtoleaveusinfullpossessionof.Hemadethemoststrenuouseffortstoregainthepositionhehadlost.TroopswerebroughtupfromhisleftandattackedHancockfuriously.Hancockwasforcedtofallback:buthedidsoslowly,withhisfacetotheenemy,inflictingonhimheavyloss,untilbehindthebreastworkshehadcaptured.Theseheturned,facingthemtheotherway,andcontinuedtohold.WrightwasordereduptoreinforceHancock,andarrivedbysixo'clock.Hewaswoundedsoonaftercomingupbutdidnotrelinquishthecommandofhiscorps,althoughthefightinglasteduntiloneo'clockthenextmorning.Ateighto'clockWarrenwasorderedupagain,butwassoslowinmakinghisdispositionsthathisorderswerefrequentlyrepeated,andwithemphasis.Ateleveno'clockIgaveMeadewrittenorderstorelieveWarrenfromhiscommandifhefailedtomovepromptly.Hancockplacedbatteriesonhighgroundinhisrear,whichheusedagainsttheenemy,firingovertheheadsofhisowntroops.

Burnsideaccomplishedbutlittleonourleftofapositivenature,butnegativelyagreatdeal.HekeptLeefromreinforcinghiscentrefromthatquarter.Ifthe5thcorps,orratherifWarren,hadbeenaspromptasWrightwaswiththe6thcorps,betterresultsmighthavebeenobtained.

betterresultsmighthavebeenobtained.

Leemassedheavilyfromhisleftflankonthebrokenpointofhisline.Fivetimesduringthedayheassaultedfuriously,butwithoutdislodgingourtroopsfromtheirnewposition.Hislossesmusthavebeenfearful.Sometimesthebelligerentswouldbeseparatedbybutafewfeet.Inoneplaceatree,eighteeninchesindiameter,wascutentirelydownbymusketballs.Allthetreesbetweenthelineswereverymuchcuttopiecesbyartilleryandmusketry.Itwasthreeo'clocknextmorningbeforethefightingceased.Someofourtroopshadthenbeentwentyhoursunderfire.Inthisengagementwedidnotloseasingleorganization,notevenacompany.Theenemylostonedivisionwithitscommander,onebrigadeandoneregiment,withheavylosseselsewhere.(*30)Ourlosseswereheavy,but,asstated,nowholecompanywascaptured.AtnightLeetookapositioninrearofhisformerone,andbythefollowingmorninghewasstronglyintrenchedinit.

Warren'scorpswasnowtemporarilybrokenup,Cutler'sdivisionsenttoWright,andGriffin'stoHancock.Meadeorderedhischiefofstaff,GeneralHumphreys,toremainwithWarrenandtheremainingdivision,andauthorizedhimtogiveitordersinhisname.

DuringthedayIwaspassingalongthelinefromwingtowingcontinuously.Aboutthecentrestoodahousewhichprovedtobeoccupiedbyanoldladyandherdaughter.SheshowedsuchunmistakablesignsofbeingstronglyUnionthatIstopped.ShesaidshehadnotseenaUnionflagforsolongatimethatitdidherheartgoodtolookuponitagain.Shesaidherhusbandandson,being,Unionmen,hadhadtoleaveearlyinthewar,andwerenowsomewhereintheUnionarmy,ifalive.Shewaswithoutfoodornearlyso,soIorderedrationsissuedtoher,andpromisedtofindoutifIcouldwherethehusbandandsonwere.

Therewasnofightingonthe13th,furtherthanalittleskirmishingbetweenMott'sdivisionandtheenemy.IwasafraidthatLeemightbemovingout,andIdidnotwanthimtogowithoutmyknowingit.Theindicationswerethathewasmoving,butitwasfoundthathewasonlytakinghisnewpositionbackfromthesalientthathadbeencaptured.Ourdeadwereburiedthisday.Mott'sdivisionwasreducedtoabrigade,andassignedtoBirney'sdivision.

DuringthisdayIwrotetoWashingtonrecommendingShermanandMeade(*31)forpromotiontothegradeofMajor-Generalintheregulararmy;HancockforBrigadier-General;Wright,GibbonandHumphreystobeMajor-GeneralsofVolunteers;andUptonandCarrolltobeBrigadiers.Uptonhadalreadybeennamedassuch,buttheappointmenthadtobeconfirmedbytheSenateonthe

namedassuch,buttheappointmenthadtobeconfirmedbytheSenateonthenominationofthePresident.

Thenightofthe13thWarrenandWrightweremovedbythereartotheleftofBurnside.Thenightwasverydarkanditrainedheavily,theroadsweresobadthatthetroopshadtocuttreesandcorduroytheroadapartoftheway,togetthrough.Itwasmidnightbeforetheygottothepointwheretheyweretohalt,anddaylightbeforethetroopscouldbeorganizedtoadvancetotheirpositioninline.Theygainedtheirpositioninline,however,withoutanyfighting,exceptalittleinWright'sfront.HereUptonhadtocontendforanelevationwhichwewantedandwhichtheenemywasnotdisposedtoyield.Uptonfirstdrovetheenemy,andwasthenrepulsedinturn.Ayrescomingtohissupportwithhisbrigade(ofGriffin'sdivision,Warren'scorps),thepositionwassecuredandfortified.Therewasnomorebattleduringthe14th.ThisbroughtourlineeastoftheCourtHouseandrunningnorthandsouthandfacingwest.

Duringthenightofthe14th-15thLeemovedtocoverthisnewfront.ThisleftHancockwithoutanenemyconfrontinghim.Hewasbroughttotherearofournewcentre,readytobemovedinanydirectionhemightbewanted.

Onthe15thnewscamefromButlerandAverill.TheformerreportedthecaptureoftheouterworksatDrury'sBluff,ontheJamesRiver,andthathiscavalryhadcuttherailroadandtelegraphsouthofRichmondontheDanvilleroad:andthelatter,thedestructionofadepotofsuppliesatDublin,WestVirginia,andthebreakingofNewRiverBridgeontheVirginiaandTennesseeRailroad.ThenextdaynewscamefromShermanandSheridan.ShermanhadforcedJohnstonoutofDalton,Georgia,andwasfollowinghimsouth.ThereportfromSheridanembracedhisoperationsuptohispassingtheouterdefencesofRichmond.TheprospectmustnowhavebeendismalinRichmond.TheroadandtelegraphwerecutbetweenthecapitalandLee.Theroadsandwireswerecutineverydirectionfromtherebelcapital.Temporarilythatcitywascutofffromallcommunicationwiththeoutsideexceptbycourier.Thisconditionofaffairs,however,wasofbutshortduration.

IwroteHalleck:

NEARSPOTTSYLVANIAC.H.,May16,1864,8A.M.

MAJOR-GENERALHALLECK,Washington,D.C.:

Wehavehadfivedaysalmostconstantrainwithoutanyprospectyetofitclearingup.TheroadshavenowbecomesoimpassablethatambulanceswithwoundedmencannolongerrunbetweenhereandFredericksburg.Alloffensiveoperationsnecessarilyceaseuntilwecanhavetwenty-fourhoursofdryweather.Thearmyisinthebestofspirits,andfeelthegreatestconfidenceofultimatesuccess.YoucanassurethePresidentandSecretaryofWarthattheelementsalonehavesuspendedhostilities,andthatitisinnomannerduetoweaknessorexhaustiononourpart.

U.S.GRANT,Lieut.-General.

Theconditionoftheroadswassuchthatnothingwasdoneonthe17th.ButthatnightHancockandWrightweretomakeanightmarchbacktotheiroldpositions,andtomakeanassaultatfouro'clockinthemorning.Leegottroopsbackintimetoprotecthisoldline,sotheassaultwasunsuccessful.Onthisday(18th)thenewswasalmostasdiscouragingtousasithadbeentwodaysbeforeintherebelcapital.Asstatedabove,Hancock'sandWright'scorpshadmadeanunsuccessfulassault.NewscamethatSigelhadbeendefeatedatNewMarket,badly,andwasretreatingdownthevalley.Nottwohoursbefore,IhadsenttheinquirytoHalleckwhetherSigelcouldnotgettoStauntontostopsuppliescomingfromtheretoLee.IaskedatoncethatSigelmightberelieved,andsomeoneelseputinhisplace.Hunter'snamewassuggested,andIheartilyapproved.FurthernewsfromButlerreportedhimdrivenfromDrury'sBluff,butstillinpossessionofthePetersburgroad.BankshadbeendefeatedinLouisiana,relieved,andCanbyputinhisplace.Thischangeofcommanderwasnotonmysuggestion.Allthisnewswasverydiscouraging.Allofitmusthavebeenknownbytheenemybeforeitwasbyme.Infact,thegoodnews(fortheenemy)musthavebeenknowntohimatthemomentIthoughthewasindespair,andhisanguishhadbeenalreadyrelievedwhenwewereenjoyinghissupposeddiscomfiture,Butthiswasnotimeforrepining.Iimmediatelygaveordersforamovementbytheleftflank,ontowardsRichmond,tocommenceonthenightofthe19th.IalsoaskedHallecktosecurethecooperationofthenavyinchangingourbaseofsuppliesfromFredericksburgtoPortRoyal,ontheRappahannock.

UptothistimeIhadreceivednoreinforcements,exceptsixthousandrawtroopsunderBrigadierGeneralRobertO.Tyler,justarrived.Theyhadnotyetjoinedtheircommand,Hancock'scorps,butwereonourright.Thiscorpshadbeenbroughttotherearofthecentre,readytomoveinanydirection.Lee,probablysuspectingsomemoveonmypart,andseeingourrightentirelyabandoned,

suspectingsomemoveonmypart,andseeingourrightentirelyabandoned,movedEwell'scorpsaboutfiveo'clockintheafternoon,withEarly'sasareserve,toattackusinthatquarter.TylerhadcomeupfromFredericksburg,andhadbeenhaltedontheroadtotherightofourline,nearKitching'sbrigadeofWarren'scorps.Tylerreceivedtheattackwithhisrawtroops,andtheymaintainedtheirposition,untilreinforced,inamannerworthyofveterans.

Hancockwasinapositiontoreinforcespeedily,andwasthesoldiertodoitwithoutwaitingtomakedispositions.BirneywasthrowntoTyler'srightandCrawfordtohisleft,withGibbonasareserve;andEwellwaswhirledbackspeedilyandwithheavyloss.

WarrenhadbeenorderedtogetonEwell'sflankandinhisrear,tocuthimofffromhisintrenchments.ButhiseffortsweresofeeblethatunderthecoverofnightEwellgotbackwithonlythelossofafewhundredprisoners,besideshiskilledandwounded.Thearmybeingengageduntilafterdark,Irescindedtheorderforthemarchbyourleftflankthatnight.

Assoonasitwasdiscoveredthattheenemywerecomingouttoattack,Inaturallysupposedtheywoulddetachaforcetodestroyourtrains.ThewithdrawalofHancockfromtherightuncoveredoneroadfromSpottsylvaniatoFredericksburgoverwhichtrainsdrewoursupplies.Thiswasguardedbyadivisionofcoloredtroops,commandedbyGeneralFerrero,belongingtoBurnside'scorps.Ferrerowasthereforepromptlynotified,andorderedtothrowhiscavalrypicketsouttothesouthandbepreparedtomeettheenemyifheshouldcome;ifhehadtoretreattodosotowardsFredericksburg.Theenemydiddetachasexpected,andcapturedtwenty-fiveorthirtywagonswhich,however,weresoonretaken.

Inconsequenceofthedisastersthathadbefallenusinthepastfewdays,Leecouldbereinforcedlargely,andIhadnodoubthewouldbe.BeauregardhadcomeupfromthesouthwithtroopstoguardtheConfederatecapitalwhenitwasindanger.Butlerbeingdrivenback,mostofthetroopscouldbesenttoLee.HokewasnolongerneededinNorthCarolina;andSigel'stroopshavinggonebacktoCedarCreek,whipped,manytroopscouldbesparedfromthevalley.

TheWildernessandSpottsylvaniabattlesconvincedmethatwehadmoreartillerythancouldeverbebroughtintoactionatanyonetime.Itoccupiedmuchoftheroadinmarching,andtaxedthetrainsinbringingupforage.Artilleryisveryusefulwhenitcanbebroughtintoaction,butitisaveryburdensomeluxurywhereitcannotbeused.BeforeleavingSpottsylvania,therefore,Isent

luxurywhereitcannotbeused.BeforeleavingSpottsylvania,therefore,IsentbacktothedefencesofWashingtonoveronehundredpiecesofartillery,withthehorsesandcaissons.Thisrelievedtheroadsoverwhichweweretomarchofmorethantwohundredsix-horseteams,andstillleftusmoreartillerythancouldbeadvantageouslyused.Infact,beforereachingtheJamesRiverIagainreducedtheartillerywiththearmylargely.

Ibelievedthat,ifonecorpsofthearmywasexposedontheroadtoRichmond,andatadistancefromthemainarmy,Leewouldendeavortoattacktheexposedcorpsbeforereinforcementscouldcomeup;inwhichcasethemainarmycouldfollowLeeupandattackhimbeforehehadtimetointrench.SoIissuedthefollowingorders:

NEARSPOTTSYLVANIAC.H.,VA.,May18,1864.

MAJOR-GENERALMEADE,CommandingArmyofthePotomac.

BeforedaylighttomorrowmorningIproposetodrawHancockandBurnsidefromthepositiontheynowhold,andputBurnsidetotheleftofWright.WrightandBurnsideshouldthenforcetheirwayupasclosetotheenemyastheycangetwithoutageneralengagement,orwithageneralengagementiftheenemywillcomeoutoftheirworkstofight,andintrench.Hancockshouldmarchandtakeupapositionasifinsupportofthetwoleftcorps.Tomorrownight,attwelveoroneo'clock,hewillbemovedsouth-eastwithallhisforceandasmuchcavalryascanbegiventohim,togetasfartowardsRichmondonthelineoftheFredericksburgRailroadashecanmake,fightingtheenemyinwhateverforcehecanfindhim.Iftheenemymakeageneralmovetomeetthis,theywillbefollowedbytheotherthreecorpsofthearmy,andattacked,ifpossible,beforetimeisgiventointrench.

Suitabledirectionswillatoncebegivenforalltrainsandsurplusartillerytoconformtothismovement.

U.S.GRANT.

Onthe20th,Leeshowingnosignsofcomingoutofhislines,orderswererenewedforaleft-flankmovement,tocommenceafternight.

CHAPTERLIV.

MOVEMENTBYTHELEFTFLANK—BATTLEOFNORTHANNA—ANINCIDENTOFTHEMARCH—MOVINGONRICHMOND—SOUTHOFTHEPAMUNKEY—POSITIONOFTHENATIONALARMY.

WewerenowtooperateinadifferentcountryfromanywehadbeforeseeninVirginia.Theroadswerewideandgood,andthecountrywellcultivated.Nomenwereseenexceptthosebearingarms,eventheblackmanhavingbeensentaway.Thecountry,however,wasnewtous,andwehadneitherguidesnormapstotelluswheretheroadswere,orwheretheyledto.Engineerandstaffofficerswereputtothedangerousdutyofsupplyingtheplaceofbothmapsandguides.Byreconnoitringtheywereenabledtolocatetheroadsinthevicinityofeacharmycorps.Ourcoursewassouth,andwetookallroadsleadinginthatdirectionwhichwouldnotseparatethearmytoowidely.

HancockwhohadtheleadhadmarchedeasterlytoGuiney'sStation,ontheFredericksburgRailroad,thencesoutherlytoBowlingGreenandMilford.HewasatMilfordbythenightofthe21st.HerehemetadetachmentofPickett'sdivisioncomingfromRichmondtoreinforceLee.Theywerespeedilydrivenaway,andseveralhundredcaptured.Warrenfollowedonthemorningofthe21st,andreachedGuiney'sStationthatnightwithoutmolestation.BurnsideandWrightwereretainedatSpottsylvaniatokeepuptheappearanceofanintendedassault,andtoholdLee,ifpossible,whileHancockandWarrenshouldgetstartenoughtointerposebetweenhimandRichmond.

LeehadnowasuperbopportunitytotaketheinitiativeeitherbyattackingWrightandBurnsidealone,orbyfollowingbytheTelegraphRoadandstrikingHancock'sandWarren'scorps,orevenHancock'salone,beforereinforcementscouldcomeup.Buthedidnotavailhimselfofeitheropportunity.Heseemedreallytobemisledastomydesigns;butmovedbyhisinteriorline—theTelegraphRoad—tomakesureofkeepingbetweenhiscapitalandtheArmyofthePotomac.Heneveragainhadsuchanopportunityofdealingaheavyblow.

Theeveningofthe21stBurnside,9thcorps,movedoutfollowedbyWright,6thcorps.BurnsidewastotaketheTelegraphRoad;butfindingStanard'sFord,overthePo,fortifiedandguarded,heturnedeasttotheroadtakenbyHancockandWarrenwithoutanattempttodislodgetheenemy.Thenightofthe21stIhadmyheadquartersnearthe6thcorps,atGuiney'sStation,andtheenemy'scavalrywasbetweenusandHancock.TherewasaslightattackonBurnside'sandWright's

betweenusandHancock.TherewasaslightattackonBurnside'sandWright'scorpsastheymovedoutoftheirlines;butitwaseasilyrepulsed.TheobjectprobablywasonlytomakesurethatwewerenotleavingaforcetofollowupontherearoftheConfederates.

Bythemorningofthe22dBurnsideandWrightwereatGuiney'sStation.Hancock'scorpshadnowbeenmarchingandfightingcontinuouslyforseveraldays,nothavinghadrestevenatnightmuchofthetime.Theywere,therefore,permittedtorestduringthe22d.ButWarrenwaspushedtoHarris'sStore,directlywestofMilford,andconnectedwithitbyagoodroad,andBurnsidewassenttoNewBethelChurch.Wright'scorpswasstillbackatGuiney'sStation.

Iissuedthefollowingorderforthemovementofthetroopsthenextday:

NEWBETHEL,VA.,May22,1864

MAJOR-GENERALMEADE,CommandingArmyofthePotomac.

DirectcorpscommanderstoholdtheirtroopsinreadinesstomarchatfiveA.M.tomorrow.Atthathoureachcommandwillsendoutcavalryandinfantryonallroadstotheirfrontleadingsouth,andascertain,ifpossible,wheretheenemyis.IfbeyondtheSouthAnna,the5thand6thcorpswillmarchtotheforksoftheroad,whereonebranchleadstoBeaverDamStation,theothertoJerichoBridge,thensouthbyroadsreachingtheAnna,asneartoandeastofHawkinsCreekastheycanbefound.

The2dcorpswillmovetoChesterfieldFord.The9thcorpswillbedirectedtomoveatthesametimetoJerichoBridge.Themaponlyshowstworoadsforthefourcorpstomarchupon,but,nodoubt,bytheuseofplantationroads,andpressinginguides,otherscanbefound,togiveoneforeachcorps.

Thetroopswillfollowtheirrespectivereconnoitringparties.ThetrainswillbemovedatthesametimetoMilfordStation.

Headquarterswillfollowthe9thcorps.

U.S.GRANT,Lieut.-General.

Warren'scorpswasmovedfromHarris'sStoretoJerichoFord,Wright'sfollowing.Warrenarrivedatthefordearlyintheafternoon,andbyfiveo'clock

following.Warrenarrivedatthefordearlyintheafternoon,andbyfiveo'clockeffectedacrossingundertheprotectionofsharpshooters.Themenhadtowadeinwateruptotheirwaists.Assoonasenoughtroopswereovertoguardtheford,pontoonswerelaidandtheartilleryandtherestofthetroopscrossed.Thelineformedwasalmostperpendiculartothecourseoftheriver—Crawfordontheleft,nexttotheriver,Griffininthecentre,andCutlerontheright.Leewasfoundintrenchedalongthefrontoftheirline.ThewholeofHill'scorpswassentagainstWarren'srightbeforeithadgotinposition.AbrigadeofCutler'sdivisionwasdrivenback,theenemyfollowing,butassistancecominguptheenemywasinturndrivenbackintohistrencheswithheavylossinkilledandwounded,withaboutfivehundredprisonersleftinourhands.BynightWright'scorpswasupreadytoreinforceWarren.

Onthe23dHancock'scorpswasmovedtothewoodenbridgewhichspanstheNorthAnnaRiverjustwestofwheretheFredericksburgRailroadcrosses.Itwasnearnightwhenthetroopsarrived.Theyfoundthebridgeguarded,withtroopsintrenched,onthenorthside.Hancocksenttwobrigades,Egan'sandPierce's,totherightandleft,andwhenproperlydisposedtheychargedsimultaneously.Thebridgewascarriedquickly,theenemyretreatingoveritsohastilythatmanywereshovedintotheriver,andsomeofthemweredrowned.Severalhundredprisonerswerecaptured.ThehourwassolatethatHancockdidnotcrossuntilnextmorning.

Burnside'scorpswasmovedbyamiddleroadrunningbetweenthosedescribedabove,andwhichstrikestheNorthAnnaatOxFord,midwaybetweenTelegraphRoadandJerichoFord.Thehourofitsarrivalwastoolatetocrossthatnight.

Onthe24thHancock'scorpscrossedtothesouthsideoftheriverwithoutopposition,andformedlinefacingnearlywest.Therailroadinrearwastakenpossessionofanddestroyedasfaraspossible.Wright'scorpscrossedatJerichoearlythesameday,andtookpositiontotherightofWarren'scorps,extendingsouthoftheVirginiaCentralRailroad.Thisroadwastornupforaconsiderabledistancetotherear(west),thetiesburned,andtherailsbentandtwistedbyheatingthemovertheburningties.Itwasfound,however,thatBurnside'scorpscouldnotcrossatOxFord.Leehadtakenapositionwithhiscentreontheriveratthispoint,withthetwowingsthrownback,hislinemakinganacuteanglewhereitoverlookedtheriver.

BeforetheexactpositionofthewholeofLee'slinewasaccuratelyknown,IdirectedHancockandWarreneachtosendabrigadetoOxFordbythesouth

directedHancockandWarreneachtosendabrigadetoOxFordbythesouthsideoftheriver.Theyfoundtheenemytoostrongtojustifyaseriousattack.AthirdfordwasfoundbetweenOxFordandJericho.Burnsidewasdirectedtocrossadivisionoverthisford,andtosendonedivisiontoHancock.Crittendenwascrossedbythisnewly-discoveredford,andformeduptherivertoconnectwithCrawford'sleft.PotterjoinedHancockbywayofthewoodenbridge.CrittendenhadasevereengagementwithsomeofHill'scorpsonhiscrossingtheriver,andlostheavily.WhenjoinedtoWarren'scorpshewasnofurthermolested.BurnsidestillguardedOxFordfromthenorthside.

LeenowhadhisentirearmysouthoftheNorthAnna.Ourlinescoveredhisfront,withthesixmilesseparatingthetwowingsguardedbybutasingledivision.Togetfromonewingtotheothertheriverwouldhavetobecrossedtwice.Leecouldreinforceanypartofhislinefromallpointsofitinaveryshortmarch;orcouldconcentratethewholeofitwhereverhemightchoosetoassault.Wewere,forthetime,practicallytwoarmiesbesieging.

Leehadbeenreinforced,andwasbeingreinforced,largely.AboutthistimetheverytroopswhosecomingIhadpredicted,hadarrivedorwerecomingin.PickettwithafulldivisionfromRichmondwasup;HokefromNorthCarolinahadcomewithabrigade;andBreckinridgewasthere:inallprobablynotlessthanfifteenthousandmen.Buthedidnotattempttodriveusfromthefield.

Onthe22dor23dIreceiveddispatchesfromWashingtonsayingthatShermanhadtakenKingston,crossedtheEtowahRiverandwasadvancingintoGeorgia.

IwasseatedatthetimeontheporchofafineplantationhousewaitingforBurnside'scorpstopass.Meadeandhisstaff,besidesmyownstaff,werewithme.Theladyofthehouse,aMrs.Tyler,andanelderlylady,werepresent.Burnsideseeingus,cameupontheporch,hisbigspursandsaberrattlingashewalked.Hetouchedhishatpolitelytotheladies,andremarkedthathesupposedtheyhadneverseensomany"liveYankees"beforeintheirlives.Theelderlyladyspokeuppromptlysaying,"Ohyes,Ihave;manymore.""Where?"saidBurnside."InRichmond."Prisoners,ofcourse,wasunderstood.

Ireadmydispatchaloud,whenitwasreceived.Thisthrewtheyoungerladyintotears.Ifoundtheinformationshehadreceived(andIsupposeitwastheinformationgenerallyincirculationthroughtheSouth)wasthatLeewasdrivingusfromtheStateinthemostdemoralizedconditionandthatintheSouth-westourtroopswerebutlittlebetterthanprisonersofwar.Seeingourtroopsmoving

ourtroopswerebutlittlebetterthanprisonersofwar.Seeingourtroopsmovingsouthwasocularproofthatapartofherinformationwasincorrect,andsheaskedmeifmynewsfromShermanwastrue.Iassuredherthattherewasnodoubtaboutit.Ileftaguardtoprotectthehousefromintrusionuntilthetroopsshouldhaveallpassed,andassuredherthatifherhusbandwasinhidingshecouldbringhiminandheshouldbeprotectedalso.ButIpresumehewasintheConfederatearmy.

Onthe25thIgaveorders,throughHalleck,toHunter,whohadrelievedSigel,tomoveuptheValleyofVirginia,crossovertheBlueRidgetoCharlottesvilleandgoasfarasLynchburgifpossible,livinguponthecountryandcuttingtherailroadsandcanalashewent.Afterdoingthishecouldfindhiswaybacktohisbase,orjoinme.

OnthesamedaynewswasreceivedthatLeewasfallingbackonRichmond.Thisprovednottobetrue.ButwecoulddonothingwherewewereunlessLeewouldassumetheoffensive.Idetermined,therefore,todrawoutofourpresentpositionandmakeonemoreefforttogetbetweenhimandRichmond.Ihadnoexpectationnow,however,ofsucceedinginthis;butIdidexpecttoholdhimfarenoughwesttoenablemetoreachtheJamesRiverhighup.SheridanwasnowagainwiththeArmyofthePotomac.

Onthe26thIinformedthegovernmentatWashingtonofthepositionofthetwoarmies;ofthereinforcementstheenemyhadreceived;ofthemoveIproposedtomake(*32);anddirectedthatourbaseofsuppliesshouldbeshiftedtoWhiteHouse,onthePamunkey.ThewagontrainandguardsmoveddirectlyfromPortRoyaltoWhiteHouse.Suppliesmovedaroundbywater,guardedbythenavy.Ordershadpreviouslybeensent,throughHalleck,forButlertosendSmith'scorpstoWhiteHouse.Thisorderwasrepeatedonthe25th,withdirectionsthattheyshouldbelandedonthenorthsideofthePamunkey,andmarcheduntiltheyjoinedtheArmyofthePotomac.

ItwasadelicatemovetogettherightwingoftheArmyofthePotomacfromitspositionsouthoftheNorthAnnainthepresenceoftheenemy.Toaccomplishit,Iissuedthefollowingorder:

QUARLES'MILLS,VA.,May25,1864.

MAJORGENERALMEADE,CommandingA.P.

DirectGeneralsWarrenandWrighttowithdrawalltheirteamsandartillery,not

DirectGeneralsWarrenandWrighttowithdrawalltheirteamsandartillery,notinposition,tothenorthsideoftherivertomorrow.SendthatbelongingtoGeneralWright'scorpsasfarontheroadtoHanoverTownasitcango,withoutattractingattentiontothefact.SendwithitWright'sbestdivisionordivisionunderhisablestcommander.Havetheirplacesfilledupinthelinesoifpossibletheenemywillnotnoticetheirwithdrawal.Sendthecavalrytomorrowafternoon,orasmuchofitasyoumaydeemnecessary,towatchandseize,iftheycan,Littlepage'sBridgeandTaylor'sFord,andtoremainononeorothersideoftheriveratthesepointsuntiltheinfantryandartilleryallpass.AssoonasitisdarktomorrownightstartthedivisionwhichyouwithdrawfirstfromWright'scorpstomakeaforcedmarchtoHanoverTown,takingwiththemnoteamstoimpedetheirmarch.Atthesametimethisdivisionstartscommencewithdrawingallofthe5thand6thcorpsfromthesouthsideoftheriver,andmarchthemforthesameplace.Thetwodivisionsofthe9thcorpsnotnowwithHancock,maybemoveddownthenorthbankoftheriverwheretheywillbehandytosupportHancockifnecessary,orwillbethatmuchontheirroadtofollowthe5thand6thcorps.Hancockshouldholdhiscommandinreadinesstofollowassoonasthewayisclearforhim.Tomorrowitwillleavenothingforhimtodo,butassoonashecanheshouldgetallhisteamsandspareartilleryontheroadorroadswhichhewillhavetotake.AssoonasthetroopsreachHanoverTowntheyshouldgetpossessionofallthecrossingstheycaninthatneighborhood.Ithinkitwouldbewelltomakeaheavycavalrydemonstrationontheenemy'sleft,tomorrowafternoon,also.

U.S.GRANT,Lieut.-General.

Wilson'sdivisionofcavalrywasbroughtupfromtheleftandmovedbyourrightsouthtoLittleRiver.HerehemanoeuvredtogivetheimpressionthatweweregoingtoattacktheleftflankofLee'sarmy.

Undercoverofnightourrightwingwaswithdrawntothenorthsideoftheriver,LeebeingcompletelydeceivedbyWilson'sfeint.Ontheafternoonofthe26thSheridanmoved,sendingGregg'sandTorbert'scavalrytoTaylor'sandLittlepage'sfordstowardsHanover.AssoonasitwasdarkbothdivisionsmovedquietlytoHanoverFerry,leavingsmallguardsbehindtokeepuptheimpressionthatcrossingsweretobeattemptedinthemorning.SheridanwasfollowedbyadivisionofinfantryunderGeneralRussell.Onthemorningofthe27ththecrossingwaseffectedwithbutlittleloss,theenemylosingthirtyorforty,takenprisoners.ThusapositionwassecuredsouthofthePamunkey.

prisoners.ThusapositionwassecuredsouthofthePamunkey.

RussellstoppedatthecrossingwhilethecavalrypushedontoHanoverTown.HereBarringer's,formerlyGordon's,brigadeofrebelcavalrywasencountered,butitwasspeedilydrivenaway.

Warren'sandWright'scorpsweremovedbytherearofBurnside'sandHancock'scorps.Whenoutofthewaytheselattercorpsfollowed,leavingpicketsconfrontingtheenemy.Wilson'scavalryfollowedlast,watchingallthefordsuntileverythinghadrecrossed;thentakingupthepontoonsanddestroyingotherbridges,becametherear-guard.

Tworoadsweretraversedbythetroopsinthismove.TheonenearesttoandnorthoftheNorthAnnaandPamunkeywastakenbyWright,followedbyHancock.Warren,followedbyBurnside,movedbyaroadfarthernorth,andlonger.Thetrainsmovedbyaroadstillfarthernorth,andhadtotravelastillgreaterdistance.AllthetroopsthathadcrossedthePamunkeyonthemorningofthe27thremainedquietduringtherestoftheday,whilethetroopsnorthofthatstreammarchedtoreachthecrossingthathadbeensecuredforthem.

LeehadevidentlybeendeceivedbyourmovementfromNorthAnna;foronthemorningofthe27thhetelegraphedtoRichmond:"Enemycrossedtonorthside,andcavalryandinfantrycrossedatHanoverTown."Thetroopsthathadthencrossedlefthisfrontthenightofthe25th.

Thecountrywewerenowinwasadifficultonetomovetroopsover.Thestreamswerenumerous,deepandsluggish,sometimesspreadingoutintoswampsgrownupwithimpenetrablegrowthsoftreesandunderbrush.Thebanksweregenerallylowandmarshy,makingthestreamsdifficulttoapproachexceptwheretherewereroadsandbridges.

HanoverTownisabouttwentymilesfromRichmond.Therearetworoadsleadingthere;themostdirectandshortestonecrossingtheChickahominyatMeadowBridge,neartheVirginiaCentralRailroad,thesecondgoingbyNewandOldColdHarbor.AfewmilesoutfromHanoverTownthereisathirdroadbywayofMechanicsvilletoRichmond.NewColdHarborwasimportanttousbecausewhiletherewebothcoveredtheroadsbacktoWhiteHouse(whereoursuppliescamefrom),andtheroadssouth-eastoverwhichwewouldhavetopasstogettotheJamesRiverbelowtheRichmonddefences.

Onthemorningofthe28ththearmymadeanearlystart,andbynoonallhad

Onthemorningofthe28ththearmymadeanearlystart,andbynoonallhadcrossedexceptBurnside'scorps.Thiswasleftonthenorthsidetemporarilytoguardthelargewagontrain.Alinewasatonceformedextendingsouthfromtheriver,Wright'scorpsontheright,Hancock'sinthecentre,andWarren'sontheleft,readytomeettheenemyifheshouldcome.

AtthesametimeSheridanwasdirectedtoreconnoitretowardsMechanicsvilletofindLee'sposition.AtHawes'Shop,justwherethemiddleroadleavesthedirectroadtoRichmond,heencounteredtheConfederatecavalrydismountedandpartiallyintrenched.Greggattackedwithhisdivision,butwasunabletomovetheenemy.IntheeveningCustercameupwithabrigade.Theattackwasnowrenewed,thecavalrydismountingandchargingasinfantry.Thistimetheassaultwassuccessful,bothsideslosingaconsiderablenumberofmen.Butourtroopshadtoburythedead,andfoundthatmoreConfederatethanUnionsoldiershadbeenkilled.Thepositionwaseasilyheld,becauseourinfantrywasnear.

Onthe29thareconnoissancewasmadeinforce,tofindthepositionofLee.Wright'scorpspushedtoHanoverCourtHouse.Hancock'scorpspushedtowardTotopotomoyCreek;Warren'scorpstotheleftontheShadyGroveChurchRoad,whileBurnsidewasheldinreserve.Ouradvancewaspushedforwardthreemilesontheleftwithbutlittlefighting.Therewasnowanappearanceofamovementpastourleftflank,andSheridanwassenttomeetit.

Onthe30thHancockmovedtotheTotopotomoy,wherehefoundtheenemystronglyfortified.WrightwasmovedtotherightofHancock'scorps,andBurnsidewasbroughtforwardandcrossed,takingpositiontotheleftofHancock.WarrenmovedupnearHuntleyCornersontheShadyGroveChurchRoad.Therewassomeskirmishingalongthecentre,andintheeveningEarlyattackedWarrenwithsomevigor,drivinghimbackatfirst,andthreateningtoturnourleftflank.Asthebestmeansofreinforcingtheleft,Hancockwasorderedtoattackinhisfront.Hecarriedandheldtherifle-pits.WhilethiswasgoingonWarrengothismenup,repulsedEarly,anddrovehimmorethanamile.

OnthisdayIwrotetoHalleckorderingallthepontoonsinWashingtontobesenttoCityPoint.

IntheeveningnewswasreceivedofthearrivalofSmithwithhiscorpsatWhiteHouse.InotifiedMeade,inwriting,asfollows:

NEARHAWES'SHOP,VA.,6.40P.M.,May30,1864.

MAJOR-GENERALMEADE,CommandingA.P.

GeneralSmithwilldebarkhisforceattheWhiteHousetonightandstartupthesouthbankofthePamunkeyatanearlyhour,probablyat3A.M.inthemorning.Itisnotimprobablethattheenemy,beingawareofSmith'smovement,willbefeelingtogetonourleftflankforthepurposeofcuttinghimoff,orbyadashtocrushhimandgetbackbeforeweareawareofit.Sheridanoughttobenotifiedtowatchtheenemy'smovementswellouttowardsColdHarbor,andalsoontheMechanicsvilleroad.WrightshouldbegotwellmassedonHancock'sright,sothat,ifitbecomesnecessary,hecantaketheplaceofthelatterreadilywhilsttroopsarebeingthrowneastoftheTotopotomoyifnecessary.

IwantSheridantosendacavalryforceofatleasthalfabrigade,ifnotawholebrigade,at5A.M.inthemorning,tocommunicatewithSmithandtoreturnwithhim.IwillsendordersforSmithbythemessengeryousendtoSheridanwithhisorders.

U.S.GRANT.

IalsonotifiedSmithofhisdanger,andtheprecautionsthatwouldbetakentoprotecthim.

Thenightofthe30thLee'spositionwassubstantiallyfromAtlee'sStationontheVirginiaCentralRailroadsouthandeasttothevicinityofColdHarbor.Ourswas:TheleftofWarren'scorpswasontheShadyGroveRoad,extendingtotheMechanicsvilleRoadandaboutthreemilessouthoftheTotopotomoy.Burnsidetohisright,thenHancock,andWrightontheextremeright,extendingtowardsHanoverCourtHouse,sixmilessouth-eastofit.SheridanwithtwodivisionsofcavalrywaswatchingourleftfronttowardsColdHarbor.WilsonwithhisdivisiononourrightwassenttogetontheVirginiaCentralRailroadanddestroyitasfarbackaspossible.HegotpossessionofHanoverCourtHousethenextdayafteraskirmishwithYoung'scavalrybrigade.TheenemyattackedSheridan'spickets,butreinforcementsweresentupandtheattackwasspeedilyrepulsedandtheenemyfollowedsomedistancetowardsColdHarbor.

CHAPTERLV.

CHAPTERLV.

ADVANCEONCOLDHARBOR—ANANECDOTEOFTHEWAR—BATTLEOFCOLDHARBOR—CORRESPONDENCEWITHLEE—RETROSPECTIVE.

Onthe31stSheridanadvancedtonearOldColdHarbor.Hefounditintrenchedandoccupiedbycavalryandinfantry.Ahardfightensuedbuttheplacewascarried.TheenemywellknewtheimportanceofColdHarbortous,andseemeddeterminedthatweshouldnotholdit.HereturnedwithsuchalargeforcethatSheridanwasaboutwithdrawingwithoutmakinganyefforttoholditagainstsuchodds;butaboutthetimehecommencedtheevacuationhereceivedorderstoholdtheplaceatallhazards,untilreinforcementscouldbesenttohim.Hespeedilyturnedtherebelworkstofaceagainstthemandplacedhismeninpositionfordefence.Nightcameonbeforetheenemywasreadyforassault.

Wright'scorpswasorderedearlyintheeveningtomarchdirectlytoColdHarborpassingbytherearofthearmy.Itwasexpectedtoarrivebydaylightorbefore;butthenightwasdarkandthedistancegreat,sothatitwasnineo'clockthe1stofJunebeforeitreacheditsdestination.BeforethearrivalofWrighttheenemyhadmadetwoassaultsonSheridan,bothofwhichwererepulsedwithheavylosstotheenemy.Wright'scorpscomingup,therewasnofurtherassaultonColdHarbor.

Smith,whowascomingupfromWhiteHouse,wasalsodirectedtomarchdirectlytoColdHarbor,andwasexpectedearlyonthemorningofthe1stofJune;butbysomeblundertheorderwhichreachedSmithdirectedhimtoNewcastleinsteadofColdHarbor.ThroughthisblunderSmithdidnotreachhisdestinationuntilthreeo'clockintheafternoon,andthenwithtiredandworn-outmenfromtheirlonganddustymarch.HelandedtwelvethousandfivehundredmenfromButler'scommand,butadivisionwasleftatWhiteHousetemporarilyandmanymenhadfallenoutofranksintheirlongmarch.

BeforetheremovalofWright'scorpsfromourright,afterdarkonthe31st,thetwolines,FederalandConfederate,weresoclosetogetheratthatpointthateithersidecoulddetectdirectlyanymovementmadebytheother.FindingatdaylightthatWrighthadlefthisfront,Leeevidentlydivinedthathehadgonetoourleft.Atallevents,soonafterlightonthe1stofJuneAnderson,whocommandedthecorpsonLee'sleft,wasseenmovingalongWarren'sfront.Warrenwasorderedtoattackhimvigorouslyinflank,whileWrightwasdirectedtomoveoutandgetonhisfront.Warrenfiredhisartilleryattheenemy;

directedtomoveoutandgetonhisfront.Warrenfiredhisartilleryattheenemy;butlostsomuchtimeinmakingreadythattheenemygotby,andatthreeo'clockhereportedtheenemywasstronglyintrenchedinhisfront,andbesideshislinesweresolongthathehadnomassoftroopstomovewith.Heseemedtohaveforgottenthatlinesinrearofanarmyholdthemselveswhiletheirdefendersarefightingintheirfront.Wrightreconnoitredsomedistancetohisfront:buttheenemyfindingOldColdHarboralreadytakenhadhaltedandfortifiedsomedistancewest.

Bysixo'clockintheafternoonWrightandSmithwerereadytomakeanassault.Infrontofboththegroundwasclearforseveralhundredyardsandthenbecamewooded.Bothchargedacrossthisopenspaceandintothewood,capturingandholdingthefirstlineofrifle-pitsoftheenemy,andalsocapturingsevenoreighthundredprisoners.

Whilethiswasgoingon,theenemychargedWarrenthreeseparatetimeswithvigor,butwererepulsedeachtimewithloss.Therewasnoofficermorecapable,noronemorepromptinacting,thanWarrenwhentheenemyforcedhimtoit.TherewasalsoanattackuponHancock'sandBurnside'scorpsatthesametime;butitwasfeebleandprobablyonlyintendedtorelieveAndersonwhowasbeingpressedbyWrightandSmith.

Duringthenighttheenemymadefrequentattackswiththeviewofdispossessingusoftheimportantpositionwehadgained,butwithouteffectingtheirobject.

HancockwasmovedfromhisplaceinlineduringthenightandorderedtotheleftofWright.Iexpectedtotaketheoffensiveonthemorningofthe2d,butthenightwassodark,theheatanddustsoexcessiveandtheroadssointricateandhardtokeep,thattheheadofcolumnonlyreachedOldColdHarboratsixo'clock,butwasinpositionat7.30A.M.Preparationsweremadeforanattackintheafternoon,butdidnottakeplaceuntilthenextmorning.Warren'scorpswasmovedtothelefttoconnectwithSmith:Hancock'scorpswasgotintopositiontotheleftofWright's,andBurnsidewasmovedtoBethesdaChurchinreserve.WhileWarrenandBurnsideweremakingthesechangestheenemycameoutseveraltimesandattackedthem,capturingseveralhundredprisoners.Theattackswererepulsed,butnotfollowedupastheyshouldhavebeen.IwassoannoyedatthisthatIdirectedMeadetoinstructhiscorpscommandersthattheyshouldseizeallsuchopportunitieswhentheyoccurred,andnotwaitfororders,allofourmanoeuvresbeingmadefortheverypurposeofgettingtheenemyoutofhiscover.

OnthisdayWilsonreturnedfromhisraidupontheVirginiaCentralRailroad,havingdamageditconsiderably.But,likeourselves,therebelshadbecomeexpertsinrepairingsuchdamage.Sherman,inhismemoirs,relatesananecdoteofhiscampaigntoAtlantathatwellillustratesthispoint.Therebelcavalrylurkinginhisreartoburnbridgesandobstructhiscommunicationshadbecomesodisgustedathearingtrainsgowhistlingbywithinafewhoursafterabridgehadbeenburned,thattheyproposedtotryblowingupsomeofthetunnels.Oneofthemsaid,"Nouse,boys,OldShermancarriesduplicatetunnelswithhim,andwillreplacethemasfastasyoucanblowthemup;bettersaveyourpowder."

SheridanwasengagedreconnoitringthebanksoftheChickahominy,tofindcrossingsandtheconditionoftheroads.Hereportedfavorably.

DuringthenightLeemovedhisleftuptomakehislinecorrespondtoours.HislinesextendednowfromtheTotopotomoytoNewColdHarbor.MinefromBethesdaChurchbyOldColdHarbortotheChickahominy,withadivisionofcavalryguardingourright.Anassaultwasorderedforthe3d,tobemademainlybythecorpsofHancock,WrightandSmith;butWarrenandBurnsideweretosupportitbythreateningLee'sleft,andtoattackwithgreatearnestnessifheshouldeitherreinforcemorethreatenedpointsbydrawingfromthatquarterorifafavorableopportunityshouldpresentitself.

Thecorpscommandersweretoselectthepointsintheirrespectivefrontswheretheywouldmaketheirassaults.Themovewastocommenceathalf-pastfourinthemorning.HancocksentBarlowandGibbonforwardattheappointedhour,withBirneyasareserve.Barlowpushedforwardwithgreatvigor,underaheavyfireofbothartilleryandmusketry,throughthicketsandswamps.Notwithstandingalltheresistanceoftheenemyandthenaturalobstructionstoovercome,hecarriedapositionoccupiedbytheenemyoutsidetheirmainlinewheretheroadmakesadeepcutthroughabankaffordingasgoodashelterfortroopsasifithadbeenmadeforthatpurpose.Threepiecesofartilleryhadbeencapturedhere,andseveralhundredprisoners.Thegunswereimmediatelyturnedagainstthemenwhohadjustbeenusingthem.No(*33)assistancecomingtohim,he(Barlow)intrenchedunderfireandcontinuedtoholdhisplace.Gibbonwasnotsofortunateinhisfront.Hefoundthegroundoverwhichhehadtopasscutupwithdeepravines,andamorassdifficulttocross.Buthismenstruggledonuntilsomeofthemgotuptotheveryparapetcoveringtheenemy.Gibbongainedgroundmuchnearertheenemythanthatwhichheleft,andhereheintrenchedandheldfast.

Wright'scorpsmovingintwolinescapturedtheouterrifle-pitsintheirfront,butaccomplishednothingmore.Smith'scorpsalsogainedtheouterrifle-pitsinitsfront.Thegroundoverwhichthiscorps(18th)hadtomovewasthemostexposedofanyoverwhichchargesweremade.Anopenplainintervenedbetweenthecontendingforcesatthispoint,whichwasexposedbothtoadirectandacrossfire.Smith,however,findingaravinerunningtowardshisfront,sufficientlydeeptoprotectmeninitfromcrossfire,andsomewhatfromadirectfire,putMartindale'sdivisioninit,andwithBrookssupportinghimontheleftandDevensontherightsucceededingainingtheouter—probablypicket—rifle-pits.WarrenandBurnsidealsoadvancedandgainedground—whichbroughtthewholearmyononeline.

Thisassaultcostusheavilyandprobablywithoutbenefittocompensate:buttheenemywasnotcheeredbytheoccurrencesufficientlytoinducehimtotaketheoffensive.Infact,nowhereafterthebattleoftheWildernessdidLeeshowanydispositiontoleavehisdefencesfarbehindhim.

Fightingwassubstantiallyoverbyhalf-pastseveninthemorning.Ateleveno'clockIstartedtovisitallthecorpscommanderstoseeformyselfthedifferentpositionsgainedandtogettheiropinionofthepracticabilityofdoinganythingmoreintheirrespectivefronts.

Hancockgavetheopinionthatinhisfronttheenemywastoostrongtomakeanyfurtherassaultpromisesuccess.Wrightthoughthecouldgainthelinesoftheenemy,butitwouldrequirethecooperationofHancock'sandSmith'scorps.Smiththoughtalodgmentpossible,butwasnotsanguine:Burnsidethoughtsomethingcouldbedoneinhisfront,butWarrendiffered.Iconcluded,thereforetomakenomoreassaults,andalittleaftertwelvedirectedinthefollowingletterthatalloffensiveactionshouldcease.

COLDHARBOR,June3,1864.-12.30P.M.MAJOR-GENERALMEADE,

CommandingA.P.

Theopinionofcorpscommandersnotbeingsanguineofsuccessincaseanassaultisordered,youmaydirectasuspensionoffartheradvanceforthepresent.Holdourmostadvancedpositionsandstrengthenthem.Whilstonthedefensiveourlinemaybecontractedfromtherightifpracticable.

Reconnoissancesshouldbemadeinfrontofeverycorpsandadvancesmadeto

Reconnoissancesshouldbemadeinfrontofeverycorpsandadvancesmadetoadvantageouspositionsbyregularapproaches.ToaidtheexpeditionunderGeneralHunteritisnecessarythatweshoulddetainallthearmynowwithLeeuntiltheformergetswellonhiswaytoLynchburg.TodothiseffectuallyitwillbebettertokeeptheenemyoutoftheintrenchmentsofRichmondthantohavethemgobackthere.

WrightandHancockshouldbereadytoassaultincasetheenemyshouldbreakthroughGeneralSmith'slines,andallshouldbereadytoresistanassault.

U.S.GRANT,Lieutenant-General.

Theremainderofthedaywasspentinstrengtheningthelinewenowheld.BynightwewereasstrongagainstLeeashewasagainstus.

Duringthenighttheenemyquittedourrightfront,abandoningsomeoftheirwounded,andwithoutburyingtheirdead.Thesewewereabletocarefor.Butthereweremanydeadandwoundedmenbetweenthelinesofthecontendingforces,whichwerenowclosetogether,whocouldnotbecaredforwithoutacessationofhostilities.

SoIwrotethefollowing:

COLDHARBOR,VA.,June5,1864.

GENERALR.E.LEE,CommandingConfederateArmy.

Itisreportedtomethattherearewoundedmen,probablyofbotharmies,nowlyingexposedandsufferingbetweenthelinesoccupiedrespectivelybythetwoarmies.Humanitywoulddictatethatsomeprovisionshouldbemadetoprovideagainstsuchhardships.Iwouldpropose,therefore,thathereafter,whennobattleisraging,eitherpartybeauthorizedtosendtoanypointbetweenthepicketsorskirmishlines,unarmedmenbearinglitterstopickuptheirdeadorwounded,withoutbeingfireduponbytheotherparty.Anyothermethod,equallyfairtobothparties,youmayproposeformeetingtheenddesiredwillbeacceptedbyme.

U.S.GRANT,Lieut.-General.

Leerepliedthathefearedsuchanarrangementwouldleadtomisunderstanding,andproposedthatinfuture,wheneitherpartywishedtoremovetheirdeadandwounded,aflagoftrucebesent.Iansweredthisimmediatelybysaying:

COLDHARBOR,VA.,June6,1864.

GENERALR.E.LEE,CommandingArmyofN.Va.

Yourcommunicationofyesterday'sdateisreceived.Iwillsendimmediately,asyoupropose,tocollectthedeadandwoundedbetweenthelinesofthetwoarmies,andwillalsoinstructthatyoubeallowedtodothesame.Iproposethatthetimefordoingthisbebetweenthehoursof12M.and3P.M.to-day.Iwilldirectallpartiesgoingouttobearawhiteflag,andnottoattempttogobeyondwherewehavedeadorwounded,andnotbeyondorongroundoccupiedbyyourtroops.

U.S.GRANT,Lieut.-General.

Lee'sresponsewasthathecouldnotconsenttotheburialofthedeadandremovalofthewoundedinthewayIproposed,butwheneitherpartydesiredsuchpermissionitshouldbeaskedforbyflagoftruceandhehaddirectedthatanypartiesImayhavesentout,asmentionedinmyletter,tobeturnedback.Ianswered:

COLDHARBOR,VA,June6,1864.

GENERALR.E.LEE.CommandingArmy,N.Va.

Theknowledgethatwoundedmenarenowsufferingfromwantofattention,betweenthetwoarmies,compelsmetoaskasuspensionofhostilitiesforsufficienttimetocollectthemin,saytwohours.Permitmetosaythatthehoursyoumayfixuponforthiswillbeagreeabletome,andthesameprivilegewillbeextendedtosuchpartiesasyoumaywishtosendoutonthesamedutywithoutfurtherapplication.

U.S.GRANT,Lieut.-General.

Leeaccededtothis;butdelaysintransmittingthecorrespondencebroughtittothe7thofJune—forty-eighthoursafteritcommenced—beforepartiesweregotouttocollectthemenleftuponthefield.Inthemeantimeallbuttwoofthewoundedhaddied.AndIwrotetoLee:

COLDHARBOR,VA.,June7,1864.10.30A.M.

GEN.R.E.LEE,CommandingArmyofN.Va.

IregretthatyournoteofsevenP.M.yesterdayshouldhavebeenreceivedatthenearestcorpsheadquarters,towhereitwasdelivered,afterthehourwhichhadbeengivenfortheremovalofthedeadandwoundedhadexpired;10.45P.M.wasthehouratwhichitwasreceivedatcorpsheadquarters,andbetweenelevenandtwelveitreachedmyheadquarters.Asaconsequence,itwasnotunderstoodbythetroopsofthisarmythattherewasacessationofhostilitiesforthepurposeofcollectingthedeadandwounded,andnonewerecollected.Twoofficersandsixmenofthe8thand25thNorthCarolinaRegts.,whowereoutinsearchofthebodiesofofficersoftheirrespectiveregiments,werecapturedandbroughtintoourlines,owingtothiswantofunderstanding.Iregretthis,butwillstatethatassoonasIlearnedthefact,Idirectedthattheyshouldnotbeheldasprisoners,butmustbereturnedtotheircommands.Theseofficersandmenhavingbeencarelesslybroughtthroughourlinestotherearhavenotdeterminedwhethertheywillbesentbackthewaytheycame,orwhethertheywillbesentbysomeotherroute.

Regrettingthatallmyeffortsforalleviatingthesufferingsofwoundedmenleftuponthebattle-fieldhavebeenrenderednugatory,Iremain,&c.,

U.S.GRANT,Lieutenant-General.

IhavealwaysregrettedthatthelastassaultatColdHarborwasevermade.Imightsaythesamethingoftheassaultofthe22dofMay,1863,atVicksburg.AtColdHarbornoadvantagewhateverwasgainedtocompensatefortheheavylosswesustained.Indeed,theadvantagesotherthanthoseofrelativelosses,wereontheConfederateside.Beforethat,theArmyofNorthernVirginiaseemedtohaveacquiredawholesomeregardforthecourage,endurance,andsoldierlyqualitiesgenerallyoftheArmyofthePotomac.Theynolongerwantedtofightthem"oneConfederatetofiveYanks."Indeed,theyseemedtohavegivenupanyideaofgaininganyadvantageoftheirantagonistintheopenfield.

givenupanyideaofgaininganyadvantageoftheirantagonistintheopenfield.TheyhadcometomuchpreferbreastworksintheirfronttotheArmyofthePotomac.Thischargeseemedtorevivetheirhopestemporarily;butitwasofshortduration.TheeffectupontheArmyofthePotomacwasthereverse.WhenwereachedtheJamesRiver,however,alleffectsofthebattleofColdHarborseemedtohavedisappeared.

TherewasmorejustificationfortheassaultatVicksburg.WewereinaSouthernclimate,atthebeginningofthehotseason.TheArmyoftheTennesseehadwonfivesuccessivevictoriesoverthegarrisonofVicksburginthethreeprecedingweeks.TheyhaddrivenaportionofthatarmyfromPortGibsonwithconsiderableloss,afterhavingflankedthemoutoftheirstrongholdatGrandGulf.TheyhadattackedanotherportionofthesamearmyatRaymond,morethanfiftymilesfartherintheinterioroftheState,anddriventhembackintoJacksonwithgreatlossinkilled,wounded,capturedandmissing,besideslossoflargeandsmallarms:theyhadcapturedthecapitaloftheStateofMississippi,withalargeamountofmaterialsofwarandmanufactures.Onlyafewdaysbefore,theyhadbeatentheenemythenpennedupinthetownfirstatChampion'sHill,nextatBigBlackRiverBridge,inflictinguponhimalossoffifteenthousandormoremen(includingthosecutofffromreturning)besideslargelossesinarmsandammunition.TheArmyoftheTennesseehadcometobelievethattheycouldbeattheirantagonistunderanycircumstances.Therewasnotellinghowlongaregularsiegemightlast.AsIhavestated,itwasthebeginningofthehotseasoninaSouthernclimate.TherewasnotellingwhatthecasualtiesmightbeamongNortherntroopsworkingandlivingintrenches,drinkingsurfacewaterfilteredthroughrichvegetation,underatropicalsun.IfVicksburgcouldhavebeencarriedinMay,itwouldnotonlyhavesavedthearmytheriskitranofagreaterdangerthanfromthebulletsoftheenemy,butitwouldhavegivenusasplendidarmy,wellequippedandofficered,tooperateelsewherewith.Thesearereasonsjustifyingtheassault.Theonlybenefitwegained—anditwasaslightoneforsogreatasacrifice—wasthatthemenworkedcheerfullyinthetrenchesafterthat,beingsatisfiedwithdiggingtheenemyout.Hadtheassaultnotbeenmade,IhavenodoubtthatthemajorityofthoseengagedinthesiegeofVicksburgwouldhavebelievedthathadweassaulteditwouldhaveprovensuccessful,andwouldhavesavedlife,healthandcomfort.

CHAPTERLVI.

CHAPTERLVI.

LEFTFLANKMOVEMENTACROSSTHECHICKAHOMINYANDJAMES—GENERALLEE—VISITTOBUTLER—THEMOVEMENTONPETERSBURG—THEINVESTMENTOFPETERSBURG.

Lee'spositionwasnowsonearRichmond,andtheinterveningswampsoftheChickahominysogreatanobstacletothemovementoftroopsinthefaceofanenemy,thatIdeterminedtomakemynextleftflankmovecarrytheArmyofthePotomacsouthoftheJamesRiver.(*34)Preparationsforthiswerepromptlycommenced.Themovewasahazardousonetomake:theChickahominyRiver,withitsmarshyandheavilytimberedapproaches,hadtobecrossed;allthebridgesoveriteastofLeeweredestroyed;theenemyhadashorterlineandbetterroadstotravelontoconfrontmeincrossing;morethanfiftymilesintervenedbetweenmeandButler,bytheroadsIshouldhavetotravel,withboththeJamesandtheChickahominyunbridgedtocross;andlast,theArmyofthePotomachadtobegotoutofapositionbutafewhundredyardsfromtheenemyatthewidestplace.Lee,ifhedidnotchoosetofollowme,might,withhisshorterdistancetotravelandhisbridgesovertheChickahominyandtheJames,moverapidlyonButlerandcrushhimbeforethearmywithmecouldcometohisrelief.ThentoohemightsparetroopsenoughtosendagainstHunterwhowasapproachingLynchburg,livinguponthecountryhepassedthrough,andwithoutammunitionfurtherthanwhathecarriedwithhim.

Butthemovehadtobemade,andIrelieduponLee'snotseeingmydangerasIsawit.BesideswehadarmiesonbothsidesoftheJamesRiverandnotfarfromtheConfederatecapital.Iknewthatitssafetywouldbeamatterofthefirstconsiderationwiththeexecutive,legislativeandjudicialbranchesoftheso-calledConfederategovernment,ifitwasnotwiththemilitarycommanders.ButItookalltheprecautionIknewoftoguardagainstalldangers.

Sheridanwassentwithtwodivisions,tocommunicatewithHunterandtobreakuptheVirginiaCentralRailroadandtheJamesRiverCanal,onthe7thofJune,takinginstructionstoHuntertocomebackwithhim(*35).HunterwasalsoinformedbywayofWashingtonandtheValleythatSheridanwasonthewaytomeethim.ThecanalandCentralRoad,andtheregionspenetratedbythem,wereofvastimportancetotheenemy,furnishingandcarryingalargepercent.ofallthesuppliesfortheArmyofNorthernVirginiaandthepeopleofRichmond.BeforeSheridangotoffonthe7thnewswasreceivedfromHunterreportinghisadvancetoStauntonandsuccessfulengagementwiththeenemynearthatplaceonthe5th,inwhichtheConfederatecommander,W.S.Jones,waskilled.On

onthe5th,inwhichtheConfederatecommander,W.S.Jones,waskilled.Onthe4thofJunetheenemyhavingwithdrawnhisleftcorps,BurnsideonourrightwasmovedupbetweenWarrenandSmith.Onthe5thBirneyreturnedtoHancock,whichextendedhisleftnowtotheChickahominy,andWarrenwaswithdrawntoColdHarbor.WrightwasdirectedtosendtwodivisionstothelefttoextenddownthebanksofthatstreamtoBottom'sBridge.ThecavalryextendedstillfarthereasttoJones'sBridge.

Onthe7thAbercrombie—whowasincommandatWhiteHouse,andwhohadbeenincommandatourbaseofsuppliesinallthechangesmadefromthestart—wasorderedtotakeuptheironfromtheYorkRiverRailroadandputitonboats,andtobeinreadinesstomovebywatertoCityPoint.

Onthe8thMeadewasdirectedtofortifyalinedownthebankoverlookingtheChickahominy,undercoverofwhichthearmycouldmove.

Onthe9thAbercrombiewasdirectedtosendallorganizedtroopsarrivingatWhiteHouse,withoutdebarkingfromtheirtransports,toreporttoButler.HalleckwasatthistimeinstructedtosendallreinforcementstoCityPoint.

Onthe11thIwrote:

COLDHARBOR,VA.,June11,1864.

MAJOR-GEN.B.F.BUTLER,CommandingDepartmentofVa.andN.C.

ThemovementtotransferthisarmytothesouthsideoftheJamesRiverwillcommenceafterdarktomorrownight.Col.Comstock,ofmystaff,wassentspeciallytoascertainwhatwasnecessarytomakeyourpositionsecureintheintervalduringwhichtheenemymightusemostofhisforceagainstyou,andalso,toascertainwhatpointontheriverweshouldreachtoeffectacrossingifitshouldnotbepracticabletoreachthissideoftheriveratBermudaHundred.ColonelComstockhasnotyetreturned,sothatIcannotmakeinstructionsasdefiniteasIwouldwish,butthetimebetweenthisandSundaynightbeingsoshortinwhichtogetwordtoyou,ImustdothebestIcan.ColonelDentgoestotheChickahominytotaketoyouthe18thcorps.Thecorpswillleaveitspositioninthetrenchesasearlyintheevening,tomorrow,aspossible,andmakeaforcedmarchtoCole'sLandingorFerry,whereitshouldreachbytenA.M.thefollowingmorning.Thiscorpsnumbersnow15,300men.Theytakewiththemneitherwagonsnorartillery;theselattermarchingwiththebalanceofthearmy

neitherwagonsnorartillery;theselattermarchingwiththebalanceofthearmytotheJamesRiver.TheremainderofthearmywillcrosstheChickahominyatLongBridgeandatJones's,andstriketheriveratthemostpracticablecrossingbelowCityPoint.

Idirectedseveraldaysagothatallreinforcementsforthearmyshouldbesenttoyou.Iamnotadvisedofthenumberthatmayhavegone,butsupposeyouhavereceivedfromsixtotenthousand.GeneralSmithwillalsoreachyouassoonastheenemycould,goingbythewayofRichmond.

Thebalanceoftheforcewillnotbemorethanonedaybehind,unlessdetainedbythewholeofLee'sarmy,inwhichcaseyouwillbestrongenough.

Iwishyouwoulddirecttheproperstaffofficers,yourchief-engineerandyourchief-quartermaster,tocommenceatoncethecollectionofallthemeansintheirreachforcrossingthearmyonitsarrival.IfthereisapointbelowCityPointwhereapontoonbridgecanbethrown,haveitlaid.

Expectingthearrivalofthe18thcorpsbyMondaynight,ifyoudeemitpracticablefromtheforceyouhavetoseizeandholdPetersburg,youmaypreparetostart,onthearrivaloftroopstoholdyourpresentlines.IdonotwantPetersburgvisited,however,unlessitisheld,noranattempttotakeit,unlessyoufeelareasonabledegreeofconfidenceofsuccess.Ifyoushouldgothere,Ithinktroopsshouldtakenothingwiththemexceptwhattheycancarry,dependinguponsuppliesbeingsentaftertheplaceissecured.IfColonelDentshouldnotsucceedinsecuringtherequisiteamountoftransportationforthe18thcorpsbeforereachingyou,pleasehavethebalancesupplied.

U.S.GRANT,Lieut.-General.

P.S.—OnreflectionIwillsendthe18thcorpsbywayofWhiteHouse.Thedistancewhichtheywillhavetomarchwillbeenoughshortertoenablethemtoreachyouaboutthesametime,andtheuncertaintyofnavigationontheChickahominywillbeavoided.

U.S.GRANT.

COLDHARBOR,VA.,June11,1864.

MAJOR-GENERALG.G.MEADE,CommandingArmyofthePotomac.

MAJOR-GENERALG.G.MEADE,CommandingArmyofthePotomac.

ColonelComstock,whovisitedtheJamesRiverforthepurposeofascertainingthebestpointbelowBermudaHundredtowhichtomarchthearmyhasnotyetreturned.Itisnowgettingsolate,however,thatallpreparationsmaybemadeforthemovetomorrownightwithoutwaitinglonger.

Themovementwillbemadeasheretoforeagreedupon,thatis,the18thcorpsmakearapidmarchwiththeinfantryalone,theirwagonsandartilleryaccompanyingthebalanceofthearmytoCole'sLandingorFerry,andthereembarkforCityPoint,losingnotimeforrestuntiltheyreachthelatterpoint.

The5thcorpswillseizeLongBridgeandmoveoutontheLongBridgeRoadtoitsjunctionwithQuakerRoad,oruntilstoppedbytheenemy.

Theotherthreecorpswillfollowinsuchorderasyoumaydirect,oneofthemcrossingatLongBridge,andtwoatJones'sBridge.Afterthecrossingiseffected,themostpracticableroadswillbetakentoreachaboutFortPowhattan.Ofcourse,thisissupposingtheenemymakesnooppositiontoouradvance.The5thcorps,aftersecuringthepassageofthebalanceofthearmy,willjoinorfollowinrearofthecorpswhichcrossesthesamebridgewiththemselves.Thewagontrainsshouldbekeptwelleastofthetroops,andifacrossingcanbefound,ormadelowerdownthanJones'stheyshouldtakeit.

U.S.GRANT,Lieut.-General.

P.S.—InviewofthelongmarchtoreachCole'sLanding,andtheuncertaintyofbeingabletoembarkalargenumberofmenthere,thedirectionofthe18thcorpsmaybechangedtoWhiteHouse.Theyshouldbedirectedtoloaduptransports,andstartthemasfastasloadedwithoutwaitingforthewholecorpsorevenwholedivisionstogotogether.

U.S.GRANT.

Aboutthistimewordwasreceived(throughtheRichmondpapersofthe11th)thatCrookandAverellhadunitedandweremovingeast.This,withthenewsofHunter'ssuccessfulengagementnearStaunton,wasnodoubtknowntoLeebeforeitwastome.ThenSheridanleavingwithtwodivisionsofcavalry,lookedindeedthreatening,bothtoLee'scommunicationsandsupplies.MuchofhiscavalrywassentafterSheridan,andEarlywithEwell'sentirecorpswassenttotheValley.SuppliesweregrowingscarceinRichmond,andthesourcesfrom

theValley.SuppliesweregrowingscarceinRichmond,andthesourcesfromwhichtodrawthemwereinourhands.PeoplefromoutsidebegantopourintoRichmondtohelpeatupthelittleonhand.Consternationreignedthere.

Onthe12thSmithwasorderedtomoveatnighttoWhiteHouse,nottostopuntilhereachedthere,andtotakeboatsatonceforCityPoint,leavinghistrainsandartillerytomovebyland.

SoonafterdarksomeofthecavalryatLongBridgeeffectedacrossingbywadingandflounderingthroughthewaterandmud,leavingtheirhorsesbehind,anddroveawaythecavalrypickets.Apontoonbridgewasspeedilythrownacross,overwhichtheremainderofthearmysoonpassedandpushedoutforamileortwotowatchanddetainanyadvancethatmightbemadefromtheotherside.Warrenfollowedthecavalry,andbythemorningofthe13thhadhiswholecorpsover.HancockfollowedWarren.BurnsidetooktheroadtoJones'sBridge,followedbyWright.Ferrero'sdivision,withthewagontrain,movedfarthereast,byWindowShadesandCole'sFerry,ourrearbeingcoveredbycavalry.

ItwasknownthattheenemyhadsomegunboatsatRichmond.Thesemightrundownatnightandinflictgreatdamageuponusbeforetheycouldbesunkorcapturedbyournavy.GeneralButlerhad,inadvance,loadedsomevesselswithstonereadytobesunksoastoobstructthechannelinanemergency.Onthe13thIsentorderstohavethesesunkashighuptheriveraswecouldguardthem,andpreventtheirremovalbytheenemy.

AssoonasWarren'scorpswasovertheChickahominyitmarchedoutandjoinedthecavalryinholdingtheroadsfromRichmondwhilethearmypassed.Noattemptwasmadebytheenemytoimpedeourmarch,however,butWarrenandWilsonreportedtheenemystronglyfortifiedintheirfront.Bytheeveningofthe13thHancock'scorpswasatCharlesCityCourtHouseontheJamesRiver.Burnside'sandWright'scorpswereontheChickahominy,andcrossedduringthenight,Warren'scorpsandthecavalrystillcoveringthearmy.Thematerialforapontoonbridgewasalreadyathandandtheworkoflayingitwascommencedimmediately,underthesuperintendenceofBrigadier-GeneralBenham,commandingtheengineerbrigade.Ontheeveningofthe14ththecrossingcommenced,Hancockinadvance,usingboththebridgeandboats.

WhentheWildernesscampaigncommencedtheArmyofthePotomac,includingBurnside's—whichwasaseparatecommanduntilthe24thofMaywhenitwasincorporatedwiththemainarmy—numberedabout116,000men.Duringthe

incorporatedwiththemainarmy—numberedabout116,000men.Duringtheprogressofthecampaignabout40,000reinforcementswerereceived.AtthecrossingoftheJamesRiverJune14th-15ththearmynumberedabout115,000.Besidestheordinarylossesincidenttoacampaignofsixweeks'nearlyconstantfightingorskirmishing,aboutone-halfoftheartillerywassentbacktoWashington,andmanymenweredischargedbyreasonoftheexpirationoftheirtermofservice.*Inestimatingourstrengtheveryenlistedmanandeverycommissionedofficerpresentisincluded,nomatterhowemployed;inbands,sickinfieldhospitals,hospitalattendants,companycooksandall.Operatinginanenemy'scountry,andbeingsuppliedalwaysfromadistantbase,largedetachmentshadatalltimestobesentfromthefront,notonlytoguardthebaseofsuppliesandtheroadstoit,butalltheroadsleadingtoourflanksandrear.Wewerealsooperatinginacountryunknowntous,andwithoutcompetentguidesormapsshowingtheroadsaccurately.

Themannerofestimatingnumbersinthetwoarmiesdiffersmaterially.IntheConfederatearmyoftenonlybayonetsaretakenintoaccount,never,Ibelieve,dotheyestimatemorethanarehandlingthegunsoftheartilleryandarmedwithmuskets(*36)orcarbines.Generallythelatterarefarenoughawaytobeexcludedfromthecountinanyonefield.Officersanddetailsofenlistedmenarenotincluded.IntheNorthernarmiestheestimateismostliberal,takinginallconnectedwiththearmyanddrawingpay.

Estimatedinthesamemannerasours,Leehadnotlessthan80,000menatthestart.Hisreinforcementswereaboutequaltooursduringthecampaign,deductingthedischargedmenandthosesentback.Hewasonthedefensive,andinacountryinwhicheverystream,everyroad,everyobstacletothemovementoftroopsandeverynaturaldefencewasfamiliartohimandhisarmy.Thecitizenswereallfriendlytohimandhiscause,andcouldanddidfurnishhimwithaccuratereportsofoureverymove.Rearguardswerenotnecessaryforhim,andhavingalwaysarailroadathisback,largewagontrainswerenotrequired.Allcircumstancesconsideredwedidnothaveanyadvantageinnumbers.

GeneralLee,whohadledtheArmyofNorthernVirginiainallthesecontests,wasaveryhighlyestimatedmanintheConfederatearmyandStates,andfilledalsoaveryhighplaceintheestimationofthepeopleandpressoftheNorthernStates.HispraisewassoundedthroughouttheentireNorthaftereveryactionhewasengagedin:thenumberofhisforceswasalwaysloweredandthatoftheNationalforcesexaggerated.Hewasalarge,austereman,andIjudgedifficultofapproachtohissubordinates.TobeextolledbytheentirepressoftheSouthafter

approachtohissubordinates.TobeextolledbytheentirepressoftheSouthaftereveryengagement,andbyaportionofthepressNorthwithequalvehemence,wascalculatedtogivehimtheentireconfidenceofhistroopsandtomakehimfearedbyhisantagonists.Itwasnotanuncommonthingformystaff-officerstohearfromEasternofficers,"Well,GranthasnevermetBobbyLeeyet."ThereweregoodandtrueofficerswhobelievenowthattheArmyofNorthernVirginiawassuperiortotheArmyofthePotomacmantoman.Idonotbelieveso,exceptastheadvantagesspokenofabovemadethemso.BeforetheendIbelievethedifferencewastheotherway.TheArmyofNorthernVirginiabecamedespondentandsawtheend.Itdidnotpleasethem.TheNationalarmysawthesamething,andwereencouragedbyit.

TheadvanceoftheArmyofthePotomacreachedtheJamesonthe14thofJune.Preparationswereatoncecommencedforlayingthepontoonbridgesandcrossingtheriver.Asalreadystated,IhadpreviouslyorderedGeneralButlertohavetwovesselsloadedwithstoneandcarrieduptherivertoapointabovethatoccupiedbyourgunboats,wherethechannelwasnarrow,andsunktheresoastoobstructthepassageandpreventConfederategunboatsfromcomingdowntheriver.Butlerhadhadtheseboatsfilledandputinposition,buthadnothadthemsunkbeforemyarrival.Iorderedthisdone,andalsodirectedthatheshouldturnoverallmaterialandboatsnottheninuseintherivertobeusedinferryingthetroopsacross.

Ithen,onthe14th,tookasteamerandranuptoBermudaHundredtoseeGeneralButlerforthepurposeofdirectingamovementagainstPetersburg,whileourtroopsoftheArmyofthePotomacwerecrossing.

IhadsentGeneralW.F.SmithbackfromColdHarborbythewayofWhiteHouse,thenceonsteamerstoCityPointforthepurposeofgivingGeneralButlermoretroopswithwhichtoaccomplishthisresult.GeneralButlerwasorderedtosendSmithwithhistroopsreinforced,asfarasthatcouldbeconvenientlydone,fromotherpartsoftheArmyoftheJames.HegaveSmithaboutsixthousandreinforcements,includingsometwenty-fivehundredcavalryunderKautz,andaboutthirty-fivehundredcoloredinfantryunderHinks.

ThedistancewhichSmithhadtomovetoreachtheenemy'slineswasaboutsixmiles,andtheConfederateadvancelineofworkswasbuttwomilesoutsideofPetersburg.Smithwastomoveundercoverofnight,upclosetotheenemy'sworks,andassaultassoonashecouldafterdaylight.Ibelievedthen,andstillbelieve,thatPetersburgcouldhavebeeneasilycapturedatthattime.Itonlyhadabout2,500meninthedefencesbesidessomeirregulartroops,consistingof

about2,500meninthedefencesbesidessomeirregulartroops,consistingofcitizensandemployeesinthecitywhotookuparmsincaseofemergency.Smithstartedasproposed,buthisadvanceencounteredarebelforceintrenchedbetweenCityPointandtheirlinesoutsideofPetersburg.Thispositionhecarried,withsomelosstotheenemy;buttherewassomuchdelaythatitwasdaylightbeforehistroopsreallygotofffromthere.WhilethereIinformedGeneralButlerthatHancock'scorpswouldcrosstheriverandmovetoPetersburgtosupportSmithincasethelatterwassuccessful,andthatIcouldreinforcetheremorerapidlythanLeecouldreinforcefromhisposition.

IreturneddowntherivertowherethetroopsoftheArmyofthePotomacnowwere,communicatedtoGeneralMeade,inwriting,thedirectionsIhadgiventoGeneralButleranddirectedhim(Meade)tocrossHancock'scorpsoverundercoverofnight,andpushthemforwardinthemorningtoPetersburg;haltingthem,however,atadesignatedpointuntiltheycouldhearfromSmith.IalsoinformedGeneralMeadethatIhadorderedrationsfromBermudaHundredforHancock'scorps,anddesiredhimtoissuethemspeedily,andtolosenomoretimethanwasabsolutelynecessary.Therationsdidnotreachhim,however,andHancock,whilehegotallhiscorpsoverduringthenight,remaineduntilhalf-pastteninthehopeofreceivingthem.Hethenmovedwithoutthem,andontheroadreceivedanotefromGeneralW.F.Smith,askinghimtocomeon.ThisseemstobethefirstinformationthatGeneralHancockhadreceivedofthefactthathewastogotoPetersburg,orthatanythingparticularwasexpectedofhim.Otherwisehewouldhavebeentherebyfouro'clockintheafternoon.

Smitharrivedinfrontoftheenemy'slinesearlyintheforenoonofthe15th,andspentthedayuntilafterseveno'clockintheeveninginreconnoiteringwhatappearedtobeemptyworks.Theenemy'slineconsistedofredansoccupyingcommandingpositions,withrifle-pitsconnectingthem.TotheeastsideofPetersburg,fromtheAppomattoxback,therewerethirteenoftheseredansextendingadistanceofseveralmiles,probablythree.Iftheyhadbeenproperlymannedtheycouldhaveheldoutagainstanyforcethatcouldhaveattackedthem,atleastuntilreinforcementscouldhavegotupfromthenorthofRichmond.

Smithassaultedwiththecoloredtroops,andwithsuccess.Bynineo'clockatnighthewasinpossessionoffiveoftheseredansand,ofcourse,oftheconnectinglinesofrifle-pits.Allofthemcontainedartillery,whichfellintoourhands.Hancockcameupandproposedtotakeanypartassignedtohim;andSmithaskedhimtorelievehismenwhowereinthetrenches.

Smithaskedhimtorelievehismenwhowereinthetrenches.

Nextmorning,the16th,Hancockhimselfwasincommand,andcapturedanotherredan.MeadecameupintheafternoonandsucceededHancock,whohadtoberelieved,temporarily,fromthecommandofhiscorpsonaccountofthebreakingoutafreshofthewoundhehadreceivedatGettysburg.DuringthedayMeadeassaultedandcarriedonemoreredantohisrightandtwotohisleft.Inallthiswelostveryheavily.Theworkswerenotstronglymanned,buttheyallhadgunsinthemwhichfellintoourhands,togetherwiththemenwhowerehandlingthemintheefforttorepeltheseassaults.

UptothistimeBeauregard,whohadcommandedsouthofRichmond,hadreceivednoreinforcements,exceptHoke'sdivisionfromDrury'sBluff,(*37)whichhadarrivedonthemorningofthe16th;thoughhehadurgedtheauthoritiesverystronglytosendthem,believing,ashedid,thatPetersburgwouldbeavaluableprizewhichwemightseek.

Duringthe17ththefightingwasverysevereandthelossesheavy;andatnightourtroopsoccupiedaboutthesamepositiontheyhadoccupiedinthemorning,exceptthattheyheldaredanwhichhadbeencapturedbyPotterduringtheday.Duringthenight,however,Beauregardfellbacktothelinewhichhadbeenalreadyselected,andcommencedfortifyingit.Ourtroopsadvancedonthe18thtothelinewhichhehadabandoned,andfoundthattheConfederatelosshadbeenverysevere,manyoftheenemy'sdeadstillremainingintheditchesandinfrontofthem.

ColonelJ.L.Chamberlain,ofthe20thMaine,waswoundedonthe18th.Hewasgallantlyleadinghisbrigadeatthetime,ashehadbeeninthehabitofdoinginalltheengagementsinwhichhehadpreviouslybeenengaged.Hehadseveraltimesbeenrecommendedforabrigadier-generalcyforgallantandmeritoriousconduct.Onthisoccasion,however,Ipromotedhimonthespot,andforwardedacopyofmyordertotheWarDepartment,askingthatmyactmightbeconfirmedandChamberlain'snamesenttotheSenateforconfirmationwithoutanydelay.Thiswasdone,andatlastagallantandmeritoriousofficerreceivedpartialjusticeatthehandsofhisgovernment,whichhehadservedsofaithfullyandsowell.

IfGeneralHancock'sordersofthe15thhadbeencommunicatedtohim,thatofficer,withhisusualpromptness,wouldundoubtedlyhavebeenuponthegroundaroundPetersburgasearlyasfouro'clockintheafternoonofthe15th.Thedayswerelonganditwouldhavegivenhimconsiderabletimebeforenight.

Thedayswerelonganditwouldhavegivenhimconsiderabletimebeforenight.IdonotthinkthereisanydoubtthatPetersburgitselfcouldhavebeencarriedwithoutmuchloss;or,atleast,ifprotectedbyinnerdetachedworks,thatalinecouldhavebeenestablishedverymuchinrearoftheonethenoccupiedbytheenemy.ThiswouldhavegivenuscontrolofboththeWeldonandSouthSiderailroads.Thiswouldalsohavesavedanimmenseamountofhardfightingwhichhadtobedonefromthe15thtothe18th,andwouldhavegivenusgreatlytheadvantageinthelongsiegewhichensued.

Inoworderedthetroopstobeputundercoverandallowedsomeoftherestwhichtheyhadsolongneeded.Theyremainedquiet,exceptthattherewasmoreorlessfiringeveryday,untilthe22d,whenGeneralMeadeorderedanadvancetowardstheWeldonRailroad.Wewereveryanxioustogettothatroad,andevenroundtotheSouthSideRailroadifpossible.

MeademovedHancock'scorps,nowcommandedbyBirney,totheleft,withaviewtoatleastforcetheenemytostaywithinthelimitsofhisownline.GeneralWright,withthe6thcorps,wasorderedbyaroadfarthersouth,tomarchdirectlyfortheWeldonroad.Theenemypassedinbetweenthesetwocorpsandattackedvigorously,andwithveryseriousresultstotheNationaltroops,whowerethenwithdrawnfromtheiradvancedposition.

TheArmyofthePotomacwasgiventheinvestmentofPetersburg,whiletheArmyoftheJamesheldBermudaHundredandallthegroundwepossessednorthoftheJamesRiver.The9thcorps,Burnside's,wasplacedupontherightatPetersburg;the5th,Warren's,next;the2d,Birney's,next;thenthe6th,Wright's,brokenofftotheleftandsouth.ThusbeganthesiegeofPetersburg.

CHAPTERLVII.

RAIDONTHEVIRGINIACENTRALRAILROAD—RAIDONTHEWELDONRAILROAD—EARLY'SMOVEMENTUPONWASHINGTON—MININGTHEWORKSBEFOREPETERSBURG—EXPLOSIONOFTHEMINEBEFOREPETERSBURG—CAMPAIGNINTHESHENANDOAHVALLEY—CAPTUREOFTHEWELDONRAILROAD.

Onthe7thofJune,whileatColdHarbor,IhadasalreadyindicatedsentSheridanwithtwodivisionsofcavalrytodestroyasmuchashecouldoftheVirginiaCentralRailroad.GeneralHunterhadbeenoperatinguptheShenandoahValleywithsomesuccess,havingfoughtabattlenearStaunton

ShenandoahValleywithsomesuccess,havingfoughtabattlenearStauntonwherehecapturedagreatmanyprisoners,besideskillingandwoundingagoodmanymen.AfterthebattleheformedajunctionatStauntonwithAverellandCrook,whohadcomeupfromtheKanawha,orGauleyRiver.Itwassupposed,therefore,thatGeneralHunterwouldbeaboutCharlottesville,Virginia,bythetimeSheridancouldgetthere,doingonthewaythedamagethathewassenttodo.

IgaveSheridaninstructionstohaveHunter,incaseheshouldmeethimaboutCharlottesville,joinandreturnwithhimtotheArmyofthePotomac.Lee,hearingofHunter'ssuccessinthevalley,startedBreckinridgeoutforitsdefenceatonce.LearninglaterofSheridan'sgoingwithtwodivisions,healsosentHamptonwithtwodivisionsofcavalry,hisownandFitz-HughLee's.

SheridanmovedtothenorthsideoftheNorthAnnatogetoutwest,andlearnedofthemovementofthesetroopstothesouthsideofthesamestreamalmostassoonastheyhadstarted.HepushedontogettoTrevilianStationtocommencehisdestructionatthatpoint.Onthenightofthe10thhebivouackedsomesixorsevenmileseastofTrevilian,whileFitz-HughLeewasthesamenightatTrevilianStationandHamptonbutafewmilesaway.

DuringthenightHamptonorderedanadvanceonSheridan,hoping,nodoubt,tosurpriseandverybadlycripplehim.Sheridan,however,byacountermovesentCusteronarapidmarchtogetbetweenthetwodivisionsoftheenemyandintotheirrear.Thishedidsuccessfully,sothatatdaylight,whentheassaultwasmade,theenemyfoundhimselfatthesametimeresistedinfrontandattackedinrear,andbrokeinsomeconfusion.Thelosseswereprobablyverylightonbothsidesinkilledandwounded,butSheridangotawaywithsomefivehundredprisonersandsentthemtoCityPoint.

Duringthatday,the11th,SheridanmovedintoTrevilianStation,andthefollowingdayproceededtotearuptheroadeastandwest.Therewasconsiderablefightingduringthewholeoftheday,buttheworkofdestructionwenton.Inthemeantime,atnight,theenemyhadtakenpossessionofthecrossingwhichSheridanhadproposedtotaketogonorthwhenheleftTrevilian.Sheridanlearned,however,fromsomeoftheprisonershehadcapturedhere,thatGeneralHunterwasaboutLynchburg,andthereforethattherewasnouseofhisgoingontoCharlottesvillewithaviewtomeethim.

Sheridanstartedbackduringthenightofthe12th,andmadehiswaynorthandfarthereast,comingaroundbythenorthsideofWhiteHouse,andarrivingthere

farthereast,comingaroundbythenorthsideofWhiteHouse,andarrivingthereonthe21st.Herehefoundanabundanceofforageforhisanimals,foodforhismen,andsecuritywhileresting.Hehadbeenobligedtoleaveaboutninetyofhisownmeninthefield-hospitalwhichhehadestablishednearTrevilian,andthesenecessarilyfellintothehandsoftheenemy.

WhiteHouseuptothistimehadbeenadepot;butnowthatourtroopswereallontheJamesRiver,itwasnolongerwantedasastoreofsupplies.Sheridanwas,therefore,directedtobreakitup;whichhedidonthe22dofJune,bringingthegarrisonandanimmensewagontrainwithhim.AllthesewereovertheJamesRiverbythe26thofthemonth,andSheridanreadytofollow.

InthemeantimeMeadehadsentWilson'sdivisiononaraidtodestroytheWeldonandSouthSideroads.NowthatSheridanwassafeandHamptonfreetoreturntoRichmondwithhiscavalry,Wilson'spositionbecameprecarious.Meadetherefore,onthe27th,orderedSheridanovertherivertomakeademonstrationinfavorofWilson.Wilsongotback,thoughnotwithoutsevereloss,havingstruckbothroads,butthedamagedonewassoonrepaired.

AftertheseeventscomparativequietreignedaboutPetersburguntillateinJuly.Thetime,however,wasspentinstrengtheningtheintrenchmentsandmakingourpositiongenerallymoresecureagainstasuddenattack.InthemeantimeIhadtolookafterotherportionsofmycommand,wherethingshadnotbeengoingonsofavorably,always,asIcouldhavewished.

GeneralHunterwhohadbeenappointedtosucceedSigelintheShenandoahValleyimmediatelytookuptheoffensive.Hemettheenemyonthe5thofJuneatPiedmont,anddefeatedhim.Onthe8thheformedajunctionwithCrookandAverellatStaunton,fromwhichplacehemoveddirectonLynchburg,viaLexington,whichhereachedandinvestedonthe16th.Uptothistimehewasverysuccessful;andbutforthedifficultyoftakingwithhimsufficientordnancestoresoversolongamarch,throughahostilecountry,hewould,nodoubt,havecapturedLynchburg.Thedestructionoftheenemy'ssuppliesandmanufactorieshadbeenverygreat.TomeetthismovementunderGeneralHunter,GeneralLeesentEarlywithhiscorps,apartofwhichreachedLynchburgbeforeHunter.Aftersomeskirmishingonthe17thand18th,GeneralHunter,owingtoawantofammunitiontogivebattle,retiredfrombeforetheplace.Unfortunately,thiswantofammunitionlefthimnochoiceofrouteforhisreturnbutbythewayoftheGauleyandKanawharivers,thenceuptheOhioRiver,returningtoHarper'sFerrybywayoftheBaltimoreandOhioRailroad.Alongtimewasconsumedin

FerrybywayoftheBaltimoreandOhioRailroad.Alongtimewasconsumedinmakingthismovement.MeantimethevalleywasleftopentoEarly'stroops,andothersinthatquarter;andWashingtonalsowasuncovered.EarlytookadvantageofthisconditionofaffairsandmovedonWashington.

IntheabsenceofHunter,GeneralLewWallace,withheadquartersatBaltimore,commandedthedepartmentinwhichtheShenandoahlay.Hissurplusoftroopswithwhichtomoveagainsttheenemywassmallinnumber.Mostofthesewererawand,consequently,verymuchinferiortoourveteransandtotheveteranswhichEarlyhadwithhim;butthesituationofWashingtonwasprecarious,andWallacemovedwithcommendablepromptitudetomeettheenemyattheMonocacy.Hecouldhardlyhaveexpectedtodefeathimbadly,buthehopedtocrippleanddelayhimuntilWashingtoncouldbeputintoastateofpreparationforhisreception.IhadpreviouslyorderedGeneralMeadetosendadivisiontoBaltimoreforthepurposeofaddingtothedefencesofWashington,andhehadsentRicketts'sdivisionofthe6thcorps(Wright's),whicharrivedinBaltimoreonthe8thofJuly.FindingthatWallacehadgonetothefrontwithhiscommand,RickettsimmediatelytookthecarsandfollowedhimtotheMonocacywithhisentiredivision.Theymettheenemyand,asmighthavebeenexpected,weredefeated;buttheysucceededinstoppinghimforthedayonwhichthebattletookplace.ThenextmorningEarlystartedonhismarchtothecapitaloftheNation,arrivingbeforeitonthe11th.

LearningofthegravityofthesituationIhaddirectedGeneralMeadetoalsoorderWrightwiththerestofhiscorpsdirectlytoWashingtonforthereliefofthatplace,andthelatterreachedtheretheverydaythatEarlyarrivedbeforeit.The19thcorps,whichhadbeenstationedinLouisiana,havingbeenordereduptoreinforcethearmiesaboutRichmond,hadaboutthistimearrivedatFortressMonroe,ontheirwaytojoinus.IdivertedthemfromthatpointtoWashington,whichplacetheyreached,almostsimultaneouslywithWright,onthe11th.The19thcorpswascommandedbyMajor-GeneralEmory.

Earlymadehisreconnoissancewithaviewofattackingonthefollowingmorning,the12th;butthenextmorninghefoundourintrenchments,whichwereverystrong,fullymanned.Heatoncecommencedtoretreat,Wrightfollowing.ThereisnotellinghowmuchthisresultwascontributedtobyGeneralLewWallace'sleadingwhatmightwellbeconsideredalmostaforlornhope.IfEarlyhadbeenbutonedayearlierhemighthaveenteredthecapitalbeforethearrivalofthereinforcementsIhadsent.Whetherthedelaycausedbythebattleamountedtoadayornot,GeneralWallacecontributedonthisoccasion,bythedefeatofthetroopsunderhimagreaterbenefittothecausethanoftenfallsto

defeatofthetroopsunderhimagreaterbenefittothecausethanoftenfallstothelotofacommanderofanequalforcetorenderbymeansofavictory.

Fartherwestalsothetroubleswerethreatening.Sometimebefore,ForresthadmetSturgisincommandofsomeofourcavalryinMississippiandhandledhimveryroughly,gainingaverygreatvictoryoverhim.ThisleftForrestfreetogoalmostwherehepleased,andtocuttheroadsinrearofShermanwhowasthenadvancing.Shermanwasabundantlyabletolookafterthearmythathewasimmediatelywith,andallofhismilitarydivisionsolongashecouldcommunicatewithit;butitwasmyplacetoseethathehadthemeanswithwhichtoholdhisrear.TwodivisionsunderA.J.SmithhadbeensenttoBanksinLouisianasomemonthsbefore.Shermanorderedtheseback,withdirectionstoattackForrest.Smithmetanddefeatedhimverybadly.IthendirectedthatSmithshouldhangtoForrestandnotlethimgo;andtopreventbyallmeanshisgettingupontheMemphisandNashvilleRailroad.Shermanhadanticipatedmeinthismatter,andgiventhesameordersinsubstance;butreceivingmydirectionsforthisordertoSmith,herepeatedit.

Onthe25thofJuneGeneralBurnsidehadcommencedrunningaminefromaboutthecentreofhisfrontundertheConfederateworksconfrontinghim.HewasinducedtodothisbyColonelPleasants,ofthePennsylvaniaVolunteers,whoseregimentwasmostlycomposedofminers,andwhowashimselfapracticalminer.BurnsidehadsubmittedtheschemetoMeadeandmyself,andwebothapprovedofit,asameansofkeepingthemenoccupied.Hispositionwasveryfavorableforcarryingonthiswork,butnotsofavorablefortheoperationstofollowitscompletion.Thepositionofthetwolinesatthatpointwereonlyaboutahundredyardsapartwithacomparativelydeepravineintervening.Inthebottomofthisravinetheworkcommenced.Thepositionwasunfavorableinthisparticular:thattheenemy'slineatthatpointwasre-entering,sothatitsfrontwascommandedbytheirownlinesbothtotherightandleft.Then,too,thegroundwasslopingupwardbackoftheConfederatelineforaconsiderabledistance,anditwaspresumablethattheenemyhad,atleast,adetachedworkonthishighestpoint.Theworkprogressed,andonthe23dofJulytheminewasfinishedreadyforcharging;butIhadthisworkofchargingdeferreduntilwewerereadyforit.

Onthe17thofJulyseveraldeserterscameinandsaidthattherewasgreatconsternationinRichmond,andthatLeewascomingouttomakeanattackuponustheobjectbeingtoputusonthedefensivesothathemightdetachtroopstogotoGeorgiawherethearmyShermanwasoperatingagainstwassaidtobein

gotoGeorgiawherethearmyShermanwasoperatingagainstwassaidtobeingreattrouble.Iputthearmycommanders,MeadeandButler,onthelookout,buttheattackwasnotmade.

Iconcluded,then,afewdayslater,todosomethinginthewayofoffensivemovementmyself,havinginviewsomethingofthesameobjectthatLeehadhad.Wright'sandEmory'scorpswereinWashington,andwiththisreductionofmyforceLeemightveryreadilyhavesparedsometroopsfromthedefencestosendWest.Ihadotherobjectsinview,however,besideskeepingLeewherehewas.Theminewasconstructedandreadytobeexploded,andIwantedtotakethatoccasiontocarryPetersburgifIcould.Itwastheobject,therefore,togetasmanyofLee'stroopsawayfromthesouthsideoftheJamesRiveraspossible.Accordingly,onthe26th,wecommencedamovementwithHancock'scorpsandSheridan'scavalrytothenorthsidebythewayofDeepBottom,whereButlerhadapontoonbridgelaid.Theplan,inthemain,wastoletthecavalrycutlooseand,joiningwithKautz'scavalryoftheArmyoftheJames,getbyLee'slinesanddestroyasmuchastheycouldoftheVirginiaCentralRailroad,while,inthemeantime,theinfantrywastomoveoutsoastoprotecttheirrearandcovertheirretreatbackwhentheyshouldhavegotthroughwiththeirwork.Weweresuccessfulindrawingtheenemy'stroopstothenorthsideoftheJamesasIexpected.Theminewasorderedtobecharged,andthemorningofthe30thofJulywasthetimefixedforitsexplosion.IgaveMeademinuteorders(*38)onthe24thdirectinghowIwantedtheassaultconducted,whichordersheamplifiedintogeneralinstructionsfortheguidanceofthetroopsthatweretobeengaged.

Meade'sinstructions,whichI,ofcourse,approvedmostheartily,wereallthatIcanseenowwasnecessary.Theonlyfurtherprecautionwhichhecouldhavetaken,andwhichhecouldnotforesee,wouldhavebeentohavedifferentmentoexecutethem.

Thegallerytotheminewasoverfivehundredfeetlongfromwhereitenteredthegroundtothepointwhereitwasundertheenemy'sworks,andwithacrossgalleryofsomethingovereightyfeetrunningundertheirlines.Eightchambershadbeenleft,requiringatonofpowdereachtochargethem.AllwasreadybythetimeIhadprescribed;andonthe29thHancockandSheridanwerebroughtbackneartheJamesRiverwiththeirtroops.UndercoverofnighttheystartedtorecrossthebridgeatDeepBottom,andtomarchdirectlyforthatpartofourlinesinfrontofthemine.

WarrenwastoholdhislineofintrenchmentswithasufficientnumberofmenandconcentratethebalanceontherightnexttoBurnside'scorps,whileOrd,nowcommandingthe18thcorps,temporarilyunderMeade,wastoformintherearofBurnsidetosupporthimwhenhewentin.Allweretoclearofftheparapetsandtheabatisintheirfrontsoastoleavethespaceasopenaspossible,andbeabletochargethemomenttheminehadbeensprungandBurnsidehadtakenpossession.Burnside'scorpswasnottostopinthecrateratallbutpushontothetopofthehill,supportedontherightandleftbyOrd'sandWarren'scorps.

WarrenandOrdfulfilledtheirinstructionsperfectlysofarasmakingreadywasconcerned.Burnsideseemedtohavepaidnoattentionwhatevertotheinstructions,andleftalltheobstructioninhisownfrontforhistroopstogetoverinthebestwaytheycould.ThefourdivisionsofhiscorpswerecommandedbyGeneralsPotter,Willcox,LedlieandFerrero.Thelastwasacoloreddivision;andBurnsideselectedittomaketheassault.Meadeinterferedwiththis.BurnsidethentookLedlie'sdivision—aworseselectionthanthefirstcouldhavebeen.Infact,PotterandWillcoxweretheonlydivisioncommandersBurnsidehadwhowereequaltotheoccasion.Ledliebesidesbeingotherwiseinefficient,provedalsotopossessdisqualificationlesscommonamongsoldiers.

Therewassomedelayabouttheexplosionoftheminesothatitdidnotgooffuntilaboutfiveo'clockinthemorning.Whenitdidexplodeitwasverysuccessful,makingacratertwentyfeetdeepandsomethinglikeahundredfeetinlength.Instantlyonehundredandtencannonandfiftymortars,whichhadbeenplacedinthemostcommandingpositionscoveringthegroundtotherightandleftofwherethetroopsweretoentertheenemy'slines,commencedplaying.Ledlie'sdivisionmarchedintothecraterimmediatelyontheexplosion,butmostofthemenstoppedthereintheabsenceofanyonetogivedirections;theircommanderhavingfoundsomesaferetreattogetintobeforetheystarted.Therewassomedelayontheleftandrightinadvancing,butsomeofthetroopsdidgetinandturntotherightandleft,carryingtherifle-pitsasIexpectedtheywoulddo.

TherehadbeengreatconsternationinPetersburg,aswewerewellaware,aboutarumoredminethatweweregoingtoexplode.Theyknewweweremining,andtheyhadfailedtocutourmineoffbycountermining,thoughBeauregardhadtakentheprecautiontorunupalineofintrenchmentstotherearofthatpartoftheirlinefrontingwheretheycouldseethatourmenwereatwork.Wehadlearnedthroughdeserterswhohadcomeinthatthepeoplehadverywildrumorsaboutwhatwasgoingononourside.Theysaidthatwehadunderminedthe

aboutwhatwasgoingononourside.TheysaidthatwehadunderminedthewholeofPetersburg;thattheywererestinguponaslumberingvolcanoanddidnotknowatwhatmomenttheymightexpectaneruption.Isomewhatbasedmycalculationsuponthisstateoffeeling,andexpectedthatwhentheminewasexplodedthetroopstotherightandleftwouldfleeinalldirections,andthatourtroops,iftheymovedpromptly,couldgetinandstrengthenthemselvesbeforetheenemyhadcometoarealizationofthetruesituation.ItwasjustasIexpecteditwouldbe.Wecouldseethemenrunningwithoutanyapparentobjectexcepttogetaway.Itwashalfanhourbeforemusketryfiring,toamounttoanything,wasopeneduponourmeninthecrater.Itwasanhourbeforetheenemygotartilleryuptoplayuponthem;anditwasnineo'clockbeforeLeegotupreinforcementsfromhisrighttojoininexpellingourtroops.

Theeffortwasastupendousfailure.Itcostusaboutfourthousandmen,mostly,however,captured;andallduetoinefficiencyonthepartofthecorpscommanderandtheincompetencyofthedivisioncommanderwhowassenttoleadtheassault.

Afterbeingfullyassuredofthefailureofthemine,andfindingthatmostofthatpartofLee'sarmywhichhadbeendrawnnorthoftheJamesRiverwerestillthere,IgaveMeadedirectionstosendacorpsofinfantryandthecavalrynextmorning,beforeLeecouldgethisforcesback,todestroyfifteenortwentymilesoftheWeldonRailroad.Butmisfortunesnevercomesingly.IlearnedduringthatsameafternoonthatWright'spursuitofEarlywasfeeblebecauseoftheconstantandcontraryordershehadbeenreceivingfromWashington,whileIwascutofffromimmediatecommunicationbyreasonofourcableacrossChesapeakeBaybeingbroken.Early,however,wasnotawareofthefactthatWrightwasnotpursuinguntilhehadreachedStrasburg.FindingthathewasnotpursuedheturnedbacktoWinchester,whereCrookwasstationedwithasmallforce,anddrovehimout.HethenpushednorthuntilhehadreachedthePotomac,thenhesentMcCauslandacrosstoChambersburg,Pa.,todestroythattown.Chambersburgwasapurelydefencelesstownwithnogarrisonwhatever,andnofortifications;yetMcCausland,underEarly'sorders,burnedtheplaceandleftaboutthreehundredfamilieshouseless.Thisoccurredonthe30thofJuly.IrescindedmyordersforthetroopstogoouttodestroytheWeldonRailroad,anddirectedthemtoembarkforWashingtonCity.AfterburningChambersburgMcCauslandretreated,pursuedbyourcavalry,towardsCumberland.TheyweremetanddefeatedbyGeneralKelleyanddrivenintoVirginia.

TheShenandoahValleywasveryimportanttotheConfederates,becauseitwastheprincipalstorehousetheynowhadforfeedingtheirarmiesaboutRichmond.

theprincipalstorehousetheynowhadforfeedingtheirarmiesaboutRichmond.Itwaswellknownthattheywouldmakeadesperatestruggletomaintainit.Ithadbeenthesourceofagreatdealoftroubletousheretoforetoguardthatoutlettothenorth,partlybecauseoftheincompetencyofsomeofthecommanders,butchieflybecauseofinterferencefromWashington.

ItseemedtobethepolicyofGeneralHalleckandSecretaryStantontokeepanyforcesentthere,inpursuitoftheinvadingarmy,movingrightandleftsoastokeepbetweentheenemyandourcapital;and,generallyspeaking,theypursuedthispolicyuntilallknowledgeofthewhereaboutsoftheenemywaslost.Theywereleft,therefore,freetosupplythemselveswithhorses,beefcattle,andsuchprovisionsastheycouldcarryawayfromWesternMarylandandPennsylvania.Ideterminedtoputastoptothis.IstartedSheridanatonceforthatfieldofoperation,andonthefollowingdaysentanotherdivisionofhiscavalry.

IhadpreviouslyaskedtohaveSheridanassignedtothatcommand,butMr.Stantonobjected,onthegroundthathewastooyoungforsoimportantacommand.Onthe1stofAugustwhenIsentreinforcementsfortheprotectionofWashington,Isentthefollowingorders:

CITYPOINT,VA.,

August1,1864,11.30A.M.

MAJOR-GENERALHALLECK,WashingtonD.C.

IamsendingGeneralSheridanfortemporarydutywhilsttheenemyisbeingexpelledfromtheborder.UnlessGeneralHunterisinthefieldinperson,IwantSheridanputincommandofallthetroopsinthefield,withinstructionstoputhimselfsouthoftheenemyandfollowhimtothedeath.Wherevertheenemygoesletourtroopsgoalso.OncestartedupthevalleytheyoughttobefolloweduntilwegetpossessionoftheVirginiaCentralRailroad.IfGeneralHunterisinthefield,giveSheridandirectcommandofthe6thcorpsandcavalrydivision.Allthecavalry,Ipresume,willreachWashingtoninthecourseoftomorrow.

U.S.GRANT,Lieutenant-General.

ThePresidentinsomewayorothergottoseethisdispatchofminedirectingcertaininstructionstobegiventothecommandersinthefield,operatingagainst

certaininstructionstobegiventothecommandersinthefield,operatingagainstEarly,andsentmethefollowingverycharacteristicdispatch:

OFFICEU.S.MILITARYTELEGRAPH,WARDEPARTMENT,WASHINGTON,D.C.,August3,1864.

Cypher.6P.M.,

LT.GENERALGRANT,CityPoint,Va.

Ihaveseenyourdespatchinwhichyousay,"IwantSheridanputincommandofallthetroopsinthefield,withinstructionstoputhimselfsouthoftheenemy,andfollowhimtothedeath.Wherevertheenemygoes,letourtroopsgoalso."This,Ithink,isexactlyright,astohowourforcesshouldmove.Butpleaselookoverthedespatchesyoumayhavereceivedfromhere,evensinceyoumadethatorder,anddiscover,ifyoucan,thatthereisanyideaintheheadofanyonehere,of"puttingourarmysouthoftheenemy,"orof"followinghimtothedeath"inanydirection.Irepeattoyouitwillneitherbedonenorattemptedunlessyouwatchiteveryday,andhour,andforceit.

A.LINCOLN.

Irepliedtothisthat"IwouldstartintwohoursforWashington,"andsoongotoff,goingdirectlytotheMonocacywithoutstoppingatWashingtononmyway.IfoundGeneralHunter'sarmyencampedthere,scatteredoverthefieldsalongthebanksoftheMonocacy,withmanyhundredsofcarsandlocomotives,belongingtotheBaltimoreandOhioRailroad,whichhehadtakentheprecautiontobringbackandcollectatthatpoint.Iaskedthegeneralwheretheenemywas.Herepliedthathedidnotknow.Hesaidthefactwas,thathewassoembarrassedwithordersfromWashingtonmovinghimfirsttotherightandthentotheleftthathehadlostalltraceoftheenemy.

IthentoldthegeneralthatIwouldfindoutwheretheenemywas,andatonceorderedsteamgotupandtrainsmadeup,givingdirectionstopushforHalltown,somefourmilesaboveHarper'sFerry,intheShenandoahValley.Thecavalryandthewagontrainsweretomarch,butallthetroopsthatcouldbetransportedbythecarsweretogointhatway.Iknewthatthevalleywasofsuchimportancetotheenemythat,nomatterhowmuchhewasscatteredatthattime,hewouldin

totheenemythat,nomatterhowmuchhewasscatteredatthattime,hewouldinaveryshorttimebefoundinfrontofourtroopsmovingsouth.

IthenwroteoutGeneralHunter'sinstructions.(*39)ItoldhimthatSheridanwasinWashington,andstillanotherdivisionwasonitsway;andsuggestedthatheestablishtheheadquartersofthedepartmentatanypointthatwouldsuithimbest,Cumberland,Baltimore,orelsewhere,andgiveSheridancommandofthetroopsinthefield.Thegeneralrepliedtothis,thathethoughthehadbetterberelievedentirely.HesaidthatGeneralHalleckseemedsomuchtodistrusthisfitnessforthepositionhewasinthathethoughtsomebodyelseoughttobethere.Hedidnotwant,inanyway,toembarrassthecause;thusshowingapatriotismthatwasnonetoocommoninthearmy.Therewerenotmanymajor-generalswhowouldvoluntarilyhaveaskedtohavethecommandofadepartmenttakenfromthemonthesuppositionthatforsomeparticularreason,orforanyreason,theservicewouldbebetterperformed.Itoldhim,"verywellthen,"andtelegraphedatonceforSheridantocometotheMonocacy,andsuggestedthatIwouldwaitandmeethimthere.

Sheridancameatoncebyspecialtrain,butreachedthereafterthetroopswerealloff.Iwenttothestationandremainedthereuntilhearrived.MyselfandoneortwoofmystaffwereaboutalltheUnionpeople,exceptGeneralHunterandhisstaff,whowereleftattheMonocacywhenSheridanarrived.IhastilytoldSheridanwhathadbeendoneandwhatIwantedhimtodo,givinghim,atthesametime,thewritteninstructionswhichhadbeenpreparedforGeneralHunteranddirectedtothatofficer.

Sheridannowhadabout30,000mentomovewith,8,000ofthembeingcavalry.Earlyhadaboutthesamenumber,butthesuperiorabilityoftheNationalcommanderovertheConfederatecommanderwassogreatthatallthelatter'sadvantageofbeingonthedefensivewasmorethancounterbalancedbythiscircumstance.AsIhadpredicted,EarlywassoonfoundinfrontofSheridaninthevalley,andPennsylvaniaandMarylandwerespeedilyfreedfromtheinvaders.TheimportanceofthevalleywassogreattotheConfederatesthatLeereinforcedEarly,butnottotheextentthatwethoughtandfearedhewould.

TopreventasmuchaspossiblethesereinforcementsfrombeingsentoutfromRichmond,IhadtodosomethingtocompelLeetoretainhisforcesabouthiscapital.IthereforegaveordersforanothermovetothenorthsideoftheJamesRiver,tothreatenRichmond.Hancock'scorps,partofthe10thcorpsunderBirney,andGregg'sdivisionofcavalrywerecrossedtothenorthsideoftheJamesduringthenightofthe13th-14thofAugust.Athreateningpositionwas

Jamesduringthenightofthe13th-14thofAugust.Athreateningpositionwasmaintainedforanumberofdays,withmoreorlessskirmishing,andsometolerablyhardfighting;althoughitwasmyobjectandmyinstructionsthatanythinglikeabattleshouldbeavoided,unlessopportunitiesshouldpresentthemselveswhichwouldinsuregreatsuccess.GeneralMeadewasleftincommandofthefewtroopsaroundPetersburg,stronglyintrenched;andwasinstructedtokeepaclosewatchupontheenemyinthatquarter,andhimselftotakeadvantageofanyweakeningthatmightoccurthroughaneffortonthepartoftheenemytoreinforcethenorthside.Therewasnoparticularvictorygainedoneitherside;butduringthattimenomorereinforcementsweresenttothevalley.

IinformedSheridanofwhathadbeendonetopreventreinforcementsbeingsentfromRichmondagainsthim,andalsothattheeffortswehadmadehadproventhatoneofthedivisionswhichwesupposedhadgonetothevalleywasstillatRichmond,becausewehadcapturedsixorsevenhundredprisonersfromthatdivision,eachofitsfourbrigadeshavingcontributedtoourlistofcaptures.Ialsoinformedhimthatbutonedivisionhadgone,anditwaspossiblethatIshouldbeabletopreventthegoingofanymore.

ToaddtomyembarrassmentatthistimeSherman,whowasnownearAtlanta,wantedreinforcements.HewasperfectlywillingtotaketherawtroopsthenbeingraisedintheNorth-west,sayingthathecouldteachthemmoresoldieringinonedayamonghistroopsthantheywouldlearninaweekinacampofinstruction.IthereforeaskedthatalltroopsincampsofinstructionintheNorth-westbesenttohim.ShermanalsowantedtobeassuredthatnoEasterntroopsweremovingoutagainsthim.IinformedhimofwhatIhaddoneandassuredhimthatIwouldholdallthetroopstherethatitwaspossibleformetohold,andthatuptothattimenonehadgone.IalsoinformedhimthathisrealdangerwasfromKirbySmith,whocommandedthetrans-MississippiDepartment.IfSmithshouldescapeSteele,andgetacrosstheMississippiRiver,hemightmoveagainsthim.Ihad,therefore,askedtohaveanexpeditionreadytomovefromNewOrleansagainstMobileincaseKirbySmithshouldgetacross.Thiswouldhaveatendencytodrawhimtothedefenceofthatplace,insteadofgoingagainstSherman.

RightinthemidstofalltheseembarrassmentsHalleckinformedmethattherewasanorganizedschemeonfootintheNorthtoresistthedraft,andsuggestedthatitmightbecomenecessarytodrawtroopsfromthefieldtoputitdown.Healsoadvisedtakinginsail,andnotgoingtoofast.

alsoadvisedtakinginsail,andnotgoingtoofast.

ThetroopswerewithdrawnfromthenorthsideoftheJamesRiveronthenightofthe20th.Beforetheywerewithdrawn,however,andwhilemostofLee'sforcewasonthatsideoftheriver,Warrenhadbeensentwithmostofthe5thcorpstocapturetheWeldonRailroad.Hetookuphislineofmarchwellbacktotherear,southoftheenemy,whilethetroopsremaininginthetrenchesextendedsoastocoverthatpartofthelinewhichhehadvacatedbymovingout.Fromourleft,neartheoldline,itwasaboutthreemilestotheWeldonRailroad.AdivisionwasorderedfromtherightofthePetersburglinetoreinforceWarren,whileadivisionwasbroughtbackfromthenorthsideoftheJamesRivertotakeitsplace.

Thisroadwasveryimportanttotheenemy.Thelimitsfromwhichhissupplieshadbeendrawnwerealreadyverymuchcontracted,andIknewthathemustfightdesperatelytoprotectit.Warrencarriedtheroad,thoughwithheavylossonbothsides.Hefortifiedhisnewposition,andourtrencheswerethenextendedfromtheleftofourmainlinetoconnectwithhisnewone.LeemaderepeatedattemptstodislodgeWarren'scorps,butwithoutsuccess,andwithheavyloss.

AssoonasWarrenwasfortifiedandreinforcementsreachedhim,troopsweresentsouthtodestroythebridgesontheWeldonRailroad;andwithsuchsuccessthattheenemyhadtodrawinwagons,foradistanceofaboutthirtymiles,allthesuppliestheygotthereafterfromthatsource.Itwasonthe21stthatLeeseemedtohavegivenuptheWeldonRailroadashavingbeenlosttohim;butalongaboutthe24thor25thhemaderenewedattemptstorecaptureit;againhefailedandwithveryheavylossestohimascomparedwithours.

Onthenightofthe20thourtroopsonthenorthsideoftheJameswerewithdrawn,andHancockandGreggweresentsouthtodestroytheWeldonRailroad.Theywereattackedonthe25thatReams'sStation,andafterdesperatefightingapartofourlinegaveway,losingfivepiecesofartillery.ButtheWeldonRailroadneverwentoutofourpossessionfromthe18thofAugusttothecloseofthewar.

CHAPTERLVIII.

SHERIDAN'SADVANCE—VISITTOSHERIDAN—SHERIDAN'SVICTORYINTHESHENANDOAH—SHERIDAN'SRIDETOWINCHESTER—CLOSEOFTHECAMPAIGNFOR

SHENANDOAH—SHERIDAN'SRIDETOWINCHESTER—CLOSEOFTHECAMPAIGNFORTHEWINTER.

WehadourtroopsontheWeldonRailroadcontendingagainstalargeforcethatregardedthisroadofsomuchimportancethattheycouldaffordtoexpendmanylivesinretakingit;ShermanjustgettingthroughtoAtlantawithgreatlossesofmenfromcasualties,dischargesanddetachmentsleftalongasguardstooccupyandholdtheroadinrearofhim;Washingtonthreatenedbutashorttimebefore,andnowEarlybeingstrengthenedinthevalleysoas,probably,torenewthatattempt.Itkeptmeprettyactiveinlookingafterallthesepoints.

Onthe10thofAugustSheridanhadadvancedonEarlyuptheShenandoahValley,EarlyfallingbacktoStrasburg.Onthe12thIlearnedthatLeehadsenttwentypiecesofartillery,twodivisionsofinfantryandaconsiderablecavalryforcetostrengthenEarly.ItwasimportantthatSheridanshouldbeinformedofthis,soIsenttheinformationtoWashingtonbytelegraph,anddirectedacouriertobesentfromtheretogetthemessagetoSheridanatallhazards,givinghimtheinformation.Themessenger,anofficerofthearmy,pushedthroughwithgreatenergyandreachedSheridanjustintime.TheofficerwentthroughbywayofSnicker'sGap,escortedbysomecavalry.HefoundSheridanjustmakinghispreparationstoattackEarlyinhischosenposition.Now,however,hewasthrownbackonthedefensive.

Onthe15thofSeptemberIstartedtovisitGeneralSheridanintheShenandoahValley.MypurposewastohavehimattackEarly,ordrivehimoutofthevalleyanddestroythatsourceofsuppliesforLee'sarmy.IknewitwasimpossibleformetogetordersthroughWashingtontoSheridantomakeamove,becausetheywouldbestoppedthereandsuchordersasHalleck'scaution(andthatoftheSecretaryofWar)wouldsuggestwouldbegiveninstead,andwould,nodoubt,becontradictorytomine.Itherefore,withoutstoppingatWashington,wentdirectlythroughtoCharlestown,sometenmilesaboveHarper'sFerry,andwaitedtheretoseeGeneralSheridan,havingsentacourierinadvancetoinformhimwheretomeetme.

WhenSheridanarrivedIaskedhimifhehadamapshowingthepositionsofhisarmyandthatoftheenemy.Heatoncedrewoneoutofhissidepocket,showingallroadsandstreams,andthecampsofthetwoarmies.Hesaidthatifhehadpermissionhewouldmovesoandso(pointingouthow)againsttheConfederates,andthathecould"whipthem."BeforestartingIhaddrawnupaplanofcampaignforSheridan,whichIhadbroughtwithme;but,seeingthathewassoclearandsopositiveinhisviewsandsoconfidentofsuccess,Isaid

wassoclearandsopositiveinhisviewsandsoconfidentofsuccess,Isaidnothingaboutthisanddidnottakeitoutofmypocket.

Sheridan'swagontrainswerekeptatHarper'sFerry,whereallofhisstoreswere.Bykeepingtheteamsatthatplace,theirforagedidnothavetobehauledtothem.Assuppliesofammunition,provisionsandrationsforthemenwerewanted,trainswouldbemadeuptodeliverthestorestothecommissariesandquartermastersencampedatWinchester.Knowingthathe,inmakingpreparationstomoveatagivenday,wouldhavetobringupwagonstrainsfromHarper'sFerry,IaskedhimifhecouldbereadytogetoffbythefollowingTuesday.ThiswasonFriday."OYes,"hesaid,he"couldbeoffbeforedaylightonMonday."Itoldhimthentomaketheattackatthattimeandaccordingtohisownplan;andIimmediatelystartedtoreturntothearmyaboutRichmond.AftervisitingBaltimoreandBurlington,NewJersey,IarrivedatCityPointonthe19th.

OnthewayouttoHarper'sFerryIhadmetMr.RobertGarrett,PresidentoftheBaltimoreandOhioRailroad.Heseemedveryanxioustoknowwhenworkmenmightbeputupontheroadagainsoastomakerepairsandputitinshapeforrunning.Itwasalargepieceofpropertytohavestandingidle.ItoldhimIcouldnotanswerthenpositivelybutwouldtryandinformhimbeforeagreatwhile.OnmyreturnMr.GarrettmetmeagainwiththesameandItoldhimIthoughtthatbytheWednesdayhemightsendhisworkmenoutonhisroad.Igavehimnofurtherinformationhowever,andhehadnosuspicionofhowIexpectedtohavetheroadclearedforhisworkmen.

Sheridanmovedatthetimehehadfixedupon.HemetEarlyatthecrossingofOpequonCreek,amostdecisivevictory—onewhichthecountry.Earlyhadinvitedthisattackhimselfbyhisbadgeneralshipandmadethevictoryeasy.HehadsentG.T.Anderson'sdivisioneastoftheBlueRidgebeforeIwenttoHarper'sFerry;andaboutthetimeIarrivedtherehestartedotherdivisions(leavingbuttwointheircamps)tomarchtoMartinsburgforthepurposedestroyingtheBaltimoreandOhioRailroadatthatpoint.EarlyherelearnedthatIhadbeenwithSheridanand,supposingtherewassomemovementonfoot,startedbackassoonashegottheinformation.Buthisforceswereseparatedand,asIhavesaid,hewasverybadlydefeated.HefellbacktoFisher'sHill,Sheridanfollowing.

Thevalleyisnarrowatthatpoint,andEarlymadeanotherstandthere,behindworkswhichextendedacross.ButSheridanturnedbothhisflanksandagainsent

workswhichextendedacross.ButSheridanturnedbothhisflanksandagainsenthimspeedingupthevalley,followinginhotpursuit.ThepursuitwascontinuedupthevalleytoMountJacksonandNewMarket.Sheridancapturedaboutelevenhundredprisonersandsixteenguns.ThehouseswhichhepassedallalongtheroutewerefoundtobefilledwithEarly'swounded,andthecountryswarmedwithhisdeserters.Finally,onthe25th,Earlyturnedfromthevalleyeastward,leavingSheridanatHarrisonburginundisputedpossession.

Nowoneofthemainobjectsoftheexpeditionbegantobeaccomplished.Sheridanwenttoworkwithhiscommand,gatheringinthecrops,cattle,andeverythingintheupperpartofthevalleyrequiredbyourtroops;andespeciallytakingwhatmightbeofusetotheenemy.Whathecouldnottakeawayhedestroyed,sothattheenemywouldnotbeinvitedtocomebackthere.IcongratulatedSheridanuponhisrecentgreatvictoryandhadasaluteofahundredgunsfiredinhonorofit,thegunsbeingaimedattheenemyaroundPetersburg.Ialsonotifiedtheothercommandersthroughoutthecountry,whoalsofiredsalutesinhonorofhisvictory.

Ihadreasontobelievethattheadministrationwasalittleafraidtohaveadecisivebattleatthattime,forfearitmightgoagainstusandhaveabadeffectontheNovemberelections.TheconventionwhichhadmetandmadeitsnominationoftheDemocraticcandidateforthepresidencyhaddeclaredthewarafailure.TreasonwastalkedasboldlyinChicagoatthatconventionaseverbeeninCharleston.Itwasaquestionwhetherthegovernmentwouldthenhavehadthepowertomakearrestsandpunishthosewhotalkedtreason.Butthisdecisivevictorywasthemosteffectivecampaignargumentmadeinthecanvass.

Sheridan,inhispursuit,gotbeyondwheretheycouldhearfromhiminWashington,andthePresidentbecameverymuchfrightenedabouthim.HewasafraidthatthehotpursuithadbeenalittlelikethatofGeneralCasswassaidtohavebeen,inoneofourIndianwars,whenhewasanofficerofarmy.CasswaspursuingtheIndianssocloselythatthefirstthingheknewhefoundhimselfinfront,andtheIndianspursuinghim.ThePresidentwasafraidthatSheridanhadgotontheothersideofEarlyandthatEarlywasinbehindhim.HewasafraidthatSheridanwasgettingsofarawaythatreinforcementswouldbesentoutfromRichmondtoenableEarlytobeathim.IrepliedtothePresidentthatIhadtakenstepstopreventLeefromsendingreinforcementstoEarly,byattackingtheformerwherehewas.

Onthe28thofSeptember,toretainLeeinhisposition,IsentOrdwiththe18thcorpsandBirneywiththe10thcorpstomakeanadvanceonRichmond,to

corpsandBirneywiththe10thcorpstomakeanadvanceonRichmond,tothreatenit.OrdmovedwiththeleftwinguptoChaffin'sBluff;Birneywiththe10thcorpstookaroadfarthernorth;whileKautzwiththecavalrytooktheDarbyroad,stillfarthertothenorth.Theygotacrosstheriverbythenextmorning,andmadeanefforttosurprisetheenemy.Inthat,however,theywereunsuccessful.

Theenemy'slineswereverystrongandveryintricate.Stannard'sdivisionofthe18thcorpswithGeneralBurnham'sbrigadeleading,triedanassaultagainstFortHarrisonandcaptureditwithsixteengunsandagoodmanyprisoners.Burnhamwaskilledintheassault.ColonelStevenswhosucceededhimwasbadlywounded;andhissuccessoralsofellinthesameway.Someworkstotherightandleftwerealsocarriedwiththegunsinthem—sixinnumber—andafewmoreprisoners.Birney'stroopstotherightcapturedtheenemy'sintrenchedpicket-lines,butwereunsuccessfulintheireffortsuponthemainline.

Ourtroopsfortifiedtheirnewposition,bringingFortHarrisonintothenewlineandextendingittotheriver.ThisbroughtusprettyclosetotheenemyonthenorthsideoftheJames,andthetwoopposinglinesmaintainedtheirrelativepositionstothecloseofthesiege.

Intheafternoonafurtherattemptwasmadetoadvance,butitfailed.Ordfellbadlywounded,andhadtoberelieved;thecommanddevolveduponGeneralHeckman,andlaterGeneralWeitzelwasassignedtothecommandofthe18thcorps.DuringthenightLeereinforcedhistroopsaboutFortGilmer,whichwasattherightofFortHarrison,byeightadditionalbrigadesfromPetersburg,andattemptedtoretaketheworkswhichwehadcapturedbyconcentratingtenbrigadesagainstthem.Alltheireffortsfailed,theirattacksbeingallrepulsedwithveryheavyloss.InoneoftheseassaultsuponusGeneralStannard,agallantofficerwhowasdefendingFortHarrison,lostanarm.Ourcasualtiesduringtheseoperationsamountedto394killed,I,554woundedand324missing.

WhilstthiswasgoingonGeneralMeadewasinstructedtokeepupanappearanceofmovingtroopstoourextremeleft.ParkeandWarrenwerekeptwithtwodivisions,eachunderarms,readytomoveleavingtheirenclosedbatteriesmanned,withascatteringlineontheotherintrenchments.Theobjectofthiswastopreventreinforcementsfromgoingtothenorthsideoftheriver.Meadewasinstructedtowatchtheenemycloselyand,ifLeeweakenedhislines,tomakeanattack.

Onthe30ththesetroopsmovedout,underWarren,andcapturedanadvanced

Onthe30ththesetroopsmovedout,underWarren,andcapturedanadvancedintrenchedcampatPeeble'sfarm,drivingtheenemybacktothemainline.Ourtroopsfollowedandmadeanattackinthehopeofcarryingtheenemy'smainline;butinthistheywereunsuccessfulandlostalargenumberofmen,mostlycaptured.Thenumberofkilledandwoundedwasnotlarge.Thenextdayourtroopsadvancedagainandestablishedthemselves,intrenchinganewlineaboutamileinfrontoftheenemy.ThisadvancedWarren'spositionontheWeldonRailroadveryconsiderably.

Sheridanhavingdriventheenemyoutofthevalley,andtakentheproductionsofthevalleysothatinsteadofgoingthereforsuppliestheenemywouldhavetobringhisprovisionswithhimifheagainenteredit,recommendedareductionofhisownforce,thesurplustobesentwhereitcouldbeofmoreuse.Iapprovedofhissuggestion,andorderedhimtosendWright'scorpsbacktotheJamesRiver.IfurtherdirectedhimtorepairtherailroaduptheShenandoahValleytowardstheadvancedpositionwhichwewouldholdwithasmallforce.ThetroopsweretobesenttoWashingtonbythewayofCulpeper,inordertowatchtheeastsideoftheBlueRidge,andpreventtheenemyfromgettingintotherearofSheridanwhilehewasstilldoinghisworkofdestruction.

Thevalleywassoveryimportant,however,totheConfederatearmythat,contrarytoourexpectations,theydeterminedtomakeonemorestrike,andsaveitifpossiblebeforethesuppliesshouldbealldestroyed.ReinforcementsweresentthereforetoEarly,andthisbeforeanyofourtroopshadbeenwithdrawn.EarlypreparedtostrikeSheridanatHarrisonburg;butthelatterhadnotremainedthere.

Onthe6thofOctoberSheridancommencedretiringdownthevalley,takingordestroyingallthefoodandforageanddrivingthecattlebeforehim,Earlyfollowing.AtFisher'sHillSheridanturnedhiscavalrybackonthatofEarly,which,undertheleadofRosser,waspursuingclosely,androuteditmostcompletely,capturingelevengunsandalargenumberofprisoners.Sheridanlostonlyaboutsixtymen.Hiscavalrypursuedtheenemybacksometwenty-fivemiles.Onthe10thofOctoberthemarchdownthevalleywasagainresumed,Earlyagainfollowing.

InoworderedSheridantohalt,andtoimprovetheopportunityifaffordedbytheenemy'shavingbeensufficientlyweakened,tomovebackagainandcuttheJamesRiverCanalandVirginiaCentralRailroad.ButthisorderhadtogothroughWashingtonwhereitwasintercepted;andwhenSheridanreceivedwhat

throughWashingtonwhereitwasintercepted;andwhenSheridanreceivedwhatpurportedtobeastatementofwhatIwantedhimtodoitwassomethingentirelydifferent.HalleckinformedSheridanthatitwasmywishforhimtoholdaforwardpositionasabasefromwhichtoactagainstCharlottesvilleandGordonsville;thatheshouldfortifythispositionandprovisionit.

Sheridanobjectedtothismostdecidedly;andIwasimpelledtotelegraphhim,onthe14th,asfollows:

CITYPOINT,VA.,October14,1864.—12.30P.M.

MAJOR-GENERALSHERIDAN,CedarCreek,Va.

WhatIwantisforyoutothreatentheVirginiaCentralRailroadandcanalinthemanneryourjudgmenttellsyouisbest,holdingyourselfreadytoadvance,iftheenemydrawofftheirforces.Ifyoumaketheenemyholdaforceequaltoyourownfortheprotectionofthosethoroughfares,itwillaccomplishnearlyasmuchastheirdestruction.Ifyoucannotdothis,thenthenextbestthingtodoistosendherealltheforceyoucan.Ideemagoodcavalryforcenecessaryforyouroffensive,aswellasdefensiveoperations.Youneednotthereforesendheremorethanonedivisionofcavalry.

U.S.GRANT,Lieutenant-General.

SheridanhavingbeensummonedtoWashingtonCity,startedonthe15thleavingWrightincommand.HisarmywasthenatCedarCreek,sometwentymilessouthofWinchester.ThenextmorningwhileatFrontRoyal,SheridanreceivedadispatchfromWright,sayingthatadispatchfromLongstreettoEarlyhadbeenintercepted.ItdirectedthelattertobereadytomoveandtocrushSheridanassoonashe,Longstreet,arrived.OnthereceiptofthisnewsSheridanorderedthecavalryupthevalleytojoinWright.

Onthe18thofOctoberEarlywasreadytomove,andduringthenightsucceededingettinghistroopsintherearofourleftflank,whichfledprecipitatelyandingreatconfusiondownthevalley,losingeighteenpiecesofartilleryandathousandormoreprisoners.TherightunderGeneralGettymaintainedafirmandsteadyfront,fallingbacktoMiddletownwhereittookapositionandmadeastand.Thecavalrywenttotherear,seizedtheroadsleadingtoWinchesterandheldthemfortheuseofourtroopsinfallingback,GeneralWrighthavingorderedaretreatbacktothatplace.

orderedaretreatbacktothatplace.

SheridanhavingleftWashingtononthe18th,reachedWinchesterthatnight.Thefollowingmorninghestartedtojoinhiscommand.Hehadscarcelygotoutoftown,whenhemethismenreturninginpanicfromthefrontandalsoheardheavyfiringtothesouth.HeimmediatelyorderedthecavalryatWinchestertobedeployedacrossthevalleytostopthestragglers.LeavingmembersofhisstafftotakecareofWinchesterandthepublicpropertythere,hesetoutwithasmallescortdirectlyforthesceneofbattle.Ashemetthefugitivesheorderedthemtoturnback,remindingthemthattheyweregoingthewrongway.Hispresencesoonrestoredconfidence.Findingthemselvesworsefrightenedthanhurtthemendidhaltandturnback.Manyofthosewhohadruntenmilesgotbackintimetoredeemtheirreputationasgallantsoldiersbeforenight.

WhenSheridangottothefronthefoundGettyandCusterstillholdingtheirgroundfirmlybetweentheConfederatesandourretreatingtroops.Everythingintherearwasnoworderedup.Sheridanatonceproceededtointrenchhisposition;andheawaitedanassaultfromtheenemy.Thiswasmadewithvigor,andwasdirectedprincipallyagainstEmory'scorps,whichhadsustainedtheprincipallossinthefirstattack.Byoneo'clocktheattackwasrepulsed.Earlywassobadlydamagedthatheseemeddisinclinedtomakeanotherattack,butwenttoworktointrenchhimselfwithaviewtoholdingthepositionhehadalreadygained.Hethought,nodoubt,thatSheridanwouldbegladenoughtoleavehimunmolested;butinthishewasmistaken.

AboutthemiddleoftheafternoonSheridanadvanced.Hesenthiscavalrybybothflanks,andtheypenetratedtotheenemy'srear.Thecontestwascloseforatime,butatlengththeleftoftheenemybroke,anddisintegrationalongthewholelinesoonfollowed.Earlytriedtorallyhismen,buttheywerefollowedsocloselythattheyhadtogivewayveryquicklyeverytimetheyattemptedtomakeastand.Ourcavalry,havingpushedonandgotintherearoftheConfederates,capturedtwenty-fourpiecesofartillery,besidesretakingwhathadbeenlostinthemorning.ThisvictoryprettymuchclosedthecampaigningintheValleyofVirginia.AlltheConfederatetroopsweresentbacktoRichmondwiththeexceptionofonedivisionofinfantryandalittlecavalry.Wright'scorpswasorderedbacktotheArmyofthePotomac,andtwootherdivisionswerewithdrawnfromthevalley.Earlyhadlostmoremeninkilled,woundedandcapturedinthevalleythanSheridanhadcommandedfromfirsttolast.

OnmorethanoneoccasionintheseengagementsGeneralR.B.Hayes,who

OnmorethanoneoccasionintheseengagementsGeneralR.B.Hayes,whosucceededmeasPresidentoftheUnitedStates,boreaveryhonorablepart.Hisconductonthefieldwasmarkedbyconspicuousgallantryaswellasthedisplayofqualitiesofahigherorderthanthatofmerepersonaldaring.Thismightwellhavebeenexpectedofonewhocouldwriteatthetimeheissaidtohavedoneso:"AnyofficerfitfordutywhoatthiscrisiswouldabandonhisposttoelectioneerforaseatinCongress,oughttobescalped."HavingenteredthearmyasaMajorofVolunteersatthebeginningofthewar,GeneralHayesattainedbymeritoriousservicetherankofBrevetMajor-Generalbeforeitsclose.

OnthenorthsideoftheJamesRivertheenemyattackedKautz'scavalryonthe7thofOctober,anddroveitbackwithheavylossinkilled,woundedandprisoners,andthelossofalltheartillery.Thiswasfollowedupbyanattackonourintrenchedinfantryline,butwasrepulsedwithsevereslaughter.Onthe13thareconnoissancewassentoutbyGeneralButler,withaviewtodrivetheenemyfromsomenewworkshewasconstructing,whichresultedinheavylosstous.

Onthe24thIorderedGeneralMeadetoattempttogetpossessionoftheSouthSideRailroad,andforthatpurposetoadvanceonthe27th.Theattemptprovedafailure,however,themostadvancedofourtroopsnotgettingnearerthanwithinsixmilesofthepointaimedfor.SeeingtheimpossibilityofitsaccomplishmentIorderedthetroopstowithdraw,andtheywereallbackintheirformerpositionsthenextday.

Butler,bymydirections,alsomadeademonstrationonthenorthsideoftheJamesRiverinordertosupportthismove,bydetainingtheretheConfederatetroopswhowereonthatside.Hesucceededinthis,butfailedoffurtherresultsbynotmarchingpasttheenemy'sleftbeforeturninginontheDarbyroadandbyreasonofsimplycomingupagainsttheirlinesinplace.

ThisclosedactiveoperationsaroundRichmondforthewinter.Ofcoursetherewasfrequentskirmishingbetweenpickets,butnoseriousbattlewasfoughtneareitherPetersburgorRichmond.ItwouldprolongthisworktogiveadetailedaccountofallthattookplacefromdaytodayaroundPetersburgandatotherpartsofmycommand,anditwouldnotinterestthegeneralreaderifgiven.AllthesedetailscanbefoundbythemilitarystudentinaseriesofbookspublishedbytheScribners,Badeau'shistoryofmycampaigns,andalsointhepublicationsoftheWarDepartment,includingboththeNationalandConfederatereports.

InthelatterpartofNovemberGeneralHancockwasrelievedfromthecommandofthe2dcorpsbytheSecretaryofWarandorderedtoWashington,toorganize

ofthe2dcorpsbytheSecretaryofWarandorderedtoWashington,toorganizeandcommandacorpsofveterantroopstobedesignatedthe1stcorps.Itwasexpectedthatthiswouldgivehimalargecommandtoco-operatewithinthespring.Itwasmyexpectation,atthetime,thatinthefinaloperationsHancockshouldmoveeitherupthevalley,orelseeastoftheBlueRidgetoLynchburg;theideabeingtomakethespringcampaignthecloseofthewar.Iexpected,withShermancomingupfromtheSouth,MeadesouthofPetersburgandaroundRichmond,andThomas'scommandinTennesseewithdepotsofsuppliesestablishedintheeasternpartofthatState,tomovefromthedirectionofWashingtonorthevalleytowardsLynchburg.WewouldthenhaveLeesosurroundedthathissupplieswouldbecutoffentirely,makingitimpossibleforhimtosupporthisarmy.

GeneralHumphreys,chief-of-staffoftheArmyofthePotomac,wasassignedtothecommandofthe2dcorps,tosucceedHancock.

CHAPTERLIX.

THECAMPAIGNINGEORGIA—SHERMAN'SMARCHTOTHESEA—WARANECDOTES—THEMARCHONSAVANNAH—INVESTMENTOFSAVANNAH—CAPTUREOFSAVANNAH.

LetusnowreturntotheoperationsinthemilitarydivisionoftheMississippi,andaccompanyShermaninhismarchtothesea.

ThepossessionofAtlantabyusnarrowedtheterritoryoftheenemyverymateriallyandcutoffoneofhistworemaininglinesofroadsfromeasttowest.

AshorttimeafterthefallofAtlantaMr.DavisvisitedPalmettoandMaconandmadespeechesateachplace.HespokeatPalmettoonthe20thofSeptember,andatMacononthe22d.InasmuchashehadrelievedJohnstonandappointedHood,andHoodhadimmediatelytakentheinitiative,itisnaturaltosupposethatMr.DaviswasdisappointedwithGeneralJohnston'spolicy.MyownjudgmentisthatJohnstonactedverywisely:hehusbandedhismenandsavedasmuchofhisterritoryashecould,withoutfightingdecisivebattlesinwhichallmightbelost.AsShermanadvanced,asIhaveshow,hisarmybecamespreadout,until,ifthishadbeencontinued,itwouldhavebeeneasytodestroyitindetail.IknowthatbothShermanandIwererejoicedwhenweheardofthechange.Hoodwasunquestionablyabrave,gallantsoldierandnotdestituteofability;butunfortunatelyhispolicywastofighttheenemywhereverhesaw

ability;butunfortunatelyhispolicywastofighttheenemywhereverhesawhim,withoutthinkingmuchoftheconsequencesofdefeat.

InhisspeechesMr.DavisdenouncedGovernorBrown,ofGeorgia,andGeneralJohnstoninunmeasuredterms,eveninsinuatingthattheirloyaltytotheSoutherncausewasdoubtful.SofarasGeneralJohnstonisconcerned,IthinkDavisdidhimagreatinjusticeinthisparticular.Ihadknowthegeneralbeforethewarandstronglybelieveditwouldbeimpossibleforhimtoacceptahighcommissionforthepurposeofbetrayingthecausehehadespoused.There,asIhavesaid,IthinkthathispolicywasthebestonethatcouldhavebeenpursuedbythewholeSouth—protractthewar,whichwasallthatwasnecessarytoenablethemtogainrecognitionintheend.TheNorthwasalreadygrowingweary,astheSouthevidentlywasalso,butwiththisdifference.IntheNorththepeoplegoverned,andcouldstophostilitieswhenevertheychosetostopsupplies.TheSouthwasamilitarycamp,controlledabsolutelybythegovernmentwithsoldierstobackit,andthewarcouldhavebeenprotracted,nomattertowhatextentthediscontentreached,uptothepointofopenmutinyofthesoldiersthemselves.Mr.Davis'sspeecheswerefrankappealstothepeopleofGeorgiaandthatportionoftheSouthtocometotheirrelief.HetriedtoassurehisfrightenedhearersthattheYankeeswererapidlydiggingtheirowngraves;thatmeasureswerealreadybeingtakentocutthemofffromsuppliesfromtheNorth;andthatwithaforceinfront,andcutofffromtherear,theymustsoonstarveinthemidstofahostilepeople.PaperscontainingreportsofthesespeechesimmediatelyreachedtheNorthernStates,andtheywererepublished.Ofcourse,thatcausednoalarmsolongastelegraphiccommunicationwaskeptupwithSherman.

WhenHoodwasforcedtoretreatfromAtlantahemovedtothesouth-westandwasfollowedbyaportionofSherman'sarmy.HesoonappearedupontherailroadinSherman'srear,andwithhiswholearmybegandestroyingtheroad.AtthesametimealsotheworkwasbeguninTennesseeandKentuckywhichMr.DavishadassuredhishearersatPalmettoandMaconwouldtakeplace.HeorderedForrest(abouttheablestcavalrygeneralintheSouth)northforthispurpose;andForrestandWheelercarriedouttheirorderswithmoreorlessdestruction,occasionallypickingupagarrison.Forrestindeedperformedtheveryremarkablefeatofcapturing,withcavalry,twogunboatsandanumberoftransports,somethingtheaccomplishmentofwhichisveryhardtoaccountfor.Hood'sarmyhadbeenweakenedbyGovernorBrown'swithdrawingtheGeorgiaStatetroopsforthepurposeofgatheringintheseason'scropsfortheuseofthepeopleandfortheuseofthearmy.ThisnotonlydepletedHood'sforcesbutitservedamostexcellentpurposeingatheringinsuppliesoffoodandforagefor

servedamostexcellentpurposeingatheringinsuppliesoffoodandforagefortheuseofourarmyinitssubsequentmarch.Shermanwasobligedtopushonwithhisforceandgohimselfwithportionsofithitherandthither,untilitwasclearlydemonstratedtohimthatwiththearmyhethenhaditwouldbeimpossibletoholdthelinefromAtlantabackandleavehimanyforcewhateverwithwhichtotaketheoffensive.Hadthatplanbeenadheredto,verylargereinforcementswouldhavebeennecessary;andMr.Davis'spredictionofthedestructionofthearmywouldhavebeenrealized,orelseShermanwouldhavebeenobligedtomakeasuccessfulretreat,whichMr.DavissaidinhisspeecheswouldprovemoredisastrousthanNapoleon'sretreatfromMoscow.

ThesespeechesofMr.DaviswerenotlonginreachingSherman.Hetookadvantageoftheinformationtheygave,andmadeallthepreparationpossibleforhimtomaketomeetwhatnowbecameexpected,attemptstobreakhiscommunications.Somethingelsehadtobedone:andtoSherman'ssensibleandsoldierlymindtheideawasnotlongindawninguponhim,notonlythatsomethingelsehadtobedone,butwhatthatsomethingelseshouldbe.

OnSeptember10thItelegraphedShermanasfollows:

CITYPOINT,VA.,Sept.10,1864.

MAJOR-GENERALSHERMAN,Atlanta,Georgia.

Sosoonasyourmenaresufficientlyrested,andpreparationscanbemade,itisdesirablethatanothercampaignshouldbecommenced.Wewanttokeeptheenemyconstantlypressedtotheendofthewar.Ifwegivehimnopeacewhilstthewarlasts,theendcannotbedistant.NowthatwehaveallofMobileBaythatisvaluable,IdonotknowbutitwillbethebestmovetotransferCanby'stroopstoactuponSavannah,whilstyoumoveonAugusta.Ishouldliketohearfromyou,however,inthismatter.

U.S.GRANT,Lieutenant-General.

Shermanrepliedpromptly:

"IfIcouldbesureoffindingprovisionsandammunitionatAugusta,orColumbus,Georgia,IcanmarchtoMilledgeville,andcompelHoodtogiveupAugustaorMacon,andthenturnontheother.*Ifyoucanmanagetotakethe

SavannahRiverashighupasAugusta,ortheChattahoocheeasfarupasColumbus,IcansweepthewholeStateofGeorgia."

Onthe12thIsentaspecialmessenger,oneofmyownstaff,withaletterinvitingSherman'sviewsaboutthenextcampaign.

CITYPOINT,VA.,Sept.12,1864.

MAJOR-GENERALW.T.SHERMAN,CommandingMillDivisionoftheMississippi.

IsendLieutenant-ColonelPorter,ofmystaff,withthis.ColonelPorterwillexplaintoyoutheexactconditionofaffairsherebetterthanIcandointhelimitsofaletter.AlthoughIfeelmyselfstrongenoughforoffensiveoperations,Iamholdingonquietlytogetadvantageofrecruitsandconvalescents,whoarecomingforwardveryrapidly.Mylinesarenecessarilyverylong,extendingfromDeepBottomnorthoftheJamesacrossthepeninsulaformedbytheAppomattoxandtheJames,andsouthoftheAppomattoxtotheWeldonRoad.Thislineisverystronglyfortified,andcanbeheldwithcomparativelyfewmen,butfromitsgreatlengthtakesmanyintheaggregate.Ipropose,whenIdomove,toextendmyleftsoastocontrolwhatisknownastheSouthSide,orLynchburgandPetersburgRoad,thenifpossibletokeeptheDanvilleRoadcut.Atthesametimethismoveismade,IwanttosendaforceoffromsixtotenthousandmenagainstWilmington.

ThewayIproposetodothisistolandthemennorthofFortFisher,andholdthatpoint.Atthesametimealargenavalfleetwillbeassembledthere,andtheiron-cladswillrunthebatteriesastheydidatMobile.ThiswillgiveusthesamecontroloftheharborofWilmingtonthatwenowhaveoftheharborofMobile.Whatyouaretodowiththeforcesatyourcommand,Idonotsee.Thedifficultiesofsupplyingyourarmy,exceptwhenyouareconstantlymoving,beyondwhereyouare,Iplainlysee.IfithadnotbeenforPrice'smovementsCanbywouldhavesenttwelvethousandmorementoMobile.FromyourcommandontheMississippianequalnumbercouldhavebeentaken.Withtheseforcesmyideawouldhavebeentodividethem,sendingonehalftoMobileandtheotherhalftoSavannah.Youcouldthenmoveasproposedinyourtelegram,soastothreatenMaconandAugustaequally.Whicheverwasabandonedbytheenemyyoucouldtakeandopenupanewbaseofsupplies.Myobjectnowinsendingastaffofficerisnotsomuchtosuggestoperationsforyou,astogetyourviewsandhaveplansmaturedbythetimeeverythingcanbegotready.It

yourviewsandhaveplansmaturedbythetimeeverythingcanbegotready.Itwillprobablybethe5thofOctoberbeforeanyoftheplanshereinindicatedwillbeexecuted.

Ifyouhaveanypromotionstorecommend,sendthenamesforwardandIwillapprovethem.*

U.S.GRANT,Lieutenant-General.

ThisreachedShermanonSeptember20th.

Onthe25thofSeptemberShermanreportedtoWashingtonthatHood'stroopswereinhisrear.HehadprovidedagainstthisbysendingadivisiontoChattanoogaandadivisiontoRome,Georgia,whichwasintherearofHood,supposingthatHoodwouldfallbackinthedirectionfromwhichhehadcometoreachtherailroad.AtthesametimeShermanandHoodkeptupacorrespondencerelativetotheexchangeofprisoners,thetreatmentofcitizens,andothermatterssuitabletobearrangedbetweenhostilecommandersinthefield.Onthe27thofSeptemberItelegraphedShermanasfollows:

CITYPOINT,VA.,September27,1864—10.30A.M.

MAJOR-GENERALSHERMAN:

IhavedirectedallrecruitsandnewtroopsfromtheWesternStatestobesenttoNashville,toreceivetheirfurtherordersfromyou.*

U.S.GRANT,Lieutenant-General.

Onthe29thShermansentThomasbacktoChattanooga,andafterwardstoNashville,withanotherdivision(Morgan's)oftheadvancedarmy.Shermanthensuggestedthat,whenhewasprepared,hismovementsshouldtakeplaceagainstMilledgevilleandthentoSavannah.Hisexpectationatthattimewas,tomakethismovementassoonashecouldgetuphissupplies.Hoodwasmovinginhisowncountry,andwasmovinglightsothathecouldmaketwomilestoSherman'sone.Hedependeduponthecountrytogatherhissupplies,andsowasnotaffectedbydelays.

AsIhavesaid,untilthisunexpectedstateofaffairshappened,Mobilehadbeen

AsIhavesaid,untilthisunexpectedstateofaffairshappened,MobilehadbeenlookeduponastheobjectivepointofSherman'sarmy.Ithadbeenafavoritemoveofminefrom1862,whenIfirstsuggestedtothethencommander-in-chiefthatthetroopsinLouisiana,insteadoffritteringawaytheirtimeinthetrans-Mississippi,shouldmoveagainstMobile.IrecommendedthisfromtimetotimeuntilIcameintocommandofthearmy,thelastofMarch1864.Havingthepowerinmyownhands,Inoworderedtheconcentrationofsupplies,storesandtroops,inthedepartmentoftheGulfaboutNewOrleans,withaviewtoamoveagainstMobile,insupportof,andinconjunctionwith,theotherarmiesoperatinginthefield.BeforeIcameintocommand,thesetroopshadbeenscatteredoverthetrans-Mississippidepartmentinsuchawaythattheycouldnotbe,orwerenot,gottenbackintimetotakeanypartintheoriginalmovement;hencetheconsideration,whichhadcausedMobiletobeselectedastheobjectivepointforSherman'sarmytofindhisnextbaseofsuppliesafterhavingcutloosefromAtlanta,nolongerexisted.

GeneralG.M.Dodge,anexceedinglyefficientofficer,havingbeenbadlywounded,hadtoleavethearmyaboutthefirstofOctober.Hewasincommandoftwodivisionsofthe16thcorps,consolidatedintoone.ShermanthendividedhisarmyintotherightandleftwingstherightcommandedbyGeneralO.O.HowardandtheleftbyGeneralSlocum.GeneralDodge'stwodivisionswereassigned,onetoeachofthesewings.Howard'scommandembracedthe15thand17thcorps,andSlocum'sthe14thand20thcorps,commandedbyGeneralsJeff.C.DavisandA.S.Williams.GeneralsLoganandBlaircommandedthetwocorpscomposingtherightwing.Aboutthistimetheylefttotakepartinthepresidentialelection,whichtookplacethatyear,leavingtheircorpstoOsterhausandRansom.IhavenodoubtthattheirleavingwasattheearnestsolicitationoftheWarDepartment.GeneralBlairgotbackintimetoresumehiscommandandtoproceedwithitthroughoutthemarchtotheseaandbacktothegrandreviewatWashington.GeneralLogandidnotreturntohiscommanduntilafteritreachedSavannah.

LoganfeltverymuchaggrievedatthetransferofGeneralHowardfromthatportionoftheArmyofthePotomacwhichwasthenwiththeWesternArmy,tothecommandoftheArmyoftheTennessee,withwhicharmyGeneralLoganhadservedfromthebattleofBelmonttothefallofAtlanta—havingpassedsuccessivelythroughallgradesfromcolonelcommandingaregimenttogeneralcommandingabrigade,divisionandarmycorps,untiluponthedeathofMcPhersonthecommandoftheentireArmyoftheTennesseedevolveduponhiminthemidstofahotlycontestedbattle.Heconceivedthathehaddonehis

himinthemidstofahotlycontestedbattle.Heconceivedthathehaddonehisfulldutyascommanderinthatengagement;andIcanbeartestimony,frompersonalobservation,thathehadprovedhimselffullyequaltoallthelowerpositionswhichhehadoccupiedasasoldier.IwillnotpretendtoquestionthemotivewhichactuatedShermanintakinganofficerfromanotherarmytosupersedeGeneralLogan.Ihavenodoubt,whatever,thathedidthisforwhatheconsideredwouldbetothegoodoftheservice,whichwasmoreimportantthanthatthepersonalfeelingsofanyindividualshouldnotbeaggrieved;thoughIdoubtwhetherhehadanofficerwithhimwhocouldhavefilledtheplaceasLoganwouldhavedone.Differencesofopinionmustexistbetweenthebestoffriendsastopoliciesinwar,andofjudgmentastomen'sfitness.Theofficerwhohasthecommand,however,shouldbeallowedtojudgeofthefitnessoftheofficersunderhim,unlessheisverymanifestlywrong.

Sherman'sarmy,afterallthedepletions,numberedaboutsixtythousandeffectivemen.Allweakmenhadbeenlefttoholdtherear,andthoseremainingwerenotonlywellmen,butstrongandhardy,sothathehadsixtythousandasgoodsoldiersasevertrodtheearth;betterthananyEuropeansoldiers,becausetheynotonlyworkedlikeamachinebutthemachinethought.Europeanarmiesknowverylittlewhattheyarefightingfor,andcareless.Includedinthesesixtythousandtroops,thereweretwosmalldivisionsofcavalry,numberingaltogetheraboutfourthousandmen.Hoodhadaboutthirty-fivetofortythousandmen,independentofForrest,whoseforceswereoperatinginTennesseeandKentucky,asMr.Davishadpromisedtheyshould.ThispartofMr.Davis'smilitaryplanwasadmirable,andpromisedthebestresultsofanythinghecouldhavedone,accordingtomyjudgment.IsaythisbecauseIhavecriticisedhismilitaryjudgmentintheremovalofJohnston,andalsointheappointmentofHood.Iamaware,however,thattherewashighfeelingexistingatthattimebetweenDavisandhissubordinate,whomIregardedasoneofhisablestlieutenants.

Onthe5thofOctobertherailroadbackfromAtlantawasagainverybadlybroken,Hoodhavinggotonthetrackwithhisarmy.Shermansawafternight,fromahighpoint,theroadburningformiles.Thedefenceoftherailroadbyourtroopswasverygallant,buttheycouldnotholdpointsbetweentheirintrenchedpositionsagainstHood'swholearmy;infacttheymadenoattempttodoso;butgenerallytheintrenchedpositionswereheld,aswellasimportantbridges,andstorelocatedatthem.Allatoona,forinstance,wasdefendedbyasmallforceofmenunderthecommandofGeneralCorse,oneoftheveryableandefficientvolunteerofficersproducedbythewar.He,withasmallforce,wascutofffromtheremainderoftheNationalarmyandwasattackedwithgreatvigorbymany

theremainderoftheNationalarmyandwasattackedwithgreatvigorbymanytimeshisownnumber.Shermanfromhishighpositioncouldseethebattleraging,withtheConfederatetroopsbetweenhimandhissubordinate.Hesentmen,ofcourse,toraisethetemporarysiege,butthetimethatwouldbenecessarilyconsumedinreachingCorse,wouldbesogreatthatalloccupyingtheintrenchmentsmightbedead.Corsewasamanwhowouldneversurrender.FromahighpositionsomeofSherman'ssignalcorpsdiscoveredasignalflagwavingfromaholeintheblockhouseatAllatoona.ItwasfromCorse.Hehadbeenshotthroughtheface,buthesignalledtohischiefamessagewhichleftnodoubtofhisdeterminationtoholdhispostatallhazards.Itwasatthispointprobably,thatShermanfirstrealizedthatwiththeforcesathisdisposal,thekeepingopenofhislineofcommunicationwiththeNorthwouldbeimpossibleifheexpectedtoretainanyforcewithwhichtooperateoffensivelybeyondAtlanta.Heproposed,therefore,todestroytheroadsbacktoChattanooga,whenallreadytomove,andleavethelatterplacegarrisoned.Yet,beforeabandoningtherailroad,itwasnecessarythatheshouldrepairdamagesalreadydone,andholdtheroaduntilhecouldgetforwardsuchsupplies,ordnancestoresandsmallrations,ashewantedtocarrywithhimonhisproposedmarch,andtoreturntothenorthhissurplusartillery;hisobjectbeingtomovelightandtohavenomoreartillerythancouldbeusedtoadvantageonthefield.

ShermanthoughtHoodwouldfollowhim,thoughheproposedtoprepareforthecontingencyofthelattermovingtheotherwaywhilehewasmovingsouth,bymakingThomasstrongenoughtoholdTennesseeandKentucky.I,myself,wasthoroughlysatisfiedthatHoodwouldgonorth,ashedid.Onthe2dofNovemberItelegraphedShermanauthorizinghimdefinitelytomoveaccordingtotheplanhehadproposed:thatis,cuttingloosefromhisbase,givingupAtlantaandtherailroadbacktoChattanooga.TostrengthenThomashesentStanley(4thcorps)back,andalsoorderedSchofield,commandingtheArmyoftheOhio,twelvethousandstrong,toreporttohim.Inadditiontothis,A.J.Smith,who,withtwodivisionsofSherman'sarmy,wasinMissouriaidingRosecransindrivingtheenemyfromthatState,wasunderorderstoreturntoThomasand,underthemostunfavorablecircumstances,mightbeexpectedtoarrivetherelongbeforeHoodcouldreachNashville.

Inadditiontothis,thenewleviesoftroopsthatwerebeingraisedintheNorth-westwenttoThomasasrapidlyasenrolledandequipped.Thomas,withoutanyoftheseadditionsspokenof,hadagarrisonatChattanoogawhichhadbeenstrengthenedbyonedivisionandgarrisonsatBridgeport,Stevenson,Decatur,Murfreesboro,andFlorence.TherewerealreadywithhiminNashvilleten

Murfreesboro,andFlorence.TherewerealreadywithhiminNashvilletenthousandsoldiersinroundnumbers,andmanythousandsofemployeesinthequartermaster'sandotherdepartmentswhocouldbeputintheintrenchmentsinfrontofNashville,foritsdefence.Also,Wilsonwastherewithtenthousanddismountedcavalrymen,whowerebeingequippedforthefield.Thomashadatthistimeaboutforty-fivethousandmenwithoutanyofthereinforcementshereaboveenumerated.Thesereinforcementsgavehimaltogetheraboutseventythousandmen,withoutcountingwhatmightbeaddedbythenewleviesalreadyspokenof.

AboutthistimeBeauregardarriveduponthefield,nottosupersedeHoodincommand,buttotakegeneralchargeovertheentiredistrictinwhichHoodandShermanwere,ormightbe,operating.Hemadethemostfranticappealstothecitizensforassistancetoberenderedineveryway:bysendingreinforcements,bydestroyingsuppliesonthelineofmarchoftheinvaders,bydestroyingthebridgesoverwhichtheywouldhavetocross,andby,ineveryway,obstructingtheroadstotheirfront.Butitwashardtoconvincethepeopleoftheproprietyofdestroyingsupplieswhichweresomuchneededbythemselves,andeachonehopedthathisownpossessionsmightescape.

Hoodsoonstartednorth,andwentintocampnearDecatur,Alabama,whereheremaineduntilthe29thofOctober,butwithoutmakinganattackonthegarrisonofthatplace.

TheTennesseeRiverwaspatrolledbygunboats,fromMuscleShoalseast;and,also,belowthesecondshoalsouttotheOhioRiver.These,withthetroopsthatmightbeconcentratedfromthegarrisonsalongtheriveratanypointwhereHoodmightchoosetoattempttocross,madeitimpossibleforhimtocrosstheTennesseeatanyplacewhereitwasnavigable.ButMuscleShoalsisnotnavigable,andbelowthemagainisanothershoalwhichalsoobstructsnavigation.HoodthereforemoveddowntoapointnearlyoppositeFlorence,Alabama,crossedoverandremainedthereforsometime,collectingsuppliesoffood,forageandammunition.Allofthesehadtocomefromaconsiderabledistancesouth,becausetheregioninwhichhewasthensituatedwasmountainous,withsmallvalleyswhichproducedbutlittle,andwhattheyhadproducedhadlongsincebeenexhausted.Onthe1stofNovemberIsuggestedtoSherman,andalsoaskedhisviewsthereon,theproprietyofdestroyingHoodbeforehestartedonhiscampaign.

Onthe2dofNovember,asstated,IapproveddefinitelyhismakinghisproposedcampaignthroughGeorgia,leavingHoodbehindtothetendermercyofThomas

campaignthroughGeorgia,leavingHoodbehindtothetendermercyofThomasandthetroopsinhiscommand.Shermanfixedthe10thofNovemberasthedayofstarting.

ShermanstartedonthatdaytogetbacktoAtlanta,andonthe15ththerealmarchtotheseacommenced.Therightwing,underHoward,andthecavalrywenttoJonesboro,Milledgeville,thenthecapitalofGeorgia,beingSherman'sobjectiveorstoppingplaceonthewaytoSavannah.TheleftwingmovedtoStoneMountain,alongroadsmuchfarthereastthanthosetakenbytherightwing.Slocumwasincommand,andthreatenedAugustaasthepointtowhichhewasmoving,buthewastoturnoffandmeettherightwingatMilledgeville.

Atlantawasdestroyedsofarastorenderitworthlessformilitarypurposesbeforestarting,Shermanhimselfremainingoveradaytosuperintendthework,andseethatitwaswelldone.Sherman'sordersforthiscampaignwereperfect.Beforestarting,hehadsentbackallsick,disabledandweakmen,retainingnothingbutthehardy,well-inuredsoldierstoaccompanyhimonhislongmarchinprospect.Hisartillerywasreducedtosixty-fiveguns.Theammunitioncarriedwiththemwastwohundredroundsformusketandgun.Smallrationsweretakeninasmallwagontrain,whichwasloadedtoitscapacityforrapidmovement.Thearmywasexpectedtoliveonthecountry,andtoalwayskeepthewagonsfullofforageandprovisionsagainstapossibledelayofafewdays.

Thetroops,bothoftherightandleftwings,mademostoftheiradvancealongthelineofrailroads,whichtheydestroyed.Themethodadoptedtoperformthiswork,wastoburnanddestroyallthebridgesandculverts,andforalongdistance,atplaces,totearupthetrackandbendtherails.Soldierstodothisrapidlywouldformalinealongonesideoftheroadwithcrowbarsandpoles,placetheseundertherailsand,hoistingallatonce,turnovermanyrodsofroadatonetime.Thetieswouldthenbeplacedinpiles,andtherails,astheywereloosened,wouldbecarriedandputacrosstheselogheaps.Whenasufficientnumberofrailswereplaceduponapileoftiesitwouldbesetonfire.Thiswouldheattherailsverymuchmoreinthemiddle,thatbeingoverthemainpartofthefire,thanattheends,sothattheywouldnaturallybendoftheirownweight;butthesoldiers,toincreasethedamage,wouldtaketongsand,oneortwomenateachendoftherail,carryitwithforceagainstthenearesttreeandtwistitaround,thusleavingrailsformingbandstoornamenttheforesttreesofGeorgia.Allthisworkwasgoingonatthesametime,therebeingasufficientnumberofmendetailedforthatpurpose.Somepiledthelogsandbuiltthefire;someputtherailsuponthefire;whileotherswouldbendthosethatwere

someputtherailsuponthefire;whileotherswouldbendthosethatweresufficientlyheated:sothat,bythetimethelastbitofroadwastornup,thatitwasdesignedtodestroyatacertainplace,therailspreviouslytakenupwerealreadydestroyed.

Theorganizationforsupplyingthearmywasverycomplete.Eachbrigadefurnishedacompanytogathersuppliesofforageandprovisionsforthecommandtowhichtheybelonged.Strictinjunctionswereissuedagainstpillaging,orotherwiseunnecessarilyannoyingthepeople;buteverythinginshapeoffoodformanandforageforbeastwastaken.Thesupplieswereturnedovertothebrigadecommissaryandquartermaster,andwereissuedbythemtotheirrespectivecommandspreciselythesameasiftheyhadbeenpurchased.Thecapturesconsistedlargelyofcattle,sheep,poultry,somebacon,cornmeal,oftenmolasses,andoccasionallycoffeeorothersmallrations.

Theskillofthesemen,calledbythemselvesandthearmy"bummers,"incollectingtheirloadsandgettingbacktotheirrespectivecommands,wasmarvellous.Whentheystartedoutinthemorning,theywerealwaysonfoot;butscarcelyoneofthemreturnedintheeveningwithoutbeingmountedonahorseormule.Thesewouldbeturnedinforthegeneraluseofthearmy,andthenextdaythesemenwouldstartoutafootandreturnagainintheeveningmounted.

Manyoftheexploitsofthesemenwouldfallundertheheadofromance;indeed,Iamafraidthatintellingsomeoftheirexperiences,theromancegotthebetterofthetruthuponwhichthestorywasfounded,andthat,inthewaymanyoftheseanecdotesaretold,verylittleofthefoundationisleft.Isuspectthatmostofthemconsistchieflyofthefictionaddedtomakethestoriesbetter.InoneinstanceitwasreportedthatafewmenofSherman'sarmypassedahousewheretheydiscoveredsomechickensunderthedwelling.Theyimmediatelyproceededtocapturethem,toaddtothearmy'ssupplies.Theladyofthehouse,whohappenedtobeathome,madepiteousappealstohavethesespared,sayingtheywereafewshehadputawaytosavebypermissionofotherpartieswhohadprecededandwhohadtakenalltheothersthatshehad.Thesoldiersseemedmovedatherappeal;butlookingatthechickensagaintheyweretemptedandoneofthemreplied:"TherebellionmustbesuppressedifittakesthelastchickenintheConfederacy,"andproceededtoappropriatethelastone.

Anotheranecdotecharacteristicofthesetimeshasbeentold.TheSouth,priortotherebellion,keptbloodhoundstopursuerunawayslaveswhotookrefugeintheneighboringswamps,andalsotohuntconvicts.Orderswereissuedtokillalltheseanimalsastheyweremetwith.Ononeoccasionasoldierpickedupa

theseanimalsastheyweremetwith.Ononeoccasionasoldierpickedupapoodle,thefavoritepetofitsmistress,andwascarryingitofftoexecutionwhentheladymadeastrongappealtohimtospareit.Thesoldierreplied,"Madam,ourordersaretokilleverybloodhound.""Butthisisnotabloodhound,"saidthelady."Well,madam,wecannottellwhatitwillgrowintoifweleaveitbehind,"saidthesoldierashewentoffwithit.

Notwithstandingtheseanecdotes,andthenecessaryhardshiptheywouldseemtoimply,Idonotbelievetherewasmuchunwarrantablepillagingconsideringthatwewereintheenemy'sterritoryandwithoutanysuppliesexceptsuchasthecountryafforded.

Onthe23dSherman,withtheleftwing,reachedMilledgeville.Therightwingwasnotfaroff:butproceededonitswaytowardsSavannahdestroyingtheroadasitwent.ThetroopsatMilledgevilleremainedoveradaytodestroyfactories,buildingsusedformilitarypurposes,etc.,beforeresumingitsmarch.

Thegovernor,whohadbeenalmostdefyingMr.Davisbeforethis,nowfledprecipitately,asdidthelegislatureoftheStateandalltheStateofficers.Thegovernor,Shermansays,wascarefultocarryawayevenhisgardenvegetables,whileheleftthearchivesoftheStatetofallintoourhands.TheonlymilitaryforcethatwasopposedtoSherman'sforwardmarchwastheGeorgiamilitia,adivisionunderthecommandofGeneralG.W.Smith,andabattalionunderHarryWayne.NeitherthequalityoftheforcesnortheirnumberswassufficienttoevenretardtheprogressofSherman'sarmy.

ThepeopleattheSouthbecamesofranticatthistimeatthesuccessfulinvasionofGeorgiathattheytookthecadetsfromthemilitarycollegeandaddedthemtotheranksofthemilitia.TheyevenliberatedtheStateconvictsunderpromisefromthemthattheywouldserveinthearmy.IhavebutlittledoubtthattheworstactsthatwereattributedtoSherman'sarmywerecommittedbytheseconvicts,andbyotherSouthernpeoplewhooughttohavebeenundersentence—suchpeopleascouldbefoundineverycommunity,NorthandSouth—whotookadvantageoftheircountrybeinginvadedtocommitcrime.Theywereinbutlittledangerofdetection,orofarrestevenifdetected.

TheSouthernpapersincommentinguponSherman'smovementspicturedhimasinthemostdeplorablecondition:statingthathismenwerestarving,thattheyweredemoralizedandwanderingaboutalmostwithoutobject,aimingonlytoreachtheseacoastandgetundertheprotectionofournavy.ThesepapersgottotheNorthandhadmoreorlesseffectuponthemindsofthepeople,causing

theNorthandhadmoreorlesseffectuponthemindsofthepeople,causingmuchdistresstoallloyalpersonsparticularlytothosewhohadhusbands,sonsorbrotherswithSherman.Mr.Lincolnseeingtheseaccounts,hadaletterwrittenaskingmeifIcouldgivehimanythingthathecouldsaytotheloyalpeoplethatwouldcomfortthem.Itoldhimtherewasnottheslightestoccasionforalarm;thatwith60,000suchmenasShermanhadwithhim,suchacommandingofficerashewascouldnotbecutoffintheopencountry.Hemightpossiblybepreventedfromreachingthepointhehadstartedouttoreach,buthewouldgetthroughsomewhereandwouldfinallygettohischosendestination:andevenifworstcametoworsthecouldreturnNorth.IheardafterwardsofMr.Lincoln'ssaying,tothosewhowouldinquireofhimastowhathethoughtaboutthesafetyofSherman'sarmy,thatShermanwasallright:"Grantsaystheyaresafewithsuchageneral,andthatiftheycannotgetoutwheretheywantto,theycancrawlbackbytheholetheywentinat."

WhileatMilledgevillethesoldiersmetattheStateHouse,organizedalegislature,andproceededtobusinesspreciselyasiftheywerethelegislativebodybelongingtotheStateofGeorgia.Thedebateswereexciting,andwereuponthesubjectofthesituationtheSouthwasinatthattime,particularlytheStateofGeorgia.Theywentsofarastorepeal,afteraspiritedandacrimoniousdebate,theordinanceofsecession.

Thenextday(24th)Shermancontinuedhismarch,goingbythewayofWaynesboroandLouisville,Millenbeingthenextobjectiveandwherethetwocolumns(therightandleftwings)weretomeet.Theleftwingmovedtotheleftofthedirectroad,andthecavalrystillfartheroffsoastomakeitlookasthoughAugustawasthepointtheywereaimingfor.Theymovedonalltheroadstheycouldfindleadinginthatdirection.ThecavalrywassenttomakearapidmarchinhopeofsurprisingMillenbeforetheUnionprisonerscouldbecarriedaway;buttheyfailedinthis.

ThedistancefromMilledgevilletoMillenwasaboutonehundredmiles.AtthispointWheeler,whohadbeenorderedfromTennessee,arrivedandswelledthenumbersandefficiencyofthetroopsconfrontingSherman.Hardee,anativeofGeorgia,alsocame,butbroughtnotroopswithhim.ItwasintendedthatheshouldraiseaslargeanarmyaspossiblewithwhichtointerceptSherman'smarch.Hedidsucceedinraisingsometroops,andwiththeseandthoseunderthecommandofWheelerandWayne,hadanarmysufficienttocausesomeannoyancebutnogreatdetention.OurcavalryandWheeler'shadaprettysevereengagement,inwhichWheelerwasdriventowardsAugusta,thusgivingtheidea

engagement,inwhichWheelerwasdriventowardsAugusta,thusgivingtheideathatShermanwasprobablymakingforthatpoint.

Millenwasreachedonthe3dofDecember,andthemarchwasresumedthefollowingdayforSavannah,thefinalobjective.BragghadnowbeensenttoAugustawithsometroops.WadeHamptonwastherealsotryingtoraisecavalrysufficienttodestroySherman'sarmy.Ifheeverraisedaforceitwastoolatetodotheworkexpectedofit.Hardee'swholeforceprobablynumberedlessthantenthousandmen.

FromMillentoSavannahthecountryissandyandpoor,andaffordsbutverylittleforageotherthanricestraw,whichwasthengrowing.Thisansweredaverygoodpurposeasforage,andthericegrainwasanadditiontothesoldier'srations.Nofurtherresistanceworthyofnotewasmetwith,untilwithinafewmilesofSavannah.Thisplacewasfoundtobeintrenchedandgarrisoned.Shermanproceededatonceonhisarrivaltoinvesttheplace,andfoundthattheenemyhadplacedtorpedoesintheground,whichweretoexplodewhensteppedonbymanorbeast.Oneoftheseexplodedunderanofficer'shorse,blowingtheanimaltopiecesandtearingoneofthelegsoftheofficersobadlythatithadtobeamputated.Shermanatonceorderedhisprisonerstothefront,movingtheminacompactbodyinadvance,toeitherexplodethetorpedoesordigthemup.Nofurtherexplosiontookplace.

Onthe10thofDecemberthesiegeofSavannahcommenced.Shermanthen,beforeproceedinganyfurtherwithoperationsforthecaptureoftheplace,startedwithsometroopstoopencommunicationwithourfleet,whichheexpectedtofindinthelowerharbororasnearbyasthefortsoftheenemywouldpermit.InmarchingtothecoastheencounteredFortMcAllister,whichitwasnecessarytoreducebeforethesupplieshemightfindonshipboardcouldbemadeavailable.FortMcAllisterwassooncapturedbyanassaultmadebyGeneralHazen'sdivision.Communicationwasthenestablishedwiththefleet.ThecaptureofSavannahthenonlyoccupiedafewdays,andinvolvednogreatlossoflife.Thegarrison,however,asweshallsee,wasenabledtoescapebycrossingtheriverandmovingeastward.

WhenShermanhadopenedcommunicationwiththefleethefoundthereasteamer,whichIhadforwardedtohim,carryingtheaccumulatedmailsforhisarmy,alsosupplieswhichIsupposedhewouldbeinneedof.GeneralJ.G.Foster,whocommandedallthetroopssouthofNorthCarolinaontheAtlanticsea-board,visitedGeneralShermanbeforehehadopenedcommunicationwiththefleet,withtheviewofascertainingwhatassistancehecouldbetohim.Foster

thefleet,withtheviewofascertainingwhatassistancehecouldbetohim.FosterreturnedimmediatelytohisownheadquartersatHiltonHead,forthepurposeofsendingShermansiegeguns,andalsoifheshouldfindhehadthemtospare,suppliesofclothing,hardbread,etc.,thinkingthatthesearticlesmightnotbefoundoutside.ThemailonthesteamerwhichIsentdown,hadbeencollectedbyColonelA.H.MarklandofthePostOfficeDepartment,whowentinchargeofit.OnthissamevesselIsentanofficerofmystaff(LieutenantDunn)withthefollowinglettertoGeneralSherman:

CITYPOINT,VA.,Dec.3,1864.

MAJOR-GENERALW.T.SHERMAN,CommandingArmiesnearSavannah,Ga.

ThelittleinformationgleanedfromtheSouthernpress,indicatingnogreatobstacletoyourprogress,Ihavedirectedyourmails(whichhadbeenpreviouslycollectedatBaltimorebyColonelMarkland,SpecialAgentofthePostOfficeDepartment)tobesentasfarastheblockadingsquadronoffSavannah,tobeforwardedtoyouassoonasheardfromonthecoast.

Notlikingtorejoicebeforethevictoryisassured,Iabstainfromcongratulatingyouandthoseunderyourcommand,untilbottomhasbeenstruck.Ihaveneverhadafear,however,fortheresult.

SinceyouleftAtlanta,noverygreatprogresshasbeenmadehere.Theenemyhasbeencloselywatchedthough,andpreventedfromdetachingagainstyou.Ithinknotonemanhasgonefromhere,exceptsometwelveorfifteenhundreddismountedcavalry.BragghasgonefromWilmington.Iamtryingtotakeadvantageofhisabsencetogetpossessionofthatplace.OwingtosomepreparationsAdmiralPorterandGeneralButleraremakingtoblowupFortFisher(which,whilehopingforthebest,Idonotbelieveaparticlein),thereisadelayingettingthisexpeditionoff.Ihopetheywillbereadytostartbythe7th,andthatBraggwillnothavestartedbackbythattime.

InthisletterIdonotintendtogiveyouanythinglikedirectionsforfutureaction,butwillstateageneralideaIhave,andwillgetyourviewsafteryouhaveestablishedyourselfonthesea-coast.WithyourveteranarmyIhopetogetcontroloftheonlytwothroughroutesfromeasttowestpossessedbytheenemybeforethefallofAtlanta.TheconditionwillbefilledbyholdingSavannahandAugusta,orbyholdinganyotherporttotheeastofSavannahandBranchville.If

Augusta,orbyholdinganyotherporttotheeastofSavannahandBranchville.IfWilmingtonfalls,aforcefromtherecanco-operatewithyou.

ThomashasgotbackintothedefencesofNashville,withHoodcloseuponhim.Decaturhasbeenabandoned,andsohavealltheroadsexceptthemainoneleadingtoChattanooga.Partofthisfallingbackwasundoubtedlynecessaryandallofitmayhavebeen.Itdidnotlookso,however,tome.Inmyopinion,ThomasfaroutnumbersHoodininfantry.Incavalry,Hoodhastheadvantageinmoraleandnumbers.IhopeyetthatHoodwillbebadlycrippledifnotdestroyed.ThegeneralnewsyouwilllearnfromthepapersbetterthanIcouldgiveit.

Afterallbecomesquiet,androadsbecomesobadupherethatthereislikelytobeaweekortwowhennothingcanbedone,Iwillrundownthecoasttoseeyou.Ifyoudesireit,IwillaskMrs.Shermantogowithme.

Yourstruly,U.S.GRANT,Lieutenant-General

Iquotethisletterbecauseitgivesthereaderafullknowledgeoftheeventsofthatperiod.

Shermannow(the15th)returnedtoSavannahtocompleteitsinvestmentandinsurethesurrenderofthegarrison.ThecountryaboutSavannahislowandmarshy,andthecitywaswellintrenchedfromtheriverabovetotheriverbelow;andassaultscouldnotbemadeexceptalongacomparativelynarrowcauseway.ForthisreasonassaultsmusthaveresultedinseriousdestructionoflifetotheUniontroops,withthechanceoffailingaltogether.Shermanthereforedecideduponacompleteinvestmentoftheplace.Whenhebelievedthisinvestmentcompleted,hesummonedthegarrisontosurrender.GeneralHardee,whowasincommand,repliedinsubstancethattheconditionofaffairswasnotsuchasShermanhaddescribed.Hesaidhewasinfullcommunicationwithhisdepartmentandwasreceivingsuppliesconstantly.

Hardee,however,wascutoffentirelyfromallcommunicationwiththewestsideoftheriver,andbytheriveritselftothenorthandsouth.OntheSouthCarolinasidethecountrywasallricefields,throughwhichitwouldhavebeenimpossibletobringsuppliessothatHardeehadnopossiblecommunicationwiththeoutsideworldexceptbyadilapidatedplankroadstartingfromthewestbankoftheriver.Sherman,receivingthisreply,proceededinpersontoapointonthecoast,whereGeneralFosterhadtroopsstationedunderGeneralHatch,forthepurposeof

GeneralFosterhadtroopsstationedunderGeneralHatch,forthepurposeofmakingarrangementswiththelatterofficertogothroughbyoneofthenumerouschannelsrunninginlandalongthatpartofthecoastofSouthCarolina,totheplankroadwhichGeneralHardeestillpossessed,andthustocuthimofffromthelastmeanshehadofgettingsupplies,ifnotofcommunication.

Whilearrangingforthismovement,andbeforetheattempttoexecutetheplanhadbeencommenced,ShermanreceivedinformationthroughoneofhisstaffofficersthattheenemyhadevacuatedSavannahthenightbefore.Thiswasthenightofthe21stofDecember.BeforeevacuatingtheplaceHardeehadblownupthenavyyard.Someiron-cladshadbeendestroyed,aswellasotherpropertythatmighthavebeenvaluabletous;butheleftanimmenseamountofstoresuntouched,consistingofcotton,railroadcars,workshops,numerouspiecesofartillery,andseveralthousandstandsofsmallarms.

Alittleincidentoccurred,soonafterthefallofSavannah,whichShermanrelatesinhisMemoirs,andwhichisworthyofrepetition.Savannahwasoneofthepointswhereblockaderunnersentered.Shortlyafterthecityfellintoourpossession,ablockaderunnercamesailingupserenely,notdoubtingbuttheConfederateswerestillinpossession.Itwasnotmolested,andthecaptaindidnotfindouthismistakeuntilhehadtiedupandgonetotheCustomHouse,wherehefoundanewoccupantofthebuilding,andmadealessprofitabledispositionofhisvesselandcargothanhehadexpected.

AstherewassomediscussionastotheauthorshipofSherman'smarchtothesea,bycriticsofhisbookwhenitappearedbeforethepublic,IwanttostateherethatnoquestionuponthatsubjectwaseverraisedbetweenGeneralShermanandmyself.CircumstancesmadetheplanonwhichShermanexpectedtoactimpracticable,asascommanderoftheforceshenecessarilyhadtodeviseanewonwhichwouldgivemorepromiseofsuccess:consequentlyherecommendedthedestructionoftherailroadbacktoChattanooga,andthatheshouldbeauthorizedthentomove,ashedid,fromAtlantaforward.Hissuggestionswerefinallyapproved,althoughtheydidnotimmediatelyfindfavorinWashington.Evenwhenitcametothetimeofstarting,thegreatestapprehension,astotheproprietyofthecampaignhewasaboutcommence,filledthemindofthePresident,inducednodoubtbyhisadvisers.ThiswentsofarastomovethePresidenttoaskmetosuspendSherman'smarchforadayortwountilIcouldthinkthematterover.Myrecollectionis,thoughIfindnorecordtoshowit,thatoutofdeferencetothePresident'swishIdidsendadispatchtoShermanaskinghimtowaitadayortwo,orelsetheconnectionsbetweenuswerealreadycutso

himtowaitadayortwo,orelsetheconnectionsbetweenuswerealreadycutsothatIcouldnotdoso.Howeverthismaybe,thequestionofwhodevisedtheplanofmarchfromAtlantatoSavannahiseasilyanswered:itwasclearlySherman,andtohimalsobelongsthecreditofitsbrilliantexecution.Itwashardlypossiblethatanyoneelsethanthoseonthespotcouldhavedevisedanewplanofcampaigntosupersedeonethatdidnotpromisesuccess.(*40)

IwasinfavorofSherman'splanfromthetimeitwasfirstsubmittedtome.Mychiefofstaff,however,wasverybitterlyopposedtoitand,asIlearnedsubsequently,findingthathecouldnotmoveme,heappealedtotheauthoritiesatWashingtontostopit.

CHAPTERLX.

THEBATTLEOFFRANKLIN—THEBATTLEOFNASHVILLE.

Aswehaveseen,HoodsucceededincrossingtheTennesseeRiverbetweenMuscleShoalsandthelowershoalsattheendofOctober,1864.ThomassentSchofieldwiththe4thand23dcorps,togetherwiththreebrigadesofWilson'scavalrytoPulaskitowatchhim.Onthe17thofNovemberHoodstartedandmovedinsuchamannerastoavoidSchofield,therebyturninghisposition.Hoodhadwithhimthreeinfantrycorps,commandedrespectivelybyStephenD.Lee,StewartandCheatham.These,withhiscavalry,numberedaboutforty-fivethousandmen.Schofieldhad,ofallarms,aboutthirtythousand.Thomas'sorderswere,therefore,forSchofieldtowatchthemovementsoftheenemy,butnottofightabattleifhecouldavoidit;buttofallbackincaseofanadvanceonNashville,andtofighttheenemy,ashefellback,soastoretardtheenemy'smovementsuntilhecouldbereinforcedbyThomashimself.AssoonasSchofieldsawthismovementofHood's,hesenthistrainstotherear,butdidnotfallbackhimselfuntilthe21st,andthenonlytoColumbia.AtColumbiatherewasaslightskirmishbutnobattle.FromthisplaceSchofieldthenretreatedtoFranklin.Hehadsenthiswagonsinadvance,andStanleyhadgonewiththemwithtwodivisionstoprotectthem.Cheatham'scorpsofHood'sarmypursuedthewagontrainandwentintocampatSpringHill,forthenightofthe29th.

SchofieldretreatingfromColumbiaonthe29th,passedSpringHill,whereCheathamwasbivouacked,duringthenightwithoutmolestation,thoughwithinhalfamileofwheretheConfederateswereencamped.Onthemorningofthe30thhehadarrivedatFranklin.

HoodfollowedcloselyandreachedFranklinintimetomakeanattackthesameday.Thefightwasverydesperateandsanguinary.TheConfederategeneralsledtheirmenintherepeatedcharges,andthelossamongthemwasofunusualproportions.Thisfightingcontinuedwithgreatseverityuntillongafterthenightclosedin,whentheConfederatesdrewoff.GeneralStanley,whocommandedtwodivisionsoftheUniontroops,andwhosetroopsborethebruntofthebattle,waswoundedinthefight,butmaintainedhisposition.

Theenemy'slossatFranklin,accordingtoThomas'sreport,was1,750buried

Theenemy'slossatFranklin,accordingtoThomas'sreport,was1,750burieduponthefieldbyourtroops,3,800inthehospital,and702prisonersbesides.Schofield'sloss,asofficiallyreported,was189killed,1,033wounded,and1,104capturedandmissing.

ThomasmadenoefforttoreinforceSchofieldatFranklin,asitseemedtomeatthetimeheshouldhavedone,andfightoutthebattlethere.HesimplyorderedSchofieldtocontinuehisretreattoNashville,whichthelatterdidduringthatnightandthenextday.

Thomas,inthemeantime,wasmakinghispreparationstoreceiveHood.TheroadtoChattanoogawasstillwellguardedwithstronggarrisonsatMurfreesboro,Stevenson,BridgeportandChattanooga.ThomashadpreviouslygivenupDecaturandhadbeenreinforcedbyA.J.Smith'stwodivisionsjustreturnedfromMissouri.HealsohadSteedman'sdivisionandR.S.Granger's,whichhehaddrawnfromthefront.Hisquartermaster'smen,abouttenthousandinnumber,hadbeenorganizedandarmedunderthecommandofthechiefquartermaster,GeneralJ.L.Donaldson,andplacedinthefortificationsunderthegeneralsupervisionofGeneralZ.B.Tower,oftheUnitedStatesEngineers.

HoodwasallowedtomoveuponNashville,andtoinvestthatplacealmostwithoutinterference.Thomaswasstronglyfortifiedinhisposition,sothathewouldhavebeensafeagainsttheattackofHood.Hehadtroopsenougheventoannihilatehimintheopenfield.Tomehisdelaywasunaccountable—sittingthereandpermittinghimselftobeinvested,sothat,intheend,toraisethesiegehewouldhavetofighttheenemystronglypostedbehindfortifications.Itistruetheweatherwasverybad.Therainwasfallingandfreezingasitfell,sothatthegroundwascoveredwithasheetofice,thatmadeitverydifficulttomove.ButIwasafraidthattheenemywouldfindmeansofmoving,eludeThomasandmanagetogetnorthoftheCumberlandRiver.Ifhedidthis,IapprehendedmostseriousresultsfromthecampaignintheNorth,andwasafraidwemightevenhavetosendtroopsfromtheEasttoheadhimoffifhegotthere,GeneralThomas'smovementsbeingalwayssodeliberateandsoslow,thougheffectiveindefence.

IconsequentlyurgedThomasinfrequentdispatchessentfromCityPoint(*41)tomaketheattackatonce.Thecountrywasalarmed,theadministrationwasalarmed,andIwasalarmedlesttheverythingwouldtakeplacewhichIhavejustdescribedthatis,Hoodwouldgetnorth.ItwasallwithoutavailfurtherthantoelicitdispatchesfromThomassayingthathewasgettingreadytomoveas

soonashecould,thathewasmakingpreparations,etc.AtlastIhadtosaytoGeneralThomasthatIshouldbeobligedtoremovehimunlessheactedpromptly.Herepliedthathewasverysorry,buthewouldmoveassoonashecould.

GeneralLoganhappeningtovisitCityPointaboutthattime,andknowinghimasaprompt,gallantandefficientofficer,IgavehimanordertoproceedtoNashvilletorelieveThomas.Idirectedhim,however,nottodelivertheorderorpublishituntilhereachedthere,andifThomashadmoved,thennottodeliveritatall,butcommunicatewithmebytelegraph.AfterLoganstarted,inthinkingoverthesituation,Ibecamerestless,andconcludedtogomyself.IwentasfarasWashingtonCity,whenadispatchwasreceivedfromGeneralThomasannouncinghisreadinessatlasttomove,anddesignatingthetimeofhismovement.Iconcludedtowaituntilthattime.Hedidmove,andwassuccessfulfromthestart.Thiswasonthe15thofDecember.GeneralLoganwasatLouisvilleatthetimethismovementwasmade,andtelegraphedthefacttoWashington,andproceedednofartherhimself.

Thebattleduringthe15thwassevere,butfavorabletotheUniontroops,andcontinueduntilnightclosedinuponthecombat.Thenextdaythebattlewasrenewed.AfterasuccessfulassaultuponHood'smenintheirintrenchmentstheenemyfledindisorder,routedandbroken,leavingtheirdead,theirartilleryandsmallarmsingreatnumbersonthefield,besidesthewoundedthatwerecaptured.Ourcavalryhadfoughtonfootasinfantry,andhadnottheirhorseswiththem;sothattheywerenotreadytojoininthepursuitthemomenttheenemyretreated.Theysentback,however,fortheirhorses,andendeavoredtogettoFranklinaheadofHood'sbrokenarmybytheGrannyWhiteRoad,buttoomuchtimewasconsumedingettingstarted.Theyhadgotbutafewmilesbeyondthesceneofthebattlewhentheyfoundtheenemy'scavalrydismountedandbehindintrenchmentscoveringtheroadonwhichtheywereadvancing.Hereanotherbattleensued,ourmendismountingandfightingonfoot,inwhichtheConfederateswereagainroutedanddriveningreatdisorder.Ourcavalrythenwentintobivouac,andrenewedthepursuitonthefollowingmorning.Theyweretoolate.TheenemyalreadyhadpossessionofFranklin,andwasbeyondthem.ItnowbecameachaseinwhichtheConfederateshadthelead.

OurtroopscontinuedthepursuittowithinafewmilesofColumbia,wheretheyfoundtherebelshaddestroyedtherailroadbridgeaswellasallotherbridgesoverDuckRiver.Theheavyrainsofafewdaysbeforehadswelledthestreamintoamadtorrent,impassableexceptonbridges.Unfortunately,eitherthrougha

intoamadtorrent,impassableexceptonbridges.Unfortunately,eitherthroughamistakeinthewordingoftheorderorotherwise,thepontoonbridgewhichwastohavebeensentbyrailouttoFranklin,tobetakenthencewiththepursuingcolumn,hadgonetowardChattanooga.Therewas,consequently,adelayofsomefourdaysinbuildingbridgesoutoftheremainsoftheoldrailroadbridge.OfcourseHoodgotsuchastartinthistimethatfartherpursuitwasuseless,althoughitwascontinuedforsomedistance,butwithoutcominguponhimagain.

CHAPTERLXI.

EXPEDITIONAGAINSTFORTFISHER—ATTACKONTHEFORT—FAILUREOFTHEEXPEDITION—SECONDEXPEDITIONAGAINSTTHEFORT—CAPTUREOFFORTFISHER.

UptoJanuary,1865,theenemyoccupiedFortFisher,atthemouthofCapeFearRiverandbelowtheCityofWilmington.ThisportwasofimmenseimportancetotheConfederates,becauseitformedtheirprincipalinletforblockaderunnersbymeansofwhichtheybroughtinfromabroadsuchsuppliesandmunitionsofwarastheycouldnotproduceathome.Itwasequallyimportanttoustogetpossessionofit,notonlybecauseitwasdesirabletocutofftheirsuppliessoastoinsureaspeedyterminationofthewar,butalsobecauseforeigngovernments,particularlytheBritishGovernment,wereconstantlythreateningthatunlessourscouldmaintaintheblockadeofthatcoasttheyshouldceasetorecognizeanyblockade.ForthesereasonsIdetermined,withtheconcurrenceoftheNavyDepartment,inDecember,tosendanexpeditionagainstFortFisherforthepurposeofcapturingit.

Toshowthedifficultyexperiencedinmaintainingtheblockade,IwillmentionacircumstancethattookplaceatFortFisherafteritsfall.TwoEnglishblockaderunnerscameinatnight.Theircommanders,notsupposingtheforthadfallen,workedtheirwaythroughallourfleetandgotintotheriverunobserved.Theythensignalledthefort,announcingtheirarrival.Therewasacoloredmaninthefortwhohadbeentherebeforeandwhounderstoodthesesignals.HeinformedGeneralTerrywhatreplyheshouldmaketohavethemcomein,andTerrydidasheadvised.Thevesselscamein,theirofficersentirelyunconsciousthattheywerefallingintothehandsoftheUnionforces.EvenaftertheywerebroughtintotheforttheywereentertainedinconversationforsomelittletimebeforesuspectingthattheUniontroopswereoccupyingthefort.Theywerefinally

suspectingthattheUniontroopswereoccupyingthefort.Theywerefinallyinformedthattheirvesselsandcargoeswereprizes.

IselectedGeneralWeitzel,oftheArmyoftheJames,togowiththeexpedition,butgaveinstructionsthroughGeneralButler.HecommandedthedepartmentwithinwhosegeographicallimitsFortFisherwassituated,aswellasBeaufortandotherpointsonthatcoastheldbyourtroops;hewas,therefore,entitledtotherightoffittingouttheexpeditionagainstFortFisher.

GeneralButlerconceivedtheideathatifasteamerloadedheavilywithpowdercouldberunuptoneartheshoreunderthefortandexploded,itwouldcreategreathavocandmakethecaptureaneasymatter.AdmiralPorter,whowastocommandthenavalsquadron,seemedtofallinwiththeidea,anditwasnotdisapprovedofinWashington;thenavywasthereforegiventhetaskofpreparingthesteamerforthispurpose.Ihadnoconfidenceinthesuccessofthescheme,andsoexpressedmyself;butasnoseriousharmcouldcomeoftheexperiment,andtheauthoritiesatWashingtonseemeddesiroustohaveittried,Ipermittedit.ThesteamerwassenttoBeaufort,NorthCarolina,andwasthereloadedwithpowderandpreparedforthepartshewastoplayinthereductionofFortFisher.

GeneralButlerchosetogoincommandoftheexpeditionhimself,andwasallreadytosailbythe9thofDecember(1864).Veryheavystormsprevailed,however,atthattimealongthatpartofthesea-coast,andpreventedhimfromgettingoffuntilthe13thor14th.HisadvancearrivedoffFortFisheronthe15th.Thenavalforcehadbeenalreadyassembled,orwasassembling,buttheywereobligedtorunintoBeaufortformunitions,coal,etc.;then,too,thepowder-boatwasnotyetfullyprepared.Thefleetwasreadytoproceedonthe18th;butButler,whohadremainedoutsidefromthe15thuptothattime,nowfoundhimselfoutofcoal,freshwater,etc.,andhadtoputintoBeauforttoreplenish.Anotherstormovertookhim,andseveraldaysmorewerelostbeforethearmyandnavywerebothreadyatthesametimetocooperate.

Onthenightofthe23dthepowder-boatwastowedinbyagunboatasneartothefortasitwassafetorun.Shewasthenpropelledbyherownmachinerytowithinaboutfivehundredyardsoftheshore.Theretheclockwork,whichwastoexplodeherwithinacertainlengthoftime,wassetandshewasabandoned.Everybodyleft,andeventhevesselsputouttoseatopreventtheeffectoftheexplosionuponthem.Attwoo'clockinthemorningtheexplosiontookplace—andproducednomoreeffectonthefort,oranythingelseonland,thantheburstingofaboileranywhereontheAtlanticOceanwouldhavedone.Indeed

burstingofaboileranywhereontheAtlanticOceanwouldhavedone.IndeedwhenthetroopsinFortFisherheardtheexplosiontheysupposeditwastheburstingofaboilerinoneoftheYankeegunboats.

FortFisherwassituateduponalow,flatpeninsulanorthofCapeFearRiver.Thesoilissandy.Backalittlethepeninsulaisveryheavilywooded,andcoveredwithfresh-waterswamps.Thefortranacrossthispeninsula,aboutfivehundredyardsinwidth,andextendedalongtheseacoastaboutthirteenhundredyards.Theforthadanarmamentof21gunsand3mortarsonthelandside,and24gunsontheseafront.Atthattimeitwasonlygarrisonedbyfourcompaniesofinfantry,onelightbatteryandthegunnersattheheavygunslessthansevenhundredmenwithareserveoflessthanathousandmenfivemilesupthepeninsula.GeneralWhitingoftheConfederatearmywasincommand,andGeneralBraggwasincommandoftheforceatWilmington.Bothcommencedcallingforreinforcementsthemomenttheysawourtroopslanding.TheGovernorofNorthCarolinacalledforeverybodywhocouldstandbehindaparapetandshootagun,tojointhem.InthiswaytheygottwoorthreehundredadditionalmenintoFortFisher;andHoke'sdivision,fiveorsixthousandstrong,wassentdownfromRichmond.AfewofthesetroopsarrivedtheverydaythatButlerwasreadytoadvance.

Onthe24ththefleetformedforanattackinarcsofconcentriccircles,theirheavyiron-cladsgoinginverycloserange,beingnearesttheshore,andleavingintervalsorspacessothattheoutervesselscouldfirebetweenthem.Porterwasthusenabledtothrowonehundredandfifteenshellsperminute.Thedamagedonetothefortbytheseshellswasveryslight,onlytwoorthreecannonbeingdisabledinthefort.Butthefiringsilencedallthegunsbymakingittoohotforthementomaintaintheirpositionsaboutthemandcompellingthemtoseekshelterinthebomb-proofs.

OnthenextdaypartofButler'stroopsunderGeneralAdelbertAmeseffectedalandingoutofrangeofthefortwithoutdifficulty.Thiswasaccomplishedundertheprotectionofgunboatssentforthepurpose,andundercoverofarenewedattackuponthefortbythefleet.Theyformedalineacrossthepeninsulaandadvanced,partgoingnorthandparttowardthefort,coveringthemselvesastheydidso.CurtispushedforwardandcameneartoFortFisher,capturingthesmallgarrisonatwhatwascalledtheFlagPondBattery.Weitzelaccompaniedhimtowithinahalfamileoftheworks.Herehesawthattheforthadnotbeeninjured,andsoreportedtoButler,advisingagainstanassault.Ames,whohadgonenorthinhisadvance,captured228ofthereserves.TheseprisonersreportedtoButlerthatsixteenhundredofHoke'sdivisionofsixthousandfromRichmondhad

thatsixteenhundredofHoke'sdivisionofsixthousandfromRichmondhadalreadyarrivedandtherestwouldsoonbeinhisrear.

UponthesereportsButlerdeterminedtowithdrawhistroopsfromthepeninsulaandreturntothefleet.Atthattimetherehadnotbeenamanonoursideinjuredexceptbyoneoftheshellsfromthefleet.Curtishadgotwithinafewyardsoftheworks.Someofhismenhadsnatchedaflagfromtheparapetofthefort,andothershadtakenahorsefromtheinsideofthestockade.AtnightButlerinformedPorterofhiswithdrawal,givingthereasonsabovestated,andannouncedhispurposeassoonashismencouldembarktostartforHamptonRoads.PorterrepresentedtohimthathehadsenttoBeaufortformoreammunition.Hecouldfiremuchfasterthanhehadbeendoing,andwouldkeeptheenemyfromshowinghimselfuntilourmenwerewithintwentyyardsofthefort,andhebeggedthatButlerwouldleavesomebravefellowslikethosewhohadsnatchedtheflagfromtheparapetandtakenthehorsefromthefort.

Butlerwasunchangeable.Hegotallhistroopsaboard,exceptCurtis'sbrigade,andstartedback.Indoingthis,Butlermadeafearfulmistake.Myinstructionstohim,ortotheofficerwhowentincommandoftheexpedition,wereexplicitinthestatementthattoeffectalandingwouldbeofitselfagreatvictory,andifoneshouldbeeffected,thefootholdmustnotberelinquished;onthecontrary,aregularsiegeofthefortmustbecommencedand,toguardagainstinterferencebyreasonofstorms,suppliesofprovisionsmustbelaidinassoonastheycouldbegotonshore.ButGeneralButlerseemstohavelostsightofthispartofhisinstructions,andwasbackatFortMonroeonthe28th.

ItelegraphedtothePresidentasfollows:

CITYPOINT,VA.,Dec.28,1864.—8.30P.M.

TheWilmingtonexpeditionhasprovenagrossandculpablefailure.Manyofthetroopsarebackhere.DelaysandfreetalkoftheobjectoftheexpeditionenabledtheenemytomovetroopstoWilmingtontodefeatit.AftertheexpeditionsailedfromFortMonroe,threedaysoffineweatherweresquandered,duringwhichtheenemywaswithoutaforcetoprotecthimself.Whoistoblamewill,Ihope,beknown.

U.S.GRANT,Lieutenant-General.

PortersentdispatchestotheNavyDepartmentinwhichhecomplainedbitterlyofhavingbeenabandonedbythearmyjustwhenthefortwasnearlyinourpossession,andbeggedthatourtroopsmightbesentbackagaintocooperate,butwithadifferentcommander.AssoonasIheardthisIsentamessengertoPorterwithaletteraskinghimtoholdon.IassuredhimthatIfullysympathizedwithhiminhisdisappointment,andthatIwouldsendthesametroopsbackwithadifferentcommander,withsomereinforcementstooffsetthosewhichtheenemyhadreceived.Itoldhimitwouldtakesomelittletimetogettransportationfortheadditionaltroops;butassoonasitcouldbehadthemenshouldbeontheirwaytohim,andtherewouldbenodelayonmypart.IselectedA.H.Terrytocommand.

Itwasthe6thofJanuarybeforethetransportscouldbegotreadyandthetroopsaboard.TheysailedfromFortressMonroeonthatday.TheobjectanddestinationofthesecondexpeditionwereatthetimekeptasecrettoallexceptafewintheNavyDepartmentandinthearmytowhomitwasnecessarytoimparttheinformation.GeneralTerryhadnottheslightestideaofwherehewasgoingorwhathewastodo.Hesimplyknewthathewasgoingtoseaandthathehadhisorderswithhim,whichweretobeopenedwhenoutatsea.

HewasinstructedtocommunicatefreelywithPorterandhaveentireharmonybetweenarmyandnavy,becausetheworkbeforethemwouldrequirethebesteffortsofbotharmsofservice.TheyarrivedoffBeaufortonthe8th.Aheavystorm,however,preventedalandingatForthFisheruntilthe13th.Thenavyprepareditselfforattackaboutasbefore,andthesametimeassistedthearmyinlanding,thistimefivemilesaway.Onlyiron-cladsfiredatfirst;theobjectbeingtodrawthefireoftheenemy'sgunssoastoascertaintheirpositions.Thisobjectbeingaccomplished,theythenletintheirshotsthickandfast.Verysoonthegunswereallsilenced,andthefortshowedevidentsignsofbeingmuchinjured.

Terrydeployedhismenacrossthepeninsulaashadbeendonebefore,andattwoo'clockonthefollowingmorningwasupwithintwomilesofthefortwitharespectableabatisinfrontofhisline.Hisartillerywasalllandedonthatday,the14th.AgainCurtis'sbrigadeofAme'sdivisionhadthelead.Bynoontheyhadcarriedanunfinishedworklessthanahalfmilefromthefort,andturneditsoastofacetheotherway.

TerrynowsawPorterandarrangedforanassaultonthefollowingday.Thetwocommandersarrangedtheirsignalssothattheycouldcommunicatewitheachotherfromtimetotimeastheymighthaveoccasion.Atdaylightthefleet

otherfromtimetotimeastheymighthaveoccasion.Atdaylightthefleetcommenceditsfiring.Thetimeagreeduponfortheassaultwasthemiddleoftheafternoon,andAmeswhocommandedtheassaultingcolumnmovedat3.30.Porterlandedaforceofsailorsandmarinestomoveagainstthesea-frontincooperationwithAmes'sassault.TheywereunderCommanderBreeseofthenavy.Thesesailorsandmarineshadworkedtheirwayuptowithinacoupleofhundredyardsofthefortbeforetheassault.Thesignalwasgivenandtheassaultwasmade;butthepoorsailorsandmarineswererepulsedandverybadlyhandledbytheenemy,losing280killedandwoundedoutoftheirnumber.

Curtis'sbrigadechargedsuccessfullythoughmetbyaheavyfire,someofthemenhavingtowadethroughtheswampuptotheirwaiststoreachthefort.Manywerewounded,ofcourse,andsomekilled;buttheysoonreachedthepalisades.Thesetheycutaway,andpushedonthrough.Theothertroopsthencameup,Pennypacker'sfollowingCurtis,andBell,whocommandedthe3dbrigadeofAmes'sdivision,followingPennypacker.Butthefortwasnotyetcapturedthoughtheparapetwasgained.

Theworkswereveryextensive.Thelargeparapetaroundtheworkwouldhavebeenbutverylittleprotectiontothoseinsideexceptwhentheywerecloseupunderit.Traverseshad,therefore,beenrununtilreallytheworkwasasuccessionofsmallfortsenclosedbyalargeone.Therebelsmadeadesperateefforttoholdthefort,andhadtobedrivenfromthesetraversesonebyone.Thefightcontinuedtilllongafternight.Ourtroopsgainedfirstonetraverseandthenanother,andby10o'clockatnighttheplacewascarried.Duringthisengagementthesailors,whohadbeenrepulsedintheirassaultonthebastion,renderedthebestservicetheycouldbyreinforcingTerry'snorthernline—thusenablinghimtosendadetachmenttotheassistanceofAmes.Thefleetkeptupacontinuousfireuponthatpartofthefortwhichwasstilloccupiedbytheenemy.Bymeansofsignalstheycouldbeinformedwheretodirecttheirshots.

DuringthesucceedingnightstheenemyblewupFortCaswellontheoppositesideofCapeFearRiver,andabandonedtwoextensiveworksonSmith'sIslandintheriver.

Ourcapturesinallamountedto169guns,besidessmall-arms,withfullsuppliesofammunition,and2,083prisoners.Inadditiontothese,therewereabout700deadandwoundedleftthere.Wehadlost110killedand536wounded.

InthisassaultonFortFisher,Bell,oneofthebrigadecommanders,waskilled,andtwo,CurtisandPennypacker,werebadlywounded.

andtwo,CurtisandPennypacker,werebadlywounded.

SecretaryStanton,whowasonhiswaybackfromSavannah,arrivedoffFortFishersoonafteritfell.Whenheheardthegoodnewshepromotedalltheofficersofanyconsiderablerankfortheirconspicuousgallantry.Terryhadbeennominatedformajor-general,buthadnotbeenconfirmed.Thisconfirmedhim;andsoonafterIrecommendedhimforabrigadier-generalcyintheregulararmy,anditwasgiventohimforthisvictory.

CHAPTERLXII.

SHERMAN'SMARCHNORTH—SHERIDANORDEREDTOLYNCHBURG—CANBYORDEREDTOMOVEAGAINSTMOBILE—MOVEMENTSOFSCHOFIELDANDTHOMAS—CAPTUREOFCOLUMBIA,SOUTHCAROLINA—SHERMANINTHECAROLINAS.

WhennewsofShermanbeinginpossessionofSavannahreachedtheNorth,distinguishedstatesmenandvisitorsbegantopourintoseehim.AmongotherswhowentwastheSecretaryofWar,whoseemedmuchpleasedattheresultofhiscampaign.Mr.Draper,thecollectorofcustomsofNewYork,whowaswithMr.Stanton'sparty,wasputinchargeofthepublicpropertythathadbeenabandonedandcaptured.SavannahwasthenturnedovertoGeneralFoster'scommandtohold,sothatShermanmighthavehisownentirearmyfreetooperateasmightbedecideduponinthefuture.IsentthechiefengineeroftheArmyofthePotomac(GeneralBarnard)withletterstoGeneralSherman.Heremainedsometimewiththegeneral,andwhenhereturnedbroughtbackletters,oneofwhichcontainedsuggestionsfromShermanastowhatoughttobedoneincooperationwithhim,whenheshouldhavestarteduponhismarchnorthward.

ImustnotneglecttostateherethefactthatIhadnoideaoriginallyofhavingShermanmarchfromSavannahtoRichmond,oreventoNorthCarolina.Theseasonwasbad,theroadsimpassableforanythingexceptsuchanarmyashehad,andIshouldnothavethoughtoforderingsuchamove.Ihad,therefore,madepreparationstocollecttransportstocarryShermanandhisarmyaroundtotheJamesRiverbywater,andsoinformedhim.Onreceivingthisletterhewenttoworkimmediatelytoprepareforthemove,butseeingthatitwouldrequirealongtimetocollectthetransports,hesuggestedtheideathenofmarchingupnorththroughtheCarolinas.Iwasonlytoohappytoapprovethis;forifsuccessful,itpromisedeveryadvantage.HismarchthroughGeorgiahadthoroughlydestroyedalllinesoftransportationinthatState,andhadcompletely

thoroughlydestroyedalllinesoftransportationinthatState,andhadcompletelycuttheenemyofffromallsourcesofsupplytothewestofit.IfNorthandSouthCarolinawererenderedhelplesssofarascapacityforfeedingLee'sarmywasconcerned,theConfederategarrisonatRichmondwouldbereducedinterritory,fromwhichtodrawsupplies,toverynarrowlimitsintheStateofVirginia;and,althoughthatsectionofthecountrywasfertile,itwasalreadywellexhaustedofbothforageandfood.IapprovedSherman'ssuggestionthereforeatonce.

Theworkofpreparationwastedious,becausesupplies,toloadthewagonsforthemarch,hadtobebroughtfromalongdistance.Shermanwouldnowhavetomarchthroughacountryfurnishingfewerprovisionsthanthathehadpreviouslybeenoperatinginduringhismarchtothesea.Besides,hewasconfronting,ormarchingtoward,aforceoftheenemyvastlysuperiortoanyhistroopshadencounteredontheirpreviousmarch;andtheterritorythroughwhichhehadtopasshadnowbecomeofsuchvastimportancetotheveryexistenceoftheConfederatearmy,thatthemostdesperateeffortsweretobeexpectedinordertosaveit.

Sherman,therefore,whilecollectingthenecessarysuppliestostartwith,madearrangementswithAdmiralDahlgren,whocommandedthatpartofthenavyontheSouthCarolinaandGeorgiacoast,andGeneralFoster,commandingthetroops,totakepositions,andholdafewpointsontheseacoast,whichhe(Sherman)designated,intheneighborhoodofCharleston.

Thisprovisionwasmadetoenablehimtofallbackupontheseacoast,incaseheshouldencounteraforcesufficienttostophisonwardprogress.Healsowrotemealetter,makingsuggestionsastowhathewouldliketohavedoneinsupportofhismovementfarthernorth.ThisletterwasbroughttoCityPointbyGeneralBarnardatatimewhenIhappenedtobegoingtoWashingtonCity,whereIarrivedonthe21stofJanuary.IcannottelltheprovisionIhadalreadymadetocooperatewithSherman,inanticipationofhisexpectedmovement,betterthanbygivingmyreplytothisletter.

HEADQUARTERSARMIESOFTHEUNITEDSTATES,WASHINGTON,D.C.,Jan.21,1865.

MAJOR-GENERALW.T.SHERMAN,CommandingMillDiv.oftheMississippi.

GENERAL:—YourlettersbroughtbyGeneralBarnardwerereceivedatCity

GENERAL:—YourlettersbroughtbyGeneralBarnardwerereceivedatCityPoint,andreadwithinterest.Nothavingthemwithme,however,IcannotsaythatinthisIwillbeabletosatisfyyouonallpointsofrecommendation.AsIarrivedhereatoneP.M.,andmustleaveatsixP.M.,havinginthemeantimespentoverthreehourswiththeSecretaryandGeneralHalleck,Imustbebrief.BeforeyourlastrequesttohaveThomasmakeacampaignintotheheartofAlabama,IhadorderedSchofieldtoAnnapolis,Md.,withhiscorps.Theadvance(sixthousand)willreachtheseaboardbythe23d,theremainderfollowingasrapidlyasrailroadtransportationcanbeprocuredfromCincinnati.Thecorpsnumbersovertwenty-onethousandmen.IwasinducedtodothisbecauseIdidnotbelieveThomascouldpossiblybegotoffbeforespring.HispursuitofHoodindicatedasluggishnessthatsatisfiedmethathewouldneverdotoconductoneofyourcampaigns.Thecommandoftheadvanceofthepursuitwaslefttosubordinates,whilstThomasfollowedfarbehind.WhenHoodhadcrossedtheTennessee,andthoseinpursuithadreachedit,ThomashadnotmuchmorethanhalfcrossedtheState,fromwhencehereturnedtoNashvilletotakesteamerforEastport.Heispossessedofexcellentjudgment,greatcoolnessandhonesty,butheisnotgoodonapursuit.Healsoreportedhistroopsfagged,andthatitwasnecessarytoequipup.Thisreportandadeterminationtogivetheenemynorestdeterminedmetousehissurplustroopselsewhere.

ThomasisstillleftwithasufficientforcesurplustogotoSelmaunderanenergeticleader.Hehasbeentelegraphedto,toknowwhetherhecouldgo,and,ifso,whichoftheseveralrouteshewouldselect.Noreplyisyetreceived.Canbyhasbeenorderedtoactoffensivelyfromthesea-coasttotheinterior,towardsMontgomeryandSelma.Thomas'sforceswillmovefromthenorthatanearlyday,orsomeofhistroopswillbesenttoCanby.WithoutfurtherreinforcementsCanbywillhaveamovingcolumnoftwentythousandmen.

FortFisher,youareaware,hasbeencaptured.Wehaveaforcethereofeightthousandeffective.AtNewBernabouthalfthenumber.Itisrumored,throughdeserters,thatWilmingtonalsohasfallen.Iaminclinedtobelievetherumor,becauseonthe17thweknewtheenemywereblowinguptheirworksaboutFortCaswell,andthatonthe18thTerrymovedonWilmington.

IfWilmingtoniscaptured,Schofieldwillgothere.Ifnot,hewillbesenttoNewBern.Ineitherevent,allthesurplusforcesatthetwopointswillmovetotheinteriortowardGoldsboro'incooperationwithyourmovements.Fromeitherpoint,railroadcommunicationscanberunout,therebeinghereabundanceofrolling-stocksuitedtothegaugeofthoseroads.

rolling-stocksuitedtothegaugeofthoseroads.

TherehavebeenaboutsixteenthousandmensentfromLee'sarmysouth.Ofthese,youwillhavefourteenthousandagainstyou,ifWilmingtonisnotheldbytheenemy,casualtiesatFortFisherhavingovertakenabouttwothousand.

Allthesetroopsaresubjecttoyourordersasyoucomeincommunicationwiththem.Theywillbesoinstructed.FromaboutRichmondIwillwatchLeeclosely,andifhedetachesmuchmore,orattemptstoevacuate,willpitchin.Inthemeantime,shouldyoubebroughttoahaltanywhere,Icansendtwocorpsofthirtythousandeffectivementoyoursupport,fromthetroopsaboutRichmond.

Toresume:CanbyisorderedtooperatetotheinteriorfromtheGulf.A.J.Smithmaygofromthenorth,butIthinkitdoubtful.Aforceoftwenty-eightorthirtythousandwillcooperatewithyoufromNewBernorWilmington,orboth.Youcancallforreinforcements.

ThiswillbehandedyoubyCaptainHudson,ofmystaff,whowillreturnwithanymessageyoumayhaveforme.IfthereisanythingIcandoforyouinthewayofhavingsuppliesonship-board,atanypointonthesea-coast,readyforyou,letmeknowit.

Yourstruly,U.S.GRANT,Lieut.-General.

Ihadwrittenonthe18thofJanuarytoGeneralSherman,givinghimthenewsofthebattleofNashville.Hewasmuchpleasedattheresult,although,likemyself,hehadbeenverymuchdisappointedatThomasforpermittingHoodtocrosstheTennesseeRiverandnearlythewholeStateofTennessee,andcometoNashvilletobeattackedthere.He,however,asIhaddone,sentThomasawarmcongratulatoryletter.

Onthe10thofJanuary,1865,theresolutionsofthankstoShermanandhisarmypassedbyCongresswereapproved.

Sherman,afterthecapture,atoncehadthedebrisclearedup,commencingtheworkbyremovingthepilingandtorpedoesfromtheriver,andtakingupallobstructions.Hehadthenintrenchedthecity,sothatitcouldbeheldbyasmallgarrison.BythemiddleofJanuaryallhisworkwasdone,excepttheaccumulationofsuppliestocommencehismovementwith.

Heproposedtomoveintwocolumns,onefromSavannah,goingalongbythe

Heproposedtomoveintwocolumns,onefromSavannah,goingalongbytheriverofthesamename,andtheotherbyroadsfarthereast,threateningCharleston.HecommencedtheadvancebymovinghisrightwingtoBeaufort,SouthCarolina,thentoPocotaligobywater.Thiscolumn,inmovingnorth,threatenedCharleston,and,indeed,itwasnotdeterminedatfirstthattheywouldhaveaforcevisitCharleston.SouthCarolinahaddonesomuchtopreparethepublicmindoftheSouthforsecession,andhadbeensoactiveinprecipitatingthedecisionofthequestionbeforetheSouthwasfullypreparedtomeetit,thattherewas,atthattime,afeelingthroughouttheNorthandalsolargelyentertainedbypeopleoftheSouth,thattheStateofSouthCarolina,andCharleston,thehot-bedofsecessioninparticular,oughttohaveaheavyhandlaiduponthem.Infact,nothingbutthedecisiveresultsthatfollowed,deterredtheradicalportionofthepeoplefromcondemningthemovement,becauseCharlestonhadbeenleftout.Topassintotheinteriorwould,however,betoinsuretheevacuationofthecity,anditspossessionbythenavyandFoster'stroops.Itissosituatedbetweentwoformidableriversthatasmallgarrisoncouldhavehelditagainstalloddsaslongastheirsupplieswouldholdout.Shermanthereforepasseditby.

BythefirstofFebruaryallpreparationswerecompletedforthefinalmarch,Columbia,SouthCarolina,beingthefirstobjective;Fayetteville,NorthCarolina,thesecond;andGoldsboro,orneighborhood,thefinalone,unlesssomethingfurthershouldbedeterminedupon.TherightwingwentfromPocotaligo,andtheleftfromaboutHardeevilleontheSavannahRiver,bothcolumnstakingaprettydirectrouteforColumbia.Thecavalry,however,weretothreatenCharlestonontheright,andAugustaontheleft.

Onthe15thofJanuaryFortFisherhadfallen,newsofwhichShermanhadreceivedbeforestartingoutonhismarch.WealreadyhadNewBernandhadsoonWilmington,whosefallfollowedthatofFortFisher;asdidotherpointsontheseacoast,wheretheNationaltroopswerenowinreadinesstocooperatewithSherman'sadvancewhenhehadpassedFayetteville.

Onthe18thofJanuaryIorderedCanby,incommandatNewOrleans,tomoveagainstMobile,MontgomeryandSelma,Alabama,forthepurposeofdestroyingroads,machineshops,etc.Onthe8thofFebruaryIorderedSheridan,whowasintheValleyofVirginia,topushforwardassoonastheweatherwouldpermitandstrikethecanalwestofRichmondatoraboutLynchburg;andonthe20thImadetheordertogotoLynchburgassoonastheroadswouldpermit,saying:

"Assoonasitispossibletotravel,IthinkyouwillhavenodifficultyaboutreachingLynchburgwithacavalryforcealone.Fromthereyoucoulddestroytherailroadandcanalineverydirection,soastobeofnofurtherusetotherebellion.*Thisadditionalraid,withonestartingfromEastTennesseeunderStoneman,numberingaboutfourorfivethousandcavalry;onefromEastport,Mississippi,tenthousandcavalry;Canby,fromMobileBay,withabouteighteenthousandmixedtroops—thesethreelatterpushingforTuscaloosa,SelmaandMontgomery;andShermanwithalargearmyeatingoutthevitalsofSouthCarolina—isallthatwillbewantedtoleavenothingfortherebelliontostandupon.Iwouldadviseyoutoovercomegreatobstaclestoaccomplishthis.CharlestonwasevacuatedonTuesdaylast."

Onthe27thofFebruary,morethanamonthafterCanbyhadreceivedhisorders,Iagainwrotetohim,sayingthatIwasextremelyanxioustohearofhisbeinginAlabama.Inotifiedhim,also,thatIhadsentGriersontotakecommandofhiscavalry,hebeingaveryefficientofficer.IfurthersuggestedthatForrestwasprobablyinMississippi,andifhewasthere,hewouldfindhimanofficerofgreatcourageandcapacitywhomitwouldbedifficulttogetby.IstillfurtherinformedhimthatThomashadbeenorderedtostartacavalryforceintoMississippionthe20thofFebruary,orassoonaspossiblethereafter.Thisforcedidnotgetoffhowever.

AllthesemovementsweredesignedtobeinsupportofSherman'smarch,theobjectbeingtokeeptheConfederatetroopsintheWestfromleavingthere.ButneitherCanbynorThomascouldbegotoffintime.IhadsometimebeforedepletedThomas'sarmytoreinforceCanby,forthereasonthatThomashadfailedtostartanexpeditionwhichhehadbeenorderedtosendout,andtohavethetroopswheretheymightdosomething.Canbyseemedtobeequallydeliberateinallofhismovements.Iorderedhimtogoinperson;buthepreparedtosendadetachmentunderanotherofficer.GeneralGrangerhadgotdowntoNewOrleans,insomewayorother,andIwroteCanbythathemustnotputhimincommandoftroops.InspiteofthisheaskedtheWarDepartmenttoassignGrangertothecommandofacorps.

Almostindespairofhavingadequateservicerenderedtothecauseinthatquarter,IsaidtoCanby:"Iaminreceiptofadispatch*informingmethatyouhavemaderequisitionsforaconstructioncorpsandmaterialtobuildseventymilesofrailroad.Ihavedirectedthatnonebesent.Thomas'sarmyhasbeendepletedtosendaforcetoyouthattheymightbewheretheycouldactinwinter,

andatleastdetaintheforcetheenemyhadintheWest.Iftherehadbeenanyideaofrepairingrailroads,itcouldhavebeendonemuchbetterfromtheNorth,wherewealreadyhadthetroops.IexpectedyourmovementstobecooperativewithSherman'slast.Thishasnowentirelyfailed.Iwrotetoyoulongago,urgingyoutopushpromptlyandtoliveuponthecountry,anddestroyrailroads,machineshops,etc.,nottobuildthem.TakeMobileandholdit,andpushyourforcestotheinterior—toMontgomeryandtoSelma.Destroyrailroads,rollingstock,andeverythingusefulforcarryingonwar,and,whenyouhavedonethis,takesuchpositionsascanbesuppliedbywater.Bythismeansaloneyoucanoccupypositionsfromwhichtheenemy'sroadsintheinteriorcanbekeptbroken."

Mostoftheseexpeditionsgotofffinally,buttoolatetorenderanyserviceinthedirectionforwhichtheyweredesigned.

Theenemy,readytointercepthisadvance,consistedofHardee'stroopsandWheeler'scavalry,perhapslessthanfifteenthousandmeninall;butfranticeffortswerebeingmadeinRichmond,asIwassurewouldbethecase,toretardSherman'smovements.EverythingpossiblewasbeingdonetoraisetroopsintheSouth.LeedispatchedagainstShermanthetroopswhichhadbeensenttorelieveFortFisher,which,includingthoseoftheotherdefencesoftheharboranditsneighborhood,amounted,afterdeductingthetwothousandkilled,woundedandcaptured,tofourteenthousandmen.AfterThomas'svictoryatNashvillewhatremained,ofHood'sarmyweregatheredtogetherandforwardedasrapidlyaspossibletotheeasttocooperatewiththeseforces;and,finally,GeneralJosephE.Johnston,oneoftheablestcommandersoftheSouththoughnotinfavorwiththeadministration(oratleastwithMr.Davis),wasputincommandofallthetroopsinNorthandSouthCarolina.

SchofieldarrivedatAnnapolisinthelatterpartofJanuary,butbeforesendinghistroopstoNorthCarolinaIwentwithhimdownthecoasttoseethesituationofaffairs,asIcouldgivefullerdirectionsafterbeingonthegroundthanIcouldverywellhavegivenwithout.Wesoonreturned,andthetroopsweresentbyseatoCapeFearRiver.BothNewBernandWilmingtonareconnectedwithRaleighbyrailroadswhichuniteatGoldsboro.SchofieldwastolandtroopsatSmithville,nearthemouthoftheCapeFearRiveronthewestside,andmoveuptosecuretheWilmingtonandCharlottevilleRailroad.Thiscolumntooktheirpontoonbridgeswiththem,toenablethemtocrossovertotheislandsouthofthecityofWilmington.Alargebodywassentbythenorthsidetocooperatewiththem.Theysucceededintakingthecityonthe22dofFebruary.Itookthe

withthem.Theysucceededintakingthecityonthe22dofFebruary.ItooktheprecautiontoprovideforSherman'sarmy,incaseheshouldbeforcedtoturnintowardtheseacoastbeforereachingNorthCarolina,byforwardingsuppliestoeveryplacewherehewasliabletohavetomakesuchadeflectionfromhisprojectedmarch.Ialsosentrailroadrollingstock,ofwhichwehadagreatabundance,nowthatwewerenotoperatingtheroadsinVirginia.ThegaugeoftheNorthCarolinarailroadsbeingthesameastheVirginiarailroadshadbeenalteredtoo;thesecarsandlocomotiveswerereadyforusetherewithoutanychange.

Onthe31stofJanuaryIcountermandedtheordersgiventoThomastomovesouthtoAlabamaandGeorgia.(IhadpreviouslyreducedhisforcebysendingaportionofittoTerry.)Idirectedinlieuofthismovement,thatheshouldsendStonemanthroughEastTennessee,andpushhimwelldowntowardColumbia,SouthCarolina,insupportofSherman.ThomasdidnotgetStonemanoffintime,but,onthecontrary,whenIhadsupposedhewasonhismarchinsupportofShermanIheardofhisbeinginLouisville,Kentucky.Iimmediatelychangedtheorder,anddirectedThomastosendhimtowardLynchburg.Finally,however,onthe12thofMarch,hedidpushdownthroughthenorth-westernendofSouthCarolina,creatingsomeconsternation.IalsoorderedThomastosendthe4thcorps(Stanley's)toBullGapandtodestroynomoreroadseastofthat.IalsodirectedhimtoconcentratesuppliesatKnoxville,withaviewtoaprobablemovementofhisarmythroughthatwaytowardLynchburg.

Goldsboroisfourhundredandtwenty-fivemilesfromSavannah.Sherman'smarchwaswithoutmuchincidentuntilheenteredColumbia,onthe17thofFebruary.Hewasdetainedinhisprogressbyhavingtorepairandcorduroytheroads,andrebuildthebridges.Therewasconstantskirmishingandfightingbetweenthecavalryofthetwoarmies,butthisdidnotretardtheadvanceoftheinfantry.Fourdays,also,werelostinmakingcompletethedestructionofthemostimportantrailroadssouthofColumbia;therewasalsosomedelaycausedbythehighwater,andthedestructionofthebridgesonthelineoftheroad.AformidableriverhadtobecrossednearColumbia,andthatinthefaceofasmallgarrisonunderGeneralWadeHampton.Therewasbutlittledelay,however,furtherthanthatcausedbyhighwaterinthestream.HamptonleftasShermanapproached,andthecitywasfoundtobeonfire.

TherehassincebeenagreatdealofacrimonydisplayedindiscussionsofthequestionastowhosetColumbiaonfire.Shermandeniesitonthepartofhistroops,andHamptondeniesitonthepartoftheConfederates.Onethingiscertain:assoonasourtroopstookpossession,theyatonceproceededto

certain:assoonasourtroopstookpossession,theyatonceproceededtoextinguishtheflamestothebestoftheirabilitywiththelimitedmeansathand.Inanycase,theexamplesetbytheConfederatesinburningthevillageofChambersburg,Pa.,atownwhichwasnotgarrisoned,wouldseemtomakeadefenceoftheactoffiringtheseatofgovernmentoftheStatemostresponsiblefortheconflictthenraging,notimperative.

TheConfederatetroopshavingvacatedthecity,themayortookpossession,andsalliedforthtomeetthecommanderoftheNationalforcesforthepurposeofsurrenderingthetown,makingtermsfortheprotectionofproperty,etc.Shermanpaidnoattentionatalltotheoverture,butpushedforwardandtookthetownwithoutmakinganyconditionswhateverwithitscitizens.Hethen,however,cooperatedwiththemayorinextinguishingtheflamesandprovidingforthepeoplewhowererendereddestitutebythisdestructionoftheirhomes.Whenheleftthereheevengavethemayorfivehundredheadofcattletobedistributedamongthecitizens,totidethemoveruntilsomearrangementcouldbemadefortheirfuturesupplies.HeremainedinColumbiauntiltheroads,publicbuildings,workshopsandeverythingthatcouldbeusefultotheenemyweredestroyed.WhileatColumbia,ShermanlearnedforthefirsttimethatwhatremainedofHood'sarmywasconfrontinghim,underthecommandofGeneralBeauregard.

Charlestonwasevacuatedonthe18thofFebruary,andFostergarrisonedtheplace.Wilmingtonwascapturedonthe22d.ColumbiaandCherawfarthernorth,wereregardedassosecurefrominvasionthatthewealthypeopleofCharlestonandAugustahadsentmuchoftheirvaluablepropertytothesetwopointstobestored.Amongthegoodssenttherewerevaluablecarpets,tonsofoldMadeira,silverware,andfurniture.Iamafraidmuchofthesegoodsfellintothehandsofourtroops.TherewasfoundatColumbiaalargeamountofpowder,someartillery,small-armsandfixedammunition.These,ofcoursewereamongthearticlesdestroyed.Whilehere,ShermanalsolearnedofJohnston'srestorationtocommand.Thelatterwasgiven,asalreadystated,alltroopsinNorthandSouthCarolina.AfterthecompletionofthedestructionofpublicpropertyaboutColumbia,ShermanproceededonhismarchandreachedCherawwithoutanyspecialoppositionandwithoutincidenttorelate.Therailroads,ofcourse,werethoroughlydestroyedontheway.ShermanremainedadayortwoatCheraw;and,finally,onthe6thofMarchcrossedhistroopsoverthePedeeandadvancedstraightforFayetteville.HardeeandHamptonwerethere,andbarelyescaped.ShermanreachedFayettevilleonthe11thofMarch.HehaddispatchedscoutsfromCherawwithletterstoGeneralTerry,atWilmington,askinghimtosendasteamerwithsomesuppliesofbread,clothingandotherarticleswhichhe

steamerwithsomesuppliesofbread,clothingandotherarticleswhichheenumerated.Thescoutsgotthroughsuccessfully,andaboatwassentwiththemailandsucharticlesforwhichShermanhadaskedaswereinstoreatWilmington;unfortunately,however,thosestoresdidnotcontainclothing.

Fourdayslater,onthe15th,ShermanleftFayettevilleforGoldsboro.Themarch,now,hadtobemadewithgreatcaution,forhewasapproachingLee'sarmyandnearingthecountrythatstillremainedopentotheenemy.Besides,hewasconfrontingallthathehadhadtoconfrontinhispreviousmarchuptothatpoint,reinforcedbythegarrisonsalongtheroadandbywhatremainedofHood'sarmy.Franticappealsweremadetothepeopletocomeinvoluntarilyandswelltheranksofourfoe.Ipresume,however,thatJohnstondidnothaveinallover35,000or40,000men.Thepeoplehadgrowntiredofthewar,anddesertionsfromtheConfederatearmyweremuchmorenumerousthanthevoluntaryaccessions.

TherewassomefightingatAverysboroonthe16thbetweenJohnston'stroopsandSherman's,withsomeloss;andatBentonvilleonthe19thand21stofMarch,butJohnstonwithdrewfromthecontestbeforethemorningofthe22d.Sherman'slossintheselastengagementsinkilled,wounded,andmissing,wasaboutsixteenhundred.Sherman'stroopsatlastreachedGoldsboroonthe23dofthemonthandwentintobivouac;andtherehismenweredestinedtohavealongrest.SchofieldwastheretomeethimwiththetroopswhichhadbeensenttoWilmington.

Shermanwasnolongerindanger.HehadJohnstonconfrontinghim;butwithanarmymuchinferiortohisown,bothinnumbersandmorale.HehadLeetothenorthofhimwithaforcelargelysuperior;butIwasholdingLeewithastillgreaterforce,andhadhemadehisescapeandgottendowntoreinforceJohnston,Sherman,withthereinforcementshenowhadfromSchofieldandTerry,wouldhavebeenabletoholdtheConfederatesatbayforanindefiniteperiod.Hewasnearthesea-shorewithhisbacktoit,andournavyoccupiedtheharbors.HehadarailroadtobothWilmingtonandNewBern,andhisflankswerethoroughlyprotectedbystreams,whichintersectthatpartofthecountryanddeepenastheyapproachthesea.Then,too,ShermanknewthatifLeeshouldescapemeIwouldbeonhisheels,andheandJohnsontogetherwouldbecrushedinoneblowiftheyattemptedtomakeastand.Withthelossoftheircapital,itisdoubtfulwhetherLee'sarmywouldhaveamountedtomuchasanarmywhenitreachedNorthCarolina.Johnston'sarmywasdemoralizedbyconstantdefeatandwouldhardlyhavemadeanoffensivemovement,evenif

constantdefeatandwouldhardlyhavemadeanoffensivemovement,eveniftheycouldhavebeeninducedtoremainonduty.ThemenofbothLee'sandJohnston'sarmieswere,liketheirbrethrenoftheNorth,asbraveasmencanbe;butnomanissobravethathemaynotmeetsuchdefeatsanddisastersastodiscouragehimanddampenhisardorforanycause,nomatterhowjusthedeemsit.

CHAPTERLXIII.

ARRIVALOFTHEPEACECOMMISSIONERS—LINCOLNANDTHEPEACECOMMISSIONERS—ANANECDOTEOFLINCOLN—THEWINTERBEFOREPETERSBURG—SHERIDANDESTROYSTHERAILROAD—GORDONCARRIESTHEPICKETLINE—PARKERECAPTURESTHELINE—THELINEOFBATTLEOFWHITEOAKROAD.

OnthelastofJanuary,1865,peacecommissionersfromtheso-calledConfederateStatespresentedthemselvesonourlinesaroundPetersburg,andwereimmediatelyconductedtomyheadquartersatCityPoint.TheyprovedtobeAlexanderH.Stephens,Vice-PresidentoftheConfederacy,JudgeCampbell,Assistant-SecretaryofWar,andR.M.T.Hunt,formerlyUnitedStatesSenatorandthenamemberoftheConfederateSenate.

Itwasaboutdarkwhentheyreachedmyheadquarters,andIatonceconductedthemtothesteamMaryMartin,aHudsonRiverboatwhichwasverycomfortablyfittedupfortheuseofpassengers.IatoncecommunicatedbytelegraphwithWashingtonandinformedtheSecretaryofWarandthePresidentofthearrivalofthesecommissionersandthattheirobjectwastonegotiatetermsofpeacebetweenheUnitedStatesand,astheytermedit,theConfederateGovernment.IwasinstructedtoretainthematCityPoint,untilthePresident,orsomeonewhomhewoulddesignate,shouldcometomeetthem.Theyremainedseveraldaysasguestsonboardtheboat.Isawthemquitefrequently,thoughIhavenorecollectionofhavinghadanyconversationwhateverwiththemonthesubjectoftheirmission.ItwassomethingIhadnothingtodowith,andIthereforedidnotwishtoexpressanyviewsonthesubject.FormyownpartIneverhadadmitted,andneverwasreadytoadmit,thattheyweretherepresentativesofaGOVERNMENT.Therehadbeentoogreatawasteofbloodandtreasuretoconcedeanythingofthekind.Aslongastheyremainedthere,however,ourrelationswerepleasantandIfoundthemallveryagreeablegentlemen.Idirectedthecaptaintofurnishthemwiththebesttheboatafforded,andtoadministertotheircomfortineverywaypossible.Noguardwasplaced

andtoadministertotheircomfortineverywaypossible.Noguardwasplacedoverthemandnorestrictionwasputupontheirmovements;norwasthereanypledgeaskedthattheywouldnotabusetheprivilegesextendedtothem.Theywerepermittedtoleavetheboatwhentheyfeltlikeit,anddidso,cominguponthebankandvisitingmeatmyheadquarters.

Ihadnevermeteitherofthesegentlemenbeforethewar,butknewthemwellbyreputationandthroughtheirpublicservices,andIhadbeenaparticularadmirerofMr.Stephens.Ihadalwayssupposedthathewasaverysmallman,butwhenIsawhimintheduskoftheeveningIwasverymuchsurprisedtofindsolargeamanasheseemedtobe.WhenhegotdownontotheboatIfoundthathewaswearingacoarsegraywoollenovercoat,amanufacturethathadbeenintroducedintotheSouthduringtherebellion.TheclothwasthickerthananythingofthekindIhadeverseen,eveninCanada.Theovercoatextendednearlytohisfeet,andwassolargethatitgavehimtheappearanceofbeinganaverage-sizedman.Hetookthisoffwhenhereachedthecabinoftheboat,andIwasstruckwiththeapparentchangeinsize,inthecoatandoutofit.

Afterafewdays,aboutthe2dofFebruary,IreceivedadispatchfromWashington,directingmetosendthecommissionerstoHamptonRoadstomeetthePresidentandamemberofthecabinet.Mr.Lincolnmetthemthereandhadaninterviewofshortduration.ItwasnotagreatwhileaftertheymetthatthePresidentvisitedmeatCityPoint.Hespokeofhishavingmetthecommissioners,andsaidhehadtoldthemthattherewouldbenouseinenteringintoanynegotiationsunlesstheywouldrecognize,first:thattheUnionasawholemustbeforeverpreserved,andsecond:thatslaverymustbeabolished.Iftheywerewillingtoconcedethesetwopoints,thenhewasreadytoenterintonegotiationsandwasalmostwillingtohandthemablanksheetofpaperwithhissignatureattachedforthemtofillinthetermsuponwhichtheywerewillingtolivewithusintheUnionandbeonepeople.HealwaysshowedagenerousandkindlyspirittowardtheSouthernpeople,andIneverheardhimabuseanenemy.SomeofthecruelthingssaidaboutPresidentLincoln,particularlyintheNorth,usedtopiercehimtotheheart;butneverinmypresencedidheevincearevengefuldispositionandIsawagreatdealofhimatCityPoint,forheseemedgladtogetawayfromthecaresandanxietiesofthecapital.

RighthereImightrelateananecdoteofMr.Lincoln.ItwasontheoccasionofhisvisittomejustafterhehadtalkedwiththepeacecommissionersatHamptonRoads.Afteralittleconversation,heaskedmeifIhadseenthatovercoatofStephens's.IrepliedthatIhad."Well,"saidhe,"didyouseehimtakeitoff?"Isaidyes."Well,"saidhe,"didn'tyouthinkitwasthebiggestshuckandthe

saidyes."Well,"saidhe,"didn'tyouthinkitwasthebiggestshuckandthelittlestearthateveryoudidsee?"LongafterwardsItoldthisstorytotheConfederateGeneralJ.B.Gordon,atthetimeamemberoftheSenate.HerepeatedittoStephens,and,asIheardafterwards,StephenslaughedimmoderatelyatthesimileofMr.Lincoln.

Therestofthewinter,afterthedepartureofthepeacecommissioners,passedoffquietlyanduneventfully,exceptfortwoorthreelittleincidents.Ononeoccasionduringthisperiod,whileIwasvisitingWashingtonCityforthepurposeofconferringwiththeadministration,theenemy'scavalryunderGeneralWadeHampton,passingourextremeleftandthengoingtothesouth,gotineastofus.Beforetheirpresencewasknown,theyhaddrivenoffalargenumberofbeefcattlethatweregrazinginthatsection.Itwasafaircapture,andtheyweresufficientlyneededbytheConfederates.Itwasonlyretaliatingforwhatwehaddone,sometimesformanyweeksatatime,whenoutofsuppliestakingwhattheConfederatearmyotherwisewouldhavegotten.Asappearsinthisbook,ononesingleoccasionwecapturedfivethousandheadofcattlewhichwerecrossingtheMississippiRivernearPortHudsonontheirwayfromTexastosupplytheConfederatearmyintheEast.

OneofthemostanxiousperiodsofmyexperienceduringtherebellionwasthelastfewweeksbeforePetersburg.IfeltthatthesituationoftheConfederatearmywassuchthattheywouldtrytomakeanescapeattheearliestpracticablemoment,andIwasafraid,everymorning,thatIwouldawakefrommysleeptohearthatLeehadgone,andthatnothingwasleftbutapicketline.HehadhisrailroadbythewayofDanvillesouth,andIwasafraidthathewasrunningoffhismenandallstoresandordnanceexceptsuchasitwouldbenecessarytocarrywithhimforhisimmediatedefence.IknewhecouldmovemuchmorelightlyandmorerapidlythanI,andthat,ifhegotthestart,hewouldleavemebehindsothatwewouldhavethesamearmytofightagainfarthersouthandthewarmightbeprolongedanotheryear.

IwasledtothisfearbythefactthatIcouldnotseehowitwaspossiblefortheConfederatestoholdoutmuchlongerwheretheywere.ThereisnodoubtthatRichmondwouldhavebeenevacuatedmuchsoonerthanitwas,ifithadnotbeenthatitwasthecapitaloftheso-calledConfederacy,andthefactofevacuatingthecapitalwould,ofcourse,havehadaverydemoralizingeffectupontheConfederatearmy.Whenitwasevacuated(asweshallseefurtheron),theConfederacyatoncebegantocrumbleandfadeaway.Then,too,desertionsweretakingplace,notonlyamongthosewhowerewithGeneralLeeinthe

weretakingplace,notonlyamongthosewhowerewithGeneralLeeintheneighborhoodoftheircapital,butthroughoutthewholeConfederacy.Irememberthatinaconversationwithmeononeoccasionlongpriortothis,GeneralButlerremarkedthattheConfederateswouldfindgreatdifficultyingettingmoremenfortheirarmy;possiblyadding,thoughIamnotcertainastothis,"unlesstheyshouldarmtheslave."

TheSouth,asweallknew,wereconscriptingeveryable-bodiedmanbetweentheagesofeighteenandforty-five;andnowtheyhadpassedalawforthefurtherconscriptionofboysfromfourteentoeighteen,callingthemthejuniorreserves,andmenfromforty-fivetosixtytobecalledtheseniorreserves.Thelatterweretoholdthenecessarypointsnotinimmediatedanger,andespeciallythoseintherear.GeneralButler,inalludingtothisconscription,remarkedthattheywerethus"robbingboththecradleandthegrave,"anexpressionwhichIafterwardsusedinwritingalettertoMr.Washburn.

Itwasmybeliefthatwhiletheenemycouldgetnomorerecruitstheywerelosingatleastaregimentaday,takingitthroughouttheentirearmy,bydesertionsalone.Thenbycasualtiesofwar,sickness,andothernaturalcauses,theirlossesweremuchheavier.Itwasamerequestionofarithmetictocalculatehowlongtheycouldholdoutwhilethatrateofdepletionwasgoingon.Ofcourselongbeforetheirarmywouldbethusreducedtonothingthearmywhichwehadinthefieldwouldhavebeenabletocapturetheirs.ThentooIknewfromthegreatnumberofdesertions,thatthemenwhohadfoughtsobravely,sogallantlyandsolongforthecausewhichtheybelievedin—andasearnestly,Itakeit,asourmenbelievedinthecauseforwhichtheywerefighting—hadlosthopeandbecomedespondent.ManyofthemweremakingapplicationtobesentNorthwheretheymightgetemploymentuntilthewarwasover,whentheycouldreturntotheirSouthernhomes.

FortheseandotherreasonsIwasnaturallyveryimpatientforthetimetocomewhenIcouldcommencethespringcampaign,whichIthoroughlybelievedwouldclosethewar.

ThereweretwoconsiderationsIhadtoobserve,however,andwhichdetainedme.Onewasthefactthatthewinterhadbeenoneofheavyrains,andtheroadswereimpassableforartilleryandteams.Itwasnecessarytowaituntiltheyhaddriedsufficientlytoenableustomovethewagontrainsandartillerynecessarytotheefficiencyofanarmyoperatingintheenemy'scountry.TheotherconsiderationwasthatGeneralSheridanwiththecavalryoftheArmyofthePotomacwasoperatingonthenorthsideoftheJamesRiver,havingcomedown

PotomacwasoperatingonthenorthsideoftheJamesRiver,havingcomedownfromtheShenandoah.ItwasnecessarythatIshouldhavehiscavalrywithme,andIwasthereforeobligedtowaituntilhecouldjoinmesouthoftheJamesRiver.

Letusnowtakeaccountofwhathewasdoing.

Onthe5thofMarchIhadheardfromSheridan.HehadmetEarlybetweenStauntonandCharlottesvilleanddefeatedhim,capturingnearlyhisentirecommand.Earlyandsomeofhisofficersescapedbyfindingrefugeintheneighboringhousesorinthewoods.

Onthe12thIheardfromhimagain.Hehadturnedeast,tocometoWhiteHouse.HecouldnotgotoLynchburgasordered,becausetherainshadbeensoveryheavyandthestreamsweresoverymuchswollen.Hehadapontoontrainwithhim,butitwouldnotreachhalfwayacrosssomeofthestreams,attheirthenstageofwater,whichhewouldhavetogetoveringoingsouthasfirstordered.

IhadsuppliessentaroundtoWhiteHouseforhim,andkeptthedepotthereopenuntilhearrived.WehadintendedtoabandonitbecausetheJamesRiverhadnowbecomeourbaseofsupplies.

Sheridanhadabouttenthousandcavalrywithhim,dividedintotwodivisionscommandedrespectivelybyCusterandDevin.GeneralMerrittwasactingaschiefofcavalry.Sheridanmovedverylight,carryingonlyfourdays'provisionswithhim,withalargersupplyofcoffee,saltandothersmallrations,andaverylittleelsebesidesammunition.TheystoppedatCharlottesvilleandcommencedtearinguptherailroadbacktowardLynchburg.HealsosentadivisionalongtheJamesRiverCanaltodestroylocks,culvertsetc.Allmillsandfactoriesalongthelinesofmarchofhistroopsweredestroyedalso.

SheridanhadinthiswayconsumedsomuchtimethathismakingamarchtoWhiteHousewasnowsomewhathazardous.HedeterminedthereforetofighthiswayalongtherailroadandcanaltillhewasasneartoRichmondasitwaspossibletoget,oruntilattacked.Hedidthis,destroyingthecanalasfarasGoochland,andtherailroadtoapointasnearRichmondashecouldget.Onthe10thhewasatColumbia.Negroeshadjoinedhiscolumntothenumberoftwothousandormore,andtheyassistedconsiderablyintheworkofdestroyingtherailroadsandthecanal.Hiscavalrywasinasfineaconditionaswhenhestarted,becausehehadbeenabletofindplentyofforage.Hehadcapturedmostof

becausehehadbeenabletofindplentyofforage.HehadcapturedmostofEarly'shorsesandpickedupagoodmanyothersontheroad.WhenhereachedAshlandhewasassailedbytheenemyinforce.Heresistedtheirassaultwithpartofhiscommand,movedquicklyacrosstheSouthandNorthAnna,goingnorth,andreachedWhiteHousesafelyonthe19th.

ThetimeforShermantomovehadtobefixedwithreferencetothetimehecouldgetawayfromGoldsborowherehethenwas.Supplieshadtobegotuptohimwhichwouldlasthimthroughalongmarch,astherewouldprobablynotbemuchtobeobtainedinthecountrythroughwhichhewouldpass.Ihadtoarrange,therefore,thatheshouldstartfromwherehewas,intheneighborhoodofGoldsboroonthe18thofApril,theearliestdayatwhichhesupposedhecouldbeready.

ShermanwasanxiousthatIshouldwaitwhereIwasuntilhecouldcomeup,andmakeasurethingofit;butIhaddeterminedtomoveassoonastheroadsandweatherwouldadmitofmydoingso.Ihadbeentieddownsomewhatinthematteroffixinganytimeatmypleasureforstarting,untilSheridan,whowasonhiswayfromtheShenandoahValleytojoinme,shouldarrive,asbothhispresenceandthatofhiscavalrywerenecessarytotheexecutionoftheplanswhichIhadinmind.However,havingarrivedatWhiteHouseonthe19thofMarch,Iwasenabledtomakemyplans.

PromptedbymyanxietylestLeeshouldgetawaysomenightbeforeIwasawareofit,andhavingtheleadofme,pushintoNorthCarolinatojoinwithJohnstoninattemptingtocrushoutSherman,Ihad,asearlyasthe1stofthemonthofMarch,giveninstructionstothetroopsaroundPetersburgtokeepasharplookouttoseethatsuchamovementshouldnotescapetheirnotice,andtobereadystrikeatonceifitwasundertaken.

ItisnowknownthatearlyinthemonthofMarchMr.DavisandGeneralLeehadaconsultationaboutthesituationofaffairsinandaboutandPetersburg,andtheybothagreedplaceswerenolongertenableforthem,andthattheymustgetawayassoonaspossible.They,too,werewaitingfordryroads,oraconditionoftheroadswhichwouldmakeitpossibletomove.

GeneralLee,inaidofhisplanofescape,andtosecureawideropeningtoenablethemtoreachtheDanvilleRoadwithgreatersecuritythanhewouldhaveinthewaythetwoarmiesweresituated,determineduponanassaultupontherightofourlinesaroundPetersburg.Thenightofthe24thofMarchwasfixeduponforthisassault,andGeneralGordonwasassignedtotheexecutionoftheplan.The

thisassault,andGeneralGordonwasassignedtotheexecutionoftheplan.ThepointbetweenFortStedmanandBatteryNo.10,whereourlineswereclosesttogether,wasselectedasthepointofhisattack.Theattackwastobemadeatnight,andthetroopsweretogetpossessionofthehighergroundintherearwheretheysupposedwehadintrenchments,thensweeptotherightandleft,createapanicinthelinesofourarmy,andforcemetocontractmylines.Leehopedthiswoulddetainmeafewdayslongerandgivehimanopportunityofescape.Theplanwaswellconceivedandtheexecutionofitverywelldoneindeed,uptothepointofcarryingaportionofourline.

Gordonassembledhistroopsunderthecoverofnight,atthepointatwhichtheyweretomaketheircharge,andgotpossessionofourpicket-line,entirelywithouttheknowledgeofthetroopsinsideofourmainlineofintrenchments;thisreducedthedistancehewouldhavetochargeovertonotmuchmorethanfiftyyards.Forsometimebeforethedesertershadbeencominginwithgreatfrequency,oftenbringingtheirarmswiththem,andthistheConfederategeneralknew.Takingadvantageofthisknowledgehesenthispickets,withtheirarms,creepingthroughtooursasiftodesert.Whentheygottoourlinestheyatoncetookpossessionandsentourpicketstotherearasprisoners.Inthemainlineourmenweresleepingserenely,asifingreatsecurity.Thisplanwastohavebeenexecutedandmuchdamagedonebeforedaylight;butthetroopsthatweretoreinforceGordonhadtobebroughtfromthenorthsideoftheJamesRiverand,bysomeaccidentontherailroadontheirwayover,theyweredetainedforaconsiderabletime;sothatitgottobenearlydaylightbeforetheywerereadytomakethecharge.

Thecharge,however,wassuccessfulandalmostwithoutloss,theenemypassingthroughourlinesbetweenFortStedmanandBatteryNo.10.Thenturningtotherightandlefttheycapturedthefortandthebattery,withallthearmsandtroopsinthem.Continuingthecharge,theyalsocarriedbatteriesElevenandTwelvetoourleft,whichtheyturnedtowardCityPoint.

MeadehappenedtobeatCityPointthatnight,andthisbreakinhislinecuthimofffromallcommunicationwithhisheadquarters.Parke,however,commandingthe9thcorpswhenthisbreachtookplace,telegraphedthefactstoMeade'sheadquarters,andlearningthatthegeneralwasaway,assumedcommandhimselfandwithcommendablepromptitudemadeallpreparationstodrivetheenemyback.GeneralTidballgatheredalargenumberofpiecesofartilleryandplantedtheminrearofthecapturedworkssoastosweepthenarrowspaceofgroundbetweenthelinesverythoroughly.Hartranftwassoonoutwithhis

groundbetweenthelinesverythoroughly.Hartranftwassoonoutwithhisdivision,asalsowasWillcox.HartranfttotherightofthebreachheadedtherebelsoffinthatdirectionandrapidlydrovethembackintoFortStedman.Ontheothersidetheyweredrivenbackintotheintrenchmentswhichtheyhadcaptured,andbatterieselevenandtwelvewereretakenbyWillcoxearlyinthemorning.

Parkethenthrewalinearoundoutsideofthecapturedfortandbatteries,andcommunicationwasoncemoreestablished.TheartilleryfirewaskeptupsocontinuouslythatitwasimpossiblefortheConfederatestoretreat,andequallyimpossibleforreinforcementstojointhem.Theyall,therefore,fellcaptivesintoourhands.ThiseffortofLee'scosthimaboutfourthousandmen,andresultedintheirkilling,woundingandcapturingabouttwothousandofours.

AftertherecaptureofthebatteriestakenbytheConfederates,ourtroopsmadeachargeandcarriedtheenemy'sintrenchedpicketline,whichtheystrengthenedandheld.This,inturn,gaveusbutashortdistancetochargeoverwhenourattackcametobemadeafewdayslater.

ThedaythatGordonwasmakingdispositionsforthisattack(24thofMarch)Iissuedmyordersforthemovementtocommenceonthe29th.Ord,withthreedivisionsofinfantryandMackenzie'scavalry,wastomoveinadvanceonthenightofthe27th,fromthenorthsideoftheJamesRiverandtakehisplaceonourextremeleft,thirtymilesaway.HeleftWeitzelwiththerestoftheArmyoftheJamestoholdBermudaHundredandthenorthoftheJamesRiver.TheengineerbrigadewastobeleftatCityPoint,andParke'scorpsinthelinesaboutPetersburg.(*42)

Ordwasathisplacepromptly.HumphreysandWarrenwerethenonourextremeleftwiththe2dand5thcorps.TheyweredirectedonthearrivalofOrd,andonhisgettingintopositionintheirplaces,tocrossHatcher'sRunandextendoutwesttowardFiveForks,theobjectbeingtogetintoapositionfromwhichwecouldstriketheSouthSideRailroadandultimatelytheDanvilleRailroad.Therewasconsiderablefightingintakingupthesenewpositionsforthe2dand5thcorps,inwhichtheArmyoftheJameshadalsotoparticipatesomewhat,andthelosseswerequitesevere.

ThiswaswhatwasknownastheBattleofWhiteOakRoad.

CHAPTERLXIV.

INTERVIEWWITHSHERIDAN—GRANDMOVEMENTOFTHEARMYOFTHEPOTOMAC—SHERIDAN'SADVANCEONFIVEFORKS—BATTLEOFFIVEFORKS—PARKEANDWRIGHTSTORMTHEENEMY'SLINE—BATTLESBEFOREPETERSBURG.

SheridanreachedCityPointonthe26thdayofMarch.Hishorses,ofcourse,werejadedandmanyofthemhadlosttheirshoes.Afewdaysofrestwerenecessarytorecuperatetheanimalsandalsotohavethemshodandputinconditionformoving.ImmediatelyonGeneralSheridan'sarrivalatCityPointIpreparedhisinstructionsforthemovewhichIhaddecidedupon.Themovementwastocommenceonthe29thofthemonth.

AfterreadingtheinstructionsIhadgivenhim,Sheridanwalkedoutofmytent,andIfollowedtohavesomeconversationwithhimbyhimself—notinthepresenceofanybodyelse,evenofamemberofmystaff.InpreparinghisinstructionsIcontemplatedjustwhattookplace;thatistosay,capturingFiveForks,drivingtheenemyfromPetersburgandRichmondandterminatingthecontestbeforeseparatingfromtheenemy.ButtheNationhadalreadybecomerestlessanddiscouragedattheprolongationofthewar,andmanybelievedthatitwouldneverterminateexceptbycompromise.Knowingthatunlessmyplanprovedanentiresuccessitwouldbeinterpretedasadisastrousdefeat,IprovidedintheseinstructionsthatinacertaineventhewastocutloosefromtheArmyofthePotomacandhisbaseofsupplies,andlivinguponthecountryproceedsouthbythewayoftheDanvilleRailroad,ornearit,acrosstheRoanoke,getintherearofJohnston,whowasguardingthatroad,andcooperatewithShermanindestroyingJohnston;thenwiththesecombinedforcestohelpcarryouttheinstructionswhichShermanalreadyhadreceived,toactincooperationwiththearmiesaroundPetersburgandRichmond.

IsawthatafterSheridanhadreadhisinstructionsheseemedsomewhatdisappointedattheidea,possibly,ofhavingtocutlooseagainfromtheArmyofthePotomac,andplacehimselfbetweenthetwomainarmiesoftheenemy.Isaidtohim:"General,thisportionofyourinstructionsIhaveputinmerelyasablind;"andgavehimthereasonfordoingso,heretoforedescribed.Itoldhimthat,asamatteroffact,Iintendedtoclosethewarrighthere,withthismovement,andthatheshouldgonofarther.Hisfaceatoncebrightenedup,andslappinghishandonhisleghesaid:"Iamgladtohearit,andwecandoit."

SheridanwasnothowevertomakehismovementagainstFiveForksuntilhegot

SheridanwasnothowevertomakehismovementagainstFiveForksuntilhegotfurtherinstructionsfromme.

Oneday,afterthemovementIamabouttodescribehadcommenced,andwhenhiscavalrywasonourextremeleftandfartotherear,south,Sheridanrodeuptowheremyheadquarterswerethenestablished,atDabney'sMills.Hemetsomeofmystaffofficersoutside,andwashighlyjubilantovertheprospectsofsuccess,givingreasonswhyhebelievedthiswouldprovethefinalandsuccessfuleffort.Althoughmychief-of-staffhadurgedverystronglythatwereturntoourpositionaboutCityPointandinthelinesaroundPetersburg,heaskedSheridantocomeintoseemeandsaytomewhathehadbeensayingtothem.Sheridanfeltalittlemodestaboutgivinghisadvicewhereithadnotbeenasked;sooneofmystaffcameinandtoldmethatSheridanhadwhattheyconsideredimportantnews,andsuggestedthatIsendforhim.Ididso,andwasgladtoseethespiritofconfidencewithwhichhewasimbued.KnowingasIdidfromexperience,ofwhatgreatvaluethatfeelingofconfidencebyacommanderwas,Ideterminedtomakeamovementatonce,althoughonaccountoftherainswhichhadfallenafterIhadstartedouttheroadswerestillveryheavy.Ordersweregivenaccordingly.

Finallythe29thofMarchcame,andfortunatelytherehavingbeenafewdaysfreefromrain,thesurfaceofthegroundwasdry,givingindicationsthatthetimehadcomewhenwecouldmove.OnthatdateImovedoutwithallthearmyavailableafterleavingsufficientforcetoholdthelineaboutPetersburg.Itsoonsetinrainingagainhowever,andinaveryshorttimetheroadsbecamepracticallyimpassableforteams,andalmostsoforcavalry.Sometimesahorseormulewouldbestandingapparentlyonfirmground,whenallatonceonefootwouldsink,andashecommencedscramblingtocatchhimselfallhisfeetwouldsinkandhewouldhavetobedrawnbyhandoutofthequicksandssocommoninthatpartofVirginiaandothersouthernStates.Itbecamenecessarythereforetobuildcorduroyroadseveryfootofthewayasweadvanced,tomoveourartilleryupon.Thearmyhadbecomesoaccustomedtothiskindofwork,andweresowellpreparedforit,thatitwasdoneveryrapidly.Thenextday,March30th,wehadmadesufficientprogresstothesouth-westtowarrantmeinstartingSheridanwithhiscavalryoverbyDinwiddiewithinstructionstothencomeupbytheroadleadingnorth-westtoFiveForks,thusmenacingtherightofLee'sline.

Thismovementwasmadeforthepurposeofextendingourlinestothewestasfaraspracticabletowardstheenemy'sextremeright,orFiveForks.Thecolumnmovingdetachedfromthearmystillinthetrencheswas,excludingthecavalry,

movingdetachedfromthearmystillinthetrencheswas,excludingthecavalry,verysmall.Theforcesinthetrencheswerethemselvesextendingtotheleftflank.Warrenwasontheextremeleftwhentheextensionbegan,butHumphreyswasmarchedaroundlaterandthrownintolinebetweenhimandFiveForks.

MyhopewasthatSheridanwouldbeabletocarryFiveForks,getontheenemy'srightflankandrear,andforcethemtoweakentheircentretoprotecttheirrightsothatanassaultinthecentremightbesuccessfullymade.GeneralWright'scorpshadbeendesignatedtomakethisassault,whichIintendedtoorderassoonasinformationreachedmeofSheridan'ssuccess.Hewastomoveundercoverasclosetotheenemyashecouldget.

ItisnaturaltosupposethatLeewouldunderstandmydesigntobetogetuptotheSouthSideandultimatelytotheDanvilleRailroad,assoonashehadheardofthemovementcommencedonthe29th.TheseroadsweresoimportanttohisveryexistencewhileheremainedinRichmondandPetersburg,andofsuchvitalimportancetohimevenincaseofretreat,thatnaturallyhewouldmakemoststrenuouseffortstodefendthem.Hedidonthe30thsendPickettwithfivebrigadestoreinforceFiveForks.Healsosentaroundtotherightofhisarmysometwoorthreeotherdivisions,besidesdirectingthatothertroopsbeheldinreadinessonthenorthsideoftheJamesRivertocomeoveroncall.Hecameoverhimselftosuperintendinpersonthedefenceofhisrightflank.

SheridanmovedbacktoDinwiddieCourt-Houseonthenightofthe30th,andthentookaroadleadingnorth-westtoFiveForks.Hehadonlyhiscavalrywithhim.Soonencounteringtherebelcavalryhemetwithaverystoutresistance.HegraduallydrovethembackhoweveruntilintheneighborhoodofFiveForks.Herehehadtoencounterothertroopsbesidesthosehehadbeencontendingwith,andwasforcedtogiveway.

InthisconditionofaffairshenotifiedmeofwhathadtakenplaceandstatedthathewasfallingbacktowardDinwiddiegraduallyandslowly,andaskedmetosendWright'scorpstohisassistance.IrepliedtohimthatitwasimpossibletosendWright'scorpsbecausethatcorpswasalreadyinlinecloseuptotheenemy,whereweshouldwanttoassaultwhenthepropertimecame,andwasbesidesalongdistancefromhim;butthe2d(Humphreys's)and5th(Warren's)corpswereonourextremeleftandalittletotherearofitinapositiontothreatentheleftflankoftheenemyatFiveForks,andthatIwouldsendWarren.

AccordinglyordersweresenttoWarrentomoveatoncethatnight(the31st)toDinwiddieCourtHouseandputhimselfincommunicationwithSheridanas

DinwiddieCourtHouseandputhimselfincommunicationwithSheridanassoonaspossible,andreporttohim.Hewasveryslowinmoving,someofhistroopsnotstartinguntilafter5o'clocknextmorning.Whenhedidmoveitwasdoneverydeliberately,andonarrivingatGravellyRunhefoundthestreamswollenfromtherecentrainssothatheregardeditasnotfordable.Sheridanofcourseknewofhiscoming,andbeingimpatienttogetthetroopsupassoonaspossible,sentorderstohimtohasten.HewasalsohastenedoratleastorderedtomoveuprapidlybyGeneralMeade.Henowfeltthathecouldnotcrossthatcreekwithoutbridges,andhisorderswerechangedtomovesoastostrikethepursuingenemyinflankorgetintheirrear;buthewassolateingettingupthatSheridandeterminedtomoveforwardwithouthim.However,Ayres'sdivisionofWarren'scorpsreachedhimintimetobeinthefightallday,mostofthetimeseparatedfromtheremainderofthe5thcorpsandfightingdirectlyunderSheridan.

WarrenreportedtoSheridanabout11o'clockonthe1st,butthewholeofhistroopswerenotupsoastobemuchengageduntillateintheafternoon.Griffin'sdivisioninbackingtogetoutofthewayofaseverecrossfireoftheenemywasfoundmarchingawayfromthefighting.Thisdidnotcontinuelong,however;thedivisionwasbroughtbackandwithAyres'sdivisiondidmostexcellentserviceduringtheday.Crawford'sdivisionofthesamecorpshadbackedstillfartheroff,andalthoughordersweresentrepeatedlytobringitup,itwaslatebeforeitfinallygottowhereitcouldbeofmaterialassistance.Oncethereitdidveryexcellentservice.

Sheridansucceededbythemiddleoftheafternoonoralittlelater,inadvancinguptothepointfromwhichtomakehisdesignedassaultuponFiveForksitself.Hewasveryimpatienttomaketheassaultandhaveitalloverbeforenight,becausethegroundheoccupiedwouldbeuntenableforhiminbivouacduringthenight.Unlesstheassaultwasmadeandwassuccessful,hewouldbeobligedtoreturntoDinwiddieCourt-House,orevenfurtherthanthatforthenight.

ItwasatthisjunctionofaffairsthatSheridanwantedtogetCrawford'sdivisioninhand,andhealsowantedWarren.HesentstaffofficerafterstaffofficerinsearchofWarren,directingthatgeneraltoreporttohim,buttheywereunabletofindhim.AtalleventsSheridanwasunabletogetthatofficertohim.Finallyhewenthimself.HeissuedanorderrelievingWarrenandassigningGriffintothecommandofthe5thcorps.Thetroopswerethenbroughtupandtheassaultsuccessfullymade.

IwassomuchdissatisfiedwithWarren'sdilatorymovementsinthebattleofWhiteOakRoadandinhisfailuretoreachSheridanintime,thatIwasverymuchafraidthatatthelastmomenthewouldfailSheridan.Hewasamanoffineintelligence,greatearnestness,quickperception,andcouldmakehisdispositionsasquicklyasanyofficer,underdifficultieswherehewasforcedtoact.ButIhadbeforediscoveredadefectwhichwasbeyondhiscontrol,thatwasveryprejudicialtohisusefulnessinemergenciesliketheonejustbeforeus.Hecouldseeeverydangerataglancebeforehehadencounteredit.Hewouldnotonlymakepreparationstomeetthedangerwhichmightoccur,buthewouldinformhiscommandingofficerwhatothersshoulddowhilehewasexecutinghismove.

IhadsentastaffofficertoGeneralSheridantocallhisattentiontothesedefects,andtosaythatasmuchasIlikedGeneralWarren,nowwasnotatimewhenwecouldletourpersonalfeelingsforanyonestandinthewayofsuccess;andifhisremovalwasnecessarytosuccess,nottohesitate.ItwasuponthatauthorizationthatSheridanremovedWarren.Iwasverysorrythatithadbeendone,andregrettedstillmorethatIhadnotlongbeforetakenoccasiontoassignhimtoanotherfieldofduty.

ItwasduskwhenourtroopsunderSheridanwentovertheparapetsoftheenemy.Thetwoarmiesweremingledtogetherthereforatimeinsuchmannerthatitwasalmostaquestionwhichonewasgoingtodemandthesurrenderoftheother.Soon,however,theenemybrokeandranineverydirection;somesixthousandprisoners,besidesartilleryandsmall-armsinlargequantities,fallingintoourhands.Theflyingtroopswerepursuedindifferentdirections,thecavalryand5thcorpsunderSheridanpursuingthelargerbodywhichmovednorth-west.

Thispursuitcontinueduntilaboutnineo'clockatnight,whenSheridanhaltedhistroops,andknowingtheimportancetohimofthepartoftheenemy'slinewhichhadbeencaptured,returned,sendingthe5thcorpsacrossHatcher'sRuntojustsouth-westofPetersburg,andfacingthemtowardit.Merritt,withthecavalry,stoppedandbivouackedwestofFiveForks.

Thiswastheconditionwhichaffairswereinonthenightofthe1stofApril.IthenissuedordersforanassaultbyWrightandParkeatfouro'clockonthemorningofthe2d.Ialsoorderedthe2dcorps,GeneralHumphreys,andGeneralOrdwiththeArmyoftheJames,ontheleft,toholdthemselvesinreadinesstotakeanyadvantagethatcouldbetakenfromweakeningintheirfront.

takeanyadvantagethatcouldbetakenfromweakeningintheirfront.

InotifiedMr.LincolnatCityPointofthesuccessoftheday;infactIhadreportedtohimduringthedayandeveningasIgotnews,becausehewassomuchinterestedinthemovementstakingplacethatIwantedtorelievehismindasmuchasIcould.InotifiedWeitzelonthenorthsideoftheJamesRiver,directinghim,also,tokeepcloseuptotheenemy,andtakeadvantageofthewithdrawaloftroopsfromtheretopromptlyenterthecityofRichmond.

IwasafraidthatLeewouldregardthepossessionofFiveForksasofsomuchimportancethathewouldmakealastdesperateefforttoretakeit,riskingeverythinguponthecastofasingledie.ItwasforthisreasonthatIhadorderedtheassaulttotakeplaceatonce,assoonasIhadreceivedthenewsofthecaptureofFiveForks.Thecorpscommanders,however,reportedthatitwassodarkthatthemencouldnotseetomove,anditwouldbeimpossibletomaketheassaultthen.ButwekeptupacontinuousartilleryfireupontheenemyaroundthewholelineincludingthatnorthoftheJamesRiver,untilitwaslightenoughtomove,whichwasaboutaquartertofiveinthemorning.

AtthathourParke'sandWright'scorpsmovedoutasdirected,brushedtheabatisfromtheirfrontastheyadvancedunderaheavyfireofmusketryandartillery,andwentwithoutflinchingdirectlyontilltheymountedtheparapetsandthrewthemselvesinsideoftheenemy'sline.Parke,whowasontheright,sweptdowntotherightandcapturedaveryconsiderablelengthoflineinthatdirection,butatthatpointtheouterwassoneartheinnerlinewhichcloselyenvelopedthecityofPetersburgthathecouldmakenoadvanceforwardand,infact,hadaveryserioustasktoturnthelineswhichhehadcapturedtothedefenceofhisowntroopsandtoholdthem;buthesucceededinthis.

WrightswungaroundtohisleftandmovedtoHatcher'sRun,sweepingeverythingbeforehim.Theenemyhadtraversesinrearofhiscapturedline,undercoverofwhichhemadesomethingofastand,fromonetoanother,asWrightmovedon;butthelattermetnoseriousobstacle.Asyouproceedtothelefttheouterlinebecomesgraduallymuchfartherfromtheinnerone,andalongaboutHatcher'sRuntheymustbenearlytwomilesapart.BothParkeandWrightcapturedaconsiderableamountofartilleryandsomeprisoners—Wrightaboutthreethousandofthem.

InthemeantimeOrdandHumphreys,inobediencetotheinstructionstheyhadreceived,hadsucceededbydaylight,orveryearlyinthemorning,incapturingtheintrenchedpicket-linesintheirfront;andbeforeWrightgotuptothatpoint,

theintrenchedpicket-linesintheirfront;andbeforeWrightgotuptothatpoint,Ordhadalsosucceededingettinginsideoftheenemy'sintrenchments.Thesecondcorpssoonfollowed;andtheouterworksofPetersburgwereinthehandsoftheNationaltroops,nevertobewrenchedfromthemagain.WhenWrightreachedHatcher'sRun,hesentaregimenttodestroytheSouthSideRailroadjustoutsideofthecity.

MyheadquarterswerestillatDabney'ssaw-mills.AssoonasIreceivedthenewsofWright'ssuccess,Isentdispatchesannouncingthefacttoallpointsaroundtheline,includingthetroopsatBermudaHundredandthoseonthenorthsideoftheJames,andtothePresidentatCityPoint.Furtherdispatcheskeptcomingin,andastheydidIsenttheadditionalnewstothesepoints.Findingatlengththattheywereallin,Imountedmyhorsetojointhetroopswhowereinsidetheworks.WhenIarrivedthereIrodemyhorseovertheparapetjustasWright'sthreethousandprisonerswerecomingout.IwassoonjoinedinsidebyGeneralMeadeandhisstaff.

Leemadefranticeffortstorecoveratleastpartofthelostground.Parkeonourrightwasrepeatedlyassaulted,butrepulsedeveryeffort.BeforenoonLongstreetwasorderedupfromthenorthsideoftheJamesRiverthusbringingthebulkofLee'sarmyaroundtothesupportofhisextremeright.AssoonasIlearnedthisInotifiedWeitzelanddirectedhimtokeepupclosetotheenemyandtohaveHartsuff,commandingtheBermudaHundredfront,todothesamething,andiftheyfoundanybreaktogoin;Hartsuffespeciallyshoulddoso,forthiswouldseparateRichmondandPetersburg.

Sheridan,afterhehadreturnedtoFiveForks,sweptdowntoPetersburg,cominginonourleft.ThisgaveusacontinuouslinefromtheAppomattoxRiverbelowthecitytothesameriverabove.Ateleveno'clock,nothavingheardfromSheridan,IreinforcedParkewithtwobrigadesfromCityPoint.Withthisadditionalforcehecompletedhiscapturedworksforbetterdefence,andbuiltbackfromhisright,soastoprotecthisflank.Healsocarriedinandmadeanabatisbetweenhimselfandtheenemy.LeebroughtadditionaltroopsandartilleryagainstParkeevenafterthiswasdone,andmadeseveralassaultswithveryheavylosses.

TheenemyhadinadditiontotheirintrenchedlinecloseuptoPetersburg,twoenclosedworksoutsideofit,FortGreggandFortWhitworth.Wethoughtithadnowbecomenecessarytocarrythembyassault.Aboutoneo'clockintheday,FortGreggwasassaultedbyFoster'sdivisionofthe24thcorps(Gibbon's),supportedbytwobrigadesfromOrd'scommand.Thebattlewasdesperateand

supportedbytwobrigadesfromOrd'scommand.ThebattlewasdesperateandtheNationaltroopswererepulsedseveraltimes;butitwasfinallycarried,andimmediatelythetroopsinFortWhitworthevacuatedtheplace.ThegunsofFortGreggwereturnedupontheretreatingenemy,andthecommandingofficerwithsomesixtyofthemenofFortWhitworthsurrendered.

IhadorderedMilesinthemorningtoreporttoSheridan.InmovingtoexecutethisorderhecameupontheenemyattheintersectionoftheWhiteOakRoadandtheClaiborneRoad.TheenemyfellbacktoSutherlandStationontheSouthSideRoadandwerefollowedbyMiles.Thisposition,naturallyastronganddefensibleone,wasalsostronglyintrenched.SheridannowcameupandMilesaskedpermissionfromhimtomaketheassault,whichSheridangave.BythistimeHumphreyshadgotthroughtheouterworksinhisfront,andcameupalsoandassumedcommandoverMiles,whocommandedadivisioninhiscorps.IhadsentanordertoHumphreystoturntohisrightandmovetowardsPetersburg.Thisorderhenowgot,andstartedoff,thusleavingMilesalone.Thelattermadetwoassaults,bothofwhichfailed,andhehadtofallbackafewhundredyards.

HearingthatMileshadbeenleftinthisposition,IdirectedHumphreystosendadivisionbacktohisrelief.Hewenthimself.

SheridanbeforestartingtosweepdowntoPetersburghadsentMerrittwithhiscavalrytothewesttoattacksomeConfederatecavalrythathadassembledthere.MerrittdrovethemnorthtotheAppomattoxRiver.SheridanthentooktheenemyatSutherlandStationonthereversesidefromwhereMileswas,andthetwotogethercapturedtheplace,withalargenumberofprisonersandsomepiecesofartillery,andputtheremainder,portionsofthreeConfederatecorps,toflight.Sheridanfollowed,anddrovethemuntilnight,whenfurtherpursuitwasstopped.MilesbivouackedforthenightonthegroundwhichhewithSheridanhadcarriedsohandsomelybyassault.IcannotexplainthesituationherebetterthanbygivingmydispatchtoCityPointthatevening:

BOYDTONROAD,NEARPETERSBURG,April2,1865.—4.40P.M.

COLONELT.S.BOWERS,CityPoint.

Wearenowupandhaveacontinuouslineoftroops,andinafewhourswillbeintrenchedfromtheAppomattoxbelowPetersburgtotheriverabove.Heth'sand

Wilcox'sdivisions,suchpartofthemaswerenotcaptured,werecutofffromtown,eitherdesignedlyontheirpartorbecausetheycouldnothelpit.Sheridanwiththecavalryand5thcorpsisabovethem.Miles'sdivision,2dcorps,wassentfromtheWhiteOakRoadtoSutherlandStationontheSouthSideRailroad,wherehemetthem,andatlastaccountswasengagedwiththem.NotknowingwhetherSheridanwouldgetupintime,GeneralHumphreyswassentwithanotherdivisionfromhere.Thewholecapturessincethearmystartedoutgunningwillamounttonotlessthantwelvethousandmen,andprobablyfiftypiecesofartillery.Idonotknowthenumberofmenandgunsaccuratelyhowever.*IthinkthePresidentmightcomeoutandpayusavisittomorrow.

U.S.GRANT,Lieutenant-General.

DuringthenightofApril2dourlinewasintrenchedfromtheriverabovetotheriverbelow.IorderedabombardmenttobecommencedthenextmorningatfiveA.M.,tobefollowedbyanassaultatsixo'clock;buttheenemyevacuatedPetersburgearlyinthemorning.

CHAPTERLXV.

THECAPTUREOFPETERSBURG—MEETINGPRESIDENTLINCOLNINPETERSBURG—THECAPTUREOFRICHMOND—PURSUINGTHEENEMY—VISITTOSHERIDANANDMEADE.

GeneralMeadeandIenteredPetersburgonthemorningofthe3dandtookapositionundercoverofahousewhichprotectedusfromtheenemy'smusketrywhichwasflyingthickandfastthere.AswewouldoccasionallylookaroundthecornerwecouldseethestreetsandtheAppomattoxbottom,presumablynearthebridge,packedwiththeConfederatearmy.Ididnothaveartillerybroughtup,becauseIwassureLeewastryingtomakehisescape,andIwantedtopushimmediatelyinpursuit.AtalleventsIhadnotthehearttoturntheartilleryuponsuchamassofdefeatedandfleeingmen,andIhopedtocapturethemsoon.

SoonaftertheenemyhadentirelyevacuatedPetersburg,amancameinwhorepresentedhimselftobeanengineeroftheArmyofNorthernVirginia.HesaidthatLeehadforsometimebeenatworkpreparingastrongenclosedintrenchment,intowhichhewouldthrowhimselfwhenforcedoutofPetersburg,andfighthisfinalbattlethere;thathewasactuallyatthattimedrawinghis

andfighthisfinalbattlethere;thathewasactuallyatthattimedrawinghistroopsfromRichmond,andfallingbackintothispreparedwork.ThisstatementwasmadetoGeneralMeadeandmyselfwhenweweretogether.IhadalreadygivenordersforthemovementupthesouthsideoftheAppomattoxforthepurposeofheadingoffLee;butMeadewassomuchimpressedbythisman'sstorythathethoughtweoughttocrosstheAppomattoxthereatonceandmoveagainstLeeinhisnewposition.IknewthatLeewasnofool,ashewouldhavebeentohaveputhimselfandhisarmybetweentwoformidablestreamsliketheJamesandAppomattoxrivers,andbetweentwosucharmiesasthoseofthePotomacandtheJames.Thenthesestreamscomingtogetherastheydidtotheeastofhim,itwouldbeonlynecessarytocloseupinthewesttohavehimthoroughlycutofffromallsuppliesorpossibilityofreinforcement.Itwouldonlyhavebeenaquestionofdays,andnotmanyofthem,ifhehadtakenthepositionassignedtohimbytheso-calledengineer,whenhewouldhavebeenobligedtosurrenderhisarmy.Suchisoneoftherusesresortedtoinwartodeceiveyourantagonist.MyjudgmentwasthatLeewouldnecessarilyhavetoevacuateRichmond,andthattheonlycourseforhimtopursuewouldbetofollowtheDanvilleRoad.AccordinglymyobjectwastosecureapointonthatroadsouthofLee,andItoldMeadethis.HesuggestedthatifLeewasgoingthatwaywewouldfollowhim.Myreplywasthatwedidnotwanttofollowhim;wewantedtogetaheadofhimandcuthimoff,andifhewouldonlystayinthepositionhe(Meade)believedhimtobeinatthattime,Iwantednothingbetter;thatwhenwegotinpossessionoftheDanvilleRailroad,atitscrossingoftheAppomattoxRiver,ifwestillfoundhimbetweenthetworivers,allwehadtodowastomoveeastwardandclosehimup.ThatwewouldthenhavealltheadvantagewecouldpossiblyhavebymovingdirectlyagainsthimfromPetersburg,evenifheremainedinthepositionassignedhimbytheengineerofficer.

Ihadheldmostofthecommandalooffromtheintrenchments,soastostartthemoutontheDanvilleRoadearlyinthemorning,supposingthatLeewouldbegoneduringthenight.DuringthenightIstrengthenedSheridanbysendinghimHumphreys'scorps.

Lee,aswenowknow,hadadvisedtheauthoritiesatRichmond,duringtheday,oftheconditionofaffairs,andtoldthemitwouldbeimpossibleforhimtoholdoutlongerthannight,ifhecouldholdoutthatlong.DaviswasatchurchwhenhereceivedLee'sdispatch.Thecongregationwasdismissedwiththenoticethattherewouldbenoeveningservice.TherebelgovernmentleftRichmondabouttwoo'clockintheafternoonofthe2d.

twoo'clockintheafternoonofthe2d.

AtnightLeeorderedhistroopstoassembleatAmeliaCourtHouse,hisobjectbeingtogetaway,joinJohnstonifpossible,andtotrytocrushShermanbeforeIcouldgetthere.AssoonasIwassureofthisInotifiedSheridananddirectedhimtomoveoutontheDanvilleRailroadtothesouthsideoftheAppomattoxRiverasspeedilyaspossible.Herepliedthathealreadyhadsomeofhiscommandninemilesout.IthenorderedtherestoftheArmyofthePotomacunderMeadetofollowthesameroadinthemorning.Parke'scorpsfollowedbythesameroad,andtheArmyoftheJameswasdirectedtofollowtheroadwhichranalongsideoftheSouthSideRailroadtoBurke'sStation,andtorepairtherailroadandtelegraphastheyproceeded.Thatroadwasa5feetgauge,whileourrollingstockwasallofthe4feet81/2inchesgauge;consequentlytherailononesideofthetrackhadtobetakenupthroughoutthewholelengthandrelaidsoastoconformtothegaugeofourcarsandlocomotives.

Mr.LincolnwasatCityPointatthetime,andhadbeenforsomedays.IwouldhavelethimknowwhatIcontemplateddoing,onlywhileIfeltastrongconvictionthatthemovewasgoingtobesuccessful,yetitmightnotproveso;andthenIwouldhaveonlyaddedanothertothemanydisappointmentshehadbeensufferingforthepastthreeyears.Butwhenwestartedouthesawthatweweremovingforapurpose,andbiddingusGodspeed,remainedtheretoheartheresult.

ThenextmorningafterthecaptureofPetersburg,ItelegraphedMr.Lincolnaskinghimtorideoutthereandseeme,whileIwouldawaithisarrival.Ihadstartedallthetroopsoutearlyinthemorning,sothataftertheNationalarmyleftPetersburgtherewasnotasoultobeseen,notevenananimalinthestreets.Therewasabsolutelynoonethere,exceptmystaffofficersand,possibly,asmallescortofcavalry.Wehadselectedthepiazzaofadesertedhouse,andoccupiedituntilthePresidentarrived.

AboutthefirstthingthatMr.Lincolnsaidtome,afterwarmcongratulationsforthevictory,andthanksbothtomyselfandtothearmywhichhadaccomplishedit,was:"Doyouknow,general,thatIhavehadasortofasneakingideaforsomedaysthatyouintendedtodosomethinglikethis."Ourmovementshavingbeensuccessfuluptothispoint,InolongerhadanyobjectinconcealingfromthePresidentallmymovements,andtheobjectsIhadinview.HeremainedforsomedaysnearCityPoint,andIcommunicatedwithhimfrequentlyandfullybytelegraph.

Mr.LincolnknewthatithadbeenarrangedforShermantojoinmeatafixedtime,tocooperateinthedestructionofLee'sarmy.ItoldhimthatIhadbeenveryanxioustohavetheEasternarmiesvanquishtheiroldenemywhohadsolongresistedalltheirrepeatedandgallantattemptstosubduethemordrivethemfromtheircapital.TheWesternarmieshadbeeninthemainsuccessfuluntiltheyhadconqueredalltheterritoryfromtheMississippiRivertotheStateofNorthCarolina,andwerenowalmostreadytoknockatthebackdoorofRichmond,askingadmittance.IsaidtohimthatiftheWesternarmiesshouldbeevenuponthefield,operatingagainstRichmondandLee,thecreditwouldbegiventothemforthecapture,bypoliticiansandnon-combatantsfromthesectionofcountrywhichthosetroopshailedfrom.ItmightleadtodisagreeablebickeringsbetweenmembersofCongressoftheEastandthoseoftheWestinsomeoftheirdebates.WesternmembersmightbethrowingituptothemembersoftheEastthatinthesuppressionoftherebelliontheywerenotabletocaptureanarmy,ortoaccomplishmuchinthewayofcontributingtowardthatend,buthadtowaituntiltheWesternarmieshadconqueredalltheterritorysouthandwestofthem,andthencomeontohelpthemcapturetheonlyarmytheyhadbeenengagedwith.

Mr.Lincolnsaidhesawthatnow,buthadneverthoughtofitbefore,becausehisanxietywassogreatthathedidnotcarewheretheaidcamefromsotheworkwasdone.

TheArmyofthePotomachaseveryreasontobeproudofitsfouryears'recordinthesuppressionoftherebellion.ThearmyithadtofightwastheprotectiontothecapitalofapeoplewhichwasattemptingtofoundanationupontheterritoryoftheUnitedStates.Itslosswouldbethelossofthecause.Everyenergy,therefore,wasputforthbytheConfederacytoprotectandmaintaintheircapital.Everythingelsewouldgoifitwent.Lee'sarmyhadtobestrengthenedtoenableittomaintainitsposition,nomatterwhatterritorywaswrestedfromtheSouthinanotherquarter.

IneverexpectedanysuchbickeringasIhaveindicated,betweenthesoldiersofthetwosections;and,fortunately,therehasbeennonebetweenthepoliticians.PossiblyIamtheonlyonewhothoughtoftheliabilityofsuchastateofthingsinadvance.

WhenourconversationwasatanendMr.LincolnmountedhishorseandstartedonhisreturntoCityPoint,whileIandmystaffstartedtojointhearmy,nowagoodmanymilesinadvance.UptothistimeIhadnotreceivedthereportofthe

goodmanymilesinadvance.UptothistimeIhadnotreceivedthereportofthecaptureofRichmond.

SoonafterIleftPresidentLincolnIreceivedadispatchfromGeneralWeitzelwhichnotifiedmethathehadtakenpossessionofRichmondatabout8.15o'clockinthemorningofthatday,the3d,andthathehadfoundthecityonfireintwoplaces.Thecitywasinthemostutterconfusion.Theauthoritieshadtakentheprecautiontoemptyalltheliquorintothegutter,andtothrowouttheprovisionswhichtheConfederategovernmenthadleft,forthepeopletogatherup.Thecityhadbeendesertedbytheauthorities,civilandmilitary,withoutanynoticewhateverthattheywereabouttoleave.Infact,uptotheveryhouroftheevacuationthepeoplehadbeenledtobelievethatLeehadgainedanimportantvictorysomewherearoundPetersburg.

Weitzel'scommandfoundevidenceofgreatdemoralizationinLee'sarmy,therebeingstillagreatmanymenandevenofficersinthetown.Thecitywasonfire.Ourtroopsweredirectedtoextinguishtheflames,whichtheyfinallysucceededindoing.Thefirehadbeenstartedbysomeoneconnectedwiththeretreatingarmy.Allauthoritiesdenythatitwasauthorized,andIpresumeitwastheworkofexcitedmenwhowereleavingwhattheyregardedastheircapitalandmayhavefeltthatitwasbettertodestroyitthanhaveitfallintothehandsoftheirenemy.Bethatasitmay,theNationaltroopsfoundthecityinflames,andusedeveryefforttoextinguishthem.

ThetroopsthathadformedLee'sright,agreatmanyofthem,werecutofffromgettingbackintoPetersburg,andwerepursuedbyourcavalrysohotlyandcloselythattheythrewawaycaissons,ammunition,clothing,andalmosteverythingtolightentheirloads,andpushedalonguptheAppomattoxRiveruntilfinallytheytookwaterandcrossedover.

IleftMr.Lincolnandstarted,asIhavealreadysaid,tojointhecommand,whichhaltedatSutherlandStation,aboutninemilesout.Wehadstilltimetomarchasmuchfarther,andtimewasanobject;buttheroadswerebadandthetrainsbelongingtotheadvancecorpshadblockeduptheroadsothatitwasimpossibletogeton.Then,again,ourcavalryhadstrucksomeoftheenemyandwerepursuingthem;andtheorderswerethattheroadsshouldbegivenuptothecavalrywhenevertheyappeared.Thiscausedfurtherdelay.

GeneralWright,whowasincommandofoneofthecorpswhichwereleftback,thoughttogaintimebylettinghismengointobivouacandtryingtogetupsomerationsforthem,andclearingouttheroad,sothatwhentheydidstartthey

rationsforthem,andclearingouttheroad,sothatwhentheydidstarttheywouldbeuninterrupted.Humphreys,whowasfarahead,wasalsooutofrations.Theydidnotsucceedingettingthemupthroughthenight;buttheArmyofthePotomac,officersandmen,weresoelatedbythereflectionthatatlasttheywerefollowingupavictorytoitsend,thattheypreferredmarchingwithoutrationstorunningapossibleriskoflettingtheenemyeludethem.Sothemarchwasresumedatthreeo'clockinthemorning.

Merritt'scavalryhadstrucktheenemyatDeepCreek,anddriventhemnorthtotheAppomattox,where,Ipresume,mostofthemwereforcedtocross.

Onthemorningofthe4thIlearnedthatLeehadorderedrationsupfromDanvilleforhisfamishingarmy,andthattheyweretomeethimatFarmville.ThisshowedthatLeehadalreadyabandonedtheideaoffollowingtherailroaddowntoDanville,buthaddeterminedtogofartherwest,bythewayofFarmville.InotifiedSheridanofthisanddirectedhimtogetpossessionoftheroadbeforethesuppliescouldreachLee.HerespondedthathehadalreadysentCrook'sdivisiontogetupontheroadbetweenBurkesvilleandJetersville,thentofacenorthandmarchalongtheroaduponthelatterplace;andhethoughtCrookmustbetherenow.ThebulkofthearmymoveddirectlyforJetersvillebytworoads.

AfterIhadreceivedthedispatchfromSheridansayingthatCrookwasontheDanvilleRoad,IimmediatelyorderedMeadetomakeaforcedmarchwiththeArmyofthePotomac,andtosendParke'scorpsacrossfromtheroadtheywereontotheSouthSideRailroad,tofallintherearoftheArmyoftheJamesandtoprotecttherailroadwhichthatarmywasrepairingasitwentalong.

OurtroopstookpossessionofJetersvilleandinthetelegraphoffice,theyfoundadispatchfromLee,orderingtwohundredthousandrationsfromDanville.Thedispatchhadnotbeensent,butSheridansentaspecialmessengerwithittoBurkesvilleandhaditforwardedfromthere.Inthemeantime,however,dispatchesfromothersourceshadreachedDanville,andtheyknewtherethatourarmywasonthelineoftheroad;sothattheysentnofurthersuppliesfromthatquarter.

AtthistimeMerrittandMackenzie,withthecavalry,wereoffbetweentheroadwhichtheArmyofthePotomacwasmarchingonandtheAppomattoxRiver,andwereattackingtheenemyinflank.Theypickedupagreatmanyprisonersandforcedtheabandonmentofsomeproperty.

LeeintrenchedhimselfatAmeliaCourtHouse,andalsohisadvancenorthofJetersville,andsenthistroopsouttocollectforage.Thecountrywasverypoorandaffordedbutverylittle.Hisforagersscatteredagreatdeal;manyofthemwerepickedupbyourmen,andmanyothersneverreturnedtotheArmyofNorthernVirginia.

Griffin'scorpswasintrenchedacrosstherailroadsouthofJetersville,andSheridannotifiedmeofthesituation.IagainorderedMeadeupwithalldispatch,SheridanhavingbuttheonecorpsofinfantrywithalittlecavalryconfrontingLee'sentirearmy.Meade,alwayspromptinobeyingorders,nowpushedforwardwithgreatenergy,althoughhewashimselfsickandhardlyabletobeoutofbed.Humphreysmovedattwo,andWrightatthreeo'clockinthemorning,withoutrations,asIhavesaid,thewagonsbeingfarintherear.

IstayedthatnightatWilson'sStationontheSouthSideRailroad.Onthemorningofthe5thIsentwordtoSheridanoftheprogressMeadewasmaking,andsuggestedthathemightnowattackLee.WehadnownootherobjectivethantheConfederatearmies,andIwasanxioustoclosethethingupatonce.

Onthe5thImarchedagainwithOrd'scommanduntilwithinabouttenmilesofBurkesville,whereIstoppedtolethisarmypass.IthenreceivedfromSheridanthefollowingdispatch:

"ThewholeofLee'sarmyisatornearAmeliaCourtHouse,andonthissideofit.GeneralDavies,whomIsentouttoPainesvilleontheirrightflank,hasjustcapturedsixpiecesofartilleryandsomewagons.WecancapturetheArmyofNorthernVirginiaifforceenoughcanbethrowntothispoint,andthenadvanceuponit.MycavalrywasatBurkesvilleyesterday,andsixmilesbeyond,ontheDanvilleRoad,lastnight.GeneralLeeisatAmeliaCourtHouseinperson.Theyareoutofrations,ornearlyso.TheywereadvancinguptherailroadtowardsBurkesvilleyesterday,whenweinterceptedthematthispoint."

ItnowbecamealifeanddeathstrugglewithLeetogetsouthtohisprovisions.

Sheridan,thinkingtheenemymightturnoffimmediatelytowardsFarmville,movedDavies'sbrigadeofcavalryouttowatchhim.Daviesfoundthemovementhadalreadycommenced.Heattackedanddroveawaytheircavalrywhichwasescortingwagonstothewest,capturingandburning180wagons.Healsocapturedfivepiecesofartillery.TheConfederateinfantrythenmovedagainsthimandprobablywouldhavehandledhimveryroughly,butSheridan

againsthimandprobablywouldhavehandledhimveryroughly,butSheridanhadsenttwomorebrigadesofcavalrytofollowDavies,andtheycametohisreliefintime.Asharpengagementtookplacebetweenthesethreebrigadesofcavalryandtheenemy'sinfantry,butthelatterwasrepulsed.

MeadehimselfreachedJetersvilleabouttwoo'clockintheafternoon,butinadvanceofallhistroops.TheheadofHumphreys'scorpsfollowedinaboutanhourafterwards.Sheridanstationedthetroopsastheycameup,atMeade'srequest,thelatterstillbeingverysick.HeextendedtwodivisionsofthiscorpsofftothewestoftheroadtotheleftofGriffin'scorps,andonedivisiontotheright.Thecavalrybythistimehadalsocomeup,andtheywereputstillfartherofftotheleft,Sheridanfeelingcertainthattherelaytheroutebywhichtheenemyintendedtoescape.Hewantedtoattack,feelingthatiftimewasgiven,theenemywouldgetaway;butMeadepreventedthis,preferringtowaittillhistroopswereallup.

AtthisjunctureSheridansentmealetterwhichhadbeenhandedtohimbyacoloredman,withanotefromhimselfsayingthathewishedIwastheremyself.TheletterwasdatedAmeliaCourtHouse,April5th,andsignedbyColonelTaylor.Itwastohismother,andshowedthedemoralizationoftheConfederatearmy.Sheridan'snotealsogavemetheinformationashererelatedofthemovementsofthatday.IreceivedasecondmessagefromSheridanonthe5th,inwhichheurgedmoreemphaticallytheimportanceofmypresence.Thiswasbroughttomebyascoutingrayuniform.Itwaswrittenontissuepaper,andwrappedupintin-foilsuchaschewingtobaccoisfoldedin.Thiswasaprecautiontakensothatifthescoutshouldbecapturedhecouldtakethistin-foiloutofhispocketandputtingitintohismouth,chewit.ItwouldcausenosurpriseatalltoseeaConfederatesoldierchewingtobacco.Itwasnearlynightwhenthisletterwasreceived.IgaveOrddirectionstocontinuehismarchtoBurkesvilleandthereintrenchhimselfforthenight,andinthemorningtomovewesttocutoffalltheroadsbetweenthereandFarmville.

Ithenstartedwithafewofmystaffandaverysmallescortofcavalry,goingdirectlythroughthewoods,tojoinMeade'sarmy.Thedistancewasaboutsixteenmiles;butthenightbeingdarkourprogresswasslowthroughthewoodsintheabsenceofdirectroads.However,wegottotheoutpostsaboutteno'clockintheevening,andaftersomelittleparleyconvincedthesentinelsofouridentityandwereconductedintowhereSheridanwasbivouacked.Wetalkedoverthesituationforsomelittletime,SheridanexplainingtomewhathethoughtLeewastryingtodo,andthatMeade'sorders,ifcarriedout,movingtotherightflank,wouldgivehimthecovetedopportunityofescapingusandputtingusin

flank,wouldgivehimthecovetedopportunityofescapingusandputtingusinrearofhim.

WethentogethervisitedMeade,reachinghisheadquartersaboutmidnight.IexplainedtoMeadethatwedidnotwanttofollowtheenemy;wewantedtogetaheadofhim,andthathisorderswouldallowtheenemytoescape,andbesidesthat,IhadnodoubtthatLeewasmovingrightthen.Meadechangedhisordersatonce.TheywerenowgivenforanadvanceonAmeliaCourtHouse,atanearlyhourinthemorning,asthearmythenlay;thatis,theinfantrybeingacrosstherailroad,mostofittothewestoftheroad,withthecavalryswungoutstillfarthertotheleft.

CHAPTERLXVI.

BATTLEOFSAILOR'SCREEK—ENGAGEMENTATFARMVILLE—CORRESPONDENCEWITHGENERALLEE—SHERIDANINTERCEPTSTHEENEMY.

TheAppomattox,goingwestward,takesalongsweeptothesouth-westfromtheneighborhoodoftheRichmondandDanvilleRailroadbridge,andthentrendsnorth-westerly.Sailor'sCreek,aninsignificantstream,runningnorthward,emptiesintotheAppomattoxbetweentheHighBridgeandJetersville.NeartheHighBridgethestageroadfromPetersburgtoLynchburgcrossestheAppomattoxRiver,alsoonabridge.TherailroadrunsonthenorthsideoftherivertoFarmville,afewmileswest,andfromthere,recrossing,continuesonthesouthsideofit.Theroadscomingupfromthesouth-easttoFarmvillecrosstheAppomattoxRiverthereonabridgeandrunonthenorthside,leavingtheLynchburgandPetersburgRailroadwelltotheleft.

Lee,inpushingoutfromAmeliaCourtHouse,availedhimselfofalltheroadsbetweentheDanvilleRoadandAppomattoxRivertomoveupon,andneverpermittedtheheadofhiscolumnstostopbecauseofanyfightingthatmightbegoingoninhisrear.Inthiswayhecameverynearsucceedingingettingtohisprovisiontrainsandeludinguswithatleastpartofhisarmy.

Asexpected,Lee'stroopshadmovedduringthenightbefore,andourarmyinmovinguponAmeliaCourtHousesoonencounteredthem.TherewasagooddealoffightingbeforeSailor'sCreekwasreached.Ourcavalrychargedinuponabodyoftheirswhichwasescortingawagontraininordertogetitpastourleft.Asevereengagementensued,inwhichwecapturedmanyprisoners,andmany

Asevereengagementensued,inwhichwecapturedmanyprisoners,andmanymenalsowerekilledandwounded.TherewasasmuchgallantrydisplayedbysomeoftheConfederatesintheselittleengagementsaswasdisplayedatanytimeduringthewar,notwithstandingthesaddefeatsofthepastweek.

ThearmiesfinallymetonSailor'sCreek,whenaheavyengagementtookplace,inwhichinfantry,artilleryandcavalrywereallbroughtintoaction.Ourmenontheright,astheywerebroughtinagainsttheenemy,cameinonhigherground,anduponhisflank,givinguseveryadvantagetobederivedfromthelayofthecountry.Ourfiringwasalsoverymuchmorerapid,becausetheenemycommencedhisretreatwestwardandinfiringasheretreatedhadtoturnaroundeverytimehefired.Theenemy'slosswasveryheavy,aswellinkilledandwoundedasincaptures.Somesixgeneralofficersfellintoourhandsinthisengagement,andseventhousandmenweremadeprisoners.Thisengagementwascommencedinthemiddleoftheafternoonofthe6th,andtheretreatandpursuitwerecontinueduntilnightfall,whenthearmiesbivouackeduponthegroundwherethenighthadovertakenthem.

WhenthemovetowardsAmeliaCourtHousehadcommencedthatmorning,IorderedWright'scorps,whichwasontheextremeright,tobemovedtotheleftpastthewholearmy,totaketheplaceofGriffin's,andorderedthelatteratthesametimetomovebyandplaceitselfontheright.Theobjectofthismovementwastogetthe6thcorps,Wright's,nexttothecavalry,withwhichtheyhadformerlyservedsoharmoniouslyandsoefficientlyinthevalleyofVirginia.

The6thcorpsnowremainedwiththecavalryandunderSheridan'sdirectcommanduntilafterthesurrender.

OrdhadbeendirectedtotakepossessionofalltheroadssouthwardbetweenBurkesvilleandtheHighBridge.Onthemorningofthe6thhesentColonelWashburnwithtwoinfantryregimentswithinstructionstodestroyHighBridgeandtoreturnrapidlytoBurkesvilleStation;andhepreparedhimselftoresisttheenemythere.SoonafterWashburnhadstartedOrdbecamealittlealarmedastohissafetyandsentColonelRead,ofhisstaff,withabouteightycavalrymen,toovertakehimandbringhimback.VeryshortlyafterthisheheardthattheheadofLee'scolumnhadgotuptotheroadbetweenhimandwhereWashburnnowwas,andattemptedtosendreinforcements,butthereinforcementscouldnotgetthrough.Read,however,hadgotthroughaheadoftheenemy.HerodeontoFarmvilleandwasonhiswaybackagainwhenhefoundhisreturncutoff,andWashburnconfrontingapparentlytheadvanceofLee'sarmy.Readdrewhismen

WashburnconfrontingapparentlytheadvanceofLee'sarmy.Readdrewhismenupintolineofbattle,hisforcenowconsistingoflessthansixhundredmen,infantryandcavalry,androdealongtheirfront,makingaspeechtohismentoinspirethemwiththesameenthusiasmthathehimselffelt.Hethengavetheordertocharge.Thislittlebandmadeseveralcharges,ofcourseunsuccessfulones,butinflictedalossupontheenemymorethanequaltotheirownentirenumber.ColonelReadfellmortallywounded,andthenWashburn;andatthecloseoftheconflictnearlyeveryofficerofthecommandandmostoftherankandfilehadbeeneitherkilledorwounded.Theremainderthensurrendered.TheConfederatestookthistobeonlytheadvanceofalargercolumnwhichhadheadedthemoff,andsostoppedtointrench;sothatthisgallantbandofsixhundredhadcheckedtheprogressofastrongdetachmentoftheConfederatearmy.

ThisstoppageofLee'scolumnnodoubtsavedtousthetrainsfollowing.LeehimselfpushedonandcrossedthewagonroadbridgeneartheHighBridge,andattemptedtodestroyit.Hedidsetfiretoit,buttheflameshadmadebutlittleheadwaywhenHumphreyscameupwithhiscorpsanddroveawaytherear-guardwhichhadbeenlefttoprotectitwhileitwasbeingburnedup.Humphreysforcedhiswayacrosswithsomeloss,andfollowedLeetotheintersectionoftheroadcrossingatFarmvillewiththeonefromPetersburg.HereLeeheldapositionwhichwasverystrong,naturally,besidesbeingintrenched.Humphreyswasalone,confrontinghimallthroughtheday,andinaveryhazardousposition.Heputonaboldface,however,andassaultedwithsomeloss,butwasnotassaultedinreturn.

OurcavalryhadgonefarthersouthbythewayofPrinceEdward'sCourtHouse,alongwiththe5thcorps(Griffin's),OrdfallinginbetweenGriffinandtheAppomattox.Crook'sdivisionofcavalryandWright'scorpspushedonwestofFarmville.WhenthecavalryreachedFarmvilletheyfoundthatsomeoftheConfederateswereinaheadofthem,andhadalreadygottheirtrainsofprovisionsbacktothatpoint;butourtroopswereintimetopreventthemfromsecuringanythingtoeat,althoughtheysucceededinagainrunningthetrainsoff,sothatwedidnotgetthemforsometime.ThesetroopsretreatedtothenorthsideoftheAppomattoxtojoinLee,andsucceededindestroyingthebridgeafterthem.ConsiderablefightingensuedtherebetweenWright'scorpsandaportionofourcavalryandtheConfederates,butfinallythecavalryfordedthestreamanddrovethemaway.Wrightbuiltafoot-bridgeforhismentomarchoveronandthenmarchedouttothejunctionoftheroadstorelieveHumphreys,arrivingtherethatnight.IhadstoppedthenightbeforeatBurkesvilleJunction.Ourtroopswerethenprettymuchalloutoftheplace,butwehadafieldhospital

troopswerethenprettymuchalloutoftheplace,butwehadafieldhospitalthere,andOrd'scommandwasextendedfromthatpointtowardsFarmville.

HereImetDr.Smith,aVirginianandanofficeroftheregulararmy,whotoldmethatinaconversationwithGeneralEwell,oneoftheprisonersandarelativeofhis,EwellhadsaidthatwhenwehadgotacrosstheJamesRiverheknewtheircausewaslost,anditwasthedutyoftheirauthoritiestomakethebesttermstheycouldwhiletheystillhadarighttoclaimconcessions.Theauthoritiesthoughtdifferently,however.Nowthecausewaslostandtheyhadnorighttoclaimanything.Hesaidfurther,thatforeverymanthatwaskilledafterthisinthewarsomebodyisresponsible,anditwouldbebutverylittlebetterthanmurder.HewasnotsurethatLeewouldconsenttosurrenderhisarmywithoutbeingabletoconsultwiththePresident,buthehopedhewould.

IrodeintoFarmvilleonthe7th,arrivingthereearlyintheday.SheridanandOrdwerepushingthrough,awaytothesouth.MeadewasbacktowardstheHighBridge,andHumphreysconfrontingLeeasbeforestated.AfterhavinggoneintobivouacatPrinceEdward'sCourtHouse,SheridanlearnedthatseventrainsofprovisionsandforagewereatAppomattox,anddeterminedtostartatonceandcapturethem;andaforcedmarchwasnecessaryinordertogettherebeforeLee'sarmycouldsecurethem.Hewrotemeanotetellingmethis.Thisfact,togetherwiththeincidentrelatedthenightbeforebyDr.Smith,gavemetheideaofopeningcorrespondencewithGeneralLeeonthesubjectofthesurrenderofhisarmy.Ithereforewrotetohimonthisday,asfollows:

HEADQUARTERSARMIESOFTHEU.S.,5P.M.,April7,1865.

GENERALR.E.LEECommandingC.S.A.

TheresultofthelastweekmustconvinceyouofthehopelessnessoffurtherresistanceonthepartoftheArmyofNorthernVirginiainthisstruggle.Ifeelthatitisso,andregarditasmydutytoshiftfrommyselftheresponsibilityofanyfurthereffusionofblood,byaskingofyouthesurrenderofthatportionoftheConfederateStatesarmyknownastheArmyofNorthernVirginia.

U.S.GRANT,Lieut.-General.

Leerepliedontheeveningofthesamedayasfollows:

April7,1865.

GENERAL:Ihavereceivedyournoteofthisday.ThoughnotentertainingtheopinionyouexpressonthehopelessnessoffurtherresistanceonthepartoftheArmyofNorthernVirginia,Ireciprocateyourdesiretoavoiduselesseffusionofblood,andthereforebeforeconsideringyourproposition,askthetermsyouwillofferonconditionofitssurrender.

R.E.LEE,General.

LIEUT.-GENERALU.S.GRANT,CommandingArmiesoftheU.S.

Thiswasnotsatisfactory,butIregardeditasdeservinganotherletterandwrotehimasfollows:

April8,1865.

GENERALR.E.LEE,CommandingC.S.A.

Yournoteoflasteveninginreplytomineofsamedate,askingtheconditiononwhichIwillacceptthesurrenderoftheArmyofNorthernVirginiaisjustreceived.InreplyIwouldsaythat,peacebeingmygreatdesire,thereisbutoneconditionIwouldinsistupon,namely:thatthemenandofficerssurrenderedshallbedisqualifiedfortakinguparmsagainagainsttheGovernmentoftheUnitedStatesuntilproperlyexchanged.Iwillmeetyou,orwilldesignateofficerstomeetanyofficersyoumaynameforthesamepurpose,atanypointagreeabletoyou,forthepurposeofarrangingdefinitelythetermsuponwhichthesurrenderoftheArmyofNorthernVirginiawillbereceived.

U.S.GRANT,Lieut.-General.

Lee'sarmywasrapidlycrumbling.ManyofhissoldiershadenlistedfromthatpartoftheStatewheretheynowwere,andwerecontinuallydroppingoutoftheranksandgoingtotheirhomes.IknowthatIoccupiedahotelalmostdestituteoffurnitureatFarmville,whichhadprobablybeenusedasaConfederatehospital.ThenextmorningwhenIcameoutIfoundaConfederatecolonelthere,whoreportedtomeandsaidthathewastheproprietorofthathouse,andthathewasacolonelofaregimentthathadbeenraisedinthatneighborhood.Hesaidthat

acolonelofaregimentthathadbeenraisedinthatneighborhood.Hesaidthatwhenhecamealongpasthome,hefoundthathewastheonlymanoftheregimentremainingwithLee'sarmy,sohejustdroppedout,andnowwantedtosurrenderhimself.Itoldhimtostaythereandhewouldnotbemolested.ThatwasoneregimentwhichhadbeeneliminatedfromLee'sforcebythiscrumblingprocess.

AlthoughSheridanhadbeenmarchingallday,histroopsmovedwithalacrityandwithoutanystraggling.Theybegantoseetheendofwhattheyhadbeenfightingfouryearsfor.Nothingseemedtofatiguethem.Theywerereadytomovewithoutrationsandtravelwithoutrestuntiltheend.Stragglinghadentirelyceased,andeverymanwasnowarivalforthefront.Theinfantrymarchedaboutasrapidlyasthecavalrycould.

SheridansentCusterwithhisdivisiontomovesouthofAppomattoxStation,whichisaboutfivemilessouth-westoftheCourtHouse,togetwestofthetrainsanddestroytheroadstotherear.Theygottherethenightofthe8th,andsucceededpartially;butsomeofthetrainmenhadjustdiscoveredthemovementofourtroopsandsucceededinrunningoffthreeofthetrains.TheotherfourwereheldbyCuster.

TheheadofLee'scolumncamemarchingupthereonthemorningofthe9th,notdreaming,Isuppose,thattherewereanyUnionsoldiersnear.TheConfederatesweresurprisedtofindourcavalryhadpossessionofthetrains.However,theyweredesperateandatonceassaulted,hopingtorecoverthem.Inthemeleethatensuedtheysucceededinburningoneofthetrains,butnotingettinganythingfromit.CusterthenorderedtheothertrainsrunbackontheroadtowardsFarmville,andthefightcontinued.

Sofar,onlyourcavalryandtheadvanceofLee'sarmywereengaged.Soon,however,Lee'smenwerebroughtupfromtherear,nodoubtexpectingtheyhadnothingtomeetbutourcavalry.ButourinfantryhadpushedforwardsorapidlythatbythetimetheenemygotuptheyfoundGriffin'scorpsandtheArmyoftheJamesconfrontingthem.Asharpengagementensued,butLeequicklysetupawhiteflag.

CHAPTERLXVII.

NEGOTIATIONSATAPPOMATTOX—INTERVIEWWITHLEEATMCLEAN'SHOUSE—THE

NEGOTIATIONSATAPPOMATTOX—INTERVIEWWITHLEEATMCLEAN'SHOUSE—THETERMSOFSURRENDER—LEE'SSURRENDER—INTERVIEWWITHLEEAFTERTHESURRENDER.

Onthe8thIhadfollowedtheArmyofthePotomacinrearofLee.Iwassufferingveryseverelywithasickheadache,andstoppedatafarmhouseontheroadsomedistanceinrearofthemainbodyofthearmy.Ispentthenightinbathingmyfeetinhotwaterandmustard,andputtingmustardplastersonmywristsandthebackpartofmyneck,hopingtobecuredbymorning.DuringthenightIreceivedLee'sanswertomyletterofthe8th,invitinganinterviewbetweenthelinesonthefollowingmorning.(*43)Butitwasforadifferentpurposefromthatofsurrenderinghisarmy,andIansweredhimasfollows:

HEADQUARTERSARMIESOFTHEU.S.,April9,1865.

GENERALR.E.LEE,CommandingC.S.A.

Yournoteofyesterdayisreceived.AsIhavenoauthoritytotreatonthesubjectofpeace,themeetingproposedfortenA.M.to-daycouldleadtonogood.Iwillstate,however,General,thatIamequallyanxiousforpeacewithyourself,andthewholeNorthentertainsthesamefeeling.Thetermsuponwhichpeacecanbehadarewellunderstood.BytheSouthlayingdowntheirarmstheywillhastenthatmostdesirableevent,savethousandsofhumanlivesandhundredsofmillionsofpropertynotyetdestroyed.Sincerelyhopingthatallourdifficultiesmaybesettledwithoutthelossofanotherlife,Isubscribemyself,etc.,

U.S.GRANT,Lieutenant-General.

Iproceededatanearlyhourinthemorning,stillsufferingwiththeheadache,togettotheheadofthecolumn.IwasnotmorethantwoorthreemilesfromAppomattoxCourtHouseatthetime,buttogodirectIwouldhavetopassthroughLee'sarmy,oraportionofit.Ihadthereforetomovesouthinordertogetuponaroadcomingupfromanotherdirection.

WhenthewhiteflagwasputoutbyLee,asalreadydescribed,IwasinthiswaymovingtowardsAppomattoxCourtHouse,andconsequentlycouldnotbecommunicatedwithimmediately,andbeinformedofwhatLeehaddone.Lee,therefore,sentaflagtothereartoadviseMeadeandonetothefronttoSheridan,sayingthathehadsentamessagetomeforthepurposeofhavingameetingto

sayingthathehadsentamessagetomeforthepurposeofhavingameetingtoconsultaboutthesurrenderofhisarmy,andaskedforasuspensionofhostilitiesuntilIcouldbecommunicatedwith.AstheyhadheardnothingofthisuntilthefightinghadgottobesevereandallgoingagainstLee,bothofthesecommandershesitatedveryconsiderablyaboutsuspendinghostilitiesatall.Theywereafraiditwasnotingoodfaith,andwehadtheArmyofNorthernVirginiawhereitcouldnotescapeexceptbysomedeception.They,however,finallyconsentedtoasuspensionofhostilitiesfortwohourstogiveanopportunityofcommunicatingwithmeinthattime,ifpossible.Itwasfoundthat,fromtherouteIhadtaken,theywouldprobablynotbeabletocommunicatewithmeandgetananswerbackwithinthetimefixedunlessthemessengershouldpassthroughtherebellines.

Lee,therefore,sentanescortwiththeofficerbearingthismessagethroughhislinestome.

April9,1865.

GENERAL:Ireceivedyournoteofthismorningonthepicket-linewhitherIhadcometomeetyouandascertaindefinitelywhattermswereembracedinyourproposalofyesterdaywithreferencetothesurrenderofthisarmy.Inowrequestaninterviewinaccordancewiththeoffercontainedinyourletterofyesterdayforthatpurpose.

R.E.LEE,General.

LIEUTENANT-GENERALU.S.GRANTCommandingU.S.Armies.

WhentheofficerreachedmeIwasstillsufferingwiththesickheadache,buttheinstantIsawthecontentsofthenoteIwascured.Iwrotethefollowingnoteinreplyandhastenedon:

April9,1865.

GENERALR.E.LEE,CommandingC.S.Armies.

Yournoteofthisdateisbutthismoment(11.50A.M.)received,inconsequenceofmyhavingpassedfromtheRichmondandLynchburgroadtotheFarmvilleandLynchburgroad.IamatthiswritingaboutfourmileswestofWalker's

andLynchburgroad.IamatthiswritingaboutfourmileswestofWalker'sChurchandwillpushforwardtothefrontforthepurposeofmeetingyou.Noticesenttomeonthisroadwhereyouwishtheinterviewtotakeplacewillmeetme.

U.S.GRANT,Lieutenant-General.

IwasconductedatoncetowhereSheridanwaslocatedwithhistroopsdrawnupinlineofbattlefacingtheConfederatearmynearby.Theywereverymuchexcited,andexpressedtheirviewthatthiswasallaruseemployedtoenabletheConfederatestogetaway.TheysaidtheybelievedthatJohnstonwasmarchingupfromNorthCarolinanow,andLeewasmovingtojoinhim;andtheywouldwhiptherebelswheretheynowwereinfiveminutesifIwouldonlyletthemgoin.ButIhadnodoubtaboutthegoodfaithofLee,andprettysoonwasconductedtowherehewas.IfoundhimatthehouseofaMr.McLean,atAppomattoxCourtHouse,withColonelMarshall,oneofhisstaffofficers,awaitingmyarrival.Theheadofhiscolumnwasoccupyingahill,onaportionofwhichwasanappleorchard,beyondalittlevalleywhichseparateditfromthatonthecrestofwhichSheridan'sforcesweredrawnupinlineofbattletothesouth.

BeforestatingwhattookplacebetweenGeneralLeeandmyself,Iwillgiveallthereisofthestoryofthefamousappletree.

Warsproducemanystoriesoffiction,someofwhicharetolduntiltheyarebelievedtobetrue.Thewaroftherebellionwasnoexceptiontothisrule,andthestoryoftheappletreeisoneofthosefictionsbasedonaslightfoundationoffact.AsIhavesaid,therewasanappleorchardonthesideofthehilloccupiedbytheConfederateforces.Runningdiagonallyupthehillwasawagonroad,which,atonepoint,ranverynearoneofthetrees,sothatthewheelsofvehicleshad,onthatside,cutofftherootsofthistree,leavingalittleembankment.GeneralBabcock,ofmystaff,reportedtomethatwhenhefirstmetGeneralLeehewassittinguponthisembankmentwithhisfeetintheroadbelowandhisbackrestingagainstthetree.Thestoryhadnootherfoundationthanthat.Likemanyotherstories,itwouldbeverygoodifitwasonlytrue.

IhadknownGeneralLeeintheoldarmy,andhadservedwithhimintheMexicanWar;butdidnotsuppose,owingtothedifferenceinourageandrank,thathewouldrememberme,whileIwouldmorenaturallyrememberhimdistinctly,becausehewasthechiefofstaffofGeneralScottintheMexicanWar.

WhenIhadleftcampthatmorningIhadnotexpectedsosoontheresultthatwasthentakingplace,andconsequentlywasinroughgarb.Iwaswithoutasword,asIusuallywaswhenonhorsebackonthefield,andworeasoldier'sblouseforacoat,withtheshoulderstrapsofmyranktoindicatetothearmywhoIwas.WhenIwentintothehouseIfoundGeneralLee.Wegreetedeachother,andaftershakinghandstookourseats.Ihadmystaffwithme,agoodportionofwhomwereintheroomduringthewholeoftheinterview.

WhatGeneralLee'sfeelingswereIdonotknow.Ashewasamanofmuchdignity,withanimpassibleface,itwasimpossibletosaywhetherhefeltinwardlygladthattheendhadfinallycome,orfeltsadovertheresult,andwastoomanlytoshowit.Whateverhisfeelings,theywereentirelyconcealedfrommyobservation;butmyownfeelings,whichhadbeenquitejubilantonthereceiptofhisletter,weresadanddepressed.Ifeltlikeanythingratherthanrejoicingatthedownfallofafoewhohadfoughtsolongandvaliantly,andhadsufferedsomuchforacause,thoughthatcausewas,Ibelieve,oneoftheworstforwhichapeopleeverfought,andoneforwhichtherewastheleastexcuse.Idonotquestion,however,thesincerityofthegreatmassofthosewhowereopposedtous.

GeneralLeewasdressedinafulluniformwhichwasentirelynew,andwaswearingaswordofconsiderablevalue,verylikelytheswordwhichhadbeenpresentedbytheStateofVirginia;atallevents,itwasanentirelydifferentswordfromtheonethatwouldordinarilybeworninthefield.Inmyroughtravelingsuit,theuniformofaprivatewiththestrapsofalieutenant-general,Imusthavecontrastedverystrangelywithamansohandsomelydressed,sixfeethighandoffaultlessform.ButthiswasnotamatterthatIthoughtofuntilafterwards.

Wesoonfellintoaconversationaboutoldarmytimes.Heremarkedthatherememberedmeverywellintheoldarmy;andItoldhimthatasamatterofcourseIrememberedhimperfectly,butfromthedifferenceinourrankandyears(therebeingaboutsixteenyears'differenceinourages),IhadthoughtitverylikelythatIhadnotattractedhisattentionsufficientlytoberememberedbyhimaftersuchalonginterval.OurconversationgrewsopleasantthatIalmostforgottheobjectofourmeeting.Aftertheconversationhadrunoninthisstyleforsometime,GeneralLeecalledmyattentiontotheobjectofourmeeting,andsaidthathehadaskedforthisinterviewforthepurposeofgettingfrommethetermsIproposedtogivehisarmy.IsaidthatImeantmerelythathisarmyshouldlaydowntheirarms,nottotakethemupagainduringthecontinuanceof

shouldlaydowntheirarms,nottotakethemupagainduringthecontinuanceofthewarunlessdulyandproperlyexchanged.Hesaidthathehadsounderstoodmyletter.

Thenwegraduallyfelloffagainintoconversationaboutmattersforeigntothesubjectwhichhadbroughtustogether.Thiscontinuedforsomelittletime,whenGeneralLeeagaininterruptedthecourseoftheconversationbysuggestingthatthetermsIproposedtogivehisarmyoughttobewrittenout.IcalledtoGeneralParker,secretaryonmystaff,forwritingmaterials,andcommencedwritingoutthefollowingterms:

APPOMATTOXC.H.,VA.,

Ap19th,1865.

GEN.R.E.LEE,Comd'gC.S.A.

GEN:Inaccordancewiththesubstanceofmylettertoyouofthe8thinst.,IproposetoreceivethesurrenderoftheArmyofN.Va.onthefollowingterms,towit:Rollsofalltheofficersandmentobemadeinduplicate.Onecopytobegiventoanofficerdesignatedbyme,theothertoberetainedbysuchofficerorofficersasyoumaydesignate.TheofficerstogivetheirindividualparolesnottotakeuparmsagainsttheGovernmentoftheUnitedStatesuntilproperlyexchanged,andeachcompanyorregimentalcommandersignalikeparoleforthemenoftheircommands.Thearms,artilleryandpublicpropertytobeparkedandstacked,andturnedovertotheofficerappointedbymetoreceivethem.Thiswillnotembracetheside-armsoftheofficers,northeirprivatehorsesorbaggage.Thisdone,eachofficerandmanwillbeallowedtoreturntotheirhomes,nottobedisturbedbyUnitedStatesauthoritysolongastheyobservetheirparolesandthelawsinforcewheretheymayreside.

Veryrespectfully,U.S.GRANT,Lt.Gen.

WhenIputmypentothepaperIdidnotknowthefirstwordthatIshouldmakeuseofinwritingtheterms.Ionlyknewwhatwasinmymind,andIwishedtoexpressitclearly,sothattherecouldbenomistakingit.AsIwroteon,thethoughtoccurredtomethattheofficershadtheirownprivatehorsesandeffects,whichwereimportanttothem,butofnovaluetous;alsothatitwouldbeanunnecessaryhumiliationtocalluponthemtodelivertheirsidearms.

unnecessaryhumiliationtocalluponthemtodelivertheirsidearms.

Noconversation,notoneword,passedbetweenGeneralLeeandmyself,eitheraboutprivateproperty,sidearms,orkindredsubjects.Heappearedtohavenoobjectionstothetermsfirstproposed;orifhehadapointtomakeagainstthemhewishedtowaituntiltheywereinwritingtomakeit.Whenhereadoverthatpartofthetermsaboutsidearms,horsesandprivatepropertyoftheofficers,heremarked,withsomefeeling,Ithought,thatthiswouldhaveahappyeffectuponhisarmy.

Then,afteralittlefurtherconversation,GeneralLeeremarkedtomeagainthattheirarmywasorganizedalittledifferentlyfromthearmyoftheUnitedStates(stillmaintainingbyimplicationthatweweretwocountries);thatintheirarmythecavalrymenandartilleristsownedtheirownhorses;andheaskedifhewastounderstandthatthemenwhosoownedtheirhorsesweretobepermittedtoretainthem.Itoldhimthatasthetermswerewrittentheywouldnot;thatonlytheofficerswerepermittedtotaketheirprivateproperty.Hethen,afterreadingoverthetermsasecondtime,remarkedthatthatwasclear.

IthensaidtohimthatIthoughtthiswouldbeaboutthelastbattleofthewar—Isincerelyhopedso;andIsaidfurtherItookitthatmostofthemenintheranksweresmallfarmers.Thewholecountryhadbeensoraidedbythetwoarmiesthatitwasdoubtfulwhethertheywouldbeabletoputinacroptocarrythemselvesandtheirfamiliesthroughthenextwinterwithouttheaidofthehorsestheywerethenriding.TheUnitedStatesdidnotwantthemandIwould,therefore,instructtheofficersIleftbehindtoreceivetheparolesofhistroopstoleteverymanoftheConfederatearmywhoclaimedtoownahorseormuletaketheanimaltohishome.Leeremarkedagainthatthiswouldhaveahappyeffect.

Hethensatdownandwroteoutthefollowingletter:

HEADQUARTERSARMYOFNORTHERNVIRGINIA,April9,1865.

GENERAL:—IreceivedyourletterofthisdatecontainingthetermsofthesurrenderoftheArmyofNorthernVirginiaasproposedbyyou.Astheyaresubstantiallythesameasthoseexpressedinyourletterofthe8thinst.,theyareaccepted.Iwillproceedtodesignatetheproperofficerstocarrythestipulationsintoeffect.

R.E.LEE,General.LIEUT.-GENERALU.S.GRANT.

R.E.LEE,General.LIEUT.-GENERALU.S.GRANT.

Whileduplicatesofthetwoletterswerebeingmade,theUniongeneralspresentwereseverallypresentedtoGeneralLee.

ThemuchtalkedofsurrenderingofLee'sswordandmyhandingitback,thisandmuchmorethathasbeensaidaboutitisthepurestromance.ThewordswordorsidearmswasnotmentionedbyeitherofusuntilIwroteitintheterms.Therewasnopremeditation,anditdidnotoccurtomeuntilthemomentIwroteitdown.IfIhadhappenedtoomitit,andGeneralLeehadcalledmyattentiontoit,IshouldhaveputitinthetermspreciselyasIaccededtotheprovisionaboutthesoldiersretainingtheirhorses.

GeneralLee,afterallwascompletedandbeforetakinghisleave,remarkedthathisarmywasinaverybadconditionforwantoffood,andthattheywerewithoutforage;thathismenhadbeenlivingforsomedaysonparchedcornexclusively,andthathewouldhavetoaskmeforrationsandforage.Itoldhim"certainly,"andaskedforhowmanymenhewantedrations.Hisanswerwas"abouttwenty-fivethousand;"andIauthorizedhimtosendhisowncommissaryandquartermastertoAppomattoxStation,twoorthreemilesaway,wherehecouldhave,outofthetrainswehadstopped,alltheprovisionswanted.Asforforage,wehadourselvesdependedalmostentirelyuponthecountryforthat.

GeneralsGibbon,GriffinandMerrittweredesignatedbymetocarryintoeffecttheparolingofLee'stroopsbeforetheyshouldstartfortheirhomes—GeneralLeeleavingGeneralsLongstreet,GordonandPendletonforthemtoconferwithinordertofacilitatethiswork.LeeandIthenseparatedascordiallyaswehadmet,hereturningtohisownlines,andallwentintobivouacforthenightatAppomattox.

SoonafterLee'sdepartureItelegraphedtoWashingtonasfollows:

HEADQUARTERSAPPOMATTOXC.H.,VA.,April9th,1865,4.30P.M.

HON.E.M.STANTON,SecretaryofWar,Washington.

GeneralLeesurrenderedtheArmyofNorthernVirginiathisafternoonontermsproposedbymyself.Theaccompanyingadditionalcorrespondencewillshowtheconditionsfully.

U.S.GRANT,Lieut.-General.

Whennewsofthesurrenderfirstreachedourlinesourmencommencedfiringasaluteofahundredgunsinhonorofthevictory.Iatoncesentword,however,tohaveitstopped.TheConfederateswerenowourprisoners,andwedidnotwanttoexultovertheirdownfall.

IdeterminedtoreturntoWashingtonatonce,withaviewtoputtingastoptothepurchaseofsupplies,andwhatInowdeemedotheruselessoutlayofmoney.Beforeleaving,however,IthoughtI(*44)wouldliketoseeGeneralLeeagain;sonextmorningIrodeoutbeyondourlinestowardshisheadquarters,precededbyabuglerandastaff-officercarryingawhiteflag.

Leesoonmountedhishorse,seeingwhoitwas,andmetme.Wehadtherebetweenthelines,sittingonhorseback,averypleasantconversationofoverhalfanhour,inthecourseofwhichLeesaidtomethattheSouthwasabigcountryandthatwemighthavetomarchoveritthreeorfourtimesbeforethewarentirelyended,butthatwewouldnowbeabletodoitastheycouldnolongerresistus.Heexpresseditashisearnesthope,however,thatwewouldnotbecalledupontocausemorelossandsacrificeoflife;buthecouldnotforetelltheresult.IthensuggestedtoGeneralLeethattherewasnotamanintheConfederacywhoseinfluencewiththesoldieryandthewholepeoplewasasgreatashis,andthatifhewouldnowadvisethesurrenderofallthearmiesIhadnodoubthisadvicewouldbefollowedwithalacrity.ButLeesaid,thathecouldnotdothatwithoutconsultingthePresidentfirst.Iknewtherewasnousetourgehimtodoanythingagainsthisideasofwhatwasright.

Iwasaccompaniedbymystaffandotherofficers,someofwhomseemedtohaveagreatdesiretogoinsidetheConfederatelines.TheyfinallyaskedpermissionofLeetodosoforthepurposeofseeingsomeoftheiroldarmyfriends,andthepermissionwasgranted.Theywentover,hadaverypleasanttimewiththeiroldfriends,andbroughtsomeofthembackwiththemwhentheyreturned.

WhenLeeandIseparatedhewentbacktohislinesandIreturnedtothehouseofMr.McLean.Heretheofficersofbotharmiescameingreatnumbers,andseemedtoenjoythemeetingasmuchasthoughtheyhadbeenfriendsseparatedforalongtimewhilefightingbattlesunderthesameflag.Forthetimebeingitlookedverymuchasifallthoughtofthewarhadescapedtheirminds.Afteran

lookedverymuchasifallthoughtofthewarhadescapedtheirminds.AfteranhourpleasantlypassedinthiswayIsetoutonhorseback,accompaniedbymystaffandasmallescort,forBurkesvilleJunction,uptowhichpointtherailroadhadbythistimebeenrepaired.

CHAPTERLXVIII.

MORALEOFTHETWOARMIES—RELATIVECONDITIONSOFTHENORTHANDSOUTH—PRESIDENTLINCOLNVISITSRICHMOND—ARRIVALATWASHINGTON—PRESIDENTLINCOLN'SASSASSINATION—PRESIDENTJOHNSON'SPOLICY.

AfterthefallofPetersburg,andwhenthearmiesofthePotomacandtheJameswereinmotiontoheadoffLee'sarmy,themoraleoftheNationaltroopshadgreatlyimproved.Therewasnomorestraggling,nomorerearguards.Themenwhoinformertimeshadbeenfallingback,werenow,asIhavealreadystated,strivingtogettothefront.Forthefirsttimeinfourwearyyearstheyfeltthattheywerenownearingthetimewhentheycouldreturntotheirhomeswiththeircountrysaved.Ontheotherhand,theConfederatesweremorethancorrespondinglydepressed.Theirdespondencyincreasedwitheachreturningday,andespeciallyafterthebattleofSailor'sCreek.Theythrewawaytheirarmsinconstantlyincreasingnumbers,droppingoutoftheranksandbetakingthemselvestothewoodsinthehopeofreachingtheirhomes.IhavealreadyinstancedthecaseoftheentiredisintegrationofaregimentwhosecolonelImetatFarmville.Asaresultoftheseandotherinfluences,whenLeefinallysurrenderedatAppomattox,therewereonly28,356officersandmenlefttobeparoled,andmanyofthesewerewithoutarms.Itwasprobablythislatterfactwhichgaverisetothestatementsometimesmade,NorthandSouth,thatLeesurrenderedasmallernumberofmenthanwhattheofficialfiguresshow.Asamatterofofficialrecord,andinadditiontothenumberparoledasgivenabove,wecapturedbetweenMarch29thandthedateofsurrender19,132Confederates,tosaynothingofLee'sotherlosses,killed,woundedandmissing,duringtheseriesofdesperateconflictswhichmarkedhisheadlonganddeterminedflight.Thesamerecordshowsthenumberofcannon,includingthoseatAppomattox,tohavebeen689betweenthedatesnamed.

Therehasalwaysbeenagreatconflictofopinionastothenumberoftroopsengagedineverybattle,orallimportantbattles,foughtbetweenthesections,theSouthmagnifyingthenumberofUniontroopsengagedandbelittlingtheirown.Northernwritershavefallen,inmanyinstances,intothesameerror.Ihaveoften

Northernwritershavefallen,inmanyinstances,intothesameerror.Ihaveoftenheardgentlemen,whowerethoroughlyloyaltotheUnion,speakofwhatasplendidfighttheSouthhadmadeandsuccessfullycontinuedforfouryearsbeforeyielding,withtheirtwelvemillionofpeopleagainstourtwenty,andofthetwelvefourbeingcoloredslaves,non-combatants.Iwilladdtotheirargument.WehadmanyregimentsofbraveandloyalmenwhovolunteeredundergreatdifficultyfromthetwelvemillionbelongingtotheSouth.

ButtheSouthhadrebelledagainsttheNationalgovernment.Itwasnotboundbyanyconstitutionalrestrictions.ThewholeSouthwasamilitarycamp.Theoccupationofthecoloredpeoplewastofurnishsuppliesforthearmy.Conscriptionwasresortedtoearly,andembracedeverymalefromtheageofeighteentoforty-five,excludingonlythosephysicallyunfittoserveinthefield,andthenecessarynumberofcivilofficersofStateandintendedNationalgovernment.Theoldandphysicallydisabledfurnishedagoodportionofthese.Theslaves,thenon-combatants,one-thirdofthewhole,wererequiredtoworkinthefieldwithoutregardtosex,andalmostwithoutregardtoage.Childrenfromtheageofeightyearscouldanddidhandlethehoe;theywerenotmucholderwhentheybegantoholdtheplough.Thefourmillionofcolorednon-combatantswereequaltomorethanthreetimestheirnumberintheNorth,ageforageandsexforsex,insupplyingfoodfromthesoiltosupportarmies.WomendidnotworkinthefieldsintheNorth,andchildrenattendedschool.

TheartsofpeacewerecarriedonintheNorth.Townsandcitiesgrewduringthewar.Inventionsweremadeinallkindsofmachinerytoincreasetheproductsofaday'slaborintheshop,andinthefield.IntheSouthnooppositionwasallowedtothegovernmentwhichhadbeensetupandwhichwouldhavebecomerealandrespectediftherebellionhadbeensuccessful.Norearhadtobeprotected.Allthetroopsinservicecouldbebroughttothefronttocontesteveryinchofgroundthreatenedwithinvasion.ThepressoftheSouth,likethepeoplewhoremainedathome,wereloyaltotheSoutherncause.

IntheNorth,thecountry,thetownsandthecitiespresentedaboutthesameappearancetheydointimeofpeace.Thefurnacewasinblast,theshopswerefilledwithworkmen,thefieldswerecultivated,notonlytosupplythepopulationoftheNorthandthetroopsinvadingtheSouth,buttoshipabroadtopayapartoftheexpenseofthewar.IntheNorththepresswasfreeuptothepointofopentreason.Thecitizencouldentertainhisviewsandexpressthem.TroopswerenecessaryintheNorthernStatestopreventprisonersfromtheSouthernarmybeingreleasedbyoutsideforce,armedandsetatlargetodestroybyfireourNortherncities.PlanswereformedbyNorthernandSoutherncitizenstoburn

Northerncities.PlanswereformedbyNorthernandSoutherncitizenstoburnourcities,topoisonthewatersupplyingthem,tospreadinfectionbyimportingclothingfrominfectedregions,toblowupourriverandlakesteamers—regardlessofthedestructionofinnocentlives.Thecopperheaddisreputableportionofthepressmagnifiedrebelsuccesses,andbelittledthoseoftheUnionarmy.Itwas,withalargefollowing,anauxiliarytotheConfederatearmy.TheNorthwouldhavebeenmuchstrongerwithahundredthousandofthesemenintheConfederateranksandtherestoftheirkindthoroughlysubdued,astheUnionsentimentwasintheSouth,thanwewereasthebattlewasfought.

AsIhavesaid,thewholeSouthwasamilitarycamp.Thecoloredpeople,fourmillioninnumber,weresubmissive,andworkedinthefieldandtookcareofthefamilieswhiletheable-bodiedwhitemenwereatthefrontfightingforacausedestinedtodefeat.Thecausewaspopular,andwasenthusiasticallysupportedbytheyoungmen.Theconscriptiontookallofthem.Beforethewarwasover,furtherconscriptionstookthosebetweenfourteenandeighteenyearsofageasjuniorreserves,andthosebetweenforty-fiveandsixtyasseniorreserves.Itwouldhavebeenanoffence,directlyafterthewar,andperhapsitwouldbenow,toaskanyable-bodiedmanintheSouth,whowasbetweentheagesoffourteenandsixtyatanytimeduringthewar,whetherhehadbeenintheConfederatearmy.Hewouldassertthathehad,oraccountforhisabsencefromtheranks.UndersuchcircumstancesitishardtoconceivehowtheNorthshowedsuchasuperiorityofforceineverybattlefought.Iknowtheydidnot.

During1862and'3,JohnH.Morgan,apartisanofficer,ofnomilitaryeducation,butpossessedofcourageandendurance,operatedintherearoftheArmyoftheOhioinKentuckyandTennessee.Hehadnobaseofsuppliestoprotect,butwasathomewhereverhewent.ThearmyoperatingagainsttheSouth,onthecontrary,hadtoprotectitslinesofcommunicationwiththeNorth,fromwhichallsupplieshadtocometothefront.Everyfootofroadhadtobeguardedbytroopsstationedatconvenientdistancesapart.Theseguardscouldnotrenderassistancebeyondthepointswherestationed.MorganWasfoot-looseandcouldoperatewhere,hisinformation—alwayscorrect—ledhimtobelievehecoulddothegreatestdamage.Duringthetimehewasoperatinginthiswayhekilled,woundedandcapturedseveraltimesthenumberheeverhadunderhiscommandatanyonetime.Hedestroyedmanymillionsofpropertyinaddition.Placeshedidnotattackhadtobeguardedasifthreatenedbyhim.Forrest,anablersoldier,operatedfartherwest,andheldfromtheNationalfrontquiteasmanymenascouldbesparedforoffensiveoperations.ItissafetosaythatmorethanhalftheNationalarmywasengagedinguardinglinesofsupplies,orwereonleave,sick

Nationalarmywasengagedinguardinglinesofsupplies,orwereonleave,sickinhospitalorondetailwhichpreventedtheirbearingarms.Then,again,largeforceswereemployedwherenoConfederatearmyconfrontedthem.IdeemitsafetosaythattherewerenolargeengagementswheretheNationalnumberscompensatedfortheadvantageofpositionandintrenchmentoccupiedbytheenemy.

WhileIwasinpursuitofGeneralLee,thePresidentwenttoRichmondincompanywithAdmiralPorter,andonboardhisflagship.Hefoundthepeopleofthatcityingreatconsternation.Theleadingcitizensamongthepeoplewhohadremainedathomesurroundedhim,anxiousthatsomethingshouldbedonetorelievethemfromsuspense.GeneralWeitzelwasnottheninthecity,havingtakenofficesinoneoftheneighboringvillagesafterhistroopshadsucceededinsubduingtheconflagrationwhichtheyhadfoundinprogressonenteringtheConfederatecapital.ThePresidentsentforhim,and,onhisarrival,ashortinterviewwashadonboardthevessel,AdmiralPorterandaleadingcitizenofVirginiabeingalsopresent.AfterthisinterviewthePresidentwroteanorderinaboutthesewords,whichIquotefrommemory:"GeneralWeitzelisauthorizedtopermitthebodycallingitselftheLegislatureofVirginiatomeetforthepurposeofrecallingtheVirginiatroopsfromtheConfederatearmies."

Immediatelysomeofthegentlemencomposingthatbodywroteoutacallforameetingandhaditpublishedintheirpapers.Thiscall,however,wentverymuchfurtherthanMr.Lincolnhadcontemplated,ashedidnotsaythe"LegislatureofVirginia"but"thebodywhichcalleditselftheLegislatureofVirginia."Mr.StantonsawthecallaspublishedintheNorthernpaperstheverynextissueandtookthelibertyofcountermandingtheorderauthorizinganymeetingoftheLegislature,oranyotherbody,andthisnotwithstandingthefactthatthePresidentwasnearerthespotthanhewas.

ThiswascharacteristicofMr.Stanton.Hewasamanwhoneverquestionedhisownauthority,andwhoalwaysdidinwartimewhathewantedtodo.Hewasanableconstitutionallawyerandjurist;buttheConstitutionwasnotanimpedimenttohimwhilethewarlasted.InthislatterparticularIentirelyagreewiththeviewheevidentlyheld.TheConstitutionwasnotframedwithaviewtoanysuchrebellionasthatof1861-5.Whileitdidnotauthorizerebellionitmadenoprovisionagainstit.Yettherighttoresistorsuppressrebellionisasinherentastherightofself-defence,andasnaturalastherightofanindividualtopreservehislifewheninjeopardy.TheConstitutionwasthereforeinabeyanceforthetimebeing,sofarasitinanywayaffectedtheprogressandterminationofthe

timebeing,sofarasitinanywayaffectedtheprogressandterminationofthewar.

ThoseinrebellionagainstthegovernmentoftheUnitedStateswerenotrestrictedbyconstitutionalprovisions,oranyother,excepttheactsoftheirCongress,whichwasloyalanddevotedtothecauseforwhichtheSouthwasthenfighting.Itwouldbeahardcasewhenone-thirdofanation,unitedinrebellionagainstthenationalauthority,isentirelyuntrammeled,thattheothertwo-thirds,intheireffortstomaintaintheUnionintact,shouldberestrainedbyaConstitutionpreparedbyourancestorsfortheexpresspurposeofinsuringthepermanencyoftheconfederationoftheStates.

AfterIleftGeneralLeeatAppomattoxStation,IwentwithmystaffandafewothersdirectlytoBurkesvilleStationonmywaytoWashington.TheroadfromBurkesvillebackhavingbeennewlyrepairedandthegroundbeingsoft,thetraingotoffthetrackfrequently,and,asaresult,itwasaftermidnightoftheseconddaywhenIreachedCityPoint.AssoonaspossibleItookadispatch-boatthencetoWashingtonCity.

WhileinWashingtonIwasverybusyforatimeinpreparingthenecessaryordersforthenewstateofaffairs;communicatingwithmydifferentcommandersofseparatedepartments,bodiesoftroops,etc.Butbythe14thIwasprettywellthroughwiththiswork,soastobeabletovisitmychildren,whoweretheninBurlington,NewJersey,attendingschool.Mrs.GrantwaswithmeinWashingtonatthetime,andwewereinvitedbyPresidentandMrs.Lincolntoaccompanythemtothetheatreontheeveningofthatday.IrepliedtothePresident'sverbalinvitationtotheeffect,thatifwewereinthecitywewouldtakegreatpleasureinaccompanyingthem;butthatIwasveryanxioustogetawayandvisitmychildren,andifIcouldgetthroughmyworkduringthedayIshoulddoso.Ididgetthroughandstartedbytheeveningtrainonthe14th,sendingMr.Lincolnword,ofcourse,thatIwouldnotbeatthetheatre.

AtthattimetherailroadtoNewYorkenteredPhiladelphiaonBroadStreet;passengerswereconveyedinambulancestotheDelawareRiver,andthenferriedtoCamden,atwhichpointtheytookthecarsagain.WhenIreachedtheferry,ontheeastsideoftheCityofPhiladelphia,Ifoundpeopleawaitingmyarrivalthere;andalsodispatchesinformingmeoftheassassinationofthePresidentandMr.Seward,andoftheprobableassassinationoftheVicePresident,Mr.Johnson,andrequestingmyimmediatereturn.

Itwouldbeimpossibleformetodescribethefeelingthatovercamemeatthe

Itwouldbeimpossibleformetodescribethefeelingthatovercamemeatthenewsoftheseassassinations,moreespeciallytheassassinationofthePresident.Iknewhisgoodnessofheart,hisgenerosity,hisyieldingdisposition,hisdesiretohaveeverybodyhappy,andaboveallhisdesiretoseeallthepeopleoftheUnitedStatesenteragainuponthefullprivilegesofcitizenshipwithequalityamongall.IknewalsothefeelingthatMr.JohnsonhadexpressedinspeechesandconversationagainsttheSouthernpeople,andIfearedthathiscoursetowardsthemwouldbesuchastorepel,andmakethemunwillingcitizens;andiftheybecamesuchtheywouldremainsoforalongwhile.Ifeltthatreconstructionhadbeensetback,notellinghowfar.

IimmediatelyarrangedforgettingatraintotakemebacktoWashingtonCity;butMrs.Grantwaswithme;itwasaftermidnightandBurlingtonwasbutanhouraway.FindingthatIcouldaccompanyhertoourhouseandreturnaboutassoonastheywouldbereadytotakemefromthePhiladelphiastation,Iwentupwithherandreturnedimmediatelybythesamespecialtrain.ThejoythatIhadwitnessedamongthepeopleinthestreetandinpublicplacesinWashingtonwhenIleftthere,hadbeenturnedtogrief;thecitywasinrealityacityofmourning.IhavestatedwhatIbelievedthentheeffectofthiswouldbe,andmyjudgmentnowisthatIwasright.IbelievetheSouthwouldhavebeensavedfromverymuchofthehardnessoffeelingthatwasengenderedbyMr.Johnson'scoursetowardsthemduringthefirstfewmonthsofhisadministration.Bethisasitmay,Mr.Lincoln'sassassinationwasparticularlyunfortunatefortheentirenation.

Mr.Johnson'scoursetowardstheSouthdidengenderbitternessoffeeling.Hisdenunciationsoftreasonandhisever-readyremark,"Treasonisacrimeandmustbemadeodious,"wasrepeatedtoallthosemenoftheSouthwhocametohimtogetsomeassurancesofsafetysothattheymightgotoworkatsomethingwiththefeelingthatwhattheyobtainedwouldbesecuretothem.Heutteredhisdenunciationswithgreatvehemence,andastheywereaccompaniedwithnoassurancesofsafety,manySouthernersweredriventoapointalmostbeyondendurance.

ThePresidentoftheUnitedStatesis,inalargedegree,oroughttobe,arepresentativeofthefeeling,wishesandjudgmentofthoseoverwhomhepresides;andtheSouthernerswhoreadthedenunciationsofthemselvesandtheirpeoplemusthavecometotheconclusionthatheutteredthesentimentsoftheNorthernpeople;whereas,asamatteroffact,butfortheassassinationofMr.Lincoln,IbelievethegreatmajorityoftheNorthernpeople,andthesoldiersunanimously,wouldhavebeeninfavorofaspeedyreconstructionontermsthat

unanimously,wouldhavebeeninfavorofaspeedyreconstructionontermsthatwouldbetheleasthumiliatingtothepeoplewhohadrebelledagainsttheirgovernment.Theybelieved,Ihavenodoubt,asIdid,thatbesidesbeingthemildest,itwasalsothewisest,policy.

ThepeoplewhohadbeeninrebellionmustnecessarilycomebackintotheUnion,andbeincorporatedasanintegralpartofthenation.Naturallythenearertheywereplacedtoanequalitywiththepeoplewhohadnotrebelled,themorereconciledtheywouldfeelwiththeiroldantagonists,andthebettercitizenstheywouldbefromthebeginning.Theysurelywouldnotmakegoodcitizensiftheyfeltthattheyhadayokearoundtheirnecks.

IdonotbelievethatthemajorityoftheNorthernpeopleatthattimewereinfavorofnegrosuffrage.Theysupposedthatitwouldnaturallyfollowthefreedomofthenegro,butthattherewouldbeatimeofprobation,inwhichtheex-slavescouldpreparethemselvesfortheprivilegesofcitizenshipbeforethefullrightwouldbeconferred;butMr.Johnson,afteracompleterevolutionofsentiment,seemedtoregardtheSouthnotonlyasanoppressedpeople,butasthepeoplebestentitledtoconsiderationofanyofourcitizens.ThiswasmorethanthepeoplewhohadsecuredtoustheperpetuationoftheUnionwerepreparedfor,andtheybecamemoreradicalintheirviews.TheSouthernershadthemostpowerintheexecutivebranch,Mr.Johnsonhavinggonetotheirside;andwithacompactSouth,andsuchsympathyandsupportastheycouldgetfromtheNorth,theyfeltthattheywouldbeabletocontrolthenationatonce,andalreadymanyofthemactedasiftheythoughttheywereentitledtodoso.

ThusMr.Johnson,fightingCongressontheonehand,andreceivingthesupportoftheSouthontheother,droveCongress,whichwasoverwhelminglyrepublican,tothepassingoffirstonemeasureandthenanothertorestricthispower.TherebeingasolidSouthononesidethatwasinaccordwiththepoliticalpartyintheNorthwhichhadsympathizedwiththerebellion,itfinally,inthejudgmentofCongressandofthemajorityofthelegislaturesoftheStates,becamenecessarytoenfranchisethenegro,inallhisignorance.Inthiswork,IshallnotdiscussthequestionofhowfarthepolicyofCongressinthisparticularprovedawiseone.Itbecameanabsolutenecessity,however,becauseofthefoolhardinessofthePresidentandtheblindnessoftheSouthernpeopletotheirowninterest.Astomyself,whilestronglyfavoringthecoursethatwouldbetheleasthumiliatingtothepeoplewhohadbeeninrebellion,Igraduallyworkeduptothepointwhere,withthemajorityofthepeople,Ifavoredimmediateenfranchisement.

enfranchisement.

CHAPTERLXIX.

SHERMANANDJOHNSTON—JOHNSTON'SSURRENDERTOSHERMAN—CAPTUREOFMOBILE—WILSON'SEXPEDITION—CAPTUREOFJEFFERSONDAVIS—GENERALTHOMAS'SQUALITIES—ESTIMATEOFGENERALCANBY.

WhenIleftAppomattoxIorderedGeneralMeadetoproceedleisurelybacktoBurkesvilleStationwiththeArmyofthePotomacandtheArmyoftheJames,andtogointocampthereuntilfurtherordersfromme.GeneralJohnston,ashasbeenstatedbefore,wasinNorthCarolinaconfrontingGeneralSherman.Itcouldnotbeknownpositively,ofcourse,whetherJohnstonwouldsurrenderonthenewsofLee'ssurrender,thoughIsupposedhewould;andifhedidnot,BurkesvilleStationwasthenaturalpointfromwhichtomovetoattackhim.ThearmywhichIcouldhavesentagainsthimwassuperiortohis,andthatwithwhichShermanconfrontedhimwasalsosuperior;andbetweenthetwohewouldnecessarilyhavebeencrushed,ordrivenaway.WiththelossoftheircapitalandtheArmyofNorthernVirginiaitwasdoubtfulwhetherJohnston'smenwouldhavethespirittostand.Mybeliefwasthathewouldmakenosuchattempt;butIadoptedthiscourseasaprecautionagainstwhatmighthappen,howeverimprobable.

SimultaneouslywithmystartingfromCityPoint,IsentamessengertoNorthCarolinabyboatwithdispatchestoGeneralSherman,informinghimofthesurrenderofLeeandhisarmy;alsoofthetermswhichIhadgivenhim;andIauthorizedShermantogivethesametermstoJohnstonifthelatterchosetoacceptthem.ThecountryisfamiliarwiththetermsthatShermanagreedtoCONDITIONALLY,becausetheyembracedapoliticalquestionaswellasamilitaryoneandhewouldthereforehavetoconferwiththegovernmentbeforeagreeingtothemdefinitely.

GeneralShermanhadmetMr.LincolnatCityPointwhilevisitingtheretoconferwithmeaboutourfinalmovement,andknewwhatMr.LincolnhadsaidtothepeacecommissionerswhenhemetthematHamptonRoads,viz.:thatbeforehecouldenterintonegotiationswiththemtheywouldhavetoagreetotwopoints:onebeingthattheUnionshouldbepreserved,andtheotherthatslaveryshouldbeabolished;andiftheywerereadytoconcedethesetwopointshewasalmostreadytosignhisnametoablankpieceofpaperandpermitthem

hewasalmostreadytosignhisnametoablankpieceofpaperandpermitthemtofilloutthebalanceofthetermsuponwhichwewouldlivetogether.HehadalsoseennoticesinthenewspapersofMr.Lincoln'svisittoRichmond,andhadreadinthesamepapersthatwhiletherehehadauthorizedtheconveningoftheLegislatureofVirginia.

Shermanthought,nodoubt,inaddingtothetermsthatIhadmadewithgeneralLee,thathewasbutcarryingoutthewishesofthePresidentoftheUnitedStates.Butseeingthathewasgoingbeyondhisauthority,hemadeitapointthatthetermswereonlyconditional.Theysignedthemwiththisunderstanding,andagreedtoatruceuntilthetermscouldbesenttoWashingtonforapproval;ifapprovedbytheproperauthoritiesthere,theywouldthenbefinal;ifnotapproved,thenhewouldgiveduenotice,beforeresuminghostilities.Astheworldknows,Sherman,frombeingoneofthemostpopulargeneralsoftheland(Congresshavingevengonesofarastoproposeabillprovidingforasecondlieutenant-generalforthepurposeofadvancinghimtothatgrade),wasdenouncedbythePresidentandSecretaryofWarinverybitterterms.Somepeoplewentsofarastodenouncehimasatraitor—amostpreposteroustermtoapplytoamanwhohadrenderedsomuchserviceashehad,evensupposinghehadmadeamistakeingrantingsuchtermsashedidtoJohnstonandhisarmy.IfShermanhadtakenauthoritytosendJohnstonwithhisarmyhome,withtheirarmstobeputinthearsenalsoftheirownStates,withoutsubmittingthequestiontotheauthoritiesatWashington,thesuspicionsagainsthimmighthavesomefoundation.ButthefeelingagainstShermandiedoutveryrapidly,anditwasnotmanyweeksbeforehewasrestoredtothefullestconfidenceoftheAmericanpeople.

When,somedaysaftermyreturntoWashington,PresidentJohnsonandtheSecretaryofwarreceivedthetermswhichGeneralShermanhadforwardedforapproval,acabinetmeetingwasimmediatelycalledandIwassentfor.Thereseemedtobethegreatestconsternation,lestShermanwouldcommitthegovernmenttotermswhichtheywerenotwillingtoaccedetoandwhichhehadnorighttogrant.AmessagewentoutdirectingthetroopsintheSouthnottoobeyGeneralSherman.IwasorderedtoproceedatoncetoNorthCarolinaandtakechargeofmattertheremyself.OfcourseIstartedwithoutdelay,andreachedthereassoonaspossible.IrepairedtoRaleigh,whereShermanwas,asquietlyaspossible,hopingtoseehimwithoutevenhisarmylearningofmypresence.

WhenIarrivedIwenttoSherman'sheadquarters,andwewereatonceclosetedtogether.IshowedhimtheinstructionandordersunderwhichIvisitedhim.I

together.IshowedhimtheinstructionandordersunderwhichIvisitedhim.ItoldhimthatIwantedhimtonotifyGeneralJohnstonthatthetermswhichtheyhadconditionallyagreeduponhadnotbeenapprovedinWashington,andthathewasauthorizedtoofferthesametermsIhadgivenGeneralLee.IsentShermantodothishimself.Ididnotwishtheknowledgeofmypresencetobeknowntothearmygenerally;soIleftittoShermantonegotiatethetermsofthesurrendersolelybyhimself,andwithouttheenemyknowingthatIwasanywherenearthefield.AssoonaspossibleIstartedtogetaway,toleaveShermanquitefreeanduntrammelled.

AtGoldsboro',onmywayback,Imetamail,containingthelastnewspapers,andIfoundinthemindicationsofgreatexcitementintheNorthoverthetermsShermanhadgivenJohnston;andharshordersthathadbeenpromulgatedbythePresidentandSecretaryofWar.IknewthatShermanmustseethesepapers,andIfullyrealizedwhatgreatindignationtheywouldcausehim,thoughIdonotthinkhisfeelingscouldhavebeenmoreexcitedthanweremyown.Butlikethetrueandloyalsoldierthathewas,hecarriedouttheinstructionsIhadgivenhim,obtainedthesurrenderofJohnston'sarmy,andsettleddowninhiscampaboutRaleigh,toawaitfinalorders.

TherewerestillafewexpeditionsoutintheSouththatcouldnotbecommunicatedwith,andhadtobelefttoactaccordingtothejudgmentoftheirrespectivecommanders.WiththeseitwasimpossibletotellhowthenewsofthesurrenderofLeeandJohnston,ofwhichtheymusthaveheard,mightaffecttheirjudgmentastowhatwasbesttodo.

ThethreeexpeditionswhichIhadtriedsohardtogetofffromthecommandsofThomasandCanbydidfinallygetoff:oneunderCanbyhimself,againstMobile,lateinMarch;thatunderStonemanfromEastTennesseeonthe20th;andtheoneunderWilson,startingfromEastport,Mississippi,onthe22dofMarch.Theywerealleminentlysuccessful,butwithoutanygoodresult.Indeedmuchvaluablepropertywasdestroyedandmanyliveslostatatimewhenwewouldhavelikedtosparethem.Thewarwaspracticallyoverbeforetheirvictoriesweregained.Theyweresolateincommencingoperations,thattheydidnotholdanytroopsawaythatotherwisewouldhavebeenoperatingagainstthearmieswhichweregraduallyforcingtheConfederatearmiestoasurrender.TheonlypossiblegoodthatwemayhaveexperiencedfromtheseraidswasbyStoneman'sgettingnearLynchburgaboutthetimethearmiesofthePotomacandtheJameswereclosinginonLeeatAppomattox.

StonemanenteredNorthCarolinaandthenpushednorthtostriketheVirginiaandTennesseeRailroad.Hegotuponthatroad,destroyeditsbridgesatdifferentplacesandrenderedtheroaduselesstotheenemyuptowithinafewmilesofLynchburg.HisapproachcausedtheevacuationofthatcityaboutthetimewewereatAppomattox,andwasthecauseofacommotionweheardofthere.Hethenpushedsouth,andwasoperatingintherearofJohnston'sarmyaboutthetimethenegotiationsweregoingonbetweenShermanandJohnstonforthelatter'ssurrender.InthisraidStonemancapturedanddestroyedalargeamountofstores,whilefourteengunsandnearlytwothousandprisonerswerethetrophiesofhissuccess.

CanbyappearedbeforeMobileonthe27thofMarch.ThecityofMobilewasprotectedbytwoforts,besidesotherintrenchments—SpanishFort,ontheeastsideofthebay,andFortBlakely,northofthecity.Thesefortswereinvested.Onthenightofthe8thofApril,theNationaltroopshavingcarriedtheenemy'sworksatonepoint,SpanishFortwasevacuated;andonthe9th,theverydayofLee'ssurrender,Blakelywascarriedbyassault,withaconsiderablelosstous.Onthe11ththecitywasevacuated.

IhadtriedformorethantwoyearstohaveanexpeditionsentagainstMobilewhenitspossessionbyuswouldhavebeenofgreatadvantage.Itfinallycostlivestotakeitwhenitspossessionwasofnoimportance,andwhen,ifleftalone,itwouldwithinafewdayshavefallenintoourhandswithoutanybloodshedwhatever.

Wilsonmovedoutwithfull12,000men,wellequippedandwellarmed.Hewasanenergeticofficerandaccomplishedhisworkrapidly.Forrestwasinhisfront,butwithneitherhisold-timearmynorhisold-timeprestige.Henowhadprincipallyconscripts.Hisconscriptsweregenerallyoldmenandboys.Hehadafewthousandregularcavalryleft,butnotenoughtoevenretardmateriallytheprogressofWilson'scavalry.Selmafellonthe2dofApril,withalargenumberofprisonersandalargequantityofwarmaterial,machineshops,etc.,tobedisposedofbythevictors.Tuscaloosa,MontgomeryandWestPointfellinquicksuccession.Thesewereallimportantpointstotheenemybyreasonoftheirrailroadconnections,asdepotsofsupplies,andbecauseoftheirmanufactoriesofwarmaterial.Theywerefortifiedorintrenched,andtherewasconsiderablefightingbeforetheywerecaptured.Maconsurrenderedonthe21stofApril.HerenewswasreceivedofthenegotiationsforthesurrenderofJohnston'sarmy.WilsonbelongedtothemilitarydivisioncommandedbySherman,andofcoursewasboundbyhisterms.Thisstoppedallfighting.

wasboundbyhisterms.Thisstoppedallfighting.

GeneralRichardTaylorhadnowbecometheseniorConfederateofficerstillatlibertyeastoftheMississippiRiver,andonthe4thofMayhesurrenderedeverythingwithinthelimitsofthisextensivecommand.GeneralE.KirbySmithsurrenderedthetrans-Mississippidepartmentonthe26thofMay,leavingnootherConfederatearmyatlibertytocontinuethewar.

Wilson'sraidresultedinthecaptureofthefugitivepresidentofthedefunctconfederacybeforehegotoutofthecountry.ThisoccurredatIrwinsville,Georgia,onthe11thofMay.Formyself,andIbelieveMr.Lincolnsharedthefeeling,IwouldhavebeenverygladtohaveseenMr.Davissucceedinescaping,butforonereason:Ifearedthatifnotcaptured,hemightgetintothetrans-Mississippiregionandtheresetupamorecontractedconfederacy.Theyoungmennowoutofhomesandoutofemploymentmighthaveralliedunderhisstandardandprotractedthewaryetanotheryear.TheNorthernpeopleweretiredofthewar,theyweretiredofpilingupadebtwhichwouldbeafurthermortgageupontheirhomes.

Mr.Lincoln,Ibelieve,wantedMr.Davistoescape,becausehedidnotwishtodealwiththematterofhispunishment.Heknewtherewouldbepeopleclamoringforthepunishmentoftheex-Confederatepresident,forhightreason.Hethoughtbloodenoughhadalreadybeenspilledtoatoneforourwickednessasanation.Atalleventshedidnotwishtobethejudgetodecidewhethermoreshouldbeshedornot.Buthisownlifewassacrificedatthehandsofanassassinbeforetheex-presidentoftheConfederacywasaprisonerinthehandsofthegovernmentwhichhehadlentallhistalentandallhisenergiestodestroy.

Allthingsaresaidtobewiselydirected,andforthebestinterestofallconcerned.Thisreflectiondoesnot,however,abateintheslightestoursenseofbereavementintheuntimelylossofsogoodandgreatamanasAbrahamLincoln.

HewouldhaveproventhebestfriendtheSouthcouldhavehad,andsavedmuchofthewranglingandbitternessoffeelingbroughtoutbyreconstructionunderaPresidentwhoatfirstwishedtorevengehimselfuponSouthernmenofbettersocialstandingthanhimself,butwhostillsoughttheirrecognition,andinashorttimeconceivedtheideaandadvancedthepropositiontobecometheirMosestoleadthemtriumphantlyoutofalltheirdifficulties.

Thestoryofthelegislationenactedduringthereconstructionperiodtostaythe

ThestoryofthelegislationenactedduringthereconstructionperiodtostaythehandsofthePresidentistoofreshinthemindsofthepeopletobetoldnow.Muchofit,nodoubt,wasunconstitutional;butitwashopedthatthelawsenactedwouldservetheirpurposebeforethequestionofconstitutionalitycouldbesubmittedtothejudiciaryandadecisionobtained.Theselawsdidservetheirpurpose,andnowremain"adeadletter"uponthestatutebooksoftheUnitedStates,noonetakinginterestenoughinthemtogivethemapassingthought.

MuchwassaidatthetimeaboutthegarbMr.Daviswaswearingwhenhewascaptured.Icannotsettlethisquestionfrompersonalknowledgeofthefacts;butIhavebeenunderthebelief,frominformationgiventomebyGeneralWilsonshortlyaftertheevent,thatwhenMr.Davislearnedthathewassurroundedbyourcavalryhewasinhistentdressedinagentleman'sdressinggown.Naturallyenough,Mr.Daviswantedtoescape,andwouldnotreflectmuchhowthisshouldbeaccomplishedprovideditmightbedonesuccessfully.Ifcaptured,hewouldbenoordinaryprisoner.Herepresentedalltherewasofthathostilitytothegovernmentwhichhadcausedfouryearsofthebloodiestwar—andthemostcostlyinotherrespectsofwhichhistorymakesanyrecord.Everyonesupposedhewouldbetriedfortreasonifcaptured,andthathewouldbeexecuted.Hadhesucceededinmakinghisescapeinanydisguiseitwouldhavebeenadjudgedagoodthingafterwardsbyhisadmirers.

AsmyofficiallettersonfileintheWarDepartment,aswellasmyremarksinthisbook,reflectuponGeneralThomasbydwellingsomewhatuponhistardiness,itisduetomyself,aswellastohim,thatIgivemyestimateofhimasasoldier.ThesameremarkwillapplyalsointhecaseofGeneralCanby.IhadbeenatWestPointwithThomasoneyear,andhadknownhimlaterintheoldarmy.Hewasamanofcommandingappearance,slowanddeliberateinspeechandaction;sensible,honestandbrave.Hepossessedvaluablesoldierlyqualitiesinaneminentdegree.Hegainedtheconfidenceofallwhoservedunderhim,andalmosttheirlove.Thisimpliesaveryvaluablequality.Itisaqualitywhichcallsoutthemostefficientservicesofthetroopsservingunderthecommanderpossessingit.

Thomas'sdispositionsweredeliberatelymade,andalwaysgood.Hecouldnotbedrivenfromapointhewasgiventohold.Hewasnotasgood,however,inpursuitashewasinaction.IdonotbelievethathecouldeverhaveconductedSherman'sarmyfromChattanoogatoAtlantaagainstthedefencesandthecommanderguardingthatlinein1864.Ontheotherhand,ifithadbeengivenhimtoholdthelinewhichJohnstontriedtohold,neitherthatgeneralnor

himtoholdthelinewhichJohnstontriedtohold,neitherthatgeneralnorSherman,noranyotherofficercouldhavedoneitbetter.

Thomaswasavaluableofficer,whorichlydeserved,ashehasreceived,theplauditsofhiscountrymenforthepartheplayedinthegreattragedyof1861-5.

GeneralCanbywasanofficerofgreatmerit.Hewasnaturallystudious,andinclinedtothelaw.Therehavebeeninthearmybutveryfew,ifany,officerswhotookasmuchinterestinreadinganddigestingeveryactofCongressandeveryregulationforthegovernmentofthearmyashe.Hisknowledgegainedinthiswaymadehimamostvaluablestaffofficer,acapacityinwhichalmostallhisarmyserviceswererendereduptothetimeofhisbeingassignedtotheMilitaryDivisionoftheGulf.Hewasanexceedinglymodestofficer,thoughofgreattalentandlearning.Ipresumehisfeelingswhenfirstcalledupontocommandalargearmyagainstafortifiedcity,weresomewhatlikemyownwhenmarchingaregimentagainstGeneralThomasHarrisinMissouriin1861.Neitherofuswouldhavefelttheslightesttrepidationingoingintobattlewithsomeoneelsecommanding.HadCanbybeeninotherengagementsafterwards,hewould,Ihavenodoubt,haveadvancedwithoutanyfeararisingfromasenseoftheresponsibility.HewasafterwardskilledinthelavabedsofSouthernOregon,whileinpursuitofthehostileModocIndians.Hischaracterwasaspureashistalentandlearningweregreat.Hisserviceswerevaluableduringthewar,butprincipallyasabureauofficer.Ihavenoideathatitwasfromchoicethathisserviceswererenderedinanoffice,butbecauseofhissuperiorefficiencythere.

CHAPTERLXX.

THEENDOFTHEWAR—THEMARCHTOWASHINGTON—ONEOFLINCOLN'SANECDOTES—GRANDREVIEWATWASHINGTON—CHARACTERISTICSOFLINCOLNANDSTANTON—ESTIMATEOFTHEDIFFERENTCORPSCOMMANDERS.

Thingsbegantoquietdown,andasthecertaintythattherewouldbenomorearmedresistancebecameclearer,thetroopsinNorthCarolinaandVirginiawereorderedtomarchimmediatelytothecapital,andgointocampthereuntilmusteredout.SuitablegarrisonswereleftattheprominentplacesthroughouttheSouthtoinsureobediencetothelawsthatmightbeenactedforthegovernmentoftheseveralStates,andtoinsuresecuritytothelivesandpropertyofallclasses.Idonotknowhowfarthiswasnecessary,butIdeemeditnecessary,atthattime,thatsuchacourseshouldbepursued.Ithinknowthatthesegarrisons

thattime,thatsuchacourseshouldbepursued.Ithinknowthatthesegarrisonswerecontinuedaftertheyceasedtobeabsolutelyrequired;butitisnottobeexpectedthatsucharebellionaswasfoughtbetweenthesectionsfrom1861to1865couldterminatewithoutleavingmanyseriousapprehensionsinthemindofthepeopleastowhatshouldbedone.

ShermanmarchedhistroopsfromGoldsboro,uptoManchester,onthesouthsideoftheJamesRiver,oppositeRichmond,andthereputthemincamp,whilehewentbacktoSavannahtoseewhatthesituationwasthere.

Itwasduringthistripthatthelastoutragewascommitteduponhim.HalleckhadbeensenttoRichmondtocommandVirginia,andhadissuedordersprohibitingevenSherman'sowntroopsfromobeyinghis,Sherman's,orders.Shermanmetthepapersonhisreturn,containingthisorderofHalleck,andveryjustlyfeltindignantattheoutrage.OnhisarrivalatFortressMonroereturningfromSavannah,ShermanreceivedaninvitationfromHallecktocometoRichmondandbehisguest.Thisheindignantlyrefused,andinformedHalleck,furthermore,thathehadseenhisorder.Healsostatedthathewascominguptotakecommandofhistroops,andashemarchedthroughitwouldprobablybeaswellforHallecknottoshowhimself,becausehe(Sherman)wouldnotberesponsibleforwhatsomerashpersonmightdothroughindignationforthetreatmenthehadreceived.Verysoonafterthat,ShermanreceivedordersfrommetoproceedtoWashingtonCity,andtogointocamponthesouthsideofthecitypendingthemustering-outofthetroops.

TherewasnoincidentworthnotinginthemarchnorthwardfromGoldsboro,toRichmond,orinthatfromRichmondtoWashingtonCity.Thearmy,however,commandedbySherman,whichhadbeenengagedinallthebattlesoftheWestandhadmarchedfromtheMississippithroughtheSouthernStatestothesea,fromtheretoGoldsboro,andthencetoWashingtonCity,hadpassedovermanyofthebattle-fieldsoftheArmyofthePotomac,thushavingseen,toagreaterextentthananyotherbodyoftroops,theentiretheatreofthefouryears'warforthepreservationoftheUnion.

ThemarchofSherman'sarmyfromAtlantatotheseaandnorthtoGoldsboro,whileitwasnotaccompaniedwiththedangerthatwasanticipated,yetwasmagnificentinitsresults,andequallymagnificentinthewayitwasconducted.Ithadanimportantbearing,invariousways,uponthegreatobjectwehadinview,thatofclosingthewar.AlltheStateseastoftheMississippiRiveruptotheStateofGeorgia,hadfeltthehardshipsofthewar.Georgia,andSouthCarolina,andalmostallofNorthCarolina,uptothistime,hadbeenexempt

Carolina,andalmostallofNorthCarolina,uptothistime,hadbeenexemptfrominvasionbytheNorthernarmies,exceptupontheirimmediateseacoasts.TheirnewspapershadgivensuchanaccountofConfederatesuccess,thatthepeoplewhoremainedathomehadbeenconvincedthattheYankeeshadbeenwhippedfromfirsttolast,anddrivenfrompillartopost,andthatnowtheycouldhardlybeholdingoutforanyotherpurposethantofindawayoutofthewarwithhonortothemselves.

EvenduringthismarchofSherman'sthenewspapersinhisfrontwereproclaimingdailythathisarmywasnothingbetterthanamobofmenwhowerefrightenedoutoftheirwitsandhastening,panic-stricken,totrytogetunderthecoverofournavyforprotectionagainsttheSouthernpeople.Asthearmywasseenmarchingontriumphantly,however,themindsofthepeoplebecamedisabusedandtheysawthetruestateofaffairs.Inturntheybecamedisheartened,andwouldhavebeengladtosubmitwithoutcompromise.

Anothergreatadvantageresultingfromthismarch,andwhichwascalculatedtohastentheend,wasthefactthatthegreatstorehouseofGeorgiawasentirelycutofffromtheConfederatearmies.AsthetroopsadvancednorthfromSavannah,thedestructionoftherailroadsinSouthCarolinaandthesouthernpartofNorthCarolina,furthercutofftheirresourcesandleftthearmiesstillinVirginiaandNorthCarolinadependentforsuppliesuponaverysmallareaofcountry,alreadyverymuchexhaustedoffoodandforage.

Induetimethetwoarmies,onefromBurkesvilleJunctionandtheotherfromtheneighborhoodofRaleigh,NorthCarolina,arrivedandwentintocampneartheCapital,asdirected.Thetroopswerehardy,beinginuredtofatigue,andtheyappearedintheirrespectivecampsasreadyandfitfordutyastheyhadeverbeenintheirlives.Idoubtwhetheranequalbodyofmenofanynation,takethemmanforman,officerforofficer,wasevergottentogetherthatwouldhaveprovedtheirequalinagreatbattle.

ThearmiesofEuropearemachines;themenarebraveandtheofficerscapable;butthemajorityofthesoldiersinmostofthenationsofEuropearetakenfromaclassofpeoplewhoarenotveryintelligentandwhohaveverylittleinterestinthecontestinwhichtheyarecalledupontotakepart.Ourarmieswerecomposedofmenwhowereabletoread,menwhoknewwhattheywerefightingfor,andcouldnotbeinducedtoserveassoldiers,exceptinanemergencywhenthesafetyofthenationwasinvolved,andsonecessarilymusthavebeenmorethanequaltomenwhofoughtmerelybecausetheywerebraveandbecausetheywerethoroughlydrilledandinuredtohardships.

andbecausetheywerethoroughlydrilledandinuredtohardships.

TherewasnothingofparticularimportanceoccurredduringthetimethesetroopswereincampbeforestartingNorth.

IrememberonelittleincidentwhichIwillrelateasananecdotecharacteristicofMr.Lincoln.ItoccurredadayafterIreachedWashington,andaboutthetimeGeneralMeadereachedBurkesvillewiththearmy.GovernorSmithofVirginiahadleftRichmondwiththeConfederateStatesgovernment,andhadgonetoDanville.SupposingIwasnecessarilywiththearmyatBurkesville,headdressedalettertomethereinformingmethat,asgovernoroftheCommonwealthoftheStateofVirginia,hehadtemporarilyremovedtheStatecapitalfromRichmondtoDanville,andaskingifhewouldbepermittedtoperformthefunctionsofhisofficetherewithoutmolestationbytheFederalauthorities.Igivethisletteronlyinsubstance.Healsoinquiredofmewhetherincasehewasnotallowedtoperformthedutiesofhisoffice,hewithafewothersmightnotbepermittedtoleavethecountryandgoabroadwithoutinterference.GeneralMeadebeinginformedthataflagoftrucewasoutsidehispicketswithalettertome,atoncesentoutandhadtheletterbroughtinwithoutinformingtheofficerwhobroughtitthatIwasnotpresent.Hereadtheletterandtelegraphedmeitscontents.MeetingMr.Lincolnshortlyafterreceivingthisdispatch,Irepeateditscontentstohim.Mr.Lincoln,supposingIwasaskingforinstructions,said,inreplytothatpartofGovernorSmith'sletterwhichinquiredwhetherhewithafewfriendswouldbepermittedtoleavethecountryunmolested,thathispositionwaslikethatofacertainIrishman(givingthename)heknewinSpringfieldwhowasverypopularwiththepeople,amanofconsiderablepromise,andverymuchliked.Unfortunatelyhehadacquiredthehabitofdrinking,andhisfriendscouldseethatthehabitwasgrowingonhim.Thesefriendsdeterminedtomakeanefforttosavehim,andtodothistheydrewupapledgetoabstainfromallalcoholicdrinks.TheyaskedPattojointheminsigningthepledge,andheconsented.Hehadbeensolongoutofthehabitofusingplainwaterasabeveragethatheresortedtosoda-waterasasubstitute.Afterafewdaysthisbegantogrowdistastefultohim.Soholdingtheglassbehindhim,hesaid:"Doctor,couldn'tyoudropabitofbrandyinthatunbeknownsttomyself."

IdonotrememberwhattheinstructionswerethePresidentgaveme,butIknowthatGovernorSmithwasnotpermittedtoperformthedutiesofhisoffice.IalsoknowthatifMr.Lincolnhadbeenspared,therewouldhavebeennoeffortsmadetopreventanyonefromleavingthecountrywhodesiredtodoso.He

madetopreventanyonefromleavingthecountrywhodesiredtodoso.Hewouldhavebeenequallywillingtopermitthereturnofthesameexpatriatedcitizensaftertheyhadtimetorepentoftheirchoice.

Onthe18thofMayorderswereissuedbytheadjutant-generalforagrandreviewbythePresidentandhiscabinetofSherman'sandMeade'sarmies.Thereviewcommencedonthe23dandlastedtwodays.Meade'sarmyoccupiedoversixhoursofthefirstdayinpassingthegrandstandwhichhadbeenerectedinfrontofthePresident'shouse.ShermanwitnessedthisreviewfromthegrandstandwhichwasoccupiedbythePresidentandhiscabinet.HereheshowedhisresentmentforthecruelandharshtreatmentthathadunnecessarilybeeninflicteduponhimbytheSecretaryofWar,byrefusingtotakehisextendedhand.

Sherman'stroopshadbeenincamponthesouthsideofthePotomac.Duringthenightofthe23dhecrossedoverandbivouackednotfarfromtheCapitol.Promptlyatteno'clockonthemorningofthe24th,histroopscommencedtopassinreview.Sherman'sarmymadeadifferentappearancefromthatoftheArmyofthePotomac.ThelatterhadbeenoperatingwheretheyreceiveddirectlyfromtheNorthfullsuppliesoffoodandclothingregularly:thereviewofthisarmythereforewasthereviewofabodyof65,000well-drilled,well-disciplinedandorderlysoldiersinuredtohardshipandfitforanyduty,butwithouttheexperienceofgatheringtheirownfoodandsuppliesinanenemy'scountry,andofbeingeveronthewatch.Sherman'sarmywasnotsowell-dressedastheArmyofthePotomac,buttheirmarchingcouldnotbeexcelled;theygavetheappearanceofmenwhohadbeenthoroughlydrilledtoendurehardships,eitherbylongandcontinuousmarchesorthroughexposuretoanyclimate,withouttheordinaryshelterofacamp.TheyexhibitedalsosomeoftheorderofmarchthroughGeorgiawherethe"sweetpotatoessprungupfromtheground"asSherman'sarmywentmarchingthrough.Intherearofacompanytherewouldbeacapturedhorseormuleloadedwithsmallcookingutensils,capturedchickensandotherfoodpickedupfortheuseofthemen.Negrofamilieswhohadfollowedthearmywouldsometimescomealongintherearofacompany,withthreeorfourchildrenpackeduponasinglemule,andthemotherleadingit.

Thesightwasvariedandgrand:nearlyalldayfortwosuccessivedays,fromtheCapitoltotheTreasuryBuilding,couldbeseenamassoforderlysoldiersmarchingincolumnsofcompanies.TheNationalflagwasflyingfromalmosteveryhouseandstore;thewindowswerefilledwithspectators;thedoor-stepsandside-walkswerecrowdedwithcoloredpeopleandpoorwhiteswhodidnotsucceedinsecuringbetterquartersfromwhichtogetaviewofthegrandarmies.

succeedinsecuringbetterquartersfromwhichtogetaviewofthegrandarmies.ThecitywasaboutasfullofstrangerswhohadcometoseethesightsasitusuallyisoninaugurationdaywhenanewPresidenttakeshisseat.

ItmaynotbeoutofplacetoagainalludetoPresidentLincolnandtheSecretaryofWar,Mr.Stanton,whowerethegreatconspicuousfiguresintheexecutivebranchofthegovernment.Thereisnogreatdifferenceofopinionnow,inthepublicmind,astothecharacteristicsofthePresident.WithMr.Stantonthecaseisdifferent.Theyweretheveryoppositeofeachotherinalmosteveryparticular,exceptthateachpossessedgreatability.Mr.Lincolngainedinfluenceovermenbymakingthemfeelthatitwasapleasuretoservehim.Hepreferredyieldinghisownwishtogratifyothers,ratherthantoinsistuponhavinghisownway.Itdistressedhimtodisappointothers.Inmattersofpublicduty,however,hehadwhathewished,butintheleastoffensiveway.Mr.Stantonneverquestionedhisownauthoritytocommand,unlessresisted.Hecarednothingforthefeelingofothers.Infactitseemedtobepleasantertohimtodisappointthantogratify.Hefeltnohesitationinassumingthefunctionsoftheexecutive,orinactingwithoutadvisingwithhim.Ifhisactwasnotsustained,hewouldchangeit—ifhesawthematterwouldbefollowedupuntilhedidso.

Itwasgenerallysupposedthatthesetwoofficialsformedthecomplementofeachother.TheSecretarywasrequiredtopreventthePresident'sbeingimposedupon.ThePresidentwasrequiredinthemoreresponsibleplaceofseeingthatinjusticewasnotdonetoothers.Idonotknowthatthisviewofthesetwomenisstillentertainedbythemajorityofthepeople.Itisnotacorrectview,however,inmyestimation.Mr.Lincolndidnotrequireaguardiantoaidhiminthefulfilmentofapublictrust.

Mr.Lincolnwasnottimid,andhewaswillingtotrusthisgeneralsinmakingandexecutingtheirplans.TheSecretarywasverytimid,anditwasimpossibleforhimtoavoidinterferingwiththearmiescoveringthecapitalwhenitwassoughttodefenditbyanoffensivemovementagainstthearmyguardingtheConfederatecapital.Hecouldseeourweakness,buthecouldnotseethattheenemywasindanger.TheenemywouldnothavebeenindangerifMr.Stantonhadbeeninthefield.ThesecharacteristicsofthetwoofficialswereclearlyshownshortlyafterEarlycamesoneargettingintothecapital.

AmongthearmyandcorpscommanderswhoservedwithmeduringthewarbetweentheStates,andwhoattractedmuchpublicattention,butofwhoseabilityassoldiersIhavenotyetgivenanyestimate,areMeade,Hancock,Sedgwick,

assoldiersIhavenotyetgivenanyestimate,areMeade,Hancock,Sedgwick,Burnside,TerryandHooker.Therewereothersofgreatmerit,suchasGriffin,Humphreys,WrightandMackenzie.Ofthosefirstnamed,BurnsideatonetimehadcommandoftheArmyofthePotomac,andlateroftheArmyoftheOhio.HookeralsocommandedtheArmyofthePotomacforashorttime.

GeneralMeadewasanofficerofgreatmerit,withdrawbackstohisusefulnessthatwerebeyondhiscontrol.Hehadbeenanofficeroftheengineercorpsbeforethewar,andconsequentlyhadneverservedwithtroopsuntilhewasoverforty-sixyearsofage.Heneverhad,Ibelieve,acommandoflessthanabrigade.Hesawclearlyanddistinctlythepositionoftheenemy,andthetopographyofthecountryinfrontofhisownposition.Hisfirstideawastotakeadvantageofthelayoftheground,sometimeswithoutreferencetothedirectionwewantedtomoveafterwards.Hewassubordinatetohissuperiorsinranktotheextentthathecouldexecuteanorderwhichchangedhisownplanswiththesamezealhewouldhavedisplayediftheplanhadbeenhisown.Hewasbraveandconscientious,andcommandedtherespectofallwhoknewhim.Hewasunfortunatelyofatemperthatwouldgetbeyondhiscontrol,attimes,andmakehimspeaktoofficersofhighrankinthemostoffensivemanner.Noonesawthisfaultmoreplainlythanhehimself,andnooneregretteditmore.Thismadeitunpleasantattimes,eveninbattle,forthosearoundhimtoapproachhimevenwithinformation.Inspiteofthisdefecthewasamostvaluableofficeranddeservesahighplaceintheannalsofhiscountry.

GeneralBurnsidewasanofficerwhowasgenerallylikedandrespected.Hewasnot,however,fittedtocommandanarmy.Nooneknewthisbetterthanhimself.Healwaysadmittedhisblunders,andextenuatedthoseofofficersunderhimbeyondwhattheywereentitledto.Itwashardlyhisfaultthathewaseverassignedtoaseparatecommand.

OfHookerIsawbutlittleduringthewar.Ihadknownhimverywellbefore,however.WhereIdidseehim,atChattanooga,hisachievementinbringinghiscommandaroundthepointofLookoutMountainandintoChattanoogaValleywasbrilliant.Ineverthelessregardedhimasadangerousman.Hewasnotsubordinatetohissuperiors.Hewasambitioustotheextentofcaringnothingfortherightsofothers.Hisdispositionwas,whenengagedinbattle,togetdetachedfromthemainbodyofthearmyandexerciseaseparatecommand,gatheringtohisstandardallhecouldofhisjuniors.

Hancockstandsthemostconspicuousfigureofallthegeneralofficerswhodidnotexerciseaseparatecommand.Hecommandedacorpslongerthananyother

notexerciseaseparatecommand.Hecommandedacorpslongerthananyotherone,andhisnamewasnevermentionedashavingcommittedinbattleablunderforwhichhewasresponsible.Hewasamanofveryconspicuouspersonalappearance.Tall,well-formedand,atthetimeofwhichInowwrite,youngandfresh-looking,hepresentedanappearancethatwouldattracttheattentionofanarmyashepassed.Hisgenialdispositionmadehimfriends,andhispersonalcourageandhispresencewithhiscommandinthethickestofthefightwonforhimtheconfidenceoftroopsservingunderhim.Nomatterhowhardthefight,the2dcorpsalwaysfeltthattheircommanderwaslookingafterthem.

SedgwickwaskilledatSpottsylvaniabeforeIhadanopportunityofforminganestimateofhisqualificationsasasoldierfrompersonalobservation.IhadknownhiminMexicowhenbothofuswerelieutenants,andwhenourservicegavenoindicationthateitherofuswouldeverbeequaltothecommandofabrigade.Hestoodveryhighinthearmy,however,asanofficerandaman.Hewasbraveandconscientious.Hisambitionwasnotgreat,andheseemedtodreadresponsibility.Hewaswillingtodoanyamountofbattling,butalwayswantedsomeoneelsetodirect.HedeclinedthecommandoftheArmyofthePotomaconce,ifnotoftener.

GeneralAlfredH.Terrycameintothearmyasavolunteerwithoutamilitaryeducation.Hiswaywaswonwithoutpoliticalinfluenceuptoanimportantseparatecommand—theexpeditionagainstFortFisher,inJanuary,1865.Hissuccesstherewasmostbrilliant,andwonforhimtherankofbrigadier-generalintheregulararmyandofmajor-generalofvolunteers.Heisamanwhomakesfriendsofthoseunderhimbyhisconsiderationoftheirwantsandtheirdues.Asacommander,hewontheirconfidencebyhiscoolnessinactionandbyhisclearnessofperceptionintakinginthesituationunderwhichhewasplacedatanygiventime.

Griffin,Humphreys,andMackenzieweregoodcorpscommanders,butcameintothatpositionsoneartothecloseofthewarasnottoattractpublicattention.Allthreeservedassuch,inthelastcampaignofthearmiesofthePotomacandtheJames,whichculminatedatAppomattoxCourtHouse,onthe9thofApril,1865.Thesuddencollapseoftherebellionmonopolizedattentiontotheexclusionofalmosteverythingelse.IregardedMackenzieasthemostpromisingyoungofficerinthearmy.GraduatingatWestPoint,ashedid,duringthesecondyearofthewar,hehadwonhiswayuptothecommandofacorpsbeforeitsclose.Thishediduponhisownmeritandwithoutinfluence.

CONCLUSION.

ThecauseofthegreatWaroftheRebellionagainsttheUnitedStatuswillhavetobeattributedtoslavery.Forsomeyearsbeforethewarbeganitwasatritesayingamongsomepoliticiansthat"Astatehalfslaveandhalffreecannotexist."Allmustbecomeslaveorallfree,orthestatewillgodown.Itooknopartmyselfinanysuchviewofthecaseatthetime,butsincethewarisover,reviewingthewholequestion,Ihavecometotheconclusionthatthesayingisquitetrue.

Slaverywasaninstitutionthatrequiredunusualguaranteesforitssecuritywhereveritexisted;andinacountrylikeourswherethelargerportionofitwasfreeterritoryinhabitedbyanintelligentandwell-to-dopopulation,thepeoplewouldnaturallyhavebutlittlesympathywithdemandsuponthemforitsprotection.HencethepeopleoftheSouthweredependentuponkeepingcontrolofthegeneralgovernmenttosecuretheperpetuationoftheirfavoriteinstitution.TheywereenabledtomaintainthiscontrollongaftertheStateswhereslaveryexistedhadceasedtohavethecontrollingpower,throughtheassistancetheyreceivedfromoddmenhereandtherethroughouttheNorthernStates.Theysawtheirpowerwaning,andthisledthemtoencroachupontheprerogativesandindependenceoftheNorthernStatesbyenactingsuchlawsastheFugitiveSlaveLaw.BythislaweveryNorthernmanwasobliged,whenproperlysummoned,toturnoutandhelpapprehendtherunawayslaveofaSouthernman.Northernmarshalsbecameslave-catchers,andNortherncourtshadtocontributetothesupportandprotectionoftheinstitution.

ThiswasadegradationwhichtheNorthwouldnotpermitanylongerthanuntiltheycouldgetthepowertoexpungesuchlawsfromthestatutebooks.PriortothetimeoftheseencroachmentsthegreatmajorityofthepeopleoftheNorthhadnoparticularquarrelwithslavery,solongastheywerenotforcedtohaveitthemselves.ButtheywerenotwillingtoplaytheroleofpolicefortheSouthintheprotectionofthisparticularinstitution.

Intheearlydaysofthecountry,beforewehadrailroads,telegraphsandsteamboats—inaword,rapidtransitofanysort—theStateswereeachalmostaseparatenationality.Atthattimethesubjectofslaverycausedbutlittleornodisturbancetothepublicmind.Butthecountrygrew,rapidtransitwasestablished,andtradeandcommercebetweentheStatesgottobesomuchgreaterthanbefore,thatthepoweroftheNationalgovernmentbecamemorefeltandrecognizedand,therefore,hadtobeenlistedinthecauseofthisinstitution.

andrecognizedand,therefore,hadtobeenlistedinthecauseofthisinstitution.

Itisprobablywellthatwehadthewarwhenwedid.Wearebetteroffnowthanwewouldhavebeenwithoutit,andhavemademorerapidprogressthanweotherwiseshouldhavemade.ThecivilizednationsofEuropehavebeenstimulatedintounusualactivity,sothatcommerce,trade,travel,andthoroughacquaintanceamongpeopleofdifferentnationalities,hasbecomecommon;whereas,before,itwasbutthefewwhohadeverhadtheprivilegeofgoingbeyondthelimitsoftheirowncountryorwhoknewanythingaboutotherpeople.Then,too,ourrepublicaninstitutionswereregardedasexperimentsuptothebreakingoutoftherebellion,andmonarchicalEuropegenerallybelievedthatourrepublicwasaropeofsandthatwouldpartthemomenttheslighteststrainwasbroughtuponit.Nowithasshownitselfcapableofdealingwithoneofthegreatestwarsthatwasevermade,andourpeoplehaveproventhemselvestobethemostformidableinwarofanynationality.

Butthiswarwasafearfullesson,andshouldteachusthenecessityofavoidingwarsinthefuture.

TheconductofsomeoftheEuropeanstatesduringourtroublesshowsthelackofconscienceofcommunitieswheretheresponsibilitydoesnotcomeuponasingleindividual.Seeinganationthatextendedfromoceantoocean,embracingthebetterpartofacontinent,growingasweweregrowinginpopulation,wealthandintelligence,theEuropeannationsthoughtitwouldbewelltogiveusacheck.Wemight,possibly,afterawhilethreatentheirpeace,or,atleast,theperpetuityoftheirinstitutions.Hence,EnglandwasconstantlyfindingfaultwiththeadministrationatWashingtonbecausewewerenotabletokeepupaneffectiveblockade.Shealsojoined,atfirst,withFranceandSpaininsettingupanAustrianprinceuponthethroneinMexico,totallydisregardinganyrightsorclaimsthatMexicohadofbeingtreatedasanindependentpower.Itistruetheytrumpedupgrievancesasapretext,buttheywereonlypretextswhichcanalwaysbefoundwhenwanted.

Mexico,inhervariousrevolutions,hadbeenunabletogivethatprotectiontothesubjectsofforeignnationswhichshewouldhavelikedtogive,andsomeofherrevolutionaryleadershadforcedloansfromthem.Underpretenceofprotectingtheircitizens,thesenationsseizeduponMexicoasafootholdforestablishingaEuropeanmonarchyuponourcontinent,thusthreateningourpeaceathome.I,myself,regardedthisasadirectactofwaragainsttheUnitedStatesbythepowersengaged,andsupposedasamatterofcoursethattheUnitedStateswouldtreatitassuchwhentheirhandswerefreetostrike.Ioftenspokeofthematterto

treatitassuchwhentheirhandswerefreetostrike.IoftenspokeofthemattertoMr.LincolnandtheSecretaryofWar,butneverheardanyspecialviewsfromthemtoenablemetojudgewhattheythoughtorfeltaboutit.IinferredthattheyfeltagooddealasIdid,butwereunwillingtocommitthemselveswhilewehadourowntroublesuponourhands.

AllofthepowersexceptFranceverysoonwithdrewfromthearmedinterventionfortheestablishmentofanAustrianprinceuponthethroneofMexico;butthegoverningpeopleofthesecountriescontinuedtothecloseofthewartothrowobstaclesinourway.AfterthesurrenderofLee,therefore,entertainingtheopinionhereexpressed,IsentSheridanwithacorpstotheRioGrandetohavehimwherehemightaidJuarezinexpellingtheFrenchfromMexico.Thesetroopsgotoffbeforetheycouldbestopped;andwenttotheRioGrande,whereSheridandistributedthemupanddowntheriver,muchtotheconsternationofthetroopsinthequarterofMexicoborderingonthatstream.ThissoonledtoarequestfromFrancethatweshouldwithdrawourtroopsfromtheRioGrandeandtonegotiationsforthewithdrawaloftheirs.FinallyBazainewaswithdrawnfromMexicobyorderoftheFrenchGovernment.Fromthatdaytheempirebegantototter.Mexicowasthenabletomaintainherindependencewithoutaidfromus.

FranceisthetraditionalallyandfriendoftheUnitedStates.IdidnotblameFranceforherpartintheschemetoerectamonarchyupontheruinsoftheMexicanRepublic.Thatwastheschemeofoneman,animitatorwithoutgeniusormerit.Hehadsucceededinstealingthegovernmentofhiscountry,andmadeachangeinitsformagainstthewishesandinstinctsofhispeople.HetriedtoplaythepartofthefirstNapoleon,withouttheabilitytosustainthatrole.Hesoughtbynewconqueststoaddtohisempireandhisglory;butthesignalfailureofhisschemeofconquestwastheprecursorofhisownoverthrow.

LikeourownwarbetweentheStates,theFranco-Prussianwarwasanexpensiveone;butitwasworthtoFranceallitcostherpeople.ItwasthecompletionofthedownfallofNapoleonIII.Thebeginningwaswhenhelandedtroopsonthiscontinent.Failinghere,theprestigeofhisname—alltheprestigeheeverhad—wasgone.Hemustachieveasuccessorfall.Hetriedtostrikedownhisneighbor,Prussia—andfell.

IneveradmiredthecharacterofthefirstNapoleon;butIrecognizehisgreatgenius.Hiswork,too,hasleftitsimpressforgoodonthefaceofEurope.ThethirdNapoleoncouldhavenoclaimtohavingdoneagoodorjustact.

thirdNapoleoncouldhavenoclaimtohavingdoneagoodorjustact.

Tomaintainpeaceinthefutureitisnecessarytobepreparedforwar.Therecanscarcelybeapossiblechanceofaconflict,suchasthelastone,occurringamongourownpeopleagain;but,growingasweare,inpopulation,wealthandmilitarypower,wemaybecometheenvyofnationswhichledusinalltheseparticularsonlyafewyearsago;andunlesswearepreparedforitwemaybeindangerofacombinedmovementbeingsomedaymadetocrushusout.Now,scarcelytwentyyearsafterthewar,weseemtohaveforgottenthelessonsittaught,andaregoingonasifinthegreatestsecurity,withoutthepowertoresistaninvasionbythefleetsoffourth-rateEuropeanpowersforatimeuntilwecouldprepareforthem.

Weshouldhaveagoodnavy,andoursea-coastdefencesshouldbeputinthefinestpossiblecondition.Neitherofthesecostmuchwhenitisconsideredwherethemoneygoes,andwhatwegetinreturn.Moneyexpendedinafinenavy,notonlyaddstooursecurityandtendstopreventwarinthefuture,butisverymaterialaidtoourcommercewithforeignnationsinthemeantime.Moneyspentuponsea-coastdefencesisspentamongourownpeople,andallgoesbackagainamongthepeople.Theworkaccomplished,too,likethatofthenavy,givesusafeelingofsecurity.

England'scoursetowardstheUnitedStatesduringtherebellionexasperatedthepeopleofthiscountryverymuchagainstthemothercountry.Iregrettedit.EnglandandtheUnitedStatesarenaturalallies,andshouldbethebestoffriends.Theyspeakonelanguage,andarerelatedbybloodandotherties.Wetogether,oreveneitherseparately,arebetterqualifiedthananyotherpeopletoestablishcommercebetweenallthenationalitiesoftheworld.

Englandgovernsherowncolonies,andparticularlythoseembracingthepeopleofdifferentracesfromherown,betterthananyothernation.Sheisjusttotheconquered,butrigid.Shemakesthemself-supporting,butgivesthebenefitoflabortothelaborer.Shedoesnotseemtolookuponthecoloniesasoutsidepossessionswhichsheisatlibertytoworkforthesupportandaggrandizementofthehomegovernment.

ThehostilityofEnglandtotheUnitedStatesduringourrebellionwasnotsomuchrealasitwasapparent.Itwasthehostilityoftheleadersofonepoliticalparty.IamtoldthattherewasnotimeduringthecivilwarwhentheywereabletogetupinEnglandademonstrationinfavorofsecession,whilethesewereconstantlybeinggottenupinfavoroftheUnion,or,astheycalledit,infavorof

constantlybeinggottenupinfavoroftheUnion,or,astheycalledit,infavoroftheNorth.EveninManchester,whichsufferedsofearfullybyhavingthecottoncutofffromhermills,theyhadamonsterdemonstrationinfavoroftheNorthattheverytimewhentheirworkmenwerealmostfamishing.

Itispossiblethatthequestionofaconflictbetweenracesmaycomeupinthefuture,asdidthatbetweenfreedomandslaverybefore.Theconditionofthecoloredmanwithinourbordersmaybecomeasourceofanxiety,tosaytheleast.Buthewasbroughttoourshoresbycompulsion,andhenowshouldbeconsideredashavingasgoodarighttoremainhereasanyotherclassofourcitizens.ItwaslookingtoasettlementofthisquestionthatledmetourgetheannexationofSantoDomingoduringthetimeIwasPresidentoftheUnitedStates.

SantoDomingowasfreelyofferedtous,notonlybytheadministration,butbyallthepeople,almostwithoutprice.Theislandisuponourshores,isveryfertile,andiscapableofsupportingfifteenmillionsofpeople.Theproductsofthesoilaresovaluablethatlaborinherfieldswouldbesocompensatedastoenablethosewhowishedtogotheretoquicklyrepaythecostoftheirpassage.Itookitthatthecoloredpeoplewouldgothereingreatnumbers,soastohaveindependentstatesgovernedbytheirownrace.TheywouldstillbeStatesoftheUnion,andundertheprotectionoftheGeneralGovernment;butthecitizenswouldbealmostwhollycolored.

BythewarwithMexico,wehadacquired,aswehaveseen,territoryalmostequalinextenttothatwealreadypossessed.ItwasseenthatthevolunteersoftheMexicanwarlargelycomposedthepioneerstosettleupthePacificcoastcountry.Theirnumbers,however,werescarcelysufficienttobeanucleusforthepopulationoftheimportantpointsoftheterritoryacquiredbythatwar.Afterourrebellion,whensomanyyoungmenwereatlibertytoreturntotheirhomes,theyfoundtheywerenotsatisfiedwiththefarm,thestore,ortheworkshopofthevillages,butwantedlargerfields.Theminesofthemountainsfirstattractedthem;butafterwardstheyfoundthatrichvalleysandproductivegrazingandfarminglandswerethere.Thisterritory,thegeographyofwhichwasnotknowntousatthecloseoftherebellion,isnowaswellmappedasanyportionofourcountry.Railroadstraverseitineverydirection,north,south,east,andwest.Theminesareworked.Thehighlandsareusedforgrazingpurposes,andrichagriculturallandsarefoundinmanyofthevalleys.Thisistheworkofthevolunteer.ItisprobablethattheIndianswouldhavehadcontroloftheselandsforacenturyyetbutforthewar.Wemustconclude,therefore,thatwarsarenot

foracenturyyetbutforthewar.Wemustconclude,therefore,thatwarsarenotalwaysevilsunmixedwithsomegood.

Priortotherebellionthegreatmassofthepeopleweresatisfiedtoremainnearthescenesoftheirbirth.Infactanimmensemajorityofthewholepeopledidnotfeelsecureagainstcomingtowantshouldtheymoveamongentirestrangers.Somuchwasthecountrydividedintosmallcommunitiesthatlocalizedidiomshadgrownup,sothatyoucouldalmosttellwhatsectionapersonwasfrombyhearinghimspeak.Before,newterritoriesweresettledbya"class";peoplewhoshunnedcontactwithothers;peoplewho,whenthecountrybegantosettleuparoundthem,wouldpushoutfartherfromcivilization.Theirgunsfurnishedmeat,andthecultivationofaverylimitedamountofthesoil,theirbreadandvegetables.Allthestreamsaboundedwithfish.TrappingwouldfurnishpeltstobebroughtintotheStatesonceayear,topayfornecessaryarticleswhichtheycouldnotraise—powder,lead,whiskey,tobaccoandsomestoregoods.Occasionallysomelittlearticlesofluxurywouldenterintothesepurchases—aquarterofapoundoftea,twoorthreepoundsofcoffee,moreofsugar,someplayingcards,andifanythingwasleftoveroftheproceedsofthesale,morewhiskey.

Littlewasknownofthetopographyofthecountrybeyondthesettlementsofthesefrontiersmen.Thisisallchangednow.Thewarbegotaspiritofindependenceandenterprise.Thefeelingnowis,thatayouthmustcutloosefromhisoldsurroundingstoenablehimtogetupintheworld.Thereisnowsuchacomminglingofthepeoplethatparticularidiomsandpronunciationarenolongerlocalizedtoanygreatextent;thecountryhasfilledup"fromthecentreallaroundtothesea";railroadsconnectthetwooceansandallpartsoftheinterior;maps,nearlyperfect,ofeverypartofthecountryarenowfurnishedthestudentofgeography.

Thewarhasmadeusanationofgreatpowerandintelligence.Wehavebutlittletodotopreservepeace,happinessandprosperityathome,andtherespectofothernations.Ourexperienceoughttoteachusthenecessityofthefirst;ourpowersecuresthelatter.

Ifeelthatweareontheeveofanewera,whenthereistobegreatharmonybetweentheFederalandConfederate.Icannotstaytobealivingwitnesstothecorrectnessofthisprophecy;butIfeelitwithinmethatitistobeso.Theuniversallykindfeelingexpressedformeatatimewhenitwassupposedthateachdaywouldprovemylast,seemedtomethebeginningoftheanswerto"Letushavepeace."

ushavepeace."

Theexpressionofthesekindlyfeelingswerenotrestrictedtoasectionofthecountry,nortoadivisionofthepeople.Theycamefromindividualcitizensofallnationalities;fromalldenominations—theProtestant,theCatholic,andtheJew;andfromthevarioussocietiesoftheland—scientific,educational,religiousorotherwise.Politicsdidnotenterintothematteratall.

IamnotegotistenoughtosupposeallthissignificanceshouldbegivenbecauseIwastheobjectofit.ButthewarbetweentheStateswasaverybloodyandaverycostlywar.Onesideortheotherhadtoyieldprinciplestheydeemeddearerthanlifebeforeitcouldbebroughttoanend.Icommandedthewholeofthemightyhostengagedonthevictoriousside.Iwas,nomatterwhetherdeservedlysoornot,arepresentativeofthatsideofthecontroversy.ItisasignificantandgratifyingfactthatConfederatesshouldhavejoinedheartilyinthisspontaneousmove.Ihopethegoodfeelinginauguratedmaycontinuetotheend.

APPENDIX.

REPORTOFLIEUTENANT-GENERALU.S.GRANT,OFTHEUNITEDSTATESARMIES1864-65.

HEADQUARTERSARMIESOFTHEUNITEDSTATES,WASHINGTON,D.C.,July22,1865.

HON.E.M.STANTON,SecretaryofWar.

SIR:IhavethehonortosubmitthefollowingreportoftheoperationsoftheArmiesoftheUnitedStatesfromthedateofmyappointmenttocommandthesame.

FromanearlyperiodintherebellionIhadbeenimpressedwiththeideathatactiveandcontinuousoperationsofallthetroopsthatcouldbebroughtintothefield,regardlessofseasonandweather,werenecessarytoaspeedyterminationofthewar.Theresourcesoftheenemyandhisnumericalstrengthwerefarinferiortoours;butasanoffsettothis,wehadavastterritory,withapopulationhostiletothegovernment,togarrison,andlonglinesofriverandrailroadcommunicationstoprotect,toenableustosupplytheoperatingarmies.

ThearmiesintheEastandWestactedindependentlyandwithoutconcert,likeabalkyteam,notwoeverpullingtogether,enablingtheenemytousetogreatadvantagehisinteriorlinesofcommunicationfortransportingtroopsfromEasttoWest,reinforcingthearmymostvigorouslypressed,andtofurloughlargenumbers,duringseasonsofinactivityonourpart,togototheirhomesanddotheworkofproducing,forthesupportoftheirarmies.Itwasaquestionwhetherournumericalstrengthandresourceswerenotmorethanbalancedbythesedisadvantagesandtheenemy'ssuperiorposition.

Fromthefirst,Iwasfirmintheconvictionthatnopeacecouldbehadthatwouldbestableandconducivetothehappinessofthepeople,bothNorthandSouth,untilthemilitarypoweroftherebellionwasentirelybroken.

Ithereforedetermined,first,tousethegreatestnumberoftroopspracticableagainstthearmedforceoftheenemy;preventinghimfromusingthesameforce

againstthearmedforceoftheenemy;preventinghimfromusingthesameforceatdifferentseasonsagainstfirstoneandthenanotherofourarmies,andthepossibilityofreposeforrefittingandproducingnecessarysuppliesforcarryingonresistance.Second,tohammercontinuouslyagainstthearmedforceoftheenemyandhisresources,untilbymereattrition,ifinnootherway,thereshouldbenothinglefttohimbutanequalsubmissionwiththeloyalsectionofourcommoncountrytotheconstitutionandlawsoftheland.

Theseviewshavebeenkeptconstantlyinmind,andordersgivenandcampaignsmadetocarrythemout.Whethertheymighthavebeenbetterinconceptionandexecutionisforthepeople,whomournthelossoffriendsfallen,andwhohavetopaythepecuniarycost,tosay.AllIcansayis,thatwhatIhavedonehasbeendoneconscientiously,tothebestofmyability,andinwhatIconceivedtobeforthebestinterestsofthewholecountry.

Atthedatewhenthisreportbegins,thesituationofthecontendingforceswasaboutasfollows:TheMississippiRiverwasstronglygarrisonedbyFederaltroops,fromSt.Louis,Missouri,toitsmouth.ThelineoftheArkansaswasalsoheld,thusgivingusarmedpossessionofallwestoftheMississippi,northofthatstream.AfewpointsinSouthernLouisiana,notremotefromtheriver,wereheldbyus,togetherwithasmallgarrisonatandnearthemouthoftheRioGrande.AllthebalanceofthevastterritoryofArkansas,Louisiana,andTexaswasinthealmostundisputedpossessionoftheenemy,withanarmyofprobablynotlessthaneightythousandeffectivemen,thatcouldhavebeenbroughtintothefieldhadtherebeensufficientoppositiontohavebroughtthemout.Thelet-alonepolicyhaddemoralizedthisforcesothatprobablybutlittlemorethanone-halfofitwaseverpresentingarrisonatanyonetime.Buttheone-half,orfortythousandmen,withthebandsofguerillasscatteredthroughMissouri,Arkansas,andalongtheMississippiRiver,andthedisloyalcharacterofmuchofthepopulation,compelledtheuseofalargenumberoftroopstokeepnavigationopenontheriver,andtoprotecttheloyalpeopletothewestofit.TotheeastoftheMississippiweheldsubstantiallywiththelineoftheTennesseeandHolstonrivers,runningeastwardtoincludenearlyalloftheStateofTennessee.SouthofChattanooga,asmallfootholdhadbeenobtainedinGeorgia,sufficienttoprotectEastTennesseefromincursionsfromtheenemy'sforceatDalton,Georgia.WestVirginiawassubstantiallywithinourlines.Virginia,withtheexceptionofthenorthernborder,thePotomacRiver,asmallareaaboutthemouthofJamesRiver,coveredbythetroopsatNorfolkandFortMonroe,andtheterritorycoveredbytheArmyofthePotomaclyingalongtheRapidan,wasinthepossessionoftheenemy.Alongthesea-coastfootholdshadbeenobtainedatPlymouth,Washington,andNewBern,inNorthCarolina;Beaufort,Follyand

Plymouth,Washington,andNewBern,inNorthCarolina;Beaufort,FollyandMorrisIslands,HiltonHead,FortPulaski,andPortRoyal,inSouthCarolina;FernandinaandSt.Augustine,inFlorida.KeyWestandPensacolawerealsoinourpossession,whilealltheimportantportswereblockadedbythenavy.Theaccompanyingmap,acopyofwhichwassenttoGeneralShermanandothercommandersinMarch,1864,showsbyredlinestheterritoryoccupiedbyusatthebeginningoftherebellion,andattheopeningofthecampaignof1864,whilethoseinbluearethelineswhichitwasproposedtooccupy.

BehindtheUnionlinesthereweremanybandsofguerillasandalargepopulationdisloyaltothegovernment,makingitnecessarytoguardeveryfootofroadorriverusedinsupplyingourarmies.IntheSouth,areignofmilitarydespotismprevailed,whichmadeeverymanandboycapableofbearingarmsasoldier;andthosewhocouldnotbeararmsinthefieldactedasprovostsforcollectingdesertersandreturningthem.Thisenabledtheenemytobringalmosthisentirestrengthintothefield.

TheenemyhadconcentratedthebulkofhisforceseastoftheMississippiintotwoarmies,commandedbyGeneralsR.E.LeeandJ.E.Johnston,hisablestandbestgenerals.ThearmycommandedbyLeeoccupiedthesouthbankoftheRapidan,extendingfromMineRunwestward,stronglyintrenched,coveringanddefendingRichmond,therebelcapital,againsttheArmyofthePotomac.ThearmyunderJohnstonoccupiedastronglyintrenchedpositionatDalton,Georgia,coveringanddefendingAtlanta,Georgia,aplaceofgreatimportanceasarailroadcentre,againstthearmiesunderMajor-GeneralW.T.Sherman.InadditiontothesearmieshehadalargecavalryforceunderForrest,inNorth-eastMississippi;aconsiderableforce,ofallarms,intheShenandoahValley,andinthewesternpartofVirginiaandextremeeasternpartofTennessee;andalsoconfrontingoursea-coastgarrisons,andholdingblockadedportswherewehadnofootholduponland.

Thesetwoarmies,andthecitiescoveredanddefendedbythem,werethemainobjectivepointsofthecampaign.

Major-GeneralW.T.Sherman,whowasappointedtothecommandoftheMilitaryDivisionoftheMississippi,embracingallthearmiesandterritoryeastoftheMississippiRivertotheAlleghaniesandtheDepartmentofArkansas,westoftheMississippi,hadtheimmediatecommandofthearmiesoperatingagainstJohnston.

Major-GeneralGeorgeG.MeadehadtheimmediatecommandoftheArmyof

Major-GeneralGeorgeG.MeadehadtheimmediatecommandoftheArmyofthePotomac,fromwhereIexercisedgeneralsupervisionofthemovementsofallourarmies.

GeneralShermanwasinstructedtomoveagainstJohnston'sarmy,tobreakitup,andtogointotheinterioroftheenemy'scountryasfarashecould,inflictingallthedamagehecouldupontheirwarresources.IftheenemyinhisfrontshowedsignsofjoiningLee,tofollowhimuptothefullextentofhisability,whileIwouldpreventtheconcentrationofLeeuponhim,ifitwasinthepoweroftheArmyofthePotomactodoso.Morespecificwritteninstructionswerenotgiven,forthereasonthatIhadtalkedoverwithhimtheplansofthecampaign,andwassatisfiedthatheunderstoodthemandwouldexecutethemtothefullestextentpossible.

Major-GeneralN.P.Banks,thenonanexpeditionupRedRiveragainstShreveport,Louisiana(whichhadbeenorganizedprevioustomyappointmenttocommand),wasnotifiedbymeonthe15thofMarch,oftheimportanceitwasthatShreveportshouldbetakenattheearliestpossibleday,andthatifhefoundthatthetakingofitwouldoccupyfromtentofifteendays'moretimethanGeneralShermanhadgivenhistroopstobeabsentfromtheircommand,hewouldsendthembackatthetimespecifiedbyGeneralSherman,evenifitledtotheabandonmentofthemainobjectoftheRedRiverexpedition,forthisforcewasnecessarytomovementseastoftheMississippi;thatshouldhisexpeditionprovesuccessful,hewouldholdShreveportandtheRedRiverwithsuchforceashemightdeemnecessary,andreturnthebalanceofhistroopstotheneighborhoodofNewOrleans,commencingnomoveforthefurtheracquisitionofterritory,unlessitwastomakethatthenheldbyhimmoreeasilyheld;thatitmightbeapartofthespringcampaigntomoveagainstMobile;thatitcertainlywouldbe,iftroopsenoughcouldbeobtainedtomakeitwithoutembarrassingothermovements;thatNewOrleanswouldbethepointofdepartureforsuchanexpedition;also,thatIhaddirectedGeneralSteeletomakearealmovefromArkansas,assuggestedbyhim(GeneralBanks),insteadofademonstration,asSteelethoughtadvisable.

Onthe31stofMarch,inadditiontotheforegoingnotificationanddirections,hewasinstructedasfollows:

"1st.IfsuccessfulinyourexpeditionagainstShreveport,thatyouturnoverthedefenceoftheRedRivertoGeneralSteeleandthenavy.

defenceoftheRedRivertoGeneralSteeleandthenavy.

"2d.ThatyouabandonTexasentirely,withtheexceptionofyourholdupontheRioGrande.Thiscanbeheldwithfourthousandmen,iftheywillturntheirattentionimmediatelytofortifyingtheirpositions.Atleastone-halfoftheforcerequiredforthisservicemightbetakenfromthecoloredtroops.

"3d.ByproperlyfortifyingontheMississippiRiver,theforcetoguarditfromPortHudsontoNewOrleanscanbereducedtotenthousandmen,ifnottoalessnumber.Sixthousandmorewouldthenholdalltherestoftheterritorynecessarytoholduntilactiveoperationscanagainberesumedwestoftheriver.Accordingtoyourlastreturn,thiswouldgiveyouaforceofoverthirtythousandeffectivemenwithwhichtomoveagainstMobile.TothisIexpecttoaddfivethousandmenfromMissouri.Ifhowever,youthinktheforceherestatedtoosmalltoholdtheterritoryregardedasnecessarytoholdpossessionof,Iwouldsayconcentrateatleasttwenty-fivethousandmenofyourpresentcommandforoperationsagainstMobile.WiththeseandsuchadditionsasIcangiveyoufromelsewhere,losenotimeinmakingademonstration,tobefollowedbyanattackuponMobile.Twoormoreiron-cladswillbeorderedtoreporttoAdmiralFarragut.Thisgiveshimastrongnavalfleetwithwhichtocooperate.Youcanmakeyourownarrangementswiththeadmiralforhiscooperation,andselectyourownlineofapproach.MyownideaofthematteristhatPascagoulashouldbeyourbase;but,fromyourlongserviceintheGulfDepartment,youwillknowbestaboutthematter.Itisintendedthatyourmovementsshallbecooperativewithmovementselsewhere,andyoucannotnowstarttoosoon.AllIwouldnowaddis,thatyoucommencetheconcentrationofyourforcesatonce.Preserveaprofoundsecrecyofwhatyouintenddoing,andstartattheearliestpossiblemoment.

"U.S.GRANT,Lieutenant-General."MAJOR-GENERALN.P.BANKS."

Major-GeneralMeadewasinstructedthatLee'sarmywouldbehisobjectivepoint;thatwhereverLeewenthewouldgoalso.Forhismovementtwoplanspresentedthemselves:OnetocrosstheRapidanbelowLee,movingbyhisrightflank;theotherabove,movingbyhisleft.Eachpresentedadvantagesovertheother,withcorrespondingobjections.Bycrossingabove,LeewouldbecutofffromallchanceofignoringRichmondorgoingnorthonaraid.Butifwetookthisroute,allwedidwouldhavetobedonewhilsttherationswestartedwithheldout;besides,itseparatedusfromButler,sothathecouldnotbedirected

heldout;besides,itseparatedusfromButler,sothathecouldnotbedirectedhowtocooperate.Ifwetooktheotherroute,BrandyStationcouldbeusedasabaseofsuppliesuntilanotherwassecuredontheYorkorJamesrivers.Ofthese,however,itwasdecidedtotakethelowerroute.

ThefollowingletterofinstructionwasaddressedtoMajor-GeneralB.F.Butler:

"FORTMONROE,VIRGINIA,April2,1864.

"GENERAL:-Inthespringcampaign,whichitisdesirableshallcommenceatasearlyadayaspracticable,itisproposedtohavecooperativeactionofallthearmiesinthefield,asfarasthisobjectcanbeaccomplished.

"Itwillnotbepossibletouniteourarmiesintotwoorthreelargeonestoactassomanyunits,owingtotheabsolutenecessityofholdingontotheterritoryalreadytakenfromtheenemy.But,generallyspeaking,concentrationcanbepracticallyeffectedbyarmiesmovingtotheinterioroftheenemy'scountryfromtheterritorytheyhavetoguard.Bysuchmovement,theyinterposethemselvesbetweentheenemyandthecountrytobeguarded,therebyreducingthenumbernecessarytoguardimportantpoints,oratleastoccupytheattentionofapartoftheenemy'sforce,ifnogreaterobjectisgained.Lee'sarmyandRichmondbeingthegreaterobjectstowardswhichourattentionmustbedirectedinthenextcampaign,itisdesirabletounitealltheforcewecanagainstthem.ThenecessityofcoveringWashingtonwiththeArmyofthePotomac,andofcoveringyourdepartmentwithyourarmy,makesitimpossibletounitetheseforcesatthebeginningofanymove.Ipropose,therefore,whatcomesnearestthisofanythingthatseemspracticable:TheArmyofthePotomacwillactfromitspresentbase,Lee'sarmybeingtheobjectivepoint.Youwillcollectalltheforcesfromyourcommandthatcanbesparedfromgarrisonduty—Ishouldsaynotlessthantwentythousandeffectivemen—tooperateonthesouthsideofJamesRiver,Richmondbeingyourobjectivepoint.TotheforceyoualreadyhavewillbeaddedabouttenthousandmenfromSouthCarolina,underMajor-GeneralGillmore,whowillcommandtheminperson.Major-GeneralW.F.Smithisorderedtoreporttoyou,tocommandthetroopssentintothefieldfromyourowndepartment.

"GeneralGillmorewillbeorderedtoreporttoyouatFortressMonroe,withallthetroopsontransports,bythe18thinstant,orassoonthereafteraspracticable.Shouldyounotreceivenoticebythattimetomove,youwillmakesuch

Shouldyounotreceivenoticebythattimetomove,youwillmakesuchdispositionofthemandyourotherforcesasyoumaydeembestcalculatedtodeceivetheenemyastotherealmovetobemade.

"Whenyouarenotifiedtomove,takeCityPointwithasmuchforceaspossible.Fortify,orratherintrench,atonce,andconcentrateallyourtroopsforthefieldthereasrapidlyasyoucan.FromCityPointdirectionscannotbegivenatthistimeforyourfurthermovements.

"Thefactthathasalreadybeenstated—thatis,thatRichmondistobeyourobjectivepoint,andthatthereistobecooperationbetweenyourforceandtheArmyofthePotomac—mustbeyourguide.ThisindicatesthenecessityofyourholdingclosetothesouthbankoftheJamesRiverasyouadvance.Then,shouldtheenemybeforcedintohisintrenchmentsinRichmond,theArmyofthePotomacwouldfollow,andbymeansoftransportsthetwoarmieswouldbecomeaunit.

"Alltheminordetailsofyouradvanceareleftentirelytoyourdirection.If,however,youthinkitpracticabletouseyourcavalrysouthofyou,soastocuttherailroadaboutHicksford,aboutthetimeofthegeneraladvance,itwouldbeofimmenseadvantage.

"Youwillpleaseforwardformyinformation,attheearliestpracticableday,allorders,details,andinstructionsyoumaygivefortheexecutionofthisorder.

"U.S.GRANT,Lieutenant-General."MAJOR-GENERALB.F.BUTLER."

Onthe16ththeseinstructionsweresubstantiallyreiterated.Onthe19th,inordertosecurefullcooperationbetweenhisarmyandthatofGeneralMeade,hewasinformedthatIexpectedhimtomovefromFortMonroethesamedaythatGeneralMeademovedfromCulpeper.TheexacttimeIwastotelegraphhimassoonasitwasfixed,andthatitwouldnotbeearlierthanthe27thofApril;thatitwasmyintentiontofightLeebetweenCulpeperandRichmond,ifhewouldstand.Shouldhe,however,fallbackintoRichmond,Iwouldfollowupandmakeajunctionwithhis(GeneralButler's)armyontheJamesRiver;that,couldIbecertainhewouldbeabletoinvestRichmondonthesouthside,soastohavehisleftrestingontheJames,abovethecity,Iwouldformthejunctionthere;thatcircumstancesmightmakethiscourseadvisableanyhow;thatheshoulduseeveryexertiontosecurefootingasfarupthesouthsideoftheriverashecould,

everyexertiontosecurefootingasfarupthesouthsideoftheriverashecould,andassoonaspossibleafterthereceiptoforderstomove;thatifhecouldnotcarrythecity,heshouldatleastdetainaslargeaforcethereaspossible.

IncooperationwiththemainmovementsagainstLeeandJohnston,Iwasdesirousofusingallothertroopsnecessarilykeptindepartmentsremotefromthefieldsofimmediateoperations,andalsothosekeptinthebackgroundfortheprotectionofourextendedlinesbetweentheloyalStatesandthearmiesoperatingagainstthem.

Averyconsiderableforce,undercommandofMajor-GeneralSigel,wassoheldfortheprotectionofWestVirginia,andthefrontiersofMarylandandPennsylvania.WhilstthesetroopscouldnotbewithdrawntodistantfieldswithoutexposingtheNorthtoinvasionbycomparativelysmallbodiesoftheenemy,theycouldactdirectlytotheirfront,andgivebetterprotectionthaniflyingidleingarrison.Bysuchamovementtheywouldeithercompeltheenemytodetachlargelyfortheprotectionofhissuppliesandlinesofcommunication,orhewouldlosethem.GeneralSigelwasthereforedirectedtoorganizeallhisavailableforceintotwoexpeditions,tomovefromBeverlyandCharleston,undercommandofGeneralsOrdandCrook,againsttheEastTennesseeandVirginiaRailroad.Subsequently,GeneralOrdhavingbeenrelievedathisownrequest,GeneralSigelwasinstructedathisownsuggestion,togiveuptheexpeditionbyBeverly,andtoformtwocolumns,oneunderGeneralCrook,ontheKanawha,numberingabouttenthousandmen,andoneontheShenandoah,numberingaboutseventhousandmen.TheoneontheShenandoahtoassemblebetweenCumberlandandtheShenandoah,andtheinfantryandartilleryadvancedtoCedarCreekwithsuchcavalryascouldbemadeavailableatthemoment,tothreatentheenemyintheShenandoahValley,andadvanceasfaraspossible;whileGeneralCrookwouldtakepossessionofLewisburgwithpartofhisforceandmovedowntheTennesseeRailroad,doingasmuchdamageashecould,destroyingtheNewRiverBridgeandthesaltworks,atSaltville,Va.

Owingtotheweatherandbadconditionoftheroads,operationsweredelayeduntilthe1stofMay,when,everythingbeinginreadinessandtheroadsfavorable,ordersweregivenforageneralmovementofallthearmiesnotlaterthanthe4thofMay.

Myfirstobjectbeingtobreakthemilitarypoweroftherebellion,andcapturetheenemy'simportantstrongholds,mademedesirousthatGeneralButlershouldsucceedinhismovementagainstRichmond,asthatwouldtendmorethananythingelse,unlessitwerethecaptureofLee'sarmy,toaccomplishthis

anythingelse,unlessitwerethecaptureofLee'sarmy,toaccomplishthisdesiredresultintheEast.Ifhefailed,itwasmydetermination,byhardfighting,eithertocompelLeetoretreat,ortosocripplehimthathecouldnotdetachalargeforcetogonorth,andstillretainenoughforthedefenceofRichmond.Itwaswellunderstood,bybothGeneralsButlerandMeade,beforestartingonthecampaign,thatitwasmyintentiontoputboththeirarmiessouthoftheJamesRiver,incaseoffailuretodestroyLeewithoutit.

BeforegivingGeneralButlerhisinstructions,IvisitedhimatFortMonroe,andinconversationpointedouttheapparentimportanceofgettingpossessionofPetersburg,anddestroyingrailroadcommunicationasfarsouthaspossible.Believing,however,inthepracticabilityofcapturingRichmondunlessitwasreinforced,Imadethattheobjectivepointofhisoperations.AstheArmyofthePotomacwastomovesimultaneouslywithhim,Leecouldnotdetachfromhisarmywithsafety,andtheenemydidnothavetroopselsewheretobringtothedefenceofthecityintimetomeetarapidmovementfromthenorthofJamesRiver.

Imayherestatethat,commandingallthearmiesasIdid,Itried,asfaraspossible,toleaveGeneralMeadeinindependentcommandoftheArmyofthePotomac.Myinstructionsforthatarmywereallthroughhim,andweregeneralintheirnature,leavingallthedetailsandtheexecutiontohim.Thecampaignsthatfollowedprovedhimtobetherightmanintherightplace.Hiscommandingalwaysinthepresenceofanofficersuperiortohiminrank,hasdrawnfromhimmuchofthatpublicattentionthathiszealandabilityentitlehimto,andwhichhewouldotherwisehavereceived.

ThemovementoftheArmyofthePotomaccommencedearlyonthemorningofthe4thofMay,undertheimmediatedirectionandordersofMajor-GeneralMeade,pursuanttoinstructions.Beforenight,thewholearmywasacrosstheRapidan(thefifthandsixthcorpscrossingatGermaniaFord,andthesecondcorpsatEly'sFord,thecavalry,underMajor-GeneralSheridan,movinginadvance,)withthegreaterpartofitstrains,numberingaboutfourthousandwagons,meetingwithbutslightopposition.Theaveragedistancetravelledbythetroopsthatdaywasabouttwelvemiles.ThisIregardedasagreatsuccess,anditremovedfrommymindthemostseriousapprehensionsIhadentertained,thatofcrossingtheriverinthefaceofanactive,large,well-appointed,andablycommandedarmy,andhowsolargeatrainwastobecarriedthroughahostilecountry,andprotected.Earlyonthe5th,theadvancecorps(thefifth,Major-GeneralG.K.Warrencommanding)metandengagedtheenemyoutsidehis

GeneralG.K.Warrencommanding)metandengagedtheenemyoutsidehisintrenchmentsnearMineRun.Thebattleragedfuriouslyallday,thewholearmybeingbroughtintothefightasfastasthecorpscouldbegotuponthefield,which,consideringthedensityoftheforestandnarrownessoftheroads,wasdonewithcommendablepromptness.

GeneralBurnside,withtheninthcorps,was,atthetimetheArmyofthePotomacmoved,leftwiththebulkofhiscorpsatthecrossingoftheRappahannockRiverandAlexandriaRailroad,holdingtheroadbacktoBullRun,withinstructionsnottomoveuntilhereceivednoticethatacrossingoftheRapidanwassecured,buttomovepromptlyassoonassuchnoticewasreceived.Thiscrossinghewasapprisedofontheafternoonofthe4th.Bysixo'clockofthemorningofthe6thhewasleadinghiscorpsintoactionneartheWildernessTavern,someofhistroopshavingmarchedadistanceofoverthirtymiles,crossingboththeRappahannockandRapidanrivers.Consideringthatalargeproportion,probablytwo-thirdsofhiscommand,wascomposedofnewtroops,unaccustomedtomarches,andcarryingtheaccoutrementsofasoldier,thiswasaremarkablemarch.

ThebattleoftheWildernesswasrenewedbyusatfiveo'clockonthemorningofthe6th,andcontinuedwithunabatedfuryuntildarknesssetin,eacharmyholdingsubstantiallythesamepositionthattheyhadontheeveningofthe5th.Afterdark,theenemymadeafeebleattempttoturnourrightflank,capturingseveralhundredprisonersandcreatingconsiderableconfusion.ButthepromptnessofGeneralSedgwick,whowaspersonallypresentandcommandedthatpartofourline,soonreformeditandrestoredorder.Onthemorningofthe7th,reconnoissancesshowedthattheenemyhadfallenbehindhisintrenchedlines,withpicketstothefront,coveringapartofthebattle-field.Fromthisitwasevidenttomymindthatthetwodays'fightinghadsatisfiedhimofhisinabilitytofurthermaintainthecontestintheopenfield,notwithstandinghisadvantageofposition,andthathewouldwaitanattackbehindhisworks.IthereforedeterminedtopushonandputmywholeforcebetweenhimandRichmond;andorderswereatonceissuedforamovementbyhisrightflank.Onthenightofthe7th,themarchwascommencedtowardsSpottsylvaniaCourtHouse,thefifthcorpsmovingonthemostdirectroad.Buttheenemyhavingbecomeapprisedofourmovement,andhavingtheshorterline,wasenabledtoreachtherefirst.Onthe8th,GeneralWarrenmetaforceoftheenemy,whichhadbeensentouttoopposeanddelayhisadvance,togaintimetofortifythelinetakenupatSpottsylvania.Thisforcewassteadilydrivenbackonthemainforce,withintherecentlyconstructedworks,afterconsiderablefighting,resultinginseverelosstobothsides.Onthemorningofthe9th,GeneralSheridanstartedon

severelosstobothsides.Onthemorningofthe9th,GeneralSheridanstartedonaraidagainsttheenemy'slinesofcommunicationwithRichmond.The9th,10th,and11thwerespentinmanoeuvringandfighting,withoutdecisiveresults.Amongthekilledonthe9thwasthatableanddistinguishedsoldierMajor-GeneralJohnSedgwick,commandingthesixtharmycorps.Major-GeneralH.G.Wrightsucceededhimincommand.Earlyonthemorningofthe12thageneralattackwasmadeontheenemyinposition.Thesecondcorps,Major-GeneralHancockcommanding,carriedasalientofhisline,capturingmostofJohnson'sdivisionofEwell'scorpsandtwentypiecesofartillery.Buttheresistancewassoobstinatethattheadvantagegaineddidnotprovedecisive.The13th,14th,15th,16th,17th,and18th,wereconsumedinmanoeuvringandawaitingthearrivalofreinforcementsfromWashington.DeemingitimpracticabletomakeanyfurtherattackupontheenemyatSpottsylvaniaCourtHouse,orderswereissuedonthe15thwithaviewtoamovementtotheNorthAnna,tocommenceattwelveo'clockonthenightofthe19th.Lateintheafternoonofthe19th,Ewell'scorpscameoutofitsworksonourextremerightflank;buttheattackwaspromptlyrepulsed,withheavyloss.ThisdelayedthemovementtotheNorthAnnauntilthenightofthe21st,whenitwascommenced.Buttheenemyagain,havingtheshorterline,andbeinginpossessionofthemainroads,wasenabledtoreachtheNorthAnnainadvanceofus,andtookpositionbehindit.ThefifthcorpsreachedtheNorthAnnaontheafternoonofthe23d,closelyfollowedbythesixthcorps.Thesecondandninthcorpsgotupaboutthesametime,thesecondholdingtherailroadbridge,andtheninthlyingbetweenthatandJerichoFord.GeneralWarreneffectedacrossingthesameafternoon,andgotapositionwithoutmuchopposition.Soonaftergettingintopositionhewasviolentlyattacked,butrepulsedtheenemywithgreatslaughter.Onthe25th,GeneralSheridanrejoinedtheArmyofthePotomacfromtheraidonwhichhestartedfromSpottsylvania,havingdestroyedthedepotsatBeaverDamandAshlandstations,fourtrainsofcars,largesuppliesofrations,andmanymilesofrailroad-track;recapturedaboutfourhundredofourmenontheirwaytoRichmondasprisonersofwar;metanddefeatedtheenemy'scavalryatYellowTavern;carriedthefirstlineofworksaroundRichmond(butfindingthesecondlinetoostrongtobecarriedbyassault),recrossedtothenorthbankoftheChickahominyatMeadowBridgeunderheavyfire,andmovedbyadetourtoHaxall'sLanding,ontheJamesRiver,wherehecommunicatedwithGeneralButler.Thisraidhadtheeffectofdrawingoffthewholeoftheenemy'scavalryforce,makingitcomparativelyeasytoguardourtrains.

GeneralButlermovedhismainforceuptheJamesRiver,inpursuanceofinstructions,onthe4thofMay,GeneralGillmorehavingjoinedhimwiththe

instructions,onthe4thofMay,GeneralGillmorehavingjoinedhimwiththetenthcorps.Atthesametimehesentaforceofonethousandeighthundredcavalry,bywayofWestPoint,toformajunctionwithhimwhereverhemightgetafoothold,andaforceofthreethousandcavalry,underGeneralKautz,fromSuffolk,tooperateagainsttheroadsouthofPetersburgandRichmond.Onthe5th,heoccupied,withoutopposition,bothCityPointandBermudaHundred,hismovementbeingacompletesurprise.Onthe6th,hewasinpositionwithhismainarmy,andcommencedintrenching.Onthe7thhemadeareconnoissanceagainstthePetersburgandRichmondRailroad,destroyingaportionofitaftersomefighting.Onthe9thhetelegraphedasfollows:

"HEADQUARTERS,NEARBERMUDALANDING,May9,1864.

"HON.E.M.STANTON,SecretaryofWar.

"Ouroperationsmaybesummedupinafewwords.WithonethousandsevenhundredcavalrywehaveadvancedupthePeninsula,forcedtheChickahominy,andhavesafely,broughtthemtotheirpresentposition.Thesewerecoloredcavalry,andarenowholdingouradvancepicketstowardsRichmond.

"GeneralKautz,withthreethousandcavalryfromSuffolk,onthesamedaywithourmovementupJamesRiver,forcedtheBlackWater,burnedtherailroadbridgeatStonyCreek,belowPetersburg,cuttingintoBeauregard'sforceatthatpoint.

"Wehavelandedhere,intrenchedourselves,destroyedmanymilesofrailroad,andgotapositionwhich,withpropersupplies,wecanholdoutagainstthewholeofLee'sarmy.Ihaveorderedupthesupplies.

"Beauregard,withalargeportionofhisforce,wasleftsouthbythecuttingoftherailroadsbyKautz.ThatportionwhichreachedPetersburgunderHillIhavewhippedto-day,killingandwoundingmany,andtakingmanyprisoners,afterasevereandwell-contestedfight.

"GeneralGrantwillnotbetroubledwithanyfurtherreinforcementstoLeefromBeauregard'sforce.

"BENJ.F.BUTLER,Major-General."

Ontheeveningofthe13thandmorningofthe14thhecarriedaportionofthe

Ontheeveningofthe13thandmorningofthe14thhecarriedaportionoftheenemy'sfirstlineofdefencesatDrury'sBluff,orFortDarling,withsmallloss.Thetimethusconsumedfromthe6thlosttousthebenefitofthesurpriseandcaptureofRichmondandPetersburg,enabling,asitdid,BeauregardtocollecthislooseforcesinNorthandSouthCarolina,andbringthemtothedefenceofthoseplaces.Onthe16th,theenemyattackedGeneralButlerinhispositioninfrontofDrury'sBluff.Hewasforcedback,ordrewback,intohisintrenchmentsbetweentheforksoftheJamesandAppomattoxrivers,theenemyintrenchingstronglyinhisfront,thuscoveringhisrailroads,thecity,andallthatwasvaluabletohim.Hisarmy,therefore,thoughinapositionofgreatsecurity,wasascompletelyshutofffromfurtheroperationsdirectlyagainstRichmondasifithadbeeninabottlestronglycorked.Itrequiredbutacomparativelysmallforceoftheenemytoholditthere.

Onthe12th,GeneralKautz,withhiscavalry,wasstartedonaraidagainsttheDanvilleRailroad,whichhestruckatCoalfield,Powhatan,andChulaStations,destroyingthem,therailroad-track,twofreighttrains,andonelocomotive,togetherwithlargequantitiesofcommissaryandotherstores;thence,crossingtotheSouthSideRoad,struckitatWilson's,Wellsville,andBlack'sandWhite'sStations,destroyingtheroadandstation-houses;thenceheproceededtoCityPoint,whichhereachedonthe18th.

Onthe19thofApril,andpriortothemovementofGeneralButler,theenemy,withalandforceunderGeneralHokeandaniron-cladram,attackedPlymouth,N.C.,commandedbyGeneralH.W.Wessells,andourgunboatsthere,and,afterseverefighting,theplacewascarriedbyassault,andtheentiregarrisonandarmamentcaptured.ThegunboatSmithfieldwassunk,andtheMiamidisabled.

ThearmysenttooperateagainstRichmondhavinghermeticallysealeditselfupatBermudaHundred,theenemywasenabledtobringthemost,ifnotall,thereinforcementsbroughtfromthesouthbyBeauregardagainsttheArmyofthePotomac.Inadditiontothisreinforcement,averyconsiderableone,probablynotlessthanfifteenthousandmen,wasobtainedbycallinginthescatteredtroopsunderBreckinridgefromthewesternpartofVirginia.

ThepositionofBermudaHundredwasaseasytodefendasitwasdifficulttooperatefromagainsttheenemy.Idetermined,therefore,tobringfromitallavailableforces,leavingenoughonlytosecurewhathadbeengained;andaccordingly,onthe22d,Idirectedthattheybesentforward,undercommandofMajor-GeneralW.F.Smith,tojointheArmyofthePotomac.

Major-GeneralW.F.Smith,tojointheArmyofthePotomac.

Onthe24thofMay,the9tharmycorps,commandedbyMajor-GeneralA.E.Burnside,wasassignedtotheArmyofthePotomac,andfromthistimeforwardconstitutedaportionofMajor-GeneralMeade'scommand.

Findingtheenemy'spositionontheNorthAnnastrongerthaneitherofhispreviousones,Iwithdrewonthenightofthe26thtothenorthbankoftheNorthAnna,andmovedviaHanoverTowntoturntheenemy'spositionbyhisright.

GeneralsTorbert'sandMerritt'sdivisionsofcavalry,underSheridan,andthe6thcorps,ledtheadvance,crossedthePamunkeyRiveratHanoverTown,afterconsiderablefighting,andonthe28ththetwodivisionsofcavalryhadasevere,butsuccessfulengagementwiththeenemyatHawes'sShop.Onthe29thand30thweadvanced,withheavyskirmishing,totheHanoverCourtHouseandColdHarborRoad,anddevelopedtheenemy'spositionnorthoftheChickahominy.Lateontheeveningofthelastdaytheenemycameoutandattackedourleft,butwasrepulsedwithveryconsiderableloss.AnattackwasimmediatelyorderedbyGeneralMeade,alonghiswholeline,whichresultedindrivingtheenemyfromapartofhisintrenchedskirmishline.

Onthe31st,GeneralWilson'sdivisionofcavalrydestroyedtherailroadbridgesovertheSouthAnnaRiver,afterdefeatingtheenemy'scavalry.GeneralSheridan,onthesameday,reachedColdHarbor,andheldituntilrelievedbythe6thcorpsandGeneralSmith'scommand,whichhadjustarrived,viaWhiteHouse,fromGeneralButler'sarmy.

Onthe1stdayofJuneanattackwasmadeatfiveP.M.bythe6thcorpsandthetroopsunderGeneralSmith,theothercorpsbeingheldinreadinesstoadvanceonthereceiptoforders.Thisresultedinourcarryingandholdingtheenemy'sfirstlineofworksinfrontoftherightofthe6thcorps,andinfrontofGeneralSmith.Duringtheattacktheenemymaderepeatedassaultsoneachofthecorpsnotengagedinthemainattack,butwasrepulsedwithheavylossineveryinstance.Thatnighthemadeseveralassaultstoregainwhathehadlostintheday,butfailed.The2dwasspentingettingtroopsintopositionforanattackonthe3d.Onthe3dofJuneweagainassaultedtheenemy'sworks,inthehopeofdrivinghimfromhisposition.Inthisattemptourlosswasheavy,whilethatoftheenemy,Ihavereasontobelieve,wascomparativelylight.ItwastheonlygeneralattackmadefromtheRapidantotheJameswhichdidnotinflictupontheenemylossestocompensateforourownlosses.Iwouldnotbeunderstoodassayingthatallpreviousattacksresultedinvictoriestoourarms,oraccomplished

sayingthatallpreviousattacksresultedinvictoriestoourarms,oraccomplishedasmuchasIhadhopedfromthem;buttheyinflictedupontheenemyseverelosses,whichtended,intheend,tothecompleteoverthrowoftherebellion.

FromtheproximityoftheenemytohisdefencesaroundRichmond,itwasimpossible,byanyflankmovement,tointerposebetweenhimandthecity.Iwasstillinaconditiontoeithermovebyhisleftflank,andinvestRichmondfromthenorthside,orcontinuemymovebyhisrightflanktothesouthsideoftheJames.WhiletheformermighthavebeenbetterasacoveringforWashington,yetafullsurveyofallthegroundsatisfiedmethatitwouldbeimpracticabletoholdalinenorthandeastofRichmondthatwouldprotecttheFredericksburgRailroad,along,vulnerableline,whichwouldexhaustmuchofourstrengthtoguard,andthatwouldhavetobeprotectedtosupplythearmy,andwouldleaveopentotheenemyallhislinesofcommunicationonthesouthsideoftheJames.Myidea,fromthestart,hadbeentobeatLee'sarmynorthofRichmond,ifpossible.Then,afterdestroyinghislinesofcommunicationnorthoftheJamesRiver,totransferthearmytothesouthside,andbesiegeLeeinRichmond,orfollowhimsouthifheshouldretreat.AfterthebattleoftheWilderness,itwasevidentthattheenemydeemeditofthefirstimportancetorunnoriskswiththearmyhethenhad.Heactedpurelyonthedefensive,behindbreastworks,orfeeblyontheoffensiveimmediatelyinfrontofthem,andwhere,incaseofrepulse,hecouldeasilyretirebehindthem.WithoutagreatersacrificeoflifethanIwaswillingtomake,allcouldnotbeaccomplishedthatIhaddesignednorthofRichmond.Ithereforedeterminedtocontinuetoholdsubstantiallythegroundwethenoccupied,takingadvantageofanyfavorablecircumstancesthatmightpresentthemselves,untilthecavalrycouldbesenttoCharlottesvilleandGordonsvilletoeffectuallybreakuptherailroadconnectionbetweenRichmondandtheShenandoahValleyandLynchburg;andwhenthecavalrygotwelloff,tomovethearmytothesouthsideoftheJamesRiver,bytheenemy'srightflank,whereIfeltIcouldcutoffallhissourcesofsupply,exceptbythecanal.

Onthe7th,twodivisionsofcavalry,underGeneralSheridan,gotoffontheexpeditionagainsttheVirginiaCentralRailroad,withinstructionstoHunter,whomIhopedhewouldmeetnearCharlottesville,tojoinhisforcestoSheridan's,andaftertheworklaidoutforthemwasthoroughlydone,tojointheArmyofthePotomacbytheroutelaiddowninSheridan'sinstructions.

Onthe10thofJune,GeneralButlersentaforceofinfantry,underGeneralGillmore,andofcavalryunderGeneralKautz,tocapturePetersburg,ifpossible,anddestroytherailroadandcommonbridgesacrosstheAppomattox.Thecavalrycarriedtheworksonthesouthside,andpenetratedwellintowardsthe

cavalrycarriedtheworksonthesouthside,andpenetratedwellintowardsthetown,butwereforcedtoretire.GeneralGillmore,findingtheworkswhichheapproachedverystrong,anddeeminganassaultimpracticable,returnedtoBermudaHundredwithoutattemptingone.

AttachinggreatimportancetothepossessionofPetersburg,IsentbacktoBermudaHundredandCityPoint,GeneralSmith'scommandbywater,viatheWhiteHouse,toreachthereinadvanceoftheArmyofthePotomac.ThiswasfortheexpresspurposeofsecuringPetersburgbeforetheenemy,becomingawareofourintention,couldreinforcetheplace.

ThemovementfromColdHarborcommencedafterdarkontheeveningofthe12th.Onedivisionofcavalry,underGeneralWilson,andthe5thcorps,crossedtheChickahominyatLongBridge,andmovedouttoWhiteOakSwamp,tocoverthecrossingsoftheothercorps.TheadvancecorpsreachedJamesRiver,atWilcox'sLandingandCharlesCityCourtHouse,onthenightofthe13th.

DuringthreelongyearstheArmiesofthePotomacandNorthernVirginiahadbeenconfrontingeachother.Inthattimetheyhadfoughtmoredesperatebattlesthanitprobablyeverbeforefelltothelotoftwoarmiestofight,withoutmateriallychangingthevantagegroundofeither.TheSouthernpressandpeople,withmoreshrewdnessthanwasdisplayedintheNorth,findingthattheyhadfailedtocaptureWashingtonandmarchontoNewYork,astheyhadboastedtheywoulddo,assumedthattheyonlydefendedtheirCapitalandSouthernterritory.Hence,Antietam,Gettysburg,andalltheotherbattlesthathadbeenfought,werebythemsetdownasfailuresonourpart,andvictoriesforthem.Theirarmybelievedthis.Itproducedamoralewhichcouldonlybeovercomebydesperateandcontinuoushardfighting.ThebattlesoftheWilderness,Spottsylvania,NorthAnnaandColdHarbor,bloodyandterribleastheywereonourside,wereevenmoredamagingtotheenemy,andsocrippledhimastomakehimwaryeverafteroftakingtheoffensive.Hislossesinmenwereprobablynotsogreat,owingtothefactthatwewere,saveintheWilderness,almostinvariablytheattackingparty;andwhenhedidattack,itwasintheopenfield.Thedetailsofthesebattles,whichforenduranceandbraveryonthepartofthesoldiery,haverarelybeensurpassed,aregiveninthereportofMajor-GeneralMeade,andthesubordinatereportsaccompanyingit.

Duringthecampaignofforty-threedays,fromtheRapidantotheJamesRiver,thearmyhadtobesuppliedfromanever-shiftingbase,bywagons,overnarrowroads,throughadenselywoodedcountry,withalackofwharvesateachnew

roads,throughadenselywoodedcountry,withalackofwharvesateachnewbasefromwhichtoconvenientlydischargevessels.Toomuchcreditcannot,therefore,beawardedtothequartermasterandcommissarydepartmentsforthezealandefficiencydisplayedbythem.Underthegeneralsupervisionofthechiefquartermaster,Brigadier-GeneralR.Ingalls,thetrainsweremadetooccupyalltheavailableroadsbetweenthearmyandourwater-base,andbutlittledifficultywasexperiencedinprotectingthem.

ThemovementintheKanawhaandShenandoahvalleys,underGeneralSigel,commencedonthe1stofMay.GeneralCrook,whohadtheimmediatecommandoftheKanawhaexpedition,dividedhisforcesintotwocolumns,givingone,composedofcavalry,toGeneralAverell.Theycrossedthemountainsbyseparateroutes.AverellstrucktheTennesseeandVirginiaRailroad,nearWytheville,onthe10th,andproceedingtoNewRiverandChristiansburg,destroyedtheroad,severalimportantbridgesanddepots,includingNewRiverBridge,formingajunctionwithCrookatUniononthe15th.GeneralSigelmoveduptheShenandoahValley,mettheenemyatNewMarketonthe15th,and,afterasevereengagement,wasdefeatedwithheavyloss,andretiredbehindCedarCreek.NotregardingtheoperationsofGeneralSigelassatisfactory,Iaskedhisremovalfromcommand,andMajor-GeneralHunterappointedtosupersedehim.HisinstructionswereembracedinthefollowingdispatchestoMajor-GeneralH.W.Halleck,chiefofstaffofthearmy:

"NEARSPOTTSYLVANIACOURTHOUSE,VA."May20,1864.

"TheenemyareevidentlyrelyingforsuppliesgreatlyonsuchasarebroughtoverthebranchroadrunningthroughStaunton.Onthewhole,therefore,IthinkitwouldbebetterforGeneralHuntertomoveinthatdirection;reachStauntonandGordonsvilleorCharlottesville,ifhedoesnotmeettoomuchopposition.Ifhecanholdatbayaforceequaltohisown,hewillbedoinggoodservice.

"U.S.GRANT,Lieutenant-General."MAJOR-GENERALH.W.HALLECK."

"JERICHOFORD,VA.,May25,1864.

"IfHuntercanpossiblygettoCharlottesvilleandLynchburg,heshoulddoso,livingonthecountry.Therailroadsandcanalshouldbedestroyedbeyondpossibilityofrepairsforweeks.Completingthis,hecouldfindhiswaybackto

possibilityofrepairsforweeks.Completingthis,hecouldfindhiswaybacktohisoriginalbase,orfromaboutGordonsvillejointhisarmy.

"U.S.GRANT,Lieutenant-General."MAJOR-GENERALH.W.HALLECK."

GeneralHunterimmediatelytookuptheoffensive,and,movinguptheShenandoahValley,mettheenemyonthe5thofJuneatPiedmont,and,afterabattleoftenhours,routedanddefeatedhim,capturingonthefieldofbattleonethousandfivehundredmen,threepiecesofartillery,andthreehundredstandofsmallarms.Onthe8thofthesamemonthheformedajunctionwithCrookandAverellatStaunton,fromwhichplacehemoveddirectonLynchburg,viaLexington,whichplacehereachedandinvestedonthe16thdayofJune.Uptothistimehewasverysuccessful;andbutforthedifficultyoftakingwithhimsufficientordnancestoresoversolongamarch,throughahostilecountry,hewould,nodoubt,havecapturedthat,totheenemyimportant,point.Thedestructionoftheenemy'ssuppliesandmanufactorieswasverygreat.TomeetthismovementunderGeneralHunter,GeneralLeesentaforce,perhapsequaltoacorps,apartofwhichreachedLynchburgashorttimebeforeHunter.Aftersomeskirmishingonthe17thand18th,GeneralHunter,owingtoawantofammunitiontogivebattle,retiredfrombeforetheplace.Unfortunately,thiswantofammunitionlefthimnochoiceofrouteforhisreturnbutbywayofKanawha.ThislosttoustheuseofhistroopsforseveralweeksfromthedefenceoftheNorth.

HadGeneralHuntermovedbywayofCharlottesville,insteadofLexington,ashisinstructionscontemplated,hewouldhavebeeninapositiontohavecoveredtheShenandoahValleyagainsttheenemy,shouldtheforcehemethaveseemedtoendangerit.Ifitdidnot,hewouldhavebeenwithineasydistanceoftheJamesRiverCanal,onthemainlineofcommunicationbetweenLynchburgandtheforcesentforitsdefence.IhavenevertakenexceptiontotheoperationsofGeneralHunter,andamnotnowdisposedtofindfaultwithhim,forIhavenodoubtheactedwithinwhatheconceivedtobethespiritofhisinstructionsandtheinterestsoftheservice.Thepromptitudeofhismovementsandhisgallantryshouldentitlehimtothecommendationofhiscountry.

ToreturntotheArmyofthePotomac:The2dcorpscommencedcrossingtheJamesRiveronthemorningofthe14thbyferry-boatsatWilcox'sLanding.Thelayingofthepontoon-bridgewascompletedaboutmidnightofthe14th,andthecrossingofthebalanceofthearmywasrapidlypushedforwardbybothbridge

crossingofthebalanceofthearmywasrapidlypushedforwardbybothbridgeandferry.

Afterthecrossinghadcommenced,IproceededbysteamertoBermudaHundredtogivethenecessaryordersfortheimmediatecaptureofPetersburg.

TheinstructionstoGeneralButlerwereverbal,andwereforhimtosendGeneralSmithimmediately,thatnight,withallthetroopshecouldgivehimwithoutsacrificingthepositionhethenheld.ItoldhimthatIwouldreturnatoncetotheArmyofthePotomac,hastenitscrossingandthrowitforwardtoPetersburgbydivisionsasrapidlyasitcouldbedone,thatwecouldreinforceourarmiesmorerapidlytherethantheenemycouldbringtroopsagainstus.GeneralSmithgotoffasdirected,andconfrontedtheenemy'spicketsnearPetersburgbeforedaylightnextmorning,butforsomereasonthatIhaveneverbeenabletosatisfactorilyunderstand,didnotgetreadytoassaulthismainlinesuntilnearsundown.Then,withapartofhiscommandonly,hemadetheassault,andcarriedthelinesnorth-eastofPetersburgfromtheAppomattoxRiver,foradistanceofovertwoandahalfmiles,capturingfifteenpiecesofartilleryandthreehundredprisoners.ThiswasaboutsevenP.M.BetweenthelinethuscapturedandPetersburgtherewerenootherworks,andtherewasnoevidencethattheenemyhadreinforcedPetersburgwithasinglebrigadefromanysource.Thenightwasclearthemoonshiningbrightlyandfavorabletofurtheroperations.GeneralHancock,withtwodivisionsofthe2dcorps,reachedGeneralSmithjustafterdark,andofferedtheserviceofthesetroopsashe(Smith)mightwish,waivingranktothenamedcommander,whohenaturallysupposedknewbestthepositionofaffairs,andwhattodowiththetroops.ButinsteadoftakingthesetroopsandpushingatonceintoPetersburg,herequestedGeneralHancocktorelieveapartofhislineinthecapturedworks,whichwasdonebeforemidnight.

BythetimeIarrivedthenextmorningtheenemywasinforce.Anattackwasorderedtobemadeatsixo'clockthateveningbythetroopsunderSmithandthe2dand9thcorps.Itrequireduntilthattimeforthe9thcorpstogetupandintoposition.Theattackwasmadeasordered,andthefightingcontinuedwithbutlittleintermissionuntilsixo'clockthenextmorning,andresultedinourcarryingtheadvanceandsomeofthemainworksoftheenemytotheright(ourleft)ofthosepreviouslycapturedbyGeneralSmith,severalpiecesofartillery,andoverfourhundredprisoners.

The5thcorpshavinggotup,theattackswererenewedandpersistedinwithgreatvigoronthe17thand18th,butonlyresultedinforcingtheenemyintoan

greatvigoronthe17thand18th,butonlyresultedinforcingtheenemyintoaninteriorline,fromwhichhecouldnotbedislodged.Theadvantagesofpositiongainedbyuswereverygreat.ThearmythenproceededtoenvelopPetersburgtowardstheSouthSideRailroadasfaraspossiblewithoutattackingfortifications.

Onthe16ththeenemy,toreinforcePetersburg,withdrewfromapartofhisintrenchmentinfrontofBermudaHundred,expecting,nodoubt,togettroopsfromnorthoftheJamestotaketheplaceofthosewithdrawnbeforewecoulddiscoverit.GeneralButler,takingadvantageofthis,atoncemovedaforceontherailroadbetweenPetersburgandRichmond.AssoonasIwasapprisedoftheadvantagethusgained,toretainitIorderedtwodivisionsofthe6thcorps,GeneralWrightcommanding,thatwereembarkingatWilcox'sLanding,underordersforCityPoint,toreporttoGeneralButleratBermudaHundred,ofwhichGeneralButlerwasnotified,andtheimportanceofholdingapositioninadvanceofhispresentlineurgeduponhim.

Abouttwoo'clockintheafternoonGeneralButlerwasforcedbacktothelinetheenemyhadwithdrawnfrominthemorning.GeneralWright,withhistwodivisions,joinedGeneralButlerontheforenoonofthe17th,thelatterstillholdingwithastrongpicket-linetheenemy'sworks.Butinsteadofputtingthesedivisionsintotheenemy'sworkstoholdthem,hepermittedthemtohaltandrestsomedistanceintherearofhisownline.Betweenfourandfiveo'clockintheafternoontheenemyattackedanddroveinhispicketsandre-occupiedhisoldline.

Onthenightofthe20thandmorningofthe21stalodgmentwaseffectedbyGeneralButler,withonebrigadeofinfantry,onthenorthbankoftheJames,atDeepBottom,andconnectedbypontoon-bridgewithBermudaHundred.

Onthe19th,GeneralSheridan,onhisreturnfromhisexpeditionagainsttheVirginiaCentralRailroad,arrivedattheWhiteHousejustastheenemy'scavalrywasabouttoattackit,andcompelledittoretire.Theresultofthisexpeditionwas,thatGeneralSheridanmettheenemy'scavalrynearTrevilianStation,onthemorningofthe11thofJune,whomheattacked,andafteranobstinatecontestdrovefromthefieldincompleterout.Helefthisdeadandnearlyallhiswoundedinourhands,andaboutfourhundredprisonersandseveralhundredhorses.Onthe12thhedestroyedtherailroadfromTrevilianStationtoLouisaCourtHouse.Thisoccupieduntilthreeo'clockP.M.,whenheadvancedinthedirectionofGordonsville.Hefoundtheenemyreinforcedbyinfantry,behind

directionofGordonsville.Hefoundtheenemyreinforcedbyinfantry,behindwell-constructedrifle-pits,aboutfivemilesfromthelatterplaceandtoostrongtosuccessfullyassault.Ontheextremeright,however,hisreservebrigadecarriedtheenemy'sworkstwice,andwastwicedriventherefrombyinfantry.Nightclosedthecontest.Nothavingsufficientammunitiontocontinuetheengagement,andhisanimalsbeingwithoutforage(thecountryfurnishingbutinferiorgrazing),andhearingnothingfromGeneralHunter,hewithdrewhiscommandtothenorthsideoftheNorthAnna,andcommencedhisreturnmarch,reachingWhiteHouseatthetimebeforestated.Afterbreakingupthedepotatthatplace,hemovedtotheJamesRiver,whichhereachedsafelyafterheavyfighting.Hecommencedcrossingonthe25th,nearFortPowhatan,withoutfurthermolestation,andrejoinedtheArmyofthePotomac.

Onthe22d,GeneralWilson,withhisowndivisionofcavalryoftheArmyofthePotomac,andGeneralKautz'sdivisionofcavalryoftheArmyoftheJamesmovedagainsttheenemy'srailroadssouthofRichmond.StrikingtheWeldonRailroadatReams'sStation,destroyingthedepotandseveralmilesoftheroad,andtheSouthSideroadaboutfifteenmilesfromPetersburg,tonearNottowayStation,wherehemetanddefeatedaforceoftheenemy'scavalry.HereachedBurkesvilleStationontheafternoonofthe23d,andfromtheredestroyedtheDanvilleRailroadtoRoanokeBridge,adistanceoftwenty-fivemiles,wherehefoundtheenemyinforce,andinapositionfromwhichhecouldnotdislodgehim.Hethencommencedhisreturnmarch,andonthe28thmettheenemy'scavalryinforceattheWeldonRailroadcrossingofStonyCreek,wherehehadaseverebutnotdecisiveengagement.ThencehemadeadetourfromhisleftwithaviewofreachingReams'sStation(supposingittobeinourpossession).Atthisplacehewasmetbytheenemy'scavalry,supportedbyinfantry,andforcedtoretire,withthelossofhisartilleryandtrains.Inthislastencounter,GeneralKautz,withapartofhiscommand,becameseparated,andmadehiswayintoourlines.GeneralWilson,withtheremainderofhisforce,succeededincrossingtheNottowayRiverandcominginsafelyonourleftandrear.Thedamagetotheenemyinthisexpeditionmorethancompensatedforthelosseswesustained.ItseveredallconnectionbyrailroadwithRichmondforseveralweeks.

Withaviewofcuttingtheenemy'srailroadfromnearRichmondtotheAnnarivers,andmakinghimwaryofthesituationofhisarmyintheShenandoah,and,intheeventoffailureinthis,totakeadvantageofhisnecessarywithdrawaloftroopsfromPetersburg,toexplodeaminethathadbeenpreparedinfrontofthe9thcorpsandassaulttheenemy'slinesatthatplace,onthenightofthe26thofJulythe2dcorpsandtwodivisionsofthecavalrycorpsandKautz'scavalrywerecrossedtothenorthbankoftheJamesRiverandjoinedtheforceGeneral

werecrossedtothenorthbankoftheJamesRiverandjoinedtheforceGeneralButlerhadthere.Onthe27ththeenemywasdrivenfromhisintrenchedposition,withthelossoffourpiecesofartillery.Onthe28thourlineswereextendedfromDeepBottomtoNewMarketRoad,butingettingthispositionwereattackedbytheenemyinheavyforce.Thefightinglastedforseveralhours,resultinginconsiderablelosstobothsides.Thefirstobjectofthismovehavingfailed,byreasonoftheverylargeforcethrowntherebytheenemy,Ideterminedtotakeadvantageofthediversionmade,byassaultingPetersburgbeforehecouldgethisforcebackthere.Onedivisionofthe2dcorpswaswithdrawnonthenightofthe28th,andmovedduringthenighttotherearofthe18thcorps,torelievethatcorpsintheline,thatitmightbefoot-looseintheassaulttobemade.Theothertwodivisionsofthe2dcorpsandSheridan'scavalrywerecrossedoveronthenightofthe29thandmovedinfrontofPetersburg.Onthemorningofthe30th,betweenfourandfiveo'clock,theminewassprung,blowingupabatteryandmostofaregiment,andtheadvanceoftheassaultingcolumn,formedofthe9thcorps,immediatelytookpossessionofthecratermadebytheexplosion,andthelineforsomedistancetotherightandleftofit,andadetachedlineinfrontofit,butforsomecausefailedtoadvancepromptlytotheridgebeyond.Hadtheydonethis,IhaveeveryreasontobelievethatPetersburgwouldhavefallen.Othertroopswereimmediatelypushedforward,butthetimeconsumedingettingthemupenabledtheenemytorallyfromhissurprise(whichhadbeencomplete),andgetforcestothispointforitsdefence.Thecapturedlinethusheldbeinguntenable,andofnoadvantagetous,thetroopswerewithdrawn,butnotwithoutheavyloss.Thusterminatedindisasterwhatpromisedtobethemostsuccessfulassaultofthecampaign.

Immediatelyupontheenemy'sascertainingthatGeneralHunterwasretreatingfromLynchburgbywayoftheKanawhaRiver,thuslayingtheShenandoahValleyopenforraidintoMarylandandPennsylvania,hereturnednorthwardandmoveddownthatvalley.Assoonasthismovementoftheenemywasascertained,GeneralHunter,whohadreachedtheKanawhaRiver,wasdirectedtomovehistroopswithoutdelay,byriverandrailroad,toHarper'sFerry;butowingtothedifficultyofnavigationbyreasonoflowwaterandbreaksintherailroad,greatdelaywasexperiencedingettingthere.Itbecamenecessary,therefore,tofindothertroopstocheckthismovementoftheenemy.Forthispurposethe6thcorpswastakenfromthearmiesoperatingagainstRichmond,towhichwasaddedthe19thcorps,thenfortunatelybeginningtoarriveinHamptonRoadsfromtheGulfDepartment,underordersissuedimmediatelyaftertheascertainmentoftheresultoftheRedRiverexpedition.ThegarrisonsofBaltimoreandWashingtonwereatthistimemadeupofheavy-artillery

ofBaltimoreandWashingtonwereatthistimemadeupofheavy-artilleryregiments,hundreddays'men,anddetachmentsfromtheinvalidcorps.OnedivisionundercommandofGeneralRicketts,ofthe6thcorps,wassenttoBaltimore,andtheremainingtwodivisionsofthe6thcorps,underGeneralWright,weresubsequentlysenttoWashington.Onthe3dofJulytheenemyapproachedMartinsburg.GeneralSigel,whowasincommandofourforcesthere,retreatedacrossthePotomacatShepherdtown;andGeneralWeber,commandingatHarper'sFerry,crossedtheoccupiedHagerstown,movingastrongcolumntowardsFrederickCity.GeneralWallace,withRickett'sdivisionandhisowncommand,thelattermostlynewandundisciplinedtroops,pushedoutfromBaltimorewithgreatpromptness,andmettheenemyinforceontheMonocacy,nearthecrossingoftherailroadbridge.Hisforcewasnotsufficienttoinsuresuccess,buthefoughttheenemynevertheless,andalthoughitresultedinadefeattoourarms,yetitdetainedtheenemy,andtherebyservedtoenableGeneralWrighttoreachWashingtonwithtwodivisionofthe6thcorps,andtheadvanceofthe19thcorps,beforehim.FromMonocacytheenemymovedonWashington,hiscavalryadvancereachingRockvilleontheeveningofthe10th.Onthe12thareconnoissancewasthrownoutinfrontofFortStevens,toascertaintheenemy'spositionandforce.Asevereskirmishensued,inwhichwelostabouttwohundredandeightyinkilledandwounded.Theenemy'slosswasprobablygreater.Hecommencedretreatingduringthenight.LearningtheexactconditionofaffairsatWashington,Irequestedbytelegraph,atforty-fiveminutespastelevenP.M.,onthe12th,theassignmentofMajor-GeneralH.G.Wrighttothecommandofallthetroopsthatcouldbemadeavailabletooperateinthefieldagainsttheenemy,anddirectedthatheshouldgetoutsideofthetrencheswithalltheforcehecould,andpushEarlytothelastmoment.GeneralWrightcommencedthepursuitonthe13th;onthe18ththeenemywasovertakenatSnicker'sFerry,ontheShenandoah,whenasharpskirmishoccurred;andonthe20th,GeneralAverellencounteredanddefeatedaportionoftherebelarmyatWinchester,capturingfourpiecesofartilleryandseveralhundredprisoners.

LearningthatEarlywasretreatingsouthtowardsLynchburgorRichmond,Idirectedthatthe6thand19thcorpsbegotbacktothearmiesoperatingagainstRichmond,sothattheymightbeusedinamovementagainstLeebeforethereturnofthetroopssentbyhimintothevalley;andthatHuntershouldremainintheShenandoahValley,keepingbetweenanyforceoftheenemyandWashington,actingonthedefensiveasmuchaspossible.Ifeltthatiftheenemyhadanynotionofreturning,thefactwouldbedevelopedbeforethe6thand19thcorpscouldleaveWashington.Subsequently,the19thcorpswasexceptedform

corpscouldleaveWashington.Subsequently,the19thcorpswasexceptedformtheordertoreturntotheJames.

Aboutthe25thitbecameevidentthattheenemywasagainadvancinguponMarylandandPennsylvania,andthe6thcorps,thenatWashington,wasorderedbacktothevicinityofHarper'sFerry.Therebelforcemoveddownthevalley,andsentaraidingpartyintoPennsylvaniawhichonthe30thburnedChambersburg,andthenretreated,pursuedbyourcavalry,towardsCumberland.TheyweremetanddefeatedbyGeneralKelley,andwithdiminishednumbersescapedintothemountainsofWestVirginia.FromthetimeofthefirstraidthetelegraphwireswerefrequentlydownbetweenWashingtonandCityPoint,makingitnecessarytotransmitmessagesapartofthewaybyboat.Ittookfromtwenty-fourtothirty-sixhourstogetdispatchesthroughandreturnanswerswouldbereceivedshowingadifferentstateoffactsfromthoseonwhichtheywerebased,causingconfusionandapparentcontradictionofordersthatmusthaveconsiderablyembarrassedthosewhohadtoexecutethem,andrenderedoperationsagainsttheenemylesseffectivethantheyotherwisewouldhavebeen.Toremedythisevil,itwasevidenttomymindthatsomepersonshouldhavethesupremecommandofalltheforcesintheDepartmentofWestVirginia,Washington,Susquehanna,andtheMiddleDepartment,andIsorecommended.

Onthe2dofAugust,IorderedGeneralSheridantoreportinpersontoMajor-GeneralHalleck,chiefofstaff,atWashington,withaviewtohisassignmenttothecommandofalltheforcesagainstEarly.AtthistimetheenemywasconcentratedintheneighborhoodofWinchester,whileourforces,underGeneralHunter,wereconcentratedontheMonocacy,atthecrossingoftheBaltimoreandOhioRailroad,leavingopentotheenemyWesternMarylandandSouthernPennsylvania.FromwhereIwas,IhesitatedtogivepositiveordersforthemovementofourforcesatMonocacy,lestbysodoingIshouldexposeWashington.Therefore,onthe4th,IleftCityPointtovisitHunter'scommand,anddetermineformyselfwhatwasbesttobedone.Onarrivalthere,andafterconsultationwithGeneralHunter,Iissuedtohimthefollowinginstructions:

"MONOCACYBRIDGE,MARYLAND,August5,1864—8P.M.

"GENERAL:—ConcentrateallyouravailableforcewithoutdelayinthevicinityofHarper'sFerry,leavingonlysuchrailroadguardsandgarrisonsforpublicpropertyasmaybenecessary.Use,inthisconcentrating,therailroad,ifbysodoingtimecanbesaved.FromHarper'sFerry,ifitisfoundthattheenemyhasmovednorthofthePotomacinlargeforce,pushnorth,followinghimand

movednorthofthePotomacinlargeforce,pushnorth,followinghimandattackinghimwhereverfound;followhim,ifdrivensouthofthePotomac,aslongasitissafetodoso.IfitisascertainedthattheenemyhasbutasmallforcenorthofthePotomac,thenpushsouthwiththemainforce,detachingunderacompetentcommander,asufficientforcetolookaftertheraiders,anddrivethemtotheirhomes.Indetachingsuchaforce,thebrigadeofthecavalrynowenroutefromWashingtonviaRockvillemaybetakenintoaccount.

"Therearenowontheirwaytojoinyouthreeotherbrigadesofthebestcavalry,numberingatleastfivethousandmenandhorses.Thesewillbeinstructed,intheabsenceoffurtherorders,tojoinyoubythesouthsideofthePotomac.Onebrigadewillprobablystartto-morrow.InpushinguptheShenandoahValley,whereitisexpectedyouwillhavetogofirstorlast,itisdesirablethatnothingshouldbelefttoinvitetheenemytoreturn.Takeallprovisions,forage,andstockwantedfortheuseofyourcommand;suchascannotbeconsumed,destroy.Itisnotdesirablethatthebuildingsshouldbedestroyed—theyshouldratherbeprotected;butthepeopleshouldbeinformedthat,solongasanarmycansubsistamongthem,recurrenceofthesesraidsmustbeexpected,andwearedeterminedtostopthematallhazards.

"Bearinmind,theobjectistodrivetheenemysouth;andtodothisyouwanttokeephimalwaysinsight.Beguidedinyourcoursebythecoursehetakes.

"Makeyourownarrangementsforsuppliesofallkinds,givingregularvouchersforsuchasmaybetakenfromloyalcitizensinthecountrythroughwhichyoumarch.

"U.S.GRANT,Lieutenant-General."MAJOR-GENERALD.HUNTER."

Thetroopswereimmediatelyputinmotion,andtheadvancereachedHalltownthatnight.

GeneralHunterhaving,inourconversation,expressedawillingnesstoberelievedfromcommand,ItelegraphedtohaveGeneralSheridan,thenatWashington,senttoHarper'sFerrybythemorningtrain,withorderstotakegeneralcommandofallthetroopsinthefield,andtocallonGeneralHunteratMonocacy,whowouldturnovertohimmyletterofinstructions.IremainedatMonocacyuntilGeneralSheridanarrived,onthemorningofthe6th,and,afteraconferencewithhiminrelationtomilitaryaffairsinthatvicinity,Ireturnedto

conferencewithhiminrelationtomilitaryaffairsinthatvicinity,IreturnedtoCityPointbywayofWashington.

Onthe7thofAugust,theMiddleDepartment,andtheDepartmentsofWestVirginia,Washington,andSusquehanna,wereconstitutedintothe"MiddleMilitaryDivision,"andMajor-GeneralSheridanwasassignedtotemporarycommandofthesame.

Twodivisionsofcavalry,commandedbyGeneralsTorbertandWilson,weresenttoSheridanfromtheArmyofthePotomac.ThefirstreachedhimatHarper'sFerryaboutthe11thofAugust.

HisoperationsduringthemonthofAugustandtheforepartofSeptemberwerebothofanoffensiveanddefensivecharacter,resultinginmanysevereskirmishes,principallybythecavalry,inwhichweweregenerallysuccessful,butnogeneralengagementtookplace.Thetwoarmieslayinsuchaposition—theenemyonthewestbankoftheOpequonCreekcoveringWinchester,andourforcesinfrontofBerryville—thateithercouldbringonabattleatanytime.DefeattouswouldlayopentotheenemytheStatesofMarylandandPennsylvaniaforlongdistancesbeforeanotherarmycouldbeinterposedtocheckhim.UnderthesecircumstancesIhesitatedaboutallowingtheinitiativetobetaken.Finally,theuseoftheBaltimoreandOhioRailroad,andtheChesapeakeandOhioCanal,whichwerebothobstructedbytheenemy,becamesoindispensablynecessarytous,andtheimportanceofrelievingPennsylvaniaandMarylandfromcontinuouslythreatenedinvasionsogreat,thatIdeterminedtheriskshouldbetaken.ButfearingtotelegraphtheorderforanattackwithoutknowingmorethanIdidofGeneralSheridan'sfeelingsastowhatwouldbetheprobableresult,IleftCityPointonthe15thofSeptembertovisithimathisheadquarters,todecide,afterconferencewithhim,whatshouldbedone.ImethimatCharlestown,andhepointedoutsodistinctlyhoweacharmylay;whathecoulddothemomenthewasauthorized,andexpressedsuchconfidenceofsuccess,thatIsawtherewerebuttwowordsofinstructionsnecessary—Goin!Fortheconveniencesofforage,theteamsforsupplyingthearmywerekeptatHarper'sFerry.IaskedhimifhecouldgetouthisteamsandsuppliesintimetomakeanattackontheensuingTuesdaymorning.Hisreplywas,thathecouldbeforedaylightonMonday.Hewasoffpromptlytotime,andImayhereadd,thattheresultwassuchthatIhaveneversincedeemeditnecessarytovisitGeneralSheridanbeforegivinghimorders.

Earlyonthemorningofthe19th,GeneralSheridanattackedGeneralEarlyatthecrossingontheOpequonCreek,andafteramostsanguinaryandbloodybattle,

crossingontheOpequonCreek,andafteramostsanguinaryandbloodybattle,lastinguntilfiveo'clockintheevening,defeatedhimwithheavyloss,carryinghisentirepositionfromOpequonCreektoWinchester,capturingseveralthousandprisonersandfivepiecesofartillery.Theenemyrallied,andmadeastandinastrongpositionatFisher'sHill,wherehewasattacked,andagaindefeatedwithheavylossonthe20th[22d].SheridanpursuedhimwithgreatenergythroughHarrisonburg,Staunton,andthegapsoftheBlueRidge.Afterstrippingtheuppervalleyofmostofthesuppliesandprovisionsfortherebelarmy,hereturnedtoStrasburg,andtookpositiononthenorthsideofCedarCreek.

Havingreceivedconsiderablereinforcements,GeneralEarlyagainreturnedtothevalley,and,onthe9thofOctober,hiscavalryencounteredoursnearStrasburg,wheretherebelsweredefeated,withthelossofelevenpiecesofartilleryandthreehundredandfiftyprisoners.Onthenightofthe18th,theenemycrossedthemountainswhichseparatethebranchesoftheShenandoah,fordedtheNorthFork,andearlyonthemorningofthe19th,undercoverofthedarknessandthefog,surprisedandturnedourleftflank,andcapturedthebatterieswhichenfiladedourwholeline.Ourtroopsfellbackwithheavylossandinmuchconfusion,butwerefinallyralliedbetweenMiddletownandNewtown.Atthisjuncture,GeneralSheridan,whowasatWinchesterwhenthebattlecommencedarrivedonthefield,arrangedhislinesjustintimetorepulseaheavyattackoftheenemy,andimmediatelyassumingtheoffensive,heattackedinturnwithgreatvigor.Theenemywasdefeatedwithgreatslaughter,andthelossofmostofhisartilleryandtrains,andthetrophieshehadcapturedinthemorning.Thewreckofhisarmyescapedduringthenight,andfledinthedirectionofStauntonandLynchburg.PursuitwasmadetoMountJackson.Thusendedthis,theenemy'slastattempttoinvadetheNorthviatheShenandoahValley.Iwasnowenabledtoreturnthe6thcorpstotheArmyofthePotomac,andtosendonedivisionfromSheridan'sarmytotheArmyoftheJames,andanothertoSavannah,Georgia,toholdSherman'snewacquisitionsonthesea-coast,andthusenablehimtomovewithoutdetachingfromhisforceforthatpurpose.

ReportsfromvarioussourcesledmetobelievethattheenemyhaddetachedthreedivisionsfromPetersburgtoreinforceEarlyintheShenandoahValley.Ithereforesentthe2dcorpsandGregg'sdivisionofcavalry,oftheArmyofthePotomac,andaforceofGeneralButler'sarmy,onthenightofthe13thofAugust,tothreatenRichmondfromthenorthsideoftheJames,topreventhimfromsendingtroopsaway,and,ifpossible,todrawbackthosesent.Inthismove

fromsendingtroopsaway,and,ifpossible,todrawbackthosesent.Inthismovewecapturedsixpiecesofartilleryandseveralhundredprisoners,detainedtroopsthatwereundermarchingorders,andascertainedthatbutonedivision(Kershaw's),ofthethreereputeddetached,hadgone.

TheenemyhavingwithdrawnheavilyfromPetersburgtoresistthismovement,the5thcorps,GeneralWarrencommanding,wasmovedoutonthe18th,andtookpossessionoftheWeldonRailroad.Duringthedayhehadconsiderablefighting.Toregainpossessionoftheroad,theenemymaderepeatedanddesperateassaults,butwaseachtimerepulsedwithgreatloss.Onthenightofthe20th,thetroopsonthenorthsideoftheJameswerewithdrawn,andHancockandGreggreturnedtothefrontatPetersburg.Onthe25th,the2dcorpsandGregg'sdivisionofcavalry,whileatReams'sStationdestroyingtherailroad,wereattacked,andafterdesperatefighting,apartofourlinegaveway,andfivepiecesofartilleryfellintothehandsoftheenemy.

Bythe12thofSeptember,abranchrailroadwascompletedfromtheCityPointandPetersburgRailroadtotheWeldonRailroad,enablingustosupply,withoutdifficulty,inallweather,thearmyinfrontofPetersburg.

TheextensionofourlinesacrosstheWeldonRailroadcompelledtheenemytosoextendhis,thatitseemedhecouldhavebutfewtroopsnorthoftheJamesforthedefenceofRichmond.Onthenightofthe28th,the10thcorps,Major-GeneralBirney,andthe18thcorps,Major-GeneralOrdcommanding,ofGeneralButler'sarmy,werecrossedtothenorthsideoftheJames,andadvancedonthemorningofthe29th,carryingtheverystrongfortificationsandintrenchmentsbelowChaffin'sFarm,knownasFortHarrison,capturingfifteenpiecesofartillery,andtheNewMarketRoadandintrenchments.ThissuccesswasfollowedupbyagallantassaultuponFortGilmer,immediatelyinfrontoftheChaffinFarmfortifications,inwhichwewererepulsedwithheavyloss.Kautz'scavalrywaspushedforwardontheroadtotherightofthis,supportedbyinfantry,andreachedtheenemy'sinnerline,butwasunabletogetfurther.ThepositioncapturedfromtheenemywassothreateningtoRichmond,thatIdeterminedtoholdit.Theenemymadeseveraldesperateattemptstodislodgeus,allofwhichwereunsuccessful,andforwhichhepaiddearly.Onthemorningofthe30th,GeneralMeadesentoutareconnoissancewithaviewtoattackingtheenemy'sline,ifitwasfoundsufficientlyweakenedbywithdrawaloftroopstothenorthside.Inthisreconnoissancewecapturedandheldtheenemy'sworksnearPoplarSpringChurch.Intheafternoon,troopsmovingtogettotheleftofthepointgainedwereattackedbytheenemyinheavyforce,and

gettotheleftofthepointgainedwereattackedbytheenemyinheavyforce,andcompelledtofallbackuntilsupportedbytheforcesholdingthecapturedworks.OurcavalryunderGreggwasalsoattacked,butrepulsedtheenemywithgreatloss.

Onthe7thofOctober,theenemyattackedKautz'scavalrynorthoftheJames,anddroveitbackwithheavylossinkilled,wounded,andprisoners,andthelossofalltheartilleryeightorninepieces.Thishefollowedupbyanattackonourintrenchedinfantryline,butwasrepulsedwithsevereslaughter.Onthe13th,areconnoissancewassentoutbyGeneralButler,withaviewtodrivetheenemyfromsomenewworkshewasconstructing,whichresultedinveryheavylosstous.

Onthe27th,theArmyofthePotomac,leavingonlysufficientmentoholditsfortifiedline,movedbytheenemy'srightflank.The2dcorps,followedbytwodivisionsofthe5thcorps,withthecavalryinadvanceandcoveringourleftflank,forcedapassageofHatcher'sRun,andmovedupthesouthsideofittowardstheSouthSideRailroad,untilthe2dcorpsandpartofthecavalryreachedtheBoydtonPlankRoadwhereitcrossesHatcher'sRun.AtthispointweweresixmilesdistantfromtheSouthSideRailroad,whichIhadhopedbythismovementtoreachandhold.Butfindingthatwehadnotreachedtheendoftheenemy'sfortifications,andnoplacepresentingitselfforasuccessfulassaultbywhichhemightbedoubledupandshortened,Ideterminedtowithdrawtowithinourfortifiedline.Ordersweregivenaccordingly.ImmediatelyuponreceivingareportthatGeneralWarrenhadconnectedwithGeneralHancock,Ireturnedtomyheadquarters.SoonafterIlefttheenemymovedoutacrossHatcher'sRun,inthegapbetweenGeneralsHancockandWarren,whichwasnotclosedasreported,andmadeadesperateattackonGeneralHancock'srightandrear.GeneralHancockimmediatelyfacedhiscorpstomeetit,andafterabloodycombatdrovetheenemywithinhisworks,andwithdrewthatnighttohisoldposition.

Insupportofthismovement,GeneralButlermadeademonstrationonthenorthsideoftheJames,andattackedtheenemyontheWilliamsburgRoad,andalsoontheYorkRiverRailroad.Intheformerhewasunsuccessful;inthelatterhesucceededincarryingaworkwhichwasafterwardsabandoned,andhisforceswithdrawntotheirformerpositions.

FromthistimeforwardtheoperationsinfrontofPetersburgandRichmond,untilthespringcampaignof1865,wereconfinedtothedefenceandextensionofour

thespringcampaignof1865,wereconfinedtothedefenceandextensionofourlines,andtooffensivemovementsforcripplingtheenemy'slinesofcommunication,andtopreventhisdetachinganyconsiderableforcetosendsouth.Bythe7thofFebruary,ourlineswereextendedtoHatcher'sRun,andtheWeldonRailroadhadbeendestroyedtoHicksford.

GeneralShermanmovedfromChattanoogaonthe6thofMay,withtheArmiesoftheCumberland,Tennessee,andOhio,commanded,respectively,byGeneralsThomasMcPherson,andSchofield,uponJohnston'sarmyatDalton;butfindingtheenemy'spositionatBuzzard'sRoost,coveringDalton,toostrongtobeassaulted,GeneralMcPhersonwassentthroughSnakeGaptoturnit,whileGeneralsThomasandSchofieldthreateneditinfrontandonthenorth.Thismovementwassuccessful.Johnston,findinghisretreatlikelytobecutoff,fellbacktohisfortifiedpositionatResaca,wherehewasattackedontheafternoonofMay15th.Aheavybattleensued.Duringthenighttheenemyretreatedsouth.Lateonthe17th,hisrear-guardwasovertakennearAdairsville,andheavyskirmishingfollowed.Thenextmorning,however,hehadagaindisappeared.Hewasvigorouslypursued,andwasovertakenatCassvilleonthe19th,butduringtheensuingnightretreatedacrosstheEtowah.Whiletheseoperationsweregoingon,GeneralJeffersonC.Davis'sdivisionofThomas'sarmywassenttoRome,capturingitwithitsfortsandartillery,anditsvaluablemillsandfoundries.GeneralSherman,havinggivehisarmyafewdays'restatthispoint,againputitinmotiononthe23d,forDallas,withaviewofturningthedifficultpassatAllatoona.Ontheafternoonofthe25th,theadvance,underGeneralHooker,hadaseverebattlewiththeenemy,drivinghimbacktoNewHopeChurch,nearDallas.Severalsharpencountersoccurredatthispoint.Themostimportantwasonthe28th,whentheenemyassaultedGeneralMcPhersonatDallas,butreceivedaterribleandbloodyrepulse.

Onthe4thofJune,JohnstonabandonedhisintrenchedpositionatNewHopeChurch,andretreatedtothestrongpositionsofKenesaw,Pine,andLostmountains.Hewasforcedtoyieldthetwolast-namedplaces,andconcentratehisarmyonKenesaw,where,onthe27th,GeneralsThomasandMcPhersonmadeadeterminedbutunsuccessfulassault.Onthenightofthe2dofJuly,Shermancommencedmovinghisarmybytherightflank,andonthemorningofthe3d,foundthattheenemy,inconsequenceofthismovement,hadabandonedKenesawandretreatedacrosstheChattahoochee.

GeneralShermanremainedontheChattahoocheetogivehismenrestandgetupstoresuntilthe17thofJuly,whenheresumedhisoperations,crossedtheChattahoochee,destroyedalargeportionoftherailroadtoAugusta,anddrove

Chattahoochee,destroyedalargeportionoftherailroadtoAugusta,anddrovetheenemybacktoAtlanta.AtthisplaceGeneralHoodsucceededGeneralJohnstonincommandoftherebelarmy,andassumingtheoffensive-defensivepolicy,madeseveralsevereattacksuponShermaninthevicinityofAtlanta,themostdesperateanddeterminedofwhichwasonthe22dofJuly.AboutoneP.M.ofthisdaythebrave,accomplished,andnoble-heartedMcPhersonwaskilled.GeneralLogansucceededhim,andcommandedtheArmyoftheTennesseethroughthisdesperatebattle,anduntilhewassupersededbyMajor-GeneralHoward,onthe26th,withthesamesuccessandabilitythathadcharacterizedhiminthecommandofacorpsordivision.

Inalltheseattackstheenemywasrepulsedwithgreatloss.Findingitimpossibletoentirelyinvesttheplace,GeneralSherman,aftersecuringhislineofcommunicationsacrosstheChattahoochee,movedhismainforceroundbytheenemy'sleftflankupontheMontgomeryandMaconroads,todrawtheenemyfromhisfortifications.Inthishesucceeded,andafterdefeatingtheenemynearRough-and-Ready,Jonesboro,andLovejoy's,forcinghimtoretreattothesouth,onthe2dofSeptemberoccupiedAtlanta,theobjectivepointofhiscampaign.

Aboutthetimeofthismove,therebelcavalry,underWheeler,attemptedtocuthiscommunicationsintherear,butwasrepulsedatDalton,anddrivenintoEastTennessee,whenceitproceededwesttoMcMinnville,Murfreesboro,andFranklin,andwasfinallydrivensouthoftheTennessee.Thedamagedonebythisraidwasrepairedinafewdays.

DuringthepartialinvestmentofAtlanta,GeneralRousseaujoinedGeneralShermanwithaforceofcavalryfromDecatur,havingmadeasuccessfulraidupontheAtlantaandMontgomeryRailroad,anditsbranchesnearOpelika.CavalryraidswerealsomadebyGeneralsMcCook,Garrard,andStoneman,tocuttheremainingRailroadcommunicationwithAtlanta.Thefirsttwoweresuccessfulthelatter,disastrous.

GeneralSherman'smovementfromChattanoogatoAtlantawasprompt,skilful,andbrilliant.Thehistoryofhisflankmovementsandbattlesduringthatmemorablecampaignwilleverbereadwithaninterestunsurpassedbyanythinginhistory.

Hisownreport,andthoseofhissubordinatecommanders,accompanyingit,givethedetailsofthatmostsuccessfulcampaign.

Hewasdependentforthesupplyofhisarmiesuponasingle-trackrailroadfrom

Hewasdependentforthesupplyofhisarmiesuponasingle-trackrailroadfromNashvilletothepointwherehewasoperating.Thispassedtheentiredistancethroughahostilecountry,andeveryfootofithadtobeprotectedbytroops.ThecavalryforceoftheenemyunderForrest,inNorthernMississippi,wasevidentlywaitingforShermantoadvancefarenoughintothemountainsofGeorgia,tomakearetreatdisastrous,togetuponthislineanddestroyitbeyondthepossibilityoffurtheruse.Toguardagainstthisdanger,ShermanleftwhathesupposedtobeasufficientforcetooperateagainstForrestinWestTennessee.HedirectedGeneralWashburn,whocommandedthere,tosendBrigadier-GeneralS.D.Sturgisincommandofthisforcetoattackhim.Onthemorningofthe10thofJune,GeneralSturgismettheenemynearGuntown,Mississippi,wasbadlybeaten,anddrivenbackinutterroutandconfusiontoMemphis,adistanceofaboutonehundredmiles,hotlypursuedbytheenemy.Bythis,however,theenemywasdefeatedinhisdesignsuponSherman'slineofcommunications.Thepersistencywithwhichhefollowedupthissuccessexhaustedhim,andmadeaseasonforrestandrepairsnecessary.Inthemeantime,Major-GeneralA.J.Smith,withthetroopsoftheArmyoftheTennesseethathadbeensentbyGeneralShermantoGeneralBanks,arrivedatMemphisontheirreturnfromRedRiver,wheretheyhaddonemostexcellentservice.HewasdirectedbyGeneralShermantoimmediatelytaketheoffensiveagainstForrest.Thishedidwiththepromptnessandeffectwhichhascharacterizedhiswholemilitarycareer.Onthe14thofJuly,hemettheenemyatTupelo,Mississippi,andwhippedhimbadly.Thefightingcontinuedthroughthreedays.Ourlosswassmallcomparedwiththatoftheenemy.Havingaccomplishedtheobjectofhisexpedition,GeneralSmithreturnedtoMemphis.

DuringthemonthsofMarchandAprilthissameforceunderForrestannoyedusconsiderably.Onthe24thofMarchitcapturedUnionCity,Kentucky,anditsgarrison,andonthe24thattackedPaducah,commandedbyColonelS.G.Hicks,40thIllinoisVolunteers.ColonelH.,havingbutasmallforce,withdrewtothefortsneartheriver,fromwhereherepulsedtheenemyanddrovehimfromtheplace.

Onthe13thofApril,partofthisforce,undertherebelGeneralBuford,summonedthegarrisonofColumbus,Kentucky,tosurrender,butreceivedforreplyfromColonelLawrence,34thNewJerseyVolunteers,thatbeingplacedtherebyhisGovernmentwithadequateforcetoholdhispostandrepelallenemiesfromit,surrenderwasoutofthequestion.

OnthemorningofthesamedayForrestattackedFortPillow,Tennessee,

OnthemorningofthesamedayForrestattackedFortPillow,Tennessee,garrisonedbyadetachmentofTennesseecavalryandthe1stRegimentAlabamacoloredtroops,commandedbyMajorBooth.Thegarrisonfoughtbravelyuntilaboutthreeo'clockintheafternoon,whentheenemycarriedtheworksbyassault;and,afterourmenthrewdowntheirarms,proceededtoaninhumanandmercilessmassacreofthegarrison.

Onthe14th,GeneralBuford,havingfailedatColumbus,appearedbeforePaducah,butwasagaindrivenoff.

Guerillasandraiders,seeminglyemboldenedbyForrest'soperations,werealsoveryactiveinKentucky.ThemostnotedofthesewasMorgan.Withaforceoffromtwotothreethousandcavalry,heenteredtheStatethroughPoundGapinthelatterpartofMay.Onthe11thofJunetheyattackedandcapturedCynthiana,withitsentiregarrison.Onthe12thhewasovertakenbyGeneralBurbridge,andcompletelyroutedwithheavyloss,andwasfinallydrivenoutoftheState.ThisnotoriousguerillawasafterwardssurprisedandkillednearGreenville,Tennessee,andhiscommandcapturedanddispersedbyGeneralGillem.

IntheabsenceofofficialreportsofthecommencementoftheRedRiverexpedition,exceptsofarasrelatestothemovementsofthetroopssentbyGeneralShermanunderGeneralA.J.Smith,Iamunabletogivethedateofitsstarting.ThetroopsunderGeneralSmith,comprisingtwodivisionsofthe16thandadetachmentofthe17tharmycorps,leftVicksburgonthe10thofMarch,andreachedthedesignatedpointonRedRiveronedayearlierthanthatappointedbyGeneralBanks.TherebelforcesatFortdeRussy,thinkingtodefeathim,leftthefortonthe14thtogivehimbattleintheopenfield;but,whileoccupyingtheenemywithskirmishinganddemonstrations,SmithpushedforwardtoFortdeRussy,whichhadbeenleftwithaweakgarrison,andcaptureditwithitsgarrisonaboutthreehundredandfiftymen,elevenpiecesofartillery,andmanysmall-arms.Ourlosswasbutslight.Onthe15thhepushedforwardtoAlexandria,whichplacehereachedonthe18th.Onthe21sthehadanengagementwiththeenemyatHenderson'sHill,inwhichhedefeatedhim,capturingtwohundredandtenprisonersandfourpiecesofartillery.

Onthe28th,heagainattackedanddefeatedtheenemyundertherebelGeneralTaylor,atCaneRiver.Bythe26th,GeneralBankshadassembledhiswholearmyatAlexandria,andpushedforwardtoGrandEcore.OnthemorningofApril6thhemovedfromGrandEcore.Ontheafternoonofthe7th,headvancedandmettheenemynearPleasantHill,anddrovehimfromthefield.OnthesameafternoontheenemymadeastandeightmilesbeyondPleasantHill,butwas

afternoontheenemymadeastandeightmilesbeyondPleasantHill,butwasagaincompelledtoretreat.Onthe8th,atSabineCrossRoadsandPeachHill,theenemyattackedanddefeatedhisadvance,capturingnineteenpiecesofartilleryandanimmenseamountoftransportationandstores.Duringthenight,GeneralBanksfellbacktoPleasantHill,whereanotherbattlewasfoughtonthe9th,andtheenemyrepulsedwithgreatloss.Duringthenight,GeneralBankscontinuedhisretrogrademovementtoGrandEcore,andthencetoAlexandria,whichhereachedonthe27thofApril.HereaseriousdifficultyaroseingettingAdmiralPorter'sfleetwhichaccompaniedtheexpedition,overtherapids,thewaterhavingfallensomuchsincetheypassedupastopreventtheirreturn.AtthesuggestionofColonel(nowBrigadier-General)Bailey,andunderhissuperintendence,wing-damswereconstructed,bywhichthechannelwascontractedsothatthefleetpasseddowntherapidsinsafety.

ThearmyevacuatedAlexandriaonthe14thofMay,afterconsiderableskirmishingwiththeenemy'sadvance,andreachedMorganziaandPointCoupeeneartheendofthemonth.Thedisastrousterminationofthisexpedition,andthelatenessoftheseason,renderedimpracticablethecarryingoutofmyplansofamovementinforcesufficienttoinsurethecaptureofMobile.

Onthe23dofMarch,Major-GeneralSteeleleftLittleRockwiththe7tharmycorps,tocooperatewithGeneralBanks'sexpeditionontheRedRiver,andreachedArkadelphiaonthe28th.Onthe16thofApril,afterdrivingtheenemybeforehim,hewasjoined,nearElkin'sFerry,inWashitaCounty,byGeneralThayer,whohadmarchedfromFortSmith.Afterseveralsevereskirmishes,inwhichtheenemywasdefeated,GeneralSteelereachedCamden,whichheoccupiedaboutthemiddleofApril.

OnlearningthedefeatandconsequentretreatofGeneralBanksonRedRiver,andthelossofoneofhisowntrainsatMark'sMill,inDallasCounty,GeneralSteeledeterminedtofallbacktotheArkansasRiver.HeleftCamdenonthe26thofApril,andreachedLittleRockonthe2dofMay.Onthe30thofApril,theenemyattackedhimwhilecrossingSalineRiveratJenkins'sFerry,butwasrepulsedwithconsiderableloss.Ourlosswasaboutsixhundredinkilled,woundedandprisoners.

Major-GeneralCanby,whohadbeenassignedtothecommandofthe"MilitaryDivisionoftheWestMississippi,"wasthereforedirectedtosendthe19tharmycorpstojointhearmiesoperatingagainstRichmond,andtolimittheremainderofhiscommandtosuchoperationsasmightbenecessarytoholdthepositions

ofhiscommandtosuchoperationsasmightbenecessarytoholdthepositionsandlinesofcommunicationshethenoccupied.

BeforestartingGeneralA.J.Smith'stroopsbacktoSherman,GeneralCanbysentapartofittodisperseaforceoftheenemythatwascollectingneartheMississippiRiver.GeneralSmithmetanddefeatedthisforcenearLakeChicotonthe5thofJune.Ourlosswasaboutfortykilledandseventywounded.

InthelatterpartofJuly,GeneralCanbysentMajor-GeneralGordonGranger,withsuchforcesashecouldcollect,tocooperatewithAdmiralFarragutagainstthedefencesofMobileBay.Onthe8thofAugust,FortGainessurrenderedtothecombinednavalandlandforces.FortPowellwasblownupandabandoned.

Onthe9th,FortMorganwasinvested,and,afteraseverebombardment,surrenderedonthe23d.Thetotalcapturesamountedtoonethousandfourhundredandsixty-fourprisoners,andonehundredandfourpiecesofartillery.

AboutthelastofAugust,itbeingreportedthattherebelGeneralPrice,withaforceofabouttenthousandmen,hadreachedJacksonport,onhiswaytoinvadeMissouri,GeneralA.J.Smith'scommand,thenenroutefromMemphistojoinSherman,wasorderedtoMissouri.Acavalryforcewasalso,atthesametime,sentfromMemphis,undercommandofColonelWinslow.ThismadeGeneralRosecrans'sforcessuperiortothoseofPrice,andnodoubtwasentertainedhewouldbeabletocheckPriceanddrivehimback;whiletheforcesunderGeneralSteele,inArkansas,wouldcutoffhisretreat.Onthe26thdayofSeptember,PriceattackedPilotKnobandforcedthegarrisontoretreat,andthencemovednorthtotheMissouriRiver,andcontinuedupthatrivertowardsKansas.GeneralCurtis,commandingDepartmentofKansas,immediatelycollectedsuchforcesashecouldtorepeltheinvasionofKansas,whileGeneralRosecrans'scavalrywasoperatinginhisrear.

TheenemywasbroughttobattleontheBigBlueanddefeated,withthelossofnearlyallhisartilleryandtrainsandalargenumberofprisoners.HemadeaprecipitateretreattoNorthernArkansas.TheimpunitywithwhichPricewasenabledtoroamovertheStateofMissouriforalongtime,andtheincalculablemischiefdonebyhim,showtohowlittlepurposeasuperiorforcemaybeused.ThereisnoreasonwhyGeneralRosecransshouldnothaveconcentratedhisforces,andbeatenanddrivenPricebeforethelatterreachedPilotKnob.

September20th,theenemy'scavalry,underForrest,crossedtheTennesseenear

September20th,theenemy'scavalry,underForrest,crossedtheTennesseenearWaterloo,Alabama,andonthe23dattackedthegarrisonatAthens,consistingofsixhundredmen,whichcapitulatedonthe24th.Soonafterthesurrendertworegimentsofreinforcementsarrived,andafteraseverefightwerecompelledtosurrender.Forrestdestroyedtherailroadwestward,capturedthegarrisonatSulphurBranchtrestle,skirmishedwiththegarrisonatPulaskionthe27th,andonthesamedaycuttheNashvilleandChattanoogaRailroadnearTullahomaandDechard.Onthemorningofthe30th,onecolumnofForrest'scommand,underBuford,appearedbeforeHuntsville,andsummonedthesurrenderofthegarrison.Receivingananswerinthenegative,heremainedinthevicinityoftheplaceuntilnextmorning,whenheagainsummoneditssurrender,andreceivedthesamereplyasonthenightbefore.HewithdrewinthedirectionofAthenswhichplacehadbeenregarrisoned,andattackeditontheafternoonofthe1stofOctober,butwithoutsuccess.Onthemorningofthe2dherenewedhisattack,butwashandsomelyrepulsed.

AnothercolumnunderForrestappearedbeforeColumbiaonthemorningofthe1st,butdidnotmakeanattack.Onthemorningofthe3dhemovedtowardsMountPleasant.Whiletheseoperationsweregoingon,everyexertionwasmadebyGeneralThomastodestroytheforcesunderForrestbeforehecouldrecrosstheTennessee,butwasunabletopreventhisescapetoCorinth,Mississippi.

InSeptember,anexpeditionunderGeneralBurbridgewassenttodestroythesaltworksatSaltville,Virginia.Hemettheenemyonthe2dofOctober,aboutthreemilesandahalffromSaltville,anddrovehimintohisstronglyintrenchedpositionaroundthesaltworks,fromwhichhewasunabletodislodgehim.DuringthenighthewithdrewhiscommandandreturnedtoKentucky.

GeneralSherman,immediatelyafterthefallofAtlanta,puthisarmiesincampinandabouttheplace,andmadeallpreparationsforrefittingandsupplyingthemforfutureservice.ThegreatlengthofroadfromAtlantatotheCumberlandRiver,however,whichhadtobeguarded,allowedthetroopsbutlittlerest.

DuringthistimeJeffersonDavismadeaspeechinMacon,Georgia,whichwasreportedinthepapersoftheSouth,andsoonbecameknowntothewholecountry,disclosingtheplansoftheenemy,thusenablingGeneralShermantofullymeetthem.Heexhibitedtheweaknessofsupposingthatanarmythathadbeenbeatenandfearfullydecimatedinavainattemptatthedefensive,couldsuccessfullyundertaketheoffensiveagainstthearmythathadsooftendefeatedit.

it.

Inexecutionofthisplan,Hood,withthisarmy,wassoonreportedtothesouth-westofAtlanta.MovingfartoSherman'sright,hesucceededinreachingtherailroadaboutBigShanty,andmovednorthonit.

GeneralSherman,leavingaforcetoholdAtlanta,withtheremainderofhisarmyfelluponhimanddrovehimtoGadsden,Alabama.SeeingtheconstantannoyancehewouldhavewiththeroadstohisrearifheattemptedtoholdAtlanta,GeneralShermanproposedtheabandonmentanddestructionofthatplace,withalltherailroadsleadingtoit,andtelegraphedmeasfollows:

"CENTREVILLE,GEORGIA",October10—noon.

"DispatchaboutWilsonjustreceived.HoodisnowcrossingCoosaRiver,twelvemilesbelowRome,boundwest.IfhepassesovertheMobileandOhioroad,hadInotbetterexecutetheplanofmylettersentbyColonelPorter,andleaveGeneralThomaswiththetroopsnowinTennesseetodefendtheState?HewillhaveanampleforcewhenthereinforcementsorderedreachNashville.

"W.T.SHERMAN,Major-General."LIEUTENANT-GENERALGRANT."

Forafullunderstandingoftheplanreferredtointhisdispatch,IquotefromthelettersentbyColonelPorter:

"Iwillthereforegivemyopinion,thatyourarmyandCanby'sshouldbereinforcedtothemaximum;thatafteryougetWilmington,youstrikeforSavannahandtheriver;thatCanbybeinstructedtoholdtheMississippiRiver,andsendaforcetogetColumbus,Georgia,eitherbythewayoftheAlabamaortheAppalachicola,andthatIkeepHoodemployedandputmyarmyinfinalorderforamarchonAugusta,Columbia,andCharleston,tobereadyassoonasWilmingtonissealedastocommerceandthecityofSavannahisinourpossession."ThiswasinreplytoaletterofmineofdateSeptember12th,inanswertoadispatchofhiscontainingsubstantiallythesameproposition,andinwhichIinformedhimofaproposedmovementagainstWilmington,andofthesituationinVirginia,etc.

"CITYPOINT,VIRGINIA,

"CITYPOINT,VIRGINIA,

"October11,1864—11A.M.

"YourdispatchofOctober10threceived.DoesitnotlookasifHoodwasgoingtoattempttheinvasionofMiddleTennessee,usingtheMobileandOhioandMemphisandCharlestonroadstosupplyhisbaseontheTennesseeRiver,aboutFlorenceorDecatur?Ifhedoesthis,heoughttobemetandpreventedfromgettingnorthoftheTennesseeRiver.Ifyouweretocutloose,IdonotbelieveyouwouldmeetHood'sarmy,butwouldbebushwhackedbyalltheoldmenandlittleboys,andsuchrailroadguardsasarestillleftathome.HoodwouldprobablystrikeforNashville,thinkingthatbygoingnorthhecouldinflictgreaterdamageuponusthanwecouldupontherebelsbygoingsouth.IfthereisanywayofgettingatHood'sarmy,Iwouldpreferthat,butImusttrusttoyourownjudgment.IfindIshallnotbeabletosendaforcefromheretoactwithyouonSavannah.Yourmovements,therefore,willbeindependentofmine;atleastuntilthefallofRichmondtakesplace.IamafraidThomas,withsuchlinesofroadashehastoprotect,couldnotpreventHoodfromgoingnorth.WithWilsonturnedloose,withallyourcavalry,youwillfindtherebelsputmuchmoreonthedefensivethanheretofore.

"U.S.GRANT,Lieutenant-General."MAJOR-GENERALW.T.SHERMAN."

"KINGSTON,GEORGIA,"October11—11A.M.

"HoodmovedhisarmyfromPalmettoStationacrossbyDallasandCedartown,andisnowontheCoosaRiver,southofRome.HethrewonecorpsonmyroadatAcworth,andIwasforcedtofollow.IholdAtlantawiththe20thcorps,andhavestrongdetachmentsalongmyline.Thisreducesmyactiveforcetoacomparativelysmallarmy.Wecannotremainhereonthedefensive.Withthetwenty-fivethousandmen,andtheboldcavalryhehas,hecanconstantlybreakmyroads.Iwouldinfinitelyprefertomakeawreckoftheroad,andofthecountryfromChattanoogatoAtlantaincludingthelattercitysendbackallmywoundedandworthless,andwithmyeffectivearmy,movethroughGeorgia,smashingthings,tothesea.HoodmayturnintoTennesseeandKentucky,butIbelievehewillbeforcedtofollowme.Insteadofmybeingonthedefensive,Iwouldbeontheoffensive;insteadofguessingatwhathemeanstodo,hewouldhavetoguessatmyplans.Thedifferenceinwarisfulltwenty-fivepercent.I

havetoguessatmyplans.Thedifferenceinwarisfulltwenty-fivepercent.IcanmakeSavannah,Charleston,orthemouthoftheChattahoochee.

"Answerquick,asIknowwewillnothavethetelegraphlong.

"W.T.SHERMAN,Major-General."LIEUTENANT-GENERALGRANT."

"CITYPOINT,VIRGINIA,"October11,1864—11.30P.M.

"Yourdispatchofto-dayreceived.Ifyouaresatisfiedthetriptothesea-coastcanbemade,holdingthelineoftheTennesseeRiverfirmly,youmaymakeit,destroyingalltherailroadsouthofDaltonorChattanooga,asyouthinkbest.

"U.S.GRANT,Lieutenant-General."MAJOR-GENERALW.T.SHERMAN."

ItwastheoriginaldesigntoholdAtlanta,andbygettingthroughtothecoast,withagarrisonleftonthesouthernrailroads,leadingeastandwest,throughGeorgia,toeffectuallysevertheeastfromthewest.Inotherwords,cutthewould-beConfederacyintwoagain,asithadbeencutoncebyourgainingpossessionoftheMississippiRiver.GeneralSherman'splanvirtuallyeffectedthisobject.

GeneralShermancommencedatoncehispreparationsforhisproposedmovement,keepinghisarmyinpositioninthemeantimetowatchHood.BecomingsatisfiedthatHoodhadmovedwestwardfromGadsdenacrossSandMountain,GeneralShermansentthe4thcorps,Major-GeneralStanleycommanding,andthe23dcorps,Major-GeneralSchofieldcommanding,backtoChattanoogatoreporttoMajor-GeneralThomas,atNashville,whomhehadplacedincommandofallthetroopsofhismilitarydivision,savethefourarmycorpsandcavalrydivisionhedesignedtomovewiththroughGeorgia.Withthetroopsthusleftathisdisposal,therewaslittledoubtthatGeneralThomascouldholdthelineoftheTennessee,or,intheeventHoodshouldforceit,wouldbeabletoconcentrateandbeathiminbattle.ItwasthereforereadilyconsentedtothatShermanshouldstartforthesea-coast.

HavingconcentratedhistroopsatAtlantabythe14thofNovember,hecommencedhismarch,threateningbothAugustaandMacon.Hiscoming-outpointcouldnotbedefinitelyfixed.Havingtogatherhissubsistenceashe

pointcouldnotbedefinitelyfixed.Havingtogatherhissubsistenceashemarchedthroughthecountry,itwasnotimpossiblethataforceinferiortohisownmightcompelhimtoheadforsuchpointashecouldreach,insteadofsuchashemightprefer.Theblindnessoftheenemy,however,inignoringhismovement,andsendingHood'sarmy,theonlyconsiderableforcehehadwestofRichmondandeastoftheMississippiRiver,northwardonanoffensivecampaign,leftthewholecountryopen,andSherman'sroutetohisownchoice.

Howthatcampaignwasconducted,howlittleoppositionwasmetwith,theconditionofthecountrythroughwhichthearmiespassed,thecaptureofFortMcAllister,ontheSavannahRiver,andtheoccupationofSavannahonthe21stofDecember,areallclearlysetforthinGeneralSherman'sadmirablereport.

SoonafterGeneralShermancommencedhismarchfromAtlanta,twoexpeditions,onefromBatonRouge,Louisiana,andonefromVicksburg,Mississippi,werestartedbyGeneralCanbytocuttheenemy'slinesofcommunicationwithMobileanddetaintroopsinthatfield.GeneralFoster,commandingDepartmentoftheSouth,alsosentanexpedition,viaBroadRiver,todestroytherailroadbetweenCharlestonandSavannah.TheexpeditionfromVicksburg,undercommandofBrevetBrigadier-GeneralE.D.Osband(colonel3dUnitedStatescoloredcavalry),captured,onthe27thofNovember,anddestroyedtheMississippiCentralRailroadbridgeandtrestle-workoverBigBlackRiver,nearCanton,thirtymilesoftheroad,andtwolocomotives,besideslargeamountsofstores.TheexpeditionfromBatonRougewaswithoutfavorableresults.TheexpeditionfromtheDepartmentoftheSouth,undertheimmediatecommandofBrigadier-GeneralJohnP.Hatch,consistingofaboutfivethousandmenofallarms,includingabrigadefromthenavy,proceededupBroadRiveranddebarkedatBoyd'sNeckonthe29thofNovember,fromwhereitmovedtostriketherailroadatGrahamsville.AtHoneyHill,aboutthreemilesfromGrahamsville,theenemywasfoundandattackedinastronglyfortifiedposition,whichresulted,afterseverefighting,inourrepulsewithalossofsevenhundredandforty-sixinkilled,wounded,andmissing.DuringthenightGeneralHatchwithdrew.Onthe6thofDecemberGeneralFosterobtainedapositioncoveringtheCharlestonandSavannahRailroad,betweentheCoosawhatchieandTulifinnyrivers.

Hood,insteadoffollowingSherman,continuedhismovenorthward,whichseemedtometobeleadingtohiscertaindoom.Atallevents,hadIhadthepowertocommandbotharmies,Ishouldnothavechangedtheordersunderwhichheseemedtobeacting.Onthe26thofOctober,theadvanceofHood's

whichheseemedtobeacting.Onthe26thofOctober,theadvanceofHood'sarmyattackedthegarrisonatDecatur,Alabama,butfailingtocarrytheplace,withdrewtowardsCourtland,andsucceeded,inthefaceofourcavalry,ineffectingalodgmentonthenorthsideoftheTennesseeRiver,nearFlorence.Onthe28th,ForrestreachedtheTennessee,atFortHeiman,andcapturedagunboatandthreetransports.Onthe2dofNovemberheplantedbatteriesaboveandbelowJohnsonville,ontheoppositesideoftheriver,isolatingthreegunboatsandeighttransports.Onthe4ththeenemyopenedhisbatteriesupontheplace,andwasrepliedtofromthegunboatsandthegarrison.Thegunboatsbecomingdisabledweresetonfire,asalsowerethetransports,topreventtheirfallingintothehandsoftheenemy.Aboutamillionandahalfdollars'worthofstoreandpropertyontheleveeandinstorehouseswasconsumedbyfire.Onthe5ththeenemydisappearedandcrossedtothenorthsideoftheTennesseeRiver,aboveJohnsonville,movingtowardsClifton,andsubsequentlyjoinedHood.Onthenightofthe5th,GeneralSchofield,withtheadvanceofthe23dcorps,reachedJohnsonville,butfindingtheenemygone,wasorderedtoPulaski,andwasputincommandofallthetroopersthere,withinstructiontowatchthemovementsofHoodandretardhisadvance,butnottoriskageneralengagementuntilthearrivalofGeneralA.J.Smith'scommandfromMissouri,anduntilGeneralWilsoncouldgethiscavalryremounted.

Onthe19th,GeneralHoodcontinuedhisadvance.GeneralThomas,retardinghimasmuchaspossible,fellbacktowardsNashvilleforthepurposeofconcentratinghiscommandandgainingtimeforthearrivalofreinforcements.Theenemycomingupwithourmainforce,commandedbyGeneralSchofield,atFranklin,onthe30th,assaultedourworksrepeatedlyduringtheafternoonuntillateatnight,butwereineveryinstancerepulsed.Hislossinthisbattlewasonethousandsevenhundredandfiftykilled,sevenhundredandtwoprisoners,andthreethousandeighthundredwounded.Amonghislossesweresixgeneralofficerskilled,sixwounded,andonecaptured.Ourentirelosswastwothousandthreehundred.Thiswasthefirstseriousoppositiontheenemymetwith,andIamsatisfiedwasthefatalblowtoallhisexpectations.Duringthenight,GeneralSchofieldfellbacktowardsNashville.Thisleftthefieldtotheenemy—notlostbybattle,butvoluntarilyabandoned—sothatGeneralThomas'swholeforcemightbebroughttogether.TheenemyfollowedupandcommencedtheestablishmentofhislineinfrontofNashvilleonthe2dofDecember.

AssoonasitwasascertainedthatHoodwascrossingtheTennesseeRiver,andthatPricewasgoingoutofMissouri,GeneralRosecranswasorderedtosendtoGeneralThomasthetroopsofGeneralA.J.Smith'scommand,andsuchothertroopsashecouldspare.TheadvanceofthisreinforcementreachedNashville

troopsashecouldspare.TheadvanceofthisreinforcementreachedNashvilleonthe30thofNovember.

Onthemorningofthe15thDecember,GeneralThomasattackedHoodinposition,and,inabattlelastingtwodays,defeatedanddrovehimfromthefieldintheutmostconfusion,leavinginourhandmostofhisartilleryandmanythousandprisoners,includingfourgeneralofficers.

BeforethebattleofNashvilleIgrewveryimpatientover,asitappearedtome,theunnecessarydelay.ThisimpatiencewasincreaseduponlearningthattheenemyhadsentaforceofcavalryacrosstheCumberlandintoKentucky.IfearedHoodwouldcrosshiswholearmyandgiveusgreattroublethere.AfterurginguponGeneralThomasthenecessityofimmediatelyassumingtheoffensive,IstartedWesttosuperintendmattersthereinperson.ReachingWashingtonCity,IreceivedGeneralThomas'sdispatchannouncinghisattackupontheenemy,andtheresultasfarasthebattlehadprogressed.Iwasdelighted.Allfearsandapprehensionsweredispelled.IamnotyetsatisfiedbutthatGeneralThomas,immediatelyupontheappearanceofHoodbeforeNashville,andbeforehehadtimetofortify,shouldhavemovedoutwithhiswholeforceandgivenhimbattle,insteadofwaitingtoremounthiscavalry,whichdelayedhimuntiltheinclemencyoftheweathermadeitimpracticabletoattackearlierthanhedid.ButhisfinaldefeatofHoodwassocomplete,thatitwillbeacceptedasavindicationofthatdistinguishedofficer'sjudgment.

AfterHood'sdefeatatNashvilleheretreated,closelypursuedbycavalryandinfantry,totheTennesseeRiver,beingforcedtoabandonmanypiecesofartilleryandmostofhistransportation.Onthe28thofDecemberouradvancedforcesascertainedthathehadmadegoodhisescapetothesouthsideoftheriver.

Aboutthistime,therainshavingsetinheavilyinTennesseeandNorthAlabama,makingitdifficulttomovearmytransportationandartillery,GeneralThomasstoppedthepursuitbyhismainforceattheTennesseeRiver.Asmallforceofcavalry,underColonelW.J.Palmer,15thPennsylvaniaVolunteers,continuedtofollowHoodforsomedistance,capturingconsiderabletransportationandalltheenemy'spontoon-bridge.ThedetailsoftheseoperationswillbefoundclearlysetforthinGeneralThomas'sreport.

Acavalryexpedition,underBrevetMajor-GeneralGrierson,startedfromMemphisonthe21stofDecember.Onthe25thhesurprisedandcapturedForrest'sdismountedcampatVerona,Mississippi,ontheMobileandOhio

Forrest'sdismountedcampatVerona,Mississippi,ontheMobileandOhioRailroad,destroyedtherailroad,sixteencarsloadedwithwagonsandpontoonsforHood'sarmy,fourthousandnewEnglishcarbines,andlargeamountsofpublicstores.Onthemorningofthe28thheattackedandcapturedaforceoftheenemyatEgypt,anddestroyedatrainoffourteencars;thenceturningtothesouth-west,hestrucktheMississippiCentralRailroadatWinona,destroyedthefactoriesandlargeamountsofstoresatBankston,andthemachine-shopsandpublicpropertyatGrenada,arrivingatVicksburgJanuary5th.

DuringtheoperationsinMiddleTennessee,theenemy,withaforceunderGeneralBreckinridge,enteredEastTennessee.Onthe13thofNovemberheattackedGeneralGillem,nearMorristown,capturinghisartilleryandseveralhundredprisoners.Gillem,withwhatwasleftofhiscommand,retreatedtoKnoxville.Followinguphissuccess,BreckinridgemovedtonearKnoxville,butwithdrewonthe18th,followedbyGeneralAmmen.UnderthedirectionsofGeneralThomas,GeneralStonemanconcentratedthecommandsofGeneralsBurbridgeandGillemnearBean'sStationtooperateagainstBreckinridge,anddestroyordrivehimintoVirginia—destroythesaltworksatSaltville,andtherailroadintoVirginiaasfarashecouldgowithoutendangeringhiscommand.Onthe12thofDecemberhecommencedhismovement,capturinganddispersingtheenemy'sforceswhereverhemetthem.Onthe16thhestrucktheenemy,underVaughn,atMarion,completelyroutingandpursuinghimtoWytheville,capturingallhisartillery,trains,andonehundredandninety-eightprisoners;anddestroyedWytheville,withitsstoresandsupplies,andtheextensivelead-worksnearthere.ReturningtoMarion,hemetaforceunderBreckinridge,consisting,amongothertroops,ofthegarrisonofSaltville,thathadstartedinpursuit.Heatoncemadearrangementstoattackitthenextmorning;butmorningfoundBreckinridgegone.HethenmoveddirectlytoSaltville,anddestroyedtheextensivesaltworksatthatplace,alargeamountofstores,andcapturedeightpiecesofartillery.Havingthussuccessfullyexecutedhisinstructions,hereturnedGeneralBurbridgetoLexingtonandGeneralGillemtoKnoxville.

Wilmington,NorthCarolina,wasthemostimportantsea-coastportlefttotheenemythroughwhichtogetsuppliesfromabroad,andsendcottonandotherproductsoutbyblockade-runners,besidesbeingaplaceofgreatstrategicvalue.ThenavyhadbeenmakingstrenuousexertionstosealtheharborofWilmington,butwithonlypartialeffect.ThenatureoftheoutletofCapeFearRiverwassuch,thatitrequiredwatchingforsogreatadistancethat,withoutpossessionofthelandnorthofNewInlet,orFortFisher,itwasimpossibleforthenavyto

thelandnorthofNewInlet,orFortFisher,itwasimpossibleforthenavytoentirelyclosetheharboragainsttheentranceofblockade-runners.

Tosecurethepossessionofthislandrequiredthecooperationofalandforce,whichIagreedtofurnish.ImmediatelycommencedtheassemblageinHamptonRoads,underAdmiralD.D.Porter,ofthemostformidablearmadaevercollectedforconcentrationupononegivenpoint.Thisnecessarilyattractedtheattentionoftheenemy,aswellasthatoftheloyalNorth;andthroughtheimprudenceofthepublicpress,andverylikelyofofficersofbothbranchesofservice,theexactobjectoftheexpeditionbecameasubjectofcommondiscussioninthenewspapersbothNorthandSouth.Theenemy,thuswarned,preparedtomeetit.ThiscausedapostponementoftheexpeditionuntilthelaterpartofNovember,when,beingagaincalleduponbyHon.G.V.Fox,AssistantSecretaryoftheNavy,Iagreedtofurnishthemenrequiredatonce,andwentmyself,incompanywithMajor-GeneralButler,toHamptonRoads,wherewehadaconferencewithAdmiralPorterastotheforcerequiredandthetimeofstarting.Aforceofsixthousandfivehundredmenwasregardedassufficient.Thetimeofstartingwasnotdefinitelyarranged,butitwasthoughtallwouldbereadybythe6thofDecember,ifnotbefore.Learning,onthe30thofNovember,thatBragghadgonetoGeorgia,takingwithhimmostoftheforcesaboutWilmington,IdeemeditoftheutmostimportancethattheexpeditionshouldreachitsdestinationbeforethereturnofBragg,anddirectedGeneralButlertomakeallarrangementsforthedepartureofMajor-GeneralWeitzel,whohadbeendesignatedtocommandthelandforces,sothatthenavymightnotbedetainedonemoment.

Onthe6thofDecember,thefollowinginstructionsweregiven:

"CITYPOINT,VIRGINIA,December6,1864.

"GENERAL:ThefirstobjectoftheexpeditionunderGeneralWeitzelistoclosetotheenemytheportofWilmington.Ifsuccessfulinthis,thesecondwillbetocaptureWilmingtonitself.Therearereasonablegroundstohopeforsuccess,ifadvantagecanbetakenoftheabsenceofthegreaterpartoftheenemy'sforcesnowlookingafterShermaninGeorgia.Thedirectionsyouhavegivenforthenumbersandequipmentoftheexpeditionareallright,exceptintheunimportantmatterofwheretheyembarkandtheamountofintrenchingtoolstobetaken.TheobjectoftheexpeditionwillbegainedbyeffectingalandingonthemainlandbetweenCapeFearRiverandtheAtlantic,northofthenorthentrancetotheriver.ShouldsuchlandingbeeffectedwhiletheenemystillholdsFortFisher

river.ShouldsuchlandingbeeffectedwhiletheenemystillholdsFortFisherandthebatteriesguardingtheentrancetotheriver,thenthetroopsshouldintrenchthemselves,and,bycooperatingwiththenavy,effectthereductionandcaptureofthoseplaces.Theseinourhands,thenavycouldentertheharbor,andtheportofWilmingtonwouldbesealed.ShouldFortFisherandthepointoflandonwhichitisbuiltfallintothehandsofourtroopsimmediatelyonlanding,thenitwillbeworththeattempttocaptureWilmingtonbyaforcedmarchandsurprise.Iftimeisconsumedingainingthefirstobjectoftheexpedition,thesecondwillbecomeamatterofafterconsideration.

"Thedetailsforexecutionareintrustedtoyouandtheofficerimmediatelyincommandofthetroops.

"ShouldthetroopsunderGeneralWeitzelfailtoeffectalandingatornearFortFisher,theywillbereturnedtothearmiesoperatingagainstRichmondwithoutdelay.

"U.S.GRANT,Lieutenant-General."MAJOR-GENERALB.F.BUTLER."

GeneralButlercommandingthearmyfromwhichthetroopsweretakenforthisenterprise,andtheterritorywithinwhichtheyweretooperate,militarycourtesyrequiredthatallordersandinstructionsshouldgothroughhim.Theyweresosent,butGeneralWeitzelhassinceofficiallyinformedmethatheneverreceivedtheforegoinginstructions,norwasheawareoftheirexistence,untilhereadGeneralButler'spublishedofficialreportoftheFortFisherfailure,withmyindorsementandpapersaccompanyingit.IhadnoideaofGeneralButler'saccompanyingtheexpeditionuntiltheeveningbeforeitgotofffromBermudaHundred,andthendidnotdreambutthatGeneralWeitzelhadreceivedalltheinstructions,andwouldbeincommand.IratherformedtheideathatGeneralButlerwasactuatedbyadesiretowitnesstheeffectoftheexplosionofthepowder-boat.TheexpeditionwasdetainedseveraldaysatHamptonRoads,awaitingtheloadingofthepowder-boat.

TheimportanceofgettingtheWilmingtonexpeditionoffwithoutanydelay,withorwithoutthepowder-boat,hadbeenurgeduponGeneralButler,andheadvisedtosonotifyAdmiralPorter.

Theexpeditionfinallygotoffonthe13thofDecember,andarrivedattheplaceofrendezvous,offNewInlet,nearFortFisher,ontheeveningofthe15th.

ofrendezvous,offNewInlet,nearFortFisher,ontheeveningofthe15th.AdmiralPorterarrivedontheeveningofthe18th,havingputinatBeauforttogetammunitionforthemonitors.Theseabecomingrough,makingitdifficulttolandtroops,andthesupplyofwaterandcoalbeingaboutexhausted,thetransportfleetputbacktoBeauforttoreplenish;this,withthestateoftheweather,delayedthereturntotheplaceofrendezvousuntilthe24th.Thepowder-boatwasexplodedonthemorningofthe24th,beforethereturnofGeneralButlerfromBeaufort;butitwouldseem,fromthenoticetakenofitintheSouthernnewspapers,thattheenemywereneverenlightenedastotheobjectoftheexplosionuntiltheywereinformedbytheNorthernpress.

Onthe25thalandingwaseffectedwithoutopposition,andareconnoissance,underBrevetBrigadier-GeneralCurtis,pusheduptowardsthefort.Butbeforereceivingafullreportoftheresultofthisreconnoissance,GeneralButler,indirectviolationoftheinstructionsgiven,orderedthere-embarkationofthetroopsandthereturnoftheexpedition.There-embarkationwasaccomplishedbythemorningofthe27th.

OnthereturnoftheexpeditionofficersandmenamongthemBrevetMajor-General(thenBrevetBrigadier-General)N.M.Curtis,First-LieutenantG.W.Ross,117thRegimentNewYorkVolunteers,First-LieutenantWilliamH.Walling,andSecond-LieutenantGeorgeSimpson,142dNewYorkVolunteersvoluntarilyreportedtomethatwhenrecalledtheywerenearlyintothefort,and,intheiropinion,itcouldhavebeentakenwithoutmuchloss.

Soonafterthereturnoftheexpedition,IreceivedadispatchfromtheSecretaryoftheNavy,andaletterfromAdmiralPorter,informingmethatthefleetwasstilloffFortFisher,andexpressingtheconvictionthat,underaproperleader,theplacecouldbetaken.Thenaturalsuppositionwithmewas,thatwhenthetroopsabandonedtheexpedition,thenavywoulddosoalso.Findingithadnot,however,Iansweredonthe30thofDecember,advisingAdmiralPortertoholdon,andthatIwouldsendaforceandmakeanotherattempttotaketheplace.ThistimeIselectedBrevetMajor-General(nowMajor-General)A.H.Terrytocommandtheexpedition.Thetroopscomposingitconsistedofthesamethatcomposedtheformer,withtheadditionofasmallbrigade,numberingaboutonethousandfivehundred,andasmallsiegetrain.Thelatteritwasneverfoundnecessarytoland.Icommunicateddirecttothecommanderoftheexpeditionthefollowinginstructions:

"CITYPOINT,VIRGINIA,January3,1865.

"CITYPOINT,VIRGINIA,January3,1865.

"GENERAL:TheexpeditionintrustedtoyourcommandhasbeenfittedouttorenewtheattempttocaptureFortFisher,N.C.,andWilmingtonultimately,ifthefortfalls.YouwillthenproceedwithaslittledelayaspossibletothenavalfleetlyingoffCapeFearRiver,andreportthearrivalofyourselfandcommandtoAdmiralD.D.Porter,commandingNorthAtlanticBlockadingSquadron.

"Itisexceedinglydesirablethatthemostcompleteunderstandingshouldexistbetweenyourselfandthenavalcommander.Isuggest,therefore,thatyouconsultwithAdmiralPorterfreely,andgetfromhimtheparttobeperformedbyeachbranchofthepublicservice,sothattheremaybeunityofaction.Itwouldbewelltohavethewholeprogrammelaiddowninwriting.IhaveservedwithAdmiralPorter,andknowthatyoucanrelyonhisjudgmentandhisnervetoundertakewhatheproposes.Iwould,therefore,defertohimasmuchasisconsistentwithyourownresponsibilities.ThefirstobjecttobeattainedistogetafirmpositiononthespitoflandonwhichFortFisherisbuilt,fromwhichyoucanoperateagainstthatfort.Youwanttolooktothepracticabilityofreceivingyoursupplies,andtodefendingyourselfagainstsuperiorforcessentagainstyoubyanyoftheavenuesleftopentotheenemy.Ifsuchapositioncanbeobtained,thesiegeofFortFisherwillnotbeabandoneduntilitsreductionisaccomplished,oranotherplanofcampaignisorderedfromtheseheadquarters.

"Myownviewsare,thatifyoueffectalanding,thenavyoughttorunaportionoftheirfleetintoCapeFearRiver,whilethebalanceofitoperatesontheoutside.LandforcescannotinvestFortFisher,orcutitofffromsuppliesorreinforcements,whiletheriverisinpossessionoftheenemy.

"Asiege-trainwillbeloadedonvesselsandsenttoFortMonroe,inreadinesstobesenttoyouifrequired.AllothersuppliescanbedrawnfromBeaufortasyouneedthem.

"Keepthefleetofvesselswithyouuntilyourpositionisassured.Whenyoufindtheycanbespared,orderthemback,orsuchofthemasyoucanspare,toFortMonroe,toreportfororders.

"Incaseoffailuretoeffectalanding,bringyourcommandbacktoBeaufort,andreporttotheseheadquartersforfurtherinstructions.YouwillnotdebarkatBeaufortuntilsodirected.

"GeneralSheridanhasbeenorderedtosendadivisionoftroopstoBaltimoreand

"GeneralSheridanhasbeenorderedtosendadivisionoftroopstoBaltimoreandplacethemonsea-goingvessels.ThesetroopswillbebroughttoFortMonroeandkeptthereonthevesselsuntilyouareheardfrom.Shouldyourequirethem,theywillbesenttoyou.

"U.S.GRANT,Lieutenant-General."BREVETMAJOR-GENERALA.H.TERRY."

Lieutenant-ColonelC.B.Comstock,aide-de-camp(nowbrevetbrigadier-general),whoaccompaniedtheformerexpedition,wasassigned,inorders,aschief-engineertothis.

Itwillbeseenthattheseinstructionsdidnotdiffermateriallyfromthosegivenforthefirstexpedition,andthatinneitherinstancewasthereanordertoassaultFortFisher.Thiswasamatterleftentirelytothediscretionofthecommandingofficer.

TheexpeditionsailedfromFortMonroeonthemorningofthe6th,arrivingattherendezvous,offBeaufort,onthe8th,where,owingtothedifficultiesoftheweather,itlayuntilthemorningofthe12th,whenitgotunderwayandreacheditsdestinationthatevening.Undercoverofthefleet,thedisembarkationofthetroopscommencedonthemorningofthe13th,andbythreeo'clockP.M.wascompletedwithoutloss.Onthe14thareconnoissancewaspushedtowithinfivehundredyardsofFortFisher,andasmalladvanceworktakenpossessionofandturnedintoadefensivelineagainstanyattemptthatmightbemadefromthefort.Thisreconnoissancedisclosedthefactthatthefrontoftheworkhadbeenseriouslyinjuredbythenavyfire.Intheafternoonofthe15ththefortwasassaulted,andaftermostdesperatefightingwascaptured,withitsentiregarrisonandarmament.Thuswassecured,bythecombinedeffortsofthenavyandarmy,oneofthemostimportantsuccessesofthewar.Ourlosswas:killed,onehundredandten;wounded,fivehundredandthirty-six.Onthe16thandthe17ththeenemyabandonedandblewupFortCaswellandtheworksonSmith'sIsland,whichwereimmediatelyoccupiedbyus.ThisgaveusentirecontrolofthemouthoftheCapeFearRiver.

Atmyrequest,Mayor-GeneralB.F.Butlerwasrelieved,andMajor-GeneralE.O.C.OrdassignedtotheDepartmentofVirginiaandNorthCarolina.

ThedefenceofthelineoftheTennesseenolongerrequiringtheforcewhichhad

ThedefenceofthelineoftheTennesseenolongerrequiringtheforcewhichhadbeatenandnearlydestroyedtheonlyarmynowthreateningit,IdeterminedtofindotherfieldsofoperationforGeneralThomas'ssurplustroops—fieldsfromwhichtheywouldcooperatewithothermovements.GeneralThomaswasthereforedirectedtocollectalltroops,notessentialtoholdhiscommunicationsatEastport,inreadinessfororders.Onthe7thofJanuary,GeneralThomaswasdirected,ifhewasassuredofthedepartureofHoodsouthfromCorinth,tosendGeneralSchofieldwithhiscorpseastwithaslittledelayaspossible.Thisdirectionwaspromptlycompliedwith,andtheadvanceofthecorpsreachedWashingtononthe23dofthesamemonth,whenceitwassenttoFortFisherandNewBern.Onthe26thhewasdirectedtosendGeneralA.J.Smith'scommandandadivisionofcavalrytoreporttoGeneralCanby.Bythe7thofFebruarythewholeforcewasenrouteforitsdestination.

TheStateofNorthCarolinawasconstitutedintoamilitarydepartment,andGeneralSchofieldassignedtocommand,andplacedundertheordersofMajor-GeneralSherman.Thefollowinginstructionsweregivenhim:

"CITYPOINT,VA.,January31,1865.

"GENERAL:—*YourmovementsareintendedascooperativewithSherman'sthroughtheStatesofSouthandNorthCarolina.ThefirstpointtobeattainedistosecureWilmington.Goldsboro'willthenbeyourobjectivepoint,movingeitherfromWilmingtonorNewBern,orboth,asyoudeembest.ShouldyounotbeabletoreachGoldsboro',youwilladvanceonthelineorlinesofrailwayconnectingthatplacewiththesea-coast—asneartoitasyoucan,buildingtheroadbehindyou.Theenterpriseunderyouhastwoobjects:thefirstistogiveGeneralShermanmaterialaid,ifneeded,inhismarchnorth;thesecond,toopenabaseofsuppliesforhimonhislineofmarch.Assoon,therefore,asyoucandeterminewhichofthetwopoints,WilmingtonorNewBern,youcanbestuseforthrowingsuppliesfrom,totheinterior,youwillcommencetheaccumulationoftwentydays'rationsandforageforsixtythousandmenandtwentythousandanimals.Youwillgetoftheseasmanyasyoucanhouseandprotecttosuchpointintheinteriorasyoumaybeabletooccupy.IbelieveGeneralPalmerhasreceivedsomeinstructionsdirectfromGeneralShermanonthesubjectofsecuringsuppliesforhisarmy.Youwilllearnwhatstepshehastaken,andbegovernedinyourrequisitionsaccordingly.Asupplyofordnancestoreswillalsobenecessary.

"MakeallrequisitionsuponthechiefsoftheirrespectivedepartmentsinthefieldwithmeatCityPoint.Communicatewithmebyeveryopportunity,andshouldyoudeemitnecessaryatanytime,sendaspecialboattoFortressMonroe,fromwhichpointyoucancommunicatebytelegraph.

"Thesuppliesreferredtointheseinstructionsareexclusiveofthoserequiredforyourowncommand.

"Themovementsoftheenemymayjustify,orevenmakeityourimperativeduty,tocutloosefromyourbase,andstrikefortheinteriortoaidSherman.Insuchcaseyouwillactonyourownjudgmentwithoutwaitingforinstructions.Youwillreport,however,whatyoupurposedoing.Thedetailsforcarryingouttheseinstructionsarenecessarilylefttoyou.Iwouldurge,however,ifIdidnotknowthatyouarealreadyfullyalivetotheimportanceofit,promptaction.ShermanmaybelookedforintheneighborhoodofGoldsboro'anytimefromthe22dtothe28thofFebruary;thislimitsyourtimeverymaterially.

"Ifrolling-stockisnotsecuredinthecaptureofWilmington,itcanbesuppliedfromWashington.AlargeforceofrailroadmenhavealreadybeensenttoBeaufort,andothermechanicswillgotoFortFisherinadayortwo.OnthispointIhaveinformedyoubytelegraph.

"U.S.GRANT,Lieutenant-General."MAJOR-GENERALJ.M.SCHOFIELD."

PrevioustogivingtheseinstructionsIhadvisitedFortFisher,accompaniedbyGeneralSchofield,forthepurposeofseeingformyselftheconditionofthings,andpersonallyconferringwithGeneralTerryandAdmiralPorterastowhatwasbesttobedone.

AnticipatingthearrivalofGeneralShermanatSavannahhisarmyentirelyfoot-loose,HoodbeingthenbeforeNashville,Tennessee,theSouthernrailroadsdestroyed,sothatitwouldtakeseveralmonthstore-establishathroughlinefromwesttoeast,andregardingthecaptureofLee'sarmyasthemostimportantoperationtowardsclosingtherebellion—IsentorderstoGeneralShermanonthe6thofDecember,thatafterestablishingabaseonthesea-coast,withnecessarygarrison,toincludeallhisartilleryandcavalry,tocomebywatertoCityPointwiththebalanceofhiscommand.

Onthe18thofDecember,havingreceivedinformationofthedefeatandutter

Onthe18thofDecember,havingreceivedinformationofthedefeatandutterroutofHood'sarmybyGeneralThomas,andthat,owingtothegreatdifficultyofprocuringoceantransportation,itwouldtakeovertwomonthstotransportSherman'sarmy,anddoubtingwhetherhemightnotcontributeasmuchtowardsthedesiredresultbyoperatingfromwherehewas,Iwrotetohimtothateffect,andaskedhimforhisviewsastowhatwouldbebesttodo.AfewdaysafterthisIreceivedacommunicationfromGeneralSherman,ofdate16thDecember,acknowledgingthereceiptofmyorderofthe6th,andinformingmeofhispreparationstocarryitintoeffectassoonashecouldgettransportation.Alsothathehadexpected,uponreducingSavannah,instantlytomarchtoColumbia,SouthCarolina,thencetoRaleigh,andthencetoreporttome;butthatthiswouldconsumeaboutsixweeks'timeafterthefallofSavannah,whereasbyseahecouldprobablyreachmebythemiddleofJanuary.Theconfidencehemanifestedinthisletterofbeingabletomarchupandjoinmepleasedme,and,withoutwaitingforareplytomyletterofthe18th,Idirectedhim,onthe28thofDecember,tomakepreparationstostartasheproposed,withoutdelay,tobreakuptherailroadsinNorthandSouthCarolina,andjointhearmiesoperatingagainstRichmondassoonashecould.

Onthe21stofJanuaryIinformedGeneralShermanthatIhadorderedthe23dcorps,Major-GeneralSchofieldcommanding,east;thatitnumberedabouttwenty-onethousandmen;thatwehadatFortFisher,abouteightthousandmen;atNewBern,aboutfourthousand;thatifWilmingtonwascaptured,GeneralSchofieldwouldgothere;ifnot,hewouldbesenttoNewBern;that,ineitherevent,allthesurplusforceatbothpointswouldmovetotheinteriortowardsGoldsboro',incooperationwithhismovement;thatfromeitherpointrailroadcommunicationcouldberunout;andthatallthesetroopswouldbesubjecttohisordersashecameintocommunicationwiththem.

Inobediencetohisinstructions,GeneralSchofieldproceededtoreduceWilmington,NorthCarolina,incooperationwiththenavyunderAdmiralPorter,movinghisforcesupbothsidesoftheCapeFearRiver.FortAnderson,theenemy'smaindefenceonthewestbankoftheriver,wasoccupiedonthemorningofthe19th,theenemyhavingevacuateditafterourappearancebeforeit.

Afterfightingon20thand21st,ourtroopsenteredWilmingtononthemorningofthe22d,theenemyhavingretreatedtowardsGoldsboro'duringthenight.PreparationswereatoncemadeforamovementonGoldsboro'intwocolumns—onefromWilmington,andtheotherfromNewBern—andtorepairthe

—onefromWilmington,andtheotherfromNewBern—andtorepairtherailroadleadingtherefromeachplace,aswellastosupplyGeneralShermanbyCapeFearRiver,towardsFayetteville,ifitbecamenecessary.ThecolumnfromNewBernwasattackedonthe8thofMarch,atWise'sForks,anddrivenbackwiththelossofseveralhundredprisoners.Onthe11ththeenemyrenewedhisattackuponourintrenchedposition,butwasrepulsedwithsevereloss,andfellbackduringthenight.Onthe14ththeNeuseRiverwascrossedandKinstonoccupied,andonthe21stGoldsboro'wasentered.ThecolumnfromWilmingtonreachedCox'sBridge,ontheNeuseRiver,tenmilesaboveGoldsboro',onthe22d.

Bythe1stofFebruary,GeneralSherman'swholearmywasinmotionfromSavannah.HecapturedColumbia,SouthCarolina,onthe17th;thencemovedonGoldsboro',NorthCarolina,viaFayetteville,reachingthelatterplaceonthe12thofMarch,openingupcommunicationwithGeneralSchofieldbywayofCapeFearRiver.Onthe15thheresumedhismarchonGoldsboro'.HemetaforceoftheenemyatAverysboro',andafteraseverefightdefeatedandcompelledittoretreat.Ourlossinthisengagementwasaboutsixhundred.Theenemy'slosswasmuchgreater.Onthe18ththecombinedforcesoftheenemy,underJoeJohnston,attackedhisadvanceatBentonville,capturingthreegunsanddrivingitbackuponthemainbody.GeneralSlocum,whowasintheadvanceascertainingthatthewholeofJohnston'sarmywasinthefront,arrangedhistroopsonthedefensive,intrenchedhimselfandawaitedreinforcements,whichwerepushedforward.Onthenightofthe21sttheenemyretreatedtoSmithfield,leavinghisdeadandwoundedinourhands.FromthereShermancontinuedtoGoldsboro',whichplacehadbeenoccupiedbyGeneralSchofieldonthe21st(crossingtheNeuseRivertenmilesabovethere,atCox'sBridge,whereGeneralTerryhadgotpossessionandthrownapontoon-bridgeonthe22d),thusformingajunctionwiththecolumnsfromNewBernandWilmington.

AmongtheimportantfruitsofthiscampaignwasthefallofCharleston,SouthCarolina.Itwasevacuatedbytheenemyonthenightofthe17thofFebruary,andoccupiedbyourforcesonthe18th.

Onthemorningofthe31stofJanuary,GeneralThomaswasdirectedtosendacavalryexpedition,underGeneralStoneman,fromEastTennessee,topenetrateSouthCarolinawelldowntowardsColumbia,todestroytherailroadsandmilitaryresourcesofthecountry,andreturn,ifhewasable,toEastTennesseebywayofSalisbury,NorthCarolina,releasingourprisonersthere,ifpossible.Ofthefeasibilityofthislatter,however,GeneralStonemanwastojudge.Sherman'smovements,Ihadnodoubt,wouldattracttheattentionofalltheforce

Sherman'smovements,Ihadnodoubt,wouldattracttheattentionofalltheforcetheenemycouldcollect,andfacilitatetheexecutionofthis.GeneralStonemanwassolateinmakinghisstartonthisexpedition(andShermanhavingpassedoutoftheStateofSouthCarolina),onthe27thofFebruaryIdirectedGeneralThomastochangehiscourse,andorderhimtorepeathisraidoflastfall,destroyingtherailroadtowardsLynchburgasfarashecould.ThiswouldkeephimbetweenourgarrisonsinEastTennesseeandtheenemy.IregardeditnotimpossiblethatintheeventoftheenemybeingdrivenfromRichmond,hemightfallbacktoLynchburgandattemptaraidnorththroughEastTennessee.Onthe14thofFebruarythefollowingcommunicationwassenttoGeneralThomas:

"CITYPOINT,VA.,February14,1865.

"GeneralCanbyispreparingamovementfromMobileBayagainstMobileandtheinteriorofAlabama.Hisforcewillconsistofabouttwentythousandmen,besidesA.J.Smith'scommand.ThecavalryyouhavesenttoCanbywillbedebarkedatVicksburg.It,withtheavailablecavalryalreadyinthatsection,willmovefromthereeastward,incooperation.Hood'sarmyhasbeenterriblyreducedbytheseverepunishmentyougaveitinTennessee,bydesertionconsequentupontheirdefeat,andnowbythewithdrawalofmanyofthemtoopposeSherman.(Itakeitalargeportionoftheinfantryhasbeensowithdrawn.ItissoassertedintheRichmondpapers,andamemberoftherebelCongresssaidafewdayssinceinaspeech,thatone-halfofithadbeenbroughttoSouthCarolinatoopposeSherman.)Thisbeingtrue,orevenifitisnottrue,Canby'smovementwillattractalltheattentionoftheenemy,andleavetheadvancefromyourstandpointeasy.Ithinkitadvisable,therefore,thatyouprepareasmuchofacavalryforceasyoucanspare,andholditinreadinesstogosouth.Theobjectwouldbethreefold:first,toattractasmuchoftheenemy'sforceaspossible,toinsuresuccesstoCanby;second,todestroytheenemy'slineofcommunicationsandmilitaryresources;third,todestroyorcapturetheirforcesbroughtintothefield.TuscaloosaandSelmawouldprobablybethepointstodirecttheexpeditionagainst.This,however,wouldnotbesoimportantasthemerefactofpenetratingdeepintoAlabama.Discretionshouldbelefttotheofficercommandingtheexpeditiontogowhere,accordingtotheinformationhemayreceive,hewillbestsecuretheobjectsnamedabove.

"Nowthatyourforcehasbeensomuchdepleted,Idonotknowwhatnumberofmenyoucanputintothefield.Ifnotmorethanfivethousandmen,however,allcavalry,Ithinkitwillbesufficient.Itisnotdesirablethatyoushouldstartthis

cavalry,Ithinkitwillbesufficient.ItisnotdesirablethatyoushouldstartthisexpeditionuntiltheoneleavingVicksburghasbeenthreeorfourdaysout,orevenaweek.Idonotknowwhenitwillstart,butwillinformyoubytelegraphassoonasIlearn.Ifyoushouldhearthroughothersourcesbeforehearingfromme,youcanactontheinformationreceived.

"Toinsuresuccessyourcavalryshouldgowithaslittlewagon-trainaspossible,relyinguponthecountryforsupplies.Iwouldalsoreducethenumberofgunstoabattery,orthenumberofbatteries,andputtheextrateamstothegunstaken.Nogunsorcaissonsshouldbetakenwithlessthaneighthorses.

"Pleaseinformmebytelegraph,onreceiptofthis,whatforceyouthinkyouwillbeabletosendunderthesedirections.

"U.S.GRANT,Lieutenant-General."MAJOR-GENERALG.H.THOMAS."

Onthe15th,hewasdirectedtostarttheexpeditionassoonafterthe20thashecouldgetitoff.

Ideemeditoftheutmostimportance,beforeageneralmovementofthearmiesoperatingagainstRichmond,thatallcommunicationswiththecity,northofJamesRiver,shouldbecutoff.TheenemyhavingwithdrawnthebulkofhisforcefromtheShenandoahValleyandsentitsouth,orreplacedtroopssentfromRichmond,anddesiringtoreinforceSherman,ifpracticable,whosecavalrywasgreatlyinferiorinnumberstothatoftheenemy,IdeterminedtomakeamovefromtheShenandoah,which,ifsuccessful,wouldaccomplishthefirstatleast,andpossiblythelatteroftheobjects.IthereforetelegraphedGeneralSheridanasfollows:

"CITYPOINT,VA.,February20,1865—1P.M.

"GENERAL:—Assoonasitispossibletotravel,IthinkyouwillhavenodifficultyaboutreachingLynchburgwithacavalryforcealone.Fromthereyoucoulddestroytherailroadandcanalineverydirection,soastobeofnofurtherusetotherebellion.SufficientcavalryshouldbeleftbehindtolookafterMosby'sgang.FromLynchburg,ifinformationyoumightgettherewouldjustifyit,youwillstrikesouth,headingthestreamsinVirginatothewestwardofDanville,andpushonandjoinGeneralSherman.Thisadditionalraid,withonenowaboutstartingfromEastTennesseeunderStoneman,numberingfouror

nowaboutstartingfromEastTennesseeunderStoneman,numberingfourorgivethousandcavalry,onefromVicksburg,numberingsevenoreightthousandcavalry,onefromEastport,Mississippi,thenthousandcavalry,CanbyfromMobileBay,withaboutthirty-eightthousandmixedtroops,thesethreelatterpushingforTuscaloosa,Selma,andMontgomery,andShermanwithalargearmyeatingoutthevitalsofSouthCarolina,isallthatwillbewantedtoleavenothingfortherebelliontostandupon.Iwouldadviseyoutoovercomegreatobstaclestoaccomplishthis.CharlestonwasevacuatedonTuesday1st.

"U.S.GRANT,Lieutenant-General."MAJOR-GENERALP.H.SHERIDAN."

Onthe25thIreceivedadispatchfromGeneralSheridan,inquiringwhereShermanwasaimingfor,andifIcouldgivehimdefiniteinformationastothepointshemightbeexpectedtomoveon,thissideofCharlotte,NorthCarolina.Inanswer,thefollowingtelegramwassenthim:

"CITYPOINT,VA.,February25,1865.

"GENERAL:—Sherman'smovementswilldependontheamountofoppositionhemeetswithfromtheenemy.Ifstronglyopposed,hemaypossiblyhavetofallbacktoGeorgetown,S.C.,andfitoutforanewstart.Ithink,however,alldangerforthenecessityofgoingtothatpointhaspassed.IbelievehehaspassedCharlotte.HemaytakeFayettevilleonhiswaytoGoldsboro'.IfyoureachLynchburg,youwillhavetobeguidedinyouraftermovementsbytheinformationyouobtain.BeforeyoucouldpossiblyreachSherman,IthinkyouwouldfindhimmovingfromGoldsboro'towardsRaleigh,orengagingtheenemystronglypostedatoneortheotheroftheseplaces,withrailroadcommunicationsopenedfromhisarmytoWilmingtonorNewBern.

"U.S.GRANT,Lieutenant-General."MAJOR-GENERALP.H.SHERIDAN."

GeneralSheridanmovedfromWinchesteronthe27thofFebruary,withtwodivisionsofcavalry,numberingaboutfivethousandeach.Onthe1stofMarchhesecuredthebridge,whichtheenemyattemptedtodestroy,acrossthemiddleforkoftheShenandoah,atMountCrawford,andenteredStauntononthe2d,theenemyhavingretreatedtoWaynesboro'.ThencehepushedontoWaynesboro',

enemyhavingretreatedtoWaynesboro'.ThencehepushedontoWaynesboro',wherehefoundtheenemyinforceinanintrenchedposition,underGeneralEarly.Withoutstoppingtomakeareconnoissance,animmediateattackwasmade,thepositionwascarried,andsixteenhundredprisoners,elevenpiecesofartillery,withhorsesandcaissonscomplete,twohundredwagonsandteamsloadedwithsubsistence,andseventeenbattle-flags,werecaptured.Theprisoners,underanescortoffifteenhundredmen,weresentbacktoWinchester.ThencehemarchedonCharlottesville,destroyingeffectuallytherailroadandbridgesashewent,whichplacehereachedonthe3d.Hereheremainedtwodays,destroyingtherailroadtowardsRichmondandLynchburg,includingthelargeironbridgesoverthenorthandsouthforksoftheRivannaRiverandawaitedthearrivalofhistrains.ThisnecessarydelaycausedhimtoabandontheideaofcapturingLynchburg.Onthemorningofthe6th,dividinghisforceintotwocolumns,hesentonetoScottsville,whenceitmarcheduptheJamesRiverCanaltoNewMarket,destroyingeverylock,andinmanyplacesthebankofthecanal.FromhereaforcewaspushedoutfromthiscolumntoDuiguidsville,toobtainpossessionofthebridgeacrosstheJamesRiveratthatplace,butfailed.Theenemyburneditonourapproach.TheenemyalsoburnedthebridgeacrosstheriveratHardwicksville.TheothercolumnmoveddowntherailroadtowardsLynchburg,destroyingitasfarasAmherstCourtHouse,sixteenmilesfromLynchburg;thenceacrossthecountry,unitingwiththecolumnatNewMarket.Theriverbeingveryhigh,hispontoonswouldnotreachacrossit;andtheenemyhavingdestroyedthebridgesbywhichhehadhopedtocrosstheriverandgetontheSouthSideRailroadaboutFarmville,anddestroyittoAppomattoxCourtHouse,theonlythingleftforhimwastoreturntoWinchesterorstrikeabaseattheWhiteHouse.Fortunately,hechosethelatter.FromNewMarkethetookuphislineofmarch,followingthecanaltowardsRichmond,destroyingeverylockuponitandcuttingthebankswhereverpracticable,toapointeightmileseastofGoochland,concentratingthewholeforceatColumbiaonthe10th.Hereherestedoneday,andsentthroughbyscoutsinformationofhiswhereaboutsandpurposes,andarequestforsuppliestomeethimatWhiteHouse,whichreachedmeonthenightofthe12th.AninfantryforcewasimmediatelysenttogetpossessionofWhiteHouse,andsupplieswereforwarded.MovingfromColumbiainadirectiontothreatenRichmond,tonearAshlandStation,hecrossedtheAnnas,andafterhavingdestroyedallthebridgesandmanymilesoftherailroad,proceededdownthenorthbankofthePamunkeytoWhiteHouse,whichplacehereachedonthe19th.

PrevioustothisthefollowingcommunicationwassenttoGeneralThomas:

"CITYPOINT,VIRGINIA,March7,1865—9.30A.M.

"GENERAL:—IthinkitwillbeadvisablenowforyoutorepairtherailroadinEastTennessee,andthrowagoodforceuptoBull'sGapandfortifythere.SuppliesatKnoxvillecouldalwaysbegotforwardasrequired.WithBull'sGapfortified,youcanoccupyasoutpostsaboutallofEastTennessee,andbeprepared,ifitshouldberequiredofyouinthespring,tomakeacampaigntowardsLynchburg,orintoNorthCarolina.IdonotthinkStonemanshouldbreaktheroaduntilhegetsintoVirginia,unlessitshouldbetocutoffrolling-stockthatmaybecaughtwestofthat.

"U.S.GRANT,Lieutenant-General."MAJOR-GENERALG.H.THOMAS."

ThusitwillbeseenthatinMarch,1865,GeneralCanbywasmovinganadequateforceagainstMobileandthearmydefendingitunderGeneralDickTaylor;Thomaswaspushingouttwolargeandwell-appointedcavalryexpeditions—onefromMiddleTennesseeunderBrevetMajor-GeneralWilsonagainsttheenemy'svitalpointsinAlabama,theotherfromEastTennessee,underMajor-GeneralStoneman,towardsLynchburg—andassemblingtheremainderofhisavailableforces,preparatorytocommenceoffensiveoperationsfromEastTennessee;GeneralSheridan'scavalrywasatWhiteHouse;thearmiesofthePotomacandJameswereconfrontingtheenemy,underLee,inhisdefencesofRichmondandPetersburg;GeneralShermanwithhisarmies,reinforcedbythatofGeneralSchofield,wasatGoldsboro';GeneralPopewasmakingpreparationsforaspringcampaignagainsttheenemyunderKirbySmithandPrice,westoftheMississippi;andGeneralHancockwasconcentratingaforceinthevicinityofWinchester,Virginia,toguardagainstinvasionortooperateoffensively,asmightprovenecessary.

AfterthelongmarchbyGeneralSheridan'scavalryoverwinterroads,itwasnecessarytorestandrefitatWhiteHouse.AtthistimethegreatestsourceofuneasinesstomewasthefearthattheenemywouldleavehisstronglinesaboutPetersburgandRichmondforthepurposeofunitingwithJohnston,andbeforehewasdrivenfromthembybattle,orIwaspreparedtomakeaneffectualpursuit.Onthe24thofMarch,GeneralSheridanmovedfromWhiteHouse,crossedtheJamesRiveratJones'sLanding,andformedajunctionwiththeArmyofthePotomacinfrontofPetersburgonthe27th.Duringthismove,GeneralOrdsentforcestocoverthecrossingsoftheChickahominy.

GeneralOrdsentforcestocoverthecrossingsoftheChickahominy.

Onthe24thofMarchthefollowinginstructionsforageneralmovementofthearmiesoperatingagainstRichmondwereissued:

"CITYPOINT,VIRGINIA,March24,1865.

"GENERAL:Onthe29thinstantthearmiesoperatingagainstRichmondwillbemovedbyourleft,forthedoublepurposeofturningtheenemyoutofhispresentpositionaroundPetersburg,andtoinsurethesuccessofthecavalryunderGeneralSheridan,whichwillstartatthesametime,initseffortstoreachanddestroytheSouthSideandDanvillerailroads.TwocorpsoftheArmyofthePotomacwillbemovedatfirstintwocolumns,takingthetworoadscrossingHatcher'sRun,nearestwherethepresentlineheldbyusstrikesthatstream,bothmovingtowardsDinwiddieCourtHouse.

"ThecavalryunderGeneralSheridan,joinedbythedivisionnowunderGeneralDavies,willmoveatthesametimebytheWeldonRoadandtheJerusalemPlankRoad,turningwestfromthelatterbeforecrossingtheNottoway,andwestwiththewholecolumnbeforereachingStonyCreek.GeneralSheridanwillthenmoveindependently,underotherinstructionswhichwillbegivenhim.AlldismountedcavalrybelongingtotheArmyofthePotomac,andthedismountedcavalryfromtheMiddleMilitaryDivisionnotrequiredforguardingpropertybelongingtotheirarmofservice,willreporttoBrigadier-GeneralBenham,tobeaddedtothedefencesofCityPoint.Major-GeneralParkewillbeleftincommandofallthearmyleftforholdingthelinesaboutPetersburgandCityPoint,subjectofcoursetoordersfromthecommanderoftheArmyofthePotomac.The9tharmycorpswillbeleftintact,toholdthepresentlineofworkssolongasthewholelinenowoccupiedbyusisheld.If,however,thetroopstotheleftofthe9thcorpsarewithdrawn,thentheleftofthecorpsmaybethrownbacksoastooccupythepositionheldbythearmypriortothecaptureoftheWeldonRoad.Alltroopstotheleftofthe9thcorpswillbeheldinreadinesstomoveattheshortestnoticebysuchrouteasmaybedesignatedwhentheorderisgiven.

"GeneralOrdwilldetachthreedivisions,twowhiteandonecolored,orsomuchofthemashecan,andholdhispresentlines,andmarchforthepresentleftoftheArmyofthePotomac.Intheabsenceoffurtherorders,oruntilfurtherordersaregiven,thewhitedivisionswillfollowtheleftcolumnoftheArmyofthePotomac,andthecoloreddivisiontherightcolumn.Duringthemovement

Potomac,andthecoloreddivisiontherightcolumn.DuringthemovementMajor-GeneralWeitzelwillbeleftincommandofalltheforcesremainingbehindfromtheArmyoftheJames.

"ThemovementoftroopsfromtheArmyoftheJameswillcommenceonthenightofthe27thinstant.GeneralOrdwillleavebehindtheminimumnumberofcavalrynecessaryforpicketduty,intheabsenceofthemainarmy.Acavalryexpedition,fromGeneralOrd'scommand,willalsobestartedfromSuffolk,toleavethereonSaturday,the1stofApril,underColonelSumner,forthepurposeofcuttingtherailroadaboutHicksford.This,ifaccomplished,willhavetobeasurprise,andthereforefromthreetofivehundredmenwillbesufficient.Theyshould,however,besupportedbyalltheinfantrythatcanbesparedfromNorfolkandPortsmouth,asfaroutastowherethecavalrycrossestheBlackwater.ThecrossingshouldprobablybeatUniten.ShouldColonelSumnersucceedinreachingtheWeldonRoad,hewillbeinstructedtodoallthedamagepossibletothetriangleofroadsbetweenHicksford,Weldon,andGaston.TherailroadbridgeatWeldonbeingfittedupforthepassageofcarriages,itmightbepracticabletodestroyanyaccumulationofsuppliestheenemymayhavecollectedsouthoftheRoanoke.Allthetroopswillmovewithfourdays'rationsinhaversacksandeightdays'inwagons.Toavoidasmuchhaulingaspossible,andtogivetheArmyoftheJamesthesamenumberofdays'supplieswiththeArmyofthePotomac,GeneralOrdwilldirecthiscommissaryandquartermastertohavesufficientsuppliesdeliveredattheterminusoftheroadtofillupinpassing.Sixtyroundsofammunitionpermanwillbetakeninwagons,andasmuchgrainasthetransportationonhandwillcarry,aftertakingthespecifiedamountofothersupplies.Thedenselywoodedcountryinwhichthearmyhastooperatemakingtheuseofmuchartilleryimpracticable,theamounttakenwiththearmywillbereducedtosixoreightgunstoeachdivision,attheoptionofthearmycommanders.

"Allnecessarypreparationsforcarryingthesedirectionsintooperationmaybecommencedatonce.Thereservesofthe9thcorpsshouldbemassedasmuchaspossible.WhileIwouldnotnoworderanunconditionalattackontheenemy'slinebythem,theyshouldbereadyandshouldmaketheattackiftheenemyweakenshislineintheirfront,withoutwaitingfororders.Incasetheycarrytheline,thenthewholeofthe9thcorpscouldfollowupsoastojoinorcooperatewiththebalanceofthearmy.Toprepareforthis,the9thcorpswillhaverationsissuedtothem,sameasthebalanceofthearmy.GeneralWeitzelwillkeepvigilantwatchuponhisfront,andiffoundatallpracticabletobreakthroughatanypoint,hewilldoso.AsuccessnorthoftheJamesshouldbefollowedupwithgreatpromptness.Anattackwillnotbefeasibleunlessitisfoundthatthe

withgreatpromptness.Anattackwillnotbefeasibleunlessitisfoundthattheenemyhasdetachedlargely.InthatcaseitmayberegardedasevidentthattheenemyarerelyingupontheirlocalreservesprincipallyforthedefenceofRichmond.PreparationsmaybemadeforabandoningallthelinenorthoftheJames,exceptinclosedworksonlytobeabandoned,however,afterabreakismadeinthelinesoftheenemy.

"BytheseinstructionsalargepartofthearmiesoperatingagainstRichmondisleftbehind.Theenemy,knowingthis,may,asanonlychance,striptheirlinestothemerestskeleton,inthehopeofadvantagenotbeingtakenofit,whiletheyhurleverythingagainstthemovingcolumn,andreturn.Itcannotbeimpressedtoostronglyuponcommandersoftroopsleftinthetrenchesnottoallowthistooccurwithouttakingadvantageofit.Theveryfactoftheenemycomingouttoattack,ifhedoesso,mightberegardedasalmostconclusiveevidenceofsuchaweakeningofhislines.Iwouldhaveitparticularlyenjoineduponcorpscommandersthat,incaseofanattackfromtheenemy,thosenotattackedarenottowaitforordersfromthecommandingofficerofthearmytowhichtheybelong,butthattheywillmovepromptly,andnotifythecommanderoftheiraction.Iwouldalsoenjointhesameactiononthepartofdivisioncommanderswhenotherpartsoftheircorpsareengaged.Inlikemanner,Iwouldurgetheimportanceoffollowinguparepulseoftheenemy.

"U.S.GRANT,Lieutenant-General."MAJOR-GENERALSMEADE,ORD,ANDSHERIDAN."

Earlyonthemorningofthe25ththeenemyassaultedourlinesinfrontofthe9thcorps(whichheldfromtheAppomattoxRivertowardsourleft),andcarriedFortStedman,andapartofthelinetotherightandleftofit,establishedthemselvesandturnedthegunsofthefortagainstus,butourtroopsoneitherflankheldtheirgrounduntilthereserveswerebroughtup,whentheenemywasdrivenbackwithaheavylossinkilledandwounded,andonethousandninehundredprisoners.Ourlosswassixty-eightkilled,threehundredandthirty-sevenwounded,andfivehundredandsixmissing.GeneralMeadeatonceorderedtheothercorpstoadvanceandfeeltheenemyintheirrespectivefronts.Pushingforward,theycapturedandheldtheenemy'sstronglyintrenchedpicket-lineinfrontofthe2dand6thcorps,andeighthundredandthirty-fourprisoners.Theenemymadedesperateattemptstoretakethisline,butwithoutsuccess.Ourlossinfrontofthesewasfifty-twokilled,eighthundredandsixty-fourwounded,andtwohundredandsevenmissing.Theenemy'slossinkilledandwoundedwasfar

twohundredandsevenmissing.Theenemy'slossinkilledandwoundedwasfargreater.

GeneralShermanhavinggothistroopsallquietlyincampaboutGoldsboro',andhispreparationsforfurnishingsuppliestothemperfected,visitedmeatCityPointonthe27thofMarch,andstatedthathewouldbereadytomove,ashehadpreviouslywrittenme,bythe10thofApril,fullyequippedandrationedfortwentydays,ifitshouldbecomenecessarytobringhiscommandtobearagainstLee'sarmy,incooperationwithourforcesinfrontofRichmondandPetersburg.GeneralShermanproposedinthismovementtothreatenRaleigh,andthen,byturningsuddenlytotheright,reachtheRoanokeatGastonorthereabouts,whencehecouldmoveontotheRichmondandDanvilleRailroad,strikingitinthevicinityofBurkesville,orjointhearmiesoperatingagainstRichmond,asmightbedeemedbest.Thisplanhewasdirectedtocarryintoexecution,ifhereceivednofurtherdirectionsinthemeantime.IexplainedtohimthemovementIhadorderedtocommenceonthe29thofMarch.ThatifitshouldnotproveasentirelysuccessfulasIhoped,IwouldcutthecavalryloosetodestroytheDanvilleandSouthSiderailroads,andthusdeprivetheenemyoffurthersupplies,andalsotopreventtherapidconcentrationofLee'sandJohnston'sarmies.

Ihadspentdaysofanxietylesteachmorningshouldbringthereportthattheenemyhadretreatedthenightbefore.IwasfirmlyconvincedthatSherman'scrossingtheRoanokewouldbethesignalforLeetoleave.WithJohnstonandhimcombined,along,tedious,andexpensivecampaign,consumingmostofthesummer,mightbecomenecessary.BymovingoutIwouldputthearmyinbetterconditionforpursuit,andwouldatleast,bythedestructionoftheDanvilleRoad,retardtheconcentrationofthetwoarmiesofLeeandJohnston,andcausetheenemytoabandonmuchmaterialthathemightotherwisesave.Ithereforedeterminednottodelaythemovementordered.

Onthenightofthe27th,Major-GeneralOrd,withtwodivisionsofthe24thcorps,Major-GeneralGibboncommanding,andonedivisionofthe25thcorps,Brigadier-GeneralBirneycommanding,andMacKenzie'scavalry,tookuphislineofmarchinpursuanceoftheforegoinginstructions,andreachedthepositionassignedhimnearHatcher'sRunonthemorningofthe29th.Onthe28ththefollowinginstructionsweregiventoGeneralSheridan:

"CITYPOINT,VA.,March28,1865.

"GENERAL:—The5tharmycorpswillmovebytheVaughnRoadatthreeA.M.to-morrowmorning.The2dmovesataboutnineA.M.,havingbutaboutthreemilestomarchtoreachthepointdesignatedforittotakeontherightofthe5thcorps,afterthelatterreachingDinwiddieCourtHouse.Moveyourcavalryatasearlyanhourasyoucan,andwithoutbeingconfinedtoanyparticularroadorroads.Youmaygooutbythenearestroadsinrearofthe5thcorps,passbyitsleft,andpassingneartoorthroughDinwiddie,reachtherightandrearoftheenemyassoonasyoucan.Itisnottheintentiontoattacktheenemyinhisintrenchedposition,buttoforcehimout,ifpossible.Shouldhecomeoutandattackus,orgethimselfwherehecanbeattacked,moveinwithyourentireforceinyourownway,andwiththefullreliancethatthearmywillengageorfollow,ascircumstanceswilldictate.Ishallbeonthefield,andwillprobablybeabletocommunicatewithyou.ShouldInotdoso,andyoufindthattheenemykeepswithinhismainintrenchedline,youmaycutlooseandpushfortheDanvilleRoad.Ifyoufinditpracticable,IwouldlikeyoutocrosstheSouthSideRoad,betweenPetersburgandBurkesville,anddestroyittosomeextent.Iwouldnotadvisemuchdetention,however,untilyoureachtheDanvilleRoad,whichIwouldlikeyoutostrikeasneartotheAppomattoxaspossible.Makeyourdestructiononthatroadascompleteaspossible.YoucanthenpassontotheSouthSideRoad,westofBurkesville,anddestroythatinlikemanner.

"Afterhavingaccomplishedthedestructionofthetworailroads,whicharenowtheonlyavenuesofsupplytoLee'sarmy,youmayreturntothisarmy,selectingyourroadfurthersouth,oryoumaygoonintoNorthCarolinaandjoinGeneralSherman.Shouldyouselectthelattercourse,gettheinformationtomeasearlyaspossible,sothatImaysendorderstomeetyouatGoldsboro'.

"U.S.GRANT,Lieutenant-General."MAJOR-GENERALP.H.SHERIDAN."

Onthemorningofthe29ththemovementcommenced.AtnightthecavalrywasatDinwiddieCourtHouse,andtheleftofourinfantrylineextendedtotheQuakerRoad,nearitsintersectionwiththeBoydtonPlankRoad.Thepositionofthetroopsfromlefttorightwasasfollows:Sheridan,Warren,Humphreys,Ord,Wright,Parke.

EverythinglookedfavorabletothedefeatoftheenemyandthecaptureofPetersburgandRichmond,ifthepropereffortwasmade.IthereforeaddressedthefollowingcommunicationtoGeneralSheridan,havingpreviouslyinformed

thefollowingcommunicationtoGeneralSheridan,havingpreviouslyinformedhimverballynottocutloosefortheraidcontemplatedinhisordersuntilhereceivednoticefrommetodoso:

"GRAVELLYCREEK,March29,1865.

"GENERAL:—OurlineisnowunbrokenfromtheAppomattoxtoDinwiddie.Weareallready,however,togiveupall,fromtheJerusalemPlankRoadtoHatcher'sRun,whenevertheforcescanbeusedadvantageously.AftergettingintolinesouthofHatcher's,wepushedforwardtofindtheenemy'sposition.GeneralGriffinwasattackednearwheretheQuakerRoadintersectstheBoydtonRoad,butrepulsediteasily,capturingaboutonehundredmen.HumphreysreachedDabney'sMill,andwaspushingonwhenlastheardfrom.

"Inowfeellikeendingthematter,ifitispossibletodoso,beforegoingback.Idonotwantyou,therefore,tocutlooseandgoaftertheenemy'sroadsatpresent.Inthemorningpusharoundtheenemy,ifyoucan,andgetontohisrightrear.Themovementsoftheenemy'scavalrymay,ofcourse,modifyyouraction.Wewillactalltogetherasonearmyhere,untilitisseenwhatcanbedonewiththeenemy.Thesignal-officeratCobb'sHillreported,athalf-pastelevenA.M.,thatacavalrycolumnhadpassedthatpointfromRichmondtowardsPetersburg,takingfortyminutestopass.

"U.S.GRANT,Lieutenant-General."MAJOR-GENERALP.H.SHERIDAN."

Fromthenightofthe29thtothemorningofthe31sttherainfellinsuchtorrentsastomakeitimpossibletomoveawheeledvehicle,exceptascorduroyroadswerelaidinfrontofthem.Duringthe30th,SheridanadvancedfromDinwiddieCourtHousetowardsFiveForks,wherehefoundtheenemyinfullforce.GeneralWarrenadvancedandextendedhislineacrosstheBoydtonPlankRoadtoneartheWhiteOakRoad,withaviewofgettingacrossthelatter;but,findingtheenemystronginhisfrontandextendingbeyondhisleft,wasdirectedtoholdonwherehewas,andfortify.GeneralHumphreysdrovetheenemyfromhisfrontintohismainlineontheHatcher,nearBurgess'sMills.GeneralsOrd,Wright,andParkemadeexaminationsintheirfrontstodeterminethefeasibilityofanassaultontheenemy'slines.Thetwolatterreportedfavorably.Theenemyconfrontingusashedid,ateverypointfromRichmondtoourextremeleft,Iconceivedhislinesmustbeweaklyheld,andcouldbepenetratedifmyestimate

conceivedhislinesmustbeweaklyheld,andcouldbepenetratedifmyestimateofhisforceswascorrect.Idetermined,therefore,toextendourlinenofarther,buttoreinforceGeneralSheridanwithacorpsofinfantry,andthusenablehimtocutlooseandturntheenemy'srightflank,andwiththeothercorpsassaulttheenemy'slines.Theresultoftheoffensiveeffortoftheenemytheweekbefore,whenheassaultedFortStedman,particularlyfavoredthis.Theenemy'sintrenchedpicket-linecapturedbyusatthattimethrewthelinesoccupiedbythebelligerentssoclosetogetheratsomepointsthatitwasbutamoment'srunfromonetotheother.PreparationswereatoncemadetorelieveGeneralHumphreys'scorps,toreporttoGeneralSheridan;buttheconditionoftheroadspreventedimmediatemovement.Onthemorningofthe31st,GeneralWarrenreportedfavorablytogettingpossessionoftheWhiteOakRoad,andwasdirectedtodoso.Toaccomplishthis,hemovedwithonedivision,insteadofhiswholecorps,whichwasattackedbytheenemyinsuperiorforceanddrivenbackonthe2ddivisionbeforeithadtimetoform,andit,inturn,forcedbackuponthe3ddivision,whentheenemywaschecked.Adivisionofthe2dcorpswasimmediatelysenttohissupport,theenemydrivenbackwithheavyloss,andpossessionoftheWhiteOakRoadgained.Sheridanadvanced,andwithaportionofhiscavalrygotpossessionoftheFiveForks;buttheenemy,aftertheaffairwiththe5thcorps,reinforcedtherebelcavalry,defendingthatpointwithinfantry,andforcedhimbacktowardsDinwiddieCourtHouse.HereGeneralSheridandisplayedgreatgeneralship.Insteadofretreatingwithhiswholecommandonthemainarmy,totellthestoryofsuperiorforcesencountered,hedeployedhiscavalryonfoot,leavingonlymountedmenenoughtotakechargeofthehorses.Thiscompelledtheenemytodeployoveravastextentofwoodedandbrokencountry,andmadehisprogressslow.Atthisjuncturehedispatchedtomewhathadtakenplace,andthathewasdroppingbackslowlyonDinwiddieCourtHouse.GeneralMackenzie'scavalryandonedivisionofthe5thcorpswereimmediatelyorderedtohisassistance.SoonafterreceivingareportfromGeneralMeadethatHumphreyscouldholdourpositionontheBoydtonRoad,andthattheothertwodivisionsofthe5thcorpscouldgotoSheridan,theyweresoorderedatonce.ThustheoperationsofthedaynecessitatedthesendingofWarren,becauseofhisaccessibility,insteadofHumphreys,aswasintended,andprecipitatedintendedmovements.Onthemorningofthe1stofApril,GeneralSheridan,reinforcedbyGeneralWarren,drovetheenemybackonFiveForks,where,lateintheevening,heassaultedandcarriedhisstronglyfortifiedposition,capturingallhisartilleryandbetweenfiveandsixthousandprisoners.

Aboutthecloseofthisbattle,BrevetMajor-GeneralCharlesGriffinrelievedMajor-GeneralWarrenincommandofthe5thcorps.Thereportofthisreachedmeafternightfall.Someapprehensionsfilledmymindlesttheenemymight

meafternightfall.Someapprehensionsfilledmymindlesttheenemymightdeserthislinesduringthenight,andbyfallinguponGeneralSheridanbeforeassistancecouldreachhim,drivehimfromhispositionandopenthewayforretreat.Toguardagainstthis,GeneralMiles'sdivisionofHumphreys'scorpswassenttoreinforcehim,andabombardmentwascommencedandkeptupuntilfouro'clockinthemorning(April2),whenanassaultwasorderedontheenemy'slines.GeneralWrightpenetratedthelineswithhiswholecorps,sweepingeverythingbeforehim,andtohislefttowardsHatcher'sRun,capturingmanygunsandseveralthousandprisoners.HewascloselyfollowedbytwodivisionsofGeneralOrd'scommand,untilhemettheotherdivisionofGeneralOrd'sthathadsucceededinforcingtheenemy'slinesnearHatcher'sRun.GeneralsWrightandOrdimmediatelyswungtotheright,andclosedalloftheenemyonthatsideoftheminPetersburg,whileGeneralHumphreyspushedforwardwithtwodivisionsandjoinedGeneralWrightontheleft.GeneralParkesucceededincarryingtheenemy'smainline,capturinggunsandprisoners,butwasunabletocarryhisinnerline.GeneralSheridanbeingadvisedoftheconditionofaffairs,returnedGeneralMilestohispropercommand.Onreachingtheenemy'slinesimmediatelysurroundingPetersburg,aportionofGeneralGibbon'scorps,byamostgallantcharge,capturedtwostronginclosedworks—themostsalientandcommandingsouthofPetersburg—thusmateriallyshorteningthelineofinvestmentnecessaryfortakinginthecity.TheenemysouthofHatcher'sRunretreatedwestwardtoSutherland'sStation,wheretheywereovertakenbyMiles'sdivision.Asevereengagementensued,andlasteduntilbothhisrightandleftflankswerethreatenedbytheapproachofGeneralSheridan,whowasmovingfromFord'sStationtowardsPetersburg,andadivisionsentbyGeneralMeadefromthefrontofPetersburg,whenhebrokeintheutmostconfusion,leavinginourhandshisgunsandmanyprisoners.ThisforceretreatedbythemainroadalongtheAppomattoxRiver.Duringthenightofthe2dtheenemyevacuatedPetersburgandRichmond,andretreatedtowardsDanville.Onthemorningofthe3dpursuitwascommenced.GeneralSheridanpushedfortheDanvilleRoad,keepingneartheAppomattox,followedbyGeneralMeadewiththe2dand6thcorps,whileGeneralOrdmovedforBurkesville,alongtheSouthSideRoad;the9thcorpsstretchedalongthatroadbehindhim.Onthe4th,GeneralSheridanstrucktheDanvilleRoadnearJetersville,wherehelearnedthatLeewasatAmeliaCourtHouse.HeimmediatelyintrenchedhimselfandawaitedthearrivalofGeneralMeade,whoreachedtherethenextday.GeneralOrdreachedBurkesvilleontheeveningofthe5th.

Onthemorningofthe5th,IaddressedMajor-GeneralShermanthefollowing

Onthemorningofthe5th,IaddressedMajor-GeneralShermanthefollowingcommunication:

"WILSON'SSTATION,April5,1865.

"GENERAL:AllindicationsnowarethatLeewillattempttoreachDanvillewiththeremnantofhisforce.Sheridan,whowasupwithhimlastnight,reportsallthatisleft,horse,foot,anddragoons,attwentythousand,muchdemoralized.Wehopetoreducethisnumberone-half.IshallpushontoBurkesville,andifastandismadeatDanville,willinaveryfewdaysgothere.Ifyoucanpossiblydoso,pushonfromwhereyouare,andletusseeifwecannotfinishthejobwithLee'sandJohnston'sarmies.WhetheritwillbebetterforyoutostrikeforGreensboro',ornearertoDanville,youwillbebetterabletojudgewhenyoureceivethis.Rebelarmiesnowaretheonlystrategicpointstostrikeat.

"U.S.GRANT,Lieutenant-General."MAJOR-GENERALW.T.SHERMAN."

Onthemorningofthe6th,itwasfoundthatGeneralLeewasmovingwestofJetersville,towardsDanville.GeneralSheridanmovedwithhiscavalry(the5thcorpshavingbeenreturnedtoGeneralMeadeonhisreachingJetersville)tostrikehisflank,followedbythe6thcorps,whilethe2dand5thcorpspressedhardafter,forcinghimtoabandonseveralhundredwagonsandseveralpiecesofartillery.GeneralOrdadvancedfromBurkesvilletowardsFarmville,sendingtworegimentsofinfantryandasquadronofcavalry,underBrevetBrigadier-GeneralTheodoreRead,toreachanddestroythebridges.ThisadvancemettheheadofLee'scolumnnearFarmville,whichitheroicallyattackedanddetaineduntilGeneralReadwaskilledandhissmallforceoverpowered.Thiscausedadelayintheenemy'smovements,andenabledGeneralOrdtogetwellupwiththeremainderofhisforce,onmeetingwhich,theenemyimmediatelyintrenchedhimself.Intheafternoon,GeneralSheridanstrucktheenemysouthofSailors'Creek,capturedsixteenpiecesofartilleryandaboutfourhundredwagons,anddetainedhimuntilthe6thcorpsgotup,whenageneralattackofinfantryandcavalrywasmade,whichresultedinthecaptureofsixorseventhousandprisoners,amongwhomweremanygeneralofficers.Themovementsofthe2dcorpsandGeneralOrd'scommandcontributedgreatlytotheday'ssuccess.

Onthemorningofthe7ththepursuitwasrenewed,thecavalry,exceptonedivision,andthe5thcorpsmovingbyPrinceEdward'sCourtHouse;the6th

division,andthe5thcorpsmovingbyPrinceEdward'sCourtHouse;the6thcorps,GeneralOrd'scommand,andonedivisionofcavalry,onFarmville;andthe2dcorpsbytheHighBridgeRoad.ItwassoonfoundthattheenemyhadcrossedtothenorthsideoftheAppomattox;butsoclosewasthepursuit,thatthe2dcorpsgotpossessionofthecommonbridgeatHighBridgebeforetheenemycoulddestroyit,andimmediatelycrossedover.The6thcorpsandadivisionofcavalrycrossedatFarmvilletoitssupport.

FeelingnowthatGeneralLee'schanceofescapewasutterlyhopeless,IaddressedhimthefollowingcommunicationfromFarmville:

"April7,1865.

"GENERAL—TheresultofthelastweekmustconvinceyouofthehopelessnessoffurtherresistanceonthepartoftheArmyofNorthernVirginiainthisstruggle.Ifeelthatitisso,andregarditasmydutytoshiftfrommyselftheresponsibilityofanyfurthereffusionofblood,byaskingofyouthesurrenderofthatportionoftheConfederateStatesarmyknownastheArmyofNorthernVirginia.

"U.S.GRANT,Lieutenant-General."GENERALR.E.LEE."

Earlyonthemorningofthe8th,beforeleaving,IreceivedatFarmvillethefollowing:

"April7,1865.

"GENERAL:Ihavereceivedyournoteofthisdate.ThoughnotentertainingtheopinionyouexpressonthehopelessnessoffurtherresistanceonthepartoftheArmyofNorthernVirginia,Ireciprocateyourdesiretoavoiduselesseffusionofblood,andtherefore,beforeconsideringyourproposition,askthetermsyouwillofferonconditionofitssurrender.

"R.E.LEE,General."LIEUTENANT-GENERALU.S.GRANT."

TothisIimmediatelyreplied:

TothisIimmediatelyreplied:

"April8,1865.

"GENERAL:—Yournoteoflastevening,inreplytomineofsamedate,askingtheconditiononwhichIwillacceptthesurrenderoftheArmyofNorthernVirginia,isjustreceived.Inreply,Iwouldsay,thatpeacebeingmygreatdesire,thereisbutoneconditionIwouldinsistupon—namely,ThatthemenandofficerssurrenderedshallbedisqualifiedfortakinguparmsagainagainsttheGovernmentoftheUnitedStatesuntilproperlyexchanged.Iwillmeetyou,orwilldesignateofficerstomeetanyofficersyoumaynameforthesamepurpose,atanypointagreeabletoyou,forthepurposeofarrangingdefinitelythetermsuponwhichthesurrenderoftheArmyoftheNorthernVirginiawillbereceived.

"U.S.GRANT,Lieutenant-General."GENERALR.E.LEE."

Earlyonthemorningofthe8ththepursuitwasresumed.GeneralMeadefollowednorthoftheAppomattox,andGeneralSheridan,withallthecavalry,pushedstraightaheadforAppomattoxStation,followedbyGeneralOrd'scommandandthe5thcorps.DuringthedayGeneralMeade'sadvancehadconsiderablefightingwiththeenemy'srear-guard,butwasunabletobringonageneralengagement.LateintheeveningGeneralSheridanstrucktherailroadatAppomattoxStation,drovetheenemyfromthere,andcapturedtwenty-fivepiecesofartillery,ahospitaltrain,andfourtrainsofcarsloadedwithsuppliesforLee'sarmy.DuringthisdayIaccompaniedGeneralMeade'scolumn,andaboutmidnightreceivedthefollowingcommunicationfromGeneralLee:

April8,1865.

"GENERAL:—Ireceived,atalatehour,yournoteofto-day.InmineofyesterdayIdidnotintendtoproposethesurrenderoftheArmyofNorthernVirginia,buttoaskthetermsofyourproposition.Tobefrank,Idonotthinktheemergencyhasarisentocallforthesurrenderofthisarmy;butastherestorationofpeaceshouldbethesoleobjectofall,Idesiredtoknowwhetheryourproposalswouldleadtothatend.Icannot,therefore,meetyouwithaviewtothesurrenderoftheArmyofNorthernVirginia;butasfarasyourproposalmayaffecttheConfederateStatesforcesundermycommand,andtendtothe

affecttheConfederateStatesforcesundermycommand,andtendtotherestorationofpeace,IshouldbepleasedtomeetyouattenA.M.to-morrowontheoldstage-roadtoRichmond,betweenthepicket-linesofthetwoarmies.

"R.E.LEE,General."LIEUTENANT-GENERALU.S.GRANT."

Earlyonthemorningofthe9thIreturnedhimananswerasfollows,andimmediatelystartedtojointhecolumnsouthoftheAppomattox:

"April9,1865.

"GENERAL:—Yournoteofyesterdayisreceived.Ihavenoauthoritytotreatonthesubjectofpeace;themeetingproposedfortenA.M.to-daycouldleadtonogood.Iwillstate,however,general,thatIamequallyanxiousforpeacewithyourself,andthewholeNorthentertainsthesamefeeling.Thetermsuponwhichpeacecanbehadarewellunderstood.BytheSouthlayingdowntheirarmstheywillhastenthatmostdesirableevent,savethousandsofhumanlives,andhundredsofmillionsofpropertynotyetdestroyed.Seriouslyhopingthatallourdifficultiesmaybesettledwithoutthelossofanotherlife,Isubscribemyself,etc.

"U.S.GRANT,Lieutenant-General."GENERALR.E.LEE."

Onthismorningofthe9th,GeneralOrd'scommandandthe5thcorpsreachedAppomattoxStationjustastheenemywasmakingadesperateefforttobreakthroughourcavalry.Theinfantrywasatoncethrownin.Soonafterawhiteflagwasreceived,requestingasuspensionofhostilitiespendingnegotiationsforasurrender.

BeforereachingGeneralSheridan'sheadquarters,IreceivedthefollowingfromGeneralLee:

"April9,1865.

"GENERAL:—Ireceivedyournoteofthismorningonthepicket-line,whitherIhadcometomeetyou,andascertaindefinitelywhattermswereembracedin

hadcometomeetyou,andascertaindefinitelywhattermswereembracedinyourproposalofyesterdaywithreferencetothesurrenderofthisarmy.Inowaskaninterview,inaccordancewiththeoffercontainedinyourletterofyesterday,forthatpurpose.

"R.E.LEE,General."LIEUTENANT-GENERALU.S.GRANT."

TheinterviewwasheldatAppomattoxCourt-House,theresultofwhichissetforthinthefollowingcorrespondence:

APPOMATTOXCOURT-HOUSE,Virginia,April9,1865.

"GENERAL:Inaccordancewiththesubstanceofmylettertoyouofthe8thinstant,IproposetoreceivethesurrenderoftheArmyofNorthernVirginiaonthefollowingterms,towit:Rollsofalltheofficersandmentobemadeinduplicate,onecopytobegiventoanofficertobedesignatedbyme,theothertoberetainedbysuchofficerorofficersasyoumaydesignate.TheofficerstogivetheirindividualparolesnottotakeuparmsagainsttheGovernmentoftheUnitedStatesuntilproperlyexchanged;andeachcompanyorregimentalcommandersignalikeparoleforthemenoftheircommands.Thearms,artillery,andpublicpropertytobeparkedandstacked,andturnedovertotheofficersappointedbymetoreceivethem.Thiswillnotembracetheside-armsoftheofficers,northeirprivatehorsesorbaggage.Thisdone,eachofficerandmanwillbeallowedtoreturntohishome,nottobedisturbedbyUnitedStatesauthoritysolongastheyobservetheirparolesandthelawsinforcewheretheymayreside.

"U.S.GRANT,Lieutenant-General."GENERALR.E.LEE."

"HEADQUARTERSARMYOFNORTHERNVIRGINIA,April9,1865.

"GENERAL:IhavereceivedyourletterofthisdatecontainingthetermsofsurrenderoftheArmyofNorthernVirginiaasproposedbyyou.Astheyaresubstantiallythesameasthoseexpressedinyourletterofthe8thinstant,theyareaccepted.Iwillproceedtodesignatetheproperofficerstocarrythestipulationsintoeffect.

stipulationsintoeffect.

"R.E.LEE,General."LIEUTENANT-GENERALU.S.GRANT."

ThecommandofMajor-GeneralGibbon,the5tharmycorpsunderGriffin,andMackenzie'scavalry,weredesignatedtoremainatAppomattoxCourt-Houseuntiltheparolingofthesurrenderedarmywascompleted,andtotakechargeofthepublicproperty.TheremainderofthearmyimmediatelyreturnedtothevicinityofBurkesville.

GeneralLee'sgreatinfluencethroughoutthewholeSouthcausedhisexampletobefollowed,andto-daytheresultisthatthearmieslatelyunderhisleadershipareattheirhomes,desiringpeaceandquiet,andtheirarmsareinthehandsofourordnanceofficers.

Onthereceiptofmyletterofthe5th,GeneralShermanmoveddirectlyagainstJoeJohnston,whoretreatedrapidlyonandthroughRaleigh,whichplaceGeneralShermanoccupiedonthemorningofthe13th.Thedaypreceding,newsofthesurrenderofGeneralLeereachedhimatSmithfield.

Onthe14thacorrespondencewasopenedbetweenGeneralShermanandGeneralJohnston,whichresultedonthe18thinanagreementforasuspensionofhostilities,andamemorandumorbasisforpeace,subjecttotheapprovalofthePresident.ThisagreementwasdisapprovedbythePresidentonthe21st,whichdisapproval,togetherwithyourinstructions,wascommunicatedtoGeneralShermanbymeinpersononthemorningofthe24th,atRaleigh,NorthCarolina,inobediencetoyourorders.NoticewasatoncegivenbyhimtoGeneralJohnstonfortheterminationofthetrucethathadbeenenteredinto.Onthe25thanothermeetingbetweenthemwasagreedupon,totakeplaceonthe26th,whichterminatedinthesurrenderanddisbandmentofJohnston'sarmyuponsubstantiallythesametermsasweregiventoGeneralLee.

TheexpeditionunderGeneralStonemanfromEastTennesseegotoffonthe20thofMarch,movingbywayofBoone,NorthCarolina,andstrucktherailroadatWytheville,Chambersburg,andBigLick.TheforcestrikingitatBigLickpushedontowithinafewmilesofLynchburg,destroyingtheimportantbridges,whilewiththemainforceheeffectuallydestroyeditbetweenNewRiverandBigLick,andthenturnedforGreensboro',ontheNorthCarolinaRailroad;struckthatroadanddestroyedthebridgesbetweenDanvilleandGreensboro',

struckthatroadanddestroyedthebridgesbetweenDanvilleandGreensboro',andbetweenGreensboro'andtheYadkin,togetherwiththedepotsofsuppliesalongit,andcapturedfourhundredprisoners.AtSalisburyheattackedanddefeatedaforceoftheenemyunderGeneralGardiner,capturingfourteenpiecesofartilleryandonethousandthreehundredandsixty-fourprisoners,anddestroyedlargeamountsofarmystores.AtthisplacehedestroyedfifteenmilesofrailroadandthebridgestowardsCharlotte.ThencehemovedtoSlatersville.

GeneralCanby,whohadbeendirectedinJanuarytomakepreparationsforamovementfromMobileBayagainstMobileandtheinteriorofAlabama,commencedhismovementonthe20thofMarch.The16thcorps,Major-GeneralA.J.Smithcommanding,movedfromFortGainesbywatertoFishRiver;the13thcorps,underMajor-GeneralGordonGranger,movedfromFortMorganandjoinedthe16thcorpsonFishRiver,bothmovingthenceonSpanishFortandinvestingitonthe27th;whileMajor-GeneralSteele'scommandmovedfromPensacola,cuttherailroadleadingfromTensastoMontgomery,effectedajunctionwiththem,andpartiallyinvestedFortBlakely.AfteraseverebombardmentofSpanishFort,apartofitslinewascarriedonthe8thofApril.Duringthenighttheenemyevacuatedthefort.FortBlakelywascarriedbyassaultonthe9th,andmanyprisonerscaptured;ourlosswasconsiderable.ThesesuccessespracticallyopenedtoustheAlabamaRiver,andenabledustoapproachMobilefromthenorth.Onthenightofthe11ththecitywasevacuated,andwastakenpossessionofbyourforcesonthemorningofthe12th.

TheexpeditionundercommandofBrevetMajor-GeneralWilson,consistingoftwelvethousandfivehundredmountedmen,wasdelayedbyrainsuntilMarch22d,whenitmovedfromChickasaw,Alabama.Onthe1stofApril,GeneralWilsonencounteredtheenemyinforceunderForrestnearEbenezerChurch,drovehiminconfusion,capturedthreehundredprisonersandthreeguns,anddestroyedthecentralbridgeovertheCahawbaRiver.Onthe2dheattackedandcapturedthefortifiedcityofSelma,defendedbyForrest,withseventhousandmenandthirty-twoguns,destroyedthearsenal,armory,navalfoundry,machine-shops,vastquantitiesofstores,andcapturedthreethousandprisoners.Onthe4thhecapturedanddestroyedTuscaloosa.Onthe10thhecrossedtheAlabamaRiver,andaftersendinginformationofhisoperationstoGeneralCanby,marchedonMontgomery,whichplaceheoccupiedonthe14th,theenemyhavingabandonedit.Atthisplacemanystoresandfivesteamboatsfellintoourhands.ThenceaforcemarcheddirectonColumbus,andanotheronWestPoint,bothofwhichplaceswereassaultedandcapturedonthe16th.Attheformerplacewegotonethousandfivehundredprisonersandfifty-twofield-guns,destroyedtwogunboats,thenavyyard,foundries,arsenal,manyfactories,and

destroyedtwogunboats,thenavyyard,foundries,arsenal,manyfactories,andmuchotherpublicproperty.Atthelatterplacewegotthreehundredprisoners,fourguns,anddestroyednineteenlocomotivesandthreehundredcars.Onthe20thhetookpossessionofMacon,Georgia,withsixtyfield-guns,onethousandtwohundredmilitia,andfivegenerals,surrenderedbyGeneralHowellCobb.GeneralWilson,hearingthatJeff.Daviswastryingtomakehisescape,sentforcesinpursuitandsucceededincapturinghimonthemorningofMay11th.

Onthe4thdayofMay,GeneralDickTaylorsurrenderedtoGeneralCanbyalltheremainingrebelforceseastoftheMississippi.

AforcesufficienttoinsureaneasytriumphovertheenemyunderKirbySmith,westoftheMississippi,wasimmediatelyputinmotionforTexas,andMajor-GeneralSheridandesignatedforitsimmediatecommand;butonthe26thdayofMay,andbeforetheyreachedtheirdestination,GeneralKirbySmithsurrenderedhisentirecommandtoMajor-GeneralCanby.Thissurrenderdidnottakeplace,however,untilafterthecaptureoftherebelPresidentandVice-President;andthebadfaithwasexhibitedoffirstdisbandingmostofhisarmyandpermittinganindiscriminateplunderofpublicproperty.

OwingtothereportthatmanyofthoselatelyinarmsagainstthegovernmenthadtakenrefugeuponthesoilofMexico,carryingwiththemarmsrightfullybelongingtotheUnitedStates,whichhadbeensurrenderedtousbyagreementamongthemsomeoftheleaderswhohadsurrenderedinpersonandthedisturbedconditionofaffairsontheRioGrande,theordersfortroopstoproceedtoTexaswerenotchanged.

Therehavebeenseverecombats,raids,expeditions,andmovementstodefeatthedesignsandpurposesoftheenemy,mostofthemreflectinggreatcreditonourarms,andwhichcontributedgreatlytoourfinaltriumph,thatIhavenotmentioned.Manyofthesewillbefoundclearlysetforthinthereportsherewithsubmitted;someinthetelegramsandbriefdispatchesannouncingthem,andothers,Iregrettosay,havenotasyetbeenofficiallyreported.

ForinformationtouchingourIndiandifficulties,Iwouldrespectfullyrefertothereportsofthecommandersofdepartmentsinwhichtheyhaveoccurred.

IthasbeenmyfortunetoseethearmiesofboththeWestandtheEastfightbattles,andfromwhatIhaveseenIknowthereisnodifferenceintheirfightingqualities.Allthatitwaspossibleformentodoinbattletheyhavedone.TheWesternarmiescommencedtheirbattlesintheMississippiValley,andreceived

WesternarmiescommencedtheirbattlesintheMississippiValley,andreceivedthefinalsurrenderoftheremnantoftheprincipalarmyopposedtotheminNorthCarolina.ThearmiesoftheEastcommencedtheirbattlesontheriverfromwhichtheArmyofthePotomacderiveditsname,andreceivedthefinalsurrenderoftheiroldantagonistsatAppomattoxCourtHouse,Virginia.Thesplendidachievementsofeachhavenationalizedourvictoriesremovedallsectionaljealousies(ofwhichwehaveunfortunatelyexperiencedtoomuch),andthecauseofcriminationandrecriminationthatmighthavefollowedhadeithersectionfailedinitsduty.Allhaveaproudrecord,andallsectionscanwellcongratulatethemselvesandeachotherforhavingdonetheirfullshareinrestoringthesupremacyoflawovereveryfootofterritorybelongingtotheUnitedStates.Letthemhopeforperpetualpeaceandharmonywiththatenemy,whosemanhood,howevermistakenthecause,drewforthsuchherculeandeedsofvalor.

Ihavethehonortobe,Veryrespectfully,yourobedientservant,U.S.GRANT,Lieutenant-General.

THEEND

__________FOOTNOTES

(*1)AfterwardsGeneralGardner,C.S.A.

(*2)GeneralGarlandexpressedawishtogetamessagebacktoGeneralTwiggs,hisdivisioncommander,orGeneralTaylor,totheeffectthathewasnearlyoutofammunitionandmusthavemoresenttohim,orotherwisebereinforced.Deemingthereturndangeroushedidnotliketoorderanyonetocarryit,sohecalledforavolunteer.LieutenantGrantofferedhisservices,whichwereaccepted.—PUBLISHERS.

(*3)MentionedinthereportsofMajorLee,ColonelGarlandandGeneralWorth.—PUBLISHERS.

(*4)NOTE.—IthadbeenafavoriteideawithGeneralScottforagreatmanyyearsbeforetheMexicanwartohaveestablishedintheUnitedStatesasoldiers'home,patternedaftersomethingofthekindabroad,particularly,Ibelieve,in

home,patternedaftersomethingofthekindabroad,particularly,Ibelieve,inFrance.Herecommendedthisuniformly,oratleastfrequently,inhisannualreportstotheSecretaryofWar,butnevergotanyhearing.Now,ashehadconqueredthestate,hemadeassessmentsuponthedifferentlargetownsandcitiesoccupiedbyourtroops,inproportiontotheircapacitytopay,andappointedofficerstoreceivethemoney.Inadditiontothesumthusrealizedhehadderived,throughcaptureatCerroGordo,salesofcapturedgovernmenttobacco,etc.,sumswhichswelledthefundtoatotalofabout$220,000.Portionsofthisfundweredistributedamongtherankandfile,giventothewoundedinhospital,orappliedinotherways,leavingabalanceofsome$118,000remainingunappliedatthecloseofthewar.Afterthewarwasoverandthetroopsallhome,GeneralScottappliedtohavethismoney,whichhadneverbeenturnedintotheTreasuryoftheUnitedStates,expendedinestablishingsuchhomesashehadpreviouslyrecommended.ThisfundwasthefoundationoftheSoldiers'HomeatWashingtonCity,andalsooneatHarrodsburgh,Kentucky.

Thelatterwentintodisusemanyyearsago.Infactitneverhadmanysoldiersinit,andwas,Ibelieve,finallysold.

(*5)TheMexicanwarmadethreepresidentialcandidates,Scott,TaylorandPierce—andanynumberofaspirantsforthathighoffice.ItmadealsogovernorsofStates,membersofthecabinet,foreignministersandotherofficersofhighrankbothinstateandnation.Therebellion,whichcontainedmorewarinasingleday,atsomecriticalperiods,thanthewholeMexicanwarintwoyears,hasnotbeensofruitfulofpoliticalresultstothoseengagedontheUnionside.Ontheotherside,thesideoftheSouth,nearlyeverymanwhoholdsofficeofanysortwhatever,eitherinthestateorinthenation,wasaConfederatesoldier,butthisiseasilyaccountedforfromthefactthattheSouthwasamilitarycamp,andtherewereveryfewpeopleofasuitableagetobeinthearmywhowerenotinit.

(*6)C.B.Lagow,theothersnotyethavingjoinedme.

(*7)NOTE.—SincewritingthischapterIhavereceivedfromMrs.W.H.L.Wallace,widowofthegallantgeneralwhowaskilledinthefirstday'sfightonthefieldofShiloh,aletterfromGeneralLew.Wallacetohimdatedthemorningofthe5th.AtthedateofthisletteritwaswellknownthattheConfederateshadtroopsoutalongtheMobile&OhiorailroadwestofCrump'slandingand

troopsoutalongtheMobile&OhiorailroadwestofCrump'slandingandPittsburglanding,andwerealsocollectingnearShiloh.ThislettershowsthatatthattimeGeneralLew.WallacewasmakingpreparationsfortheemergencythatmighthappenforthepassingofreinforcementsbetweenShilohandhisposition,extendingfromCrump'slandingwestward,andhesendsitovertheroadrunningfromAdamsvilletothePittsburglandingandPurdyroad.ThesetworoadsintersectnearlyamilewestofthecrossingofthelatteroverOwlCreek,whereourrightrested.InthisletterGeneralLew.WallaceadvisesGeneralW.H.L.Wallacethathewillsend"to-morrow"(andhisletteralsosays"April5th,"whichisthesamedaytheletterwasdatedandwhich,therefore,musthavebeenwrittenonthe4th)somecavalrytoreporttohimathisheadquarters,andsuggestingtheproprietyofGeneralW.H.L.Wallace'ssendingacompanybackwiththemforthepurposeofhavingthecavalryatthetwolandingsfamiliarizethemselveswiththeroadsothattheycould"actpromptlyincaseofemergencyasguidestoandfromthedifferentcamps."

ThismodifiesverymateriallywhatIhavesaid,andwhathasbeensaidbyothers,oftheconductofGeneralLew.WallaceatthebattleofShiloh.Itshowsthathenaturally,withnomoreexperiencethanhehadatthetimeintheprofessionofarms,wouldtaketheparticularroadthathedidstartuponintheabsenceoforderstomovebyadifferentroad.

Themistakehemade,andwhichprobablycausedhisapparentdilatoriness,wasthatofadvancingsomedistanceafterhefoundthatthefiring,whichwouldbeatfirstdirectlytohisfrontandthenofftotheleft,hadfallenbackuntilithadgotverymuchinrearofthepositionofhisadvance.ThisfallingbackhadtakenplacebeforeIsentGeneralWallaceorderstomoveuptoPittsburglandingand,naturally,myorderwastofollowtheroadnearesttheriver.Butmyorderwasverbal,andtoastaffofficerwhowastodeliverittoGeneralWallace,sothatIamnotcompetenttosayjustwhatordertheGeneralactuallyreceived.

GeneralWallace'sdivisionwasstationed,theFirstbrigadeatCrump'slanding,theSecondouttwomiles,andtheThirdtwoandahalfmilesout.HearingthesoundsofbattleGeneralWallaceearlyorderedhisFirstandThirdbrigadestoconcentrateontheSecond.Ifthepositionofourfronthadnotchanged,theroadwhichWallacetookwouldhavebeensomewhatshortertoourrightthantheRiverroad.

U.S.GRANT.

MOUNTMACGREGOR,NEWYORK,June21,1885.

MOUNTMACGREGOR,NEWYORK,June21,1885.

(*8)NOTE:InanarticleonthebattleofShilohwhichIwrotefortheCenturyMagazine,IstatedthatGeneralA.McD.McCook,whocommandedadivisionofBuell'sarmy,expressedsomeunwillingnesstopursuetheenemyonMonday,April7th,becauseoftheconditionofhistroops.GeneralBadeau,inhishistory,alsomakesthesamestatement,onmyauthority.OutofjusticetoGeneralMcCookandhiscommand,Imustsaythattheyleftapointtwenty-twomileseastofSavannahonthemorningofthe6th.Fromtheheavyrainsofafewdayspreviousandthepassageoftrainsandartillery,theroadswerenecessarilydeepinmud,whichmademarchingslow.Thedivisionhadnotonlymarchedthroughthismudthedaybefore,butithadbeenintherainallnightwithoutrest.Itwasengagedinthebattleoftheseconddayanddidasgoodserviceasitspositionallowed.InfactanopportunityoccurredforittoperformaconspicuousactofgallantrywhichelicitedthehighestcommendationfromdivisioncommandersintheArmyoftheTennessee.GeneralShermanbothinhismemoirsandreportmakesmentionofthisfact.GeneralMcCookhimselfbelongstoafamilywhichfurnishedmanyvolunteerstothearmy.IrefertothesecircumstanceswithminutenessbecauseIdidGeneralMcCookinjusticeinmyarticleintheCentury,thoughnottotheextentonewouldsupposefromthepublicpress.Iamnotwillingtodoanyoneaninjustice,andifconvincedthatIhavedoneone,Iamalwayswillingtomakethefullestadmission.

(*9)NOTE.—Forgallantryinthevariousengagements,fromthetimeIwasleftincommanddownto26thofOctoberandonmyrecommendation,GeneralsMcPhersonandC.S.HamiltonwerepromotedtobeMajor-Generals,andColonelsC.C.Marsh,20thIllinois,M.M.Crocker,13thIowaJ.A.Mower,11thMissouri,M.D.Leggett,78thOhio,J.D.Stevenson,7thMissouri,andJohnE.Smith,45thIllinois,tobeBrigadiers.

(*10)ColonelElletreportedhavingattackedaConfederatebatteryontheRedRivertwodaysbeforewithoneofhisboats,theDeSoto.Runningaground,hewasobligedtoabandonhisvessel.However,hereportedthathesetfiretoherandblewherup.Twentyofhismenfellintothehandsoftheenemy.Withthebalanceheescapedonthesmallcapturedsteamer,theNewEra,andsucceededinpassingthebatteriesatGrandGulfandreachingthevicinityofVicksburg.

(*11)OneofColonelEllet'svesselswhichhadruntheblockadeonFebruarythe2dandbeensunkintheRedRiver.

(*12)NOTE.—OnthisoccasionGovernorRichardYates,ofIllinois,happenedtobeonavisittothearmyandaccompaniedmetoCarthage.IfurnishedanambulanceforhisuseandthatofsomeoftheStateofficerswhoaccompaniedhim.

(*13)NOTE.—WhenGeneralShermanfirstlearnedofthemoveIproposedtomake,hecalledtoseemeaboutit.IrecollectthatIhadtransferredmyheadquartersfromaboatintherivertoahouseashortdistancebackfromthelevee.IwasseatedonthepiazzaengagedinconversationwithmystaffwhenShermancameup.Afterafewmoments'conversationhesaidthathewouldliketoseemealone.Wepassedintothehousetogetherandshutthedoorafterus.ShermanthenexpressedhisalarmatthemoveIhadordered,sayingthatIwasputtingmyselfinapositionvoluntarilywhichanenemywouldbegladtomanoeuvreayear—oralongtime—togetmein.Iwasgoingintotheenemy'scountry,withalargeriverbehindmeandtheenemyholdingpointsstronglyfortifiedaboveandbelow.Hesaidthatitwasanaxiominwarthatwhenanygreatbodyoftroopsmovedagainstanenemytheyshoulddosofromabaseofsupplies,whichtheywouldguardastheywouldtheappleoftheeye,etc.Hepointedoutallthedifficultiesthatmightbeencounteredinthecampaignproposed,andstatedinturnwhatwouldbethetruecampaigntomake.Thiswas,insubstance,togobackuntilhighgroundcouldbereachedontheeastbankoftheriver;fortifythereandestablishadepotofsupplies,andmovefromthere,beingalwayspreparedtofallbackuponitincaseofdisaster.IsaidthiswouldtakeusbacktoMemphis.Shermanthensaidthatwastheveryplacehewouldgoto,andwouldmovebyrailroadfromMemphistoGrenada,repairingtheroadasweadvanced.TothisIreplied,thecountryisalreadydisheartenedoverthelackofsuccessonthepartofourarmies;thelastelectionwentagainstthevigorousprosecutionofthewar,voluntaryenlistmentshadceasedthroughoutmostoftheNorthandconscriptionwasalreadyresortedto,andifwewentbacksofarasMemphisitwoulddiscouragethepeoplesomuchthatbasesofsupplieswouldbeofnouse:neithermentoholdthemnorsuppliestoputinthemwouldbefurnished.Theproblemforuswastomoveforwardtoadecisivevictory,orourcausewaslost.Noprogresswasbeingmadeinanyotherfield,andwehadtogoon.

Shermanwrotetomyadjutantgeneral,ColonelJ.A.Rawlins,embodyinghisviewsofthecampaignthatshouldbemade,andaskinghimtoadvisemetoatleastgettheviewsofmygeneralsuponthesubject.ColonelRawlinsshowedmetheletter,butIdidnotseeanyreasonforchangingmyplans.TheletterwasnotansweredandthesubjectwasnotsubsequentlymentionedbetweenShermanandmyselftotheendofthewar,thatIrememberof.Ididnotregardtheletterasofficial,andconsequentlydidnotpreserveit.GeneralShermanfurnishedacopyhimselftoGeneralBadeau,whoprinteditinhishistoryofmycampaigns.Ididnotregardeithertheconversationbetweenusorthelettertomyadjutant-generalasprotests,butsimplyfriendlyadvicewhichtherelationsbetweenusfullyjustified.Shermangavethesameenergytomakethecampaignasuccessthathewouldorcouldhavedoneifithadbeenorderedbyhimself.ImakethisstatementheretocorrectanimpressionwhichwascirculatedatthecloseofthewartoSherman'sprejudice,andforwhichtherewasnofairfoundation.

(*14)MeantEdward'sStation.

(*15)CHATTANOOGA,November18,1863.

MAJOR-GENERALW.T.SHERMAN:

EnclosedherewithIsendyoucopyofinstructionstoMajor-GeneralThomas.Youhavingbeenoverthegroundinperson,andhavingheardthewholematterdiscussed,furtherinstructionswillnotbenecessaryforyou.ItisparticularlydesirablethataforceshouldbegotthroughtotherailroadbetweenClevelandandDalton,andLongstreetthuscutofffromcommunicationwiththeSouth,butbeingconfrontedbyalargeforcehere,stronglylocated,itisnoteasytotellhowthisistobeeffecteduntiltheresultofourfirsteffortisknown.

Iwilladd,however,whatisnotshowninmyinstructionstoThomas,thatabrigadeofcavalryhasbeenorderedherewhich,ifitarrivesintime,willbethrownacrosstheTennesseeaboveChickamauga,andmaybeabletomakethetriptoClevelandorthereabouts.

U.S.GRANTMaj.-Gen'l.

CHATTANOOGA,November18,1863.

MAJOR-GENERALGEO.H.THOMAS,Chattanooga:

Allpreparationsshouldbemadeforattackingtheenemy'spositiononMissionaryRidgebySaturdayatdaylight.Notbeingprovidedwithamapgivingnamesofroads,spursofthemountains,andotherplaces,suchdefiniteinstructionscannotbegivenasmightbedesirable.However,thegeneralplan,youunderstand,isforSherman,withtheforcebroughtwithhimstrengthenedbyadivisionfromyourcommand,toeffectacrossingoftheTennesseeRiverjustbelowthemouthofChickamauga;hiscrossingtobeprotectedbyartilleryfromtheheightsonthenorthbankoftheriver(tobelocatedbyyourchiefofartillery),andtosecuretheheightsonthenorthernextremitytoabouttherailroadtunnelbeforetheenemycanconcentrateagainsthim.YouwillcooperatewithSherman.ThetroopsinChattanoogaValleyshouldbewellconcentratedonyourleftflank,leavingonlythenecessaryforcetodefendfortificationsontherightandcentre,andamovablecolumnofonedivisioninreadinesstomovewhereverordered.Thisdivisionshouldshowitselfasthreateninglyaspossibleonthemostpracticablelineformakinganattackupthevalley.YoureffortthenwillbetoformajunctionwithSherman,makingyouradvancewelltowardsthenorthernendofMissionaryRidge,andmovingasnearsimultaneouslywithhimaspossible.Thejunctiononceformedandtheridgecarried,communicationswillbeatonceestablishedbetweenthetwoarmiesbyroadsonthesouthbankoftheriver.Furthermovementswillthendependonthoseoftheenemy.LookoutValley,Ithink,willbeeasilyheldbyGeary'sdivisionandwhattroopsyoumaystillhavetherebelongingtotheoldArmyoftheCumberland.Howard'scorpscanthenbeheldinreadinesstoacteitherwithyouatChattanoogaorwithSherman.ItshouldbemarchedonFridaynighttoapositiononthenorthsideoftheriver,notlowerdownthanthefirstpontoon-bridge,andthereheldinreadinessforsuchordersasmaybecomenecessary.Allthesetroopswillbeprovidedwithtwodays'cookedrationsinhaversacks,andonehundredroundsofammunitiononthepersonofeachinfantrysoldier.Specialcareshouldbetakenbyallofficerstoseethatammunitionisnotwastedorunnecessarilyfiredaway.Youwillcallontheengineerdepartmentforsuchpreparationsasyoumaydeemnecessaryforcarryingyourinfantryandartilleryoverthecreek.

U.S.GRANT,Major-General.

(*16)Inthisorderauthoritywasgivenforthetroopstoreformaftertakingthefirstlineofrifle-pitspreparatorytocarryingtheridge.

(*17)CHATTANOOGA,November24,1863.

MAJOR-GENERAL.CEO.H.THOMAS,Chattanooga

GeneralShermancarriedMissionaryRidgeasfarasthetunnelwithonlyslightskirmishing.Hisrightnowrestsatthetunnelandontopofthehill,hisleftatChickamaugaCreek.IhaveinstructedGeneralShermantoadvanceassoonasitislightinthemorning,andyourattack,whichwillbesimultaneous,willbeincooperation.Yourcommandwilleithercarrytherifle-pitsandridgedirectlyinfrontofthem,ormovetotheleft,asthepresenceoftheenemymayrequire.IfHooker'spositiononthemountain[cannotbemaintained]withasmallforce,anditisfoundimpracticabletocarrythetopfromwhereheis,itwouldbeadvisableforhimtomoveupthevalleywithalltheforcehecanspare,andascendbythefirstpracticableroad.

U.S.GRANT,

Major-General.

(*18)WASHINGTON,D.C.,December8,1863,10.2A.M.

MAJ.-GENERALU.S.GRANT:

UnderstandingthatyourlodgmentatKnoxvilleandatChattanoogaisnowsecure,Iwishtotenderyou,andallunderyourcommand,mymorethanthanks,myprofoundestgratitudefortheskill,courage,andperseverancewithwhichyouandthey,oversogreatdifficulties,haveeffectedthatimportantobject.Godblessyouall,

A.LINCOLN,

PresidentU.S.

(*19)GeneralJohnG.Foster.

(*20)DuringthiswinterthecitizensofJoDaviesCounty,Ill.,subscribedforandhadadiamond-hilledswordmadeforGeneralGrant,whichwasalwaysknownastheChattanoogasword.Thescabbardwasofgold,andwasornamentedwithascrollrunningnearlyitsentirelength,displayinginengravedlettersthenamesofthebattlesinwhichGeneralGranthadparticipated.

CongressalsogavehimavoteofthanksforthevictoriesatChattanooga,andvotedhimagoldmedalforVicksburgandChattanooga.AllsuchthingsarenowinthepossessionofthegovernmentatWashington.

(*21)WASHINGTON,D.C.December29,1863.

MAJ.-GENERALU.S.GRANT:

GeneralFosterhasaskedtoberelievedfromhiscommandonaccountofdisabilityfromoldwounds.Shouldhisrequestbegranted,whowouldyoulikeashissuccessor?ItispossiblethatSchofieldwillbesenttoyourcommand.

H.W.HALLECKGeneral-in-Chief.(OFFICIAL.)

(*22)SeelettertoBanks,inGeneralGrant'sreport,Appendix.

(*23)[PRIVATEANDCONFIDENTIAL.]

HEADQUARTERSARMIESOFTHEUNITEDSTATES,WASHINGTON,D.C.,April4,1864.

MAJOR-GENERALW.T.SHERMAN,CommandingMilitaryDivisionoftheMississippi.

GENERAL:—Itismydesign,iftheenemykeepquietandallowmetotaketheinitiativeinthespringcampaign,toworkallpartsofthearmytogether,andsomewhattowardsacommoncentre.ForyourinformationInowwriteyoumyprogramme,asatpresentdeterminedupon.

programme,asatpresentdeterminedupon.

IhavesentorderstoBanks,byprivatemessenger,tofinishuphispresentexpeditionagainstShreveportwithalldispatch;toturnoverthedefenceofRedRivertoGeneralSteeleandthenavyandtoreturnyourtroopstoyouandhisowntoNewOrleans;toabandonallofTexas,excepttheRioGrande,andtoholdthatwithnottoexceedfourthousandmen;toreducethenumberoftroopsontheMississippitothelowestnumbernecessarytoholdit,andtocollectfromhiscommandnotlessthantwenty-fivethousandmen.TothisIwilladdfivethousandmenfromMissouri.WiththisforceheistocommenceoperationsagainstMobileassoonashecan.Itwillbeimpossibleforhimtocommencetooearly.

GillmorejoinsButlerwithtenthousandmen,andthetwooperateagainstRichmondfromthesouthsideoftheJamesRiver.ThiswillgiveButlerthirty-threethousandmentooperatewith,W.F.SmithcommandingtherightwingofhisforcesandGillmoretheleftwing.IwillstaywiththeArmyofthePotomac,increasedbyBurnside'scorpsofnotlessthantwenty-fivethousandeffectivemen,andoperatedirectlyagainstLee'sarmy,whereveritmaybefound.

Sigelcollectsallhisavailableforceintwocolumns,one,underOrdandAverell,tostartfromBeverly,Virginia,andtheother,underCrook,tostartfromCharlestonontheKanawha,tomoveagainsttheVirginiaandTennesseeRailroad.

Crookwillhaveallcavalry,andwillendeavortogetinaboutSaltville,andmoveeastfromtheretojoinOrd.Hisforcewillbeallcavalry,whileOrdwillhavefromtentotwelvethousandmenofallarms.

YouIproposetomoveagainstJohnston'sarmy,tobreakitupandtogetintotheinterioroftheenemy'scountryasfarasyoucan,inflictingallthedamageyoucanagainsttheirwarresources.

Idonotproposetolaydownforyouaplanofcampaign,butsimplylaydowntheworkitisdesirabletohavedoneandleaveyoufreetoexecuteitinyourownway.Submittome,however,asearlyasyoucan,yourplanofoperations.

Asstated,Banksisorderedtocommenceoperationsassoonashecan.GillmoreisorderedtoreportatFortressMonroebythe18thinst.,orassoonthereafteraspracticable.Sigelisconcentratingnow.NonewillmovefromtheirplacesofrendezvousuntilIdirect,exceptBanks.Iwanttobereadytomovebythe25th

rendezvousuntilIdirect,exceptBanks.Iwanttobereadytomovebythe25thinst.,ifpossible.ButallIcannowdirectisthatyougetreadyassoonaspossible.Iknowyouwillhavedifficultiestoencounteringettingthroughthemountainstowheresuppliesareabundant,butIbelieveyouwillaccomplishit.

FromtheexpeditionfromtheDepartmentofWestVirginiaIdonotcalculateonverygreatresults;butitistheonlywayIcantaketroopsfromthere.WiththelonglineofrailroadSigelhastoprotect,hecansparenotroopsexcepttomovedirectlytohisfront.Inthiswayhemustgetthroughtoinflictgreatdamageontheenemy,ortheenemymustdetachfromoneofhisarmiesalargeforcetopreventit.Inotherwords,ifSigelcan'tskinhimselfhecanholdalegwhilesomeoneelseskins.

Iam,general,veryrespectfully,yourobedientservant,

U.S.GRANT,Lieutenant-General.

(*24)SeeinstructionstoButler,inGeneralGrant'sreport,Appendix.

(*25)INFIELD,CULPEPERC.H.,VA.,April9,1864.

MAJ.-GENERALGEO.G.MEADECom'd'gArmyofthePotomac.

Forinformationandasinstructiontogovernyourpreparationsforthecomingcampaign,thefollowingiscommunicatedconfidentiallyforyourownperusalalone.

Sofaraspracticableallthearmiesaretomovetogether,andtowardsonecommoncentre.BankshasbeeninstructedtoturnovertheguardingoftheRedRivertoGeneralSteeleandthenavy,toabandonTexaswiththeexceptionoftheRioGrande,andtoconcentratealltheforcehecan,notlessthan25,000men,tomoveonMobile.Thisheistodowithoutreferencetoothermovements.Fromthescatteredconditionofhiscommand,however,hecannotpossiblygetittogethertoleaveNewOrleansbeforethe1stofMay,ifsosoon.Shermanwillmoveatthesametimeyoudo,ortwoorthreedaysinadvance,Jo.Johnston'sarmybeinghisobjectivepoint,andtheheartofGeorgiahisultimateaim.IfsuccessfulhewillsecurethelinefromChattanoogatoMobilewiththeaidof

successfulhewillsecurethelinefromChattanoogatoMobilewiththeaidofBanks.

Sigelcannotsparetroopsfromhisarmytoreinforceeitherofthegreatarmies,buthecanaidthembymovingdirectlytohisfront.Thishehasbeendirectedtodo,andisnowmakingpreparationsforit.Twocolumnsofhiscommandwillmakesouthatthesametimewiththegeneralmove;onefromBeverly,fromtentotwelvethousandstrong,underMajor-GeneralOrd;theotherfromCharleston,Va.,principallycavalry,underBrig.-GeneralCrook.TheformerofthesewillendeavortoreachtheTennesseeandVirginiaRailroad,aboutsouthofCovington,andiffoundpracticablewillworkeastwardtoLynchburgandreturntoitsbasebywayoftheShenandoahValley,orjoinyou.TheotherwillstrikeatSaltville,Va.,andcomeeastwardtojoinOrd.ThecavalryfromOrd'scommandwilltrytributarieswouldfurnishusaneasylineoverwhichtobringallsuppliestowithineasyhaulingdistanceofeverypositionthearmycouldoccupyfromtheRapidantotheJamesRiver.ButLeecould,ifhechose,detachormovehiswholearmynorthonalineratherinteriortotheoneIwouldhavetotakeinfollowing.Amovementbyhisleft—ourright—wouldobviatethis;butallthatwasdonewouldhavetobedonewiththesuppliesandammunitionwestartedwith.Allideaofadoptingthislatterplanwasabandonedwhenthelimitedquantityofsuppliespossibletotakewithuswasconsidered.Thecountryoverwhichwewouldhavetopasswassoexhaustedofallfoodorforagethatwewouldbeobligedtocarryeverythingwithus.

Whilethesepreparationsweregoingontheenemywasnotentirelyidle.IntheWestForrestmadearaidinWestTennesseeuptothenorthernborder,capturingthegarrisonoffourorfivehundredmenatUnionCity,andfolloweditupbyanattackonPaducah,Kentucky,onthebanksoftheOhio.Whilehewasabletoenterthecityhefailedtocapturethefortsoranypartofthegarrison.OnthefirstintelligenceofForrest'sraidItelegraphedShermantosendallhiscavalryagainsthim,andnottolethimgetoutofthetraphehadputhimselfinto.Shermanhadanticipatedmebysendingtroopsagainsthimbeforehegotmyorder.

Forrest,however,fellbackrapidly,andattackedthetroopsatFortPillow,astationfortheprotectionofthenavigationoftheMississippiRiver.Thegarrisontoforceapassagesouthward,iftheyaresuccessfulinreachingtheVirginiaandTennesseeRailroad,tocutthemainlinesoftheroadconnectingRichmondwithalltheSouthandSouth-west.

GillmorewilljoinButlerwithabout10,000menfromSouthCarolina.Butler

GillmorewilljoinButlerwithabout10,000menfromSouthCarolina.Butlercanreducehisgarrisonsoastotake23,000menintothefielddirectlytohisfront.TheforcewillbecommandedbyMaj.-GeneralW.F.Smith.WithSmithandGillmore,ButlerwillseizeCityPoint,andoperateagainstRichmondfromthesouthsideoftheriver.Hismovementwillbesimultaneouswithyours.

Lee'sarmywillbeyourobjectivepoint.WhereverLeegoes,thereyouwillgoalso.TheonlypointuponwhichIamnowindoubtis,whetheritwillbebettertocrosstheRapidanaboveorbelowhim.Eachplanpresentsgreatadvantagesovertheotherwithcorrespondingobjections.Bycrossingabove,LeeiscutofffromallchanceofignoringRichmondandgoingnorthonaraid.Butifwetakethisroute,allwedomustbedonewhilsttherationswestartwithholdout.WeseparatefromButlersothathecannotbedirectedhowtocooperate.BytheotherrouteBrandyStationcanbeusedasabaseofsuppliesuntilanotherissecuredontheYorkorJamesrivers.

TheseadvantagesandobjectionsIwilltalkoverwithyoumorefullythanIcanwritethem.

Burnsidewithaforceofprobably25,000menwillreinforceyou.Immediatelyuponhisarrival,whichwillbeshortlyafterthe20thinst.,IwillgivehimthedefenceoftheroadfromBullRunasfarsouthaswewishtoholdit.ThiswillenableyoutocollectallyourstrengthaboutBrandyStationandtothefront.

TherewillbenavalcooperationontheJamesRiver,andtransportsandferrieswillbeprovidedsothatshouldLeefallbackintohisintrenchmentsatRichmond,Butler'sforceandyourswillbeaunit,oratleastcanbemadetoactassuch.WhatIwoulddirectthen,isthatyoucommenceatoncereducingbaggagetotheverylowestpossiblestandard.Twowagonstoaregimentoffivehundredmenisthegreatestnumberthatshouldbeallowed,forallbaggage,exclusiveofsubsistencestoresandordnancestores.Onewagontobrigadeandonetodivisionheadquartersissufficientandabouttwotocorpsheadquarters.

ShouldbyLee'srightflankbeourroute,youwillwanttomakearrangementsforhavingsuppliesofallsortspromptlyforwardedtoWhiteHouseonthePamunkey.Yourestimatesforthiscontingencyshouldbemadeatonce.Ifnotwantedthere,thereiseveryprobabilitytheywillbewantedontheJamesRiverorelsewhere.

IfLee'sleftisturned,largeprovisionwillhavetobemadeforordnancestores.Iwouldsaynotmuchshortoffivehundredroundsofinfantryammunitionwould

wouldsaynotmuchshortoffivehundredroundsofinfantryammunitionwoulddo.Bytheother,halftheamountwouldbesufficient.

U.S.GRANT,

Lieutenant-General.

(*26)GeneralJohnA.Logan,uponwhomdevolvedthecommandoftheArmyoftheTennesseeduringthisbattle,inhisreportgaveourtotallossinkilled,woundedandmissingat3,521;andestimatedthatoftheenemytobenotlessthan10,000:andGeneralG.M.Dodge,graphicallydescribingtoGeneralShermantheenemy'sattack,thefullweightofwhichfellfirstuponandwasbrokenbyhisdepletedcommand,remarks:"ThedisparityofforcescanbeseenfromthefactthatinthechargemadebymytwobrigadesunderFullerandMersytheytook351prisoners,representingforty-ninedifferentregiments,eightbrigadesandthreedivisions;andbroughtbackeightbattleflagsfromtheenemy."

(*27)UNIONARMYONTHERAPIDAN,MAY5,1864.

[COMPILED.]

LIEUTENANT-GENERALU.S.GRANT,Commander-in-Chief.

MAJOR-GENERALGEORGEG.MEADE,CommandingArmyofthePotomac.

MAJ.-GEN.W.S.HANCOCK,commandingSecondArmyCorps.

FirstDivision,Brig.-Gen.FrancisC.Barlow.FirstBrigade,Col.NelsonA.Miles.SecondBrigade,Col.ThomasA.Smyth.ThirdBrigade,Col.PaulFrank.FourthBrigade,Col.JohnR.Brooke.

SecondDivision,Brig.-Gen.JohnGibbon.FirstBrigade,Brig.-Gen.Alex.S.Webb.SecondBrigade,Brig.-Gen.JoshuaT.Owen.

ThirdBrigade,Col.SamuelS.Carroll.

ThirdDivision,Maj.-Gen.DavidB.Birney.FirstBrigade,Brig.-Gen.J.H.H.Ward.SecondBrigade,Brig.-Gen.AlexanderHays.

FourthDivisin,Brig.-Gen.GershomMott.FirstBrigade,Col.RobertMcAllister.SecondBrigade,Col.Wm.R.Brewster.

ArtilleryBrigade,Col.JohnC.Tidball.

MAJ.-GEN.G.K.WARREN,commandingFifthArmyCorps.

FirstDivision,Brig.-Gen.CharlesGriffin.FirstBrigade,Brig.-Gen.RomeynB.Ayres.SecondBrigade,Col.JacobB.Sweitzer.ThirdBrigade,Brig.-Gen.J.J.Bartlett.

SecondDivision,Brig.-Gen.JohnC.Robinson.FirstBrigade,Col.SamuelH.Leonard.SecondBrigade,Brig.-Gen.HenryBaxter.ThirdBrigade,Col.AndrewW.Denison.

ThirdDivision,Brig.-Gen.SamuelW.Crawford.FirstBrigade,Col.WmMcCandless.ThirdBrigade,Col.JosephW.Fisher.

FourthDivision,Brig.-Gen.JamesS.Wadsworth.FirstBrigade,Brig.-Gen.LysanderCutler.SecondBrigadeBrig.-Gen.JamesC.Rice.ThirdBrigade,Col.RoyStone

ArtilleryBrigade,Col.S.S.Wainwright.

MAJ.-GEN.JOHNSEDGWICK,commandingSixthArmyCorps.

FirstDivision,Brig.-Gen.H.G.Wright.

FirstBrigade,Col.HenryW.Brown.SecondBrigade,Col.EmoryUpton.ThirdBrigade,Brig.-Gen.D.A.Russell.FourthBrigade,Brig.-Gen.AlexanderShaler.

SecondDivision,Brig.-Gen.GeorgeW.Getty.FirstBrigade,Brig.-Gen.FrankWheaton.SecondBrigade,Col.LewisA.Grant.ThirdBrigade,Brig.-Gen.Thos.H.Neill.FourthBrigade,Brig.-Gen.HenryL.Eustis.

ThirdDivision,Brig.-Gen.JamesRicketts.FirstBrigade,Brig.-Gen.Wm.H.Morris.SecondBrigade,Brig.-Gen.T.Seymour.

ArtilleryBrigade,Col.C.H.Tompkins

MAJ.-GEN.P.H.SHERIDAN,commandingCavalryCorps.

FirstDivision,Brig.-Gen.A.T.A.Torbert.FirstBrigade,Brig.-Gen.G.A.Custer.SecondBrigade,Col.Thos.C.Devin.ReserveBrigade,Brig.-Gen.WesleyMerritt

SecondDivision,Brig.-Gen.D.McM.Gregg.FirstBrigade,Brig.-Gen.HenryE.Davies,Jr.SecondBrigade,Col.J.IrvinGregg.

ThirdDivision,Brig.-Gen.J.H.Wilson.FirstBrigade,Col.T.M.Bryan,Jr.SecondBrigade,Col.Geo.H.Chapman.

MAJ.-GEN.A.E.BURNSIDE,commandingNinthArmyCorps.

FirstDivision,Brig.-Gen.T.G.Stevenson.FirstBrigade,Col.SumnerCarruth.SecondBrigade,Col.DanielLeasure.

SecondDivision,Brig.-Gen.RobertB.Potter.FirstBrigade,Col.ZenasR.Bliss.SecondBrigade,Col.SimonG.Griffin.

ThirdDivision,Brig.-Gen.OrlandoWillcox.FirstBrigade,Col.JohnF.Hartranft.SecondBrigade,Col.Benj.C.Christ.

FourthDivision,Brig.-Gen.EdwardFerrero.FirstBrigade,Col.JoshuaK.Sigfried.

SecondBrigade,Col.HenryG.Thomas.

ProvisionalBrigade,Col.ElishaG.Marshall.

BRIG.-GEN.HENRYJ.HUNT,commandingArtillery.

Reserve,Col.H.S.Burton.FirstBrigade,Col.J.H.Kitching.SecondBrigade,Maj.J.A.Tompkins.FirstBrig.HorseArt.,Capt.J.M.Robertson.SecondBrigade,HorseArt.,Capt.D.R.Ransom.ThirdBrigade,Maj.R.H.Fitzhugh.

GENERALHEADQUARTERS…….ProvostGuard,Brig.-Gen.M.R.Patrick.VolunteerEngineers,Brig.-Gen.H.W.Benham.

CONFEDERATEARMY.

OrganizationoftheArmyofNorthernVirginia,CommandedbyGENERALROBERTE.LEE,August31st,1834.

FirstArmyCorps:LIEUT.-GEN.R.H.ANDERSON,Commanding.

MAJ.-GEN.GEO.E.PICKETT'SDivision.Brig.-Gen.SethM.Barton'sBrigade.(a)Brig.-Gen.M.D.Corse's""EppaHunton's""Wm.R.Terry's"

MAJ.-GEN.C.W.FIELD'SDivision.(b)Brig.-Gen.G.T.Anderson'sBrigade"E.M.Law's(c)""JohnBratton's"

MAJ.-GEN.J.B.KERSHAW'SDivision.(d)

Brig.-Gen.W.T.Wofford'sBrigade"B.G.Humphreys'""GoodeBryan's""Kershaw's(Old)"

SecondArmyCorps:MAJOR-GENERALJUBALA.EARLY,Commanding

MAJ.-GEN.JOHNB.GORDON'SDivision.Brig.-Gen.H.T.Hays'Brigade.(e)"JohnPegram's"(f)"Gordon's"(g)Brig.-Gen.R.F.Hoke's"

MAJ.-GEN.EDWARDJOHNSON'SDivision.StonewallBrig.(Brig.-Gen.J.A.Walker).(h)Brig.-Gen.JMJones'Brigade.(h)"GeoH.Stewart's"(h)"L.A.Stafford's"(e)

MAJ.-GEN.R.E.RODES'Division.Brig.-Gen.J.Daniel'sBrigade.(i)"Geo.Dole's"(k)"S.D.Ramseur'sBrigade."C.A.Battle's""R.D.Johnston's"(f)

ThirdArmyCorps:LIEUT.-GEN.A.P.HILL,Commanding.

MAJ.-GEN.WM.MAHONE'SDivision.(l)Brig.-Gen.J.C.C.Sanders'Brigade.Mahone's"Brig.-Gen.N.H.Harris's"(m)"A.R.Wright's""JosephFinegan's"

MAJ.-GEN.C.M.WILCOX'SDivision.Brig.-Gen.E.L.Thomas'sBrigade(n)"JamesH.Lane's"

"Sam'lMcCowan's""AlfredM.Scale's"

MAJ.-GEN.H.HETH'SDivision.(o)Brig.-Gen.J.R.Davis'sBrigade."JohnR.Cooke's""D.McRae's""J.J.Archer's""H.H.Walker's"

unattached:5thAlabamaBattalion.

CavalryCorps:LIEUTENANT-GENERALWADEHAMPTON,Commanding.(p)

MAJ.-GEN.FITZHUGHLEE'SDivisionBrig.-Gen.W.C.Wickham'sBrigade"L.L.Lomax's"

MAJ.-GEN.M.C.BUTLER'SDivision.Brig.-Gen.JohnDunovant'sBrigade."P.M.B.Young's""ThomasL.Rosser's"

MAJ.-GEN.W.H.F.LEE'SDivision.Brig.-Gen.RufusBarringer'sBrigade."J.R.Chambliss's"

ArtilleryReserve:BRIG.-GEN.W.N.PENDLETON,Commanding.

BRIG.-GEN.E.P.ALEXANDER'SDIVISION.*Cabell'sBattalion.Manly'sBattery.1stCo.RichmondHowitzers.Carleton'sBattery.Calloway'sBattery.

Haskell'sBattalion.

Branch'sBattery.Nelson's"Garden's"Rowan"

Huger'sBattalion.Smith'sBattery.Moody"Woolfolk"Parker's"Taylor's"Fickling's"Martin's"

Gibb'sBattalion.Davidson'sBattery.Dickenson's"Otey's"

BRIG.-GEN.A.L.LONG'SDIVISION.

Braxton'sBattalion.LeeBattery.1stMd.Artillery.Stafford"Alleghany"

Cutshaw'sBattalion.CharlottevilleArtillery.Staunton"Courtney"

Carter'sBattalion.MorrisArtillery.Orange"KingWilliamArtillery.JeffDavis"

Nelson'sBattalion.AmherstArtillery.Milledge"Fluvauna"

Brown'sBattalion.PowhatanArtillery.2dRichmondHowitzers.3d""RockbridgeArtillery.SalemFlyingArtillery.

COLR.L.WALKER'SDIVISION.

Cutt'sBattalion.Ross'sBattery.Patterson'sBattery.IrwinArtillery.

Richardson'sBattalion.LewisArtillery.DonaldsonvilleArtillery.NorfolkLight"Huger"

Mclntosh'sBattalion.Johnson'sBattery.HardawayArtillery.Danville"2dRockbridgeArtillery.

Pegram'sBattalion.PeedeeArtillery.FredericksburgArtillery.Letcher"PurcellBattery.Crenshaw'sBattery.

Poague'sBattalion.MadisonArtillery.Albemarle"Brooke"Charlotte"

NOTE.(a)COL.W.R.AylettwasincommandAug.29th,andprobablyatabovedate.(b)InspectionreportofthisdivisionshowsthatitalsocontainedBenning'sandGregg'sBrigades.(c)CommandedbyColonelP.D.Bowles.(d)Onlytwobrigadier-generalsreportedforduty;namesnotindicated.

OrganizationoftheArmyoftheValleyDistrict.(e)ConstitutingYork'sBrigade.(f)InRamseur'sDivision.(g)Evan'sBrigade,ColonelE.N.Atkinsoncommanding,andcontaining12thGeorgiaBattalion.(h)TheVirginiaregimentsconstitutedTerry'sBrigade,Gordon'sDivision.(i)Grimes'Brigade.(k)Cook's"

(l)Returnsreportbutonegeneralofficerpresentforduty;namenotindicated.(m)ColonelJosephM.Jayne,commanding.(n)ColonelThomasJ.Simmons,commanding.(o)Fourbrigadier-generalsreportedpresentforduty;namesnotindicated.(p)OnfaceofreturnsappearstohaveconsistedofHampton's,Fitz-Lee's,andW.H.F.Lee'sDivision,andDearing'sBrigade.

*Butonegeneralofficerreportedpresentfordutyintheartillery,andAlexander'snamenotontheoriginal.

(*28)HEADQUARTERSARMIESU.S.,MayII,1864.—3P.M.

MAJOR-GENERALMEADE,CommandingArmyofthePotomac.

Movethreedivisionsofthe2dcorpsbytherearofthe5thand6thcorps,undercoverofnight,soastojointhe9thcorpsinavigorousassaultontheenemyatfouro'clockA.M.to-morrow.willsendoneortwostaffofficersoverto-nighttostaywithBurnside,andimpresshimwiththeimportanceofapromptandvigorousattack.WarrenandWrightshouldholdtheircorpsasclosetotheenemyaspossible,totakeadvantageofanydiversioncausedbythisattack,andtopushinifanyopportunitypresentsitself.ThereisbutlittledoubtinmymindthattheassaultlasteveningwouldhaveprovedentirelysuccessfulifithadcommencedonehourearlierandhadbeenheartilyenteredintobyMott's

commencedonehourearlierandhadbeenheartilyenteredintobyMott'sdivisionandthe9thcorps.

U.S.GRANT,Lieut.-General.

(*29)HEADQUARTERS,ARMIESU.S.,May11,1864.-4P.M.

MAJOR-GENERALA.E.BURNSIDE,Commanding9thArmyCorps.

Major-GeneralHancockhasbeenorderedtomovehiscorpsundercoverofnighttojoinyouinavigorousattackagainsttheenemyat4o'clockA.M.to-morrow.Youwillmoveagainsttheenemywithyourentireforcepromptlyandwithallpossiblevigoratprecisely4o'clockA.M.to-morrowthe12thinst.Letyourpreparationsforthisattackbeconductedwiththeutmostsecrecyandveiledentirelyfromtheenemy.

Isendtwoofmystaffofficers,ColonelsComstockandBabcock,inwhomIhavegreatconfidenceandwhoareacquaintedwiththedirectiontheattackistobemadefromhere,toremainwithyouandGeneralHancockwithinstructionstorenderyoueveryassistanceintheirpower.GeneralsWarrenandWrightwillholdtheircorpsasclosetotheenemyaspossible,totakeadvantageofanydiversioncausedbyyoursandHancock'sattack,andwillpushintheirwholeforceifanyopportunitypresentsitself.

U.S.GRANT,Lieut.-General.

(*30)HEADQUARTERSARMIESU.S.,May12,1864,6.30P.M.

MAJOR-GENERALHALLECK,Washington,D.C.

Theeighthdayofthebattlecloses,leavingbetweenthreeandfourthousandprisonersinourhandsfortheday'swork,includingtwogeneralofficers,andoverthirtypiecesofartillery.Theenemyareobstinate,andseemtohavefoundthelastditch.Wehavelostnoorganizations,noteventhatofacompany,whilstwehavedestroyedandcapturedonedivision(Johnson's),onebrigade(Doles'),

wehavedestroyedandcapturedonedivision(Johnson's),onebrigade(Doles'),andoneregimententirefromtheenemy.

U.S.GRANT,Lieut.-General.

(*31)SPOTTSYLVANIAC.H.,May13,1864.

HONE.M.STANTON,SECRETARYOFWAR,Washington,D.C.

Ibegleavetorecommendthefollowingpromotionsbemadeforgallantanddistinguishedservicesinthelasteightdays'battles,towit:Brigadier-GeneralH.G.WrightandBrigadier-GeneralJohnGibbontobeMajor-Generals;ColonelS.S.Carroll,8thOhioVolunteersColonelE.Upton,121stNewYorkVolunteers;ColonelWilliamMcCandless,2dPennsylvaniaReserves,tobeBrigadier-Generals.IwouldalsorecommendMajor-GeneralW.S.HancockforBrigadier-Generalintheregulararmy.Hisservicesandqualificationsareeminentlydeservingofthisrecognition.InmakingtheserecommendationsIdonotwishtheclaimsofGeneralG.M.Dodgeforpromotionforgotten,butrecommendhisnametobesentinatthesametime.IwouldalsoasktohaveGeneralWrightassignedtothecommandoftheSixthArmyCorps.IwouldfurtherasktheconfirmationofGeneralHumphreystotherankofMajor-General.

GeneralMeadehasmorethanmetmymostsanguineexpectations.HeandShermanarethefittestofficersforlargecommandsIhavecomeincontactwith.IftheirservicescanberewardedbypromotiontotherankofMajor-Generalsintheregulararmythehonorwouldbeworthilybestowed,andIwouldfeelpersonallygratified.Iwouldnotliketoseeoneofthesepromotionsatthistimewithoutseeingboth.

U.S.GRANT,Lieut.-General.

(*32)QUARLES'MILLS,VA.,May26,1864.

MAJOR-GENERALHALLECK,Washington,D.C.

Therelativepositionofthetwoarmiesisnowasfollows:Lee'srightrestsona

Therelativepositionofthetwoarmiesisnowasfollows:Lee'srightrestsonaswampeastoftheRichmondandFredericksburgroadandsouthoftheNorthAnna,hiscentreontheriveratOxFord,andhisleftatLittleRiverwiththecrossingsofLittleRiverguardedasfarupaswehavegone.Hancockwithhiscorpsandonedivisionofthe9thcorpscrossedatChesterfieldFordandcoverstherightwingofLee'sarmy.Onedivisionofthe9thcorpsisonthenorthbankoftheAnnaatOxFord,withbridgesaboveandbelowatpointsnearesttoitwherebothbanksareheldbyus,sothatitcouldreinforceeitherwingofourarmywithequalfacility.The5thand6thcorpswithonedivisionofthe9thcorpsrunfromthesouthbankoftheAnnafromashortdistanceaboveOxFordtoLittleRiver,andparallelwithandneartotheenemy.

Tomakeadirectattackfromeitherwingwouldcauseaslaughterofourmenthatevensuccesswouldnotjustify.Toturntheenemybyhisright,betweenthetwoAnnasisimpossibleonaccountoftheswampuponwhichhisrightrests.ToturnhimbytheleftleavesLittleRiver,NewFoundRiverandSouthAnnaRiver,allofthemstreamspresentingconsiderableobstaclestothemovementofourarmy,tobecrossed.Ihavedeterminedthereforetoturntheenemy'srightbycrossingatornearHanoverTown.Thiscrossesallthreestreamsatonce,andleavesusstillwherewecandrawsupplies.

Duringthelastnighttheteamsandartillerynotinposition,belongingtotherightwingofourarmy,andonedivisionofthatwingwerequietlywithdrawntothenorthbankoftheriverandmoveddowntotherearoftheleft.AssoonasitisdarkthisdivisionwithmostofthecavalrywillcommenceaforcedmarchforHanoverTowntoseizeandholdthecrossings.Thebalanceoftherightwingwillwithdrawatthesamehour,andfollowasrapidlyaspossible.Theleftwingwillalsowithdrawfromthesouthbankoftheriverto-nightandfollowinrearoftherightwing.Lee'sarmyisreallywhipped.Theprisonerswenowtakeshowit,andtheactionofhisarmyshowsitunmistakably.Abattlewiththemoutsideofintrenchmentscannotbehad.OurmenfeelthattheyhavegainedtheMORALEovertheenemy,andattackhimwithconfidence.Imaybemistaken,butIfeelthatoursuccessoverLee'sarmyisalreadyassured.Thepromptnessandrapiditywithwhichyouhaveforwardedreinforcementshascontributedlargelytothefeelingofconfidenceinspiredinourmen,andtobreakdownthatoftheenemy.

WearedestroyingalltherailswecanontheCentralandFredericksburgroads.IwanttoleaveagapontheroadsnorthofRichmondsobigthattogetasingletracktheywillhavetoimportrailfromelsewhere.EvenifacrossingisnoteffectedatHanoverTownitwillprobablybenecessaryforustomoveondown

effectedatHanoverTownitwillprobablybenecessaryforustomoveondownthePamunkeyuntilacrossingiseffected.IthinkitadvisablethereforetochangeourbaseofsuppliesfromPortRoyaltotheWhiteHouse.Iwishyouwoulddirectthischangeatonce,andalsodirectSmithtoputtherailroadbridgethereinconditionforcrossingtroopsandartilleryandleavementoholdit.

U.S.GRANT,Lieut.-General.

(*33)NEARCOLDHARBOR,June3,1864,7A.M.

MAJOR-GENERALMEADE,CommandingA.P.

Themomentitbecomescertainthatanassaultcannotsucceed,suspendtheoffensive;butwhenonedoessucceed,pushitvigorouslyandifnecessarypileintroopsatthesuccessfulpointfromwherevertheycanbetaken.Ishallgotowhereyouareinthecourseofanhour.

U.S.GRANT,Lieut.-General.

(*34)COLDHARBOR,June5,1864.

MAJOR-GENERALHALLECK,ChiefofStaffoftheArmy,Washington,D.C.

Afullsurveyofallthegroundsatisfiesmethatitwouldbeimpracticabletoholdalinenorth-eastofRichmondthatwouldprotecttheFredericksburgRailroadtoenableustousethatroadforsupplyingthearmy.Todosowouldgiveusalongvulnerablelineofroadtoprotect,exhaustingmuchofourstrengthtoguardit,andwouldleaveopentotheenemyallofhislinesofcommunicationonthesouthsideoftheJames.MyideafromthestarthasbeentobeatLee'sarmyifpossiblenorthofRichmond;thenafterdestroyinghislinesofcommunicationonthenorthsideoftheJamesRivertotransferthearmytothesouthsideandbesiegeLeeinRichmond,orfollowhimsouthifheshouldretreat.

Inowfind,afteroverthirtydaysoftrial,theenemydeemsitofthefirstimportancetorunnoriskswiththearmiestheynowhave.Theyactpurelyonthedefensivebehindbreastworks,orfeeblyontheoffensiveimmediatelyinfrontof

defensivebehindbreastworks,orfeeblyontheoffensiveimmediatelyinfrontofthem,andwhereincaseofrepulsetheycaninstantlyretirebehindthem.WithoutagreatersacrificeofhumanlifethanIamwillingtomakeallcannotbeaccomplishedthatIhaddesignedoutsideofthecity.Ihavethereforeresolveduponthefollowingplan:

IwillcontinuetoholdsubstantiallythegroundnowoccupiedbytheArmyofthePotomac,takingadvantageofanyfavorablecircumstancethatmaypresentitselfuntilthecavalrycanbesentwesttodestroytheVirginiaCentralRailroadfromaboutBeaverDamforsometwenty-fiveorthirtymileswest.WhenthisiseffectedIwillmovethearmytothesouthsideoftheJamesRiver,eitherbycrossingtheChickahominyandmarchingneartoCityPoint,orbygoingtothemouthoftheChickahominyonnorthsideandcrossingthere.Toprovideforthislastandmostpossiblecontingency,severalferry-boatsofthelargestclassoughttobeimmediatelyprovided.

OnceonthesouthsideoftheJamesRiver,Icancutoffallsourcesofsupplytotheenemyexceptwhatisfurnishedbythecanal.IfHuntersucceedsinreachingLynchburg,thatwillbelosttohimalso.ShouldHunternotsucceed,Iwillstillmaketheefforttodestroythecanalbysendingcavalryupthesouthsideoftheriverwithapontoontraintocrosswherevertheycan.

Thefeelingofthetwoarmiesnowseemstobethattherebelscanprotectthemselvesonlybystrongintrenchments,whilstourarmyisnotonlyconfidentofprotectingitselfwithoutintrenchments,butthatitcanbeatanddrivetheenemywhereverandwheneverhecanbefoundwithoutthisprotection.

U.S.GRANT,Lieutenant-General.

(*35)COLDHARBOR,VA.,June6,1864.

MAJOR-GENERALD.HUNTER

CommandingDept.W.Va.

GeneralSheridanleaveshereto-morrowmorning,withinstructionstoproceedtoCharlottesville,Va.,andtocommencetherethedestructionoftheVa.Cen.R.R.,destroyingthiswayasmuchaspossible.ThecompletedestructionofthisroadandofthecanalonJamesRiverisofgreatimportancetous.Accordingto

roadandofthecanalonJamesRiverisofgreatimportancetous.AccordingtotheinstructionsIsenttoGeneralHalleckforyourguidance,youweretoproceedtoLynchburgandcommencethere.ItwouldbeofgreatvaluetoustogetpossessionofLynchburgforasingleday.Butthatpointisofsomuchimportancetotheenemy,thatinattemptingtogetitsuchresistancemaybemetastodefeatyourgettingontotheroadorcanalatall.Isee,inlookingoverthelettertoGeneralHalleckonthesubjectofyourinstructions,thatitratherindicatesthatyourrouteshouldbefromStauntonviaCharlottesville.Ifyouhavesounderstoodit,youwillbedoingjustwhatIwant.ThedirectionIwouldnowgiveis,thatifthisletterreachesyouinthevalleybetweenStauntonandLynchburg,youimmediatelyturneastbythemostpracticableroad.Fromthencemoveeastwardalongthelineoftheroad,destroyingitcompletelyandthoroughly,untilyoujoinGeneralSheridan.AftertheworklaidoutforGeneralSheridanandyourselfisthoroughlydone,proceedtojointheArmyofthePotomacbytheroutelaidoutinGeneralSheridan'sinstructions.

Ifanyportionofyourforce,especiallyyourcavalry,isneededbackinyourDepartment,youareauthorizedtosenditback.

IfonreceiptofthisyoushouldbeneartoLynchburganddeemitpracticabletodetachacavalryforcetodestroythecanal.Losenoopportunitytodestroythecanal.

U.S.GRANT,Lieut.-General.

(*36)FROMASTATEMENTOFLOSSESCOMPILEDINTHEADJUTANT-GENERAL'SOFFICE.

FIELDOFACTIONANDDATE.|KILLED.|WOUNDED.|MISSING.|AGGREGATE.|

Wilderness,May5thto7th|2,261|8,785|2,902|13,948|Spottsylvania,May8thto21st|2,271|9,360|1,970|13,601|NorthAnna,May23dto27th|186|792|165|1,143|Totopotomoy,May27thto31st|99|358|52|509|ColdHarbor,May31sttoJune12th|1,769|6,752|1,537|10,058|Total…………….|6,586|26,047|6,626|39,259|

(*37)CITYPOINT,VA.,June17,1864.11A.M.

MAJOR-GEN.HALLECK,Washington,D.C.

*

TheenemyintheirendeavortoreinforcePetersburgabandonedtheirintrenchmentsinfrontofBermudaHundred.TheynodoubtexpectedtroopsfromnorthoftheJamesRivertotaketheirplacebeforewediscoveredit.GeneralButlertookadvantageofthisandmovedaforceatonceupontherailroadandplankroadbetweenRichmondandPetersburg,whichIhopetoretainpossessionof.

Toomuchcreditcannotbegiventothetroopsandtheircommandersfortheenergyandfortitudedisplayedduringthelastfivedays.Dayandnighthasbeenallthesame,nodelaysbeingallowedonanyaccount.

U.S.GRANT,Lieut.-General.

(*38)CITYPOINT,VA.,July24,1864.

MAJOR-GENERALMEADE,Commanding,etc.

TheengineerofficerswhomadeasurveyofthefrontfromBermudaHundredreportagainsttheprobabilityofsuccessfromanattackthere.ThechancestheythinkwillbebetteronBurnside'sfront.Ifthisisattempteditwillbenecessarytoconcentratealltheforcepossibleatthepointintheenemy'slineweexpecttopenetrate.Allofficersshouldbefullyimpressedwiththeabsolutenecessityofpushingentirelybeyondtheenemy'spresentline,iftheyshouldsucceedinpenetratingit,andofgettingbacktotheirpresentlinepromptlyiftheyshouldnotsucceedinbreakingthrough.

Totherightandleftofthepointofassaultalltheartillerypossibleshouldbebroughttoplayupontheenemyinfrontduringtheassault.Theirlineswouldbesufficientforthesupportoftheartillery,andallthereservescouldbebroughtontheflanksoftheircommandsnearesttothepointofassault,readytofollowinifsuccessful.Thefieldartilleryandinfantryheldinthelinesduringthefirst

successful.Thefieldartilleryandinfantryheldinthelinesduringthefirstassaultshouldbeinreadinesstomoveatamoment'snoticeeithertotheirfrontortofollowthemainassault,astheyshouldreceiveorders.Onething,however,shouldbeimpressedoncorpscommanders.Iftheyseetheenemygivingawayontheirfrontormovingfromittoreinforceaheavilyassaultedportionoftheirline,theyshouldtakeadvantageofsuchknowledgeandactpromptlywithoutwaitingforordersfromarmycommanders.GeneralOrdcanco-operatewithhiscorpsinthismovement,andaboutfivethousandtroopsfromBermudaHundredcanbesenttoreinforceyouorcanbeusedtothreatenanassaultbetweentheAppomattoxandJamesrivers,asmaybedeemedbest.

ThisshouldbedonebyTuesdaymorning,ifdoneatall.Ifnotattempted,wewillthenstartatthedateindicatedtodestroytherailroadasfarasHicksfordatleast,andtoWeldonifpossible.

*

WhetherwesendanexpeditionontheroadorassaultatPetersburg,Burnside'sminewillbeblownup….

U.S.GRANT,Lieutenant-General.

(*39)Seeletter,August5th,Appendix.

(*40)SeeAppendix,lettersofOct.11th.

(*41)CITYPOINT,VA.,December2,1864.

MAJOR-GENERALTHOMAS,NashvilleTenn.

IfHoodispermittedtoremainquietlyaboutNashville,youwilllosealltheroadbacktoChattanoogaandpossiblyhavetoabandonthelineoftheTennessee.Shouldheattackyouitisallwell,butifhedoesnotyoushouldattackhimbeforehefortifies.Armandputinthetrenchesyourquartermasteremployees,citizens,etc.

U.S.GRANT,

U.S.GRANT,Lieutenant-General.

CITYPOINT,VA.,December2,1864.—1.30P.M.

MAJOR-GENERALTHOMAS,Nashville,Tenn.

Withyourcitizenemployeesarmed,youcanmoveoutofNashvillewithallyourarmyandforcetheenemytoretireorfightupongroundofyourownchoosing.AftertherepulseofHoodatFranklin,itlookstomethatinsteadoffallingbacktoNashvilleweshouldhavetakentheoffensiveagainsttheenemywherehewas.Atthisdistance,however,Imayerrastothebestmethodofdealingwiththeenemy.YouwillnowsufferincalculableinjuryuponyourrailroadsifHoodisnotspeedilydisposedof.Putforththereforeeverypossibleexertiontoattainthisend.Shouldyougethimtoretreatinggivehimnopeace.

U.S.GRANT,Lieutenant-General.

CITYPOINT,VA.,December5,1864.

MAJOR-GENERALTHOMAS,Nashville,Tenn.

IstherenotdangerofForrestmovingdowntheCumberlandtowherehecancrossit?ItseemstomewhilstyoushouldbegettingupyourcavalryasrapidlyaspossibletolookafterForrest,Hoodshouldbeattackedwhereheis.Timestrengthenshiminallpossibilityasmuchasitdoesyou.

U.S.GRANT,Lieutenant-General.

CITYPOINT,VA.,December6,1864—4P.M.

MAJOR-GENERALTHOMAS,Nashville,Tenn.

AttackHoodatonceandwaitnolongerforaremnantofyourcavalry.Thereis

AttackHoodatonceandwaitnolongerforaremnantofyourcavalry.ThereisgreatdangerofdelayresultinginacampaignbacktotheOhioRiver.

U.S.GRANT,Lieutenant-General.

CITYPOINT,VA.,December8,1864.—8.30P.M.

MAJOR-GENERALTHOMAS,Nashville,Tenn.

Yourdispatchofyesterdayreceived.ItlookstomeevidenttheenemyaretryingtocrosstheCumberlandRiver,andarescattered.Whynotattackatonce?Byallmeansavoidthecontingencyofafootracetoseewhich,youorHood,canbeattotheOhio.IfyouthinknecessarycallonthegovernorsofStatestosendaforceintoLouisvilletomeettheenemyifheshouldcrosstheriver.Youclearlynevershouldcrossexceptinrearoftheenemy.Nowisoneofthefinestopportunitieseverpresentedofdestroyingoneofthethreearmiesoftheenemy.Ifdestroyedhenevercanreplaceit.Usethemeansatyourcommand,andyoucandothisandcausearejoicingthatwillresoundfromoneendofthelandtotheother.

U.S.GRANT,Lieutenant-General.

CITYPOINT,VA.,December11,1864.—4P.M.

MAJOR-GENERALTHOMAS,Nashville,Tenn.

IfyoudelayattacklongerthemortifyingspectaclewillbewitnessedofarebelarmymovingfortheOhioRiver,andyouwillbeforcedtoact,acceptingsuchweatherasyoufind.Lettherebenofurtherdelay.Hoodcannotevenstandadrawnbattlesofarfromhissuppliesofordnancestores.Ifheretreatsandyoufollow,hemustlosehismaterialandmuchofhisarmy.Iaminhopesofreceivingadispatchfromyouto-dayannouncingthatyouhavemoved.Delaynolongerforweatherorreinforcements.

U.S.GRANT,Lieutenant-General.

Lieutenant-General.

WASHINGTON,D.C.,December15,1864.

MAJOR-GENERALTHOMAS,Nashville,Tenn.

IwasjustonmywaytoNashville,butreceivingadispatchfromVanDuzerdetailingyoursplendidsuccessofto-day,Ishallgonofurther.Pushtheenemynowandgivehimnorestuntilheisentirelydestroyed.YourarmywillcheerfullysuffermanyprivationstobreakupHood'sarmyandrenderituselessforfutureoperations.Donotstopfortrainsorsupplies,buttakethemfromthecountryastheenemyhavedone.Muchisnowexpected.

U.S.GRANT,Lieutenant-General.

(*42)SeeorderstoMajor-GeneralMeade,Ord,andSheridan,March24th,Appendix.

(*43)SeeAppendix.

(*44)NOTE.—Thefac-simileofthetermsofLee'ssurrenderinsertedatthisplace,wascopiedfromtheoriginaldocumentfurnishedthepublishersthroughthecourtesyofGeneralElyS.Parker,MilitarySecretaryonGeneralGrant'sstaffatthetimeofthesurrender.

ThreepagesofpaperwerepreparedinGeneralGrant'smanifoldorderbookonwhichhewrotetheterms,andtheinterlineationsanderasureswereaddedbyGeneralParkeratthesuggestionofGeneralGrant.AftersuchalterationitwashandedtoGeneralLee,whoputonhisglasses,readit,andhandeditbacktoGeneralGrant.TheoriginalwasthentranscribedbyGeneralParkeruponofficialheadedpaperandacopyfurnishedGeneralLee.

Thefac-simileherewithshowsthecolorofthepaperoftheoriginaldocumentandallinterlineationsanderasures.

andallinterlineationsanderasures.

ThereisapopularerrortotheeffectthatGeneralsGrantandLeeeachsignedthearticlesofsurrender.ThedocumentintheformofaletterwassignedonlybyGeneralGrant,intheparlorofMcLean'shousewhileGeneralLeewassittingintheroom,andGeneralLeeimmediatelywrotealetteracceptingthetermsandhandedittoGeneralGrant.

EndoftheProjectGutenbergEBookofPersonalMemoirsofU.S.Grant,VolumeTwo,byUlyssesS.Grant

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