PEOPLE OF THE PHIL. ISLANDS vs. AMADEO CORRAL

EN BANC[G.R. No. 42300. January 31, 1936.]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plainti-appellee, vs.AMADEO CORRAL, defendant-appellant.

Generoso, Pelayo, Castillo, Braganza, Chavez, Doromal, Diaz & Capili forappellant.

Solicitor-General Hilado for appellee.

SYLLABUS

1. ELECTION LAW; SUFFRAGE; DISQUALIFICATION. Under the law aperson is disqualied to vote who, since the 13th day of August, 1898, has beensentenced by nal judgment to suer not less than eighteen months ofimprisonment, such disability not having been removed by plenary pardon.(Administrative Code, sec., 432.)

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; VIOLATION OF. Whoever at any election votesknowing that he is not entitled so to do incurs in criminal responsibility. (Sec.2642 of the Administrative Code.)

3. ID.; ID.; STATUTORY NOT NATURAL RIGHT. The modern conceptionof the surage is not voting is a function of government. It is right created bylaw, not a natural right.

4. ID.; ID.; A PRIVILEGE. Surage is a privilege granted by the Stateto such person or classes as are most likely to exercise it for the public good. Forreasons of public policy, certain classes of persons are excluded from thefranchise. Among the generally excluded classes are minors, idiots, paupers, andconvicts.

5. ID.; ID.; RIGHT OF STATE. The right of State to deprive persons ofthe right of surage by reason of their having been convicted of crime, is beyondquestion. The manifest purpose of such restriction is to preserve the purity ofelections. (9 R. C. L., 1042.)

6. ID.; ID.; PRESUMPTION ARISING FROM CONVICTION. Thepresumption is that one rendered infamous by conviction of felony is unt toexercise the privilege of suffrage or to hold a public office. (9 R. C. L., 1042.)

7. ID.; ID.; DISQUALIFICATION IS FOR PROTECTION, NOT PUNISHMENT. The exclusion from the exercise of surage must be adjudged a meredisqualication imposed for protection and not for punishment, the withholdingof a privilege and not the denial of a personal right. (9 R. C. L., 1042.)

8. ID.; ID.; DISQUALIFICATION; DURATION. From the very nature of

the surage disqualication which is imposed "for protection and not for thepunishment, the withholding of a privilege and not the denial of a personal right" the deprivation of surage does not lapse at the expiration of the sentence ofthe convict. (Administrative Code, sec. 432.)

9. ID.; ID.; ID.; PRESCRIPTION. The disqualication for crime imposedby law, having once attached and not having been subsequently removed by aplenary pardon, is not wiped out only because the ex-convict had once beenallowed to vote.

D E C I S I O N

ABAD SANTOS, J p:Appellant was charged with having voted illegally at the general elections

held on June 5, 1934. After due trial, he was convicted on the ground that he hadvoted while laboring under a legal disqualication. The judgment of convictionwas based on section 2642, in connection with section 432, of the RevisedAdministrative Code.

Said section 432 reads as follows:"The following persons shall be disqualified from voting:"(a) Any person who, since the thirteenth day of August, eighteen

hundred and ninety-eight, has been sentenced by nal judgment to suer notless than eighteen months of imprisonment, such having been removed byplenary pardon.

"(b) Any person who has violated an oath of allegiance taken by him tothe United States.

"(c) Insane or feeble-minded persons."(d) Deaf-mutes who cannot read and write."(e) Electors registered under section (c) of the next proceeding section

who, after failing to make a sworn statement to the satisfaction of the board ofinspectors at any of its two meetings for registration and revision, that they areincapacitated for preparing their ballots due to permanent physical disability,present themselves at the hour of voting as incapacitated, irrespective ofwhether such incapacity be real or feigned."

And section 2642 provides:"Whoever at any election vote or attempts to vote knowing that he is not

entitled to do so, . . . shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than onemonth nor more than one year and by a ne of not less than one hundred pesosnor more than one thousand pesos, and in all cases by deprivation of the right ofsurage and disqualication from public oce for a period of not more than fouryears."

It is undisputed that appellant was sentenced by nal judgment of this

court promulgated on March 3, 1910, 1 to suer eight years and one day ofpresidio mayor. No evidence was presented to show that prior to June 5, 1934,he had been granted a plenary pardon. It is likewise undisputed that at thegeneral elections held on June 5, 1934, he voted in election precinct No. 18 of themunicipality of Davao, Province of Davao.

The modern conception of the surage is that voting is a function ofgovernment. The right to vote is not a natural right but it is a right created bylaw. Surage is a privilege granted by the State to such persons or classes as aremost likely to exercise it for the public good. In the early stages of the evolutionof the representative system of government, the exercise of the right of suragewas limited to a small portion of the inhabitants. But with the spread ofdemocratic ideas, the enjoyment of the franchise in the modern states has cometo embrace the mass of the adult male population. For reasons of public policy,certain classes of persons are excluded from the franchise. Among the generallyexcluded classes are minors, idiots, paupers, and convicts.

The right of the State to deprive persons of the right of surage by reasonof their having been convicted of crime, is beyond question. "The manifestpurpose of such restrictions upon this right is to preserve the purity of elections.The presumption is that one rendered infamous by conviction of felony, or thosebase oense indicative of moral turpitude, in unt to exercise the privilege ofsurage or to hold oce. The exclusion must for this reason be adjudged a meredisqualication, imposed for protection and in not for punishment, thewithholding of a privilege and not the denial of a personal right." (9 R. C. L.,1042.).

Upon the facts established in this case, it seems clear that the appellantwas not entitled to vote on June 5, 1934, because of section 432 of the RevisedAdministrative Code which disqualied from voting any person who, since 13thday of August, 1898, has been sentenced by nal judgment to suer not lessthan eighteen months of imprisonment, such disability not having been removedby plenary pardon. As above stated, the appellant had been sentenced by naljudgment to suer eight years and one day of presidio mayor, and not had beengranted a plenary pardon.

Counsel for the appellant contend that inasmuch as the latter voted in1928 his oense had already prescribed, and he could no longer be prosecuted forillegal voting at the general election held on June 5, 1934. This contention isclearly without merit. The disqualication for crime imposed under section 432 ofthe Revised Administrative Code having once attached on the appellant and nothaving been subsequently removed by a plenary pardon, continued and renderedit illegal for the appellant to vote at the general elections of 1934.

Neither is there any merit in the contention advanced by counsel for theappellant that the disqualication imposed on the latter must be considered ashaving been removed at the expiration of his sentence. This claim is based uponan erroneous theory of the nature of the disqualication. It regards it as apunishment when, as already indicated, the correct view is that it is imposed "forprotection and not for punishment, the withholding of a privilege and not thedenial of a personal right ." Judicial interpretation and long established

administrative practice are against such a view.The judgment appealed from is armed with costs against the appellant.

So ordered.Villa-Real, Vickers, Imperial, Butte and Goddard, JJ., concur.

Separate OpinionsAVANCEA, C. J., dissenting:

The appealed judgment armed by the majority members of this courtsentences appellant for having voted in the general election held on June 5,1934, in the municipality of Davao, Province of Davao, being disqualied fromvoting. The appellant, in my opinion, was not disqualified from voting.

The appellant was sentenced to the penalty of eight years and one day ofprision mayor in the year 1910. This penalty carried it with, as an accessory,disqualication from the right of surage during the term of the sentence. Hebegan to serve his sentence on April 11, 1910. He was granted a conditionalpardon on July 31, 1913. Inasmuch as the accessory penalty of disqualicationfrom the right of surage was not expressly remitted in this pardon, it isunderstood that he complied with and extinguished this part of the sentence onApril 12, 1918. Therefore, under the penalty imposed upon the appellant, he wasnot disqualified from voting in 1934.

The majority, however, bases its decision on section 432 of theAdministrative Code which reads:

"The following persons shall be disqualified from voting:"(a) Any person who, since the thirteenth day of August, eighteen

hundred and ninety-eight, has been sentenced by nal judgment to suer notless than eighteen months of imprisonment, such disability not having beenremoved by plenary pardon."

The language of the law is not clear whether the disqualication referred totherein is only for the term of the sentence or for the entire lifetime of theconvict. The majority however, interprets this provision in the latter sense towhich I do not agree, it being contrary to the spirit thereof.

If the interpretation of the majority were correct, section 432 of theAdministrative Code would not harmonize with the latter provisions thereof(secs. 2636, 2637, 2639, 2640, 2641, 2642, 2643, 2644, 2645, 2646, 2647,2649, 2652, 2654, 2656, 2657, 2658 and 2659) on oenses relative to electionsand elective ocers, imposing the penalties of imprisonment and disqualicationfrom the right of surage for a period not exceeding ve and fourteen years,respectively. Supposing that in one of said cases, for instance that of an electioninspector who willfully signs a false statement of the result of a ballot (sec.2639), the penalty of imprisonment for more than eighteen months imposed,said inspector, only by reason of this penalty imposed by him, would bedisqualied from voting during his entire lifetime, in accordance with section

432, if the interpretation of the majority is correct, and it would be to no purposestill to sentence him to the penalty of disqualication from the right of suragefor a period not exceeding fourteen years.

It cannot be said, to harmonize these provisions, that the disqualication

from the right of surage should be imposed only when the penalty ofimprisonment imposed therein is less than eighteen months because it isexpressly required that both penalties be imposed in all cases.

Neither can it be said that section 432 governs all cases, in general, andsections 2636 et seq. govern the specic cases referred to therein, because therewould be then be no justice in the law. One may be sentenced to more thaneighteen months of imprisonment for having committed the crime if seriousphysical injuries, for instance, through reckless negligence or in self-defense, butwith out having used the means reasonably necessary thereof, and according tothe majority opinion he will be disqualied from voting during his entire lifetimeunder section 432. However, an election inspector who, abusing his position,willfully commits a falsehood in connection with a ballot entrusted to him, afterserving his sentence which does not exceed fourteen years, will again bequalied to vote. This cannot be the result countenanced by the law. If the law inmore serious cases wherein an attempt is made directly against the cleanlinessof the election, only disqualies the guilty party from the right of surage for aperiod not exceeding fourteen years, it cannot be supposed that its intention is toforever disqualify therefrom the party guilty of a crime which bears no relation tothe exercise of surage and which does not involve the degree of moral turpitudeas in the other case.

I am of the opinion that this anomaly can be avoided only by interpretingsection 432 in the sense that the disqualication referred to therein is merelyduring the term of the sentence.RECTO, J.:

I concur in this dissenting opinion of Chief Justice Avancea.I hereby certify that Hon. George A. Malcolm, Associate Justice, participated

in this decision and voted to affirm the judgment. AVANCEA, C. J.Footnotes

1. U. S. vs. Corral, 15 Phil., 383.