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Articles05 2013 ArsOF W co p o W :

06 1 P a : A Military Revolution in Human Affairs by Sergeant Hasani Chapman

10 2 d P a :Change of Command by Master Sergeant Walter K. Treichel

13 3 d P a : ARSOF Way Forward by William Fingerhut

DePArtments

04 F o co a da

cov s o

14sp a i : U.s.

A sp a Op a oco a d ArsOF 2022

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Te magazine you are holding in your hand is one o the most popular editions we publish

each year. Tis edition incorporates our 2013 Academic Course Guide with a special edition

o Special War are.In my opinion, this is a publication that should be at the ngertips o every

member o our regiments over the next year.

Not only will you nd a complete o ering o all o the training conducted at the U.S. Army

John F. Kennedy Special War are Center and School, you will also nd the way orward or Army

special operations orces as de ned by Lieutenant General Charles Cleveland, the commander

o the U.S. Army Special Operations Command. ogether, these two pieces o collateral can help

you as a leader or Soldier to chart your path to success.

Te training provided by SWCS is among the best in the world. Not only does our training

prepare our orce or tactical success, it also prepares them or success in the Human Domain.

With the Armys recognition o the Human Domain and the introduction o the 7th War ghting

Function, the importance o the realm in which our orce operates has become evident. Over the

past several years, we have put a renewed emphasis on unconventional war are and the associated

skills needed to conduct its myriad operations. Looking through the course guide, you will nd a

number o new courses that urther our commitment to excellence in this area o operations.

Our special-operations Soldiers are known or their ability to think out-o -the-box and to take

a holistic view when analyzing a problem. For the rst time in its 25-year history, Special War are

sponsored an ARSOF Writing Competition. Te submissions by members o our regiments were

well thought out and showed that our orce has a nuanced understanding o its mission and its

way ahead. In this issue, you will nd the top three papers, as judged by a panel o senior ARSOF

o cers. Hope ully, you will not be surprised to nd that the authors vision is in-line with that

o L G Cleveland. It is important to note that these papers were submitted months be ore L G

Cleveland began writing his ARSOF 2022 vision, which you will also be able to read.

Our regiments have conducted themselves well over the past decade o con ict, and I have no

doubt as a orce we will continue to do so over the next decade.

Veritas et Libertas

FroM the

CoMMandant

Major General Edward M. Reeder Jr.

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This year marks the frst iteration o the ARSOF Writing Competition. As a pro essional-development publication, it is the job o Special Warfare to give the members o our regiments a orum to share their ideas and opinions with their brothers-in-arms. It is also an opportunity or them to challenge ideas and ways o doing things in order to improve our regiments.

When we announced the topic or the 2012 ARSOF Writing Competition, we had no idea that Lt. Gen. Charles Cleve-land, commander, U.S. Army Special Operations Command, would ask that this issue be used to share his vision. Thishappy coincidence proved that the members o our regiments ully understand the way ahead and have a shared vision

or the success o ARSOF. As you read these articles, you will fnd that they echo the thoughts o Cleveland and support hisway orward even though they were written months be oreARSOF 2022 came to ruition.

It is with great pride that we announce the winners o Special Warfares frst ARSOF writing contest. The authors o thewinning entries, published on the ollowing pages, will receive cash awards; frst place: $1,000; second place: $750; thirdplace: $500. Thank you to everyone who contributed entries to the competition. Keep an eye out in the next issue o SpecialWarfare or the announcement o the 2013 ARSOF Writing Competition topic. We look orward to seeing even more entries.

2012 co topOver the past 11 years, Army Special Operations Forces have become very tactically profcient. Some would say that

profciency has come at a cost o the orces language and cultural skills. For ARSOF to success ully ulfll its role inbuilding capacity and shaping the battlefeld, the orce must maintain a balance in its profciency to conduct lethal andnon-lethal operations.

The last 10 years have shown that while ARSOFs tactical and technical skills dominate on the battlefeld, it is o ten our skills in the human domain that have the greatest e ect. Working in the human domain, ARSOFs people-centric ocus canshape and a ect the battlespace.

How do we maintain a healthy balance between the tactical and technical skills needed for lethaloperations, while maintaining our unique ability to work in the Human Domain; and how should ARSOF

evolve to improve upon its ability to operate in the Human Domain as it looks 15 years from now?

ArsOF Writing cOmPetitiOn Winners AnnOUncing the 2012 Special Warfare

1 P a : s a ha a c ap a$1,000 w d

Sergeant Hasani Chapman served as a sta logistics supervisor in support o Operation Enduring Freedom in 2011. FromApril 2009 until February 2013, Chapman conducted battalion-level logistics as an automated logistical specialist (92A). Hecurrently serves as the stock-control supervisor or the 75th Ranger Regimental Supply Support Activity. Chapman is currentlypursuing a Bachelor o Science in Homeland Security.

2 d P a : ma s a Wa t$750 w d

Master Sergeant Walter Treichel is assigned to the Joint Special Operations University. He is in the U.S. Army Reserve.

3 d P a : c f Wa a 4 (r) W a F u$500 w d

William Fingerhut is an Army civilian instructor at the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special War are Center and School. Herecently retired as a CW4 a ter 26 years in special operations. Fingerhut began his career in 10th Special Forces Group (A)as an 18D and later as a CWO, assigned at Fort Devens, Mass., 1st Bn. 10th SFG (A) in Germany and Fort Carson, Colo. Hewas then assigned to Special Operations Command Central and later to the U.S. Army Special Operation Command. Finger-hut served multiple deployments in Iraq, A ghanistan and Southwest Asia.

April - June 2013 05

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Story title2012 ArsOF Writing cOmPetitiOn Winners

1st Place: A Military Revolution in Human AffairsBy sergeant hasani chapman

As we move ahead: -increase individual and small-unit engagements outside of OEF and OIF, -eliminate hobbyism, parochialism and arrogance from our force by doing what we ought to do, not what we want to do.

Adm. Eric . Olson, USSOCOM; ip o the Spear , Jan 2010Te topic o the ARSOF Writing ques-

tion begs an answer to the ollowing ques-tion: Who will prevent us rom doing whatwe want at the expense o what is neededand why cant we have both? Te rightanswer is that we can, we will and we truly must in order to remain an e ective mili-tary orce and deterrent against sub-stateactors seeking to globalize any numbero local insurgencies. A healthy balancebetween lethal and non-lethal operationsmust be sustained by discipline, patienceand a very sharp sense o timing. As we arestalking and tracking the enemy across theterrorist Diaspora, our understanding o hismotive, morale modus operandi will shapenot only the enemy area o operations butour own lethal operations conducted toeliminate his sanctuaries and base areas.

he terrain that our adversaries havechosen to conduct combat and supportoperations on has ranged rom rural, tourban, then mountainous and lately thedesert climates o the Middle East. A very serious threat has been identi ied in theCyber Domain, with strategic e ects thatreach beyond OCONUS orces military purview. hese networked opponents havesimultaneously globalized their terror-ist agenda and ultra-compartmentalizedtheir individual organizations through the21st century technological advancements.In true guerilla ashion, they have pickedup our weapons and applied them againstus on and o the battle ield. In order tocounter this asymmetric style o war are,we must revolutionize our understand-

ing o the battlespace. Necessarily, thelethal operations that are conducted inthe physical domain must be, to somedegree, supported and rein orced by non-lethal execution in the Human Domainin order to achieve the same success inthe Cyber Domain model o the currentpost-modern terrorist. In the same token,the SIGIN and HUMIN capabilities o our special operations orces are increas-ingly nulli ied as the enemy returns to hismountainous and rural roots, essentially

moving backwards across the time spec-trum o terrorist base operations.

Our tactical skills consist o the practicalapplication o battle drills and individualmovement techniques across the battlespace.Tese are our best orce protection tactics,techniques and procedures and o ensiveendeavors to eliminate the target and bringcombat and enemy resistance to a close.We are trained to identi y, close with anddestroy the enemy. How to best do that isthe operational guidance o o cers in theExecution paragraph. actics a ect not only the immediate battlespace, but the opera-tional and sometimes strategic (dependingon the political sensitivity) direction o agiven campaign. Its the end state that isgiven the most concern and that is rightand exact. Te technical aspects o specialoperations orces include service support; allthe logistic-, intelligence- and signal-support

unctions that shape our operations into thespear that kills and captures the enemy withdecisive results that resonates through theentire spectrum o operations. Te combi-nation o the tactical and technical serveto make SOF operations that much morelethal. Te goal isnt always the per ection o the ghting orce, but rather to make ewermistakes than the enemy. Tese surgicalstrike operations are ofen kill/capture andoverwhelmingly have lethal results or theenemys individual leadership and their sub-ordinate networks. Tey are most ofen as-sociated with direct action, counterterrorismand Ranger-type missions that assault theenemy in their base areas or meeting places

and make it a bad day to be a bad guy. In thecivilian world, SWA and FBI Hostage Res-cue eams utilize similar tactics to interdictand disrupt criminal organizations plans toshape their own AOs. But is there a HumanDomain to these operations? A subset o skills needed to success ully execute theseofen high pro le missions?

At rst glance, tactical skills seem univer-sal to the end state o any such mission. Butwhat i your mission involves advising andencouraging a host-nation ally or indigenous

orce to conduct these operations? Increas-ingly, SOF orces are required to conduct

oreign internal de ense and in speci cinstances, unconventional war are to acquiremission success. In the realm o specialwar are, we identi y the need or sustainingand improving the language and culturalskills that are serving our SOF orces in non-permissive, denied and hostile AOs aroundthe globe. A rudimentary understanding o the riendly orces culture and language isbasic to the task o having him understandwhy cleaning his weapon is essential tocombat operations and what the elements o an assault squad do upon contact with theenemy. When dealing with a warrior cultureattempting to survive a technological on-slaught, how do we prove our very presenceis less o a threat than the enemy? And how is the threat o our presence mitigated by themilitary prowess or which our SOF warriorsare known? Tese questions are answeredin the Human Domain by SOF pro ession-als who are trained or both lethal combatengagements and to navigate the humanterrain leading to the target.

Are we actually working in the Hu-man Domain? And i so, is our work thereunique? Some are o the opinion that sofpowers associated with shaping operationsare only a means to an end as ar as directaction operations are concerned. Others may contend that the raw intelligence and insightacquired by these direct actions are the endsthemselves. I our goal is to have an interde-pendent combat-intelligence cycle withoutrestricting either capacity, there must be a

balance between the honor o attending theloya jirga and the courage o leading the loya jirgas orces into lethal combat. I o er thatwe are, in act, working in the Human Do-main o the Global War on errorism. Butlike the human IQ, the results o this work are sometimes intangible and have a cumu-lative e ect on the battlespace rather than animmediate and decisive action. Its hard todo an assessment on the tactical advantageso an SF tribal engagement team much less

orecast second and third order e ects o

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this kind o deployment. Nevertheless, wemust learn to modi y our assessments andchange our parameters in orecasting eventsi our work in the Human Domain is to bee cient, e ective and relative in comparisonwith conventional orces and our own ten-dencies toward the immediate grati cationo lethal operations. As we are training or-eign militaries in the undamentals o specialoperations and re-opening the quali cationcourse to other nations o cers and NCOs,our own skill set must remain unique ande ective against enemies near and ar.

In order to put into e ect this Military Revolution in Human A airs, we must ac-cept that there is indeed a need or an evolu-tion. With this acceptance comes acknowl-edgement that there are barriers to changeand improvement; institutional, emotional,psychological even nancial. ARSOF willevolve or the better as necessary, but hope-

ully without the negative rein orcement thatall too ofen precedes miraculous changes inlong-standing institutions. Te positive evo-lution o our thoughts into action must nec-

essarily be command initiated, regulated andemphasized. I commanding o cers think its important to have Soldiers learn and putinto practice the skills involved in navigatingthe human terrain, then NCOs will en orcetheir e orts. I training in the Human Do-main is a part o the mission-essential task list, then it will be accomplished.

Te A ghanistan-Pakistan theater was, atits onset, a Human Domain o operations.For all o the bombs that were dropped on

aliban targets in the beginning stages o thewar when targets were plenti ul, it was the

rapport built by Special Forces operationaldetachments-alpha and other governmentagency liaison units with Northern Allianceleaders that identi ed aliban ront linesand negotiated or the release o hostagestrapped behind enemy lines. Te initialcollapse o the aliban as a political orce inA ghanistan was entirely the result o opera-tions in the Human Domain. Te current re-surgence in the skills necessary or that kindo tactical-political war are is evidence o thecontinued need and improved curriculum

that addresses the realm o war are involvinghuman interaction, tactical-strategic com-munication and interpersonal understand-ing. We are working in the Human Domainand working well, but we must continue toexercise our people-centric ocus in order toremain exible and ready or a similar utureengagement. As our national de ense postureshifs to counter emerging threats, our as-sessments should take into account whattruly works and where it works, along withwhat doesnt. As has been noted by war-riors rom Sun zu to Clausewitz, prolonged

contact with the enemy exposes our Psand eventually reveals our battle rhythm, anarmys combat signature once identi ed, canbe e ectively countered. Tis is the deadly dance that con ounds long-standing armiesas they struggle to win against an enemy thatonly has not to lose.

In contrast, at the beginning o OperationIraqi Freedom it appeared to be a strictly direct-action campaign. Tere were Hu-man Domain assets that provided muchneeded intelligence, shaping operations and

rOUgh terrAin The terrain that our adversaries conduct combat and support operations on has ranged from urban, to rural, and is often in rugged, moun-tainous and remote areas. Special operations forces operating in these non-permissive, denied and hostile areas rely heavily on language and cultureskills to engage indigenous populations and forces in order to sur vive, operate and achieve mission success. U.S. Army photo by Staff Sgt. Russell L. Klika

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Story title2012 ArsOF Writing cOmPetitiOn Winners

target analysis prior to the invasion, but ourintention was to remove Saddam Hussein

rom power and de eat the Iraqi army as anecessary prelude. Tis ght was largely con- ventional rom the onset with the amiliarShock & Awe signature; precision-targetedair strikes against pre-established conven-tional military targets and actual tank battleswhere superior U.S. re and maneuvereliminated the Iraqi armored threat withinweeks. Even Husseins elite orces could note ectively de end against a numerically andtactically superior opponent as Iraqi regulararmy troops surrendered by the hundreds.Indeed, as Hussein exposed his own people

to lethal chemical and biological agents, hehimsel ended up on the receiving end o a very lethal orm o justice by the very samepeople he once terri ed. In the end bulliesalways get what they deserve. Despite theseheroic deeds by SOF while conducting lethaloperations in urtherance o clear and con-cise mission set, our inability to simultane-ously conduct a Human Domain campaignin A ghanistan and a direct-action campaignin Iraq led to the slow degradation o SOFsinitial successes in both theatres. aking

nothing away rom our lethal capabilities,this degradation is made transparent by the current administrations reluctance insustaining counterinsurgency as a viable op-tion in our militarys tool box. Tis decisionmay well be in uenced by public opinion.Most Americans still like our wars short andsweet a la Kuwait; rather than protracted andmedia-driven a la Vietnam. We say we wantto see a good ght but what we really wantis a 1st round knock-out a la Mike yson.Te institutional di erences between con-ducting these separate types o operationscould not be reconciled be ore A ghanistanbecame what it is today and Iraq became the

modern-day COIN lethal-learning labora-tory. Te success ul evolution o ARSOF willharmonize the elements o lethal operationsand the Human Domain skill set in orderto eliminate inconsistencies and distrac-tions that take away rom our hard-earned victories in both areas o SOF operations.Tis new and latest Military Revolution inHuman A airs will negate mission creep andambiguity by reevaluating speci c unit mis-sions and providing better mission alloca-tion based on an end-state analysis that takes

into account the shaping operations o theHuman Domain and the precision targetingo our lethal operators.

For a historical re erence o the detrimen-tal results in underestimation and misallo-cation o Human Domain assets in combatoperations, I have examined three instanceso the negative and tragic consequencesthat are the inevitable result. In Vietnam,the village de ense o the Civilian IrregularDe ense Group under Civil Operations andRevolutionary Development Support wassupplanted by border surveillance and inter-diction missions that did not take into ac-count the culture o the Vietnamese people.

Large swaths o villagers were relocated intostrategic hamlets that were meant to separatethe enemy rom the people but only servedto separate the people rom their ancestralhomelands. With no loyalty or allegiance totheir new digs, morale su ered and resultedin an unwillingness to conduct e ectivecombat operations against an enemy whosometimes promised to return them to theirtraditional lands. In other parts o the world,people are connected to the earth in a way that we as Americans are not, most o our

hUmAn DOmAin The current resurgence in the skills necessary for tactical-political warfare is evidence of the continued need and improved curriculum thataddresses the realm of warfare involving human interaction, tactical-strategic communication and interpersonal understanding. U.S. Army photo by Staff Sgt. Russell L. Klika

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ore athers being settlers or re ugees or evenambitious entrepreneurs who sought outnew lands or better economic opportunities.Tis is basic to understanding an indigenousculture where their ancestors have lived onthe same land or hundreds i not thousands

o years while Americas birthday is only July 4, 1776. In El Salvador the so-called hunter-killer teams and assassination squads, even i they were just rumor, served to alienate thepopulation rom the government and ally them with the guerrilla action. When yourbrother or cousin or mother or ather is oneo the guerrillas with whatever revolution-ary agenda, its hard to be or someone whoyou think is hunting them down never mindagainst the actual guerrilla orce. Te U.S.mission was better served by the pro essionalconduct and example o SF teams that revo-lutionized the El Salvadorian military andpolice orce. Tis example o the power and

e ectiveness o human-relations in advisingcombat orces permeated through SF ranksand reinvigorated the cause o FID andUW as core tasks o ARSOF. Revisiting theA ghanistan campaign, I identi ed the suc-cess o the O ce o Strategic Services modelcoupling intelligence-gathering liaisonteams with operational groups in order tosynthesize the best combat orce to deal withthe numerically superior and better armed

aliban. Contrast this with our current po-litical di culties with high-value targetingand intelligence, surveillance and reconnais-sance pro ling and it seems hard to proposethe best is yet to come in A ghanistan. Tese

are just a ew observations that may helpto spark the political and military minds togive a closer look at the bene t o improvedtraining and emphasis in the Human Do-main o special operations.

Fifeen years rom now we may be ac-tualizing our current de ense realignmenttowards the Asia-Paci c theater. Anyone whohas done an area study o the Paci c Rim andSoutheast Asian areas o operation knows thatthe people who live in that part o the worldare almost completely homogenous. It goes

without saying that a vital part o any cam-paign strategy in that theater will involve a ro-bust Human Domain element. Teir cultureis nearly opaque because o this homogeny and we must learn sooner rather than later toincorporate the human elements o campaign

strategy in our endeavors in the Paci c.As I wrote earlier, my belie is that coun-

tering these uture threats and developingappropriate contingencies will rest on theshoulders o our SOF leadership. Te o cersand senior NCOs will make training in thehuman actors o war ghting a necessary part o not only pre-deployment training,but a sustained unit-training priority. Inorder or this to happen, our o cers andNCOs must support this kind o pro essionaldevelopment. It must be natural to conceivethe Human Domain o combat operations asintegral to its corresponding lethality. Tisnecessitates a change in our military culture

and way o thinking. Benchmarks must beestablished and NCOs, as the backbone o the Army, must be retrained in order to passon this essential skill set to the next genera-tion o SOF privates. Career progressionmust be linked with, but not dependent on,studies in the Human Domain o combat op-erations and how they bene t and advancethe lethality o our special operators. Squadleaders, platoon sergeants and rst ser-geants must all be on board in order to truly integrate and improve the e ects o people-centric operations in ARSOF.

Te healthy balance between tactical/technical skills utilized in lethal operations

and the corresponding Human Domainskills necessary to allow those operations tobe most e ective is realized in our commit-ment to common-sense initiatives and morethan a little cross-training between thesetwo disciplines. As I write this, I am in thecompany o two privates; one is an 11B andthe other is a 35M. Te irony is not lost onme. Te commitment required to put intopractical application any revolution is by necessity great. But every great endeavorrequires great e ort to achieve success. Its

like breaking that wall in physical trainingor that epiphany in academic study thatallows a whole new set o questions andanswers to challenge our curiosity. Strong,per ormance-based commitment reducesinstitutional resistance at the same time that

it increases the operational endurance o the unit. Tis leads to a healthy blend o thelethal skills that allow the U.S. to executekill/capture missions and those skills thatallow us to identi y which door to kick in.Sometimes we may even be able to negatethe direct action itsel or at the very leastdelegate it to indigenous orces throughexercising our new ound and newly ap-preciated skill set in the Human Domain o special operation.

Each day, month and year we spend inneglect o our human assets in the de ense oour great nation is the same time multipliedby our reluctance to do what we ought to do

in avor o what we want to do. Let us notwait or the inevitable negative rein orce-ment o military de eat or strategic stalematein order to begin to appreciate and nurturethe people-centric tools o ARSOF. Instead,lets lean orward and be proactive in engag-ing discussion about the pros and cons o anincreased awareness o the Human Domain.Discussion is the beginning o awarenessand awareness is the end o ignorance. Notknowing the law is not as bad as not wantingto know. And in the international court o war are we must be pro cient actors on theworld stage as well as skilled prosecutors o the law. Afer all, the highest orm o war are

is to be able to de eat your enemy withoutghting at all.

no t w d b w

x l of:1. ad l e t. Ol o ;Tip of The Spear , J 20102. Special Forces Advisor ; t c l 3. Seven Pillars of Wisdom; t.e. L w4. Subversion, Counter-Subversion and the Camp

against terrorism in Europe; D v d J. K ll ll

t f l vol o of arsOF w ll o z l ofd do k ll o d o l o

k w f o o d- d v o bo o

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2012 ArsOF Writing cOmPetitiOn Winners

2nd Place: Change of CommandBy master sergeant WaLter K. treicheL

Te commanders vision communicates core purpose and values. It inspires, motivates and suggests expectations or behavior. For external audiences, it helps shape their understanding o what the organization is all about. Some say that the best way to introduce ideas, especially on con

troversial matters, is to tell a story rather than to ofer an argumentative case. Tis article is written to advance the development o vision or Army special-operations orces senior leadership and describe how the community might maintain a healthy balance between the tactical and technical skills needed or lethal operations, while maintaining SOFs unique ability to work in the Human Domain.

Change of CommandNovember 10, 2028Fort Bragg, N.C.Special Forces CommandCommanding General Hubert Laski

Good afernoon:Tank you all or attending. It might seem

odd or a change o command to occur inthe middle o the night, but it turns out thatmost o the participants arent shaking outthe cobwebs and reaching or one more cupo co ee like I am. Tat is a result o so many o our Soldiers living and working in othertime zones besides Eastern Standard. In act,as you look around at who is in attendance,mostly virtual, you will see Soldiers rom sixcontinents, 87 countries, seven UN-admin-istered areas, two contested areas and a warzone. More importantly, with a ew excep-tions, these Soldiers are not on temporary duty. Tey are living and working in thesediverse areas as a critical orward elemento our military. And it is not only these Sol-diers, but in many cases, it is their amilies aswell. Tis orward posture has been decadesin the making and represents the ul llmento a vision stretching back to the earliestdays o Special Forces to World War II.

Almost 90 years ago, William Wild BillDonovan had a vision to establish, train,resource and lead a orce to provide intelli-gence and conduct unconventional operationsaround the world in support o U.S. strategicgoals. Believing that doing the same things

in the same manner and expecting di erentresults was the road to ailure, he struck outto design, train and employ a orce that couldoperate anywhere, with limited resources,communication and direction. With the warbureaucracy sucking up every able-bodiedAmerican into conventional war organizations,Donovan sought di erent people. He oundsome o them already serving in the military,but with additional skills he could put to use.He recruited paratroopers whose rst languagewas not English. He ound skills on Wall Street,

in law rms and on college campuses. Notably,he did not just recruit men, but women aswell. Te O ce o Strategic Services, led by Donovan or its entire existence, provided a

orce o small, highly trained and motivatedteams, with language and cultural acumen anda unique ability to lead in ambiguous circum-stances. Sound like anybody you know?

Tese teams conducted unconventionalwar are, trained and led partisan units, con-ducted commando raids and reconnaissancein support o the conventional military inthe European and Far East theaters. GeneralDonovans vision was so clear and the opera-tions so success ul that the vision lived oneven though the OSS was disbanded.

Te rst descendant o the OSS was theCIA, which took over the intelligence andsome o the paramilitary operations romthe OSS, leaving the large unconventional-war are realm just waiting or someone topick it up. Maj. Gen. Robert McClure saw the need and opportunity and recruited,among others, Col. Aaron Bank to developthis capability. Banks goal was to create aspecial orce with UW as its mission. Tisbegan in June 1952 with eight Soldiersstanding in ormation. Te creation o Special Forces occurred in an environmentcharacterized by little institutional under-standing and unding, no organization ordoctrine and no appetite or anything new ordi erent. Te remedy to this was to take thehard-won doctrine, training and experience

rom the OSS and incorporate it into SpecialForces. It is entirely appropriate and predict-able that the ather o Special Forces beganhis military career with the OSS.

In the intervening years, Special Forcesgrew and contracted and grew again whenthe nation needed the skills we provided.

Afer 9/11 we saw much growth andsuccess and became a victim o that success.Te missions were plenti ul; but they beganto move us away rom our core o UW. Wewere a orce that was high tech, lethal and

authorized to act in a unilateral manner.Tis was most evident in A ghanistan as weignored the lack o trust between ourselvesand the A ghans. We were orced to learnthat pain ul lesson again. Nothing goodhappens outside o relationships and norelationship exists without trust. We contin-ued to convince ourselves that the unilateralaction didnt make us look like invaders andcolonizers, but by the time we decided topay attention, it was beyond repair. We wereseduced by the ability to police the world.Our technology was so advanced that theanswer to the question, Can we do this?was usually Yes. Te question we realizedwe had to ask rst was Is this the only way to accomplish the mission? to which theanswer was almost always No.

Tis problem was recognized withinour community and addressed within theU.S. Special Operations Command Pub 1,which stated that success ul special opera-tions depend on long-term relationshipswith indigenous orces and populations andknowledge o the cultural, societal, economicand political environments in which they oc-cur. Tis reorientation o SF toward indirectaction began almost 20 years ago. Te unitsyou see be ore you are a result o that e ort.

It would be easy, and incorrect, to look back and see a straight line o problems andsolutions that bring us to today. At eachdecision point large and small, it took com-mitted individuals and leaders with courage

to see the road and maintain the direction. Ican take credit or none o it.So, what has changed in the last 20 years?

What hasnt?Te doctrinal changes were the most di -

cult to enact. Te rst hurdle was ndinga way to get our Soldiers out o CONUSand into every possible country around theworld. DY was rarely a problem, but actu-ally moving Soldiers and in many cases their

amilies, was a Herculean e ort that sup-ported long-term engagement better than

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multiple temporary visits. Tis e ort washelped along by Sequestration II in 2017.Tis was viewed as a low-cost solution andwe were prepared to embrace it.

Te second hurdle could have been themost detrimental to the survival o SF hadit been done without a lot o thought andplanning. Tis became known as the white/black split and nally became o cial sixyears ago. We discovered as we began mov-ing our Soldiers out into the world and away

rom CONUS, our reception by the hostnation was generally positive and remainedthat way right up until our governmentwould act in a unilateral ashion. Tis couldbe a drone attack, a direct-action mission

or anything seen as usurping host-nationsovereignty. It was di cult, i not impossibleto explain to our hosts that yes, we were parto the unit that just conducted that mission,but we didnt know about it and they shouldstill continue to trust us. Acting unilaterally is inherently distrust ul. Finding, xing and

nishing looks no di erent done by whiteor black, but it looks completely di erent tothe sovereign nation where it occurs. Ourdecisions to act unilaterally meant that theend justi ed the means. Tis may or may

not be true, but we had trouble guring outwhat the end was. Is it a terrorist network disrupted, a single event that resolves very little over the long run, or is it partner-ship strengthened that can accomplish thedisruption and more? We used to live in aworld run on SIPR, no oreign and com-partmentalization. It is still around, mostly because it is hard to actually get rid o anything. However, our communications aremostly in the For O cial Use Only, and inmost cases, we operate at our partners leveland on their networks. Tis has involved risk and has not been without consequences. Teconsequences have been worth the level o trust we have built and continue to maintain

with our partners.Our training pipeline has morphed alongwith our orce. Te cultural knowledge andlanguage skills we needed to eld this orcewould have overwhelmed our training andeducation and taken years rom recruitmentto quali ed Soldiers. Instead, we looked at thepast and learned a ew lessons rom the OSSand the earliest days o SF. Identi y the talentsyou need, nd people that already have mosto them and recruit them. Te OSS oundsuccess on college campuses, not with the stu-

dents, but the pro essors. Tey went to WallStreet and the corporate world. Te LodgeBill allowed oreign nationals to serve in themilitary and then receive their citizenshipwithin two years. Te new Lodge Act, signedinto law our years ago has allowed us to ndskill sets and people that would otherwisenot be available to us. Te training require-ments shif quite a bit when the language andcultural piece is already in place. So we havebecome the best place to develop physicaland technical skills. It began with the HumanPer ormance Initiative and has progressed tothe point that no matter what level o tness ispresent; we can provide a physically t, skilledwarrior in 12 months.

Standing with me today are ve oreignnationals wearing U.S. Army uni orms andSF abs. In their past lives, they were a cabdriver, dental hygienist, kindergarten teach-er, community organizer and a semi-pro es-sional soccer player. In addition to the new Lodge Act, we have expanded the concept oKA USAs. Te Korean Augmentation to theUnited States Army allows or oreign na-tionals to serve as a part o U.S. Army units.We have started to o er this program in 12countries and the initial reports are posi-

Oss in chinA Almost 90 years ago, William Wild Bill Donovan had a vision to establish, train, resource and lead a force to provide intelligence and conductunconventional operations around the world in suppor t of U.S. strategic goals. U.S. Army photo

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tive. Tis augmentation provides increasedmanpower or our smaller teams and mightinclude a path to service within SF. It is nota solution or use everywhere but we haveshown our willingness to try di erent thingsto meet the needs o our teams.

SF has always prided itsel on its ability towork in austere conditions and not immedi-ately begin building permanent acilities. Tis,more than anything, sets us apart rom ourconventional brothers and sisters. It seemsthat when they arent sure what to do, build-ing some American-centric in rastructureseems to be the rst thing on the to-do list.Tis is always expensive, sometimes complet-

ed and rarely what is actually needed.About 10 years ago, an in ormal contestbegan between some o our teams, whichrevolved around who had the smallest oot-print. Te award became known as the PegLeg Award. It was ormalized in the last coupleo years and has allowed or a high degree o creativity in ways to keep extraneous equip-ment, buildings and supplies rom taking upresources better spent on mission accomplish-ment. We realized that mission ocus can beenhanced when resources are lacking.

Our initial assessment and selection hasound a new ocus as well. In the past we

looked or physical prowess and an ability towork under pressure. Tis in turn became ourbiggest barrier to recruiting outside o whathad become our standard; nding young, mo-tivated males serving within the Army withan interest to see i they have what it takes.Tis was a de cient process and was so strin-gent that had Col. Bank tried to volunteer hewould have been passed over. urns out hewas 40-years-old be ore he made it into theOSS. We have instead turned the assessmentprocess into looking or those characteristicsnecessary or our mission and di cult to

train; maturity, empathy, an ability to buildrelationships and operating in un amiliarregions in a non-judgmental ashion.

Lastly, I would like to address our emaleSF Soldiers. Tere were many who deeply believed that emales did not belong in SF.Te cultural change that was required was

oundational. As I have mentioned be ore,we have rarely traveled on new ground. TeOSS ound quali ed people to meet themission and did not begin with a men-only club. For years we used physical qualities as

a barrier. When that was shown to be ine -ective, we resorted to other barriers such

as how they would be viewed in the hostnations. What we missed was an opportu-nity. Our country usually views oreign anddomestic policy as two unconnected realms.Tis might have been a reality in the distantpast, but since the end o World War II, therest o the world has looked to the UnitedStates and observed not only our oreignpolicy but also how we act within our ownborders. During our countrys struggle withracial reconciliation, there was little concern

or what the rest o the world thought. Itwas seen as a domestic issue with a very

local ocus. But when you talk o liberty andreedom rom oppression and human rightsand sel determination with regard to or-eign policy, those concepts are compared tohow we live at home. SF has always set andmaintained the highest standards and ourintegration o emales has made us a betterand more representative orce.

I Col. Bank walked into this ormation,he would not be surprised by our people,training or posture, although he might won-der why it took us so long to get here.

sF in AFricA Like the OSS, todays SF teams provide a force of small, highly trained and motivated teams with language and cultural acumen and the uniqueability to lead in ambiguous circumstances. U.S. Army photo

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3rd Place: ARSOF Way ForwardBy WiLLiam Fingerhut

Over the past several years, Army special-operations orces have learned a number o

lessons and have recognized that:Army Special Operations Forces have

become tactically pro cient. Some wouldsay that this pro ciency has come at a costo the orces language and cultural skills.For ARSOF to success ully ul ll its role inbuilding capacity and shaping the battle-

eld, the orce must maintain a balance inits pro ciency to conduct lethal and non-lethal operations. While ARSOFs tacticaland technical skills dominate the battle eld,it is ofen its skills in the Human Domainthat have the greatest e ect.

Te question posed to the community is this: How do we maintain a healthy balance between the tactical and technicalskills needed or lethal operations whilemaintaining our unique ability to work inthe Human Domain?

Te answer to this question is a returnto an emphasis on our core oundation,Unconventional War are, and recognitiono the act that the broad capabilities pro- vided through training and exercise o theUW model and skill set o er solutions to a

host o operational problems across hybridoperational environments.

Te ability to constantly and consistently work and train in the core capabilities o UW is the key to maintaining the properand required mix o lethal/technical andhuman-terrain operational capabilitiesneeded in changing environments.

Te development o human in rastruc-ture is elemental in all stages o UW. Tehuman terrain skills or mapping, develop-ing and building the human in rastructureexecuted through seasoned, experiencedUW operators with cultural, political,economic and social understanding o theirtarget human environments, are essential inthe success ul conduct o UW. It is a com-bination o expertise and experience thatmay be applied in various other operationalenvironments to great e ect. Tis capability may help resolve a con ict prior to the onseto hostilities or at the least provide groundcommanders with various operational andtactical options based on this human de-

velopment i con ict begins. Te success ulemployment o UW may acilitate a more

positive outcome ollowing con ict.his complex capability has driven

ARSOF success in numerous opera-tions historically. In Bosnia, Kosovo andnumerous other activities around theglobe, ARSOF operators have conductedor acilitated success ul operations basedon these skills. Operations in Iraq and A -ghanistan have demonstrated the tremen-dous potential o the UW capability. Oursuccess ul targeting operations are o tena more narrow view o working in theHuman Domain, while ARSOF actions inthe Anbar Awakening, A ghan village-sta-bility operations and other similar e ortshighlight the broader potential o the UWcapability in the Human Domain.

Te model or success is identi ed:Return to our core capability by ocusingon UW in every Special Forces Group.Te method or that return applying theright mix o tactical, technical and human-terrain skills requires rededication to an oldoperational model and the employment o new planning/training applications.

During the 1980s and 1990s, the 10thSpecial Forces Group continually empha-sized UW capability and operations in itstraining. Annual training was most ofengeared to developing insurgency in ra-structure, working with indigenous popula-tions, training o insurgents and advancedspecial-operations training or all operators.

eams rom the 10th SF Group were ocusedon speci c regions or countries, studiedlanguage, culture and politics o the area o

ocus. raining and missions in the area o ocus were exercised yearly and plans brie ed

to battalion and group commanders.In recent years, operational require-

ments and command emphasis havecaused our community to stray rom thismodel o a regional or country ocus.Every Special Forces Group must return tothis model and every team given a dedi-cated ocus area, i not already assigned.Resources should be provided or trainingin language, culture, politics, society, eco-nomics and current events. Every training

exercise within the operational groupsshould be UW- ocused.

Te U.S. Army John F. Kennedy SpecialWar are Center and School should considero ering mobile training teams to re reshthe teams UW knowledge and skill, whilethe operational groups should sel -re reshand train in insurgency structure, compo-nents and development, as well as otherUW-related topics.

Te SF operational planning ormatsshould add an annex or UW planning. UWplanning should be the norm or all the SFgroups and all deploying elements. Te mainemphasis o this UW planning should be athorough understanding and evaluation o the given human terrain and its dynamics.Further, each deploying group should createplans or the development o the humanterrain using the UW insurgency model to

urther/reach a designated end-state. Priorto deployment these plans should be testedin pre-deployment training.

It has ofen been said that i you train orand become pro cient in an UW skill-set,you will become pro cient in the conducto all SF core missions. Every UW training

event or exercise will present numerous op-portunities or tactical and technical training.Nothing will be lost to the groups through arenewed ocus on UW; rather the regimentalrededication to UW planning and trainingwill strengthen, develop and maintain ARSOFsability to navigate and operate e ectively inthe human terrain in any environment.

A second question posed to the ARSOFcommunity is:

How should ARSOF evolve to improveupon its ability to operate in the HumanDomain as it looks 15 years rom now?

Te answer, (assuming a ull rededicationto UW already implemented) is two old:1. Immediately embrace and integrate the

development and utilization o opera-tional technologies. Tis is de ned asthose types o technology that allow ARSOF operators to understand, moni-tor, navigate, develop and operate in theHuman Domain, as well as those thatcan e ectively support ARSOF core mis-sions in the Human Domain.

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2. Immediately develop and execute plansor ull integration o ARSOF operations

within the Cyber Domain.New and developing technology presents

a tremendous opportunity or SpecialForces to gain great advantage in develop-

ing and ambiguous operational environ-ments all over the globe. echnology extends reach and vision or the operatorand allows eyes, ears and actions in deniedor contested areas. echnological eyes, earsand actions act as an additional orce multi-plier, used by Special Forces operators whoare themselves orce multipliers.

Te Cyber Domain o ers the same op-portunity or ARSOF operators to extendtheir reach, vision and impact on theoperational environment. An ARSOF cybercapability would present a tremendous op-portunity and advantage to trained ARSOFoperators in the conduct o core SpecialForces missions. Te cyber arena is opento the world through social media, e-mail

and other Internet-based communications,which presents a new environment or in-teraction with and intervention in popula-tions that may be otherwise out o reach.

A myriad o new technologies is underdevelopment each year and the CyberDomain is expanding by leaps and bounds.In a time o constrained budget, limited

ootprints and operational constraints, it isimportant to consider how the lighteningpace o cyber expansion can be harnessedto support ARSOF operators.

At my Special Forces graduation, theeatured speaker, the SWCS commander,

identi ied the di erence between the resto the U.S. Armed Forces and the SpecialForces community. He stated that in theregular military, the man is an extensiono the weapons system, but in SpecialForces, the weapons system is an exten-sion o the man

Te broader meaning behind this insightis that weapons and equipment, technolo-gies and the use o the Cyber Domain must

be adapted to the ARSOF operator, to ex-tend his reach, his vision, his voice and ac-tion. Te operator must control the systemor activity. He must be able to modi y andadjust e ects. Te system is available when,where and how it is required to support

evolving and time-sensitive ARSOF opera-tions. Tese capabilities must be providedby the operator to indigenous personnel, atthe time, place, manner and orm chosenby the operator.

Op a o a t o oEvery technological advantage should

be explored and exploited by ARSOF.New technology will enhance, not inhibitspecial operations, as long as the old adageo weapons systems being an extensiono the man is applied to new operationaltechnologies. Operational technologiesprovide the opportunity to monitor thehuman terrain, as well as to vet and evalu-ate the veracity o speci ic indigenous

personnel. I utilized correctly, operationaltechnologies may be the primary methodso communication with indigenous popu-lations by ARSOF operators.

Tis is a critical juncture or ARSOF.Since 9/11 the community has partneredand embedded itsel with other governmentagencies and larger, more complex systemso weapons, communications, logistics andoperational technologies. Tis has beenadvantageous or our orces in orward oper-ating environments. Some SOF organizationshave become enamored with these capablebut large and complex systems. Partnershipswith these agencies brings additional require-ments, constraints, restrictions and layers o approval or use, not always riendly to ourunique ARSOF operational environments.

Te requirements or development andemployment o success ul and e ective opera-tional technologies or ARSOF operations are:

Te development o an organictechnology capability within ARSOFoperational units.

echnology and its e ects arecontrolled by ARSOF operators oroperational units.

echnology must be man portable. Te capability must be available on

demand. Te capabilities must be tailored to

di erent operational environmentsand populations.

Speci c equipment must ofen be in-nocuous, concealed and or dual use.

Te capabilities require trained ARSOFoperators at the operational level.

Te expertise in the capabilities must besustainable.

Some orms o operational technolo-gies must be trans errable by opera-tors to selected indigenous personnel.

New developments in operationaltechnology must be ast tracked tooperators as they are developed.

Te operational technologies must becost e ective.

Challenges to ully use and exploit modernoperational technologies are rst and oremostthe cost o the systems and the operationalexpertise required to ully utilize operationaltechnologies, both current and developing, inan e ective and time-sensitive manner.

Current resourcing within the military ollows either a commodities or sustain-

ment-based model, both ill-suited to astdeveloping new technologies suitable oroperational use. Commodities-based pro-grams may purchase any current productsidenti ed as a legitimate requirement, but donot allow or maintenance o an inventory

or operational deployment and training. Asustainment-based program will maintain atroops, organization and equipment inven-tory suitable or deployment and training,but will normally not be nimble enoughto inject new and developing technologiesas required in multiple environments andmodern ast-moving battle elds.

A hybrid- unding system must be devel-oped that provides the ability to purchase

n w d d v lo olo do o os l Fo o dv d v lo d

v o ll ov lob .

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new advances in technology immediately or operators and yet provides a sustainment

capability or a basic load o operationaltechnology with which to deploy and train.In the realm o new and developing technol-ogies, a new unding strategy is a necessity and will become a larger requirement astime goes on.

Development o tech support detach-ments must be accelerated and ully imple-mented at all Special Forces groups. Tismust become a regimental priority in orderto maintain the technology inventory andmaintain technology skills gained rom pastschoolhouse training and operational expe-rience. Seasoned ex-Special Forces opera-tors should be hired as technical specialistswithin the tech detachment in support o training tech skills to maintain the skill setand knowledge base within the orce, aswell as supporting operations as required.

Providing the machinery and training toconstruct basic technical devices and en- vironmentally harden those devices would

provide long-term cost savings. Many circuits, transmitters and GPS devices canbe purchased commercially at very coste ective prices, and provide considerabletactical support. Former Special Forces op-erators trained in technical modi cations aswell as active duty Special Forces operatorscan cost e ectively provide capability to the

orce organically. Maintaining one to twoormer ARSOF operators as trained ma-

chinists able to build, modi y and hardendi erent technical capabilities is a must.

Developing a new military occupationalspecialty as an addition to a Special Forcesdetachment-alpha to deal with technology is imperative. Former SWCS commander,Maj. Gen. Bennet Sacolick, had discussedthe idea o an additional MOS, a new MOS 18 GULF or 18 Gadget. Te time hascome to incorporate this idea into the SFA-team concept in order or Special Forcesto e ectively employ new technologies andexploit opportunities or technical supporto operations in a time e ective manner. At

the detachment level, an 18G provides thecross training and re resher training neededto maintain operational pro ciency andlevel o knowledge within the detachment.Te 18G would be the primary technology planner and integrator or all operationsand training. Te 18G, in theory, wouldprovide re resher training and training sup-port rom the tech-support detachment.

ArsOF c pa d v opCyber operational possibilities are limit-

less or ARSOF operators. Doctrine regard-ing ARSOFs use o the Cyber Domainmust be quickly and e ciently developedin order to exploit its advantages. ARSOFmovement and activities previously con-ducted on land, sea and in the air must beadapted to movement and action in the Cy-ber Domain. All o the UW human-terrainskill sets will apply in the Cyber Domain,but must be adapted to a new, dynamicenvironment. New innovative operationaltactics, techniques and procedures must

cybersPAce New and developing technologies and the Cyber Domain offer an oppor tunity for ARSOF to extend its reach, vision and impact on the opera-tional environment. U.S. Army photo

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be devised or ARSOF cyber operations.echnology has given birth to a cyber-savvy

generation and almost everywhere commu-nication devices are available, the Inter-net is available. Te ability to interact atlightening speed with speci c populations

within the Human Domain to generatesought afer e ects is immediate.

ARSOF must embrace the concept o weapons systems as an extension o the op-erator while working in the Cyber Domain,which will extend our vision, understand-ing, communications, actions and reach.

ools used and cyber Ps must re ectlanguage, cultural and societal consider-ations o the population with whom theoperator is interacting, communicating anda ecting. ARSOF Cyber capability must beresponsive to the evolving operational con-ditions and time-sensitive actions in orderto be e ective.

Te requirements or development andemployment o success ul and e ective ARSOFCyber operations are:

Establish ARSOF requirements oroperations in the Cyber Domain.

Develop ARSOF cyber doctrine andoperational guidance.

Begin training o ARSOF cyber opera-tors or each SF group.

Develop and stand up ARSOF cyber-

support elements throughout ARSOFunits and headquarters.

ARSOF cyber capability will requireall ARSOF operators to acquire basiccyber operational-movement skills.

Because o the capability inherentin the Cyber Domain, ARSOF cyberoperations must be coordinated andintegrated ully with other organiza-tions and commands.

Develop and stand up o coordinationand integration mechanisms betweenARSOF and all appropriate organiza-tions and commands.

Utilize SWCS to ully examine ap-plication o current UW skill sets anddoctrinal guidance within the CyberDomain.

ARSOF tools and Ps must re ectthe cyber environment in which wewill operate and the Human Domainwith which we will interact.

Te expertise in the capabilities mustbe sustainable.

Some orms o ARSOF cyber capability must be trans errable.

Based on the nature o ARSOF opera-tions and targets, cyber capability mustbe time sensitive and on demand.

ARSOF has slowly re-learned the neces-sity o integrated operational and intelligencecapabilities or maximum e ectiveness; now itmust employ that lesson to properly integrateoperational experience and cyber expertise

or maximum a ect as well. Proper integra-tion will require ARSOF operators with ad-ditional training in cyber skills working withother skilled cyber personnel to insure properand e ective support to ARSOF operations.

Based on the very nature o ARSOFoperations, time sensitive and on-demand

cyber capability will require execution atsome level within ARSOF.

Tere is a requirement to provide every ARSOF operator with cyber access on a daily basis, as well as ocus on the cultural aspectso the human terrain within social media,

threat awareness and operational applications.At the detachment level, an ARSOF opera-tor is not required to be a cyber expert, buthe must be skilled enough to move throughcyber space undetected, o ering a low signa-ture and possessing the requisite skills withbasic programs and commands to executebasic tasks as directed by skilled ARSOFcyber operators. He must understand andemploy solid basic cyber operational-security measures. He must understand, identi y andavoid i possible cyber threats. ARSOF mustexpand in rastructure and computer capabil-ity to ully equip the orce in order to operatee ectively in this new domain.

SWCS must begin development o ARSOFcyber doctrine and guidance, while utilizingthe current UW training and guidance toevaluate application o new tactics, techniquesand procedures or cyber operations.

New positions or civilian GS employeesintegrated into ARSOF cyber elements willhelp provide needed expertise in cyber capa-bility and skills, as well as provide continuity o capability throughout the orce.

Utilization o new technology and opera-tions within the Cyber Domain may domi-nate war are in the uture. A single enemy,equipped with relatively inexpensive com-puter equipment but provided proper skillsmight bring large military units to theirknees through a ew computer keystrokes.Immediate communication and interactionis possible with millions o people throughsocial media, which includes the ability toin uence thought and action. New technol-ogy and the Cyber Domain will make deniedareas o the world accessible, and ormerly controlled populations no longer kept insilence. Te advantages gained by incorpora-tion o ARSOF Human Domain UW skillswith modern technology and use o the Cy-ber Domain will provide dominance ar intothe uture. Our ability to quickly but wisely embrace and use these new capabilities, toe ectively navigate through this new rontierwill determine i the weapon remains anextension o the man or the man becomes anextension o the weapon.

tWee t t Weet Social media such as Twitter andFacebook provide valuable resources that canbe leveraged by ARSOF. Somalias Islamist al-Shabaab militants had their Twitter accountsuspended for posting direct threats of violenceagainst others. The twitter feed was back uptwo weeks later under the name HSMPress.

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03 > Co anders No e

04 > F re Opera ing

En iron en06 > S ra egic G idance/

Ex erna Direc ion

08 > Co and G idance / In erna Direc ion

16 > ARSOF 2022 A a G ance

18 > ARSOF 2022 Priori ies

29 > P ing ARSOF 2022in o Ac ion

Contents

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F re Opera ing En iron en .As we projectbeyond Iraq and A ghanistan, we will ace a challengingsecurity environment. We are not returning to a pre-9/11

era o operations nor the Cold War-era where competingsuperpowers created a airly predictable, i tenuous, worldorder. Instead, this new world will be characterized by anirregular balance o power between both state and non-stateactors. It will present a dynamic operating environmentthat is characterized by uncertainty. The shi t in the nationstolerance away rom large-scale joint operations, coupledwith the complexity o the uture operating environment,create a growing gap between national action and inaction this changing dynamic could give our adversaries broader

reedom o action and encourage increased instability. Thereality o this changing paradigm requires USASOC and the

U.S. Special Operations Command to build new soptions or the nation.

Future threats will range rom standing conv

and unconventional orces to irregular militias aparamilitaries to terrorist groups, criminal elemeany number o hybrids. The interaction o sevewithin the environment, including human behaviassures both og and riction.

We will increasingly act in multi-dimensionaloperating environments, which will require the oto operate within, and seamlessly shi t between, enclaves in the center o sprawling megacities anrural villages. These diverse operating environme

also test support elements, including logistics, intand communications. While the rise o non-state

/ / /

t h e f u t u r e o p e r a t i n g

e n v i r o n m

e n t

Over the next decade, the ARSOF Soldier will be called on to put all o his training to the test in ungoverneand under-governed parts o the world, as well as in urban centers. As borders become more porous andthreats evolve and build, the problem set con ronting the orce can be divided into three subsets:

Throughout the international com-

munity, there are persistent stra-tegic challenges: acquisition andallocation o natural resources,the balance o population betweenurban and rural communities andthe establishment o communica-tions. How our allies deal withthese strategic challenges willultimately shape the world inwhich ARSOF operates.

In an era o constrained budgets

and limited resources, ARSOFmust take a realistic look at theemerging challenges o today toprepare or the world o 2022.Asymmetric threats and pre-emptive cyber attacks rom bothstate and non-state actors willcharacterize regional challenges inthe next decade.

The combination o unconven-

tional challenges ranging romtransnational terrorism, disper-sion and access to weapons omass destruction, organizedcriminal networks and the priva-tization o orce could expose theUnited States to serious threatswithin the undergoverned regionso the world.

future threats >

PERSIStENt ChAllENGES EmERGING ChAllENGES uNCONvENtIONAl ChAllEN

O er e nex decade, Ar specia opera ions orces wi

re ain ac i e engaged in pro ec ing o r o e and and o r

na iona -sec ri in eres s abroad.Our orce will be called upon toace a number o threats occurring in multi-dimensional, hybrid-opera

environments. It is imperative that our orce understands not only thethreats that may develop over the next decade, but also the changingenvironment in which we will be called to operate.

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defense strategiC guidanCe

Whenever possible, we will develop innovative, low-cost and small- ootp

to achieve security objectives, relying on exercises, rotational presence and

capabilities.

2010 nationaL seCurity strategy

We will continue to rebalance our military capabilities to excel at counterterr

counterinsurgency, stability operations and meeting increasingly sophisticated

threats, while ensuring our orce is ready to address the ull range o military

/ / /

s t r a t e g i C g u i d a n C e /

e x t e r n a L d i r e C t i o n

I is i pera i e a o r p ans are g ided b and nes ed wi

o o r na iona eaders and o r ig er eadq ar ers.The ollowingguidance has defned our role as a orce. Using this guidance, we have

developed a strategic ramework or our way orward.

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What We have LearnedOver the past decade, USASOC built a robust capability

to target terrorist networks and an unmatched capacity orcounterinsurgency operations. At its peak, the level o supportto joint- orce headquarters in the U.S. Central Command areao operations was the largest sustained e ort in our history. Asa orce, our Soldiers have per ormed magni cently during twoo the nations longest wars while executing a wide range odemanding and high-risk operations in hostile environments.As the nature and extent o our engagements in the MiddleEast change, it is critical to review the lessons learned overthe past decade, assess our current situation and explorerequirements or the uture orce.

Perhaps the most signi cant change o the past decadeis the evolution o the Human Domain. During World War I,aerial plat orms were used as a means o re and observationin land combat. By the end o World War II, airspace hadevolved into a distinct domain because its control becamerecognized as a key to success in the war. National leadershipdirected the establishment o a separate department o the AirForce in order to develop the required and unique doctrine,

organization, training, materiel, leadership, personacilities solutions needed to dominate this newly,

space. A similar appreciation or infuencing popusuggests the need or establishment o a Human D

Wars among the people that emphasize infuepopulation groups rather than an exclusive emphon battle is an ancient concept. Since the early 19ARSOF have been speci cally designed to workHuman Domain. The emergence o the Human demands the armed orces and other U.S. goversecurity agencies analyze what it takes to win wathe people, including de eating terrorist and otheEvidence o this new domain can be ound in thand type o ad hoc structures and signi cant repo traditional Land Domain tools.

Based on lessons learned, the Army is updaticoncept ramework to refect the work done to aassist and infuence oreign security orces, govand people. Adding the 7th War ghting Functionother six War ghting unctions will leverage therecent war-time experiences and help ensure the

/ / /

C o m m a n d g u

i d a n C e /

i n t e r n a L d i r e C t i o n

vision Provide our nation the worlds premier special operations uni

capable o prosecuting the most sensitive special war are campaigns aexecuting the most di fcult surgical strike operations, while providingseamless and persistent special operations support to joint- orcecommanders worldwide.

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uSASOC PRIORItIES

Win the Current Fight Strengthen the Global

SOF Network

Further Army SOF/CFInterdependence

Preserve the Force

SOF tRuthS

Humans are more important than hardware. Quality is better than quantity. Special operations orces cannot be mass produced. Competent special operations orces cannot be cre-

ated a ter emergencies occur. Most special operations require non-SOF support.

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arsof CritiCaL CapabiLities : speCiaL Warfare and surgiCaL strike

USASOC provides the nation with orces capable o

executing two di erent, but mutually supporting orms

o special operations: special war are and surgical

strike. Joint- orce commanders leverage ARSOFs

ability to execute these capabilities in the development

and execution o their special operations campaigns.

Understanding the di erences will illuminate how

special war are and surgical strike can best be utilized

to achieve strategic e ects in support o regional or

national objectives.

Previous attempts to describe our orce

descriptions such as black/white, nation

theater and direct/indirect. These terms,

describe the orce by the nature o the un

command and control structures, authorities

operational approach have limited utility. Th

special war are and surgical strike more ac

describe our orce based on its capabilities

Special war are and surgical strike are

distinguished by how they address uncertain

10 ti e X Core Ac i i ies as en era ed b e u.S. Congress:1] Direc Ac ion:Short-duration strikes andother small-scale o ensive actions conducted as aspecial operation in hostile, denied or diplomaticallysensitive environments and which employ specializedmilitary capabilities to seize, destroy, capture, exploit,recover or damage designated targets.

2] S ra egic Reconnaissance: Reconnaissanceand surveillance actions conducted as a specialoperation in hostile, denied or politically sensitive en-vironments to collect or veri y in ormation o strategicor operational signi cance, employing military capa-bilities not normally ound in conventional orces.

3] uncon en iona War are:Activitiesconducted to enable a resistance movement orinsurgency to coerce, disrupt or overthrow agovernment or occupying power by operatingthrough or with an underground, auxiliary andguerrilla orce in a denied area.

4] Foreign In erna De ense:Participation bycivilian and military agencies o a government in anyo the action programs taken by another government

or other designated organization to ree and protectits society rom subversion, lawlessness, insurgency,terrorism and other threats to its security.

5] Ci i A airs Opera ions:Those militaryoperations conducted by civil a airs orcesthat (1) enhance the relationship betweenmilitary orces and civil authorities in localitieswhere military orces are present; (2) requirecoordination other interagency, intergovernmentaland nongovernmental organizations, indigenouspopulations and institutions and the private sector,

(3) involve application o unctional specialty skthat normally the responsibility o civil governmeto enhance the conduct o civil-military operation

6] Co n er erroris :Actions taken directlyagainst terrorist networks and indirectly to infuencand render global and regional environmentsinhospitable to terrorist networks.

7] mi i ar In or a ion S ppor Opera ions: Planned operations to convey selected in ormat

and indicators to oreign audiences to infuence emotions, motives, objective reasoning and ultimthe behavior o oreign governments, organizagroups, and individuals.8] h ani arian Assis ance: Programsconducted to relieve or reduce the results o naturor man made disasters or other endemic conditionsuch as human pain, disease, hunger, or privationthat might present a serious threat to li e or thatcan result in great damage to or loss o property.Humanitarian assistance provided by US orcesis limited in scope and duration. The assistance

provided is designed to supplement or complementhe e orts o the host nation civil authorities oragencies that may have the primary responsibility

or providing humanitarian assistance.

9] t ea er Searc and Resc e: Employment ospecialized SOF aircra t and uniquely quali ed SOFcrews or the rescue o personnel rom enemy terror denied areas whenever conventional combat searcand rescue techniques and capabilities are inadequat

10] Ac i i ies Specifed b e Presidenor SECDEF

SPECIAl WARFARE:

The execution o

activities that involve acombination o lethal

and non-lethal actions

taken by specially

trained and educated

orces that have a

deep understanding o

cultures and oreign

language, pro ciency

in small-unit tactics,

subversion, sabotage

and the ability to build

and ght alongside

indigenous combat

ormations in a permis-

sive, uncertain or

hostile environment.

SuRGICAl StRIkE:

The execution o

activities in a precise

manner that employ

SOF in hostile, denied

or politically sensitive

environments to seize,

destroy, capture, exploit,

recover or damagedesignated targets, or

infuence threats.

arsof CritiCaL

CapabiLities >

sof Core aCtivities >

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arsof c c lc l

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.

uncon en ionaWar are

S ppor omCO

S abi iOpera ions

Co ba ingWeapons o

massDes r c ion

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SOF Core Opera ions tai ored Co bina ions o Specia War are and S rgica S ri e Capabi i

SPECIAl WARFARE

SuRGICAl StRIkE

uSASOC is e proponen or a seg en o e u.S. Ar s Range o mi i ar Opera ions

h an Do ain land Do ain

ARmy FOuNDAtIONAl ACtIvItIES

tRADOC

FORSCOm

UW CT CP FID COIN SFA Combined Arms Maneuver / / / / / / The Armys Range of Military Operations

special war are capability mitigates uncertainty byproviding the nation a sel -contained orce that is

designed to accomplish its mission through and

with indigenous surrogates and partners. Special

war are Soldiers possess expertise in tactics,

combat-adviser skills, military deception, sabotage

and subversion, expertise in oreign language,

relationship-building skills, cultural understanding,

adaptive decision making and cognitive problemsolving. This unique skill set is necessary to

enhance survivability or our orce over extended

periods o time in hostile, austere and denied

environments. Surgical strike reduces uncertainty

through detailed analysis and pinpoint accuracy.

Key knowledge, skills and attributes or employment

o surgical strike include the execution o robust

intelligence usion, leveraging high-tech collectionsystems, management o deliberate targeting cycles

and the ability to discriminate and engage threat

targets with minimal collateral damage.

In August 2012, the U.S. Army published Army

Doctrinal Publication ADP 3-05,Special Operations .

Although doctrine will evolve over time, the

introduction o these terms in ADP 3-05 represents

a maturation o special operations concepts. By

describing special operations in these two di erent

orms, USASOCs ability to generate, sustain and

articulate ARSOF capabilities is enhanced. Further,

this approach highlights the synergy possible

through the combination o special war are and

surgical strike capabilities at the operational level.

uSASOC

7 Warfg ing F nc ion

Ar

Specia Opera ions

Force CoreCo pe enc

Ar

Con en iona

Force CoreCo pe enc

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From the O fce o Strategic Services operational groups and theexploits o Filipino guerillas led by Russell Volckmann in World II to the Montagnard Civilian Irregular De ense Groups o Vietnsupport to counterinsurgency operations in El Salvador, the Unite

States has a rich history o special war are.More recently, our orce led the U.S. overthrow o

the Taliban regime in A ghanistan in the days ollowing

9/11 and have provided essential contributions to the

success ul e orts against violent extremists organiza-

tions in Colombia and the Philippines.

Special War are is that orm o special operations

in which the United States government de ends its

interests through training, material or even directcombat support to indigenous people and riendly

governments whose interests coincide with those o the

United States. Special War are includes oreign internal

de ense, counterinsurgency and unconventional

war are. Unconventional war are became a mission or

the U.S. Army in 1952 with the activation o the 10th

Special Forces Group at Fort Bragg, N.C. A couple o

years later, in response to the French de eat at Dien

Bien Phu, counterinsurgency and oreign inte

de ense were added to the Special War are m

As with conventional war are, the Army h

developed special war are maneuver units, w

mission includes closing with and destroying

enemy. These are the ve active duty and two

Guard Special Forces Groups. Selected, traine

organized to work with indigenous orces, poarea expertise and language pro ciency, exce

small-unit ghting skills and the ability to ope

uncertain or denied areas or extended period

Forces units are designed to operate in compl

uncertain environments. Also essential to the

o Special War are are Civil A airs and M

In ormation Support Operations units, particu

enabled by their capability to analyze, segmen

speCiaL WarfareSince 1952, the termspecial war are has

been key to the con-duct o special opera-tions. At that time, theterm described theconduct o uncon-ventional war are,counterinsurgencyand PsychologicalOperations. In 1956,to re ect the evolu-

tion and ocus ospecial operations,the PSYWAR Center,now the JFK SpecialWar are Center andSchool, changed itsname to the SpecialWar are Center. In1961, President JohnF. Kennedy madespecial operations thecenter o his strategicpolicy, naming thefrst Special Assistantto the Secretary oDe ense or COIN,Special Activitiesand Special War are.Between 1952

and 1962, specialwar are became thecommonly acceptedterm to discuss UW,COIN and PSYWAR,although it was notcodifed into doctrineuntil the publicationo ADP-3-05,Special Operations in 2012.

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Our surgical strike capability has been orged rom

the daring exploits o the 1st Special Service Force and

Ranger Battalions o World War II to the Son Tay Raid

deep inside enemy territory in Vietnam. This legacy

continues today with the relentless pursuit o our

nations enemies across the globe.

The modern ARSOF surgical strike requirement

was born rom our experiences in Operation Eagle

Claw in 1979. From this ailed rescue attempt o

U.S. hostages in Iran, the U.S. was determined

to improve its capability to rapidly and surgically

conduct sensitive, scalable and unilateral direct-

action missions against adversaries anywhere in

the world. The conduct o hostage rescue or other

unilateral sensitive operations requires special

airli t, intelligence and support assets that utilize

cutting-edge technologies to ensure success.

ARSOF surgical strike maneuver units include a

special mission unit, Special Forces Comma

In-extremis Forces and the 75th Ranger Reg

Executed unilaterally or collaboratively,

strike extends operational reach and in luen

by engaging global targets discriminately an

precisely. Strike operations are not always i

to be an isolated activity; they are executed

the operational environment or in luence se

target audiences in support o larger strateg

interests. Although the actual strike is short

duration, the comprehensive planning proce

and a iliated in luence e orts requentl

interagency and host-nation partnerships to

an understanding o the threat network and

post-operation activities.

ARSOF possess a highly scalable and ve

suite o surgical strike capabilities, ranging

clandestine small-unit raids to overt, regime

Throughout our nations history, Army special operations orces hconducted sensitive military-strike operations to achieve some omost critical strategic objectives.

surgiCaL s t r i k eWorld War II,Vietnam, Laos andCambodia weremilitary con icts thatresulted in majorcollateral damage tothe areas in which thebattles were wagedas well as signifcantloss o li e. As theVietnam War wounddown, internationaland American publicopinion was outragedby widespreadbombing campaignsthat resulted in theloss o innocent lives.The slash and burnbombing campaignso the frst hal othe century wereoutdated, and in its

place, the Departmento De ense introducedthe term surgicalstrike in the frst GulWar to describe anew way o wagingwar that includedone bomb, onetarget, which greatlylimited collateral

damage and losso innocent lives.Today, ARSOF hashoned that capabilityin order to act withprecision againstthreats to our nationalsecurity.

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/ / /

a r

s o f 2 0 2 2 a t a g L a n C

e

foundationaL ConCepts for arsof >

uncon-en iona

War are

S ppor o

mCO

S abi i

Opera ions

Co ba ing

WmD

ForeignIn ernaDe ense

Co n er-

erroris

Co n er-

ins rgencSOF Core Opera ions tai ored Co bina ions o Specia War are and S rgica S ri e Capa

SPECIAl WARFARE

SuRGICAl StRIkE

528 S s ain en Brigade (Specia Opera ions - Airborne)

4 , 8 , mi i ar In or a ion S ppor Opera ions Gro ps (Airborne)

95 Ci i A airs Brigade (Airborne)

160 Specia Opera ions A ia ion Regi en

1s ,3 rd,5 ,7 ,10 ,19 ,20 Specia Forces Gro ps (Airborne)

Co ba an Co ander In-Ex re is Force

75 Ranger Regi en

Specia missions uni

Specia

War are

S rgica

S ri euW

FID

PSyOP

CmO

Ct

CP

DA

Reco erOpera ions

uSASOC genera es wo di eren b a s ppor ing or s o specia oper

Built to squeeze out uncertainty

then execute

Units trained andequipped to provide aprimarily unilateral,

scalable, direct-actioncapability that are skilledin hostage rescue, kill/

capture operations againstdesignated targets andother specialized tasks.

Designed to wade into uncertainty

and prevail

Units capable oconducting sabotage,

subversion and insurgentactivities or extended

periods in denied areasand advising, assistingand training partner-

nation orces in COIN &Special Operations.

UW CT CP FID COIN SFA Combined Arms Maneuver / / / / / /

uSASOC is e proponen or a seg en o e u.S. Ar s Range o mi i ar Opera

h an Do ain land Do ain7 Warfg ing F nc ion

ARmy FOuNDAtIONAl ACtIvItIES

tRADOC

FORSCOm

The Armys Range of Military Operations

uSASOC

Ar

Specia Opera ionsForce Core

Co pe enc

Ar

Con en ionaForce Core

Co pe enc

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future forCe deveLopment proCess

INvESt IN humAN CAPItAl

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arsof 2022 prioritiesIn order o oc s o r e or s o er e nex decade, we a e priori i ed o r req ire en s in o sw ic are e enab ing concep s a wi a ow s o direc and s ape e re de e op

1. Invest in Human Capital2. Optimize SOF/Conventional Force/JIIM Interdependence3. Operationalize the CONUS base

4. Develop SOF Capabilities at the operational level5. Facilitate SOF Mission Command6. Optimize Resourcing and Commodity Areas

In the ollowing pages, each o these enabling concepts is described in greater detail, including a brichallenges, vision and possible solutions in the near, mid and ar-term.

1. invest in human Capi taLO r orce is e bes ed ca ed, rained and eq ipped specia opera ions or a ion in e woSo diers are capab e o s cceeding in e increasing ncer ain o e 21s cen r ba

The ARSOF Soldier is our center o gravity. To ensure that our operators will succeed in the uture owe will recruit, assess, select, train, educate and retain only those Soldiers with the knowledge, skillsthrive in the most demanding conditions. To retain a decisive advantage over our adversaries, we wilsolutions to optimize our human capital, including: enhanced education and training and increased dicapital. To ensure the health o our orce, our ocus will continue to be on the preservation o our

1a. enhanCed eduCat ion and trainingChAllENGE: Success in the uture operating environment places a premium on the mastery o problhighly specialized technical skills; or the special war are units this includes oreign language and

2022 vISION:ARSOF will be the most well-educated and well-trained orce within the Department o

POtENtIAl SOlutIONS:

ShORt-tERm Activate the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special War are Center and Schools Special War ar

(Airborne) as a centrally selected O6 command (FY13). Identi y SOF assignments that require De ense Language Institute or other advanced languag Send selected Soldiers to the De ense Language Institute or training en route to assignments a Formalize and resource the SOF li elong-learning model, including expansion o SWCSs educaenable Soldiers to obtain an associates degree through its quali cation courses and to provide opSoldiers to earn bachelors, masters and doctorate degrees. (Prioritize ARSOF Education Program Broaden the range o special operations aviation-related individual training and education inaerial systems.

Develop a SWCS SOF Sustainment curriculum and doctrine or sustainment pro essionals ass Develop required training and education programs to improve asymmetric and unconventional-w Improve cross-command recruitment and assignments.

mID-tERm Implement innovative approaches to language and cultural-immersion education. Codi y and resource SOF doctorate requirements in key/infuential positions across the Departthroughout the U.S. Government. Develop a UW Capabilities Manager who supports SWCSs role as the U.S. Army Special OpeExcellence and USASOCs role as the DoD lead or UW, including a comprehensive program doctrine and leader development.

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s o f 2 0 2 2 p r i o r i t i e s

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1C. preservation of the forCe and fa miLiesChAllENGE:The challenging nature o special operations, including repeated overseas deploymconditions, places an extraordinary demand on the physical, emotional and spiritual well being and their amilies. ARSOF operational tempo is expected to remain at high-levels or the next2022 vISION:ARSOF Soldiers and amilies will understand that they are the number one priority to and capable orce. It is imperative that our orce knows that they have access to any and all program