performance audit fulfilling obligations in relation to
TRANSCRIPT
Performance Audit
Fulfilling obligations in relation to asylum seekers
Report by the Auditor GeneralJuly 2021
Table of Contents
List of Abbreviations 7Key issues 9Executive Summary 10
Chapter 1 – Introduction 15 1.1 Introduction 15 1.2 Theinternationalprotectionprocessreliesontheoperationofseveral entitiesandtheexecutionofdifferentprocedures 16 1.3 Theincreaseininfluxofasylumseekers 19 1.4 Theinternationalprotectionprocesscost26millioneurosduring2019 21 1.5 Returntocountryoforiginoffailedasylumseekersremainsa considerablechallenge 23 1.6 AuditFocus 25 1.7 Methodology 25 1.8 ReportStructure 26
Chapter 2 – Policies 28 2.1 Introduction 28 2.2 Nationalbudgets2018–2020focusedonconsiderablebudgetincreases foroperationsandservicesrelatedtointernationalprotectionprocessesarea 28 2.3 The Strategy for the Reception of Asylum Seekers and Irregular Migrants isnotfullysupportedbycomprehensiveplans 29 2.4 Conclusion 32
Chapter 3 – The Detention Process 33 3.1 Introduction 33 3.2 TheDetentionServiceswerenotawareofthelengthofstayofthe asylum-seekerswithinitspremises 34 3.3 Detentioncostsin2019totalledanestimated€5.5millionor€58perbednight 35 3.4 NationalauthoritiesandNGOsrecognisetheneedforbetterstandards withindetention 37 3.5 Stakeholdersacknowledgethatconditionswithindetentioncentres renderaccommodationproblematic 37 3.6 Lackofaccommodationwithintheopencentresresultedinprolongedstays inthedetentioncentres 41 3.7 AccesstoNGO,familymembers,andlegaladvisorsissporadicand subjectivelydecidedbytheDetentionServices 41 3.8 Ashortageofinterpretersandculturalmediatorshinderscommunication withindetentioncentres 42 3.9 CoordinationbetweentheDetentionServicesandstakeholderswas notoptimised 42
3.10 TheDetentionServicesarenotsystematicallymonitoringorfollowingupon theneedsofasylum-seekerswithintheirpremises 43 3.11 TheDetentionServicesareheavilyunderstaffedandunder-resourced 44 3.12 Conclusion 45
Chapter 4 – Open centres 46 4.1 Introduction 46 4.2 Atend2019,residentsatopencentresadministeredbyAWASincreased by34.6percentover2018,puttingafurtherstrainonconditionswithin thecentres 47 4.3 Atend2019,well-beingandpreparationforasylumseekers’integration withinsocietywerenotappropriatelyprioritised 49 4.4 Furtherco-operationandsynergyarerequiredbetweenAWAS, DetentionServicesandMHSEentities 52 4.5 During2019,AWASincreaseditsstaffby67personnelovertheprevious year,butrequiresfurtherrecruitment,especiallyatmanageriallevel 52 4.6 TheQualityAssuranceUnitisintheprocessofbeingset-upatAWAS 54 4.7 AccommodationcostsatopencentresadministeredbyAWASvariedfrom €14to€52perpersonpernight 54 4.8 Conclusion 57
Chapter 5 – The Office of the Refugee Commissioner (RefCom) (now known as the International Protection Agency) 59 5.1 Introduction 59 5.2 EASOwasessentialinassistingRefComespeciallyduetotheheavy, pendingworkload 60 5.3 In2020,theRefCoMbecameanAgencytofacilitaterecruitmentand improveworkingconditions 60 5.4 During2019,RefComreceivedtwiceasmanynewasylumapplicationsasin2018 61 5.5 Attheendof2019,therewere3,574pendingapplicationstobeprocessed byRefCom 62 5.6 Asatend2019,therewereover800applicationspendingfrompreviousyears 63 5.7 DelayinRefCoMdecisionswasdetrimentaltobothapplicantsand governmentexpenditure 64 5.8 AlthoughRefCommanagedtoincreaseitsdecisionsthroughputby11percent,
newapplicationsincreasedby96percentin2019 66 5.9 DublinClosures,Inadmissiblecases,andpre-2018casesconstituted substantialpercentagesrelatedtothe2019decisions 68 5.10 In2019,RefComtookbetweennineandtwelvemonthstoconclude decisionswhichallocatedinternationalprotectionorwereinadmissible 68 5.11 TheOfficeoftheRefugeeCommissionerrevisedprocessesandprioritised caseswhichweredeemedroutineandmostinneedofprotection 69 5.12 During2019,eachconcludedcasecostRefComanaverageof€714.21 71 5.13 Conclusion 71
Chapter 6 - Refugee Appeals Board 73 6.1 Introduction 73 6.2 MostBoardmemberslackedadequatelegalbackgroundandexperiencein asylummatters 75 6.3 Recruitmentofadministrativeandprofessionalstafftofacilitatethe RAB’soperationswasrequired 76 6.4 RABsessionswerenotcarriedoutaccordingtouniformproceduresandat thesamefrequencyacrossallChambers 76 6.5 SimilartoRefCom,theissuanceofappealsdecisionswereprolongedto thedetrimentofasylumseekersandincreasedcostsforGovernment 78 6.6 During2018and2019,therewasnoclearsystemtoprioritisependingappeals 82 6.7 ProceduresregulatingtheefficacyoftheMHSE’slegalaidservicewerenot clearlyestablishedforallstakeholders 83 6.8 Theaveragecostforeachdecisionamountedto€246.56during2019 84 6.9 Conclusion 85
List of Tables, Charts and Figures
Table1–Asylumcostsduring2019 22Table2–RelocationtootherMemberStatesandUSAbytypeofstatus(2018and2019) 24Table3–Elementsfeaturingwithinthenationalstrategicframework 30Table4–Residentsindetentioncentre(2018and2019) 35Table5–Detentioncosts–SafiBarracks(2019) 36Table6–Deficienciesindetentioncentresidentifiedbystakeholders 38Table7–Typeofresidentsasperopencentres 47Table8–Residentsaccommodatedatopencentresasatend2019 48Table9–BedNightscapacityatopencentresfor2019 49Table10–StaffatAWAS(2018to2020) 53Table11–Opencentrescosts(2019) 55Table12–DailyAllowances 57Table13–NewapplicationsreceivedbyRefComduring2018and2019 61Table14–PendingapplicationsatRefComasatend2018and2019 62Table15–DefinitionsofdecisionsbyRefCom 65Table16–DecisionstakenbyRefComduring2019byyearwhenapplicationwaslodged 67Table17–DurationofRefComdecisions(2019) 70Table18–CostsincurredbyRefComtoprocessapplications(2019) 71Table19–CasesoverviewofworkatRAB(2018and2019) 73Table20–CategoriesofRABdecisions 79Table21–BreakdownofdecisionsatRAB(2018and2019) 80Table22–DecisionsbyRABin2018and2019 81Table23–RABdecisionsof11randomlyselectedcases 81Table24–Numberofpendingappealsasatend2018and2019 83Table25–LegalAidcasesin2018and2019 84Table26–CostsincurredbyRABtoprocessappeals(2019) 85
Chart1–First-timeasylumapplications,relativechangebetweenQ32018andQ32019 21Chart2–Casesfiledbetween2016and2018andawaitingafinaldecisionatend2019 63
Figure1–Flowchartdepictingthestagesandscenariosrelatedtotheinternational protectionprocess(2018–2019) 17Figure2–Applicationsforinternationalprotectionin2019relativetopopulationsize (2019),countrysize(2015)andGDP(2018) 20Figure3–RABprocedures(2019) 74
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List of Abbreviations
AIDA AsylumInformationDatabaseAFM ArmedForcesofMaltaAMIF Asylum,MigrationandIntegrationFundAPO AssistantPsychologyOfficersAWAS AgencyfortheWelfareofAsylumSeekersCEO ChiefExecutiveOfficerDIL Daril-LiednaDS DetentionServicesEASO EuropeanAsylumSupportOfficeECHR EuropeanCourtofHumanRightsEU EuropeanUnionEUROSTAT StatisticalOfficeoftheEuropeanUnionGDP GrossDomesticProductGREVIO GroupofExpertsonActionagainstViolenceagainstWomenandDomesticViolenceHFO Hal-FaropencentreHOC HangaropencentreHR HumanResourcesHTV Hal-FarTentVillageIPA InternationalProtectionAgencyIPAT InternationalProtectionAppealsTribunalIRC InitialReceptionCentreIT InformationTechnologyJRS JesuitRefugeeServicesMEC MaltaEmigrantsCommissionMHAS MinistryforHomeAffairsandNationalSecurityMHSE MinistryforHomeAffairs,NationalSecurityandLawEnforcementMOU MemorandaofUnderstandingMS MemberStatesNAO NationalAuditOfficeNASMS NationalAsylumSeekersManagementSystemNGO Non-GovernmentalOrganisationNSO NationalStatisticsOfficeOPCAT OptionalProtectiontotheUNConventionagainstTorturePPPN PerPersonPerNightPIO PrincipalImmigrationOfficerPL PeaceLabRAB RefugeeAppealsBoard
Fulfilling obligations in relation to asylum seekers
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RefCom OfficeoftheRefugeeCommissionerSCSA SocialCareStandardsAuthoritySOP StandardOperatingProcedureSPO SeniorPsychologyOfficerTHP TemporaryHumanitarianProtectionTCN thirdcountrynationalsTCNU ThirdCountryNationalsUnitUAM UnaccompaniedMinor(s)UMAS UnaccompaniedMinorAsylumSeekersUN UnitedNationsUNHCR UnitedNationsHighCommissionerforRefugees
List of Abbreviations cont..
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1,5262018
1,6972018
635
2019
Irregular migration and the international protection process have been among the more sensitive issues which Malta had to contend with.Irregular migration brings about complex humanitarian, social, economic, financial and administrative ramifications.
Key IssuesIncrease in irregular migration
2,045
4,022
47
1,579
1,890
2,008
569
106
24
20
1,445
3,405
2,281
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
Total number of irregular immigrants arriving by boat
Malta is carrying a disproportionate burden
Malta’s ratio of international protection seekers in proportion to population and surface area has consistently been among the highest. In 2019, costs related to the International protection process amounted to around
€26 million
The international protection process
Applications
2018
New applications received by RefCom (now known as International Protection Agency) during 2018 and 2019:
2019
5042018
DetentionCenter
Number of relocations or resettlement to other Member States and USA during 2018 and 2019:
102018
Residents in detention centre as at end 2018 and 2019:
1,0842019
Pending applications at RefCom as at end 2018 and 2019:
3,574
2019
1,937
2019
Residents accommodated at Open Centres as at end 2018 and 2019:
Accommodation Relocations or Resettlements
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Executive Summary
1. TheNationalAuditOffice(NAO)embarkedontheperformanceaudit‘Fulfilling obligations in relation to asylum seekers’totracetheefficacyofalltheprocedureswhichanypersonwhosubmitsanapplicationforasyluminMaltagoesthrough.Thisreviewfollowedtheperformanceaudit‘Dealing with Asylum Applications’publishedinJuly2011butwentbeyondinscopeasitexaminedtheinternationalprotectionprocess,specificallytheoperationsandoutputsofthereceptionanddetentionprocess,thesituationwithintheopencentres,theworkcarriedout by the formerOffice of the Refugee Commissioner (RefCom1), now the InternationalProtectionAgency,andtheRefugeeAppealsBoard(RAB2)nowknownastheInternationalProtectionAppealsTribunal.Unlessotherwisestated, this reportprimarily focuseson theperiod2018-2019.
2. Theauditobjectivesaimedtoestablishthedegreetowhich:
a. thestrategies,policiesandplansinplacearecomprehensiveandupdatedinrelationtoallaspectsoftheinternationalprotectionprocess;
b. themainprocesses,suchasreception,detention,accommodationatopencentres,aswell asprocesseswithin the remitof the formerCommissioner forRefugees and theRefugeeAppealsBoardwereexecutedwithoutdelay,fairlyandeffectively;and
c. resourcesandmechanisms inplaceenableeffectiveoperationsandmonitoringoftheservicesprovidedbytheentitiesinvolvedintheasylumprocess.
3. This report has emphasised the complex humanitarian, social, economic, financial andadministrative ramifications/repercussions brought about by irregular migration – aphenomenon that Malta has been increasingly facing since 2002. Since then, Malteseauthoritieshaveinvestedheavilytoestablishanoperationalframeworkandsetupvariousentities and units to accommodate and integrate asylum seekers, process internationalprotectionapplications,orreturnunsuccessfulapplicants.
4. The international protection process comprises various interdependent stages. Differentgovernmententitiesare responsible forand influence thestayof theasylumseekersandirregularmigrantsfromtheirarrivalinMaltauntiltheirintegrationortheirdeparturefromMalta.Delaysinonephaseoftheprocessinvariably,andwithimmediateeffect,impactsthe
1 TheOfficeoftheCommissionerforRefugeeshasbeenchangedtotheInternationalProtectionAgencyinthethirdquarterof2020.2TheRefugeeAppealsBoardbecametheInternationalProtectionAppealsTribunalin2020.
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legal,administrative,andoperationalaspectsoftheothers.Thisinturnleadstohumanitarianandsocio-economiceffectsandplacesfurtherstressonnationalresourcesandtheapplicant.
5. Over the years, subsequent administrations have substantially increased resources toaddresstheirregularmigrationphenomenonbutprogresshasnotbeenwithinreachforalltheentitieseveninviewoftheextremelyhighnumbersofarrivalsofirregularmigrantsonMalteseshoresincertainyears.Moreover,areasofinefficiencieswithinsomeoftheentitiesresponsiblefortheimplementationoftheinternationalprotectionprocessprevail.Entitiesinvolvedinthisprocessarefullyawareofthesesituationsandarecontinuouslyseekingtomitigate these circumstances through process reengineering involving the recent settingupof InternationalProtectionAgency (formerlyRefCom)and the InternationalProtectionAppeals Tribunal (formerly theRAB), upgradedmedical facilities and improvement in theavailabilityofpsycho-socialservices.
6. Whilstacknowledgingthecomplexitiesanduncertaintyinvolved,theauditdeterminedthefollowingmajorinefficiencieswithintheentitiesandtheiroperations:
a. Thestrategicframeworkinrelationtothereception,detentionandaccommodationofinternationalprotection seekersand irregularmigrants isnotdeemedcomprehensiveanddetailedenoughtodetermineresourcesrequired.
b. Thedetentionperiodofasylumseekerswasrenderedmoretaxingasthedetentioncentrewasovercrowdedandpoorlymaintainedaswellassubjecttosignificantstaffshortages,lackofInformationTechnology(IT)systemsandrecord-keepingweaknesses.
c. OpencentresrunbytheAgencyfortheWelfareofAsylumSeekers(AWAS)wereoperatingat,orcloseto,capacity.Theseweregenerallycharacterisedbyover-crowdingandrequiremoreadministrativeandprofessionalstafftoprovidethedesiredlevelofservicetotheasylumseekers.
d. 2019provedtobeadifficultyearforRefComasithadtodealwithanabnormalnumberofapplicationsdespiteshortageofstafftoprocessapplicationsfrom2019andpreviousyears,resultingin3,574applicationsoutstandingatendof2019.
e. MostoftheRefugeeAppealsBoard’smembers lackedadequatelegalbackgroundandexperienceinasylummatters.
7. Due to current restrictions brought about by the Covid-19 pandemic, this performanceauditwas largely constrained to rely on secondary information rather than in-depth self-observation of the conditionswithin detention and open centres. As far as possible, theobservations/findingsweremainlyconfirmedbythemanagementoftheentitiesconcerned.
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8. Thisperformanceauditcannotbutacknowledgetheextensivepracticaldifficultiesfacedbytheentitiesconcerned.Inmostinstances,theyencountersituationswhereasylumapplicantsdo not have any personal documentationwhich can confirm their identity or nationality.Issuesofpublichealthandsecurityalsoremainatoppriorityfortheseentities.Moreover,matters pertaining to returns are severely hampered through the absence of nationaldiplomaticmissions inThirdCountriesor thenon-cooperationof these states–where incasesthisstretchestothepointthatdespitetheconclusiveevidence,theyarenotwillingtorepatriatethepersons involved.Atthesametime,thisOfficeacknowledgestherecentsignificantbreakthroughs that thenationalauthoritieshavemade in the returnsof thoseirregularmigrantswhoseapplicationforasylumhasbeenrejectedatthefirstandsecondinstances.Thisisconsideredasaverybigstepintherightdirection.
Overallconclusions
9. Irregularmigrationisoneofthemostcomplicatedissuesthatsocieties,theworldover,alwayshavehadtoface.Nonetheless,thisauditclearlyshowsthatMalta,asthesmallestEuropeanUnion(EU)MemberState,iscarryingadisproportionateburdenduetotherelativelyhighnumberofirregularmigrantsarrivingonourshores.Malta’snationalentitieswillcontinuetostruggletocopewithoutthetangibleandmaterialsupportofotherEUMemberStates.Itishightimethatinternationalsolidarity,throughafairandpracticalprocessofburden-sharing,movesfromwordsanddeclarationstoaction.
Recommendations
10. Inviewofthefindingsandconclusionsemanatingfromthisperformanceaudit,theNAOisproposingthefollowingrecommendations:
General Processes
i. TheMinistryforHomeAffairs,NationalSecurityandLawEnforcement(MHSE)isencouragedtoestablishaworkinggrouporcommitteethatoverseesthewholeasylumprocessmanagedby thedifferententities inorder tomake theasylumprocessesas seamlessandefficientas possible, minimising unnecessary delays. Towards this aim, periodical review andenhancements of business processes employed towards increased outcomes and outputlevelsshouldberesortedtobyMHSE.
ii. Each entity should ensure that its operations are governed by clear Standard OperatingProcedures(SOPs)andwrittenprocedures.
iii. MHSEistoembarkonarobustmonitoringset-upforallservicestoensurethatdelaysarekepttoaminimumandinterventionsorservicesaredeliveredinatimelyandefficientmanner.Monitoringistoconsiderfulltraceabilityofinterventionsorservicesprovided.
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iv. TheNationalAsylumSeekersManagementSystem(NASMS)informationsystemshouldbemorecomprehensiveandfacilitatetrackingofinformationrelatedtotheasylumseekersandirregularmigrants’stayinMalta.AnyunnecessarystepsthroughtheThirdCountryNationalUnit(TCNU)shouldbeavoidedandonusputonentitiestocontrol informationfromtheirend.
Strategic framework
v. MHSEisencouragedtodraftandadheretoarevisedandcomprehensiveexpandednationalstrategythatissupportedbydetailedactionplansthatareupdatedperiodicallyandaccordingto need.
Relocation and Repatriation
vi. RecenteffortswithEUMemberStatesandThirdCountries,whichledtopositiveoutcomes,aretobecontinued.Tothisend,considerationistobegiventofurtherbroadendiscussionstoensure thatMalta’s case,as the smallestEUMemberState, and thedisproportionateeffectofirregularmigrationonitssocio-economicfabric,isbetterunderstoodbystakeholdersandcontributes todeliberationsandaction leading toa fair andpracticalburden-sharingagreement.
Detention process
vii. TheDetentionServices (DS)andtheconcernedentities involved in thedetentionprocessneedtoensurethattheprovisionssetwithinthelegislationandthestrategicframeworkareindeedachievableandareacteduponthroughtherequiredfundingandsupportfromMHSE.
viii. DSshouldnotbereactiveintheirinvolvementduringthestayoftheasylumseekerswithintheir care. Hence, this Office recommends better coordination with the other entitiesinvolvedtoensurethattheyareactivelyawareofthehistoryoftheasylumseekerswithintheircareandfacilitatetheservices,careandcontactwithrelatives,acquaintancesorlegalaidrequired.
ix. DSshouldensure that livingquartersandconditionsprovide the required levelsand thatdeficiencies identified by the Monitoring Board, the Non-Governmental Organisations(NGOs)andbyEuropeanandinternationalstakeholdersare,asfaraspossible,rectified.
x. TheDSistoascertainthatanyprovisionsforlifeafterdetentionaremadeavailablethroughappropriateeducationalactivitiesandcoordinationwithAWASandotherentities.
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Agency for the Welfare of Asylum Seekers (AWAS)
xi. MHSEisencouragedto,asfaraspossible,continuesupportingAWASwithitshumanresources(HR)requirements.
xii. Measuresrelatedtomentalhealthandpsycho-socialneedsaswellasintegrationaretobecoordinatedwithallotherconcernedentities.
International Protection Agency (IPA)
xiii. As far as possible, MHSE is to consider expediting the reengineering process envisagedthroughthechangeoverfromRefComtoIPA,suchasbetterworkingconditionsandmoreattractivesalarypackageswhichcouldattracttherequiredquantityandqualityofhumanresources.
xiv. IPA is to revisit itsprocessesand identifyand rectifyany inefficiencies toensure that theprocessisnotprolongedunnecessarily.
International Protection Appeals Tribunal (IPAT)
xv. TheTribunalistoestablishclearproceduresthatleadtofairandwell-deliberateddecisionswithoutunnecessarydelay.
xvi. Therecruitmentofcompetent,ancillarystaffistobegivenitsdueprominenceandpriority.
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Chapter 1| Introduction
1.1 Introduction
1.1.1 Irregularmigration and the international protection process have been among themoresensitiveandchallengingissueswhichMaltahadtocontendwithsince2002,whenover1,600personsreachedMalta’sshoresthroughunregisteredboats.Intheyearsthatfollowed,theproblemofirregularmigrationpersistedwithregularfrequency.Statisticsshowthatduringtheperiod2018to2019,4,850personsreachedMaltairregularlyby59boatslandings.3 The vastmajorityofthesepersonsappliedforinternationalprotection.
1.1.2 WhileconsiderableworkwascarriedoutsinceMalta’saccessiontotheEuropeanUnion(EU)in2004toreinforcetheinternationalprotectionsystemadministrativelythroughtheOfficeoftheRefugeeCommissioner(RefCom4)andtheRefugeeAppealsBoards(RAB5)aswellasthrough reception,detentionandaccommodation inopen centres, thisOfficenoted thatthefulfilmentofGovernment’svisionandstrategiescouldnotalwaysbesupportedbytheappropriate levelof resourcesdedicated to thisongoingsituation.Thesituation inclosedandopencentreswasnotoptimalastheywereoverwhelmedbydemandwiththeendresultbeingthatthesecentreswerenotfulfillingtheirrolecompletely.Theprocesstodetermineinternational protection status was significantly prolonged mainly due to the resourcesallocatedandthenumberofcasestheRefComandRABhavehadtodealwith.Moreover,thisauditcouldnotunderestimatehowthereturn,resettlementandrelocationprocessesremainheavilydependentonthewillingnessofandcooperationwithEUMemberStatesandThirdCountries.
1.1.3 The resources, human and financial, thatMalta has had to invest in to deal with thesematterswereandstillareconsiderable.Furthermore,onecannotunderscoreenoughtwootherconcernsstemmingfromirregularmigrationandtheinternationalprotectionprocess.Thefirstoneisthat,internationalprotectionseekersarenotjustthethirdcountrynationals(TCNs)whoarrivethroughboatsorarerescuedbytheArmedForcesofMalta(AFM)atsea
3 Source:TheNationalStatisticsOffice(NSO),NewsRelease101/2020,page2,19June2020.4 TheOfficeoftheCommissionerforRefugeeshasbeenchangedtotheInternationalProtectionAgency(IPA)inthethirdquarterof2020.Asthis
reviewwasconcernedwitheventsupto2019,forpracticalreasonsthisreportwillrefertoRefComratherthantothenewlyestablishedAgencytheIPA.
5 TheRefugeeAppealsBoard(RAB)becametheInternationalProtectionAppealsTribunalin2020.Asthisreviewwasconcernedwitheventsupto2019,forpracticalreasonsthisreportwillrefertoRABratherthantothenewlyestablishedAgencytheInternationalProtectionAppealsTribunal(IPAT).
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butalsoincludeTCNswhowouldhaveenteredregularlyorirregularlythroughotherwaysthanbysea.Hence,theinternationalprotectionapplicationsthattheOfficeoftheRefugeeCommissioner(RefCom)hadtoprocessgobeyondthosepersonsarrivingirregularlybyboat.Between2018and2019,fromthetotalof6,067whoappliedfor internationalprotectionwithRefCom,only3,231werepersonswhoarrivedirregularlybyboat.ConsideringthesizeofMalta(316squarekilometres)andapopulationofover514,564persons,availabilityandallocationofresourcesarenotonlytheconcerns.Accommodationand logisticalconcernsaswellasintegrationorlastingresolutiontotheinternationalprotectionseekers’statusarealsohighonthenationalagenda,be itatgovernmentandcitizen level.Thisall themoreso sinceMalta’s ratio of international protection seekers in proportion to populationhasconsistently been among thehighest, and very often thehighest, among all EUMemberStates.Furthermore,sufficientevidenceshowedthatanumberofinternationalprotectionseekerscontinuedtoresideinMaltafollowingthenegativeoutcomeoftheirappeal.Thisismainlydueasformanyyearsitwasextremelydifficult,ifnotpracticallyimpossible,toreturnsuchpersonstotheircountryoforiginortransit.
1.1.4 TheNationalAuditOffice(NAO)embarkedonaperformanceaudittotracetheefficacyoftheprocedureaninternationalprotectionseekergoesthrough,fromreceptiontointegrationwithinthecommunityortheirreturn,resettlementorrelocation.Thisauditfollowedanotherperformance audit ‘Dealing with Asylum Applications’ published in July 2011 and wentbeyondinscopeasitexaminedtheinternationalprotectionprocessinitsentiretyratherthanfocusingonlyontheOfficeoftheRefugeeCommissionerandtheRefugeeAppealsBoard.
1.1.5 ThisintroductoryChapterdiscussesthefollowing:
a. thebackgroundandcontextoftheinternationalprotectionprocessesandproceduresinMalta,
b. auditfocusandmethodology,andc. reportstructure.
1.2 The international protection process relies on the operation of several entities and the execution of different procedures
1.2.1 Figure1showstheprocessesandpossibleoutcomesfromeachprocess.Theflowchartreferstotheremitofthedifferententitiesinvolvedintheinternationalprotectionprocess.
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1.2.2 ThemainstageswithintheMalteseinternationalprotectionprocessincludethefollowing:
a. Reception:WheninternationalprotectionseekersarerescuedwithinMaltesewatersbyAFM, theyare taken to the InitialReceptionCentre (IRC)where they receivemedicalattention and undergo health checks. Moreover, the Police perform identificationprocedures.Regularandirregularmigrantswhodonotarrivebyboat,donotusuallystarttheir international protectionprocedurewithin the IRCas theyusuallywould alreadyhaveaplaceofresidencewithinthecommunity.
b. Detention:Allinternationalprotectionseekers,except,vulnerableonessuchasminorsand familieswith children,who enterMalta irregularly are detained at Safi or LysterBarracksuntiltheyaretransferredtoopencentresorwithinthecommunity.Onthelapseofnine months6,anypersondetainedshouldbereleasedfromdetentionifapplicationisstillpending.Ontheotherhand,detentionintermsofthereturnprocedureisofsixmonths,whichmaybeextendedbyafurther12months.7
Over the course of 2019 and 2020, asMalta experienced a surge in the number ofarrivals,acontingency/emergencymeasurehadtobeputinplacewherebysectionsofthedetentioncentrehadtobeusedasIRC.
c. Accommodation within open centres:Opencentreshostinternationalprotectionseekersfor several months depending on availability and their family and personal situation(e.g.iftheyaresingleorhavefamilymembers).Withintheopencentres,internationalprotection seekers receive allowances, food, accommodation aswell as psycho-socialservices.
d. Receiving and processing applications related to international protection: Until thethirdquarter2020,theOfficeoftheRefugeeCommissionerwasresponsibleforthispartoftheprocess.8
e. Appeals related to international protection status: Until 2020, the Refugee AppealsBoard9 considered appeals that international protection seekers would have enteredclaiming wrongful rejections, a lesser status or due to their transfer to another EUMemberStateagainsttheirwill.
f. Return:This refers to the return to thecountryoforigin,ofTCNswhoare irregularlypresent in Malta, including former applicants for international protection. This ispursuant to subsidiary legislation under the Immigration Act (Cap. 217). Returnmay
6Source:ReceptionofAsylumSeekersRegulations,SubsidiaryLegislation420.06,paragraph6(7).7Source:StrategyfortheReceptionofAsylumSeekersandIrregularMigrants,pages10and11.8ThisperformanceauditwillmostlyrefertotheRefCominviewofthe2018-2019periodcovered.9TheRABwasreplacedbytheInternationalProtectionAppealsTribunal.
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alsobevoluntaryandmayincludeAssistedVoluntaryReturnprogrammeswherebytheprospective returnee is offered incentives to return voluntarily.Malta has had such aprogrammeinplacesince2007.
g. Relocation: A possible final stage of the process could include the settlement of aninternationalprotectionseekerinanotherMemberState.
h. Resettlement:Alternatively,aninternationalprotectionseekercouldbetransferredtoaThirdCountrysothatheorshemaybeintegratedinthatcountry.
i. Integration:Uponbeinggrantedprotectionstatus,the internationalprotectionseekercanstartbenefittingfrommeasuressuchasaccesstosocialbenefitsandemploymenttohelphim/heradjustandadapttolifeinMalta.
1.3 The increase in influx of asylum seekers
1.3.1 EuropeanUnion(EU)statisticsshowthatMalta’sratioofinternationalprotectionseekersinproportiontopopulationandsurfaceareahasconsistentlybeenamongthehighest.AccordingtotheEuropeanAsylumSupportOffice(EASO)2020Asylumreport,Maltareceivedthemostapplicationsrelativetoitsarea(85timeshigherthantheEU+baseline,whichrepresentsthetotalnumberofapplicationsrelativetoavariable),despitereceivingjust0.5percentofallapplicationslodgedinEUMemberStates.
1.3.2 The EASO report also specifies that “while one country may receive fewer applications than another overall, its capacity to absorb more applicants may not be comparable. This perspective gives a more proportional interpretation of the current situation of international protection seekers and reinforces the essential role of solidarity and sharing responsibility within the context of asylum in Europe’’.
1.3.3 Figure2portraysthreesocio-economicindicators,whichrankthenumberofapplicationsforinternationalprotectionrelativetopopulationsize,theareaofacountryandthenationalGrossDomesticProduct(GDP).Thepopulationandcountryareacanprovideaperspectiveonthecapacitytoabsorbapplications,whiletheGDPcan indicateacountry’scapacitytointegrateinternationalprotectionseekers.
1.3.4 TheMemberStatesshadedinbluereceivedarelativevolumeofapplicationslowerthantheEU+baselineandyetinabsolutenumbers,severalofthesecountriesregisteredmanymoreapplicationsin2019thanin2018.ItisnoteworthythatthefigureclearlyshowsthatMalta’sparticular circumstances, particularly its area, indeedas theEU’s smallestMember State,togetherwithanextremelyhighpopulationdensity,precludesitfromhostingalargenumberofasylumseekers.
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Figure 2 - Applications for international protection in 2019 relative to population size (2019), country size (2015) and GDP (2018)
1.3.5 According to the Statistical Office of the European Union (EUROSTAT), whencomparedwiththethirdquarterof2018,Maltarecordedarelativeincreaseof143percentoffirst-timeinternationalprotectionseekersinthesamequarterof2019.In2019,intermsofapplications,thismeantthatmorethan4,000applicationswerereceived.10Relativetoitspopulationsize,Maltareceivedthemostapplicationsforinternationalprotectionrelativetoitsarea.Chart1refers.
Annual Report on the Situation of Asylum in the European Union
84
Figure 4.22 Applications for international protection in 2019 relative to population size (2019), country size (2015) and GDP (2018)
Notes: Countries are sorted by the number of applications relative to population size (from higher to lower volumes, indicated by the arrow). The shades indicate the number of relative applications received compared to the EU+ baseline. Source: Eurostat.
A large number of cases pending with bodies examining applications at second or higher instances was likely the main explanation for the high number per capita in Austria and Sweden. Both countries received a considerable volume of applications between 2015 and 2016 but much fewer since. The remaining countries with more pending cases than the EU+ average were all subject to rising asylum trends in 2019 and, in turn, had increases in the number of open cases.
Similar considerations can be made for EU+ countries falling below the EU+ baseline. In spite of a low absolute number of pending cases, Iceland (425) seemed to be subject to a relative pressure higher than for France or Italy. Most Eastern European countries had a very low number of pending cases, both in absolute and relative terms, resulting in limited pressure on their national asylum systems.
Source:EASOAsylumReport2020,page84,2020.
10Source:EASOAsylumReport2020,page59,2020.
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Chart 1 - First-time asylum applications, relative change between Q3 2018 and Q3 2019
1.4 The international protection process cost 26 million euros during 2019
1.4.1 Governmentexpenditurerelatingtotheinternationalprotectionprocessamountedto€23,855,961in2019.Furthermore,governmentexpendedafurther€1,907,45811 (highlightedingreyinTable1andasindicatedinFootnotes13,14and15)throughEU funds (Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund [AMIF]). The expendituremostlyrelatedtotheinternationalprotectionapplicationprocessasmanagedbyRefComandthesubsequentappealsprocessundertheresponsibilityoftheRAB,accommodationwithin the closed and open centres, and procedures related toreturns,relocationorresettlementasindicatedinTable1. It istobepointedoutthat,overall,Maltawasapproximatelyallocated€20.8million,throughtheAMIFFundwhichwassetupfortheperiod2014-20,ofwhichtillOctober2020,€11.5millionwerepaid.
11Thisvaluepaidbytreasuryduringyear2019isthe100percentoftheEUFunds,meaningthat75percentareEUfundsand25percentarenationalfunds.
Source:EUROSTAT,Asylumquarterlyreport,page6,March2020.
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Table 1 - Asylum costs during 2019
Description of cost Cost €The Office of the Refugee Commissioner:CostsincurredbyRefComtoprocessapplications(2019) 1,365,535Improvingandstrengtheningtheasylumdeterminationprocedurethroughthetrainingand
fundsforinterpretersatRefCom166,967
ThesettingupofaunitatRefCom 49,47512 Refugee Appeals Board:CostforprocessingappealsbytheRAB 144,486Detention centres:Accommodationandrelatedcostsindetentioncentre 5,490,68413 Open centres:Accommodationandrelatedcostsinopencentres 12,156,68014 Other Costs:EducationalCosts 857,716PrimaryHealthCare 100,590SocialAssistancepaidbytheDepartmentofSocialSecurity 4,506,421RenovationoftheHangaropencentreandHal-FarFamilyCentre 100,445NewopencentreinHal-Far 66,956ThirdCountryNationalsUnit 92,117ForcedReturn 170,63215 RestartVIProject 118,439VoluntaryRelocationofMigrants 224,995PerDiem(forpeoplelivingintheCommunity) 151,281Total cost incurred during 2019 25,763,419
1.4.2 The biggest costs in 2019 were at over €17.6 million. As expected these related toaccommodationatopencentresanddetentioncentresandsocialbenefitsforinternationalprotection seekers. These amounts related to the 3,405 international protection seekersarriving by boat and their accommodation at the centres.Moreover, 1,355 internationalprotectionseekerswithprotectionstatus,benefitedfrom€4.5millioninsocialbenefits.
12 The€49,475referstothesettingupofaunitthatdealswithrequestsrelatedtoestablishingthecriteriaandmechanismsfordeterminingtheMemberStateresponsibleforexamininganasylumapplicationlodgedinoneoftheMemberStatesbyathirdcountrynationalorstatelesspersonfundedthroughtheAMIFproject.
13 Thetotalof€5,490,684includesanamountof€228,150fromEUfunds.TheseEUfundsrelatetotheprovisionofmaterialaidandsupportservicestoassistasylum.Thisprojectinvolvestheprovisionofmaterialaidsuchasfood(breakfast,lunch,dinner)andmedicalservicesandalsosupportservicessuchassocialworkersandsupportworkers.
14Thetotalof€12,156,680includesanamountof€1,070,655fromEUfunds.TheseEUfundsrelatetotheprovisionofmaterialaidandsupportservicestoassistasylum.Thisprojectinvolvestheprovisionofmaterialaidsuchasfood(breakfast,lunch,dinner)andmedicalservicesandalsosupportservicessuchassocialworkersandsupportworkers.
15 Thetotalof€170,632includes€106,371throughEUfunds.
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1.5 Return to country of origin of failed asylum seekers remains a considerable challenge
1.5.1 The scopeof thisperformanceauditdidnotextend to the return to countryoforiginoffailedasylumseekers.Itisfeltthatthecomplexitiesinvolvedmeritthatthesubjectmatterisaddressedinanadhocauditinduecourse.Nonetheless,thecriticalimportanceofthereturnchallengesmerits, at the very least, that this report outlines themain issues and recentdevelopments related thereto. Despite enquiries, NAO was not furnished with statisticsrelatingtotherateoffailedasylumapplications(includingtheappealsprocess)duringtheperiodunderreview.
1.5.2 PersonswithapendingremovalordermaybedetainedincustodyasnotedinParagraph1.2.2b, until removal from Malta takes place thus avoiding possible absconding. TheseRegulations apply as long as due diligence on the person in question is being pursued.Personswhoarenotreturnedfollowingtheirdetentionmaybetransferredtoopencentresand eventually theymay also seek alternative accommodation. This is however, withoutprejudicetothepossibilityoftheImmigrationPolicetoreturnthethirdcountrynationalsinquestiontocountryoforigin. Insuchcircumstances,thesepersonsareallowedtoseekemploymentuntilsuchtimeastheirreturnispossiblebutwouldnotentitlethemtowelfarebenefitsexceptforemergencyhealthcare.
1.5.3 UnderMaltesemigrationlaw,areturndecisionisissuedbythePrincipalImmigrationOfficer(PIO).Thereturndecisionisusuallyaccompaniedbyaremovalorder.OnceareturndecisionhasbeenissuedbythePIO,thepersoninquestionhastherighttoappeal,asperMalta’sImmigrationAct.
1.5.4 Nationalentitiesfacevariouschallengestoeffectareturntoafailedasylumseeker’scountryoforiginsuchasrefusalbythereceivingstate’sauthoritiestopositively identifythoseco-nationals,evenwhenaTCNwishestogobackbut lacksrequireddocumentation.MattersarefurtherexacerbatedbythelackofconsularrepresentationinmanyThirdCountriesandthelackofdirectflightstomostoftheThirdCountriesconcerned.Table2illustratesstatisticsrelatedtotherelocationorresettlementofasylumseekers.
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Coun
try
2018
2019
Asyl
um S
eeke
rsRe
fuge
eSu
bsid
iary
THP
Reje
cted
TOTA
LAs
ylum
See
kers
Refu
gee
Subs
idia
ryTH
PRe
ject
edTO
TAL
Belgium
60
00
06
00
00
00
Finlan
d0
00
00
05
00
00
5Fran
ce12
80
00
012
825
60
00
025
6Ge
rman
y66
00
00
6626
10
00
026
1Ire
land
260
00
026
110
00
011
Lithua
nia
00
00
00
30
00
03
Luxembo
urg
200
00
020
190
00
019
Nethe
rland
s20
00
00
206
00
00
6Norway
70
00
07
00
00
00
Portug
al67
00
00
6751
00
00
51Ro
man
ia0
00
00
03
00
00
3Sloven
ia0
00
00
02
00
00
2Sp
ain
830
00
083
20
00
02
USA
0
177
12
810
016
00
16TO
TAL
423
177
12
504
619
016
00
635
Source:TCN
U.
Tabl
e 2
- Re
loca
tion
to
othe
r M
embe
r St
ates
and
USA
by
type
of
stat
us (
2018
and
201
9)
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1.5.5 AsevidencedbyTable2,thevastmajorityofrelocationsduring2018and2019concernedpersonswhoappliedforasylum.Relocationsgenerallynecessitatethevoluntarywillingness,usuallyonanadhocbasis,ofEUMemberStatestobeeffected.Theserelocationstatisticsareclearlyindicativeoftheurgentneedforaneffectiveburden-sharingpolicywithEUMemberStates.ThisOfficeacknowledgestherecenteffortsbynationalentitiestorelocateasylumseekers.DespitetherecentpositiveresultsattainedthroughagreementswiththeEUandThirdCountries,theissueofreturnsofunsuccessfulapplicantsremainamajorchallengenotonlyfromanadministrativeandlogisticalpointofviewbutalsofromahumanitarianaspect.Currently, thesystemfor returns tend tobebiased in favourof the last in,which impliesthattheprocesstoreturnasylumseekerswhoseapplicationwasnotpositivelyconsideredinpreviousyearsbecomesevenmorecomplicated.
1.6 Audit Focus
1.6.1 ThisauditsoughttodeterminetheextenttowhichMaltaisfulfillingitsobligationsrelatedto internationalprotectionseekers to safeguard their rightsduring thedifferent stagesofinternationalprotection.Tothisend,theauditobjectivesaimedtoestablishthedegreetowhich:
a. thestrategies,policiesandplansinplacearecomprehensiveandupdatedinrelationtoallaspectsoftheasylumseekers;
b. themainprocesses,suchasreception,detention,accommodationatopencentres,aswell asprocesseswithin the remitof the formerCommissioner forRefugees and theRefugeeAppealsBoardwereexecutedwithoutdelay,fairlyandeffectively;and
c. resourcesandmechanisms inplaceenableeffectiveoperationsandmonitoringoftheservicesprovidedbytheentitiesinvolvedintheasylumprocess.
1.6.2 The cut-off date for this performance auditwas end 2019 since themost complete dataavailablewhendraftingofthisReportcommencedwasthatof2019.Eventsandmeasurespost2019werenotsubject tothisperformanceaudit.However, for fairness’sake,wherepossiblethisReportprovidesanoutlineofnewinitiativesundertakenbygovernment.
1.7 Methodology
1.7.1 Theattainmentoftheaboveobjectivesentailedanumberofmethodologicalapproaches.Theseincludedthefollowing:
a. Data analysis:Thisreviewanalyseddatamaintainedbythedifferententitiesresponsiblefor the internationalprotectionprocedures.Thisdata included integrated informationconcerninginternationalprotectionseekersmaintainedbytheThirdCountryNationalsUnit(TCNU)withintheMinistryforHomeAffairs,NationalSecurityandLawEnforcement(MHSE).
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b. Documentation review:Documentationreviewedincludedpolicies,reports,StandardsOperatingProcedures(SOPs),statisticsandstrategiesconcerninginternationalprotectionseekers.
c. Financial analysis: These evaluations enabled the determination of costs relatingto procedures undertaken by different entities concerning international protectionseekers.Thescopeofthisexercisewaslimitedtotheprocessesinvolvedleadingtotheinternationalprotectionseekersbeinggrantedprotectionstatusoralternativelybeingresettledorreturned.
d. Semi-structured interviews: Interviewswereundertakenwith keyofficials involved intheinternationalprotectionprocess.Tothisend,variousmeetingsandinterviewswereconducted with officials from Immigration Police, the Third Country Nationals Unit(TCNU),theOfficeoftheRefugeeCommissioner(RefCom),theRefugeeAppealsBoard(RAB),theAgencyfortheWelfareofAsylumSeekers(AWAS)andtheDetentionServices.Furthermore, the NAO also interviewed other stakeholders namely, and the UnitedNationsHighCommissionerforRefugees(UNHCR)andMigrationCo-Ordinator.
e. Tracer Study:Atracerstudywasundertakenonasampleof120internationalprotectionseekerswhoappliedwithRefComduring2018and2019.Theaimofthisstudywastotracktheinternationalprotectionprocessanddetermineitsoutputsandoutcomes.
1.8 Report Structure
1.8.1 Following this introductory Chapter, the Report proceeds to discuss the internationalprotection procedures and outcomes through a process-oriented ordering principle. Thefollowingrefers:
a. Chapter 2 – This Chapter discusses the extent towhich policies, strategies and plansconcerningtheasylumprocesscoverinternationalprotectionseekers’andgovernment’srightsandobligations.
b. Chapter 3–ThisChapterfocusesontheInitialReceptionanddetentioncentresandseekstodeterminetheextenttowhichservicesprovidedtointernationalprotectionseekersandthelegalobligationswerefulfilled.
c. Chapter 4–ThisChapterlooksintotheoperationswithintheopencentres,whichfallunderAWAS’responsibility.TheChapterpresentsthecomplexitiesofproceduresinplaceinboththegovernmentaswellasChurch-runopencentres.
d. Chapter 5 –ThisChapterexaminestheeffectivenessofmechanismsemployedbyRefComindeterminingtheprotectionstatusofinternationalprotectionseekers.
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e. Chapter 6 –ThisChapterdiscusseswhether theappealsprocessadministeredby theRefugeeAppealsBoardwastimelyandemployedinaconsistentmanner.
1.8.2 TheoverallconclusionsandrecommendationsemanatingfromthisauditareincludedinthisReport’sExecutiveSummaryonpages10to14.
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Chapter 2| Policies
2.1 Introduction
2.1.1 ThejourneytheasylumseekersandirregularmigrantsgothroughfromtheirarrivalinMaltauntiltheirprotectionstatushasbeenpositivelydecidedortheirdeparturefromMaltaissetinmotionbydifferentgovernmententitiesinvolvedinthisprocess.TheMalteseinternationalprotectionsystemisquitecomplextonavigateespeciallysinceitallocatesresponsibilitiestoanumberofgovernmententities.Thisnotwithstanding, therearenonoticeableoverlapsin remits and duties between them. The asylum-related operations of these entities aregovernedbythreemainpolicydocuments,namely,theStrategy for the Reception of Asylum Seekers and Irregular Migrants, the National Integrated Border Management Strategy and the Integration = Belonging, Migrant Integration Strategy and Action Plan. The audit findings related mostly to the implementation of the Strategy for the Reception of Asylum Seekers and Irregular Migrants, since thereception,detentionandaccommodationprocessescoveredare outlined therein.
2.1.2 In linewiththeobjectivesandscopeofthisperformanceaudit,thisChapterfirstgivesanoverviewofthenationalbudgetmeasuresforthe2018-2020.TheChapterthendiscussestheextenttowhichthenationalstrategicframeworkcomprisesinitiativesaimedatfulfillingMalta’sobligationstowardsinternationalprotectionseekersandatimprovingconditionsforinternationalprotectionseekersandirregularmigrants.
2.2 National budgets 2018 – 2020 focused on considerable budget increases for operations and services related to international protection processes area
2.2.1 Although, the government budgets of 2018, 2019, 2020 did not refer to new initiativesspecifictomigrationorinternationalprotectionissues,considerablebudgetincreasesweredevotedtotheDetentionServicesandtheAgencyfortheWelfareofAsylumSeekers(AWAS)whorunthedetention,InitialReceptionCentre(IRC)andopencentres.
2.2.2 Variousstakeholdersareinvolvedintheinternationalprotectionandimmigrationprocessandtherequiredrecruitmentandacquisitionofotherresources.Tothiseffect,in2020,significantchangeswereundertakenwithintheOfficeoftheRefugeeCommissioner(RefCom)thereafterbecomingtheInternationalProtectionAgency.Thereareongoingplanstosimilarly,turntheDetentionServices intoanAgency.Despiteenquirieswithbothstakeholders,theNationalAuditOffice(NAO)wasnotmadeprivytothechangesrequiredtosustainthebudgetingandresourcerequirementsofthetwoagencieswhichwillrecruitadditionalstaff.
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2.3 The Strategy for the Reception of Asylum Seekers and Irregular Migrants is not fully supported by comprehensive plans
2.3.1 The Strategy was published in early 2016, along with amendments to the ImmigrationAct (Cap.217)andtheReceptionofAsylumSeekersRegulations(SL420.06).ThroughtheStrategy,theMinistryforHomeAffairsandNationalSecurity(MHAS)aimedtostrikeabalancebetweentheneedforahumaneapproachontheonehandandthesafeguardingofnationalsecurityontheother,whileensuringMalta’scompliancewiththereceptionanddetentionprovisionsoutlined in theEuropeanUnion’s (EU’s) recastReceptionConditionsDirective16
andtheReturnsDirective17.
2.3.2 TheStrategygivesanoverviewofthelegalbackgroundandMalta’sobligations.Thisincludesinformation on the physical premises within the reception, detention facilities and opencentresaswellasinformationrelatingtowheninternationalprotectionseekersandirregularmigrantsmaybeaccommodatedineachofthesefacilities.TheStrategyoutlinesthegroundsuponwhich services are to be provided on the premises. This Strategy also portrays therelevant procedural landscapewhich constitute the initial stages international protectionseekersandirregularmigrantsencounter,namely,reception,detentionandaccommodationwithin the open centres. Information relative to other stages such as the application forinternationalprotectionstatusandbeyondarenotwithinthescopeofthisStrategy.
2.3.3 OneofthemainaimsoftheStrategywastotakeintoaccounttheEuropeanCourtofHumanRights (ECHR) rulings againstMalta.Within this context, subsequent legislativemeasureswereintroducedtoaddresstheserulingsagainstautomaticdetentionandinfavourofrightsofdetaineessuchastheintroductionoftheconceptofalternativestodetention,therighttoknow one’s reason fordetentionandpossibility tochallengesuchreasons.Chapter3,whichfocusesondetentiondiscusses indetailthedifficultiesthatnationalauthoritiesareencounteringtofullyembracetheseprovisions.
2.3.4 TheStrategydoesnotprovidepossiblesolutionstorecurrentissuesprevalentinreceptionanddetentioncentresaswellaslivingconditionswithinopencentres.TheStrategyisratheranexplanatorydocumentoflegislativemeasures.Furthermore,theStrategydoesnotcaterfordifferentscenariossuchasheavyarrivalsthroughboatsorthroughothermeans;althoughthis hasbeenpartlymitigatedby the contingencyplandraftedby theMinistry forHomeAffairs,NationalSecurityandLawEnforcement(MHSE)in2021.
2.3.5 This performance audit adopted a number of criteria to assess how deeply the nationalstrategic framework covers the obligations that Malta has to adhere to in terms ofinternationalprotectionseekers’rights.Therelevanceofthisassessmentisthatastrategy
16Directive2013/33/EUoftheEuropeanParliamentandoftheCouncilof26June2013LayingDownStandardsfortheReceptionofApplicantsforInternationalProtection.
17 Directive2008/115/ECof16December2008onCommonStandardsandProceduresinMemberStatesforReturningIllegallyStayingThird-CountryNationals.
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iskey tomarshalling resources in themostefficientandeffectivemanner toattainpolicyobjectives. Thediscussionwithin this Sectiondoesnot focus in anywayon the technicalcontentofthenationalstrategicframeworkbutseekstodeterminetheextenttowhichthecompilationofthestrategyfeatureelementswhichadheretogenerally-acceptedpractices.Table3refers.
Table 3 - Elements featuring within the national strategic framework
Criteria Yes NoStrategycompiledbyexpertsandspecialists YesOutlinesvision,missionandrelativeobjectives YesDevelopmentofasupportingbusinessplan NoAssignsresponsibilities YesIncludesmilestonesandtimeframes NoReferstooutcomesandmeasurableoutputs NoRelatesimpacttoKeyPerformanceIndicators NoDeterminesthedemandandsupplyforservicesovertime NoEconomicfeasibilityofspecificinitiatives NoIncorporatessidestrategiesrelatingtotheimplementationofspecificmeasures No
2.3.6 The strategy does not comprehensively refer to aspects relating to implementation
responsibility,demandandsupplyforservicesaswellasoutcomesandimpactsofstrategicinitiatives. Moreover, this document does not make additional policy recommendationsfortheadoptionordevelopmentofstrategiesrelatedtootheraspectsoftheinternationalprotectionprocess.
Thestrategicplandoesnotdelveindetail intothesupplyanddemandfortheservicesunderreview
2.3.7 The Strategy for the Reception of Asylum Seekers and Irregular Migrantsdoesnotdiscusscomprehensively the anticipated demand in relation to adequate service provisions forinternationalprotectionseekersandirregularmigrants.Understandablystatisticalprojectionsorextrapolationsasaclearbasisforplanningofferanumberoflimitationsasarrivalsdependonmany changing variables.Nonetheless, the Strategydoesnot refer to actions and thedemandforvariousservicesrequired,dependingonthenumberofarrivalsinagivenperiod.Anothercomplexityinthisregardisthatanysuchreferenceswouldneedtoconsidertherateatwhichasylumseekersarereturningtocountryoforigin.AsoutlinedinParagraph2.3.4,therecentlydraftedcontingencyplanwouldalleviatesomeoftheseissuesasthisdocumentseekstoguidenationalentitiestoaddressfluctuationsinarrivalsandtheensuinglogisticalissues.
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2.3.8 In turn, such an information gap within the strategic framework prohibits the nationalcompetentauthoritiesfromestimatingtheresourcesrequiredtoaddressthelevelofsupply.Inpractice,thisisleadingtodisequilibriumbetweendemandandsupplyinserviceswithinIRC,detentionandopencentresaswellasprocessingoftheprotectionstatusandpossibleappeal.
Theimplementationofthestrategyonreceptionisnotbasedonconcretetimeframesandmilestones
2.3.9 Timeframesandmilestonesareakeyfeatureinastrategysincetheyprovideimplementationguidelines. Such a broad implementation timeline does not appropriately guide nationalauthoritiestoplaneffectivelytherein,nortomeasurehowappropriatelytheyareinterveningandhowtheycanimprovetheiroperationsinatargetedmanner.Nonetheless,thesettingof timeframes and milestones still needs to consider an environment governed by theunpredictabilityofarrivalofanumberofasylumseekers.
TheReceptionStrategydoesnotbaseitsinitiativesonprojectedoutputsandoutcomes
2.3.10 Thestrategicplanonreceptiondoesnotlinkthepolicyrecommendationsoutlinedthereintooutputsandoutcomes.Intheabsenceoftimelinesandsupplyestimates,thestrategywouldbeconsequentlyunabletophaseoutputsoverpredeterminedperiods.Suchasituationleadstonationalauthoritiesbeingreactiveratherthanpro-activeintheiroperations.
2.3.11 Similarly, the Strategy omits references to quantifiable outcomes.While the plan’s mainobjectiveisforinternationalprotectionseekersandirregularmigrantstobeaccommodatedinanappropriatemanner,suchoutcomesarenotsupportedbykeyperformanceindicators.
2.3.12 Recent Developments–ThisOfficeacknowledgesthat inpartthe issuesdiscussed inthissectionhavebeenaddressedbytheMinistry forHomeAffairs,NationalSecurityandLawEnforcement(MHSE)throughtherecentcompilationofanationalcontingencyplan.Theplandiscussesanumberofscenariosbasedonthenumberofpersonsinvolved.
2.3.13 Another strategy that impacts asylum seekers peripherally is The National Integrated Border Management Strategy. This strategy is aimedat covering issues related tobordercontrolratherthantheinternationalprotectionprocess.Itoutlinesthemainstakeholders’dutiesinvolvedinbordercontrolsandthelegislativeobligations.Thisstrategywasdeemedperipheraltotheaudit’sscope.
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2.3.14 The Integration = Belonging, Migrant Integration Strategy and Action Plan is a strategicframeworkfocusingon legislative instruments,on-goingandplannedmeasuresaswellasinitiativesthataresupportiveorconducivetointegration.Thisstrategyplanissplitintotwoparts,withthefirstpartprovidinggeneralinformation.Therestoftheframeworkisanactualactionplanspecifyingwhatthemeasureis,thetimelinesduringwhichthemeasurewillbecarriedout, andwhichentitiesareexpected toownand implement themeasures.AkeyelementoftheStrategyandtheActionPlanisthatithascleartimelinesanddesignatesclearresponsibilitiesontheimplementationofmeasuresandinitiatives.
2.3.15 However,theactionplandoesnotprovidedetailsofthemeasuresorportrayinformationabouttheexpectedreach,outputandtheoutcomesofsuchmeasuresbutreferstoperiodicreportsonprogressmadeonthemeasures.
2.4 Conclusion
2.4.1 Whilstacknowledgingthecomplexitiesanduncertaintyinvolved,overwhichtheauthoritieshavenocontrol,thestrategicframeworkinrelationtotheinternationalprotectionseekersand irregular migrants falling within the scope of this audit is not deemed sufficientlycomprehensive.Statementsandpolicyrecommendationsthereinarenotsupportedbyin-depthdetails about the approach tobe adoptedaswell asdetailedpresentationsof themeasurestobeimplemented.Thisstateofaffairsconstrainsthedeterminationofresourcesrequired.Theforegoingraisestherisksthatpolicyrecommendationswillremainonpaperbutsomewhatlackingattheimplementationstage.
2.4.2 Theopportunityexistsforafutureandcomprehensiveexpandednationalstrategythatdelvesintoissuesaffectinginternationalprotectionseekerswhichsofarhavenotbeendiscussedthoroughlywithinthestrategies.Moreover,itiscriticalthatthenationalstrategiesare,asfaraspossible,supportedbyacomprehensiveroadmapwhichwouldenableittobetterattainitsobjectives.
2.4.3 The forthcoming Chapter discusses the extent to which the provisions of the ReceptionStrategywereembracedbythenationalentityinvolved.Tothisend,thenextChapterwilldelvedeeperintothepracticalaspectoftheimplementationofthisStrategy.
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Chapter 3 | The Detention Process
3.1 Introduction
3.1.1 Followinganegativeoutcomeofanassessmentbyeither thenationalhealthauthoritiesor immigrationpolice, upon their arrival inMalta, third countrynationals (TCNs) arrivingirregularlyaresubjecttoamaximumofninemonthsindetentionprovidedthattheywouldhavesubmittedanapplicationforinternationalprotection.ThelengthofstayindetentionalsovariesbetweenTCNs.Someofthereleasesareprolongedbecauseofdelayfrommedicalclearance fromhealthauthorities in termsof reception regulationswhich refer tohealthlegislation.Thisinvolvesmigrantswithinfectiousdiseasessuchastuberculosis.Ontheotherhand,asylumseekerswhoaredeemedvulnerableorareconfirmedasminorsfollowinganageassessmentarealsoreleasedtoanopenfacility.
3.1.2 Detention is regulatedbyReceptionofAsylumSeekersRegulations,SubsidiaryLegislation420.06andthenationalStrategy for the Reception of Asylum Seekers and Irregular Migrants. Also,accordingtotheprovisionsofSubsidiaryLegislation217.12,thefollowingcircumstancesrelatingtodetentionprevail:
a. (12)Detentionshallbemaintaineduntiltheconditionslaiddowninsub-regulation(6) are fulfilledand it isnecessary for removal tobecarriedout:Provided,however, theperiodofdetentionmaynotexceedsixmonths.
b. (13)Theperiodofsixmonthsreferredtointheprecedingprovisomaybeextendablebyafurthertwelvemonthswhere:
i. thereislackofcooperationbythethird-countrynational;orii. therearedelays inobtaining thenecessarydocuments formthe thirdcountry in
question.
c. (14) Whereitappearsthatareasonableprospectofremovalnolongerexistsforlegalorotherconsiderationsortheconditionslaiddowninsub-regulation (6) nolongerexist,detentionceasestobejustifiedandthepersonconcernedshallbereleasedimmediately.
3.1.3 Duringdetention,national authoritiesareobliged toprovide for irregularmigrants’basicneeds,includingfoodthatisculturally-appropriateaswellasclothing.Moreover,nationalauthoritiesaretorespectethnicandculturaldiversityandprovideeducational,recreationalandpastimeactivities.
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3.1.4 Thisperformanceaudithasrevealedthatthesituationin2019wasfarfromidealwithinthedetentioncentres.Overall,effortsandinvestmentinmakingthedetentionprocesssmoothandwell-organisedwerenotdeemedsufficient.Thelackofstaff,inadequatebuildings,poorrecord-keepingandInformationTechnology(IT)systemshavehighlightedtheobviouslackofanaudittrailfromtheDetentionServicesaswellasappropriatemonitoringofthedetainees’staywithinthecentres.Theseshortcomingspotentiallymadethewholestaymorechallengingthannecessaryespeciallysinceneedsofasylum-seekerswithintheirpremisescouldnotbeimmediatelyaddressed.
3.1.5 Againstthisbackground,thisChapterdiscusses:
a. thelengthofstayofthedetentionperiod;b. thecostsofdetention;c. standardswithindetentioncentres;d. theconditionswithinthedetentioncentres;e. lackofaccommodationindetentioncentres;f. accessbyasylumseekerstoNon-GovernmentalOrganisations(NGOs),familymembers
andlegaladvisors;g. shortageofinterpretersandculturalmediators;h. coordinationbetweendetentioncentresandstakeholders;i. monitoring and follow-up on needs of asylum seekers, within the detention centres
premises;andj. staffingatdetentioncentres.
3.2 The Detention Services were not aware of the length of stay of the asylum-seekers within its premises
3.2.1 TheReceptionofAsylumSeekersRegulations(SubsidiaryLegislation420.06)stipulatesclearlythesixreasonswhichcouldbeusedtodetainasylumseekers,namely,
a. inordertodetermineorverifyhis/heridentityornationality;b. inordertodetermineelementsonwhichtheapplication isbasedwhichcouldnotbe
obtainedintheabsenceofdetention;c. in order to decide on the applicant’s right to enterMaltese territory in terms of the
immigrationact;d. when the applicant is subject to return procedure and is delaying or frustrating the
enforcementofthereturndecision;e. forreasonsofnationalsecurityorpublicorder;andf. whenanasylumseekeristobereturnedtoanotherMemberStatetodeterminehis/her
asylumapplicationasthereisariskofabsconding.
3.2.2 TheaboveimplythattheissueofdetentionordersarewithintheremitoftheImmigrationPolice.Tothisend,theStrategy for the Reception of Asylum Seekers and Irregular Migrants
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alsoprovidesanAnnexwithguidelines forpoliceofficers,detailinghowthesesix clausesshouldbe interpreted.The strategyalso states thatasylumseekers shall notbedetainedformorethanninemonthsunlesstheirapplicationwouldhavebeenrejectedandwouldbeundergoingareturnsproceduremakingtheseformerasylum-seekersliabletosixmonthsindetention,withapossible12-monthextension.
3.2.3 TheMinistry for Home Affairs, National Security and Law Enforcement (MHSE) contendsthat, theDetention Services (DS) does not decidewho is detainedor for how long. ThatdecisionistakenbythePoliceintermsoftheReceptionConditionsRegulationsortheReturnRegulations.TheDetentionServiceshasnoinfluenceandconsequentlyalackofvisibilityastowhendetaineesaretobereleased.Withinthiscontext,theDSarewhollydependentoninformationanddocumentationfromtheImmigrationPolicetopromptfurtheractionwhichwould result in theasylumseekersbeing released fromdetention.Thepotentialproblembroughtaboutbythelackof informationonthedurationofdetentionattheDS’disposalarises when asylum seekers remain within detention despite their being cleared by theHealthauthoritiesandtheImmigrationPolice.Intheeventthatsuchsituationsmaterialise,thisbreachof legislationwouldnotonlybeprolongingaccess to the freemovementandpossible integrationoftheasylumseekersbutmightresult inredressbeingsoughtbytheasylumseekers through legal action.To thiseffect, anumberof caseshavealready ruledagainstsuchshortcomings.
3.3 Detention costs in 2019 totalled an estimated €5.5 million or €58 per bed night
3.3.1 In2019,theperiodwithwhichtheauditwasconcerned,onlySafiBlockBwasinuseduetotherelatively lowernumberofarrivalsduringthatyear.18Table4showsthenumberofresidentsinthemaindetentioncentrein2018and2019.
Table 4 – Residents in detention centre19 (2018 and 2019)
Description 2018 2019Newresidentsduringtheyear 152 2,362Residentswholeftduringtheyear 147 1,278Residentsasatendofyear 10 1,084
3.3.2 ThefigurespresentedinTable4weresourcedfromtheDetentionServiceswithintheMinistry
forHomeAffairs,NationalSecurityandLawEnforcement.ThisapproachwasdeemedtobethemostreliabledespitesomeminorvariancesnotedbythisOffice.
18 In2020,detaineeswerealsoaccommodatedwithinChinaHouseinHalFar,theHouseCompoundwithinBBlockaswellasthenewCBlockatHalSafi,LysterBarracks(alsoknownasHermes)untilDecember2020.DuetoCOVID-19protocols,allnewarrivalsarecurrentlyhousedatHIRCforquarantine.ThentheyaretransferredtoSafi.
19Duringtheyears2018and2019onlytheSafiBarrackswashostingresidentsinthedetentioncentre.
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3.3.3 On the other hand, 2019 statistics derived from the report of theMonitoring Board forDetainedPersonsquotethat242personsspenttimeattheSafidetentioncentre. Inviewofthesevariances,forthepurposeofthisreport,theNationalAuditOffice(NAO)baseditscalculationsuponthefiguresprovidedbytheDetentionServices.
3.3.4 Intotal,during2019,nationalauthorities incurredanexpenditureofaround€5.5million.Thistranslatesto€58perpersonperbednight.Table5refers.
Table 5 - Detention costs – Safi Barracks (2019)
Description Total Actual Cost Percentage of total cost
€ €SalariesandNationalContributions 3,993,942 72.7OperationalandManagement(ContrServ-Others) 1,077,421 19.7OperationalandManagement(Others) 305,072 5.6OperationalandManagement(ProfServ-MedicalServices) 108,926 1.9OperationalandManagement(WasteDisposal&CleaningService) 5,323 0.1Total costs 5,490,68420 100.0Total asylum seekers days 93,490Cost per asylum seeker per day €58.73
3.3.5 Table5 indicates that thesalariesandnationalcontributionsamounted to73percentofthetotaldetentioncosts.Thesecostsmostlyrelateto137securityofficersaswellastwoadministrativestaffemployedbytheDetentionServices.
3.3.6 TheDetentionServicesdidnotmakeavailableinternalpoliciesstipulatingsecuritystaffingrequirementsineachoftheblocksusedfordetention.Nonetheless,theDSlamentedthatithadencounteredsecurityofficershortagesandsubmitteda request to theMinistry forHome Affairs, National Security and Law Enforcement (MHSE) to strengthen its securitystaff complement. Consequently, staff costs increased further during 2020-2021 sinceDSembarkedonaheavyrecruitmentprogrammewhichseekstoincreasestaffmembersbyafurther220officers.TheMinistrycontendsthat90officershavebeenrecruitedandtrained.
3.3.7 For safety reasons and structural limitations, DS contends that the practice to date hasbeen that securityofficers andmaintenance staff intervene indetentionareasminimally.Consequently, security and maintenance within the detention centres is limited andrestrictedonlytocertainareas.Tothisend,therecruitmentofsecurityofficersremainsanurgentnecessityinthelightofthenumberofpersonscurrentlyindetention.Thiswillenablesecurityandmaintenancetobeeffectedthroughoutallareasofthedetentioncentres.
20Thetotalof€5,490,684includesanamountof€228,150asEuropeanUnion(EU)funds.TheseEUfundsrelatetotheprovisionofmaterialaidandsupportservicestoassistasylum.Thisprojectinvolvestheprovisionofmaterialaidsuchasfood(breakfast,lunch,dinner)andmedicalservicesandalsosupportservicessuchassocialworkersandsupportworkers.
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3.4 National authorities and NGOs recognise the need for better standards within detention
3.4.1 TheservicesprovidedbytheDetentionServicesareaccommodationandprovisionofbasicneedssuchasclothing,bedding,rationitemsandmedicalattentionmainlyforsinglemales,whoareasylumseekersandthirdcountrynationalsand/orwhowouldhaveoverstayedtheirvisa.TheexpenditureinrelationtotheseservicesareallcateredforbycentralMHSEfundsastheDetentionServiceshasnodirectbudget.
3.4.2 Ontheotherhand,theDetentionServicescontendthatitisnotwithintheirremit:
a. toinformtheasylumapplicantsoftheirrights–DSclaimthattheyfacilitateassistancebylegalprofessionalsandNon-GovernmentalOrganisations(NGOs)suchastheUnitedNationsHighCommissionerforRefugees(UNHCR);
b. toguaranteeaccommodationtoTCNsundertheprotectionofDSaccordingtothesocio-politicalneeds;and
c. tobe informedwhendetaineesaretoberelocatedtoanotherMemberState(MS)orreleasedfromdetentiontofacilitateDS’splanningprocess.
3.4.3 DuetotheCovid-19pandemic,thisOfficecouldnotconducton-sitevisitsatdetentioncentrestogatherfirst-handevidencethroughtheobservationofconditionstherein.ThislimitationwasmitigatedthroughthereviewofreportsdraftedbytheNon-GovernmentalOrganisations(NGOs)andotherinterestedparties,suchasthegovernmentappointedMonitoringBoardforDetainedPersons.Moreover, informationcollatedwas toagreatdegreecorroboratedwith interviewsheldwithDSmanagement, entitieswithin theMinistry forHomeAffairs,NationalSecurityandLawEnforcement(MHSE)andtheUnitedNationsHighCommissionerforRefugees(UNHCR).
3.4.4 TheAsylumInformationDatabase(AIDA)maintainedbytheEuropeanCouncilonRefugeesandExilesreportedontheconditionsofreceptionanddetentionfacilities.Inthe2018and2019reports,AIDAreportedthatconditionsindetentionwerebelowtheexpectedstandard,whichrenderedtheasylumseekers’staymorechallenging.
3.5 Stakeholders acknowledge that conditions within detention centres render accommodation problematic
3.5.1 Government is obliged to safeguard detainees’ welfare while in detention. DetentionguidelinesissuedbyUNHCRin2012stipulatethat,asaminimum,detentioncentresshouldprovide appropriate living conditions, which take into consideration cultural diversity,detainees’ dignity and human rights as well as access to family and community. These
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principlesarereplicatedinthenationaldocument:TheStrategy for the Reception of Asylum Seekers and Irregular Migrants.Thisdocumentspecifiesthatdetentioncentres“aresecurefacultieswhichareadministeredbytheDetentionServiceswhich:
a. respectthepersonalsafetyandconfidentialityofalldetainedpersons;b. provide for the basic needs, including food that is culturally appropriate, as well as
clothing;c. respectethnicandculturaldiversity;andd. provideeducational,recreationalandpastimeactivities”.
3.5.2 Moreover,asasignatory to theOptionalProtocol to theUnitedNations (UN)ConventionagainstTorture,theMalteseauthoritieshavealsoappointedaMonitoringBoardforDetainedPersons.Stakeholderswhohavehadfirst-handaccesstothedetentionprocesshaveraisedvarious issuesofconcernregardingthephysicalconditionsaswellas thebasic rightsandrequirements of detainees. These stakeholders include the afore-mentioned MonitoringBoardforDetainedPersons,UNHCRandotherNGOs.Table6refers.
Table 6 – Deficiencies in detention centres identified by stakeholders
Deficiencies Monitoring Board
(2018)
Monitoring Board
(2019)
Other NGOs
(2019 – 2020)Accesstofamilyandcommunity * * *Accesstointerpreters,psycho-socialstaff * * *Accesstolegaladvice *Accommodationappropriateness * * *Dignity *Issuesconcerningfood * *Lackofstaff * *Lengthofstay * * *Lackofwarmclothesandadequatebedding * * *
Clothes,privacyandadequatelivingconditionsarenotguaranteedatthedetentioncentres
3.5.3 The DS management confirmed reports by NGOs that there is over-crowding and livingquartersarecrammedwith the result thatneitherprivacynorstoragespace forpersonalpossessionsarepossible.Whilstdetaineesareprovidedwithabedeach,thereislittleroombetweenbedsorplaceswheretheymaystoretheirpersonalpossessions.
3.5.4 The premises require upgrading for comfort and security reasons especially when it ishousingmorenumbersthan itwasplannedto.Stakeholders’reportsalsonotethatthereispoorheatingandventilation,exposingdetainees toweatherconditionswithoutproperprotection. Limited and run-down sanitation and hygiene facilities also allow no privacyorproperpersonalcareofthedetainees.Mostimportantly,itisalsodifficultforproperorfrequentcleaningandmaintenanceservicestobecarriedout.The2019AIDAreportclaimsthatdetaineesareprovidedwithcleaningmaterialsandareexpected to takecareof the
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cleaningofthecentre.DSmanagementconfirmedthatthepremisesdonotlendthemselvestopropercleaningandmonitoringinviewofthewaytheyarestructuredandthenumberofdetaineeswithinthem.
3.5.5 The2019AIDAreport,basedonissueswitnessedbyNGOs,alsoclaimedthatmostoftheclothingwasdonatedonacharitablebasistotheDetentionServicesmanagementandthendistributedaccordingly.TheDetentionServicescontendedthatdonationsofclothingonlyamounted to a small portion of the total amount needed to supply the residents in thedetentioncentres sinceclothesandsuppliesaregiven tomigrantsasneeded.Before thestartofthecoldandhotmonths,residentsarealsosuppliedwithnewsetsoftherelevantattiretogetherwithshoes.Expenditurefrompublicfundsonclothingamountedto€20,924and€66,689onbedding.
3.5.6 The Detention Service are not directly responsible for providing the mental health andpsychologicalsupport for thedetainedasylum-seekerswithintheirpremisesassocialandpsycho-social servicesareprovidedby theAWASstaffpool. Such issuesarenot routinelyscreenedforbutonlyaddressed if theDetentionServicesstafforthedoctorsalertAWASandtherelevantauthoritiesorifAWAScaseworkersareawareofcertainissuesfromtheInitialReceptionCentre(IRC)stage.During2019,AWAS’AssistantPsychologistsvisitedSafionaverageonceaweektoconductassessmentsthere.ThisOfficedeemsthatsuchanumberofassessmentsneedstobeincreasedwhenoneconsidersthehardshipstheasylumseekerswould have been put through before arrival toMalta and also whilst in detention. Thissituationhasbeenpartlyresolvedasdiscussedinparagraph3.5.8.
3.5.7 TheAIDA2019reportclaimsthatthevastmajorityofapplicantsweredetainedinapplicationofHealthRegulationsandunderwentmedicalexaminationwhichonlyconsistedofX-rayschecks for tuberculosis. There was no systematic screening for other medical or mentalhealth issues.Migrantsandasylumseekers requiringmorespecialisedcarewerereferredto thegeneralhospital. In casesofemergencies, thedetaineeswereusually taken to thenearesthealthcentre.Communicationwiththehealthprofessionalswasnotalwayspossible,inviewoflanguageissuesespeciallysincetheservicesofatranslatororculturalmediatorwere not available. These pointswere all confirmed by the DSmanagementwho statedthat the situationwasongoing throughout2020.They recognised theneed for improvedandincreasedavailabilityofhealthservicesandwereworkingonincreasingavailabilityofmedicalprofessionalsthroughoutthedetentioncentresatthetimeoftheaudit.
3.5.8 Recent Developments:In2020,theDSengaged:
a. ACoordinatorforWelfareandMedicalServicestaskedwithfacilitatingandcoordinatingassessmentsandinterventionswhenneeded.Furthermore,in2020,AWASincreaseditsserviceswithinthedetentioncentres.
b. Anotherseniorgeneralpractitionerwas loaned fromthePrimaryHealthDepartment.Together with the Coordinator for Welfare and Medical Services, during 2020, the
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foundationsforanewmigranthealthservicewereputinplace,anewclinicwasbuiltandfurnishedtomakethenewmigranthealthservicefullyoperationalasanin-househealthcentre.Thisisintendedtoimprovetheefficiencyandimprovetheservicewhichisoffered to residents including through specialised clinics suchas tuberculosis clinic,ophthalmic,genitourinaryandgermatologywhichwillbecarriedout in thedetentioncentres by visiting specialists. The recruitment of a charge nurse, responsible for thismigranthealthservicetogetherwiththemedicalteamhasalsobeeninitiated.
Limited educational, recreational and past time activities are delaying integrationopportunities
3.5.9 TheDetentionServicesalsoconfirmedAIDAcontentionsthattheeducational,recreationaland pastime activities were not allocated their due importance. DS contended that thiswasmainlydue to two reasons. Firstly, theexpectedbrevityof the stayof thedetaineeswas deemed notworth thewhile to organise such events. Secondly, the uncooperativeor disinterested attitude shown by certain detainees made investment in such activitiesunfeasible.Nonetheless,DSclaimedthatitstrivestomakeavailablebookstomigrantsinitsfacilitiesthroughdonationsandeducationalmaterialsfromtheMaltaLibraries.
3.5.10 DSnotedthatwhateverwasprovidedtothedetaineesintermsofrecreationalmaterialoractivitiesseemstohavebeenbasedonthemanagement’sowndiscretion.Themanagementinsistedthatwhateverrecreationalobjects,suchastelevisions,wereprovidedwereeitherdestroyedormisusedandthatevenbasicobjectslikebedsandshoeswereeitherdismantled,unusedorusedasweaponsincertaincases.DShasdocumentedevidencerelatingtosomeoftheseincidents.
3.5.11 Thenational strategy stipulates that detainees shall have “access to open air for at least once every day and for not less than one hour”.DSandotherstakeholderscontendthatsuchaccesswasunavailabletoallinaconsistentmannerforspaceandsecurityreasons.
3.5.12 Recent Developments:DS contends thatbyend2020,all detaineeswithin thedetentioncentreswereallowedaminimumofone-hourrecreationaltime.Inthisregard,around70percentofresidentswithindetentioncentreswereallowedaccesstoopenspacesfromdawntilldusk.TheDSalsopermitsreligiousactivitieswhicharecarriedoutbyspiritualdirectorsofvariousreligiousdenominations.
3.5.13 Additionally,DSconfirmedstakeholders’concernsthatGovernmententitiesarenotprovidingeducationalmaterialoractivitiesofanykindinaccordancewiththeprovisionofthenationalstrategyondetention.TheprovisionoftheseservicesaretotallydependentonNGOsandotheroutsidevisitors,whenpermittedbytheDS.Thisentityalsoconfirmedthatinternetandcomputeraccessarenotavailabletodetainees.ThissituationprevailsdespitetheStrategyspecifyingthatthedetentionfacilitiesshouldcompriseorhaveaccessto“facilities for leisure and the delivery of education programmes”includinglanguagetraining.
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3.6 Lack of accommodation within the open centres resulted in prolonged stays in the detention centres21
3.6.1 Lengthofstayswasinfluencedbytheshortageofaccommodationwithintheopencentressincedetention centreswerebeingused to replace suchaccommodation. Theprolongedstaywithinthedetentioncentrewouldhaveaffectedseverelythefreedomofmovement,jobopportunities,contactwiththeoutsideworld,socialinteractionsingeneral,aswellasmentalhealthofthedetainees,especiallyiftheywouldhavebeenheldwithoutclearcommunicationregardingreasonforandinformationaboutlengthofstay.
3.6.2 MHSE contend that during 2019, the Detention Services released 1,287 third countrynationals.Fromthese1,287 releases,264were releasedwithinamonth,895within fourmonths,125withinninemonths,twowithintwelvemonthsandonewithinsixteenmonths.Itispertinenttonotethatduring2020,theCourtsofJusticehaveruledagainstexcessivelengthofstaywithindetentionwithoutjustifiablelegalreasonsandcriticisedthenon-adherencetotheStrategy,inmorethanonecase.StatisticsforwardedtothisOfficedidnotdifferentiatebetweenthestatusofthepersonsinvolved.
3.6.3 Insuchsituations,itisdifficulttoassignresponsibilityfortheexcessivelengthofstayonthePoliceCommissionerortheHealthDepartment(theformerhavingtheultimateauthoritytoissuereleasedocumentationfollowingmedicalclearancebytheHealthDepartment).ThisassertionconsiderstheGovernmentemergencypolicyofaccommodatingwithindetentioncentreswhentherearenovacanciesattheopencentres.
3.7 Access to NGO, family members, and legal advisors is sporadic and subjectively decided by the Detention Services
3.7.1 Theauditfoundnoevidenceofformalisedproceduresorhabitualpracticesthroughwhichdetaineescouldbevisitedbytheirfamilymembersandacquaintanceswhileindetention.VisitsdependonthediscretionoftheDSmanagement.Thisimpliesthatdetaineescannotanticipateorbecognisantoftheirrightstosuchvisitsandtheirfrequency.
3.7.2 ThesituationwasslightlybetterwhendetaineesneededtoreachNGOs,UNHCRandlegaladvisors.However,DSdidnotmaintainrecordsastothenumberoftimesdetaineesaccessedtheOfficeoftheRefugeeCommissioner(RefCom),UNHCR,theEuropeanAsylumSupportOffice(EASO),NGO’sandlegalprofessionalservicesandwhethermeetingsbetweenthetwosideswerealwaysheldwhenrequested.
21Paragraph5.3.12oftheNAOReport“A review of implementation of Sustainable Development Goal 1: Malta’s efforts at alleviating poverty’’issuedinDecember2020alsoreferstostayswithindetentiondespitetheReceptionandDetentionStrategy.
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3.7.3 Moreover,regularityofaccessdependedonDSManagementdiscretionandwasnotoutlinedinformalisedproceduresorcommunicated.Detainees’lackofclearunderstandingregardingtheirsituationandmeansofcommunicationrendereddetentionmorechallenging.
3.7.4 Recent Developments:In2020,visitshadtoberestrictedduetoCOVID-19.Inthelasttwomonthsof2020,visitsincreasedinfrequencywithUNHCRandotherNGOsholdingatotalof39visits,21visitsbylawyerswhilsttheAgencyfortheWelfareofAsylumSeekers(AWAS)heldaroundthreeassessmentsperweek.Atthesametime,EASOhelddailyinterviewsfromMondaytoFriday.
3.8 A shortage of interpreters and cultural mediators hinders communication within detention centres
3.8.1 Communicationwithinthedetentioncentrewasandremainsproblematicsincethere isachroniclackofinterpretersandculturalmediators22.Mitigatingsuchcircumstancesentailedthatanotherdetainedpersonwiththenecessarylanguageskillswasusuallyrequestedtoactasaninterpreter.Suchpracticesdonotlendthemselvesfullytothesafeguardingofpersonalandconfidentialinformation.Whilesuchpracticesareacceptableinemergencysituations,inroutinesituationstheriskalsoexiststhatmiscommunicationmayoccurintheabsenceofprofessionalinterpretersandculturalmediators.
3.8.2 The lackofcommunicationarisingfromtheabsenceofprofessional interpretersbecomesmore evidentwhen detainees are unable to comprehendDS’ notices in relation to theirdetention.Thisisparticularlyproblematicsincesuchcircumstancesusuallyoccurduringtheearlydaysofdetentionandwhenthedetainees’movementsarerestrictedbyorderoftheChiefMedicalOfficerforpublichealthreasons.Moreover,asylumseekersareinformedofsuchconditionsthroughadocumentwhichisoftenreproducedinalanguagethattheasylumseekerdoesnotunderstand.Thedetaineesaregenerallyalsonotinformedwhethertheycanchallengesuchdetentionconditionsbytheauthorities.23
3.9 Coordination between the Detention Services and stakeholders was not optimised
3.9.1 TheHealthDepartment,thePolice,theAgencyfortheWelfareofAsylumSeekers(AWAS),theInternationalProtectionAgency(formerlyknownastheOfficeoftheRefugeeCommissioner(RefCom), the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the Non-GovernmentalOrganisations (NGOs) suchas the JesuitRefugeeServices (JRS)andAditus,andtheEuropeanAsylumSupportOffice(EASO)alsoprovidetheirserviceswithinthecentres
22 Source:StrategyforthereceptionofAsylumseekersandirregularMigrants,page22.23 ThispracticeofdetainingasylumseekersinapplicationofHealthRegulationspersistedeventhroughout2020whenasylumseekersfigures
werehigherthan2019.Sincedetentiononhealthgroundsisnotaformaldetentionregime,whereasylumseekersareissuedwithadetentionorder,theyarenotentitledtoappealagainstthedecision,incontraventionoftheReceptionConditionsDirective.
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includingfacilitatingmeetingswithlawyersandthecarryingoutofinterviews,andnecessaryassessments. The audit foundnoevidenceofMemorandaofUnderstandings (MOUs) forentitiesthatarenotDStocarryoutdutieswithinorprovideservicesDS-rungrounds.Duetothecomplexityofcoordinationinvolvedinthemanagementofdetentionservices,MoUswouldhaveprovideda frameworkweresuchentitiescouldembarkonconcertedefforts,whichtranslatesintoincreasedefficiencyandcost-effectiveness.
3.9.2 Thisauditelicitedanumberofcaseswerecoordinationbetweenstakeholdersinvolvedinthemanagementandoperationsofthedetentioncentrewaslacking.Thefollowingrefers:
a. TheDetentionServicesdidnothaveaccesstotheNationalAsylumSeekersManagementSystems(NASMS)databasemaintainedbytheThirdCountryNationalUnit(TCNU)withintheMinistryforHomeAffairsandNationalSecurity;suchaccesswasgrantedin2020.Thisdatabasehastraceabilitydetailsconcerningtheasylumseekers,evenwhenindetention.ThelackofaccessweakensthepositionofDetentionServicessinceitdidnotcontributeinformationtothisdatabase.
b. Weak coordination between the Detention Services and the stakeholdersmentionedin paragraph 3.8.1. prevailed. Thiswas apparent as the former is not involved in theprovision of services that detainees may require from the other entities except forlogisticalcoordination.
c. There is scope for the Detention Services to be more proactive and participativethroughcooperationandcoordinationwithAWAS,UNHCR,EASOandNGOs.The lackofcoordinationbetweentheentitiesincreasetherisksthatdetentionisrenderedmorechallenging fordetainees.Aproblematicdetentionultimatelydeviates from the2015ReceptionandDetentionStrategy.
3.9.3 Recent Developments: Work has been carried out in this regard and the coordinationbetweenAWASandDShas facilitateda largenumberof releasesat theendof2020andbeginningof2021.
3.10 The Detention Services are not systematically monitoring or following up on the needs of asylum-seekers within their premises
3.10.1 Immigration detention operations are monitored by both official and non-governmentalentities. In 2007, Malta designated two entities as National Preventive Mechanisms, inaccordancewiththeOptionalProtocoltotheUNConventionagainstTorture(OPCAT),whichMaltaratifiedin2003.ThesearethePrisonBoardandtheMonitoringBoardforDetainedPersons.
3.10.2 TheoperationsoftheDetentionServicesandwhetherthedetainedasylum-seekersarebeingawarded their rights, should bemonitoredby theBoardof Visitors forDetained Persons
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pursuant to theBoardofVisitors forDetainedPersonsRegulations, Subsidiary Legislation217.08. In2019, theMonitoringBoardmet13timesandvisitedSafidetentioncentre35times.Themostcommoncomplaintsraisedbydetaineesrelatedtolengthofstay,inadequateclothinginwinter,andthequalityoffoodanditslackofvariety.TheBoardnotedfoodwastageandrecommendedthatstandards inrelationtofoodareobserved.Mostsignificantly,theBoard commented upon the overcrowding, dilapidated and unsanitary conditions withinroomsandbathroomsandlackofproperdiningfacilitieswiththedetainedbeingforcedtoeatinacorridorsubjecttorain,windsandweatherconditionsaswellaslackoffurnitureandspaceforpersonalbelongings.
3.10.3 FurthertotheMonitoringBoardinspections,itisevidentthatthesituationsoutlinedintheBoard’sreportprevail.Moreover,theDetentionServicedidnotcarryoutmonitoringofitsown.Hence,nodeficienciescouldbeidentified,budgetedfor,andrectifiedinatimelyandefficientmanner.
3.11 The Detention Services are heavily understaffed and under-resourced
3.11.1 The NAO noted that there was a lack of management and administrative staff whichpreventedappropriateoperational planning andexecutionwithin theDetentionServices.Theafore-mentionedStrategyfortheReceptionofAsylumSeekersandIrregularMigrantsclearly outlines that “[a]ll members of the Detention Service are subject to the terms, standards, disciplinary procedures and conditions laid down in the “standing Instructions for the Detention Services: Detention Centre Rules” which have been issued to all officers in the Detention Service by the Head of the Detention Service”.
3.11.2 However,theacutestaffshortageswithinthisentitypreventeditfromroutinelyoperatingintermsofanyStandingInstructionsorStandardOperatingProcedures(SOPs).Suchascenarioadditionallyimpliedthatin2019,reviewsofDSstaffperformance,trainingandoperationalresourcessuchasappropriateequipmentandITsystemswerealsonotallocatedtheproperprioritytothedetrimentofstaffanddetainees.ThiswasconfirmedbyDSmanagementwhowereworkingonupgradingtheiroperationaltoolsatthetimeoftheaudit.
3.11.3 Withinthiscontext,themanagementestimatedalackofstaffofcirca220personsincludingarangeofprofessionalsandstaffrequiredtorunthecentresincludingkeypersonssuchasdetentionserviceofficers,managerialandadministrativegrades,interpreters,maintenancestaff, electricians, security experts, health and safety officers, logistics officers, storepersonnelanddrivers.Informationastowhetherandwhenthesewillberecruitedremainedunavailable.
3.11.4 The substantial recruitment deemed necessary indicates that human resources werestretchedtothelimitandthattheservicesbeingprovidedwerefarfromoptimalandcouldhaveexposedstaffanddetainees tounwarrantedsafetyandsecurity risks, suchas thoserelatedtobreakouts.ThelackofrecruitmentdirectlyalsopreventedtheDSfromfulfillingitslegalobligationsinrelationtothedetainees’needs.
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3.11.5 TheDSmanagementemphasisedthatrestructuringandrecruitmentareinthepipeline.ThiswillenabletheDetentionServicestoperformitsdutiesinamoreefficientandeffectiveway.
3.12 Conclusion
3.12.1 ThisChapterdeterminedthatthedetentionperiodofasylumseekersisbeingrenderedmoretaxingasthedetentioncentreisovercrowdedandsubjecttosignificantstaffshortages,whichraisesecurityandhealthriskstobothdetaineesandemployees.Thissituationmaterialisesdespitetheprovisionsofnational legislationandtheStrategy for the Reception of Asylum Seekers and Irregular Migrants,whichstipulateGovernment’sobligationstowardsdetainees.
3.12.2 In addition, the detention phase is severely hampered by lack of adequate standards.Moreover,withinthedetentioncentres,poorconditionsessentiallyduetolackofadequatespaceandover-crowdingmadethesituationevenmoreproblematic.Inpart,thissituationhasbeencompoundedby the lackofkeyhumanresources, IT systemsaswellas record-keepingweaknesses.
3.12.3 TheDSmanagementcontendedthatthedetaineeshaveimmediateaccesstomeals,healthservicesandbasicneedsbutalsoconfirmedmostconcernsreportedbytheNGOsandtheMonitoringBoardaswellasUNHCR.Thesituationisrenderedmostdifficultinviewoflengthyrecruitmentprocessesandbudgetaryconstraints.
3.12.4 TheCOVID-19pandemicrestrictedtheNAO’saccesstodetaineesandthedetentioncentre.Nonetheless, the issues raised by various stakeholders regarding the conditions withinthe centreaswell as theextent towhichdetainees’ rightswerebeing safeguardedweregenerallyacceptedbyDetentionServicesmanagement.Onitspart,theentityisplanningareengineeringofit’sstructureandoperations.However,notimelineforthesechangeswasprovided.
3.12.5 ThisChapterdidnotseektodiscusstheprosandconsofthedetentionofasylumseekerssincethisistantamounttoGovernmentpolicy,andthussuchdiscussionfallsoutsideNAO’sremit.Nonetheless,itisevidentthatMalta,theEU’ssmallestMemberState,isfindingtheaccommodationofsuchadisproportionatenumberofasylumseekersextremelyproblematic.The challenges brought about by irregular migration are extremely complex and multi-facetedandthus,tobedulyaddressed,theserequireafocusedandconcertedinternationaleffort,includingthesolidarityofallEUMemberStates.Withoutsuchinternationalsolidarity,addressingsuchchallengeswillremainimmenselytaxingforMalta.
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Chapter 4 | Open centres
4.1 Introduction
4.1.1 Asylumseekerswhorequireaccommodationaftertheirreleasefromtheinitialreceptionordetentioncentresareaccommodatedwithinopencentresforaperioduntiltheyaredeemedindependent.Residentsinopencentresmayseekemploymentafteraperiodofninemonthsfollowingthelodgingofanasylumapplicationandarealsoissuedwithaperdiemallowance.Thesecentresactasareferencepointfortheasylumseekersseekinginformationandaccesstobasicservicessuchaseducationandhealth.
4.1.2 TheserviceprovidedbytheAgencyfortheWelfareofAsylumSeekers(AWAS)wasofferedforamaximumperiodof12monthsin2019,unlesstherewerehumanitarianreasonsrequiringalengthierstay.However,thelargenumberofasylumseekersrequiringsuchaserviceledtocircumstanceswhereaccommodationcouldnotbeofferedforsuchaperiod.Tothisend,Governmentsoughttomitigatethissituationthroughtheallocationofallowancestoasylumseekerswhowerenotresidingwithinopencentres.
4.1.3 An increased staff complement brought about a more robust administrative capacity,puttingAWASinabetterpositiontocaterforasylumseekers’needsandtopreparethemfor independent living. Moreover, over time, AWAS managed to develop good workingrelationships with established Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and otherstakeholders. Nonetheless, a number of factors still contribute to a challenging stay byasylum seekers at open centres. Thismainly relates to anovercrowdedenvironment andconsequently,theimpossibilityofthefacilitiestocopewithhighvolumesofresidentswithinthe various open centres.Within this context, this Chapter discusses the followingmainpoints:
a. theopencentresarecharacterisedbyover-crowding;b. preparationforasylumseekers’integrationwithinsocietyismostlydependentonNGOs’
intervention;c. cooperation and synergy need to be enhanced between AWAS, Detention Services
(DS)andtheMinistryforHomeAffairs,NationalSecurityandLawEnforcement(MHSE)entities;
d. despiteimprovementsinrecruitment,keyvacanciesprevail;e. asylumseekersentitlementswhileresidingatopencentres;
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f. costsperresidentincurredbyGovernmentaremainlyinfluencedbyresidentcohort;andg. occupancyratesandpartnershipagreementswithNGOs.
4.2 At end 2019, residents at open centres administered by AWAS increased by 34.6 per cent over 2018, putting a further strain on conditions within these centres
4.2.1 TherearethreemodelsofopencentreswhichcouldbeadministeredbytheAgencyfortheWelfareofAsylumSeekers(AWAS)orNGOs.Theseare:
a. thoserundirectlybyGovernment;b. opencentresownedbyGovernmentbutwhoseday-to-dayrunningissub-contractedto
third-parties,andc. NGO-runopencentres,receivingfinancialassistancefromGovernment24.
4.2.2 Open centres are planned to accommodate specific groups, whenever possible, such assinglemalesorfemales,families,andUnaccompaniedMinorAsylumSeekers(UMAS).Table7showsinmoredetailtheresidentswithinthedifferentopencentres,whichareinuseatthetimeofpublishingofthisreport.
Table 7 – Type of residents as per open centres
Type of open centre Open centre Type of ResidentsRundirectlybyGovernment Hal-FarTentVillage(HTV) SingleMales/MinorsMale16+
RundirectlybyGovernment Daril-Liedna(DIL)FemaleandMaleMinors
andVulnerableMinors(under16)
RundirectlybyGovernment Hal-Faropencentre(HFO)FamilyUnits/Single
Mothers/SingleFathers
RundirectlybyGovernment Hangaropencentre(HOC)SectionA:FamilyUnitsand
SingleMothersSectionB:Singlemales
Privately-runopencentres,
receivingfinancialassistance
fromGovernment
MaltaEmigrantsCommission
(MEC)–Balzan
FamiliesandSingle
Females/Mothers
Privately-runopencentres,
receivingfinancialassistance
fromGovernment
MaltaEmigrantsCommission
(MEC)–HousesMixedclientgroups
RundirectlybyGovernment InitialReceptionCentre(IRC)
Mixedclientgroups
particularlyVulnerable
CategoriesPrivately-runopencentres,
receivingfinancialassistance
fromGovernment
PeaceLab(PL)MalesincludingVulnerable
Males
Source:AWAS.
24 Therearecurrentlynocentressub-contractedinthismannerbutin2020,theRedCrossopenedatemporarycentretoaccommodateCOVID-19residents.
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4.2.3 Asatend2019,therewere1,937asylumseekerswithintheInitialReceptionCentre(IRC)and thesevenopenoentres.TheHangaropencentre (HOC)wasnot inuse in2019.Thisconstitutesan increaseofover14.1percentover the1,697 residentsasatendof2018.Themajorityof this increasewasabsorbedbyAWASopencentres (HTV,DIL,HFO).Asatend2019, therewere1,262 residentswithin these threecentres,which isan increaseof325(34.6percent)overthepreviousyear.Thisstateofaffairsstemsfromthefactthattheincreaseindemandforaccommodationrelatedtounaccompaniedmales,whoaregenerallyaccommodatedatAWAS-runcentres.Suchanincreaseinoccupancyratesfurtherstretchedresourcesatthesecentresandnegativelyimpactedthequalityofaccommodationduetotheresultantovercrowding.Table8refers.
Table 8 - Residents accommodated at open centres as at end 2019
Year Hal-Far Tent Village (HTV)
Dar Il-Liedna
(DIL)
Hal-Far open centre
(HFO)
Malta Emigrants
Commission (MEC) – Balzan
Malta Emigrants
Commission (MEC) - Houses
Initial Reception
Centre (IRC)
Peace Lab (PL)
Totals
2018 772 45 120 64 155 515 26 1,6972019 1,091 50 121 49 164 436 26 1,937
Source:AWAS.
4.2.4 GiventhatoccupancyratesincreasedinthethreeAWAS-runopencentresin2019over2018,andthattherewerenomajor infrastructural improvements,theremarksportrayedintheAsylumInformationDatabase(AIDA)2018reportremainedvalidfor2019.Thereportstatesthat the livingconditions in theopencentres, specifically those inHalFarare“extremelychallenging” characterised by over-crowding, inadequate structure (specifically the pre-fabricated container housing units with poor ventilation and high temperatures in thesummermonthsandinadequateinsulationfromcoldtemperatureinthewinter)andpoorhygiene.AWAScontends that in2019, thenumberofcleanersand thatofavailableskipsincreased;fullpestcontrolcoveragewasalsointroduced.In2020,anewpurchasingexerciseresultedintheacquisitionofnewcabinswithbetterinsulationproperties.
4.2.5 Ariskassessmentreportineachcentrewascarriedoutandrecommendationsweretakenonboard.Moreover,in2019,arefurbishmentprocesswasstartedtocleanupareasand,asfaraspossible,transformthemintorecreationalones.Table9showstheoccupancyrates,intermsofbednightsatthevariousopencentres.
4.2.6 During2019,occupancyrateswithintheHTV,DILandHFOvariedbetween77to89percent.On theotherhand,during thesameperiod, theotheropencentreshadoccupancy ratesrangingfrom63and89percent.Although,stillmarginallyaveragingbelowfulloccupancyrates, overcrowding in these centres prevails. The physical structure of these centres attimesprohibitthefullutilisationofroomstherein.Acaseinpointrelatestolargerrooms,whichcannotbeutilisedfullyastheyareusedtoaccommodatefamilymemberstogethertosafeguardtheirprivacy.HencetheoccupancyratesdepictedinTable9donotreflecttherealsituationwhereinreality,givenMalta’slimitedresourcesandspace,itisverydifficulttoincreasebeds.
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Table 9 - Bed Nights capacity at open centres for 2019
Source:AWAS.
4.2.7 The statisticsalso show that the longest stayswerewithin the centresnot runbyAWAS.The reason for this situation relates to thehigher turnoverof residentsatAWAScentres.On theotherhand, the longer staysat theotheropencentresarises since thesecentresaccommodatethemorevulnerablepersons,suchasfamilies,singleparentsandminors.
4.3 At end 2019, well-being and preparation for asylum seekers’ integration within society were not appropriately prioritised
4.3.1 ItisconsideredimportantthatAWAScontributesconsiderablymoretothewell-beingandpreparationforasylumseekers’ integrationwithin theMaltesecommunity.ThiscommentapplieseventhoughspecificprocessesrelatedtofacilitatingintegrationfallwithintheremitofMinistry for Justice,EqualityandGovernance.Theneed foramoredirectcontributionregardingthewell-beingandpreparationforintegration,stemsfromthepracticalrealitythatmostasylumseekerswill remain inMaltaforaconsiderableperiod– irrespectiveoftheirprotectionstatus.Discussionswithnationalentitiesaswellas literaturereviewsandNGOdocumentationenabledtheNationalAuditOffice(NAO)toelicitthekeyelementsaffectingthewell-beingofasylumseekerswithinopencentres.Thefollowingrefers:
Description
Hal-Far Tent
Village (HTV)
Dar Il-Liedna
(DIL)
Hal-Far Open centre (HFO)
Malta Emigrants
Commission (MEC) – Balzan
Malta Emigrants
Commission (MEC) - Houses
Initial Reception
Centre (IRC)
Peace Lab (PL)
Totals
Totalnumberofbedsduringtheyear(averagecapacity)
1,044 58 128 132 160 531 40 2,093
TotalnumberofpersonsaccommodatedatthecentresbetweenJan.-Dec.2019
2,424 127 245 140 148 4,162 32 7,278
Averageofbednightsperperson
127 129 169 217 350 42 331 87
Bed nights ccupancy rates
80.6 77.3 88.5 63.0 88.8 89.3 72.5 82.5
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a. Lack of interpretation–Asignificantbarrier facedbyasylumseekers inopencentresrelatestothelimitedavailabilityofprofessionalinterpreters.Insufficientinterpretationhampers asylum seekers’ ability to communicate particularly with public authorities,NGOsand locals. TheGREVIO202025Reportwhichwasproducedunder theauspicesoftheCouncilofEurope,highlightthat interpretationlimitationsareevidentatMaterDeiHospital, particularly following the cessationof the previously available hospital’smigrantunit,whichwasresourcedwithtrainedmedicalinterpreters.
b. Psycho-social Services - Following the experiences encountered by asylum seekers intheirhomelandandwithintheirnewenvironment,thedemandforpsycho-socialservicesbecomesmore pronounced. The AIDA 2019 Report laments the non-identification oftheasylumseekersrequiringinterventionaswellasthelackoffull-timementalhealthprofessionals.
4.3.2 A step in the right direction resulted when AWAS initiated the provision of therapeuticservicesinmid-2019.TheUnitcomprisedsixAssistantPsychologyOfficers(APOs),oneSeniorPsychologyOfficer (SPO), twocounsellors,onepsychologistand four interpreters (French,Somali,TigrinyaandArabic).TheAssistantPsychologyOfficersconductedassessmentsinthefollowingcentresin2019,inIRC,HTV,HFO,DILaswellasSafidetentioncentre.
4.3.3 TheroleofAPOsistoconductpsychologicalassessmentswhicharecompiledofthefollowing:
a. Socio-demographic questionnaire aimed at gathering information about the clients’psycho-social wellbeing prior to migration, during their migration journey and post-migration.
b. Hopkins Symptoms Checklist which is a psychological tool that assesses for signs ofanxietyanddepression.
c. PCL-5 which is a psychological tool that assessed for signs of post-traumatic-stressdisorder.
4.3.4 In 2019, 543 psychological assessments were conducted whilst 115 interventions werecarriedoutbystafffromthetherapeuticservicesunit.AnAPOwaspresentinIRCandHTVdaily(Mon-Fri)andinHFOandDILonaveragethree-fourtimesaweek.APOsvisitedSafionaverageonceaweektoconductassessmentsthere.
4.3.5 Despite these activities, AWAS still consider that the number of professionals employedwithinthisUnitrequirestobeaugmented,atleastbythreeseniorofficers.Thisrecruitmentshouldalleviateproblemsconcerningwaitingtimetoaccessthisserviceandamelioratethereachandqualityofservices.
25 Source:TheGroupofExpertsonActionagainstViolenceagainstWomenandDomesticViolence(GREVIO),GREVIONovember2020Report“Baseline Evaluation Report Malta”,page15,paragraph20.
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4.3.6 Two APOs were assigned to work in HTV, two in IRC, one in DIL and one in HFO. Thepsychologistworkedwithclientswhodisplayedseriouspsychologicaldifficultiesandhadahistoryofhospitalisation.Counsellorswereassignedtoworkinthedifferentcentresandwithspecificcohorts–oneworkingwithminorsandwomen,andoneworkingwithadultmales.In2019,64clientswerereferredtotheUnit’spsychologist,andcounsellorshad61and57referralsrespectively.
4.3.7 Sincethisservicewas in its initial stages inmid-2019, thisOfficebelieves that thefiguresachievedwereonthewholesatisfactory.ThisOfficeanticipatesahigherratebasedontheUnitbecomingbettermannedandthestaffbecomingmorefamiliarwiththeirclients.
4.3.8 Activities-Themajorityofcentresdonotofferanyformoforganisedactivitiesforresidents,yet asylum seekers are able to freely leave the centre.26 Nonetheless, AWAS facilitates anumberofvocationaltrainingcourseswhichareconsideredasusefulforasylumseekers.Suchcourses includeMalteseandEnglish language training.Eligibility conditionsvarybetweencoursesandgenerallyreflecteligibilitycriteriaforMaltesenationals.27ThesecoursesarenotspecificallyorganisedforresidentsofopencentresorwithinopencentresunlessNGOstakeitupon themselves toorganise suchcourses.AWASmade it clear thatwhile theentity isdisposed to facilitate and inform, the onus to attend courses and participate in activitiesremainsfullyonasylumseekers.
4.3.9 Educational assessments and access to formal education –Article13(2)of theRefugeesAct (Cap.420) states thatasylumseekers shallhaveaccess to state-fundededucationandtraining.TheReceptionRegulationsalsostatesthatasylum-seekingchildrenareentitledtoaccesstheprimaryandsecondaryeducationsysteminthesamemannerasMaltesenationals,andthismayonlybepostponedforuptothreemonthsfromthedateofsubmissionoftheasylumapplication.Thisthree-monthperiodmaybeextendedtooneyear“where specific education is provided in order to facilitate access to the education system.”AWASisentrustedtofacilitatechildren’sassessmentandplacementwithinthenationaleducationalsystem.
4.3.10 The2018and201928AIDAreportslamentthedelayinaccesstoeducationduetodifficultieswith the registration of asylum applications as well as the practical difficulties faced byasylum-seeking children in theabsenceofa formalassessmentprocess todetermine themostappropriateeducationalentrylevelforchildren.Moreover,theabsenceofpreparatoryclasses;possible limitedornoeducationalbackgroundand languagedifficulties is furtherconducivetoincreasedhardshipsforchildren,withpossibleimplicationsontheirlong-termdevelopment.
4.3.11 This Section highlighted weaknesses in crucial elements which contribute to the well-beingofasylumseekers.Theseelementsconstitutethebuildingstepstowardsaneffective
26Source:AIDA,CountryReport:Malta,page51,31December2018.27Source:AIDA,CountryReport:Malta,page52,31December2018.28Source:AIDA,CountryReport:Malta,page60,31December2019.
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integration.The foregoing implies thatpublicauthoritiesandstakeholdersneed to,as faraspossible,allocatemoreresourcestoenabletheappropriateprioritisationofsuchissues,whichinturnensuresthatMaltaisinapositiontofulfilitsobligationsinaccordancewiththenationalandinternationallegalframework.
4.4 Further co-operation and synergy are required between AWAS, Detention Services and MHSE entities
4.4.1 PursuanttoLegalNotice205of2009‘Agency for the Welfare of Asylum Seekers Regulations, 2009’, theAgencyfortheWelfareofAsylumSeekers (AWAS)shouldbethe implementingentityinrelationtonationallegislationandpolicyconcerningthewelfareofpersonsenjoyinginternationalprotectionandasylumseekers.Inpractice,AWASmanagesreceptionfacilitiesand open centres.More importantly, AWAS facilitates the delivery of services to asylumseekers and beneficiaries of international protection through referrals, information andtrainingprogrammesandgeneralaccesstoserviceprovidersandpracticalassistanceintheareaofemployment,housing,health,welfareandeducation.
4.4.2 MuchofAWAS’workiscontingentonpoliciestakenatnationalgovernmentandtheMinistryforHomeAffairs,NationalSecurityandLawEnforcement(MHSE)andonotherentitiessuchas theDetention Services for the time asylum seekers arewithin detention, awaiting forinternationalprotectionstatusortobereturned.AWAShavenosay intheprocessesanddelays by the International ProtectionAgency in deciding cases of asylum seekerswithinthe InitialReceptionCentre (IRC)oropencentres.AlsoAWAS’work isenhancedbyNon-GovernmentalOrganisations’(NGOs)andinternationalandEuropeanbodies’contributiontothewholeasylumprocesssincetheseentitiesareintegralinaidingasylumseekerswiththeirlegalrights, interpretationservicesandprovidingthemwith informationandprogrammesrelatedtotheirstayinMalta.
4.5 During 2019, AWAS increased its staff by 67 personnel over the previous year, but requires further recruitment, especially at managerial level
4.5.1 ThecurrentAWASChiefExecutiveOfficer(CEO)tookoverhisroleatthebeginningof2019.Facedwiththenewchallengeoftheresurgentboatarrivals,AWASembarkedonanevaluationexercise to address the staffing situation. Therewasdireneedof recruitment tobeef upalready-existingsectionsandpopulatenewoneswhichweredeemednecessary.Table10refers.
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Table 10 - Staff at AWAS (2018 to 2020)
Position Staff as at
end 2018
Staff as at
end 2019
Staff as at
March 2020
Additional Staff
requested for 2020CEO 1 1 1 0ServiceManager 1 2 2 3SeniorPsychologyOfficer(EUProject) 0 1 1 0ClinicalPsychologist(EUProject) 0 1 1 0AssistantPsychologyOfficers(EUProject) 0 7 7 0Counsellors(EUProject) 0 2 2 0WelfareOfficers(EUProject) 0 4 529 14UnitLeaders 5 6 5 3ProjectExecutives 2 3 3 0Executive 1 3 3 0Coordinators 8 9 9
5SeniorAdministrator 0 0 0SeniorTechnicalOfficer 0 0 0SocialWorkers 4 8 9 20Administrators 5 1030 1231 10SeniorSupportWorkers 0 14 13 0SupportWorkers 63 74 72 0ReceptionFacilitiesOfficers 0 12 55 0Handyman(Multi-SkilledFitters) 4 4 4 0Totals 94 161 204 55
Source:AWAS.
4.5.2 Table10showsthenumberanddesignationofthestaffin2019.AsperTable10,during2019,AWASincreaseditsstaffby67personneloverthepreviousyear.Therewereconsiderableincreasesinmiddlemanagementpostsandreceptionfacilitiesofficers.ItisworthnotingthatstaffrecruitmentinrelationtomentalhealthissueswasalsodependantheavilyonEUfunds.
4.5.3 As shown in the Table 10, up toMarch 2020,AWAS increased its staffwith a further 43personneloverthepreviousyear.However,AWASrecognisestheneedforfurtherrecruitmentespeciallyofsocialworkerswhoplayapivotalroleinthereceptionservices.
29IncludesfourEuropeanUnion(EU)fundedpersonnel.30IncludesoneEUfundedpersonnel.31IncludestwoEUfundedpersonnel.
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4.6 The Quality Assurance Unit is in the process of being set-up at AWAS
4.6.1 AQualityAssuranceUnittomonitorandenhancetheperformanceofAWASstaffandtheirreceptionserviceswassetupattheendof2020.
4.6.2 TheQualityAssuranceUnitismainlyresponsiblefor:
a. evaluationofReceptionServicestobeinlinewiththeEuropeanAsylumSupportOffice(EASO)receptionguidelinesandserviceindicators;
b. internalmonitoringofresidencesinaccordancewiththeSocialCareStandardsAuthority(SCSA)standards;
c. handlingofclientcomplaintsandothercomplaintsrelatedtoservicesandoperations;and
d. theformulationofplansandrecommendationsforReceptionServices.
4.7 Accommodation costs at open centres administered by AWAS varied from €14 to €52 per person per night
4.7.1 During 2019, the accommodation-related costs incurred in all open centres amounted toover€12million.Variousfactorsinfluencethecostsperpersonpernight(pppn),includingthespecificneedsofresidentsaccommodatedatthecentres.Economiesofscalebroughtaboutbythenumberofresidentsoroccupancyratesincentresalsoinfluencepppncosts.AnothervariablerelatestowhetherthecentreisoperatedbyAWASorbyNGOs.Withrespecttothelatter,thisperformanceauditcouldonlyevaluatecostsincurredbyNGOsbasedontheallocationofpublicfundstotheseorganisations.Table11refers.
4.7.2 ThegovernmentaccountsandtheAWASauditedaccountsservedas themainsourcesofinformationforthisOfficetoworkoutthecostingsrelatedtooperations,salaries,mealsandperdiemamongstthemaincategories.OtherdatawassuppliedbyMHSE.Furthermore,sincetheinformationwascompiledspecificallyforthisexercise,certaincostshadtobebasedonestimates.
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Table 11 - Open centres costs (2019)
Description Total Bed
Nights
Meals Costs
€
Other Costs
€
Total Costs
€
Meals average
cost pppn €
Other average
cost pppn €
Total average
cost pppn €
Open centres:
InitialReceptionCentre(IRC) 173,038 695,618 4,036,632 4,732,250 4.02 23.33 27.35
Hal-FarTentVillage(HTV) 307,097 934,048 3,303,649 4,237,697 3.04 10.76 13.80
Hal-Faropencentre(HFO) 41,368 100,981 869,472 970,453 2.44 21.02 23.46
DarIl-Liedna(DIL) 16,355 104,031 745,966 849,997 6.36 45.61 51.97
Total 537,858 1,834,678 8,955,719 10,790,397 3.41 16.65 20.06
Non-AWAS open centres32:
EmigrantsCommission 51,836 n/a 320,420 320,420 n/a 6.18 6.18
BalzanHome 30,345 n/a 106,489 106,489 n/a 3.51 3.51
PeaceLaboratory 10,582 n/a 20,000 20,000 n/a 1.89 1.89
Total: 92,763 n/a 446,909 446,909 n/a 4.82 4.82
Total AWAS and non-AWAS open centres costs:
630,621 1,834,678 9,402,62833 11,237,306 2.91 14.91 17.82
Other Costs:
PerDiem(IRC,HTV,HFO,DIL) n/a 850,890 n/a
PerDiem(Non-AWASopencentres)
n/a 68,484 n/a
Total overall costs: n/a 12,156,680 n/a
Source:AWASandMHSE.Note that ‘pppn’ refers to per person per night.
4.7.3 Table 11 highlights the range of costs incurred by Government to accommodate asylumseekers in open centres. At the outset, Table 11 distinguishes between costs incurredbyGovernmentinhostingandmanagingAWASpremisesdirectlyandexpenditureincurredbytheGovernmentintermofgrantstoNGOs.
4.7.4 Government grants to NGOs-Governmentincurredanaverageexpenditureof€4.82pppnfor operational costs, amounting to €446,909 in 2019 in funds to NGOs accommodatingasylumseekers.Thevariancebetweenthisamountandtheestimatedaverageof€20.06pppnincurredbyGovernment-runopencentresclearlyhighlightsthefinancialburdenassumedbyNGOstoaccommodateasylumseekers.During2019,NGOsaccommodatedasylumseekersfor92,763bednights,whichamountto14.7percentoftotalbednightsspentinlocalopencentresthroughoutthisyear.
32Thesecentresaccommodatethirdcountrynationals(TCNs)whohaveeitherleftIRCorwerewithinthecommunity.33Thetotalof€9,402,628includesanamountof€1,070,655asEUfundstobereimbursed.TheseEUfundsrelatetotheprovisionofmaterial
aidandsupportservicestoassistasylum.Thisprojectinvolvestheprovisionofmaterialaidsuchasfood(breakfast,lunch,dinner)andmedicalservicesandalsosupportservicessuchassocialworkersandsupportworkers.
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4.7.5 Value for money of AWAS-run open centres–TheNAOsoughttoassesstheextenttowhichthecostincurredtorunthefourAWASopencentresfulfilvalue-for-moneyconsiderations.Tothisend,thisperformanceauditcomparedthepppncostsofthesecentreswiththebed-only rates (withoutmeals, securityandprofessional services) chargedby localhostels, asadvertised in theMalta TourismAuthority’s portal. Thebed-only rate at anAWAS centrecostanaverageof€10.68whilethatatahosteloratwo-starhotelwasanaverageof€12.Althoughnotaperfectcomparison,therateof€20.06incurredbyAWASpppnwhichincludesmeals,securityandprofessionalservices,comparesfavourablytothe€12ratechargedpernight on bed-only basis at local hostels and two-star hotels. This consideration is baseduponthefactthatAWASprovidesmeals,security,professionalservicesincludingaccesstohealth,educationalandpsycho-socialsupportforthelengthoftheirstayintheopencentres.Furthermore, although not includedwithin the €20.06, staying at an AWAS open centreimpliesthereceiptofaperdiem,unlesstheasylumseekerwouldbeinemployment,aswellaseasieraccesstofamilymembersandasylumseekerssharingthesamebackground.
4.7.6 Intotal,thefourGovernment-runopencentresincurredanexpenditureofover€10.7millionin2019.TheoperationalcostsincurredwithinAWASrunopencentresreflecttheoverheadsassociatedwiththeseresidences.Table11showsthatHal-FarTentVillageincursthelowestoperationalcostspppn.Thisphenomenonisinpartattributedtothephysicalcompositionoftheresidences,namelymobilehomes,whicharenotasdemandingonmaintenancecostsas theotherGovernment-runopencentres.Overheadcostsarealsosignificantlyaffectedthroughadministrativeandother support staff.The relativelyhighcostspppn incurredatDaril-Liednaismainlyassociatedwiththespecialrequirementsofthevulnerablepeoplethisresidenceaccommodates,whereincases,thisalsoincludeschildrenandyoungpersons.
4.7.7 Another levelofanalysisof thefinancial informationpresented inTable11 relates to therangeofpppncostswithinGovernmentopencentres.ThenumberofbednightsaccumulatedbytherespectiveGovernment-runopencentresalsoinfluencethepppncosts.Economiesofscalealsoinfluencepppncostsineachoftheopencentres.Thismainlyoccursasrespectivecentres’fixedcostsaredividedbyahighernumberofbednights,whichinturnbringdownunitcosts.
4.7.8 Table11alsoprovidesinformationonthecostsincurredwithrespecttomealssuppliedtoasylumseekersresidinginAWASrunopencentres.Therateforbreakfastis€1.25excl.vat,Lunch€1.55excl.vat,Dinner€2.45excl.vat.Thisdoesnotmeanthateveryasylumseekerconsumesallthreemealsdailyasthisisdonethroughadailybookingsystem–hencethedisparityprojectedbyTable11inthepppncostsrelatingtomeals.Thisauditwasnotawareofseriouscomplaintsrelatingtotheprovisionofmeals,andconsequentlyitcanbeconcludedthatthecostsincurredbyGovernmentregardingthesupplyofthesemealsconstitutevalueformoneyas evenwhen the threedailymeals are considered collectively, their cost stillamountstoaroundamodesttake-awaymeal.
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4.7.9 Table12alsoportraysinformationaboutdailyallowancesreceivedbyasylumseekersresidinginopencentres.Asylumseekerswhoare inemploymentarenotentitledtotheperdiemallowances.Thedailyallowancesystemoperatesroundathreetimesregistrationperweekprocess,atsettimesoftheday;thesevaryslightlydependingonthecentre.Registrationhasthreepurposes:qualificationforthedailyallowance;securityofthebedallocated;topreventthoseworkingfromreceivingthedailyallowance.
4.7.10 The payments within the system are based on the resident’s status and any dependentchildren,wherepaymentsarereviewedonaweeklybasis.Attheendofeachregistrationoronaweeklybasis,thedatabaseisupdatedfromthephysicalsigningsheetsandattheendofthefour-weekcyclepaymentlistsareproduced.Table12showsthedifferentratesoftheperdiemallowances.
Table 12 – Daily Allowances
Payment StatusDaily Rate
€
Payment at 28 Days
€AsylumApplicant 4.66 130.48ChildOnly 2.33 65.24TemporaryHumanitarianProtection 4.66 130.48Refugeereceivingnosocialsecuritybenefits 4.08 114.24RejectedAsylum-seeker(grantedonlyinexceptionalcircumstances
tovulnerableindividuals)3.49 97.72
ReturnedAsylum-seeker(grantedtoasylumseekerssentbackto
MaltafromotherMemberStates(Dublintransfers)2.91 81.48
SingleParent 4.66 130.48
Source:AWAS.
4.8 Conclusion
4.8.1 This Chapter has shown that the cost of running open centres as accommodation forasylumseekersamountstoover€12million.Partofthisamountrelatestograntsprovidedby Government to NGOswho also accommodate asylum seekers in their own residents.Althoughonlycateringfor14.7percentofthebednightsspentinopencentresin2019,theforegoingunderlinesthefinancialandsocialcommitmentofNGOsinprovidingsupporttothisissueofnationalimportance.
4.8.2 ThisperformanceauditconcludedthatthecostsincurredbyGovernmenttohostanasylum-seekeramounttoaround€20pernight.While thisamount isconsideredreasonable, theAWAS-runcentresarecharacterisedbyover-crowding,whichinturnaffecttheenvironmentand conditions therein. To a large extent, this situation is brought about by the sporadicinfluxofasylumseekerswhich,onmanyoccasions,stretchavailableresourcestothelimit.Moreover, open centres are operating at or close to capacity. In cases, this gives rise tosituationswherebyasylumseekersaredetainedforlongerperiodsthannecessaryasthereisnoroomforthemwithinopencentres.
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4.8.3 DespitetherelativelysignificantstaffingcostsincurredbyGovernment,theadministrativeandotherprofessionalservicesarestillnotattherequired level.This influencesthe levelandqualityofservicesthatcanbeofferedtoasylumseekers.Thisstateofaffairsmayreduceopportunities forasylumseekers toexpedite their integrationprocess.Given thatasylumseekersmaybegrantedprotectionstatusandthat return isasignificantly longandoftenproblematicprocesstheopportunityclearlyexistsforopencentrestooffermoreservicesaimedatfurtherfacilitatingtheintegrationofasylumseekerswithinMaltesesociety.
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Chapter 5 | The Office of the Refugee Commissioner (RefCom) (now known as the International Protection Agency)
5.1 Introduction
5.1.1 UptoAugust2020,asylumseekers,thirdcountrynationals(TCNs)orstatelesspersonswhowishedtoseekprotectionstatuscoulddosothroughtheOfficeoftheRefugeeCommissioner(RefCom).Since,the7August2020,thisrolenolongerexistsinthelaw.TheInternationalProtectionAct now refers to the International ProtectionAgency (IPA). This performanceauditfocusedontheperiodupto2019;consequently,forpracticalreasons,thisReportwillcontinuetorefertotheOfficeoftheRefugeeCommissionerastheentity,whichatthetimewasresponsibletoreceive,processanddetermineapplicationsforinternationalprotectioninMaltaandboundbytheobligationsassumedbyMaltaunderthe1951GenevaConventionrelating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol, aswell as its obligations underEuropeanlaw.
5.1.2 TheOfficeoftheRefugeeCommissionerprovidedinformationabouttheasylumproceduretopersonswhoexpressedtheirintentiontomakeanapplicationforinternationalprotectioninMalta. Following the lodging of the application for international protection, theOfficeof theRefugeeCommissioner conducteda checkpursuant toDublin regulations toverifywhether Malta is indeed the Member State responsible for examining the applicationpursuanttotheDublinRegulation.TheRefugeeCommissionerwasboundbytheProceduralRegulations(SL420.07)34toconcludetheexaminationprocedurewithinsixmonthsofthelodgingoftheapplication.Thisperiodcouldbeextendedtoninemonthswhencomplexissueswereinvolved,whenalargenumberofthird-countrynationalssimultaneouslyappliedforinternationalprotectionorwhenthedelaycouldclearlybeattributedtothefailureoftheapplicanttocomplywithhisobligations.Thistimelimitcouldbeextendedbyafurtherthreemonthstoensureanadequateandcompleteexaminationoftheapplicationforinternationalprotection.However,theexaminationprocedurecouldnotexceedthemaximumtimelimitoftwenty-onemonthsfromthelodgingoftheapplication.
34SubsidiaryLegislation420.07,proceduralstandardsforgrantingandwithdrawinginternationalprotectionregulations.
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5.1.3 As this Chapterwill discuss further on,most of the decisions taken by theOffice of theRefugeeCommissioner(RefCom)were,inpractice,nottakenbeforethelapseofsixmonths.AswillbeoutlinedwithinthisChaptersuchstateofaffairswasinevitable.
5.2 EASO was essential in assisting RefCom especially due to the heavy, pending workload
5.2.1 Theyearunderreview,2019,wascharacterisedbyaconsiderable increase innumbersofTCNs applying for international protectionwith the Office of the Refugee Commissioner.The reason for suchamarked increasewasmainlydue to the3,405 irregular immigrantsarrivingbyboats,whichwasmorethandoublethe1,445boatarrivals in2018.OnemustalsobearinmindthattheRefComdidnotprocessonlyapplicationsfromsucharrivalsbutalsothoseofotherpersonswhowouldhavearrivedinMaltaregularlyorviaothermeans(i.e. arrived inMalta irregularlybutnot followinga searchand rescueoperation). Suchasharpincreasemeantthat,inviewoflackofrecruitment,theRefCom’sstaffendedupwithabackloginapplications.TheRefComstymiedthebacklog,improvedoperationaldeficienciesandcircumventedthelengthypublicservicerecruitmentproceduresthroughthetemporarydeploymentoftheEuropeanAsylumSupportOffice(EASO)interimstaffandMemberStateexperts.TheNAOpositivelynotesthatthiswasaresultoftheMaltaOperationalPlansignedbetweentheMinistryforHomeAffairsandNationalSecurity(MHAS)andEASOfortheperiodJunetillDecember2019.
5.2.2 Recent Developments:Administrativecapacityconcernswithin thenewAgencyprevaileduptothetimeofwritingthisreport.While,thenewAgencycontendsthattheoperationalplan referred to in theprecedingparagraphwas renewed for2020and2021, theAgencyremainedreliantonthesesameoperationalagreements,whichnecessitatedEASOsupportintheareaofprocessingofapplicationsforinternationalprotection,duringtheregistrationand lodgingof theapplication, theDublinprocedure, interviewsand thedecision-makingprocessthroughthedraftingofEvaluationReportsonindividualapplicationssubmittedtoIPA.35
5.3 In 2020, the RefCoM became an Agency to facilitate recruitment and improve working conditions
5.3.1 DuringinterviewswithRefCommanagement,theproposedstructureofthenewInternationalProtectionAgencyaswellasrecruitmentwasdiscussed.TheAgencywasplannedtomovetonewpremisessinceitwasstilloperatingfromitspreviouspremises,whichwasstructurallyunsuitable tohosta largenumberofmembersof staffandapplicants.Suchamove tookplaceinthefirstweekofMarch2021.
35Source:2019Operational&TechnicalAssistancePlanagreedbyEASOandMalta,page3,24June2019.
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5.3.2 TheAgencywasplannedtohaveastaffcomplementofaround66personsinordertoexecutethedutiesefficientlyandreducethependingbacklog.Uptillend2020,therewere43postswhichwereyet tobefilled. Interimpersonnel recruitedbytheEuropeanAsylumSupportOffice(EASO)andMemberStateexpertsdeployedwithin the frameworkof theaforesaidMalta operational plan signed byMHAS and EASO,were also planned to fill in posts for2020and2021,untilrecruitmentwastobecompleted.Itbearspointingoutthatahumanresources(HR)planwhilsttechnicallyapprovedbytheMinistryforHomeAffairs,NationalSecurityandLawEnforcements(MHSE),doesnotnecessarilytranslateintofilledpositionsforanumberofreasonsincludingessentially;
a. thelackofsuitableapplicants;b. budgetaryconstraints;c. lowsalaryscalesthatarenotcommensuratewiththeparticulardutiesandresponsibilities;
and d. thelackofpublicinterfacemakingtheRefComrelativelyunknowntothegeneralpublic.
5.3.3 Recent Developments:TheIPAiscurrentlyindiscussionwithunionsregardingtheadoptionofacollectiveagreement.Whilstauthorisationtoengagenewstaffasperpublicadministrationrecruitmentdirectiveshasbeengranted,therearestillimpedimentstosuchrecruitment.Inthisregard,discussionsareongoingbetweenMHSE,theOfficeofthePrimeMinister,andtheMinistryforFinanceandEmployment.
5.4 During 2019, RefCom received twice as many new asylum applications as in 2018
5.4.1 In2018,RefComreceived2,045newapplicationsforprocessing.Itissignificanttonotethat1,474applications(72.1percent)originatedfromTCNswhowouldhaveenteredMaltaviatheSchengensystem,orarrived inanotherwise irregularmanner,while571applications(27.9percent)werefromasylumseekerswhocametoMaltairregularlybyboat.
5.4.2 During2019,thesituationwasdifferentsincetherewerenumerousboatarrivals.Applicationslodgedbynon-boatasylumseekersamountedto1,362(33.9percentofthenewapplicationslodgedin2019,while2,660applications(66.1percent)weresubmittedbyasylumseekersarrivingbyboat.Itisimportanttospecifythattheyearofapplicationdoesnotnecessarilymean the yearof arrival inMalta. Furthermore,whenone compares the2018and2019figures,theworkloadoftheRefComdoubled,thusprolongingtheprocessingofapplicationsaswell.Table13providestherelevantfiguresfor2018and2019.
Table 13 - New applications received by RefCom during 2018 and 2019
Total/PercentagesNew applications during 2018 New applications during 2019
Non-Boat Boat Total Non-Boat Boat TotalTotal 1,474 571 2,045 1,362 2,660 4,022Percentages 72.1 27.9 100.0 33.9 66.1 100.0
Source:RefCom.
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5.5 At the end of 2019, there were 3,574 pending applications to be processed by RefCom
5.5.1 Table14highlightsalltheapplicationsatRefCompendingasatend2018and2019andtheyeartheywerelodged.
Table 14 - Pending applications at RefCom as at end 2018 and 2019
Year application lodged with RefCom
Pending applications as at end 2018 Pending applications as at end 2019Regular &
Irregular (Non-Boat)
(Boat) TotalRegular &
Irregular (Non-Boat)
(Boat) Total
2013 1 0 1 1 0 1 2014 0 0 0 0 0 02015 0 1 1 0 0 02016 0 63 63 0 13 13 2017 4 297 301 0 117 117 2018 435 725 1,160 287 384 671
2019 not
applicable not
applicable not
applicable 2,032 740 2,772
Total 440 1,086 1,526 2,320 1,254 3,574 Percentages 28.8 71.2 100.0 64.9 35.1 100.0
Source:RefCom.
5.5.2 Atend2018,pendingapplicationsconsistedof440(28.8percent) fromnon-boatasylumseekers,while1,086(71.2percent)werefrompeoplearrivinginboats.In2019,therewasashiftinthetypeofTCNsseekingasylum,sincetherewasasubstantialincreaseinasylumseekersarrivingbyboat(66percentofthenewapplications) incontrastto2018.Bywayof policy, RefCom dealt with the applications by boat arrivals first. Hence, the pendingapplications,weremostlyfromnon-boatarrivals,amountingto2,320(64.9percent)ofthetotalpendingones.The remaining35.1per cent,1,254,were fromboatarrivals. Itbearspointingout that boat arrivals usually requiremore government intervention in termsofbasicneedsthanthenon-boatarrivals;also,theboatarrivalsusuallyarriveinMaltainlargernumbersthanthenon-boatones.Hence,RefComprioritisedtheapplicationsthatweremosturgentandneededimmediatefurtheractionratherthanactingonapplicationsbasedonachronologicalorder.
5.5.3 During2019,RefComreceived4,022newapplicationstoprocess,doubletheamountofthepreviousyear.RefComstaff,despitebeingaidedbyEASOinterimstaffandMemberState-deployedexperts,werenotinapositiontofinalisetheirprocessing.Thisnecessarilymeantthattherewasasignificantnumberofapplicationswhichremainedpendinguntilend2019,namely3,574applications.ThisresultillustratesthatpendingapplicationsatRefCommorethandoubled(increasedby2,048)overaperiodof12monthssincebyend2018therehadbeen1,526applicationspending.ThisOfficeacknowledgesthatevenintheeventthatafullcomplementisemployedtoprocessprotectionapplications,ahighnumberofapplications
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wouldstillresultinoperationaldelays.Thisimpliesthattodate,therecentlyestablishedIPAfacesaconstantchallengetobalanceoutthreecriticalinterrelatedvariablesnamely,staffinglevels,processefficiencyandratesofapplications.
5.6 As at end 2019, there were over 800 applications pending from previous years
5.6.1 AccordingtoEurostatdata,thevolumeofcasesawaitingafinaldecisionincreasedbyover300percentbetweenJanuary2016andMarch2019,thatis,from715to2,195.Until2019,RefComhadnotestablishedthestatusofover800applicationsasrepresentedinChart2:
Chart 2 – Cases filed between 2016 and 2018 and awaiting a final decision at end 2019
Source:RefCom.
5.6.2 The reasons for such delays were various and mainly related to complications with theindividual cases such as lack of documentation from the applicants’ side or necessaryexaminationof furtherdocumentationthatwouldhavebeenproducedbytheapplicants.Suchdelayspointtowardscertainconsiderations:
a. RefComhumanresourceswerefrequentlystretchedtothelimit.
b. Whileacknowledgingthattheasylumprocessisverytightlyregulated,theopportunityexists to re-evaluate the efficiency of some of the processes requiring managementendorsement.
c. Delaysandundecidedoutcomesmaketheasylumseekers’personalandfamilysituation
morechallengingsincetheywouldnothavebeeninapositiontoinitiate,planorevenbenefitfromanystepstowardsintegration.
13
117
671
0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800
2016
2017
2018
Applications Filed
Applications Filed
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5.6.3 Furthertothelastpoint,thisOfficetriedtoestablishwhetherRefComacteduponcomplaintsreceivedbyasylumseekersconcerningsuchdelays.TheRefComcontendedthatwhilemostofthecomplaintsrelatedtodelaysandwerereceivedviaemails,thesewerenotrecordedastheywereconsideredaroutinepartoftheprocess.RefComnotedthatitwasnotuncommontoreceiveseveralemailsfromthesameapplicantaskingabouttheexpectedtimeframeforadecision.RefComfurthernotedthat,mostcomplaintsregardingdelaysweresubmittedbyapplicantswhoseprocedureisstillwithinthelegaltimeframesestablishedbylaw.Complaintswhichwerenotrelatedtodelayswereinvestigatedandaddressed.
5.7 Delay in RefCoM decisions was detrimental to both applicants and government
expenditure
5.7.1 WhiletheRefugeeCommissionerwasrequiredtoconcludecasesandissuedecisionswithinsixmonths of the lodging of the application, themaximum time limit allocated throughtheamendedProcedural Regulations is in fact 21months. Thetime limit is affectedbycomplexissuesoffactsorlaw,alargenumberofTCNsapplyingforinternationalprotectionsimultaneously, failure of the applicant to comply with his obligations, and when theexaminationprocedurecannotbeconcludeddue toanuncertainsituation in thecountryof origin. While the specific legislation cites ten specific reasons as to why extensionscan be resorted to, including in circumstances where heavy workloads at InternationalProtectionAgency(IPA)prevail,thisOfficebelievesthat,thesixmonthsshouldhavebeenadheredtoinmostcasesratherthantheexception,asthecurrentsituationshows.WhilethisOfficeacknowledgestheeffortsbyRefCom,andsubsequentlytheIPA,tostrengthenitsadministrativecapacity,thedifficultiesandchallengesrelatedtostaffrecruitment,referredtoabove,andtheensuingoperationalmattersisresultinginsuchextensionsbeingrepeatedlyresortedto.ThedatacollatedbytheNationalAuditOffice(NAO)withreferencetothetimetakentoissueadecisionbytheRefComwillbediscussedfurtheronwithinthisChapter.
5.7.2 NAOisconcernedthatthelongerittakestodetermineanasylumapplicationcarriesvariousconsequences and has a detrimental effect on the applicants and all the public entitiesinvolvedintheprovisionofservicestotheasylumseekers.
5.7.3 Suchconsequencesinvolveprimarilythepsychologicaleffectsontheapplicantsduetohis/herinabilitytoplanhis/herfuture,theeffectsonfamilydynamics,possibledelaysinaccessingeducationalandsocialresourcesaswellaseffectsonjobacquisitionandstability.
5.7.4 Furthermore,itheavilyaffectstheapplicant’snextstepswithintheasylumprocess,whichgenerallyinvolvesotherMaltesepublicentitiessuchastheformerRefugeeAppealsBoard(RAB), now known as the International Protection Appeals Board and Social SecurityDepartment.Moreover,delaysattheapplicationreviewstageimpliesthatintegrationeffortsarealsoextended.
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5.7.5 From a government point of view, the time taken to review international protectionapplications affects public expenditure not only due to the possibility of asylum seekersstayinglongerwithindetentionandopencentreswhen,intheoryatleast,theyshouldhavebeenreturnedtotheircountryoforigin,butalsointermsofgeneraloperationalplanningandensuing implementation.Moreover, thereexists thepossibility that resettlementandrelocationprospectsofapplicantscouldalsoendupbeingjeopardisedassuchpossibilitieswouldnotbeavailableuntilsuchpersonsareregisteredasasylumapplicantsoraregrantedinternationalprotection.TheImmigrationPoliceandtheForeignMinistrywouldnotbeinapositiontotaketherequiredactionasanasylumseekerseekinginternationalprotectioncannotberefusedadequateconsiderationandclosureofhis/hercase.Furthermore,thereexiststheriskthatsuchasylumseekers,whowouldhavebeenawaitingadecisionforseveralmonthsoryears,wouldbemoredifficulttotrace.Table15presentabriefdefinitionbytypeofdecisiontaken.
Table 15 - Definitions of decisions by RefCom
Type of Decision Definition
AdministrativeClosure
Aclosurewhichisnotbasedoninternationalprotectiongroundsasestablishedby
law.Forinstance,incaseswheretheapplicantdiesbeforeadecisiononhis/hercase
isreachedORtheapplicantshowshis/herintenttoapplyforinternationalprotection
asper lawbuthe/shedoesnot lodge theapplicationor theapplicant lodges the
applicationbutisrelocatedtoanotherEuropeanUnion(EU)MemberStatebeforea
decisionisreachedonhiscase.
DublinClosureTheapplicantistheresponsibilityofanotherMemberStateandthathe/sheistobe
transferredthereinaccordancewiththeDublinRegulation.
ExplicitlyWithdrawnAdecisionwhich is issued after an applicant explicitly declares that he/she is no
longerinterestedinpursuinghis/herapplicationforinternationalprotection.
ImplicitlyWithdrawn
Adecisionwhichisissuedafteranapplicantfailstoadheretohis/herlegalobligations
(e.g. does not complywith reporting obligations, does not appear for a personal
interviewwithoutavalidreason,and/orabsconds)thusimplicitlyindicatingthathe/
sheisnolongerinterestedinpursuinghis/herapplicationforinternationalprotection.
Inadmissible
Adecisionindicatingthattheapplicationlodgedbytheapplicantwasnotadmissible
in accordancewithArticle 24(1)(a) of the International ProtectionAct (e.g.when
theapplicantalreadyhadinternationalprotectionfromanotherMemberState).Refugee The applicant is recognised as a refugee according to the grounds at law.Rejection The applicant does not meet the criteria to be granted international protection.
SubsidiaryTheapplicant isabeneficiaryofsubsidiaryprotectionaccordingtothegroundsat
law.TemporaryHumanitarian
Protection
AlocalformofprotectiongrantedinaccordancewithArticle17AoftheInternational
ProtectionAct.WithdrawalRefugee Removalofprotection.WithdrawalSubsidiary Removalofprotection.WithdrawnTemporary
HumanitarianProtectionRemovalofprotection.
Source:RefCom.
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5.8 Although RefCom managed to increase its decisions throughput by 11 per cent, new applications increased by 96 per cent in 2019
5.8.1 During2019,newapplicationsincreasedby96.7percentover2018,anincreaseof1,977applications.ThisincreasewasnotmirroredinthenumberofconcludedapplicationssinceRefComconcluded2,215asylumapplications,orrather,22036(11percent)moreapplicationsthanthepreviousyearof2018.Table16showsthedecisionstakenbyRefComduring2019inaccordancewithyearthattheapplicationswerelodged.
5.8.2 Theprolongingofthegrantingofinternationalprotection,duetowhateverreason,hindersasylumseekersfrommovingonwithone’slifeandplanningtheirnextsteps.Suchprolongingalsoshowsthattherecouldbe:
a. lengthyprocedureswhichneedtoberectifiedespeciallywhentheinfluxofboatarrivalsisonerous;
b. possibleinformationgapsalongtheprocessingstageleadingtotheformerRefComand,now,therecentlyestablishedIPArequiringmoretimetoconcludetheexaminationandtakeadecisiononanapplication;and
c. theneedtoinvestincompetentstaffthatisspecificallytrainedinasylumprocedures.
5.8.3 Therecently-establishedIPAcontendthat,whiletheAgencyisrevisitingprocedurestoensurethatprocessefficiency,limitationatlawexistaseachapplicationmustbefullysubjectedtoitsdueprocess.
36During2018RefComregisteredatotalof1,995decisions.
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Tabl
e 16
- D
ecis
ions
tak
en b
y Re
fCom
dur
ing
2019
by
year
whe
n ap
plic
atio
n w
as lo
dged
Year
app
licati
on
lodg
ed w
ith
RefC
om
All R
efCo
ms d
ecis
ions
(Jan
uary
to D
ecem
ber 2
019)
Adm
inis
trati
ve
Clos
ure
Dubl
in
Clos
ure37
Ex
plic
itly
With
draw
nIm
plic
itly
With
draw
nIn
adm
issi
ble
Refu
gee
Reje
ction
Subs
idia
ryTe
mpo
rary
Hu
man
itaria
nW
ithdr
awal
Re
fuge
eW
ithdr
awal
Su
bsid
iary
With
draw
n Te
mpo
rary
Hu
man
itaria
n Pr
otec
tion
Tota
l
Yearoflod
ging
an
app
licati
on
nota
vailable
504
512
1813
311
51
913
144
2015
--
--
--
-1
--
--
1
2016
--
13
41-
5-
--
--
50
2017
--
-2
8211
2170
1-
--
187
2018
210
310
116
3413
5815
37
--
-49
6
2019
127
610
2664
213
1916
011
71
--
-1,
337
Tot
al
179
717
4219
738
856
247
352
141
913
2,21
5
Percen
tages
ofto
tals
8.1
32.4
1.9
8.9
17.5
2.5
11.2
15.9
0.6
0.0
0.4
0.6
100
Source:R
efCo
m.
37The
secasesareth
erespon
sibilityofa
notherM
embe
rState.
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5.9 Dublin Closures, Inadmissible cases, and pre-2018 cases constituted substantial percentages related to the 2019 decisions
5.9.1 Asnoted inTable16, in2019,RefComconcluded2,215cases.Approximately50percentofthedecisionstakenduring2019relatedtoInadmissibleandDublinClosures.Thefiguresin Table 16 show that a high percentage (32.4 per cent) of these cases, 717 cases,wereDublin cases. The cases falling within this category are usually quite straightforward todecide sincedataon suchapplicants is alreadyavailablewithin theEuropeanUnion (EU)databases.Anothersignificantportionofthecases,388cases(17.5percent)weredeemedinadmissible.ThelargenumberofinadmissiblecasesconfirmedRefCom’sclaimthattherewerenumerouscaseswherebythirdcountrynationalstrytoseekinternationalprotectioninMaltadespitethefactthattheywouldalreadyhavebeengrantedinternationalprotectioninanotherMemberState.
5.9.2 Pre-2018casesconstituted382decisions(17percentofthedecisionswhichweredecidedin2019) indicatingthatsomecasesare indeedcomplexandmaydependonthirdpartiesfor documentation to be provided. The 17 per cent is referring to those cases forwhichnodateof lodgingwasmadeavailableandtothose lodgedbetween2015andend2017.Suchasignificantpercentagecouldalsobeindicativeoftheneedforalong-overduebetterprioritisation of cases and improved operational procedures namely in terms of moreexpedient vetting of international protection applications – a situationwhich is currentlybeingaddressed.
5.9.3 The ‘Refugee’, ‘Subsidiary Protection’ and ‘Temporary Humanitarian’decisionsamountedto56(2.5percent),352(15.9percent)and14(0.6percent)respectivelyofalldecisionstakenduring2019.Thisaudit’sscopedidnotcoverissuesrelatedtothetypeofdecisionsawarded.Consequently,NAOcannotcommentonthetypeofdecisionsbycategory.
5.10 In 2019, RefCom took between nine and twelve months to conclude decisions which allocated international protection or were inadmissible
5.10.1 During2019,onaverage,RefComrequiredbetweentwototwelvemonthsfromthelodgingofapplicationstoformalisedecisions.Table17refers.ThisTableexcludes144decisionstakenduringthisyearduetotheunavailabilityoftheapplicationlodgingdateasalreadyoutlinedinTable16.
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5.10.2 Table 17 also indicates that 238 (11.5 per cent) decisions taken during 2019, referredto applications lodged prior 2018. Applications with an ‘Administrative Closure’ and ‘Dublin Closure’ decisions, on average took nearly threemonths to be concluded whichisunderstandable as these casesaredeemed tobequite straightforward cases since therelevantinformationisusuallymuchmoreeasilyavailable.‘Explicitly Withdrawn’, ‘Implicitly Withdrawn’ and ‘Rejection’,onaveragetooknearlysixmonthstobeconcludedsignifyingareasonableamountoftimeallocatedtosuchcases.RefComcontendedthat,insuchcases,whenitwasconcludedthattheapplicanthaswithdrawntheapplication,abscondedorhasnotcompliedwiththelegallyprescribedobligations,adecisiontodiscontinueanapplication,isgenerallytakenwithinamatterofdays.
5.10.3 Theapplicationswhichtooklongesttobedecidedwerethose,which,duetotheirnature,arethemostdifficulttodeterminesincetheyresultinorthwartinternationalprotectionfrombeinggranted,namelythe‘Inadmissible’, ‘Refugee’, ‘Subsidiary Protection’ and ‘Temporary Humanitarian Protection’categories.Thesefourcategoriesconstituted763cases(36.8percentofalldecisionstakenduring2019)andrequiredanaverageofbetweenninemonthstoalmost12monthstoconclude.Inaccordancewiththelaw(SubsidiaryLegislation420.07[6.5(b)]),inthesecases,RefComwasstillobligedtoinformtheapplicantsconcernedwithinareasonabletimeofthereasonsforthepostponementintheexaminationprocedureorwhythe complexitiesof their casesmeritedextensions to the six-monthperiodprescribedbylegislation.
5.11 The Office of the Refugee Commissioner revised processes and prioritised cases which were deemed routine and most in need of protection
5.11.1 TheincumbentRefugeeCommissioner,appointedinOctober2019,recognisedtheneedtoreviseprocesseswhichwere lengthyand inefficient. In linewithEuropean standards, theRefCom revised the interview and assessment templates in order to process casesmoreefficientlyand inorder toexecuteaproper individualassessmentbasedon factsandtheappropriatelegalanalysis.
5.11.2 RefComconfirmedthatprioritywasgiventovulnerableapplicantsorthoseinneedofspecialproceduralguarantees.ApplicationslodgedbyapplicantsclaimingtobeBangladeshinationalsorMoroccannationals,andotherdesignatedsafecountriesoforigin,andapplicantswhoappliedforprotectionafterbeing issuedaremovalorderby ImmigrationPolicewerealsoprioritisedin2019.
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Source:R
efCo
m.
Tabl
e 17
- D
urat
ion
of R
efCo
m d
ecis
ions
(20
19)
Year
app
licati
on
lodg
ed w
ith
RefC
om
All R
efCo
ms d
ecis
ions
(Jan
uary
to D
ecem
ber 2
019)
Adm
inis
trati
ve
Clos
ure
Dubl
in
Clos
ure
Expl
icitl
y W
ithdr
awn
Impl
icitl
y W
ithdr
awn
Inad
mis
sibl
eRe
fuge
eRe
jecti
onSu
bsid
iary
Tem
pora
ry
Hum
anita
rian
With
draw
al
Refu
gee
With
draw
al
Subs
idia
ry
With
draw
n Te
mpo
rary
Hu
man
itaria
n Pr
otec
tion
Tota
l
2015
--
--
--
-1
--
--
1
2016
--
13
41-
5-
--
--
50
2017
--
-2
8211
2170
1-
--
187
2018
210
310
116
3413
5815
37
--
-49
6
2019
127
610
2664
213
1916
011
71
--
-1,
337
Tot
al
129
713
3718
537
043
244
341
90
00
2,07
1
Averageda
ys
takenfora
de
cisio
n85
7317
117
226
626
916
635
828
4no
t a
pplic
able
not
appl
icab
leno
tap
plic
able
182
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5.12 During 2019, each concluded case cost RefCom an average of €714.21
5.12.1 During2019thetotalcostofprocessingasylumapplicationsamountedto€1,581,977.ThisfinancialinformationwassourcedfromGovernmentAccounts.Table18refers.
Table 18 - Costs incurred by RefCom to process applications (2019)
Description Total Actual Cost Percentage of total cost€
SalariesofRefComstaff 880,487 55.7Professionalservices 349,56438 22.1Administrativeservices 351,926 22.2Total costs 1,581,977 100.0Total concluded cases in 2019 2,215Averagecostperconcludedapplications €714.21
Source:RefCom.
5.12.2 Table18showsthatthetotalcostincurredbyRefComduring2019amountedto€1,581,977.Thesecostsrelatedmainlytofixedcostssuchassalariesofpublicserviceofficersemployedbytheentity.Fromapurelyfinancialpointofview,RefCom’scostsweredependantontheefficiencyoftheapplicationreviewprocess.Consequently,thelongeracasetobedecided,thehigher thecosts.Moreover,costswouldhavecontinuedtoescalatebeyondRefCom’sbudgetsinceGovernmentwouldhavebeenobligedtoaccommodateapplicants–chargeswhichwouldbeincurredbyothergovernmententities.
5.13 Conclusion
5.13.1 RefCom,whicheventuallybecameIPA,playedacriticalrolewhenprocessingapplicationsforinternationalprotectionstatus.Theexaminationoftheseapplicationstouchesonlegalandhumanitarianaspectsaswellasadministrativeefficacyintermsofconsistencyandfairnessintheapplicationofpoliciesandprocedures.Thesetwoelementsarenotmutuallyexclusiveandmoreover,theyalsohaveabearingonnationalsocio-economicfactors.Asamaincogintheasylumprocess,itwasimperativethatRefCommaintainedastrongpositiontoexecuteitsmandateefficientlyandeffectively.Theyearreviewedforthepurposeofthisaudit,2019,provedtobeaverychallengingoneforRefComasithadtodealwithanabnormalnumberofapplicationslodgedinadditiontotheoutstandingrequestssubmittedinpreviousyears.
38The€349,564 includesamounts for the InternationalProtectionAgency is currently implementing twoEUco-financedprojectsunder theAsylum,MigrationandIntegrationFundwhichbothincludeinterpretationcosts.TheseareMT/2015/AMIF1.13Improving and strengthening the asylum determination procedure through the training and funds for interpreters and MT/2015/AMIF 1.14 The setting up of a unit that deals with requests related to Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 of 26 June 2013 – establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an asylum application lodged in one of the Member States by a third country national or stateless person (recast).In2019,atotalamountof€214,442inrelationtointerpretationcostsonbothprojectswaspaidbytheTreasury.
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5.13.2 ThisChapterhasshownthatat thetimeof this review,RefComlackedtheadministrativecapacitytobeabletokeepupwiththenumberofapplicationslodged.Giventhecomplexitiesinvolved and the thoroughness of the asylum procedure, RefCom’s shortage of officialstranscendedinprocessingdelays–whichincasessurpassedlegalrequirements.Asaresult,as at end 2019, therewere 3,574 applications outstanding. 802 (22.4 per cent) of theseapplicationsdatebackbetween2013and2018.
5.13.3 Apartfromthe legalandadministrative implications,theprolongingofreviewprocedures–albeitthroughissuesbeyondRefCom’scontrol–hasfarreachingimplications.Applicantsforinternationalprotectionremainuninformedonthestatusoftheircase,capacityrelatedpressuresatclosedandopencentresbecomeincreasinglymoreapparentandtherepatriationprocess,whereapplicable,wasdelayedandperhapsrenderedevenmoreproblematic.ThisimpliedthatthelikelihoodincreasesthatthosepersonswhoarenotentitledtoprotectionstatusstillremaininMaltaindefinitely.
5.13.4 InAugust2020,RefCombecameafully-fledgedAgency,theInternationalProtectionAgency.Themainaimwastobeefupitsadministrativecapacitytoenhancethroughput.Moreover,therewereplansthatthemainofficewastomovetomoreappropriatepremisestoimproveworkingconditionswhichultimatelytranslatestoenhancingcustomerinterface.ThismovehappenedinthefirstweekofMarch2021.
5.13.5 Around ten months since RefCom was afforded Agency status, the number of officialsemployedhasnotincreased–whichmeansthatthe66membersofstaffplanned,havestillnotmaterialised.EASO’sinputinthisregardhasbeenacriticalfactortominimiseapplicationprocessingtime.Thisauditacknowledgesthatsomechangestoworkpracticeshavebeenimplemented.Tovaryingdegrees,therecentlyintroducedproceduresoffast-trackingsomeapplicationshascontributedtoreducingthenumberofoutstandingapplications.Nonetheless,thesemeasuresmainlyrelatetothemorerecentapplications.Bythetimeofdraftingofthisreport,theInternationalProtectionAgency(IPA)wasstilllackingthecapacitytoexpedientlyaddressthehighnumberofoutstandingapplicationsforinternationalprotection.
5.13.6 ThenextChapterofthisReportdiscussestheappealsprocedures.Thisisanotherimportantphase in the quest of granting international protection to asylum seekers since the vastmajorityof rejectedapplicantsappeal to the InternationalProtectionTribunal, previouslyknownastheRefugeeAppealsBoard.
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Chapter 6 | Refugee Appeals Board
6.1 Introduction
6.1.1 Should asylum seekers have their application rejected by the International ProtectionAgency(IPA),formerlyknownasOfficeoftheRefugeeCommissioner(RefCom),applicantscanappealthroughamechanismgovernedbytheInternationalProtectionAppealsTribunal(IPAT), formerly knownas theRefugeeAppeals Board (RAB).Additionally, asylum seekerswhobelievethattheyareentitledtorefugeestatusratherthan‘SubsidiaryProtection’or‘TemporaryHumanitarianProtection’,orwhowanttoappealtheDublindecisiontakenbyIPA,canalsoputforwardtheirappealwiththeIPAT.TheperformanceauditwillbereferringtotheRABratherthanIPATsincethisreviewisconcernedwith2018and2019.Figure3referstotheproceduresadoptedbytheRABasatend2019.
6.1.2 MostoftheRABdecisionstendedtoconfirmtheRefCom’srecommendations.Asprescribed
by law, the RAB’s decision was final. Following a negative decision, the police officersdelegatedbythePrincipalImmigrationOfficerwouldcommenceprocedurestoreturnformerapplicantstotheirrespectivecountriesoforigin.AppellantsmayhaveattemptedtooverturntheRefCom’sdecisionthroughahumanrightsclaimpursuanttotheEuropeanConventiononHumanRights(ECHR)and/ortheMalteseConstitutiononpointsoflawrelatedtoviolationofsomefundamentalhumanright.Appellants,attimesalsoseekjudicialredressthroughtheordinarycourtsbywayofjudicialreviewofadministrativeaction(Section469AofChapter12oftheLawsofMalta).
Table 19 – Cases overview of work at RAB (2018 and 2019)
Year New Appeals submitted at
RAB
Decided Appeals at RAB Pending Appeals at RAB
2018 929 717 4892019 764 586 668
Source:RAB.
6.1.3 Table19showsdataintermsofnewcasesthatwerereceivedin2018and2019aswellasthenumberofcasesthatweredecidedandpendingasatend2018andend2019.Thedecidedandpendingcategorieswerenotnecessarilycaseslodgedinthesameyear.
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Fulfilling obligations in relation to asylum seekers
Figu
re 3
– R
AB p
roce
dure
s (2
019)
RAB
notif
es th
e M
inis
try
for
Hom
e Af
fairs
, N
atio
nal
Secu
rity
and
Law
Enf
orcm
ent
(MH
SE) o
f the
ap
plic
ants
re
ques
t
Asyl
um s
eeke
r lo
dges
an
appe
al
with
RAB
and
can
re
ques
t fre
e le
gal
aide
thro
ugh
TCN
U
Asy
lum
see
ker w
ho w
ant t
o ap
peal
Re
fCom
's d
ecis
ion,
hav
e fif
teen
da
ys to
info
rm th
e RA
BB a
nd
regi
ster
thei
r app
eal a
pplic
atio
n fr
om th
e da
y th
ey c
olle
cted
the
writ
ten
deci
sion
.
Onc
e ap
peal
is re
gist
ered
, asy
lum
se
eker
s ar
e us
ually
giv
en a
ppro
cim
atel
y th
ree
wee
ks to
pre
pare
the
actu
al a
ppea
l su
bmis
sion
s, e
xpla
inin
g w
hy th
ey
disa
ggre
e w
ith R
efCo
's d
ecis
ion.
(doe
s no
t app
ly fo
r leg
al s
ervi
ces
not p
rovi
ded
thro
ugh
TCN
U)
An
appe
al is
to b
e de
cide
d w
ithin
thre
e m
onth
s, w
hich
co
uld
be e
xten
ded
to s
ix
mon
ths
whe
re th
ere
are
com
plex
issu
es
Appl
ican
t co
nsul
ts w
ith
lega
l cou
nsel
(M
HSE
lega
l ai
d to
priv
ate
law
yer)
Lega
l co
un
sel
subm
its
repo
rt to
RA
B
Poss
ibili
ty
of o
ral
hea
rin
g by
RA
B
Fina
l de
cisi
on b
y RA
BEn
d of
pr
oces
s
Deci
sion
s by
Ref
Com
:
Inte
rnat
iona
l Pro
tect
ion
is n
ot
gran
ted.
Su
bsid
iary
pro
tect
ion
or T
HP
is
gran
ted
inst
ead
of R
efug
ee
stat
us Du
blin
Reg
ulat
ion
deci
sion
is n
ot
acce
pted
by
the
asyl
um s
eeke
r
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6.1.4 ThisChaptersoughttodeterminetheextenttowhichtheRABfulfilleditslegalobligationsandprovidedefficientandeffectiveremedy.Againstthisbackdrop,thisChaptercoversthefollowingaspects:
a. thesuitabilityoftheBoardmemberstofilltheirrole;b. thelackofadministrativestaffandteammembersaidingtheBoards’operations;c. theproceduresrelatedtoRABsessionsandmeetings;d. thedelaysindecisions;ande. thesmallpoolofLegalAidresourceswhichprevailedforabriefperiod.
6.2 Most Board members lacked adequate legal background and experience in asylum matters
6.2.1 TheBoardsetupintermsoftheRefugeesAct(CAP.420)wascomposedoffourChambers;thefourthwassetupinApril2019.ItsremitwastohearandupholdoroverturnappealsagainstrecommendationsissuedbytheRefugeeCommissioner.EachChamberconsistedofachairpersonandthreememberswhowereappointedforthreeyearsoruntiltheirsuccessorswereappointed.OnememberunofficiallyfulfilledtheroleofsecretaryoftheChamber.ThemembersoftheChambersconsistedofachairperson(lawyer)andanothermemberfromthelegalprofession;theothertwomemberswouldhavehaddifferentandvariedprofessionalbackgroundssuchas intheeducationandemploymentsectorswithinpublicentities.TheChamberswerenominatedbytheOfficeofthePrimeMinister,intermsofArticle5oftheRefugeeActandwerechosenaccordingly:
“persons of known integrity who appear to him to be qualified by reason of having had experience of, and shown capacity in, matters deemed appropriate for the purpose:
Provided that at least one of the members of the Board shall be a person who
has practised as an advocate in Malta for a period or periods amounting, in the aggregate, to not less than seven years:
Provided further that one of the members shall be a person representing the disability sector”.
6.2.2 TheRABChairsdeemedsuchopencriterianotamenabletotheexpertiseessentialtoruleon such technical and life-changingmatters since therewasnoonusor requirements fortheBoardmemberstopossessanydirecteducationalorlegalpreparationorexperienceinasylummatters.Thislackoffamiliarityshownbythemembersinlegalinterpretationoftheappellants’casesresultedinthechairpersonsormembersfromthelegalprofessionwithintheChamberstopracticallydecidetheoutcomeoftheappellants’casesontheirown,withtherestoftheChambersimplyendorsingthedecisions.
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6.2.3 SomeoftheBoardmembersreceivedtraininginasylumlegislationandproceduresthroughtheEuropeanAsylumSupportOffice(EASO)andtheUnitedNationsHighCommissionerforRefugees (UNHCR), specifically on theDublin III legislation in 2017, attendance forwhichwasvoluntary.However,theBoardchairpersonsdidnotprovideconcreteevidenceoftheattendance, the frequency and efficacy of the training and theymade it clear thatmoretrainingwasrequiredespeciallyfornewmembersandthosewhowerenotlegalprofessionals.
6.3 Recruitment of administrative and professional staff to facilitate the RAB’s operations was required
6.3.1 The duties of the administrative staff of the former RAB were varied and wide-ranging.Whilst,theywerenotpresentattheRABsessions,theycarriedoutfollow-upworkoftheChamberssuchasupkeepoffilesanddatainputting,follow-upthroughprovisionofformsandinformationtotheappellants,generalcorrespondencewithasylumseekersandRefCom,settingmeetingswithasylumseekers, keeping information for theBoardanddistributingcasesamongsttheChambers.
6.3.2 Theadministrativestaffincludedfiveclerksandamessengerwhoalsocoveredworkrelatedto the ImmigrationAppealsBoard.At thetimeof theaudit, theadministrativestaffweremostlyquitenewtotheofficeset-upsincetherehadbeenstaffturnover.Furthermore,therewasnoofficeroccupying theroleofExecutiveSecretaryof theBoardandoverseeing theworkoftheadministrativestaffsincethepersonwhofulfilledtherolehadresignedin2018andhadnotbeenreplacedsince.Thisresultedinthestaff,especiallythoserelativelynew,workingwithoutanyclearguidanceorproceduresandworkingdifferentlyaccordingtotheneedsoftheRABchairs.
6.3.3 The RAB chairpersons indicated a lack of a pool of interpreters, research assistants and/orofficersthatcouldhavequalitativelyassistedtheBoardinitshearingsorinresearchinganddraftingdecisions.Nonetheless,formalrequestsforrecruitmentormemosdrawingtheattention to shortages inpermanentkey staff roles inadministrationandotherwisewerenotputforwardbytheChairstotheMinistryforHomeAffairs,NationalSecurityandLawEnforcement (MHSE) to enable the latter to initiate the recruitment process. This Officedeemsthisstateofaffairsamissedopportunityasthewholedecision-makingprocesscouldhavebeenimprovedbymakingitlessonerousontheChairpersons.
6.4 RAB sessions were not carried out according to uniform procedures and at the same frequency across all Chambers
6.4.1 An asylum seeker had two weeks’ time to start the appeal procedure through writtensubmissions to the Refugee Appeals Board, from the day the decision of the RefugeeCommissionerwouldhavebeenreceived.TheRefugeeAppealsBoarddidnotaccept lateappeals.Thelawdidnotgiveadeadlinefortheconclusionofanyparticularcase,exceptforinadmissibleand/ormanifestlyunfoundedcases; in suchcases theacceleratedprocedure
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appliedwherebytheChairpersonhada three-daytime limit, tocarryouta reviewof theRefCom’srecommendation.
TheChambersdidnotfollowanywrittenproceduresorharmonisedStandardOperatingProcedures(SOPs)
6.4.2 ChambersChairscouldhavedecidedtoholdanoralhearingthusprovidingtheappellantswithanopportunitytoputforwardanynewinformationordocumentationthatwouldnothavebeenavailabletohim/herwhilsttheRefComwasdecidingthecase.
6.4.3 TheaudittriedtoestablishwhethertherewereformalpreparationsfororalhearingsheldbytheBoard.Uponarequestforinformationandrecords,theNationalOfficeAudit(NAO)werenotprovidedwithconcreteinformationonthenumberoforalhearingsthatwereheldin2019andwhichcasesweredeemedworthyoforalhearingsornot.ThisOfficewasnotinapositiontoestablishifandhowmanytimestherelevantChamberwouldhavemetwiththe appellant for an oral hearing. The current Chair of the IPAT contends that the Boardwouldholdanappealworthyofahearingwhentherewasaparticularpointoflaworfactwhichneededclarification,orwheretherewasaspecificrequestbyappellant foranoralhearing.OneoftheChambersheldoralhearingforallcasesitdecideduponin2019.WhilstacknowledgingthatthelawprovidesfortheChairs’discretionwhethertoholdaformaloralhearingornot,suchdifferenceinproceduresraisesthequestionastowhetherappellantsarebeinggivenanequalopportunitytopresenttheircase.
6.4.4 ThisperformanceauditalsoestablishedthattherewerenowrittenproceduresthatguidetheChambers.TheChambersworkeddifferentlytodeterminedecisions.TherewereChamberswhichclaimedthattheymetandactuallydiscussedfilestogetherandagreeduponadecision.OtherChambersdistributedcasesandthenagreedondecisions.Thelatterpointshowsthatsuchpracticemeantthatnotallfourmemberswouldhaveviewedthefilesdeeplybutreliedoneachother’sopinions.ThecurrentChairoftheIPATcontendsthatthisisapracticewhichisusedevenbytheCourtofAppealandtheECHRandthatitislegitimateforonememberortwotolookintothedetailsofthecaseandreportfindingstotheircolleagues.
Record-keepingrelatedtotheRABsessionswasnotmadeavailabletoNAO
6.4.5 While themembersof theChamberswho fulfilled the roleof secretaries confirmed thattheirChambermetfrequently,norecordswerepresentedtoNAOwiththedatesandtimesofthesesessions.Furthermore,nofixedschedulesandagendasshowingwhatcasesweretobediscussedweremadeavailabletoNAO.Therewerealsonodocumentedminutessincesuchminutesweretaken informallyandretainedwithintherelevantChamber.Moreover,informationrelatingtocasesthatwouldhavebeendiscussedwasincludedinseparatefilespertainingtodifferentappellants,makingitdifficulttotracethetimelineofthespecificcaseandoutcomesofmeetings related to thecase.MHSEcontend that they restrictedaccess
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to Board processes and decisions, including minutes due to the confidentiality of thesedocuments and to protect appellants. NAO cannot agreewith this position since variouslegislativeprovisionsgrantthisOfficereasonableaccesstosuchdocumentationtoenableittocarryoutitsauditassignments.
6.5 Similar to RefCom, the issuance of appeals decisions were prolonged to the detriment of asylum seekers and increased costs for Government
6.5.1 TherewasnotimelimitsetinlawfortheBoardtotakeadecisionpriortothesetupoftheIPA.ThedecisiongivenbytheRABwasbindingontheparties.AsmentionedwithintheRefComChapter,Paragraph5.8.2,theconsiderabletimeinissuingthedecisioncouldhaveresultedinasylumseekersstayinglongerinMaltathantheymighthavewantedwithoutanofficialinternationalprotectionstatus.Fortheasylumseekers,thiscouldhaveincurredprotectionchallengesandpotentiallyincreasedtheirsusceptibilitytodifferentformsofexploitationinrelationtopracticalandsocialissuessuchasrent,jobopportunitiesandtenureandsocialbenefits.
6.5.2 FromaMaltesegovernmentstance,theirstayingcouldhaveresultedinincreasedcoststoprovideadequatehousingandbasicneedsoveralongperiodsinceanasylumseekercannotberemovedfromMaltawhilstthefinaldecisiononhis/herappealispending.Furthermore,anunfavourableoutcomeofthedecisionafteranumberofmonthsandyears,couldmeanthat the authorities could be seeking return of asylum seekers whowould have alreadysettledinMalta;itwouldimplyanunnecessaryhardshipforappellantsandanextraburdenontheauthoritiestotracethem.
6.5.3 RABdecisionswerecategorisedaccordingtoTable20.
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Table 20 – Categories of RAB decisions
Confirmed THP
TheOfficeoftheRefugeeCommissionerconcedestemporaryhumanitarianprotection
toapplicantswhereitdeemsfit.Thistypeofprotectionhasbeenestablishedthrough
practice, not through law, and the Board does not have the remit to grant the
TemporaryHumanitarianProtection(THP).AppellantswouldgenerallyclaimthatTHP
status is not sufficient for them, and that they should have been granted refugee
statusorsubsidiaryprotection.Dismissed Appeal Anappealcanbeupheldordismissed/rejected.
Implicitly Withdrawn Caseswhereanappealisdeemedtohavebeenimplicitlywithdrawn.Thesecasesare
providedforinSection7(2)ofChapter420oftheLawsofMalta.
InadmissibleAppliestocasesforwhichtheacceleratedprocedureisapplied.Theseareregulated
bySection24ofChapter420.Inadmissible {Vulnerable
(UAM – Unaccompanied
minor(s)}
Caseswhichareacceleratedduetothefactthattheyinvolveanunaccompaniedminor.
Inadmissible RejectionsAppliestocasesforwhichtheacceleratedprocedureisapplied.Theseareregulated
bySection24ofChapter420.
Late AppealAnappealwhichwouldhavebeenfiledmorethantwoweeksaftertheappellanthas
beennotifiedwiththeRefCom’sdecision.Manifestly Unfounded Cases in the accelerated procedure, regulated by Section 23 of Chapter 420.Negative Adecisionforrejectionofappeal.
Positive [Dublin]
Adecisionwherebyappellantsuccessfullyprovesthathisasylumapplicationshould
be considered inMalta andnot in another state, in accordancewith theDublin III
Regulation.
Rejection [Dublin]
AdecisionwherebytheBoardrejectsappellant’sDublinappealandconfirmsthathis
asylumcaseistobeheardinanother jurisdiction, inaccordancewiththeDublin III
Regulation.
Referred back to Refcom Thesearecaseswherethereissomepointwhichisnotclear,andwhicharereferred
backtoRefComsothatthisofficeprovidesfurtherdetails.
Refugee Status DecisionswherebytheBoardgrantsrefugeestatustotheappellantbecauseofthe
reasonsprovidedforbylaw.
Sine Die
Whereacaseisputoffwithoutadate,inotherwords‘archived’,sinceeitherappellant
showsnomoreinterestinthecase,orelsewheretheBoardwouldhaverequested
informationfromappellantandthiswouldnothavebeenprovided.
Subsidiary BoarddecidestograntsubsidiaryprotectioninaccordancewithSection17ofChapter
420.Withdrawn Appellantwithdrawshisowncasethroughaletteroranact.
Source:RAB.
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Thevastmajorityofappealsdecisionsin2018and2019wereclassifiedasinadmissibleorhadanegativeoutcome
6.5.4 ThefigureslistedinTable21showhowthemajorityofcaseswereinadmissibleand/orhadanegativeoutcome(almost98.0percentofalldecisionsin2018and96.1percentin2019).Themajorityofsuchappealsdecisionsweretakenundertheso-calledacceleratedprocedurewhichprovidesforathree-dayreviewforalldecisionsdeemedinadmissiblebyRefCom.Thisdecisionstillentailanassessmentoffactsandlaw,bothbyRefcomandbytheChairpersonoftheRABatreviewstage.
Table 21 - Breakdown of decisions at RAB (2018 and 2019)
Decisions 2018 2019Positive decisions 15 23 Refugee Status 2 5 Subsidiary 4 13 Temporary Humanitarian Protection 0 2 Dublin 9 3
Negative decisions 702 563 Inadmissible 596 320 Implicitly Withdrawn 1 50 Withdrawn 28 26 Others39 77 167
Source:RAB.
6.5.5 TheAsylumInformationDatabase(AIDA)2019reportdeemssuchinadmissibledecisionsasgoingcontrarytotheAsylumProceduresDirectivesincethere isnoactualexaminationofallpointsoffactsandlaw.Furthermore,theAIDA2019reportspecifiesthatsuchapracticeimpedestherighttoaneffectiveremedyeventhoughthe2017amendmentoftheRefugeesActclassifiessuchareviewasanappeal.
6.5.6 On theotherhand,while thisOfficedidnot enter into the legalmeritsof such cases, inviewofthebacklogoftheRABChambersduring2018and2019,casefilesdonotreflecttheBoard’sdeliberationsonRefCom’s interpretationofpointsof law.MHSE contends that incasesadoptingtheacceleratedprocedure,theBoardneednotcarryoutanewexaminationoffactsinthefile.TheBoardisareviewbodyinacceleratedprocedure,notasecondinstanceexaminationforum.ThispositionhasbeenconfirmedinthejudgmentoftheCourtofJusticeoftheEuropeanUnioninthe‘Alheto’judgementof25July2018.
39The‘Others’categoryreferstodismissedappeal,inadmissible(vulnerableUAM),inadmissiblerejections,lateappeal,manifestlyunfounded,negative,rejection(Dublin),referredbacktoRefCom,andsine-die.
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VariousinternalissueswithintheChambersaffectedthethroughputanddecisiontimeofcasesduring2019
6.5.7 Itisworthnotingthatin2019,therewasathroughputofdecisionsthatamountedtoaround18per cent less than thepreviousyear.Whenone factors in that thehighestnumberofcaseswereinadmissibleandweretakinganaverageoffourdayseachtodecide,thetimetakenbytheBoardtodecidetheremainingcasesisdeemedtobeexcessive.Furthermore,information referred to the Office regarding case conclusion by RAB confirms that casesremainedactiveforaconsiderableperiod.Table22refers:
Table 22 - Decisions by RAB in 2018 and 2019
Year when appeal was lodged at RAB 2018 decisions 2019 decisions2013 4 02014 1 362015 5 162016 9 172017 49 282018 649 912019 n/a 398Totals 717 586
Source:RAB.
6.5.8 Table22portrays thenumberofcases that remainedactivesince2013.DespiteenquireswiththeRABandMHSE,whichmaintainstatisticalinformationrelatedtocaseprogress,NAOwasnotfurnishedwithjustificationsexplainingthereasonforthedelaystodecidethe19caseslodgedbetween2013and2016anddecidedin2018.
6.5.9 Tofurthervalidatetheinformationintheprecedingparagraph,theNAOcarriedoutatracerstudywhich considered120 randomly selectednewapplication lodgedatRefComduring2018and2019.ElevenofthesecasesweresubsequentlytobeanalysedbytheRABfollowinganappealsapplication.ThetracerstudyshowedthatuntilMay2020,onlytwooftheelevencaseshadbeendecidedbytheRAB.Table23refers:
Table 23 - RAB decisions of 11 randomly selected cases
Type of decision
by RefCom
(11 cases)
Appeal decided by RAB Appeal pending at RAB
Total
CasesRAB decision
Average days
from lodging of
Appeal at RAB until
decision is taken by
RAB
Pending
cases
at RAB
Average days
since lodging of
appeal at RAB
until 19 May
2020DublinClosure 1wasimplicitlywithdrawn 196 6 231 7Exclusion 1wasNegative 531 1 533 2Rejection n/a 2 478 2Totals 2 364 9 319 11
Source:NAOTracerstudy.
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6.5.10 Table23showsthattheRABtookanaverageof364daystodecideuponeachofthetwocasespertainingtotheNAOtracerstudy.Ontheotherhand,aconsiderableperiodelapsedineachoftheundecidedninecases,whichwerestillactiveasatMay2020.
6.5.11 Suchdelaysdeviatefromtheprinciplethatjusticedelayedisjusticedenied.Thisdatafurthershowcasestheimportanceofdecidingcasesinamoreexpedientmannertosafeguardtheasylumseekers’rightsaswellasthefinancialburdenontheMaltesegovernmenttocontinuetosupportasylumseekerswhoareawaitingRABdecisions.
6.5.12 This performance audit identified twomain reasons contributing to these delays namelyoperationalissueswithintheChambersandtheabsenceoflegalprovisionsspecifyingcaseconclusiondeadlinepriorto2020.Thefollowingrefers:
a. TwomajorfactorscontributingtothelowerthroughputofdecisionsandconsequentlydelaysinRABdecisionsmaterialised:
i. One Chamber was affected by the resignation of a Board Member, who waseventuallyreplacedafterfivemonths.
ii. Theworkflow in another Chamberwas interrupted as a BoardMember did notinvolvehimselfinthedecision-makingprocess.ThisledtotheChamberinquestionto cease functioning for several months. Notwithstanding NAO’s enquiries, noevidencewasprovidedastowhetherMHSEintervenedonanofficialleveltoaddresstheissueofcasebacklogandincreasedwaitingfortheappellants.
b. Duringtheperiodunderreview,theprolongingofcaseswasinfluencedbytheabsenceoflegislativeprovisionsregulatingcaseconclusion.Therelevantlegislation(RefugeeAct,Chapter420)doesnot stipulateadeadlinebywhendecisions shouldbe issued sincethe date of lodging. However, following amendments to the legislation (InternationalProtectionAct, Chapter 420, Section 7{7}) in 2020, decisions taken by RAB are to bedecidedwithinthreemonthsunlesstherearespecificreasonsforextensions.
6.5.13 AnimportantconsiderationrelatingtothesefiguresinTable23relatestotheintroductionoftheDublinRegulationAppealswhichresultedintheworkloadoftheRABdoublingwhilstthenumberofmembersremainedthesameandtheadministrativesupportstaffactuallydecreased.
6.6 During 2018 and 2019, there was no clear system to prioritise pending appeals
6.6.1 Asatend2019,thenumberofpendingcasesattheformerRABamountedto668cases.Oneofthesecasesrelatedtoanasylumapplicationwhichwassubmittedin2009.Table24refers.
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Table 24 - Number of pending appeals as at end 2018 and 2019
Pending Cases TotalYear of lodging
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019Endof2018 489 1 0 0 1 7 40 20 30 77 313 N/AEndof2019 668 1 0 0 1 7 4 4 13 49 221 368
Source:RAB.
6.6.2 Table24showsthatasatend2018,176outof489casesremainedpendingforasignificantnumberofyears.Furthermore,300outofthe668cases(45percent),mostofwhichwerelodgedduring2017and2018andwerestillpendingasatend2019,hadbeenawaitingadecisionforaconsiderableperiod.Despiteenquiries,NAOwasnotinformedofthereasonsforsuchdelaysandatwhatstageoftheRABprocessthesecaseshadreached.
6.6.3 Table24illustratesthattheformerRABprocessedmostofthe2014,2015,2016and2017pendingcasesin2019.Nonetheless,caseslodgedin2013andbeforeremainedunprocessedbytheformerRABbytheendof2019.Thisstateofaffairswasmainlyduetotheconsiderableinflux of asylums seekers during these years. Despite requests, the relevant informationconnectedtosuchcaseswasnotreferredtoNAO.
6.6.4 DespitetheconsiderablenumberofoutstandingcasesattheformerRAB,therewasnotasysteminplacetoprioritisetheprocessingofcases.Uponenquiry,theadministrativestaffattheformerRABdidnotindicatethatcaseswereprioritisedbyanyformalcriteriasuchasinchronologicalorderorinaccordancewiththespecificitiesofthecase.
6.7 Procedures regulating the efficacy of the MHSE’s legal aid service were not clearly established for all stakeholders
6.7.1 Legal aid is fundamental for appellants to put forward facts surrounding their personalsituationtotheChambersduringtheappealsstage.SuchassistanceisallthemorenecessaryforthoseappealingfromdetentioncentressinceaccesstoinformationandMHSEentitiesisrestricted.Alawyercanbeengagedprivately,throughNGOsorprivatelegalpractitionersoralternativelyappellantscanseekfreelegalaidthroughMHSE.Interpretersarealsoassignedtoassist the lawyersduringtherelative interviewswiththeapplicants, ifnecessary.LegalaidlawyerscontractedbyMHSEwereforabriefperiodsubjecttoaconsiderableworkload.Renumerationwasalsonotalwayslookedatfavourablybyprospectivelawyersresultinginalimitedpooloflegalaidlawyers.MHSEconfirmedthatitspooloflawyersincreasedto10in2019.Moreover,theMinistryconfirmedthatremunerationpackagewasalsoimproved.MHSEalsonotedthattheremunerationisinaccordancewiththeminimumfeesstipulatedbytheChamberofAdvocates.MHSEremarkedthatitconsidersthepoolof10lawyersassufficient since this is commensuratewith thenumberof negativefirst instant decisions.Nonetheless,legalassistanceandexpertiseinthisareaprovidedbyNGOsremainsanaddedbonustoapplicants.
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6.7.2 In2019,MHSEcontendedthat74percentofnewRABcasesrequestedalegalaidlawyerfrom theirpoolwhile the remainingwere representedbyNGOsandprivate lawyers.Thelawyerswere requested tofileappeal submissionwithin30days fromthe interviewwiththeappellant.SupervisionofprogressregisteredinthesubmissionofreportbythelegalaidlawyeralsofallswithintheremitofMHSE.Submissionscouldremainpendingatthelawyer’sendfordifferentreasonssuchasreschedulingofappointments.Whilsttheapplicants’caseswerethenreceivedbytheRABadministrativestaff,whoallocatedthecasestotheChambersforadecisiontobetaken,theadministrativestaffhadnocontroloverwhentheChambersbegandiscussionsanddecidedthecase.
6.7.3 Table25depictsthesituationwithregardtothenumberofcasesthatwerebeingmanagedbytheLegalAidlawyers.Thenewlegalaidcasesincreasedby144percentfrom134casesto327 from2018to2019.Suchadrastic increasewas theresultof thearrivalofasylumseekersduring2019.Thenumberofcasesthatwerefinalisedin2018and2019wereactuallycasesthatwerereceivedduringthesameyear.Thefourthcolumnshowscasesthatwerenotnecessarilystartedin2018and2019indicatingdelaysintheappealsubmission.
Table 25 - Legal Aid cases in 2018 and 2019
Year New cases assigned to Legal
Aid provided by TCNU
Cases finalised by the
appointed TCNU lawyers
Outstanding cases at
TCNU lawyers’ end
(includes carried forward
from previous years)2018 134 94 2272019 327 195 163
Source:MHSE.
6.8 The average cost for each decision amounted to €246.56 during 2019
6.8.1 Atend-2019,GovernmentAccountsshowthatthetotalcostincurredforAdministrativestaff’sSalariesandremunerationforthemembersofthefourChambersamountedto€109,766.Inaddition,MHSEincurredanexpenditureofapproximately€34,720withrespecttolegalaidengagedtoassistappellants.
6.8.2 Witha totalof586decisionsundertakenby theBoardduring2019, theaverage cost foreachdecisionamountedtoapproximately€246.During2019,thetotalcostfortheRefugeeAppeals Board (RAB) amounted to €144,486. A breakdown of the €144,486 RAB cost isprovidedinTable26.
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Table 26 - Costs incurred by RAB to process appeals (2019)
Description Total Actual Cost Percentage of total cost€
Salary&NationalInsurancecostwithregardstotheadministrative
fourstaff(clerks,etc)
€26,457 18.3
RemunerationtothefourChambers&NationalInsurancecost €83,309 57.7LegalAid €34,720 24.0Total costs €144,486 100.0Total concluded appeals in 2019 586Average cost per concluded appeal €246.56
Source:RAB.
6.9 Conclusion
6.9.1 ThisChapterhasoutlinedthattheinternationalprotectionappealsprocesswascharacterisedbythelengthyprolongingofcasesin2018and2019.Admittedly,asalreadystated,duringthese years therewas ahigh influxof applications for international protectionaswell asappeals.Theimpactofthesecircumstancesisimmediateandrelatestohumanitarianaspectsfrom the appellants point of view and increased costs for Government to accommodateappellantsforalengthierperiod,especiallywithindetentioncentres.
6.9.2 ThebacklogofcaseswasprimarilybroughtaboutbytheChambers’workingmethodsand,in some cases, delays in the LegalAid’s submissionof reports.Moreover, apart from theChambers’Chairs,mostBoardmemberslackedadequatelegalbackgroundandexperienceinasylummattersmakingtheseChamberslesseffectiveandconducivetoafairdecisionoftheappellants.AdministrativeandprofessionalstafftoaidRABresearchandcontributetowardstheconclusionofdecisionswerealsofewinnumber.
6.9.3 WhilenotseekinginanywaytodelveintotheBoard’sdecisions,thisauditshowedthattheChambersadopteddifferentapproachestodealwithpendingcases.Moreover,thelevelofdocumentationincasefiles,generally,didnotprovideafullaudittrailsupportingtheBoard’sdetaileddeliberationsbackingorsupportingthedecision.Thisentailsthepointsoflawthatwere invoked.Similarly, this reviewdidnotelicitconclusiveevidenceonthefrequencyofBoardmeetings.Consequently,theauditcouldnotdeterminethenumberofhearingswithinagivenperiod.
6.9.4 SimilartoRefCom,theissuanceofdecisionswasdelayedtothedetrimentofasylumseekersand ultimately, resulting in increased costs for Government. In these circumstances, onecannot ignore thenotion that justicedelayed is tantamount to justicedenied.Thus,NAOfeelsthateveryeffortshouldbeundertakentoaddresssuchissuesinthebestinterestofallconcerned.
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NAO Annual Report and Financial Statements
May2021 NationalAuditOfficeAnnualReportandFinancialStatements2020
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July2020 AnauditofmattersrelatingtotheconcessionawardedtoVitalsGlobal HealthcarebyGovernmentPart1-Areviewofthetenderprocess.
July2020 AnauditofmattersrelatingtotheconcessionawardedtoVitalsGlobal HealthcarebyGovernmentPart1-Addendum
October2020 Follow-upReportsbytheNationalAuditOffice2020VolumeII
November2020 InformationTechnologyAudit:PlanningAuthority
November2020 PerformanceAudit:AnanalysisofMaltaMedicinesAuthorityrecruitment process
November2020 InformationTechnologyAudit:MaltaIndustrialParksLtd
November2020 ReportbytheAuditorGeneralontheWorkingsofLocalGovernmentfortheyear2019
December2020 ReportbytheAuditorGeneralonthePublicAccounts2019
December2020 AreviewofimplementationofSustainableDevelopmentGoal1-Malta’s effortsatalleviatingpoverty
January2021 PerformanceAudit:IsLESAsuitablygearedtoperformitstrafficenforcement functionadequately?
February2021 PerformanceAudit:TheeffectivenessofplasticwastemanagementinMalta
April 2021 ThecontractawardedtotheJCLandMHCConsortiumbytheStVincentde PaulResidence forthemanagementoffourresidentialblocksthrougha negotiatedprocedure
May 2021 PerformanceAudit:Preliminaryreview:NAO’sroleinreviewing Government’smeasuresrelatingtotheCOVID-19pandemic
June2021 Follow-upReportsbytheNationalAuditOffice2021VolumeI