By Major General John P. Condon, USMC(Ret.)Edited by John M. Elliott

Designed by Charles Cooney

Published by the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Air Warfare)and the Commander, Naval Air Systems Command

Washington, D.C.

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402

CONTENTS

I. The Early Years: 1912-1941 3The First Marine Aviation Force 5First Marine Aviation Force in France 6Survival: 1919-1920 7Expansion and Training 10

II. WoridWaril 11Wake Island 11Battle of Midway 12The Road Back 14The Solomons Campaign 17Central Pacific Operations 20The Philippines 21Okinawa 22The Occupation of Japan and Demobilization 22

Ill. Post-WW II Operations 23

IV. Korean War 23Chosin Reservoir 27

V. Technological Development 31

VI. Southeast Asia Involvement 33

VII. Pressing on Toward the 1980s 41

Introduction

I n any historical appreciation of Marine Corps Aviation, there aretwo factors which make Marine Aviation unique. The first is theclose relationship between Marine and Naval Aviation, and thesecond is the unchanging objective of Marine Aviation to providedirect support to Marine ground forces in combat.

One of the reasons for the parternership between Marine andNaval Aviation is the commonality which they have shared sincetheir very beginnings. Both are under the umbrella of theDepartment of the Navy and there is an interlocked approach toplanning, budgeting, procurement and operations, at all levels fromWashington to the major fleet, field and base commands. Allaviators of the naval establishment, whether Marine or Navy, aretrained in the same training commands, in the same equipment,and by the same instructors and technicians, under the samesyllabi. This adds up to the closest bond between two major airforces.

The second factor — the basic objective of Marine Aviation: tosupport Marine Corps operations on the ground — speaks for itself.While there have been a few variations in some aspects of MarineAviation planning, there has never been a departure from thisobjective.

PCN 19000317500

F'or sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office\Vashington, DC. 20402

By Major General John P. Condon. USMC(Ret.)

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Harry Gann2

I. The Early Years: 1912-1941

anne Aviation was officially born onMay 22, 1912, when First LieutenantAlfred A. Cunningham, USMC, reportedto the camp "for duty in connection withaviation." This was several months afterthe Naval Aviation Camp was establishedat Annapolis in 1911, manned byLieutenants 1. G. Ellyson, John Rodgersand J. H. Towers, plus mechanics andthree aircraft.

There was much talk at the time of anemerging mission forthe Marine Corps ofthe "occupation and defense of advancebases for the fleet." The Advance BaseSchool had been commissioned at thePhiladelphia Navy Yard and Cunninghamwas among the first Marines to beassigned; In the spring of 1912, Lt.Cunningham was ordered to Annapolisfor flight instruction. A second Marinewas soon assigned to the school, FirstLieutenant Bernard L. Smith, followed bySecond Lieutenant William M. Mcllvainin December, and First LieutenantFrancis 1. Evans in June 1915. On March31, 1916, First Lieutenant Roy S. Geigerreported to Lieutenant CommanderHenry C. Mustin at Pensacola. Each ofthese five Marines, all eager to "learn thenew," had his own concept of how thisnew arm could enhance theeffectiveness of Marine Corpsoperations. They were the prewarnucleus of Marine Aviation.

Cunningham obtained orders to theBurgess Company and Curtiss factory atMarblehead, Mass. After two hours and40 minutes of instruction, he soloed onAugust 20, 1912, even though he hadonly witnessed two landings prior to hisown. Cunningham stated that just as thegasoline gage stick was indicatingabout empty, "I got up my nerve andmade a good landing, how I don'tknow....This was my first solo."

First Lieutenant B. L. Smith becameMarine Aviator No. 2 with an officialdesignation as Naval Aviator No. 6. LikeCunningham, Smith's contributionswere enormous in the experimental andearly developmental phases of Naval andMarine Aviation. There was somedifference between them concerning theconcept of Marine Aviation.Cunningham favored complete emphasison support of the Corps as the function ofMarine Aviation, whereas Smith viewedMarine Corps support as a combinedeffort of Naval and Marine Aviation. Itwould seem that the passage of time hasconfirmed the soundness of both of theirconcepts.

One of B. L. Smith's earliestcontributions to Marine Aviation camewith a combined landing force/fleet

exercise at Culebra, P.R., in JanuaryFebruary 1914. It was a test of the abilityof a Marine force to occupy, fortify anddefend an advance base and hold itagainst hostile attack. Smith andMcllvain, with 10 enlisted mechanics,one flying boat and one amphibian,embarked at Philadelphia and arrived atCulebra early in January.

Using their C-3 Curtiss flying boatprimarily, Smith and Mcllvain flewscouting and reconnaissance missions.Throughout the exercise on an almostdaily basis, the two pilots took officers ofthe bridgade on flights over the islandand its defenses to "show the ease andspeed of aerial reconnaissance andrange of vision open to the eyes of theaerial scout." Based on his experience atCulebra, Lt. Smith later recommendedthat the Marine air unit for the advancebase mission be composed of fiveaviators and about 20 enlistedmechanics and ground crewmen.

Smith was ordered to the U.S. Embassyin Paris by the Secretary of the Navy in1914, where he served as aviationobserver and as an intelligence officer.During this tour, he visited Frenchaviation units and occasionally flew i'ticombat with them. After being orderedback from France in 1917, he directedmuch of the design and procurement ofnaval aircraft, and also organized theaerial gunnery and bombing school atMiami. In 1918, Smith was ordered backto Europe to organizethe Intelligence andPlanning Section for Naval Aviation atNavy Headquarters in Paris. After thewar, he had charge of assemblingmaterial and equipment for the famoustransatlantic flight of the Navy's NC-4 in1919.

Second Lieutenant Mcllvain reportedto Annapolis for flight instruction inDecember 1912, becoming MarineAviator No. 3 and officially designatedNaval Aviator No. 12.

In January 1915, McIlvainwas the onlyMarine left at the Navy Flying School, andit was at this time that the "MarineSection, Navy Flying School" wasofficially formed. In August as the war inEurope escalated, an agreement wasreached between the Navy and the Armyfor the training of Navy and Marine pilotsin land planes at the Signal CorpsAviation School in San Diego. Secretaryof the Navy Daniels believed that defenseof advance bases and, in the case ofMarines, possible joint operations withthe Army, required an aviation force ableto operate from either land or water.Mcllvain was one of the first two NavalAviators sent to the Army flight school.

During histraining there, Mcllvain flewfor the first time in a cockpit inside afuselage instead of from a seat in theopen, in front of the wings of a primitive"pusher." He stated later that he never

would forget "the feeling of security I feltto have a fuselage around me."

First Lieutenant Francis 1. Evansreported to Pensacola in the summer of1915, becoming the fourth MarineAviator and Naval Aviator No. 26. One ofhis many contributions to Marine andNaval Aviation involved spin-recovery asa basic element of aviation safety. Up tothat time if one inadvertently got into aspin, there was no known recoverytechnique. A spin usually meant the lossof both aircraft and pilot.

At the time, there was muchdiscussion about whether or not a

seaplane, with its heavy pontoons, couldbe looped successfully. Early in 1917, ona routine flight over Pensacola Bay in anew N-9 seaplane, Evans decided tomake an attempt to end suchdiscussions. At an altitude of about3,500 feet, he put the plane into a dive topick up enough speed to get "over thetop" of the loop maneuver. He lost toomuch speed on the way up and the planestalled and went into a spin. Evans,without realizing he was in a spin,instinctively pushed his control wheelforward to regain air speed andcontrolled the turning motion of the spinwith the rudder. Recovering from thespin, he climbed back up and tried again,stalling, spinning and recovering until hefinally managed to complete the loopwithout a stall. To make sure he hadwitnesses, Evans then flew over theseaplane hangars and repeated the

Marine Aviator No. 1, Capt. Alfred A.Cunningham.

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whole show. Pensacola incorporated thespin-recovery technique into the trainingsyllabus, and Evans was awarded aDistinguished Flying Cross retroactivelyin 1936 for his extraordinary discovery in1917.

First Lieutenant Roy S. Geiger reportedto Pensacola March 31, 1916, as MarineAviator No. 5. He was formallydesignated a Naval Aviator on June 9,1917, becoming the 49th naval pilot towin his wings. During histraining Geigermade 107 heavier-than-air flights,totaling 73 hours of flight time, plus 14free balloon ascents, totaling 28 hoursand 45 minutes.

Geiger was undoubtedly the mostdistinguished aviator in Marine Aviationhistory and one of its greatest pilots. Hisdistinction stems primarily from his earlyentry into aviation, his participation inevery significant Marine Corps actionfrom WW I through WW II, and hiscontinued and constant leadership role inMarine Aviation over a period of almost30 developmental and action-packedyears. Geiger became a career model forboth aviation and ground Marines in WWII, serving with superior distinction asboth the commanding general of the FirstMarine Air Wing in the hardest days ofthe battle for Guadalcanal, and later ascommander of the Third MarineAmphibious Corps at Bougainville,Guam, Peleliu and Okinawa.

As the war in Europe increased inintensity and the United States camecloser to becoming involved, these five —

Cunningham, Smith, Mcllvain, Evansand Geiger — were the foundation onwhich Marine Aviation was built.

With the U.S. declaration of waragainst Germany, the Navy and MarineCorps air arms entered a period of greatlyaccelerated growth in manpower andequipment. Marine Aviation developedits own units and bases, and the NavyDepartment adopted antisubmarinewarfare as Naval Aviation's principalmission.

The Marine Corps entered the warwith511 officers and 13,214 enlistedpersonnel and, by November 11, 1918,reached a strength of 2,400 officers and70,000 men. Under the energeticdirection of Major General CommandantGeorge Barnett, the Marine Corps'primary goal was to send a brigade toFrance to fight alongside the Army.Marine Aviation began an aggressiveeffort to ensure that the new arm got itsshare of the Corps expanding manpowerand that its units would be Sent to Francein support of the brigade. Cunningham,as the designated commanding officer ofthe Aviation Company of the AdvanceBase Force at Philadelphia, became theprincipal leader and driving force ofMarine Aviation expansion.

Marine Corps Aviation soon founditself split between two separatemissions. Cunningham's AviationCompany at Philadelphia, renamed theMarine Aeronautic Company, wasassigned the mission of flying seaplaneson antisubmarine patrols. Maj.Gen.

Barnett had secured Navy Departmentapproval in the summer of 1917 for theformation of a Marine air unit oflandplanes to provide reconnaissanceand artillery spotting for the brigadebeing sent to France. By October 14, theMarine Aeronautic Company hadattained a strength of 34 officers and 330enlisted men, and was divided into thetwo projected units. The 1st MarineAeronautic Company of 10 officers and93 men would prepare for seaplanemissions, while the 1st AviationSquadron of 24 officers and 237enlisted would organize to support theMarine brigade in France.

The 1st Marine Aeronautic Companyled the way into active service. In Octoberthe company, commanded by then-Captain Francis T. Evans, moved fromPhiladelphia to Naval Air Station (NAS),Cape May, N.J. On January 9, 1918, thecompany embarked at Philadelphia forduty in the Azores to beginantisubmarine operations. The unit'sstrength on deployment was 1 2 officersand 133 enlisted personnel, withequipment initially at 10 Curtiss R-6s andtwo N-9s. Later in the deployment, thecompany received six Curtiss HS-2Ls,which greatlyenhanced its abilityto carryout its basic mission.

During 1918, the Aeronautic companyoperated from its base at Punta Delgadaon the island of San Miguel. It flewregular patrols to deny enemysubmarines ready access to the convoyroutes and any kind of base activity in the

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Azores. It was not the stuff of which greatheroes are made, but the First AeronauticCompany was the first American aviationunit to deploy with a specific mission,which was well and faithfullycarried out.

The First Marine Aviation Force

The deployment of the First AviationForce, was a much more complexundertaking. The story begins with theMarine landplane unit, the 1st AviationSquadron, commanded by CaptainMcllvain. The squadron was to receivebasic flight training at the Army AviationSchool at Hazelhurst Field, Mineola, LI.,N.Y. It would then move to the ArmyAdvanced Flying School at Houston,Texas, and upon completion of thatsyllabus would be deployed to combat.The squadron moved from Philadelphiato Mineola on October 17, 1917, to begintraining. In November, the six officers inits balloon contingent were sent to FortOmaha, Neb., for training as artilleryobservers. The rest of the story revealsMarine initiative, determination,flexibility and success.

At Mineola, the squadron flew JN-4BJenny trainers with civilian instructors,and the main body of the squadron livedin tents. Training progressed reasonablywell but, by December, temperatureswere dropping rapidly and something hadto be done. In the absence of any otherorders, Capt. Mcllvain packed his troops,equipment and aircraft on a train that hehad requisitioned and headed south on

January 1, 1918. They paused atWashington to request orders, resumedthe journey, and somewhere en routethey received orders to the Army'sGerstner Field at Lake Charles, La.,where training continued in a moresuitable climate.

The next chapter in this account of afirm resolution to prepare for combatconcerns Captain Geiger's AeronauticDetachment at Philadelphia. This unitwas organized on December 15, 1917,with four officers and 36 enlisted men,most of whom were detached fromMcllvain's squadron. The unit's missionwas not yet clearly defined, but it wasplanned to be a supporting element of theAdvanced Base Force. However, onFebruary 4, 1 918, Geiger received ordersto take his detachment, now 11 officersand 41 men, to NAS Miami, Fla. Soonafter arriving, Geiger, seeking a base forthe entire 1st Aviation Force, moved hiscommand to a small airstrip on the edgeof the Everglades, owned at the time bythe Curtiss Flying School. To secureMarine training facilities independent ofthe Army, Geiger absorbed the entireSchool into the Marine Corps, arrangingto commission the instructors in thereserves and requisition the school'sJennies. On April 1, Mcllvain's squadronarrived at the field from Lake Charles and,for the first time, the nucleus of the 1stAviation Force was consolidated at onelocation.

Capt. Cunningham launched a

campaign to bring his squadrons to full

strength in men and machines. He maderepeated recruiting visits to the Officers'School at Quantico, Va., and collectedother volunteers elsewhere. As long asthey seemed willing, able and inpossession of a reasonable set ofcredentials as potential pilots ormechanics, they got orders to Miami.

Even with this influx of strength, thetwo detachments could not furnishenough pilots for the planned foursquadrons of the 1st Aviation Force.Realizing this, Cunningham toured theNavy air installations and recruited NavalAviators, most of them young reservistswho wanted to go to France. Theseofficers, already qualified Navy seaplanepilots, transferred from the Navy to theMarine Corps, and reportedtothe Marinefield at Miami for landplane training. Of135 pilots who eventually flew in Francewith the 1st Aviation Force, 78 weretransferred naval officers.

By June 16, the force was organizedinto a headquarters and four squadronsdesignated A, B, C and D. On July13, theforce, less Squadron D which was leftbehind temporarily, trained at Miami. OnJuly 18, the 107 officers and 654 enlistedmen of the three squadrons sailed forFrance in the transport USS De Kaib.

At Miami, the Marine Flying Fieldbecame a bustling military complex of

Marine DH-4s comprised the Day Wing of theNorthern Bombing Group in France.

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hangars, warehouses, machine shops,and gunnery and bombing ranges. Thecompletion of the manning and trainingof Squdaron D was accomplished as afirst priority, and then additionalpersonnel were trained to provide airpatrols off the Florida coast.

First Marine Aviation Force in France

The force disembarked at Brest on July30, and found a full bag ofadministrative and supply problems.Foremost among them was the fact thatno arrangements had been made to movethem the 400 miles to their baselocations near Calais. This was solvedand the two-day trip accomplished withthe requisition of a French train by Maj.Cunningham. Squadrons A and B werelocated at landing field sites in Calais andDunkirk, with Squadron C occupying afield near the town of La Fresne. Theforce headquarters were established inthe town of Bois en Ardres.

The worst problem encountered was adelay in the arrival of the force's aircraft.Before leaving for France, Cunninghamhad made arrangements with the Armyfor the delivery of 72 DH-4 bombers.These British-designed aircraft were tobe shipped to France, assembled thereand issued to the Marine force. Due todelays in assembly, followed by anadministrative error which sent most ofthe assembled aircraft to England, thefirst one did not reach the force untilSeptember. When it became clear thatthe delays were in the offing,Cunningham got the Navy's approval tomake a deal with the British. For every

three Liberties that Cunningham sent theRAF, they sent back one DH-9A withengine installed.

Unable to get his pilots into the airimmediately in American machines, Maj.Cunningham again talked to the Britishand made arrangements for Marinepilots to fly bombing missions with RAFSquadrons 217 and 218 in DH-4s and 9s.Each pilot flew at least three missionsunder this cooperative agreement.

On October 5, Squadron D arrived at LaFresne bringing the strength of the forceto 149 officers and 183 enlisted. At thispoint, the squadrons were redesignated7,8, 9and 10,toconformtotheNorthernBombing Group identification system.The Germans had evacuated theirsubmarine bases on the Channel coast,eliminating the planned mission of theMarines. Instead the Marine force wasplaced in general support of the Britishand Belgian armies in their final assaulton the crumbling German defenses.

By October 12, the Marines hadreceived enough of their own DH-4s and9As to begin flying missionsindependently of the British. Two dayslater, Captain Robert S. Lytle of SquadronNine led the Marines' first mission intheir own aircraft, bombing the German-held railyards at Thielt, Belgium. Thebombing was without incident but, on theway back to base, the formation of eightDHs was jumped by 12 German fighters.The Germans succeeded in separatingone aircraft from the rest of the formationand concentrated their attack on SecondLieutenant Ralph Talbot, one of the NavalReserve officers who had transferred toMarine Aviation. Talbot's gunner,

Corporal Robert G. Robinson, quicklyshot down one attacker, but two othersclosed in from below, spraying the DHwith fire and wounding Robinson in thearm. In spite of his wounds, Robinsoncleared a jam in his gun and continued tofire until hit twice more, while Talbottookfrantic evasive action. With Robinsonunconscious in the rear seat, Talbotbrought down a second German with hisfixed guns and then put the plane into asteep dive to escape the remainingGerman fighters. Crossing the Germanlines at an altitude of 50 feet, he landedsafely at a Belgium airfield whereRobinson was hospitalized. Robinsonultimately recovered and, for thismission, both he and Talbot wereawarded the Medal of Honor.

Between October 14 and November11, the Marines carried out a total of 14bombing missions against railway yards,canals, supply dumps and airfields —always flying without fighter escort.

During their tour in France fromAugust 9 to November 11, Marines of the1st Aviation Force participated in 57missions. They dropped a total of 33,932pounds of bombs, at a cost of four pilotskilled, and one pilot and two gunnerswounded. They scored confirmed kills offour German fighters and claimed eightmore. During its brief period incombat, the force earned a total of 30awards, including Talbot's andRobinson's Medals of Honor and fourDistinguished Service Medals.

The Curtiss R-6 trainer was similar to the JN-4Jenny,

Survival: 1919-1920

The 1st Aviation Force arrived back inthe United States early in January 1919,and was disbanded in February, withmost of the remaining personnel andequipment sent to Quantico and ParrisIsland, Calif. From the remnants of theforce, Maj. Cunningham formed a newSquadron D to support the SecondProvisional Brigade in the DominicanRepublic, and Squadron E to support theFirst Provisional Brigade in Haiti. InSeptember, the Marine Flying Field atMiami was closed, and the last chapter inthe story of Marine Aviation in WW Iended.

The Marine Corps, along with the otherservices, began a desperate struggle toconvince Congress that it should at leastmaintain prewar levels of personnel,bases, facilities and equipment. Withinthis overall struggle for appreciation andlegislation, Maj. Cunningham fought forpermanent status for Marine Aviation.He appeared before such august bodiesas the General Board of the Navy, andwrote numerous articles to persuade

skeptics within and outside the Corps ofthe value of aviation for future militaryoperations. As a result of his efforts andthose of other dedicated individuals,Marine Aviation won its battle forsurvival. Congress established MarineCorps strength at approximately one-fifththat of the Navy — 26,380 Marines. Itthen authorized an additional 1,020Marines for aviation and establishedpermanent aviation bases at Quantico,Parris Island and San Diego.

While the postwar situation was beingidentified in Washington, some more orless permanent operating organizationswere shaping up in the field. On October30,1920, Major General CommandantLejeune approved an aviation table oforganization. Existing personnel wereformed into four squadrons, each of twoflights. The First Squadron (flights A andB) consisted of the planes and crews inthe Dominican Republic. The Second andThird Squadrons (flights C, D, E and F)were stationed at Quantico, with theFourth Squadron (flights G and H) at Portau Prince, Haiti, in support of the FirstProvisional Brigade. The detachment at

Parris Island wasdesignated Flight L, andit was ordered to prepare to move toGuam.

In 1924, the Marine Corpswithdrew itsair units from the Dominican Republicand, with the additional stength thusmade available, Marine Aviation wasestablished on the West Coast. TheSecond Air Group, which was formed in1925, consisted of an observation,fighter and headquarters squadron.

Previously mentioned was the need atthe end of WW I for Marine Aviation toprove itself to Congress, the Americanpublic, and to the rest of the MarineCorps. The Corps found it necessary tocombine serious military exercises withheadline-hunting spectaculars in orderto make the point for Marine Aviation andfor the Corps in general. One of thelargest of the maneuvers in this categorywas conducted in 1 922 from Quantico.This exercise was a practice march of4,000 Marines from Quantico toGettysburg, Pa. Three of the big MartinMBT bombers were assigned in supportof the troops on the march. They flew atotal of 500 hours and 40,000 air miles,carrying passengers and freight andmaintaining radio contact with thecolumn in execution of simulated attackmissions. Similar exercises were heldalmost annually to keep the operationalcapabilities of the Corps and MarineAviation in the public eye.

In addition, Marine Aviators testednew equipment and techniques duringthe decade. They also made severalimportant long-distance flights andparticipated in numerous significant airraces. One of these fligths consisted oftwo DH-4s led by Lieutenant Colonel

Left, the First Aero Company at Porto Delgado,Azores. Bottom left, a Standard E-1. Bottomright, a FB-1, the first of a long line of Boeingfighters.

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Thomas C. Turner, from Washington toSanto Domingo, the longest unguardedflight over land and water made up to thattime. Another led by Maj. Geiger was aflight of three Martin MBTs from SanDiego to Quantico which took 11 days,with many stops for repairs and fuelalong the route. Another dramatic flightwas led by First Lieutenant Ford 0.Rogers, involving two DH-4s flying fromSanto Domingto to Washington, to St.Louis, to San Francisco, back toWashington and on to Santo Domingo.This flight, including engine changes onthe way back to Washington, took twoand one-half months and 127 hours ofactual flying time. It demonstrated theskill of Marine pilots and the technicalcompetence of Marine mechanics.

Air races became an Americaninstitution in the twenties. Marinessometimes flew Navy aircraft and atother times flew their own squadronaircraft. A prime participant in theformerwas Lieutenant C. F. Schilt who flew aNavy seaplane to second place in therenowned Schneider Cup race in 1926.In another famous race, the winningMarine pilot was Major Charles A. Lutzwho took first in the Curtiss Marine

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Trophy Race at Anacostia in 1928, flyinga Marine Curtiss Hawk.

The Quantico Marines had a showschedule of no small proportions wellinto the thirties. They worked up well-practiced precision show routines whichliterally put Marine Aviation "on themap." These shows helped to establish asolid reputation for competence andflying skill for Marine Aviation in the eyesof the American public. Prime leaders ofthese spectacular squadron airdemonstrations through the latetwenties and into the thirties includedMajors "Tex" Rogers, "Sandy"Sanderson, Oscar Brice and many othergreat Marine pilots almost alwaysunder the expert tutelage of Roy S.Geiger. These public shows, always inaddition to the normal emphasis onroutine training and proficiencyrequirements, were important factors inthe progress of Marine Aviation tomature stature.

During the twenties and thirties,Marine Aviation had units in support ofthe brigades in Haiti, the DominicanRepublic, China and Nicaragua. Theaviators, for the first time, had a realchance to demonstrate their ability to

A Martin MT assigned to VF-2M, Quantico, Va.It was the largest aircraft in the Marine Corpsprior to WW II.

support ground operations.In both Haiti and Santo Domingo there

was drawnout, tedious guerrilla warfarein largely roadless tropical jungle terrain.Generally, because of limitations ofarmament and performance of theaircraft — plus the tack of reliable air-ground communications — aviation wasmost effective in the indirect support role.The ability of aviation to enhanceoperations in trackless terrain wasbecoming clear to the Marine Corpsthrough these types of expeditionarydeployments.

In Haiti in 1919, Lieutenant L. H. M.Sanderson of Squadron Four made achange in the delivery tactics used inbombing. He abandoned the usualpractice of having the bomb sighted andreleased by the observer in the rear seatof the aircraft. Instead, he put the aircraftinto a dive of abour 45 degrees, sightedthe target over the nose of the plane, andreleased the bomb himself from the frontcockpit, at about 250 feet. He found thismethod improved the accuracy of the

drops and his success brought about theadoption of the dive method by thesquadron. While Sanderson neverclaimed to be the inventor of dive-bombing, he was certainly one ofthefirstMarine or Naval Aviators to use it as astandard technique.

In addition to operations in Haiti andSanto Domingo, the outbreak of civilwars in China and Nicaragua in 1927also saw Marine Aviation deploying withthe Marine brigades dispatched to eacharea. In China, Fighting Squadron Threefrom San Diego, and ObservationSquadron Five, which was formed inChina with aircraft from San Diego andpersonnel from Guam, were dispatchedto Tientsin. The airfield was about 35miles from Tientsin and the aviationpersonnel had to furnish their ownsecurity in a very exposed position. Therewas no combat during their 18-monthstay. The squadron flew a total of 3,818sorties in support of the brigade.

In Nicaragua,the guerrilla-type warfaregave aviation its first opportunity toprovide a form of close air support toMarines in combat. In 1927, a civil warled to American intervention. Followingwere years of sporadic bush fighting

Top left, a Curtiss F6C-4fighter. Left, Marine DH-4s over Mt. Momotombo,Nicaragua. Top right, aCurtiss F6C-3 modifiedfor racing.

which continued until 1932. ObservationSquadron One from San Diego andObservation Squadron Four fromQuantico, constituted the MarineAviation support for the brigade. TheNicaraguan deployment produced somenotable achievements by MarineAviation, precursors of what was tobecome the Marine air-ground teamstandard of future decades.

The thirties opened with an economicworldwide crisis, referred to half a

century later as the great depression. Theeffect on Marine Aviation and itsallocated portion of Marine Corps andNavy appropriated funds wasdebilitating. One of the first results wasto end Marine Aviation's involvementwith ballooning. At San Diego, twoobservation squadrons were consoli-dated into one and the same action wastaken at. Quantico with two fightersquadrons. The squadron at Guam,which had been there since the end ofWW I, was returned to the U.S. anddecommissioned. Marine Aviation unitswere all withdrawn from Nicaragua in1932 and from Haiti in 1934. Thus,consolidation, contraction andpostponement became the planning

considerations most commonlyencountered at the start of the decadeimmediately preceding Pearl Harbor.

This cutback was not without itsbeneficial effects. It reinforced WW Iingenuity displayed by Cunningham andGeiger in "making do with what you'vegot" and in solving problems withimagination and initiative.

Refinement and definition of theMarine Corps mission took place early inthe decade. With the formation of theFleet Marine Forces (FMF) replacing theEast and West Coast ExpeditionaryForces, the aviation components of thenewly formed FMF became Aircraft Oneat Quantico, and Aircraft Two at SanDiego. The Commandant wasresponsible for research and thedevelopment of doctrine, techniques andequipment for amphibious warfare,much of which was conducted at theMarine Corps schools in Quantico.

What evolved from the Quanticoresearch effort was the TentativeLanding Force Manual, published by theNavy Department in 1935. This manuallaid out in detail all of the principal stepsfor conducting amphibious assault. Theconcepts were tested and improved in fleetexercises during the thirties, and theresulting doctrine guided Marines totheir hard-won triumphs in theamphibious assaults of WW II. Themanual, as a whole, gave recognition toMarine Aviation as an integral and vitalelement in the execution of the primarymission of the Marine Corps.

From the mid-twenties, Marinesquadrons had qualified aboard fleetcarriers from time to time as part of theirmission, beginning with the convertedcollier USS Langley. Such operationswere often uneven in that the West Coastsquadrons gave them more emphasisthan they received in Quantico. However,in 1931, two scouting squadrons in SanDiego were assigned to operate as

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component units of Pacific Fleet carriersuntil 1934 when they rejoined AircraftTwo.

Prior to the two scouting units'assignment to Aircraft Battle Force,Pacific Fleet, Marine squadrons weresomewhat loosely controlled withrespect to doctrine and training. From1931 to 1934, the two squadronsoperated under the Navy, affordingvaluable experience to about 60 percentof active duty Marine pilots. The benefitsof this experience were soon transmittedto the training of all squadrons of theFleet Marine Force on both the East andWest Coasts. The spread of thisdisciplined syllabus training with a clearlydefined mission was a real milestone inthe evolution of Marine Aviation.

Air operations during the decadereflected the increasing capabilities andenhanced sense of purpose of MarineAviation. While the races, spectacularsand air shows continued they graduallybecame secondary to fleet problems,amphibious exercises and development,and to annual qualification in aerial

gunnery and bombing. The thirties sawincreased participation by MarineAviation in coordinated exercises whichwere laying the groundwork forrefinement of an emerging concept of theair-ground team.

Expansion and Training

Of all the armed services, MarineAviation experienced the greatestexpansion during WW II. In 1936, therewere 145 Marine pilots on active dutyand by mid-1940 the number had onlyincreased to 245. The war in Europe andin the Atlantic was in full swing in late1939 and this increase of only 100 pilotsin four years indicates the measuredtempo of the national preparation,slightly more than one year before PearlHarbor. By the end of 1940, MarineAviation pilot strength had risen to 425,well over double what it was in 1936,having been augmented by the MarineCorps Aviation Reserve. The reserve atthis time was relatively small, tightly knitand, as always, intensely loyal and

responsive. Before the end of the waragainst Japan, Marine Aviation hadreached a total of over 10,000 pilots onactive duty.

At the time of Pearl Harbor, MarineAviation unit and plane strengths were13 squadrons and 204 aircraft. By theend of the war, just less than four yearslater, the figures were 145 squadronsand approximately 3,000 aircraft. TotalMarine Aviation personnel strength hadrisen from approximately 1,350 in 1939to over 1 25,000 by V-J Day. Toaccomplish such a herculean task, a basecomplex was required in the continentalU.S., larger than anything seen before byMarine Aviation. On the East Coast,Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS), CherryPoint, N.C., replaced Quantico as thefocal point of aviation training, and todayremains the hub of aviation activity eastof the Mississippi. Similarly, El Toro,Calif., replaced San Diego on the WestCoast and today continues as the centerof Marine air operations oriented to thePacific. In both cases, the Marine air-ground team concept was a paramount

:St - t4••-

Opposite page, all ofMarine Corps Aviation onthe West Coast in 1932.Left, new aircraft arrivedin the form of theGrumman F3F-2 in 1938.

factor in site selection, as the two centersare in close proximitytothe major Marineground bases on each coast, CampPendleton in California, and CampLejeune in North Carolina.

II. World War II

The First and Second Marine AircraftWings (MAWs) were commissioned inJuly 1941, the First at Quantico and theSecond at San Diego. Each had only oneMarine Aircraft Group (MAG) byDecember 7, MAG-Il at Quantico andMAG-21 almost entirely at Ewa, Hawaii,since January. Deployments by somesquadrons and detachments of othershad been made from MAG-21 prior toDecember 7. Thus, of the 92 MAG-21aircraft complement, 44 were deployedand 48 were on the field at Ewa thatfateful Sunday morning.

The attack at Ewa was simultaneouswith similar attacks on all air installationson the island of Oahu. At Ewa, everyMarine plane was knocked out of actionin the first attack. Aircraft were notwidely dispersed because a generalwarning about the possibility of sabotagehad been issued just hours before, andplanes were parked near the runways,away from the perimeters of the fieldarea, to protect them from any localaction on the ground.

At 0755, two squadrons of Japanesefighters swept in from the northwest onlow-altitude strafing runs and, with

cannon and machine guns, blazed theparked planes. The strafing runs wererepeated again and again until all aircraftwere destroyed. MAG-21 lost fourMarines killed in the attack, and 13 werewounded. Of the 48 planes, 33 weredemolished, with the remainder, exceptone, suffering major damage. One R3Dtransport was at Ford Island for repairsand somehow escaped damage in theattacks there. Fortunately, no carrierswere in port on December 7. Enterprisewas on the way back from Wake whereshe had delivered the 12 F4Fs of VMF-211, and Lexington was en route toMidway with 18 SB2U-3s of VMSB-231.One thing was unquestionably clear. Thenation was in for a long and bitter fight.

Wake Island

Wake is a tiny atoll some 2,000 mileswest of Honolulu. It was first claimed forthe United States in 1898, but waslargely neglected until jurisdiction overthe island was passed to the NavyDepartment in 1934. In 1935, PanAmerican Airways chose Wake as a stopon its clipper route to the Orient. PrewarPacific Fleet planning included WakeIsland, but work was not begun on aprojected seaplane base at the island —to support long-range reconnaissance ofthe mid-Pacific areas containing theJapanese-mandated island — until early1941.

The first military force to arrive on

Wake was the advance detail of the FirstMarine Defense Battalion on August 19,1941. Major Paul Putnam and his 12F4F-3s aboard Enterprise departed theship on December 4, for the relativelyunfinished strip. They found the striplong enough for operations, but toonarrow for any but single-plane takeoffs,inadequate with respect to taxiingsurfaces, and without any revetments forthe parking and dispersing of aircraft.VMF-21 1 had recently received its newF4Fs and barely had time to becomefamiliar with them.

There was no radar on the island andthe only fueling equipment for theaircraft was by hand pump from 55-gallon gasoline drums. Maintenanceshelters for the mechanics on the linewere practically nonexistent, as were anystorage facilities for tools, maintenancegear and the few spare parts thesquadron could bring with it. In addition,there were only two mechanics, and apreponderance of ordnancemen, in theadvance party of the squadron which hadarrived by ship November 29.

First word of the attack on Pearl Harborwas received early in the morning ofDecember 8. Maj. Putnam was alreadyairborne, on patrol with four F4Fs. Whenhe landed and heard of the attack, asecond patrol of four was launched.While they were north of the island at12,000 feet, the first attack cameundetected from the south through a rainsquall at 1,500 feet — 36 twin-enginebombers. The bombing and strafingattack was devastating, leaving thesquadron with only the four planesairborne and inflicting a casualty count of20 killed and 11 wounded. The majorsupply of aviation gasoline wasdestroyed, as were the tools, the fewspare parts and the maintenancemanuals for the new planes. All that wasleft were the four F4Fs and thesalvageable parts from the wreckedremains of the rest.

At 1145 on the 9th, the second raid hitbut this time there was fighter oppositionto flame one bomber, and antiaircraft(AA) fire to get another. However, thedamage was again severe. When theenemy came again on the 10th, CaptainElrod got two bombers, butthe flight of 26Japanese planes hit a supply of dynamiteand set off all the three-inch and five-inch ready ammunition at one AA batteryand one seacoast battery nearby.

Early on December 11, a Japanese task

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force arrived off the southern tip of theisland and prepared to land. Shorebatteries, in a 45-minute action, scoredmany hits and sank one destroyer (thefirst Japanese surface warship to be sunkby U.S. naval forces in WW II). TheJapanese force abandoned the landingattempt and withdrew. Airborne duringthe action were Maj. Putnam and Capts.Elrod, Freuler and Tharin. As the forceretreated, they went to work with 100-pound bombs and repeated strafing runs,scoring bomb hits on two light cruisersand a medium transport. The strafingcaused one destroyer to blow up about 20miles offshore. The ship's AA fire cutElrod's main fuel line and his plane waswrecked as he made a beach landing justshort of the air strip. Freuler's enginewasbadly shot up as well.

However, less than four hours after thelanding attempt was thwarted, 30bombers were again over the island.Lieutenants Kinney and Davidson hitthem, with Davidson getting two, Kinneydamaging another, and AA knockingdown one and damaging three more. Onthe 12th, an early raid by flying boats wasmet by Capt. Tharin, who shot down oneof the two four-engined aircraft. Therewas no further raid until the 14th, whenthe early seaplane raid was repeated,followed by the return of the 30 bombersfrom Roi at 1100. The raid killed twoMarines and wounded a third, and alsomade a direct bomb hit on one of the tworemaining fighters.

The make-shift engineering sectioncontinued its heroic efforts, tradingfrom plane to plane and salvaging fromwrecks so that, by December 17, therewere still two serviceable F4Fs available.On the 20th, a Navy PBY landed in thelagoon and brought word from PearlHarbor of a relief force on the way. It tookoff on the return flight at 0700 with unitreports, mail and urgent administrativematters. It was the last contact withWake from the outside.

Just one hour and 50 minutes after thePBY took off, 29 bombers and 18 fightersarrived over the island, and this timethere was a more ominous aspect aboutthem. They were carrier types, indicatingthat new weight had been introduced tosoften up the island defenses. Threehours later, 33 bombers from Roi arrivedand reduced the AA defenses of theisland to a total of only four three-inchguns left of the original 12. The two F4Fswere still serviceable. On December22nd, Freuler and Davidson had themorning patrol, when 33 bombers and sixfighters arrived from the carriers. Capt.Freuler managed to get one of thefighters but, in so doing, debris andflames from his target disabled his plane.As he headed back, wounded in theshoulder, to attempt a forced landing on

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the strip, he caught a last glimpse ofDavidson with enemy fighters on his tail.Freuler crash-landed his burning aircrafton the field, but Davidson was not seenagain. Now the island was withoutaircraft and the remaining personnel ofVMF-21 1 joined the defense battalion asinfantrymen.

On the 21st and 22nd, the relief taskforce was about 600 miles from Wake.Because the ship losses and damagesustained at Pearl Harbor put a very highpremium on what was left, the decisionwas made, reluctantly, on the 23rd, toturn back to Pearl Harbor.

In the early morning of December 23,the first Japanese troops landed onWilkes Island, part of the Wake Islandcomplex. At 0700, CommanderCunningham, the island's commander,ordered its surrender.

Marine Aviation did not participateagain in early defensive operations untilthe Battle of Midway. Along the route toAustralia, there were other islands to bedefended. Airfields were built on most ofthese and, as soon as they were ready,Army, Navy or Marine aircraft units wereassigned. Although the Japanese tookGuam and the Philippines in the earlydays following Pearl Harbor, none ofthese island bases on the route to thesouthwest Pacific suffered the fate ofWake Island.

With the fall of Wake Island, theimmediate concern of the 2nd MAW andMAG-21 was the reinforcement ofMidway and the closest of the outerislands, from which a Japanese forcecould interdict the routes to and fromHawaii and the southwest. Of almostequal concern was the earliest possibleprovision of air defense for those Allies-held islands farther out on the route toAustralia and the southwest.

All of the lifeline "route islands" werein American or British hands, butthe onlyone that had any air defense was Fiji,where 22 British planes were based.Colonel Larkin of MAG-21 beganstrengthening Midway almostimmediately after Pearl Harbor bydispatching Marine Scout BomberSquadron (VMSB) 231 when it returnedfrom deployment aboard Lexington. Thetong overwater flight was made one weeklater on the 17th. It was a majoraccomplishment to get the squadronready to deploy again in one week's time.In addition, the arrival of VMF-221 waslike a Christmas present on the ,25thwhen it flew in from Saratoga with 14F2As, on its way back to Pearl Harborfrom the aborted relief task force forWake. Aviation deployments came fromelements of both the 1st and 2nd wings.

An important step toward organizedexpansion was taken on March 1, 1942.Squadrons were broken into as even a

In 1940, the 1st MAW HQ aircraft was thisCurtiss SBC-4.

distribution of talent as possible, to formadditional Marine air groups and fighteror bomber squadrons. For the most part,the reorganization was ahead of theequipment curve and the new unitsstruggled along with minimum aircraft,sending whatever was available inplanes and pilots to the MAG at Midway.

Personnel shifts continued in a

constant effort to spread whatexperience and talent were available, aswidely as possible. Regrettably,inexperienced and partially trained pilotsgenerally had to be moved westward toMidway and Samoa, with some veteransgoing back to Ewa and the West Coast totake over new squadrons. The net effectwas to turn Ewa, Midway and Samoa intotraining bases with minimum aircraftassigned. This was the case on the eve ofthe battle of Midway at the end of April. Atypical squadron on the West Coast in thespring of 1942 would have as many as 60lieutenants just out of flight training andonly six obsolete F2As to fly.

Battle of Midway

After the Battle of the Coral Sea,intelligence increasingly indicated abrewing assault by the Japanese, withMidway Island the target for invasion. Itsoccupation would give the Japanese theability to control and interdict anyoperations from Hawaii.

On May 2, Admiral Chester W. Nimitzmade a visit to Midway and, afterwardspreparations for an attack intensified. Bythe end of May, the airfield was literallychoked with any aircraft that could bespared from Hawaii. Included were fourB-26s and 17 B-i 7s of the Army, and sixNavy torpedo planes of the latest type.The Navy patrol planes, which had beenbased on the island from the beginning,now totaled 16. MAG-22 had 19 SBD-2s,17 SB2U-3s, 21 F2A-3s and seven F4F-3s. The SBDs and the F4Fs were to carryMarine Aviation well into the start of its

47,

swing to superiority, but at this point theywere brand-new to these squadronswhich, in turn, were largely manned byinexperienced pilots. As for the SB2U-3sand the F2As,lboth were obsolescent butthey were all that was available.

The Japanese task force wasformidable. It was composed of fourcarriers, including Akagi and Kaga; twobattleships; three cruisers; adequatesupporting destroyers; and the transportgroup carrying a landing force of 5,000troops. The plan called for three days ofsoftening up Midway by aircraft andnaval bombardment, following which the5,000 troops would land in the assault. Inthe approach to the Midway area, thetransport group took a more southerlyroute with the main force coming into thearea from the northwesterly quadrant.

The first sighting came from a patrolPBY which uncovered the transport force700 miles to the west of the island at0900 on June 3. The B-17s were sentout, and they found and struck thetransport group but without anyidentified success.

The first sighting of the main enemyforce came at 0525 on the morning ofJune 4. The four Army B-26s and the sixNavy TBFs were launched for a torpedoattack against the carrier, reported to be180 miles to the northwest of the island.At 0555, Navy radar picked up "many

planes" bearing 310 degrees at 89 milesand inbound for Midway. Within 10minutes, all planes of both Marinesquadrons were airborne. The fighterswere divided into two units of 12 and 13aircraft: seven F2As and five F4Fs underMajor Parks were vectored directly oncourse for the inbound enemy planes;and 12 F2As and one F4F under CaptainArmistead were vectored out to 10 milesto await an anticipated attack flight on aslightly different inbound heading. Thedive-bombers were divided into twogroups also, with 16 SBDs under MajorHenderson and 11 SB2Us under MajorNorris, both proceeding in company toattack the carriers "180 miles out,bearing 320 degrees, enemy course 135degrees, speed 20 knots."

At 14,000 feet and 30 miles out, Maj.Parks and his 12 fighters ran into whatlooked like the whole Japanese air force:108 planes, divided into several waves ofattack, dive-bomber and fighter aircraft.Joined in just a few moments byArmistead and his 13, the 25 fightersgave all they had and scored well. Theyreduced the attack flight to almost half ofthe 36 horizontal bombers they startedwith, and the dive-bombers from 36to 18by the time they were over the target.

The courageous and resolute attack bythe Marine fighters with their inferiorplanes resulted in the heaviest losses

they would sustain in all of WW II. Fifteenof the 25 pilots, including Maj. Parks,were lost in the brief action. In Maj.Parks' flight of 12, only Captains Carl andCarey and Lieutenant Canfield returned,while the Armistead flight lost six out ofits 13. Although 13 F2As and two F4Fswere lost, the damage inflicted by theMarine fighters on the overwhelminglysuperior striking force left the Japanesewith considerably less weight to throwagainst the American carriers as thebattle developed. It was a costlycontribution to the successful outcome ofthe battle.

Because the fighters went after theinbound attack flight, the bombersheaded toward the Japanese carrierswere very much alone. In the first launchwith the B-26s and the TBFs, no fighterswere even airborne. The attack on themain Japaneseforce atO7lO, almost 150miles from Midway, was like theslaughter of the fighters closer in. Five ofthe six TBFs and two of the four B-26s fellto either enemy fighters or AA fire,without scoring a single hit on a

Japanese ship.Maj. Henderson's SBDs reached the

enemy force ahead of the slower SB2U-3s at 0800. They went into a wide circleat 8,500 feet preparatory to launching aglide-bombing attack from 4,000 feetabove the carriers. This was because the

Grumman F4F Wildcat fighters were the mainstay of the "Cactus Air Force" at Guadalcanal prior to the introduction of the F4U.

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pilots were not experienced in the SBDwhich was new to the squadron. Theyhad no time to learn and develop theirdive-bombing tactics, a far lessvulnerable approach than glide-bombing.Defending fighters hit them at 8,000 feetand Maj. Henderson was one of the firstto be shot down.

Postwar analysis of Japanese recordsshowed that, at 0810, hits were scoredon two of the carriers,Akagi and Soryu,but that damage was quickly broughtunder control. Eight of the 16 SBDs wereshot down in the attack and, tragically, nosignificant damage was done to theenemy carrier force. Major Norris and his11 SB2Us arrived at the target about 15minutes after the SBDs and wasimmediately attacked by defendingfighters. The flight was out of position fora run on the carriers and was forced tochoose a battleship as target, inflictingminor damage on either Kirishima orHaruna. Three planes were shot downand one pilot was recovered by a PT boat.At 1900, six SBDs and five SB2Us werelaunched to search for and attack a"burning carrier," 200 miles northwestof the island. The flight could not locatethe enemy carrier and, on the return leg40 miles from the field, Maj. Norris wentinto a steep turn while letting down andwas not seen again.

June 4, 1942, was indeed a rough dayfor both fighters and dive-bombers ofMarine Aviation — high on courage andresolve, low on time and equipment. At0630, June 5, Captain Marshall Tyler, thethird skipper of VMSB-241 in the fateful24 hours of June 4-5, took off with whatdive-bombers were left — six SBDs andsix SB2Us. They had no trouble findingthe target, as an oil slick 50 miles long ledthem right in. Capt. Tyler led the SBDs ina steep dive-bombing run from 10,000

feet against Mogami and achieved sixnear misses but no direct hits. The SB2Uswere led by Captain Richard Fleming inanother glide-bombing run from 4,000feet at Mikuma, a light cruiser. Flemingwas hit in the attack and, as he pulled out,his plane burst into flames and crashedinto the after turret, starting many firesand causing extensive damage. He wasposthumously awarded the Medal ofHonor for his courageous anddetermined attack against the cruiserand his participation in all three missionsof his squadron. This was the last MarineAviation mission in the battle.

Any summary of the Battle of Midwaygives top honors to the Navy carrierpilots. While no one surpassed the pilotsof the Marine fighter aircraft and dive-bombers in sheer guts and determina-tion, the carrier air groups showed whatcould be done with a minimum level oftraining in the up-to-date SBDs and F4Fsassigned.

In Adm. Nimitz' post-action message tothe Marine Aviation units at Midway, hesummed up their part in the Battle ofMidway as follows: "Please accept mysympathy for the losses sustained byyour gallant aviation personnel based atMidway. Their sacrifice was not in vain.When the great emergency came, theywere ready. They met, unflinchingly, theattack of vastly superior numbers andmade the attack ineffective. They struckthe first blow at the enemy carriers. Theywere the spearhead of our great victory.They have written a new and shiningpage in the annals of the Marine Corps."

The Road Back

Japan's early strategy carried itsouthward over and around thePhilippines, westward to the Netherlands

and East Indies, and eastward towardNew Guinea and the BismarckArchipelago. By January 23, 1942, theJapanese had taken Rabaul, and almostimmediately began to build it into theirmajor base of operations in the easternarea of the Southwest Pacific. Theyviewed Rabaul as the focal point fromwhich they could dominate New Guineaand Australia on the right, and theSolomons, New Caledonia, Fiji, andperhaps even New Zealand on the left.Little time was wasted by the Japaneseand, within two months, they had pusheddown this chain to Bougainville andbeyond, and by early May to Tulagi in thesouthern Solomons.

One outcome of the Battle of the CoralSea was that the Japanese abandoned,for the time being, their attempt to occupyPort Moresby in New Guinea andsimultaneously seize Tulagi. The Battle ofMidway took care of step two of theirplanning, which was the occupation ofMidway and the seizure of the westernAleutians. These two outcomes made itfeasible to reassess what could be donerealistically with the policy of "doing themost with the least" in the South Pacific.Admiral Ernest J. King wasted no time inWashington looking into the matter, ashe had been concerned almost from thebeginning of the year with what he sawas the Japanese' step three: the conquestof New Caledonia, Fiji and Samoa. Tooffset such a move, it seemed logical togo "up" the same stepping stones theenemy was already starting "down."

The planning began as early asFebruary 18, when Adm. Kingsuccessfully sold the idea of making abase out of the island of Efate in the NewHebrides. By the end of March, a forcehad arrived at Vila, the capital of Efate,with the mission of building an airfield.The force was composed of the 4thDefense Battalion (Reinforced), a forwardechelon of MAG-24, and 500 troops ofthe Army's Americal Division. VMF-21 2,under Lieutenant Colonel Harold W.Bauer, one of the great younger leadersof Marine Aviation, was on its way fromEwa to Efate by any transportation andwith any incremental detachments thatcould be arranged. The squadron was inplace and operating by June 9 and Col.Bauer became the anchor of all thepreparations to open Espiritu Santo andmount the Naval and Marine Aviationeffort for the Solomons campaign.

The campaign began with the Tulagiand Guadalcanal landings August 7. Itwas a turning point in the war againstJapan, characterized by bold planning,high risk, short deadlines, almostnonexistent intelligence, inadequateshipping, dogged determination,magnificent combat performance, andexceptional stamina.

Marine Aviation played a major role in

The Brewster F2A Buffalo suffered greatly in combat against the Japanese Zero at Midway,

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all phases of the operation and, becauseit was an all-Marine-type landing fromthe initial stages, assumed the overallaviation command as the force wasaugmented by Army Air Corps and alliedsquadrons from Australia and NewZealand. From time to time, Navy fighter,dive-bomber and torpedo squadrons alsooperated temporarily ashore from theircarriers, and rendered key assistance inbeating off steady Japanese attempts toretake the island.

On August 7, there were two Marinesquadrons in the South Pacific: VMF-21 2at Efate, and VMO-251 newly-arrived atEspiritu Santo. VMO-251 was equippedwith F4F-3Ps long-range photo planes.The" had arrived from Noumea in theatter part of July, and had barely hadtime to put their planes in commissionbefore the landing. They did not receivetheir long-range fuel tanks until twoweeks after the landing and so were notof much use in the operation. The land-based fighters and dive-bombers tosupport the First Marine Division (1stMarDiv) were those of the four MAG-23squadrons and, as far as training and

aircraft were concerned, it was againalmost the same situation of "new pilotsand old machines" tragically seen atMidway.

However, just prior to sailing fromHawaii, things began looking up for thefirst two squadrons to leave forGuadalcanal. VMF-223, commanded byCaptain John L. Smith, received brand-new F4F-4s; and VMSB-232, underMajor Richard C. Mangrum, turned inits old SBD-2s for new SBD-3s,complete with self-sealing fuel'tanks andarmor plate. Both squadrons embarked inthe escort carrier Long Island andlaunched for Guadalcanal about threeweeks later on August 20, from a pointabout 200 miles southeast of the island.The other two squadrons of the group,VMF-224, commanded by Captain RobertE. Galer, and VMSB-231, led by Major LeoR. Smith, were in about the same shapeas the first two squadrons. They leftHawaii on August 15 aboard the aircrafttransports Kitty Hawk and Hammond-sport, and arrived at Guadalcanal onAugust 30.

From the very beginning of the

The Douglas SBD-1 gave the Marine Corps itsfirst modern dive-bomber prior to WW II.

operation, the Japanese made it clearthat they intended to run an "at any cost"operation to push the Marines back intothe sea. There were two large air attackson the first day. The next day, the patternof daily operations was established as araid of 45 bombers sank anotherdestroyer and a transport.

On September 8, operations becamecomplicated when General A. A.Vandegrift was informedthatthe carriersand the transports, which still held mostof the Marine supplies, could not stay forthe third of the three promised days andwould have to leave the area. To makematters worse, on the night of the 8th,Japanese naval forces almostannihilated the screening force for thetransports, sinking four cruisers andheavily damaging a fifth. Until the 20th,when the first planes arrived, this dailyroutine of heavy bomber raids did not letup. However, in between raids, everyeffort was made to bring in aviation fuel

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Designed as a fighter, the F4U Corsair provedto be an excellent bomber and provided airsuperiority over the Zero.

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