pdwk 110b group 7 deepwater horizon report

8/4/2019 PDWK 110B Group 7 Deepwater Horizon Report

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The University of Trinidad and Tobago

San Fernando Campus

Bachelor of Applied Science Part Time

Project Development Workshop (PDWK 110B)

Group 7

Question 2: The Deepwater Horizon Incident

Imagine yourself an engineer working on the Deepwater Horizon and d iscuss theHealth, Safety, Environmental and Governance issues that arose out of this incident and

make recommendations to prevent the recurrence of such a disaster

Authors:

Jenner Baldeo 111005888 [email protected]

Janelle Ramjit-Baldeo 102011057 [email protected]

Ellery Campo 106001214 [email protected]

Anil Singh 106001281 [email protected]

Barry Samaroo 107000286 [email protected]

Larry Samaroo

Rodney Sahabdool

106000295

107000283

[email protected]

[email protected]
mailto:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]


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Contents

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .......................................................................................................................... 3

BACK GROUND......................................................................................................................................... 5

SCOPE ........................................................................................................................................................ 6

CRITICAL SAFETY FACTORS THAT CONTRIBUTED TO THE BLOW OUT ................................ 7

ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS OF THE OIL SPILL............................................................................ 12

GOVERNANCE ........................................................................................................................................ 17

HEALTH RECOMMENDATIONS: ......................................................................................................... 19

CONCLUSION: ......................................................................................................................................... 21

RECOMMENDATIONS ........................................................................................................................... 22

REFERENCES ......................................................................................................................................... 24


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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The well blowout and explosions that forced the abandonment of the Deepwater Horizon rig on

April 20, 2010, were the start of a human, economic and environmental disaster in the Gulf of

Mexico. Eleven crew members were killed and seventeen injured, the crippled rig burned

uncontrollably for two days before disappearing into the sea and 4.9 million barrels of oil

contaminated the gulf before the well flow was stopped by a temporary cap on July 15, 2010.

Two relief wells, costing USD100 million each, were drilled to permanently seal the well, which

was declared effectively dead on September 19, 2010.

The spill, the largest ever in world history, caused extensive damage to marine and land wildlife

habitats as well as the fishing and tourism industries of the Gulf States. At its largest extent the

spill produced an oil slick that covered approximately 75,000 square kilometers, affected 32

National Wildlife Refugees and caused the banning of fishing in 36% of the federal waters in the

gulf. Immense underwater plumes of dissolved oil were discovered, one measuring 35

kilometers long, 200 meters high and 2 kilometers wide, as well as oil in the sediments of

underwater canyons that provide nutrient rich water to spawning grounds.

Skimmer ships, floating booms, anchored barriers, sand-filled barricades, dispersants, oil eating

microbes and controlled burning were used in an attempt to protect hundreds of miles of

shoreline, beaches, wetlands and estuaries from the oil. These measures severely diminished

the impact of the oil spill on the Gulf States, though significant quantities of oil still made its way

to the coasts of Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama and even Florida affecting beaches, rivers and

marshlands.

The federal government declared a fisheries disaster for the affected states with initial cost

estimates at USD 2.5 billion. The Tourism industry ground to a halt in 2010, with the US Travel

association estimating losses of USD25 billion over three years. British Petroleum has pledged

USD 20 billion towards a compensation fund for business and communities affected by the spill.


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Our review of this incident revealed that there were a series of contributing factors such as

mechanical failures, engineering design, and human judgments. Additionally eight direct

contributors to the blow-out can be identified as follows:

1. The annulus cement barrier did not isolate the hydrocarbons.

2. The shoe track barriers did not isolate the hydrocarbons

3. The negative pressure test was accepted even although well integrity had not been

established.

4. Influx was not recognized until hydrocarbons were in the riser.

5. Well control responses failed to regain control of the well

6. Diversion into the mud gas separator resulted in gas venting onto the rig

7. The fire and gas system did not prevent hydrocarbon ignition

8. The BOP emergency mode did not seal the well

Based on our assessment of this incident and all the contributing factors we recommend that

the following measures be implemented to reduce the likelihood of a recurrence:

A complete review of Offshore Drilling Governance

Emergency Response Training should be improved to have crews adequately prepared

to respond various emergency scenarios.

Enhanced containment and clean-up infrastructure is needed due to inherent deepwater

risks

In the light of this disaster, BP should review their Drilling Technologies

Changes in Safety and Environmental Practices should be made at the Federal and

Corporate level to ensure that risks are fully assessed, especially with regard to

deepwater installations.


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BACK GROUND

In February 2010, the Deepwater Horizon commenced drilling an exploratory well at the

Macondo Prospect, about 66 kilometers southeast of Louisiana, at a water depth of

approximately 1500 meters. The exploration rights were acquired by BP in 2009, with the

prospect jointly owned by BP (65%), Anadarko (25%) and MOEX Offshore 2007 (10%).

On April 20, 2010, during completion operations for temporary abandonment, a blowout and

subsequent explosions forced the abandonment of the Deepwater Horizon rig. This was the

start of a human, economic and environmental disaster in the Gulf of Mexico. Eleven crew

members were killed and seventeen injured, the crippled rig burned uncontrollably for two daysbefore disappearing into the sea and 4.9 million barrels of oil contaminated the gulf before the

well flow was stopped by a temporary cap on July 15, 2010. Two relief wells, costing USD100

million each, were drilled to permanently seal the well, which was declared effectively dead on

September 19, 2010.


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SCOPE

This report seeks to achieve the following objectives:

Identify the causes of the blow-out and fire

Examine the response to the initial incident, the clean-up operations and the impact of

the spill

Discuss the Safety, Health, Governance and Environment issues arising from this

incident

Make recommendations to prevent the recurrence of this disaster


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CRITICAL SAFETY FACTORS THAT CONTRIBUTED TO THE BLOW OUT

Bp Deep Water Horizon Investigation Report September 8th 2010 found the following:

Well integrity was not established or failed

Hydrocarbons entered the well undetected and well control was lost

Hydrocarbons ignited on Deepwater horizon

Blow out preventer did not seal the well (p.31)

Investigations revealed that there were a series of factors that contributed to the deepwater

horizon accident, such as mechanical failures, engineering design, and human judgments. Out

of investigations carried out eight key findings were found.

Bp Deep Water Horizon Investigation Report September 8th 2010 found the following:

1. The annulus cement barrier did not isolate the hydrocarbons.

2. The shoe track barriers did not isolate the hydrocarbons

3. The negative pressure test was accepted even although well integrity had not been

established.

4. Influx was not recognized until hydrocarbons were in the riser.

5. Well control responses failed to regain control of the well

6. Diversion into the mud gas separator resulted in gas venting onto the rig

7. The fire and gas system did not prevent hydrocarbon ignition

8. The BOP emergency mode did not seal the well


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Finding 1:

The investigations found that annulus cement barrier failed to prevent hydrocarbons from

entering the well bore after cement placement. The investigation team possible failure modes

for hydrocarbon to enter the annulus-

Ineffective cement design

Cement placement

Cement channeling and

Lost cement circulation.

Figure 1.a Fliuds Leak past Annulus Cement Barrier

Source: Deep Water the Gulf Oil Disaster and the Future of Offshore Drilling, Jan. 2011: Report

to the President, National Commission on the BP deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore

Drilling, Mar. 2011, Web, Figure 1


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Finding 2:

After it was determined that the annulus cement did not effectively isolate the reservoir,

mechanical failures were then investigated. Mechanical barrier failures were examined, the

shoe track barriers, the casing hanger seal assembly and the production casing and

components .The findings of the investigation revealed that the shoe track barrier failed to

isolate the hydrocarbons and that the initial ingress came through the shoe track barriers.

Figure 1.b Shoe Track

Source: Deep Water the Gulf Oil Disaster and the Future of Offshore Drilling, Jan. 2011: Report

to the President, National Commission on the BP deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore

Drilling, Mar. 2011, Web, Figure 1b


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Finding 3:

In the temporary abandonment of a well a positive pressure test is done which involved

closing off the well just below the blow out preventer and pumping fluids into the well to

generate a (250-2500psi) pressure then checking if the pressure holds .

A negative pressure test follows the positive pressure test which checks both the integrity of the

casing and the bottom hole cement job. To carry out the negative pressure test, pressure was

removed from inside the well to determine if fluids leak into the well past or through the bottom

hole cement job.

At the time of the negative pressure test the test was deemed successful, however subsequent

investigations of the test results indicated that well integrity had not been established and

therefore remedial steps were not taken at the time

Finding 4:

A requirement of safe drilling and completion was that operations are to maintain control of the

well to prevent influx of hydrocarbons. However investigation data revealed that an inflow of

hydrocarbon for a period of forty (40) minutes during which hydrocarbons entered that riser

before the first operations response took place.

Finding 5:

On line data obtained showed that no well control actions were taken until hydrocarbons were in

the riser. The procedures in place did not fully address high flow emergency situations and the

well control actions taken prior to the explosion; suggest that the crew were not fully prepared to

deal with the escalating situation.

Finding 6:

The mud gas separator function was to removes small amount of gas entrained in the mud,

however when the crew diverted high flow the system was overwhelmed, at that point causing

highly flammable gas to be vented onto the rig and into confined spaces under the deck.


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Finding 7:

The heating, ventilation and air conditioning (HVAC) fans and dampers were not activated

automatically, manual activation was necessary. The system (HVAC) transferred the highly

flammable gas mixture was transferred through the system into engine room, causing one

engine to overheat and creating a potential source of ignition. Highly flammable hydrocarbons

reached potential ignition sources due to the failure of the fire and gas system.

Finding 8:

From the findings one of the major safety devices did not function as it should under emergency

conditions. The Blow Out Preventer is a valve which can be closed if the drilling crew loses

control of the formation fluids .To isolate the well after the explosion an attempt was made to

operate the emergency disconnect sequence that would close the blind shear ram, that ram had

to shear the drill pipe and seal the well bore and disconnect the lower marine riser package.

However the lower marine package did not disconnect, resulting in hydrocarbons continuing to

flow indicating the blind shear ram did not seal. The investigations findings suggest that the

explosion and resulting fire damaged the multiplex cables resulting in the emergency disconnect

sequence from closing the blind shear ram.


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ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS OF THE OIL SPILL

The adverse effects of the deepwater horizon incident are of epic proportions. The situation is

further exacerbated by the fact that not only was the livelihood of the people residing in the area

affected, but the spill also had a serious backlash on the environment. To successfully examine

the effects of this oil spill we will look at it using the following categories:

1. Effects on wildlife

2. Effects on Humans

3. Legal issues

Oil spills have grave effects on the wildlife of any environment. The consequences of this

incident are no different. Indigenous species of every type were damaged or stunted as a result

of the spill and its magnitude. According to the Spisharam in the environmental impact of the

deepwater horizon oil spill document, some of the affected organisms include:

Coral reefs

Microbes

Birds and Animals

Ocean dwellers

Source: Spisharam, (June 3rd 2010). Environmental Impact of Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill.

Environmental News. Retrieved from http://www.connect-green.com/environmental-impact-of-

deepwater-horizon-oil-spill/


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Coral reefs (primarily made of limestone), house approximately 25% of all marine species. The

sensitivity of the animals and ecosystems that inhabit these reefs make them very subject to

destruction when polluted. There are two coral reefs in the Gulf of Mexico, the Flower Garden

Banks, and the Florida Reef Tract (both illustrated below).

Figure 2A: Coral Reefs in the Gulf of Mexico

Figure 2a: Source: Spisharam, (June 3rd 2010). Environmental Impact of Deepwater Horizon

Oil Spill. Environmental News. Retrieved from http://www.connect-green.com/environmental-

impact-of-deepwater-horizon-oil-spill/

It has been shown that dispersed oil droplets and dispersants cause extensive death to coral

colonies, as well as delay in growth rates. There are key factors affecting the toxicity of oil on

coral. The document Oil Spills In Coral Reefs: Planning and Response Considerations:highlight

some of these factors as follows:

Spill impacts vary in severity with the specific conditions at a given spill, including oil type

and quantity, species composition, and the nature of oil exposure.

Oil can kill corals, depending on species and exposure.

Longer exposure to lower levels of oil may kill corals as well as shorter exposure to

higher concentrations.

Chronic oil toxicity impedes coral reproduction, growth, behavior, and development.

The time of year when a spill happens is critical, since coral reproduction and early life

stages are particularly sensitive to oil.


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Branching corals are more sensitive to oil impacts than are massive or plate-like corals.

Source: Shigenaka, G., Yender, R. A., Mearns, A., & Hunter, C.L. (July 2010). Oil Spills in

Coral Reefs: Planning Response and Considerations. Retrieved from

http://response.restoration.noaa.gov/book_shelf/8_coral_chapter3.pdf: pg 24 -33.

This document also reports that various studies show that acute and chronic exposure to oil

(even at low levels) cause harm to coral reef tissues. Although it showed that the larger coral

species are more resilient to oil pollution, the branched type coral are easily damaged.

Microbes in the water break down the oil. The issue is that the balance of these microbes can

grow out of proportion as a result of the extent of the spill. This results in a massive drop of the

oxygen available in that area, and, as an end result of too many microbes. This leads to the

creation of a hypoxic area or "dead zone" which is uninhabitable.

The shores of the Gulf of Mexico are the living areas of many endangered species of birds and

animals. As the oil contaminates the living habitats of these animals, their already challenged

numbers are further dwindled due to pollution. One such example is the national bird of

Louisiana the Brown Pelican (shown below).

Figure 2b: The Brown Pelican

Source: Spisharam, (June 3rd 2010). Environmental Impact of Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill.

Environmental News. Retrieved from http://www.connect-green.com/environmental-impact-of-

deepwater-horizon-oil-spill/


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This birds nesting area and food source has been contaminated and its numbers are again in

jeopardy. This is especially disturbing as the species has grown since the onset of Hurricane

Katrina.

According to the marine environment protection agency of Australia, some of the outcomes oil

spills has on birds are:

Hypothermia in birds by reducing or destroying the insulation and waterproofing

properties of their feathers.

Birds lose body weight as their metabolism tries to combat low body temperature.

Birds become dehydrated and can starve as they give up or reduce drinking, diving and

swimming to look for food. Damage to the insides of the birds bodies. "

Source: Australian Maritime Safety Authority (Mar 30th 2011). The Effects on Wildlife.

Retrieved from

http://www.amsa.gov.au/Marine_Environment_Protection/Educational_resources_and_infor

mation/Teachers/The_Effects_of_Oil_on_Wildlife.asp.

Under the water contain another faction of animals affected by the spill. Fishes, plankton and

other sea dwellers will undoubtedly be affected by this spill. The toxins in the oil will kill thesespecies as well as the larger predators that feed on them. The ocean food chain ranges from

small plankton to large whales, and all are affected by the woes of one species. Some examples

of fish species directly affected include the blue fin tuna whose spawning grounds are damaged,

and the small minnow fish, which were seen swimming just below the oil layer.

The effects of the spill on the human inhabitants of the area were also very serious. On one

hand there were some reported cases of adverse health effects such as rashes, trouble

breathing, and dizziness. These were however mainly concentrated to the people involved in

the clean-up effort. A more salient effect is on the income of the fishermen in the area. It is well

known that BP spent a large sum of money in compensation to individuals whose livelihoods

were cut off due to the oil.


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The most important point is that of the legislation involving the oil drilling operations. According

to the Washington Post in an article printed on Wednesday May 5th 2010, the BP lease at deep

water horizon was exempted from doing and environmental impact analysis in accordance with

the US National Environmental Policy Act on April 6th 2009 by the Minerals Management

Service. This has led to environmentalists calling for a re-examination of the policy involving

drilling operations. The greater concern is that no one saw the potential for the deep water

project to result in the incident that happened, which was one of the largest US oil spills to date.

According to government documents three reviews of the area led to the conclusion that a

massive oil spill as improbable. It goes without saying that more stringent policies must be put in

place. In my opinion the environment cannot afford to have these types of incidents taking

place on a regular basis, if at all.


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GOVERNANCE

The Deepwater Horizon rig sank on April 22, 2010, two days after the well blowout and

explosion that killed eleven workers. Soon after this, attention shifted to the Minerals

Management Service (MMS), the federal agency responsible for oversight of wells drilled and

operated within Americas Exclusive Economic Zone in the Gulf of Mexico. On May 11, 2010,

the MMS was stripped of its safety and environmental enforcement responsibilities with the

Secretary of the Interior, Ken Salazar, announcing his intention to place this function within a

separate and independent entity. By June 19, 2010 the MMS name had been discarded entirely

with plans in train to reorganize the agency into three (3) separate entities: a bureau of Ocean

Energy Management; a bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement; and an Office of

Natural Resource Revenue.

The U.S governments response to this tragedy was an acknowledgement of the shortcomings

of federal regulation of offshore oil and gas installations over the years. The increased revenue

associated with drilling further offshore came with increased safety and environmental risks,

which were not matched by more sophisticated regulatory oversight. The Industry resisted such

oversight and since the MMS was created in 1982, neither the US congress nor a succession of

presidents has been able to overcome that opposition.

This typifies a reactionary approach to the governance of offshore oil and gas installations, not

only by the U.S but by governments worldwide. Following a series of disasters in the 1980s, the

Alexander Kielland rig capsized in the North Sea, the Ocean Ranger sank off Newfoundland

and the Piper Alpha platform exploded and sank off Scotland, the respective governments of

Norway, Canada and the United Kingdom each responded by transforming there approach to

the industry. In this approach the regulator would consent to development activity, proceeding

only upon the operators demonstration that sufficient safety and risk management systems

were in place and requiring that operators demonstrate thorough consideration of all risks

associated with the structures and operations for a drilling or production plan. The regulator no

longer approved operations relying solely on prescribed operational and safety standards.


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After an explosion destroyed a platform operated by ARCO, of the Louisiana coast in 1989, a

marine board review found that the MMS needed to upgrade its program to address the

changes in the operations of the deepwater blocks. The report concluded that MMS should

place its primary emphasis on the detection of potential hazards, particularly those associated

with human factors, operational procedures and modification of equipment and facilities. In 1991

the MMS published a notice requesting comments on a proposed Safety and Environmental

Management Program (SEMP), similar to that of the UK and Norway. In 1994 the MMS

announced that it would continue evaluations for two more years. Further deadlines slipped and

faced with continuing industry opposition the MMS proposed a watered down version of the

SEMP in 2006, requiring that only 4 of the 12 widely accepted elements of industrial safety

management be put in place. Industry opposition to even this was swift and only after the

Macondo blowout in 2010 was the federal agency able to implement a comprehensive,

mandatory SEMP.

In concluding it must be noted that the federal government has never lacked the authority to

control whether, when and how oil and gas are leased, explored and developed in the US. The

governments authority is virtually without limitation in this area and the MMS was the agency

mandated to regulate the industry. While advances in drilling technology enabled operators to

explore further offshore and in deeper waters both the Executive branch and the Congress

failed to ensure that agency regulators receive the additional personnel and technical expertise

and political autonomy needed to overcome the commercial interests that have opposed more

stringent regulation.


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HEALTH RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommendation 1

Monitoring of Workers Health

Companies must monitor the health of their workers before, during and after an incident.

Agencies should be set up to continuously monitor the health status of all affected employees.

These affected employees are those who have been exposed to crude oil and/or toxic fumes

Recommendation 2

Enforcement of Safety Practices

All employees of the platform should always wear the proper and necessary Personal Protective

Equipment (PPE). The safer a worker is the less likely to be injured. Employers should always

enforce all safety practices and procedures. Workers must be trained to inspect all their PPE

for signs of damage or wear and tear. Emergency PPE should be accessible to all employees

in well visible areas. All employees should receive training on emergency and evacuation

procedures regularly.

Recommendation 3

Training Centers for Volunteers

Centers should be established to train volunteers who choose to respond to oil spills. In that oil

spills may contain chemicals that can be toxic to individuals in contact with the spill. Volunteers

must be aware of the dangers associated with the chemicals they are handling. Especially when

using chemical agents during an oil spill cleanup. Chemicals used in the clean up must have all

the necessary documents attached such as instructions for use and the Material and Data

Sheet.


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Recommendation 4

Increased Screening of Fishing Communities

Government should enforce rules for fishing areas. In that restrict access to fisherman in areas

that may contain traces of oil or contaminants that could poison fishes. By restricting access to

certain areas may help in reducing the number of contaminated fishes entering the market.

Fishing communities close to offshore platforms should have regular screening and testing of all

aquatic life and water. Through regular testing the government will know the areas being

affected by an oil platform. They will be able to pinpoint oil spills and leaks before they climb into

a more serious situation. Also with continuous monitoring we can track the number and severity

of affected communities.

Recommendation 5

Therapy centers For Family Members of Affected Employees

The stability of a family can be affected as a result of any disaster. In that the families of the

employees at the platform were affected emotionally. Studies show that children are more

vulnerable to emotional stress that adults.

Centers should be established for the families of all employees affected by the disaster. These

centers should be equipped with therapists who will attend to these families. The centers shall

also provide advice and assistance with caring for all the injured parties.


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CONCLUSION

As the world has seen, the BP Deepwater Horizon disaster was of such a devastating

magnitude, that no private sector company would have been prepared to respond and handle.

All that can be done now is Recommendations and Measures that can be made and put into

practice so that a disaster like this would not happen again.


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RECOMMENDATIONS

Changes in Safety and Environmental Practices

BP has proclaimed the importance of safety for its vast worldwide operations and

yet this disaster has occurred. What they need to do now is fully review their

safety practices as well as their Environmental laws in order to prevent further

accidents.

As research shows this is not the only incident that BP has been responsible for,

there was the Texas City Refinery Explosion and the BP Forties Alpha gas line

rupture just to name a few.

So many past events have occurred. Strong recommendations should be made

by foreign entities for BP to review their practices and set higher safety

standards.

Safety Training

The importance of safety Training for employees cannot be stressed enough.

Workers need to be adequately trained in performing safe work practices and

everyone needs to know how to respond to accidents and in what ways to handle

it.

Refresher training should be carries out in a continuous basis to keep workers

well informed and well prepared.

Drilling Technology

In the light of this disaster, BP should review their Drilling Technologies in an

event to try or even change their drilling habits.

Engineering needs to be actively involved in this aspect. Management and also

Reliability also should be included as well as all departments from across the

board in an event to improve this aspect.


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Containment and Clean up Technology

If BP is to perform further drilling operations of this magnitude then they need to

have adequate containment and clean-up infrastructure. Maybe the same

technology can be used but measures can be put in place o handle a larger

capacity spill.

Preparedness

Improved measures should be put in place to have crews adequately prepared to

handle accidents. They should be able to respond in a timely manner so that the

situation would not get out of control. Management, Safety, Risk Assessment and

others should actively take part in this activity.

Corporate Culture and Management Behaviour

A complete review of Offshore Management Drilling practices should take place

and proper guidelines should be implemented because a disaster like this should

have never have happened. The companys Risk Management practices should

come under scrutiny.

Corporate BP should realize the impact that this disaster had on the world and

the effects that are still ongoing.

They need to be actively involved in all aspects like Clean-up campaigns, worker

training and counseling just to name a few. They need to get back peoples trust

in their company and the only way to do that is to go directly to the people.


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REFERENCES

Deepwater Horizon Accident Investigation Report, BP, Sept.8th 2010.Web.

Mar.2011

Deep Water The Gulf Oil disaster and future of offshore , Report to the President,

National commission on BP Deep Water Horizon Oil spill and Offshore Drilling

.Jan.2011.Web.Mar.2011http://www.oilspillcommission.gov

Australian Maritime Safety Authority ( Mar 30th 2011). The Effects on Wildlife. Retrieved

from

http://www.amsa.gov.au/Marine_Environment_Protection/Educational_resources_and_in

formation/Teachers/The_Effects_of_Oil_on_Wildlife.asp .

Spisharam, (June 3rd 2010). Environmental Impact of Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill.

Environmental News. Retrieved from http://www.connect-green.com/environmental-

impact-of-deepwater-horizon-oil-spill/

Shigenaka, G., Yender, R. A., Mearns, A., & Hunter, C.L. (July 2010). Oil Spills in Coral

Reefs: Planning Response and Considerations. Retrieved from

http://response.restoration.noaa.gov/book_shelf/8_coral_chapter3.pdf: pg 24 -33.

Eilperin, J. (2010, May 5). U.S. Exempted BPs Gulf Of Mexico Drilling from

Environmental Impact Study. The Washington Post. Retrieved from

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-

dyn/content/article/2010/05/04/AR2010050404118.html?hpid=topnews.
http://www.amsa.gov.au/Marine_Environment_Protection/Educational_resources_and_information/Teachers/The_Effects_of_Oil_on_Wildlife.asphttp://www.amsa.gov.au/Marine_Environment_Protection/Educational_resources_and_information/Teachers/The_Effects_of_Oil_on_Wildlife.asphttp://www.amsa.gov.au/Marine_Environment_Protection/Educational_resources_and_information/Teachers/The_Effects_of_Oil_on_Wildlife.asphttp://www.amsa.gov.au/Marine_Environment_Protection/Educational_resources_and_information/Teachers/The_Effects_of_Oil_on_Wildlife.asphttp://www.amsa.gov.au/Marine_Environment_Protection/Educational_resources_and_information/Teachers/The_Effects_of_Oil_on_Wildlife.asp

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