perceived hostile media bias, presumed media influence, and opinions about immigrants and...

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Perceived Hostile Media Bias, PresumedMedia Influence, and Opinions AboutImmigrants and ImmigrationBrooke Weberling McKeever a , Daniel Riffe b & Francesca DillmanCarpentier ba School of Journalism and Mass Communications , University ofSouth Carolinab School of Journalism and Mass Communication , University of NorthCarolina , Chapel HillPublished online: 09 Oct 2012.

To cite this article: Brooke Weberling McKeever , Daniel Riffe & Francesca Dillman Carpentier(2012) Perceived Hostile Media Bias, Presumed Media Influence, and Opinions About Immigrants andImmigration, Southern Communication Journal, 77:5, 420-437, DOI: 10.1080/1041794X.2012.691602

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Perceived Hostile Media Bias,Presumed Media Influence, andOpinions About Immigrants andImmigrationBrooke Weberling McKeever, Daniel Riffe, &Francesca Dillman Carpentier

This study explores hostile media bias and third-person perceptions of the influence of

media coverage of immigrants using data (N¼ 529) from North Carolina, where the

Latino population grew almost 400% in two decades. As hypothesized, anti-immigrant

sentiment was significantly related to perceptions of ‘‘hostile’’ (pro-immigrant) news

coverage. However, anti-immigrant sentiment was not directly related to belief in

coverage effects on others. Analysis revealed two ‘‘paths’’ for relationships among anti-

immigrant sentiment, exposure and attention to media coverage, perceived media bias,

and presumed media influence or third-person perceptions.

Latinos in the southern United States in 1990 represented less than 2% of the

population (Lynn, 2008, p. 7), but the Latino population grew 394% in North

Carolina between 1990 and 2000 (North Carolina Institute of Medicine, 2003).

Although the state’s 2007 percentage (7%) was below the 15.1% for the United States

as a whole, it dwarfed 2000’s 4.7% and 1990’s 1.04% for the state (U.S. Census

Bureau, 2009). The state’s Latino population grew an additional 2.6% since 2006,

though the national rate has slowed since then (Ohlemacher, 2008; Pew Hispanic

Center, 2008).

Brooke Weberling McKeever, School of Journalism and Mass Communications, University of South Carolina.

Daniel Riffe, School of Journalism and Mass Communication, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill.

Francesca Dillman Carpentier, School of Journalism and Mass Communication, University of North Carolina,

Chapel Hill. Correspondence to: Brooke Weberling McKeever, School of Journalism and Mass Communica-

tions, University of South Carolina, Carolina Coliseum, Columbia, SC 29208. E-mail: [email protected]

Southern Communication Journal

Vol. 77, No. 5, November–December 2012, pp. 420–437

ISSN 1041-794X (print)/1930-3203 (online)

# 2012 Southern States Communication Association. DOI: 10.1080/1041794X.2012.691602

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Growth of immigrant populations has been met nationwide with mixed reactions.

Polls of U.S. residents show that agreement with the idea that immigrants make crime

worse in the United States grew from 48.4% of respondents in 2004 to 60.6% in 2007;

agreement that immigrants have a negative effect on social and moral values grew

from 29.1% to 40.2% (Dalton & Wilson, 2008).

Antagonism toward Latino immigrants can be viewed from a number of different

perspectives, among them notions of identity (Cain, Citrin, & Wong, 2000) and

‘‘what it means to be an American’’ citizen (Citrin, Rheingold, & Green, 1990),

and contextual elements and processes, such as when a sudden local demographic

change is politicized in terms of available national rhetoric (Hopkins, 2007). Fore-

most, however, is the threat perspective, whether the threat is to an individual or a

group’s relative position (Blumer, 1958; Wilson, 2001) or, more fundamentally, as

a sociotropic threat, a generalized threat to society as a whole (Burns & Gimpel,

2000; Citrin, Green, Muste, & Wong, 1997; Dalton & Wilson, 2008). Some empirical

evidence (Burns & Gimpel, 2000; Wilson, 2001) suggests that a perceived sociotropic

threat can be more salient than a personal threat (Dalton & Wilson, 2008, p. 5), and

that some societal-level concepts (e.g., ‘‘the economy’’) generate greater anxiety than

do concerns about one’s own conditions (Citrin et al., 1997).

The Roles of Mass Media

Mass media have a role in shaping people’s perceptions of immigrants and immi-

gration (Kellstedt, 2003), serving as sources for learning about national trends and

policy proposals (Kim, Carvalho, Davis, & Mullins, 2011). Some argue that news

coverage is one mechanism whereby immigrants and the immigration issue are

framed (Coutin & Chock, 1997; Kim et al., 2011). For example, more than a decade

ago, McGowan (2001) complained that the press dodges difficult and politically

incorrect aspects of immigration. More recently, Kim et al. (2011) explored how

media coverage defines immigration as a problem, including possible causes and

solutions for the problem. Coutin and Chock (1997) have contrasted journalistic

coverage of ‘‘immigration as a crisis’’ (with immigrants depicted as ‘‘destructive, law-

less, foreign, and unrooted,’’ p. 127), with what they call ‘‘legalization narratives’’ of

enterprising and hard-working immigrants contributing to the rich fabric of U.S. life.

Previous research suggests that threat themes in news coverage may fuel or reinforce

anti-immigrant sentiment for people who feel anxious or threatened, while positive

portrayals may influence pro-immigrant views (Borjas, 1999; Brader, Valentino, &

Suhay, 2008).

Two distinct but related processes suggest that strong opinions about an issue

affect one’s view of favorableness of coverage and belief about its potential influence

on others. First, the ‘‘hostile media effect’’ predicts that people who hold strong opi-

nions on issues see news coverage as biased against or hostile toward those opinions

(Perloff, 2008; Vallone, Rosse, & Lepper, 1985). Second, according to the ‘‘third-

person perception’’ process (Andsager & White, 2007; Davison, 1983; Perloff,

2008) and the ‘‘theory of presumed influence’’ (Gunther & Storey, 2003), people

Hostile Media and Immigration 421

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believe others (third persons) will be swayed more by media coverage than they

are themselves.

In sum, media coverage may challenge or reinforce perceptions of immigrants and

immigration, and beliefs about quantity and quality of media coverage may affect

perceptions of how other people will view immigrants and immigration. Using survey

data collected in North Carolina in fall 2008 (N¼ 529), this study explores rela-

tionships among anti-immigrant sentiment, perception of hostile media bias, and

presumed influence of coverage on third-person others.

Literature Review

Hostile Media Bias

Hostile media bias describes how people with strong attitudes about an issue believe

that media intentionally slant stories against their side or in favor of the other side

(Vallone et al., 1985). This bias was first described in a study of news coverage of

the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, in which participants who identified with either side

of the conflict viewed news coverage as biased in favor of the opposing side (Vallone

et al., 1985). Participants who did not identify with either side judged the coverage to

be neutral. The same effect has been found in research on labor disputes, college

sports infractions, genetically modified foods, scientific research on animals (Arpan

& Raney, 2003; Christen, Kannaovakun, & Gunther, 2002; Gunther, Christen,

Liebhart, & Chi-Yun Chia, 2001; Gunther & Schmitt, 2004), as well as controversial

issues like domestic security, stem cell research, and social security reform (Hwang,

Pan, & Sun, 2008).

Four explanations for hostile media bias have been cited. The different standards

explanation suggests that extremely biased people judge even a balanced presentation

to be hostile because it gives equal time or space to the other side (Vallone et al.,

1985). Second, people who believe strongly come to expect consistent bias in all media

coverage of the other side of the issue (Giner-Sorolla & Chaiken, 1994). Third, people

selectively recall negative facts about their side especially well and rely on that recall to

make biased judgments (Giner-Sorolla & Chaiken, 1994; Vallone et al., 1985). Finally,

selective categorization suggests that people on opposite sides truly see the same con-

tent differently, categorizing identical content into different valence areas (Gunther &

Schmitt, 2004).

Third-Person Effect and the Influence of Presumed Influence

The third-person effect is based on the idea that individuals perceive media and mass

communication to have a stronger impact on others than on the self (Andsager &

White, 2007; Davison, 1983; Perloff, 2008). People see themselves as more discerning

than others and believe that the media will have the greatest effect not on ‘‘me or on

you, but on them, the third persons’’ (Davison, 1983, p. 3). A meta-analysis of 32

published studies and 121 effects confirmed support for the presence and strength

of third-person effect (Paul, Salwen, & Dupagne, 2000).

422 The Southern Communication Journal

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Indeed, third-person effects have emerged in studies on advertising and entertain-

ment media (Gunther & Thorson, 1992; Henrikson & Flora, 1999; Salwen &

Dupagne, 1999; Scharrer, 2002), negative political advertising (Cheng & Riffe,

2008; Lovejoy, Cheng, & Riffe, 2010), coverage of public opinion polls (Pan, Abisaid,

Paek, Sun, & Houden, 2006; Price & Stroud, 2006), political news coverage (Salwen,

1998), coverage of the Y2K ‘‘millennium bug’’ (Tewksbury, Moy, & Weis, 2004),

coverage of high-profile legal cases (Salwen & Driscoll, 1997), environmental news

(Jensen & Hurley, 2005), and immigration (Matera & Salwen, 1999). Matera and

Salwen examined agenda setting and the third-person effect and found that salience

of the issue of illegal immigration was the most important predictor of third-person

effects.

Third-person-effect studies typically involve a participant scoring the perceived

effect of a communication on oneself, and then scoring its perceived effect on others,

whether the others are similar (‘‘other students like you’’) or socially distant

(ambiguous others, such as ‘‘most people’’). The researcher then subtracts one score

from the other, though other measurement approaches have been used as well

(Schmierbach, Boyle, & McLeod, 2008). Third-person effect is seen most often when

social distance is greater (Andsager & White, 2007; Jensen & Hurley, 2005).

As evidenced in a meta-analysis, third-person effects are so consistent that

researchers often ask participants about message effects on others even when they

are not asked to estimate an effect on themselves (Paul et al., 2000). In fact, Gunther

and Storey (2003) have described the ‘‘influence of presumed influence,’’ a perspec-

tive focusing on how people think and behave, based on their estimation of media

effects on others without actual measurement of a first-person effect on oneself. This

is the approach the current study takes.

This perspective is grounded in the idea of a more general ‘‘persuasive press

inference’’ (Gunther, 1998), which argues that people attend to and form impress-

ions of the volume and slant of mass media content, assume that content is repre-

sentative and has broad reach and assume that content influences opinions and

attitudes of others (Gunther & Storey, 2003, p. 202). Supporting evidence comes

from a number of studies (Gunther & Christen, 1999, 2002; Mutz & Soss, 1997;

Salwen, 1998).

Hostile Media Effects and Presumed Influence: The Case of Immigration Attitudes

Presumed influence, third-person perception, and perceived hostile media bias are

related and predictable phenomena with news coverage of issues like immigration,

which may be deeply involving for people. In his study of evaluations of news cover-

age of an Arab-Israeli conflict, Perloff (1989) noted that, in addition to anticipating

greater effects on neutral others, partisans judged the news coverage as biased

(demonstrating possible hostile media bias), even though nonpartisans judged the

carefully edited television coverage as essentially neutral. This finding suggests that

people with strong anti-immigrant opinions may believe not only that news coverage

is pro-immigrant but also may presume that the majority of the audience is


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pro-immigrant as a result of biased media coverage (demonstrating presumed

influence and=or third-person perceptions).

Interestingly, the opposite also has been found. Sometimes, individuals project

their attitudes onto others, believing that an audience will naturally agree with their

side of the issue. This type of projection has been called ‘‘biased assimilation,’’ and

research has shown that individuals often believe that public opinion mirrors their

own perceptions of an issue (Christian et al., 2002; Gunther & Christen, 2002;

Gunther et al., 2001). For example, a person with pro-immigrant attitudes might

assume that others have similar attitudes about immigrants and immigration

regardless of news content.

These two distorted and related, yet opposing, views have both been supported

by research findings. Generally, individuals are likely to rely on ‘‘third-person,

contrast-based judgments when the issue is historically and ethnically

involving . . . and news is vivid and graphic’’ (Perloff, 2008, p. 262). On the other

hand, people may project their views onto others when they hold strong opinions

on an issue but the issue is not salient (Gunther & Schmitt, 2004). Alternatively, both

third-person perception and biased assimilation may occur simultaneously and could

cancel each other out to create a more accurate view of public opinion or yield

unpredictable effects on audience attitudes (Gunther & Christen, 2002; Perloff, 2008).

Hypotheses and Research Question

The present study uses a survey of North Carolina residents to examine the following

variables: attitudes about immigrants and immigration, exposure and attention to

immigration news, beliefs about the amount and favorableness of media coverage

of immigration, as well as beliefs about the consequence of others’ exposure to such

media coverage. Thus, two hypotheses and a research question are proposed.

First, research on perceived hostile media bias suggests the following hypothesis:

H1: Pro- or anti-immigrant sentiment will be negatively related to perception ofmedia coverage, with those holding anti-immigrant sentiment judgingcoverage as favorable to immigrants, and those holding pro-immigrantsentiment judging coverage as negative toward immigrants.

Second, third-person-effect research, the theory of the influence of presumed

influence, and the persuasive press inference point to the next hypothesis:

H2: Anti-immigrant sentiment will be positively related to presumed influence ofmedia coverage on favorability of others’ views of immigrants, with thoseholding anti-immigrant sentiment seeing coverage influencing others to havefavorable views of immigrants.

The relationships between sentiments about immigrants, perceptions about immi-

grant coverage in media, and presumed influence of the media on others are likely to

interrelate. Adding to the complexity of these relationships, factors such as subjective

knowledge about immigration, exposure to immigration coverage, and attention paid

to this media coverage might mediate the strength and direction of associations


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between immigrant sentiments, perceptions of media, and presumed influence of

media. Therefore, a path analysis is used to evaluate these complex relationships,

in exploration of the link between H1 and H2 proposed above. Additionally, the

following research question is posed:

RQ1: What factors contribute most strongly to presumed influence on others ofnews coverage of immigrants?

Method

Trained callers at a university calling center in North Carolina collected telephone

survey data during weekday evening hours in October 2008. A starting sample of

2,400 randomly selected telephone numbers was generated and up to six callbacks

made to interview ‘‘the next adult (over 18 years old) celebrating a birthday.’’ The

final tally was 529 completed interviews (559 with partially completed interviews).

Using the American Association for Public Opinion Research (AAPOR) Response

Rate 4, the 529 completions represent a response rate of 34% (AAPOR, 2008). Sam-

pling error for a sample this size is þ=�4.2% at the 95% confidence level. Sampling

error is only one error source, and some analyses involve subsets of data.

Measures

Anti-immigrant sentiment

The survey included 12 belief or opinion statements and asked respondents to indi-

cate their agreement (1¼ strongly disagree, 5¼ strongly agree). To create an index

tapping anti-immigrant sentiment, these measures were examined to identify the

items most clearly separating respondents into somewhat polar or bimodal distribu-

tions and tapping what might be seen as fundamental or visceral attitudes. Three

items selected were consistent with the sociotropic level of perceived threat to society

(Burns & Gimpel, 2000; Citrin et al., 1997; Wilson, 2001): ‘‘Immigrants are becoming

too demanding in their push for rights’’; ‘‘The growing number of immigrants threa-

tens traditional American customs and values’’; and ‘‘Immigrants bring crime to

America.’’ The three items were averaged to create the composite index, a¼ .81. Gen-

erally, respondents’ scores on the anti-immigrant index were more negative than

positive, M¼ 3.47, SD¼ 1.25 (higher scores indicate greater agreement with

anti-immigrant items). Of the three measures comprising the index, respondents

agreed most strongly with the statement, ‘‘Immigrants are too demanding in their

push for rights.’’ See Table 1 for respondent agreement on the three items. See

Table 2 for descriptive statistics on all measures.

Perception of favorableness of news coverage

To examine whether respondents would judge media coverage of immigrants and

immigration as ‘‘hostile’’ to their own position, respondents indicated on a 5-point

scale (1¼ very unfavorably, 5¼ very favorably) their opinion in response to the


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question: ‘‘How would you describe the way North Carolina immigrants are treated

in the news stories you see about immigrants?’’ Respondents generally believed that

news media coverage treated immigrants more favorably than unfavorably. The

majority (57%) believed the news gave ‘‘about the right amount’’ of attention to

immigrants.

Presumed influence of media coverage on others

Finally, respondents were asked to assess the consequences of the news media cover-

age of immigration and immigrants: ‘‘Based on everything you’ve seen in the news

about North Carolina immigrants, do you think most people who see the news would

have a very negative, somewhat negative, neither negative nor positive, somewhat

positive, or very positive view of immigrants?’’ Scoring was again on a 5-point

scale. Respondents as a whole seemed to presume that exposure to news coverage

of immigrants would influence others’ perceptions of immigrants in a somewhat

negative way.

In addition, RQ1 required measurement of a number of knowledge, exposure,

and attention measures. Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for these and other

key variables described above. Table 3 presents bivariate correlational data for all

variables.

Subjective knowledge about immigration

Using a 5-point agreement scale (1¼ strongly disagree, 5¼ strongly agree), respon-

dents reacted to the statement ‘‘I consider myself knowledgeable about immigration

issues.’’ Respondent agreement with this statement was above the midpoint of the

5-point scale.

Table 1 Respondent Distribution on Items Measuring Anti-Immigrant Sentiment

Strongly

disagree

%

Disagree

somewhat

%

Neither

agree=

disagree %

Agree

somewhat

%

Strongly

agree

%

Total

%

Immigrants are becoming too

demanding in their push

for rights (n¼ 534).

12 18 10 24 37 101�

The growing number of

immigrants threatens

traditional American customs

and values (n¼ 534).

18 17 5 24 36 100

Immigrants bring crime

to America (n¼ 537).

15 19 6 34 27 101�

�Total greater than 100% due to rounding error.


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News exposure

Respondents indicated how many days per week they watch a television news show

covering news about the state; on average, how many minutes per day they spend

watching such news shows; how many minutes they spend reading a newspaper each

day; and how many minutes per day they typically spend reading news on the Web or

Internet. Respondents reported watching television approximately five days per week

Table 2 Descriptive Statistics for Key Variables

Variable n M SD

1. Age 527 53.13 14.99

2. Incomea 457 4.44 1.95

3. Educationb 530 4.19 1.27

4. Media exposure

TV news (days=week) 533 5.20 2.30

TV news (minutes=day) 487 55.64 56.28

Newspaper (minutes=day) 533 27.07 28.97

Online (minutes=day) 532 27.95 50.53

5. Subjective Knowledge about Immigrationc 530 3.73 1.16

6. Attention to Immigration Newsd 534 2.22 .534

7. Anti-Immigrant Sentiment (combined measure)e 523 3.47 1.25

Immigrants are too demanding in push for rights. 534 3.56 1.43

Immigrants threaten American customs and values. 534 3.45 1.54

Immigrants bring crime to America. 537 3.40 1.42

8. Favorableness of News Treatment of Immigrantsf 491 3.22 1.06

9. Perceived Media Attention to Immigrantsg 509 1.78 .62

10. Presumed Influence of News on Others’ Views of Immigrantsh 482 2.36 .95

n %

11. Gender

Male 222 41.7

Female 310 58.3

12. Race

White 409 77.8

Non-White 117 22.2

aIncome was measured on a 1–7 scale (1¼ less than 15,000; 7¼more than $90,000).bEducation was measured on a continuous ordinal scale (1¼ 8th grade or less; 6¼ postgraduate study).cSubjective knowledge measured on a 1–5scale (1¼ strongly disagree and 5¼ strongly agree).dAttention to immigration news scored 1–3 (1¼ never and 3¼ always).ePerception of immigrants scored 1–5 (1¼ strongly disagree and 5¼ strongly agree). Three-item index summed

and averaged (a¼ .81).fNews treatment of immigrants scored 1–5 (1¼ very unfavorably and 5¼ very favorably).gAmount of news attention to immigrants scored 1–3 (1¼ too little attention and 3¼ too much attention).hPresumed Influence on Others’ perceptions on 1–5 scale (1¼ very negative and 5¼ very positive).


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Table

3Pearson’sCorrelationsAmongVariables

12

34

56

78

910

11

12

13

14

1.Age

1.0

2.Income

�.199��

1.0

3.Education

�.130��

.477��

1.0

4.Gender

dummya

�.030

.166��

.058

1.0

5.Racedummyb

.186��

.127��

.040

.109�

1.0

6.TVExposure

(d=w)

.143��

�.079

�.142��

�.025

�.107�

1.0

7.TVExposure

(m=d)

.124��

�.093

�.115�

�.110�

�.050

.229��

1.0

8.New

spaper

Exposure

(m=d)

.278��

.014

.092�

�.032

.018

.175��

.263��

1.0

9.Web

Exposure

(m=d)

�.225��

.133��

.162��

.128��

�.038

�.078

.188��

.034

1.0

10.Attentionto

Immigration

New

s

�.074

�.010

�.042

�.060

�.046

.210��

.148��

.144��

.085�

1.0

11.Anti-ImmigrantSentiment

.212��

�.198��

�.307��

.020

.173��

.126��

.119��

.049

.040

�.156��

1.0

12.Perceived

Favorablenessof

New

sCoverage

.167��

�.103�

�.175��

.047

.061

.071

.035

.052

.034

�.143��

.408��

1.0

13.Perceived

Media

Attention

Level

.067

�.016

�.110�

�.028

�.010

�.002

.078

.042

�.015

.139��

.015

�.018

1.0

14.Presumed

Influence

ofNew

s.096�

�.082

�.047

.027

�.045

�.042

.021

�.051

�.003

.112�

.019

.306��

�.0861.0

15.SubjectiveKnowledge

�.061

.133��

.096�

.193��

.023

.079

.123��

.127��

.191��

.264��

.086

.110�

.050

.003

aGender

dummycoded:1¼male,0¼female.

bRacedummycoded:1¼White,0¼Non-W

hite.

� p<.05.��p<.01(two-tailedtests).

428

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or an average of 56 minutes per day, reading a newspaper an average of 27 minutes

per day, and 28 minutes per day reading news online.

Attention to immigration news

Respondents used a 3-point scale (never, sometimes, or always) to answer the follow-

ing questions: ‘‘When you see news stories on television, in the newspaper or else-

where, about North Carolina immigration and immigrants, would you say you

always pay a lot of attention to them, sometimes pay attention, or never pay attention

to them?’’ The majority of respondents (70%) replied ‘‘sometimes’’ to this question.

Perceived amount of media attention paid to immigration

In addition, respondents indicated on a 3-point scale whether ‘‘the amount of atten-

tion that North Carolina television news and newspapers give to immigrant issues in

North Carolina’’ was ‘‘too little, about the right amount, or too much.’’

Demographic variables

Demographic variables included gender, age, last completed grade of education, race=

ethnicity, and household income. About 58% of the sample was female, and 78% of

survey participants identified themselves as White. These figures are close to North

Carolina’s 51% female, 74% White population (U.S. Census Bureau, 2009). The

mean age of the sample was 53. About 66% of respondents reported a household

income of $45,000 or more. A fourth (24%) of respondents reported graduating high

school, and 25% were college graduates.

Findings

Preliminary Analysis

In preparation for examining the hypotheses and research question, all variables were

subjected to a Pearson correlation analysis (see Table 3). Anti-immigrant sentiment

was positively correlated with race (dummy-coded with 1¼White and 0¼ non-

White), meaning White respondents revealed higher anti-immigrant sentiment than

non-White respondents. Recall that three-fourths of the respondents were White.

Anti-immigrant sentiment was also significantly and positively correlated with age,

with older respondents revealing more anti-immigrant sentiment. However,

anti-immigrant sentiment was negatively correlated with income and education, with

respondents who reported lower education and income generally revealing greater

anti-immigrant sentiment.1 Respondents reporting higher income and education also

reported having more knowledge of immigration issues. Men reported having more

knowledge as well.

Subjective knowledge about immigration issues, exposure to news coverage about

immigration, and attention to this news coverage were positively related with one

another. Attention to immigration news was additionally correlated with all other


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measures of news exposure. Interestingly, the more attentive respondents reported

being to immigration news, the more the respondents thought the level of media

attention to immigration was ‘‘too much.’’ Yet, the more attentive the respondents

were, the less favorably they thought the news treated immigrants. Regarding favor-

ability, older respondents viewed media coverage of immigrants as more favorable

(and thus hostile to their view), and wealthier and more educated respondents saw

the coverage as unfavorable.

Hypotheses and Research Question

H1 predicted that immigrant sentiment would be negatively related to perceived

favorableness of news treatment of immigrants. In other words, the more anti-

immigrant the respondent, the greater his or her perception that media coverage

of immigrants was favorable, and, conversely, the less anti-immigrant the respondent,

the greater his or her perception that media coverage of immigrants was negative. H1

received strong support, r¼ .41, p< .01. As anti-immigration sentiment increased,

judgment of media coverage of immigration as favorable also increased. This

relationship indicates anti-immigrant respondents saw media coverage as hostile to

their view.

H2 proposed a third-person effect: namely, that anti-immigrant sentiment would

be positively related to presumed influence of media coverage on the favorability of

others’ views, with those holding anti-immigrant sentiment seeing coverage influen-

cing others to have favorable views of immigrants. Anti-immigrant sentiment did not

correlate with presumed influence of news coverage on the perceived favorability of

others’ views, r¼ .02, ns. H2 was not supported. There appears to be no direct link

between anti-immigrant sentiment and this third-person perception.

However, correlation results (Table 3) suggest a possible indirect link between

these two variables. Presumed influence of news coverage on others’ views of immi-

grants was positively correlated with perceived favorableness of news treatment of

immigrants, r¼ .31, p< .01. That is, the greater influence respondents presumed

news coverage would have, the more favorable they deemed news coverage to be

as well. Recall that perceived favorableness was also associated with anti-immigrant

sentiment, as well as attention paid to the media coverage. These findings hint at

the complexity of third-person effect and hostile media bias in terms of this sample’s

views on immigration, leading to RQ1: What factors contribute most strongly to pre-

sumed influence on others of news coverage of immigrants?

Path analysis

Based on what is known about perceived hostile media bias, third-person effects, and

the presumed influence of media on others, it is likely that individuals’ own views on

immigration would relate to their attention to news about immigration, which in

turn should relate to how extreme they perceive the news coverage about immigrants

to be (positive or negative), and finally how much the news media are biasing others’


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views of immigration. Examining this path of relationships step by step, information

on media selection suggests that the more threatening immigrants seem, the more

likely the tendency to survey the news environment for information about this poten-

tial threat (e.g., Knobloch, Carpentier, & Zillmann, 2003). This tendency should

result in greater attention to news that arises about immigrants.

In addition, the literature on hostile media bias suggests that individuals’ views of

immigrants should predict how they perceive the news coverage. People who feel

particularly negative about immigrants, for example, should judge the news coverage

as biased toward pro-immigrant views. This effect should be especially true of

anti-immigrant individuals who are paying close attention to the news coverage.

Finally, according to what is known about perceived third-person influences, these

individuals’ attitudes about immigrants, coupled with their perceptions of media

bias, should contribute to their interpretations of other citizen’s views of immi-

gration. Essentially, the more anti-immigrant the sentiment, the more hostile the

news media will likely appear and the more positive ‘‘others’’ will appear as a result

of this biased news coverage. To explore these relationships, a path analysis was con-

ducted to provide estimates of association (see Byrne, 1998; Hu & Bentler, 1995;

Schumacker & Lomax, 1996), as well as a pictorial representation of the associations,

between the variables outlined in Figure 1. The path analysis for this investigation was

tested using AMOS 6.0 software.

Results indicated that the proposed model was a good fit, explaining the data set

well, v2(2)¼ 0.62, p¼ .73, GFI¼ .99, CFI¼ .99, RMSEA¼ .01, Hoelter¼ 5,408. The

path results illustrate perceptions about news influence in two ways. In general,

people who felt more anti-immigrant sentiment paid more attention to what was

being covered in the news, b¼ 0.15. Yet, these individuals only thought others were

heavily influenced by the news media when they also perceived a news bias. On one

hand, there was a direct relationship between anti-immigrant sentiment and percep-

tions that the media treated immigrants favorably—a perception of media bias,

b¼ 0.40. In addition, perceptions of media bias were also exacerbated if anti-

immigrant sentiment increased and attention to media coverage also increased,

b¼ 0.12. In both of these cases, perceptions of media bias hostile to one’s own senti-

ments led to presumptions that the media influenced others, b¼ 0.38.

On the other hand, if perceptions of media bias were not taken into account,

anti-immigrant sentiment did not necessarily lead to presumptions that the media

influence others. Rather, a negative relationship exists between anti-immigrant sen-

timent and presumed influence, b¼�0.12—a relationship that is intensified as more

and more attention is paid to the media coverage, b¼�0.20. Increased attention to

coverage also corresponded with perceptions that the amount of coverage was insuf-

ficient (‘‘too little’’), b¼�0.14. Interestingly, as respondents felt the amount of

coverage was ‘‘too much,’’ the presumed influence of the media decreased, b¼�0.11. Rather, if people felt there was ‘‘too little’’ coverage and they were paying

attention to that coverage, they were more likely to feel the media had an influence

on others. Again, the more intense the anti-immigrant sentiment, the stronger the

beliefs that media have an influence on others if evaluations of the media content


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(presumed bias or sufficiency of amount) enter into the equation. When little treat-

ment is given to judging the media coverage, the media are perceived as having little

influence.

Figure 1 Results of path analysis of individuals’ own extent of anti-immigrant sentiments, self-reported atten-

tion paid to news about immigrants in the individuals’ state of residence, perceived extent of favorable news

coverage of immigrants, perceived amount of attention the news pays to immigrant issues, and perceived extent

of others’ favorable views of immigrants. Higher scores for anti-immigrant sentiment indicate greater visceral

reactions to immigrants. Higher scores for attention indicate greater attention to news coverage. Higher scores

for other perceptions indicate more favorable views or coverage, respectively. Values are beta coefficients.�p< .05. ��p< .01.


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To evaluate this path model from the opposite perspective, people who felt neutral

or pro-immigrant did not pay as much attention to news coverage, did not think the

news is overly favorable toward immigrants and did not particularly believe there is

too little coverage (in fact, they might even feel there’s too much coverage). Thus,

they tended to feel the news, which they weren’t paying attention to, might indeed

be a significant influence on others, especially if the news is favorable (reflective of

their own position). Thus, it seems that individuals who sense a hostile media bias

perceive a hostile third-person effect or presumed influence of media on others,

whereas individuals who do not sense a hostile media bias are assimilative in their

perceptions of others.

Finally, people tended to feel the news had an influence on others if they, them-

selves, were not attending to the news. This finding is perhaps suggestive of a

first-person effect, where a person who might be alerted to his or her own suscepti-

bility to news is less likely to think the news has any appreciable effect. Asking the

respondents to think about their own media consumption might have triggered such

an alert.

Discussion and Conclusions

This study revealed findings consistent with existing research and also contributes

new data and analyses that provide unique perspectives. Many respondents in this

survey held strong and negative sentiments toward immigration, opinions consistent

with a view of immigration as a sociotropic threat (Burns & Gimpel, 2000; Wilson,

2001). Indeed, 60% agreed that immigration threatens traditional customs and

values, though national polls in 2007 showed only 40% holding that belief across

the United States (Dalton & Wilson, 2008). The North Carolina data, however, mir-

rored national findings that 60% agree with the statement, ‘‘Immigrants bring crime

to America.’’

Within this sample, race and age were significantly correlated with anti-immigrant

sentiment, but the latter was negatively related to income and education. This pattern

was reversed for perceived favorability of media coverage of immigration—higher

income, better-educated, younger respondents saw coverage as more unfavorable.

Males reported more subjective knowledge of immigration issues, with knowledge

positively related to television, newspaper, and online news exposure, as well as to

reported attention to immigration news.

Respondents typically judged the quantity of media coverage of immigrants to be

‘‘about right’’ but also more favorable than unfavorable, and the relationship of

anti-immigrant sentiment to perceived coverage favorableness evidenced the hypo-

thesized hostile media phenomenon. Although respondents believed media coverage

would influence third-person others more negatively than positively, the level of

anti-immigrant sentiment was not, as predicted, related directly to this third-person

perception or presumed influence of media on others.

Path analysis seems to show evidence of the two types of views found in previous

research on hostile media effect. One path showed relationships in which beliefs


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about others’ views of immigrants were seen as contrary to one’s own, such that the

more those individuals felt threatened by immigrants, the more they felt that news

coverage was favorable toward immigrants and the more they believed others would

be influenced to hold favorable views of immigrants. This is clear evidence of the

hypothesized hostile media effect and presumed influence discovered in previous

studies.

However, the second path (right side of the model) indicated that the greater these

individuals’ anti-immigrant sentiment, the more likely they were to believe that

media coverage would lead others to be anti-immigrant. The more they perceived

too little coverage of immigrants, the more they felt that others would be influenced

to hold anti-immigrant views similar to their own. In other words, they experienced

biased assimilation or the belief that public opinion mirrors their own, which has also

been found in previous research (and described earlier in this article).

Interestingly, the path analysis suggests two types of anti-immigrant sentiment.

For one, when considering media coverage as hostile to their own views, people

holding anti-immigrant views tended to believe the media had an influence on

third-person others, swaying those others in a pro-immigrant way. On the other

hand, when not considering media as hostile, these people tended to see others as

being in agreement. Oddly, it appears that if only more coverage of immigration

was provided, these people would expect third-person others to hold views more

similar to their own.

These contrasts may be explained by individual differences and core values or

beliefs. As noted, individuals are likely to rely on ‘‘third-person, contrast-based judg-

ments when the issue is historically and ethnically involving, like the Middle East, and

news is vivid and graphic’’ (Perloff, 2008, p. 262). On the other hand, people may

experience biased assimilation or project their views onto others when they hold

strong opinions, but the issue is not central or salient (Gunther & Schmitt, 2004).

Without knowing more about respondents’ histories, personal experiences, or the

intricacies or depth of their views and beliefs on immigration issues, not to mention

how ‘‘vivid and graphic’’ the media coverage is that they attend to (whether framed

as ‘‘immigration as crisis’’ or ‘‘legalization narrative’’), it is impossible to know with

certainty whether these explanations hold true in this study. Such possibilities

warrant further research.

Of course, this study has limitations. First, it utilized a traditional random-digit

telephone survey. Given the growth of cell-phone-only households, call-blocking

technology, etc., the sample may be biased in unknowable ways. Second, it addressed

a sensitive subject, meaning social desirability may have affected respondent candor.

Third, it was limited to a single state that has seen an extreme increase in Latino

immigrants in the last two decades; therefore, the results may not be generalizable

to other states or representative of U.S. residents as a whole.

Nonetheless, these data and the results of path analysis seem to reveal evidence of

both hostile media effect and biased assimilation, as well as presumed influence on

third-person others regarding the amount and valence (or favorableness) of media

coverage of immigrants and various issues related to immigration. Future research


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could replicate this study with other populations or regarding other topics to see if

the same effects emerge. Exploring which topics produce similar effects when, where,

and among whom will lead to greater understanding of these phenomena and the

importance of such media coverage and its effects on society.

Note

[1] Although it was not the focus of this study, anti-immigrant sentiment also correlated signifi-

cantly and negatively with political liberalism (r¼�.31, p< .01), which was measured on a

1- to 5-point scale where 1¼ very conservative and 5¼ very liberal, meaning that respon-

dents who revealed more anti-immigrant sentiment also reported being more conservative.

Anti-immigrant sentiment also correlated significantly with residence (r¼�.17, p< .01),

coded with dummy variables where 1¼ city or suburb and 0¼ rural, meaning respondents

living in rural areas revealed higher anti-immigrant sentiment.

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