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Participant Manual

Delegated Officer Initial Training [Virtual Classroom]

Lesson # 10 Risk Management Concepts and Principles

Revision Date: December 21, 2012

Printed Date: December 18, 2012

Delegated Officer Initial Training Risk Management Concepts and Principles _______________________________________________________________________________

NOTES:

Transport Canada – People Management and Learning

RDIMS# 7223684 Lesson #10

1

TERMINAL OBJECTIVES

In a virtual plenary, classroom setting, given a theoretical lecture and discussion and with reference to: RDIMS-#6334008-CAD QUA-007 Issue 02 – TCCA Integrated Risk Management Framework , RDIMS-#7017467-SI QUA-008 Risk Management Process for Aviation Safety Activities, and TCCA IRMF

LEXICON / LEXIQUE CGIR DE TCAC - RDIMS / SGDDI 6083986, the learner will describe the TCCA Risk Management program, as evaluated by peer learners and the instructor.

ENABLING OBJECTIVES

The participant will: 1. Outline the Concepts and Principles 2. Discuss specific terms refering the Lexicon [RDIMS 6083986] 3. Differentiate Risk Assessment and Risk Treatment 4. Explain the “5 Questions” model, purpose and application 5. Explain the range of risk assessemnt processes, tools and techniques within TCCA, that can be

used to perform a risk assessment under the varying degree of depth and detail.

REFERENCES:

- RDIMS-#6334008-CAD QUA-007 ISSUE 02 - TRANSPORT CANADA CIVIL AVIATION INTEGRATED RISK

MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK;

- RDIMS-#7017467-SI QUA-008 Risk Management Process for Aviation Safety Activities, - TCCA IRMF LEXICON / LEXIQUE CGIR DE TCAC - RDIMS / SGDDI 6083986RDIMS-#6000379-RISK INDEX

MATRIX REFERENCE

pcdocs://RDIMS/6334008/R











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Risk Management Concepts and Principles

DOIT – On-line / Virtual Classroom

Edgar Allain – MABB [Flight Ops, Analyses and Occurrence Reporting-ATL]

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Welcome to DOIT On-line - Risk Management Concepts and Principles. The purpose of this session in the virtual classroom, is that it serves as an introduction to the Transport Canada Civil Aviation [TCCA] risk program and generally provides the risk concepts and defintions to facilitate the adaptation of the directorate‟s Risk Management Tools, processes and techniques.

To ensure that all learners acquire a base of knowledge and awareness respecting the purpose and role of the TCCA Risk Mangement program and organization as well as an overall awareness of how Risk Management should be applied in accordance with the Civil Aviation Directive [TCCA Integrated Risk Management Framework] and the Staff Instruction regarding the Risk Management Process for Aviation Safety Acitivities.

By understanding the Risk Concepts and Principles, you will have an understanding of the TCCA Risk Mangement processes either during Risk Assessments and / or Risk Treatment.


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- Quiz / Assessment

- Historical Overview and the Future [Flight 2010; Flight 2015]

- Key Definitions

- Risk in Context

- Sources

- How do we address Risk?

- Integrated Risk Management

- The 5 Questions

- TCCA Business Model

- Risk Navigator

- Tools: PASS; Basic,

Modified; Conventional and

Enhanced

- Risk Matrix

- Uncertainty Management

− CAD-QUA-007: TCCA

Integrated Risk

Management

− SI QUA-008: Risk

Management Process for

Aviation Safety Activities

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HISTORICAL OVERVIEW - FLIGHT 2010

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TCCA is an organization that is concerned about safety and managing risk, and one that embraces a systems approach to managing risk. TCCA evolved to this point through a series of changes in its way of thinking and ultimately, a change in where it shifted its priorities.

Historically, the Vision of Flight 2005 & 10 embraced a systems approach to attempting to indentify risk, but organizationally, it has moved beyond that limited notion.

In keeping with the systems approach to managing risk for aviation organizations, TCCA also began to institute a formal framework for its own management system internally through with the inception of an Integrated Management System (IMS).

This framework describes how the organization supports the strategic direction with a focus on the management of key processes to optimize resource utilization, while assuring results for Canadians.

The performance goals, processes, and accompanying cultural changes necessary for a successful IMS are, for all intents and purposes, the same as those of a sound Safety Management System [SMS].


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We can expect SMS implementation and integration in all areas of The Civil Aviation Transportation System in Canada over the course of time.

Companies are envisioned to evolve from compliance to safety risk management thinking.

TC will transform from regulatory compliance auditors into system evaluators, as the underlying philosophy shifts the onus for proving or disproving adequate safety performance from the regulator to the organization.

Expect well-designed and executed risk management systems and risk-based oversight programs to lay the groundwork for this to happen, while achieving safer skies.

Expect a natural progression towards full integrated risk management.


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For the purposes of the Civil Aviation program and to bring the TCCA Strategic Goals into focus, in 2005, TCCA defined safety as “The condition where risks are managed to acceptable levels.”


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6

.

[Government of Canada Interdepartmental Committee - All Hazards

Risk Assessment Framework dated November 2009]

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National Audit Office 2000 – UK

Note

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The „Risk‟ definition is a neutral definition and allows flexibility in application which will be discussed later.

TCCA set up a national Risk Management Committee [RMC] in 2004 under the auspices of the accountable executive for the risk program having a national membership. In short, the RMC works collaboratively to review and improve the program and learning activties.

During the recent development and refinement of risk tools, the RMC members previously considered the concept of “the chance of something happening” however, some felt that the term „chance‟ would tend to lead users to toward thinking in terms of Likelihood or Probability. Further in researching various other sources it was evident that “Something happening that may have an impact on the achievement of objectives” was more effective for TCCA‟s intent.

Note: “the potential for loss or Injury” was the previous terminology used and is appropriate when dealing with pure safety risks.

It is usually a question that directly identifies the very risk that we are concerned about.


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Risk in Context

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Internal Factors may include, but are not limited to:

a) culture of the organization; b) organizational mission and values; c) priorities; d) policies, procedures and processes in place; e) ongoing operational functions, programs, and

activities; f) learning culture; g) human resource availability; h) geographic land facility considerations; i) technologies applied within the organization; and j) historical considerations

External Factors may include, but are not limited to:

a) the social and cultural, legal, regulatory, financial, technological, economic, natural and competitive environment, whether international, national, or regional;

b) key drivers and trends having impact on the objectives of the organization; and/or the industry;

c) relationships with, and perceptions and values of external stakeholders.


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Stephen Ward -IRM Risk Management and

Context 2005

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With respect to Uncertainty Management, a key element to managing Uncertainty is to consider various sources of uncertainty facing an organization.

Stephen Ward in Risk Management Organization an Context identifies 5 perspectives to consider .

The aim is to highlight the value of different perspectives that focus on different aspects of Uncertainty and Risk

The five Perspectives are depicted here.

Understanding the Sources of Risk in a particular organization may aid us in being able to better Identify, Predict and Treat risk.


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T

E

A

M

ransfer

liminate

ccept

itigateRDIMS: 7125388

How do we address Risk?

- Transfer Risk : Insurance, Auto land – auto pilot operations

- Eliminate: Stopping operations

- Accept : Risk in an operation deemed as low Risk are often simply acceptable. Risks in everyday life.

- Mitigate: Cockpit Automation, Controls, Standard Operating Procedures, redundancy. Reducing Likelihood and or Severity


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[TC Corporate Planning and Reporting

Directorate; October 2009]

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WHAT IS INTEGRATED RISK MANAGEMENT?

“Integrated risk management promotes a continuous, proactive and systematic process to understand, manage and communicate risk from an organization-wide perspective. It is about making strategic decisions that contribute to the achievement of an organization's overall corporate objectives.”

Integrated Risk Management Framework, TBS

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Often when considerating Integrated Risk Management we hear words such as „Enterprise Risk Management‟, „Holistic Risk Management‟ and also „Integrated Risk Management.‟

In August 2010, the Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat [TBS] introduced the Framework for the Management of Risk.

Integrated Risk Management is defined as :

“Integrated risk management is a continuous, proactive and systematic process to understand, manage and communicate risk from an organization-wide perspective. It is about making strategic decisions that contribute to the achievement of an organization's overall corporate objectives.”


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Why Implement Integrated Risk Management?

To protect the program / organization and the Government of Canada by minimizing losses without overprotecting assets, balancing the costs of risk management with its benefits

An important component of good management and the federal government‟s Management Accountability Framework (MAF)


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This depicts a risk management process in a simple form, taken from the 5 questions in CAD QUA-007. The 5 questions are in the first paragraph of Section 4.0:

1) What has changed? 2) What can happen? 3) What is the effect? 4) What are the options? 5) What are the next steps?

Similarly….. 1) What could go wrong? 2) How could it happen? 3) What is the impact? How does it affect us? 4) What can be done to prevent/reduce the impact? How can I prevent it

or reduce the effects? 5) What do I need to do next?

So how do we manage Risks and What is Risk Management? As simplistic as these 5 questions are, they are the essence of a Risk Management Process. It is depicted consistently with the process of more complex methods in the CAN/CSA Q850 Risk Standard.


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The Risk Management steps in the process are depicted by this diagram from the CAN/CSA Q850 as well as the TCCA Business Model

Note, the Risk Management process is not only what TCCA has embraced as the correct way in doing things but it is also in the very Core of our Philosophy, Policy. Procedures and Practices [the 4Ps].


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What has

changed?

What can

happen?

What is the

effect?

What are

the

options?

What are

the next

steps?

Business Model Flow Chart:

The model is a 5 step process as follows:

1. Initiation: Collect proactive and reactive data and integrate from various sources internal and external to Transport Canada Civil Aviation to identify issues.

2. Preliminary Analysis: Analyse the issue by understanding the causal, contributing and underlying factors; determine the scope of the issue; establish a benchmark to enable measurement of the impact.

Note, Continuously monitor reported issues for trends (aggregate issues). 3. Risk Estimation: Estimate risk and determine risk level. Decide if intervention is necessary. 4. Risk Evaluation: Evaluate benefit of intervening given associated costs. 5. Measure Impact and Communicate: Measure change using original benchmark and communicate the results to

stakeholders. Determine that the risks were mitigated. If they were not - diagnose, redo and repair processes.

The diagram shows the “normal” flow of a hazard. Hazards are received through various sources. The control risk box may include activities such as risk assessments, gap analysis and issue analysis. The decision to intervene is taken at the Manager level. It is important to keep management abreast of these issues as they are occurring. Should the decision to intervene be “No”, it is critical to reevaluate to ensure that the decision to intervene need to be revisited.

If the decision to intervene is “Yes”, a project manager is responsible to develop an implementation plan (report) and it is up to the implementation team to carry-out the strategy.

Once the strategy has been implemented, an evaluation process must occur to determine if the risk has been mitigated. If the data shows that the risk has not been mitigated, we must reassess the plan and create a new strategy. However, if the


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answer is “Yes”, a review period should be established (this will vary on a case-by-case basis) to confirm that the hazard has not resurfaced.

After the review is conducted a decision will be made to close the file and the issue will be passed to the Office of Primary Interest [OPI].

Simple Complicated Complex Chaotic

Depth, Detail,

Auxiliary Questions

Scope of response

Risk Landscape Navigator

As we look across the spectrum of complexity, the depth and detail of the sense making (analysis) is a guide to applying techniques that have a likelihood of success depending on the scope of the issue.

We are now equipped to model a system and its behaviour as complex as the system itself.


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The Pre-Assessment Scan page: - is a condensed, tactical application of Treasury Board guidelines and requirements for “Environmental Scan” - can be used in regulatory, internal management and operational decision making. - functionality is founded on a quick, drop-down pick list that generates level of risk

factors to be used in determining the Type of risk Assessment Process (Scope page)


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The Pre-Assessment Scope page: - highlights important landmarks for determining an appropriate risk assessment process. - includes an input box (text) at the top to briefly describe the situation. - the “triage factors” are transcribed automatically from the “Scan” page. - in the “issue context” column, the user simply selects a „best fit‟ answer to the reference points. - an optimum process results from the scores of the matrix - alternative processes may be chosen due to additional factors

- print and attach to the „Terms of Reference‟ or to the risk assessment documentation.

Notes on Process Choice:

When a risk assessment is to be conducted, the decision maker must complete this “Pre-Assessment Scan and Scope” tool the results of which will provide general guidance on the type of risk assessment tool to be used for the analysis with regard to the level of complexity. The decision maker ultimately decides which risk assessment tool is to be applied. However, if they elect that an assessment tool other than that recommended by the PASS process will be utilized, they must provide and document, their rationale.


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The Basic Tool is a basic process that asks fifteen questions. The particularity of this process is that all the answers are known or can be easily and readily determined. It is used for simple issues and an individual or a team can perform a risk analysis by using this tool. It is seen as a quick, day-to-day and practical instrument to analyze risk and is divided into two main sections: Risk Assessment and Risk Treatment.

RISK ASSESSMENT [portion]:

i) What‟s the Hazard (condition, situation, immediate concern, or change)?

ii) Who is the decision maker? iii) Who else is, or should be, involved? iv) What could go wrong? v) How could it happen? vi) What are the outcomes? vii) What is the level of risk? viii) Is there value in the proposed activity?

RISK TREATMENT [portion]:

i) What are the options for controlling the level of risk? ii) Which option looks best? iii) If the option is used, will the risk level be acceptable. iv) What needs to be done, by whom and when v) Were the risk control measures completed? vi) Were the risk control measures effective vii) Is further action or assessment required?

The two above mentioned sections include the Initation of the Process and Establishing the context; Estimation and Evaluation; Analysis of the Control Options; and the Action Plan, Monitoring and Follow up activities. All these steps are supported by appropriate sign-off documentation that addess accountability. The logical sequence of the tool‟s steps make it a user-friendly, quick, easy and self-guiding for assessing risk and conducting risk assessments.


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The Modified Tool is also a short process which incorporate the SHELL Model . Note in reference to the new Risk Lexicon, the SHELL Model expresses the interrelationships and interdependencies of different systemic components and the human component on under the influence of environmental conditions.

Reference:[E. Edwards – 1972 Man and Machine: Systems for Safety; modified by Hawkins 1984, 1987]

The combination of hardware, software and human resources, does not exist in a vacuum; they always operate in a context of economic, political, historical and socio-cultural factors. The model is depicted graphically to display not only its four components, but also the relationships, or interfaces between Liveware and all other components. [Software-Hardware Environment-Liveware]

Process:

a) Initiate the process and establish the context (situation description, situation details, stakeholders, and exposure interval).

b) Perform preliminary analysis and estimate the risk (hazard description, Identification of the main scenarios considered, Determination of the likelihood and the severity of each scenario, and Risk levels).

c) Control the risk (Methods to control the risk, Preliminary Risk Control options, Which option look best, What are the residual risks associated with this option and are they acceptable?, and Final control option).

d) Take action: develop implementation plan. e) Monitoring and follow-up

Similar to the Basic tool, the Modified tool is systematically supported by appropriate sign-off documentations that address the issue of accountability. As the previous tool, the logical sequences of its steps made it a friendly and self-guiding approach to conduct RA.


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CONVENTIONAL

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The Conventional Risk Assessment tool is a systematic process and replaces a process you may hear about from your colleagues formerly called “Type 2A” – it is obsolete.

The Conventional Tool comrpises 6 steps:

1. Initiate the Process / Establish the Context 2. Identify and Assess Risks 3. Control the Risk 4. Costs and Benefits of Risk Control 5. Take Action 6. Monitor Impact and Follow Up

We cannot forget: that we must complete the Summary Report at the end eventhough it is placed at the front of the process and also perform the Information Management / Documentation steps.


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Risk Assessment vs. Risk Treatment

It is important to point out that the those involved in the risk assessment may not necessarily be involved or engaged in the Risk Treatment. It depends on who has the appropriately determined comptency to carry out the task - this is determined and assigned by the decision maker.

Historically, what was always the Process of Managing Risk in the organization, somehow became part and parcel of the Risk Assessment …and consequently the ownership of Steps 5-6 was often not solidified and as a consequence sometimes not carried out nor followed through. This was particularly symptomatic of Step 6.

Thus, the RMC deteremined the only way to really ensure proper attention is given to the two parts of the Risk Management process is to emphasize the two separate parts and that not all those engaged in the RA will necessarily be engaged in the Risk Treatment


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A characteristic of a system

describing the degree of interaction

between its components. As the

number and nature of the interactions

increase, behavior within the system

becomes immeasurable in linear

terms. Non-linear patterns emerge.

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The tools under the category Enhanced and Comprehensive are directed at the system level to ensure that in managing one risk, an intolerable situation is not creating elsewhere in that system under assessment.

An example of a tool under category Enhanced is the Rasmussen Framework (AcciMap).

An example of a tool under category Comprehensive is the risk profile methodology at the Department level and TCCA level

These definitions are provided to remind us that we must select an appropriate approach for the type risk assessment. In the end, we want to support our decisions and based them on the proper context and situation we face.

Now we will review some practices under these categories and some that are under development

The Safety Study on Risk profiling the Air Taxi Sector in Canada is most interesting. The study team gathered considerable information on the air taxi sector, examined historical accident rate patterns, reviewed the SATOPS final report, and analyzed approximately 125 air taxi accidents occurring between 1996 and 2006 in the Pacific Region. The team tested analytic tools, including an adaptation of James Reason‟s Generic Error Modeling System (AGEMS), Rasmussen‟s Risk Management Framework and accident mapping (ACCIMAP) techniques; the team also administered a series of questionnaires and interviews.

Civil Aviation recently launched a safety awareness campaign aimed at seaplane/floatplane operators and passengers. The awareness campaign includes a variety of educational and information products to raise safety awareness. Civil Aviation will review, with industry stakeholders, safety advocates, affected communities, and other jurisdictions, potential measures to improve floatplane safety. The review will include aircraft design standards and the possibility of implementing improvements in egress from submerged floatplanes, such as the operation of emergency exits, pop-out windows, wearing of life vests by passengers and egress training for commercial crews.


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Sense Making Influence / InhibitScan

Complexity Thinking Activities:

As we become more capable and confident in dealing with complex issues, the activities of complexity thinking also map onto the Transport Canada Civil Aviation Business Model. In fact, those activities already relate to what we do!


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Simple Complicated Complex Chaotic

QRH

SOP

Best Practice

HFACS

RCA

Domino

Fishbone

Fault Tree Analysis

Failure Mode Effects Analysis (FMEA)

Procedural Error Analysis Tool (PEAT)

Maintenance Error Decision Aid

(MEDA)

TapRoot

HFACS

SWOT

Models

Etc.

Narrative Capture

Story Telling

System Dynamics Modeling

Rasmussen Framework

(AcciMap)

Systems-Theoretic Accident Model and

Processes

(STAMP)

Frequency Resonance Analysis Modeling

(FRAM)

Cynefin Framework (Cognitive Edge)

Complexity Matrix (Stacey)

Starlight (Pacific Northwest Laboratories)

Models

Etc.

Command and Control

Emergency Response

Plan

Toolbox

Some tools that are applicable for each domain in the complexity spectrum are situated here.

Some can be used in adjacent domains

The matrix is a suggestion only, and not limiting to those tools mentioned as a multitude of analytical techniques exists

New methods continually emerge and should be given careful consideraion.

Many of these tools, and others are available via courses internally and externally.


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National Audit Office 2000 UK]

Risk ScenarioA sequence of events, situation, activity or factors

leading to an occurrence and resulting in a single or

multiple consequences.

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Exposure IntervalPeriod within which the risk activity is evaluated (time,

cycles, intervals, people, etc.)

28

ISO GUIDE 73:2009]

ConsequenceImpact or effect as a result of the scenario

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When referring to the term “Likelihood” it is the Likelihood of the Sequence of Events / Situation / Activity / Occurrence (the Risk) AND the Consequence

When referring to the Severity, it is the Impact of the Consequences


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Risk Level = Intersection of Likelihood and Severity

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The 2 Variable Matrix is the standard in the Staff Instruction: Likelihood X Severity = Risk Index

When conducting a Risk Analysis, the Risk Level is based on an evaluation of the following two factors:

Likelihood that a risk scenario will occur, and Severity of the events. The Risk Level is a subset of a two-digit Risk Indicator (number and letter) resulting from the intersection of LIKELIHOOD and SEVERITY on the Risk Matrix.


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Likelihood (L)

What is the Likelihood of that sequence of events/situation/activities happening during the exposure interval?

1 – Improbable – Rare

Almost inconceivable that the event will occur during the exposure interval

statistically impossible [10-9 and below]

Event is almost never expected to occur

2 – Remote – Unlikely

Unlikely, but possible to occur during the exposure interval

Statically 10-7 – 10-9

Event is not expected to occur very often

3 – Occasional

Likely to occur sometimes during the exposure interval

Statistically 10-5 – 10-7

Event is expected to occur in some circumstances

4 – Probable – Likely

Will occur several times during the exposure interval


Event is expected to occur in majority of circumstances

5 - Frequent - Almost

certain

Likely to occur often during the exposure interval


Event is expected to occur in almost all circumstances

Severity (S)

The sequence of events has happened. How serious is the severity of the consequences?

A

Negligible

Little to no impact on TCCA program or system objectives

Less than minor injury and/or less than minor system damage

Personnel: No injuries.

Operations: Minor operational delay with no immediate costs.

Equipment: No damage or minor technical delay with no immediate costs.

Environment: Minor contained release that does not significantly threaten the quality of life of humans and/or the habitat.

Media attention: No media attention.

Public confidence: No loss of public confidence.

B

Minor

Minimal questioning of TCCA program or system objectives

Nuisance / Operating limitations / Use of emergency procedures / Minor incident

Minor injury and/or Minor system damage

Personnel: First aid injury, no disability or lost time.

Operations: May result in operating limitations, or emergency procedures; operational delay incurring relatively minimal costs.

Equipment: Technical delay requiring grounding of aircraft and causing the operator to incur relatively minimal costs.

Environment: Contained release that may reduce the quality of life of humans and the habitat. Full recovery period will be

less than 5 years

Media attention: Media attention that requires Briefing and/or Question Period notes and Minister’s attention.

Public confidence: May be lowered, but public accepts situation.

C

Moderate

Significant questioning of TCCA program or system objectives

Injuries to persons / Serious incident / Significant reduction in safety margins / Reduction in the capacity to cope with adverse

operating conditions / Increase in workload

Personnel: Lost time injury or passenger injuries (i.e. broken bone), no disability. Difficult for crew to cope with adverse

conditions.

Operations: Operational delay requiring grounding of an aircraft and causing the operator substantial costs. May result in

significant reduction in safety margins.

Equipment: Technical delay requiring grounding of an aircraft and causing the operator relatively substantial costs.

Environment: Small uncontained release that threatens lives of humans and the habitat with effects lasting up to 15 years

Media attention: Media attention that elevates occurrence to High profile status requiring Minister’s action and/or results in

Parliamentary debates.

Public confidence: Significantly lowered with high profile media coverage and numerous ATIP requests.

D

Major - Critical

Necessitates modifications to TCCA program or system objectives

Major damages to equipment / Death / Serious injuries / large reduction in safety margins / Physical distress or excessive

workload such that the operation cannot be conducted safely, accurately or completely

Severe injury and/or major system damage

Personnel: Disability or severe injuries. Crew extended because of workload or environmental conditions.

Operations: Operational delay grounding air operator’s fleet. May result in a large reduction in safety margins.

Equipment: Technical delay grounding aircraft fleet causing substantial costs and long delays to return the aircraft to service.

Environment: Moderate uncontained release that kills and/or threatens lives of humans and the habitat with effects lasting up

to 30 years.

Media attention: Media attention that initiates legal action against the Crown and/or public servants, Parliamentary debate.

Public confidence: Decreased; significant reduction in travelling public flying on a particular aircraft type or airline.

E

Catastrophic -

Extreme

Necessitates a significant change to and/or revocation of portions of TCCA program or system objectives

Equipment destroyed / multiple fatalities

Results in fatalities and/or loss of the system

Personnel: Fatal injuries to personnel or passengers. Public exposed to life threatening hazard.

Operations: Operational delay grounding all operating certificates for the subject aircraft/ engine/ major

component. Removal of the operating certificate for subject aircraft/engine/major component or airline.

Equipment: Loss of aircraft.

Environment: Large uncontained release that kills and threatens lives of humans and the habitat with

irreversible effects lasting for more than 50 years.

Media attention: Media attention having severe repercussion for the Minister, and/or public servants.

Public confidence: Public demonstrations organized against the Crown.


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Uncertainty Management

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Another term used in the Risk Community is Uncertainty and correspondingly Uncertainty Management

The author Steven Ward in Risk Management Organization and Context argues that using the term “Uncertainty” in some cases in the place of the word Risk, may significantly broaden the definition of risk and thought processes.

Definitions of, or how we look at Risk are important in that it drives the focus of attention in subsequent RM. A narrow definition of risk will imply correspondingly a narrow focus of attention in RM.

A perspective that views risk solely in terms of adverse effects on the achievement of objectives, is not without value in seeking to increase the chances of meeting objectives, but it is unnecessarily limited.

Defining Risk in terms of events, conditions or circumstances, does not facilitate consideration of potential variability in performance that is driven by underlying ambiguity.

This discussion piece to some degree, is beyond the scope of this training, but it is an awareness piece to assist in the realization when looking at organizations.


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33 RDIMS: 7125388

Reverting back to the definition of Risk: “Something happening that may have an impact on the achievement of objectives” one can hopefully realize that it does lend itself in being able to consider not only Threats but additionally Opportunities that may implicate an organization.

Defining Risk in terms of events, conditions or circumstances, does not facilitate consideration of potential variability in performance that is driven by underlying ambiguity.


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34

- Quiz / Assessment

- Historical Overview and the Future [Flight 2010; Flight 2015]

- Key Definitions

- Risk in Context

- Sources

- How do we address Risk?

- Integrated Risk Management

- The 5 Questions

-TCCA Business Model

-Risk Navigator

- Tools: PASS; Basic,

Modified; Conventional

and Enhanced

- Risk Matrix

- Uncertainty

Management

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The RMC have worked hard at reviewing and analyzing various risk management definitions and terms and the RMC firmly believes these will work to continually improve our processes.

The RMC will update and modify as necessary in order to stay current, relevant and align with professional standards and processes.


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This reverts back to the concept of Enterprise or Organization-wide Risk Management. TCCA is moving toward this approach.


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SI QUA-008 RISK MANAGEMENT PROCESS FOR

AVIATION SAFETY ACTIVITIES RDIMS-#7017467

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