Paying the HumanCosts of War

Christopher GelpiPeter D. Feaver

Jason ReiflerDuke University &

Triangle Institute for Security Studies

Casualty Aversion as aConstraint on American Power

Mueller (1973, 1994): support for war drops with log of casualties

Developed into conventional wisdom that public will not tolerate casualties Beirut 1983, Gulf War 1991, Somalia 1993

Widespread assumption of “casualty phobia” Kosovo 1999

Caused Saddam to doubt US resolve in March 2003

Casualty Aversion:A Contingent Constraint?

Casualty phobia myth persisted despite evidence to the contrary Academic consensus on public cost/benefit

approach to support for war Key Question: What causes variation in

sensitivity to casualties? Jentleson: Policy Objective (PPO) Larson: Domestic Elite Consensus Kull: International Consensus Feaver & Gelpi: Likelihood of Success

Approval of Korean War and Battle Deaths

Key appears to be perceived success

Big drop in support is Aug-Dec 1950 – losing to PRC

Slope is positive from Feb-Aug 1951 - US recovers

Slope is negative in 1952 - stalemate sets in

0

5,000

10,000

15,000

20,000

25,000

30,000

35,000

Aug-50 Jan-51 Jun-51 Nov-51 Apr-52 Sep-520

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

Cumulative Hostile Deaths Percent Supporting

Approval of Vietnam Warand Battle Deaths

Impact of casualties seems to depend on success

Pre-Tet slope only significant because of drop Mar-May 1966 Matches increase in

those saying war is a “mistake”

Post-Tet slope triples majority of population

now says war is a “mistake”

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

Aug-65

Dec-6

5

Apr-66

Aug-66

Dec-6

6

Apr-67

Aug-67

Dec-6

7

Apr-68

Aug-68

Dec-6

8

Apr-69

Aug-69

Dec-6

9

Apr-70

Aug-70

Dec-7

0

Apr-71

05000100001500020000250003000035000400004500050000

Percent Supporting Cumulative Hostile Deaths

Presidential Approval andCasualties in Iraq

40

45

50

55

60

65

70

75

Mar

-03

Apr-03

May

-03

Jun-0

3

Jul-0

3

Aug-03

Sep-

03

Oct-0

3

Nov-0

3

Dec-0

3

Jan-

04

Feb-

04

Mar

-04

Apr-04

May

-04

Jun-0

4

Jul-0

4

Aug-04

Sep-

04

Oct-0

4

Nov-0

4

Ap

pro

val

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

Casu

alt

ies

Bush Approval Major Combat DeathsInsurgency Deaths Post-Sovereignty Deaths

Measures for Analysis of Weekly Approval and Deaths in Iraq

Presidential Approval - Weekly data Data from The Polling Report

Casualties – Log of deaths in Iraq Data from the US Military

Minutes of Media coverage of Iraq Data from The Tyndall Report

Growth in Dow Jones Industrial Index Dummy variables:

Onset of Insurgency Capture of Hussein Release of Kay Report Renewed Iraqi Sovereignty

Predicting Presidential Approval With Casualties In Iraq

40

45

50

55

60

65

70

75

Mar

-03

Apr-0

3

May

-03

Jun-0

3

Jul-0

3

Aug-03

Sep-0

3

Oct-0

3

Nov-0

3

Dec-0

3

Jan-0

4

Feb-

04

Mar

-04

Apr-0

4

May

-04

Jun-0

4

Jul-0

4

Aug-04

Sep-0

4

Ap

pro

va

l

Bush Approval Predicted Approval

Summary: Impact of Iraq War on Presidential Approval Impact of US Casualties:

During battlefield combat, approval went up with casualties

During insurgency, approval went down with casualties

After sovereignty casualties have no effect on approval

Turning points: End of May 2003 when “insurgency” became dominant

media frame Transfer of sovereignty to new government – an

indicator of success? Impact of Media Coverage

Rally effect before war & during major combat Coverage of democratic presidential candidates Media frame: battlefield, insurgency, and sovereignty

Comparing Sources of Casualty Tolerance in the Real World

Aggregate Data show casualty tolerance varies What drives this variation?

Experimental research shows support for all four mechanisms

“Success” seems an anecdotal fit, but… Now we need to:

Compare the relative importance of these mechanisms

Show they influence attitudes in a real conflict

A Model of Public Attitudes Toward Casualties In Iraq

Tolerance ForCasualties

US Right toAttack

US WillSucceed

Education

Demographics(Age, Race, Gender)

PartyIdentification

Four Clusters of AttitudesToward the War in Iraq Vietnam Syndrome: Iraq war wrong, we

are likely to lose Bush Base: Iraq war right, we are likely to

win Noble Failure: Iraq war right, we are likely

to lose Pottery Barn: Iraq war wrong, we are likely

to win

Logit Analysis ofTolerable Casualties In Iraq

Variable Coefficient T - Statistic

Right to Attack 0.98 (0.75)

Will Succeed 0.642 (4.80)***

Right X Succeed 0.268 (4.09)***

Female -0.294 (2.48)**

Minority -0.615 (3.68)***

Education 0.293 (4.65)***

Age 0.182 (3.17)***

Party ID -0.083 (2.26)**

N 1006

The Sources of Tolerance for Casualties in Iraq: Interactive Effects

Not At AllLikely

Not VeryLikely Somewhat

Likely Very Likely

Strongly Disapprove

Somewhat Disapprove

Somewhat Approve

Strongly Approve

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

Probability of Tolerating 1500 US Deaths

Expected Success

Rightness or Wrongness of War

The Demographic Sources of Casualty Tolerance in Iraq

ExplanatoryVariable

Change in Explanatory Variable

Δ Probability of Tolerating 1500 US Deaths

Age 18-29 to 60+ Years Old

+12%

Gender Male to Female -6%

Race White to Non-White -15%

Level of Education No H.S. to College Degree

+20%

Party Identification Strong Rep. to Strong Dem.

-11%

Reality Check:Our Survey & Election Outcome 2004

Our Survey Actual Vote

Bush 51.84% 51%

Kerry 48.16% 48%

Logit Analysis of Presidential Vote Choice: November 2004

Variable Coefficient T - Statistic

Right to Attack 0.599 (3.03)***

Will Succeed 0.027 (0.14)

Right X Succeed 0.417 (3.80)***

Female 0.291 (1.66)*

Minority -0.216 (0.93)

Education -0.102 (1.13)

Age 0.089 (1.04)

Party ID -0.793 (12.59)**

N 1006

Iraq and Presidential Vote Choice 2004

Not At AllLikely Not Very

LikelySomewhat

Likely Very Likely

Strongly Disapprove

Somewhat Disapprove

Somewhat Approve

Strongly Approve

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

Probability of Voting For Bush

Expected Success

Rightness or Wrongness of War

The Demographic Sources of Presidential Vote Choice in 2004

ExplanatoryVariable

Change in Explanatory Variable

Δ Probability of Voting for Bush

Age 18-29 to 60+ Years Old

+6%

Gender Male to Female -7%

Race White to Non-White -5%

Level of Education No H.S. to College Degree

-6%

Party Identification Strong Rep. to Strong Dem.

-81%

What Does It Mean to beSuccessful in Iraq?

25%

4%

28%

22%

4%

9%

8%

Iraqis ProvideSecurity

Iraqi EconomyRebuilt

Iraq Democratic

Iraqis Normal Lives

Iraqi Govt. No WMD

Iraqi Govt. No Linksto Terrorism

Iraq Not Threat toNeighbors

How Will We KnowWe Are Succeeding In Iraq?

19%

6%

14%

40%

8%

4%4%

4% 1%

Services Iraqis HaveAvailableHow Well Iraq's EconomyIs DoingHow Soon Elections AreHeldWhether Iraqis AreCooperating with the USAttacks Against USSoldiersUS Casualties

How Many Insurgents AreKilled/ArrestedHow Much Money the USSpendsRefused

Likelihood of “Success” and Whether the War in Iraq was the “Right Thing”

Right | US Will Succeed Thing | 1 2 3 4 | Total-----------+--------------------------------------------+---------- 1 | 84 155 49 8 | 296 | 80.77 51.16 11.89 2.72 | 26.59 -----------+--------------------------------------------+---------- 2 | 12 68 91 15 | 186 | 11.54 22.44 22.09 5.10 | 16.71 -----------+--------------------------------------------+---------- 3 | 3 63 167 60 | 293 | 2.88 20.79 40.53 20.41 | 26.33 -----------+--------------------------------------------+---------- 4 | 5 17 105 211 | 338 | 4.81 5.61 25.49 71.77 | 30.37 -----------+--------------------------------------------+---------- Total | 104 303 412 294 | 1,113 | 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 | 100.00

Pearson chi2(9) = 631.8776 Pr = 0.000

A Model of Public Attitudes Toward “Success” and “The Right Thing”

US Right toAttack

US WillSucceed

SupportPreemptive

force

BelieveSaddam

linksto WMD,terrorism

Care aboutInt’l

Consensuson force

Confidentin US &

IraqiLeaders

US hasplan tosucceed

Party ID,Demographics

Education,

Domestic elite consensusto stay in Iraq

Two-Stage Least Squares Analysis Whether US Was Right to Attack Iraq

Variable Coefficient T - Statistic

US Will Succeed 0.743 (10.34)**

Iraq Had WMD 0.114 (3.34)**

Link to Al-Qaeda 0.108 (3.60)**

Link to War on Terror

0.158 (4.34)**

Multilateralism -0.111 (3.02)**

Bush Doctrine 0.127 (2.87)**

Party ID -0.071 (4.50)**

N 964

Two-Stage Least Squares Analysis Whether US Will Succeed Iraq

Variable Coefficient T - Statistic

US Right to Attack 0.451 (8.34)***

Confident in US Leaders 0.274 (5.12)***

US Plan to Win the War 0.046 (1.99)**

Importance of Force 0.164 (3.64)***

US Elite Consensus 0.102 (2.44)**

Party ID -0.001 (0.10)

N 964

Conclusions Aggregate data show public willingness to

bear costs of war has varied significantly over time

Experimental evidence supports all hypothesized influences on costs and benefits Jentleson, Larson, Kull, Feaver & Gelpi

Data on attitudes toward Iraq war suggest that weighting of factors depends on the decision being made

“Do the right thing?” or“Just Win Baby?” Expectations of success is trumps for casualty

tolerance and support for ongoing mission Prospective judgment about future outcome Pottery Barn twice as likely as Noble Failure to support

casualties Rightness/wrongness is trumps for

determining vote choice Retrospective judgment about wisdom of a

leader’s decision Majority of Noble Failure support Bush but

overwhelming majority of Pottery Barn support Kerry

The Structure of Public Attitudes Toward Iraq Attitudes toward “Success” and “Right

Thing” structured along reasonable dimensions Consistent with hypotheses in literature

Attitudes are well organized, but are they immune to new information?

Attitudes cause one another, but stronger flow is “success” as a cause of “right thing”

Supplemental Slides

Sources of Data Historical aggregate data on support for

Korea, Vietnam, Somalia Recent aggregate Presidential Approval

data during current in Iraq Individual level data on attitudes toward

current war in Iraq Series of surveys from October 2004 through

October 2004 Flaw in literature: mostly aggregate data

Experimental Support for the Impact of Primary Policy Objective

Do you support “the United States taking military action to replace the government of Yemen…” If it were threatening the shipping of oil

through the Persian Gulf? 47% approve (FPR Mission)

If it were engaging in ethnic cleansing and forced slavery?

61% approve (HI mission) If it were providing terrorist bases to Al-

Qaeda? 71% approve (WT Mission)

Framing Effects and Support for a Hypothetical Invasion of Yemen

Combat Global Terror 0.256 (2.40)*

Promote Human Rights 0.176 (1.85)

Prevent Hostile Superpower 0.154 (1.59)

Human Rights x Frame 0.437 (2.82)**

Terrorism x Frame 0.598 (3.47)**

US Power x Frame 0.504 (3.31)**

Human Rights Frame -0.944 (2.40)*

Terrorism Frame -1.403 (3.70)**

Expected Casualties -0.120 (1.92)

Expected Success 0.773 (8.64)**

Experimental Support for theImpact of Domestic and Int’l Consensus

Do you support “military action to defend the democratic government of East Timor against an insurrection …”? If Congress, UN, and NATO endorse?

74% approve

If Congress opposes? 48% approve

If UN and NATO oppose? 41% approve

If Congress, UN, and NATO all oppose? 24% approve

Elite Consensus and Support for Hypothetical Use of Force in E. Timor

Coefficient T-statistic

All ElitesSupport Force

3.165 (48.56)**

Domestic Elites Oppose Force

-0.414 (4.41)**

Int’l Elites Oppose Force

-0.551 (6.06)**

Both Sets of Elites Oppose

-1.105 (12.15)**

Expected Success, Casualties, and Support for Hypothetical Use of Force

Probability Respondent Strongly Approves of Using Force

Expect 50 Deaths

Expect 500 Deaths

Expect 5,000 Deaths

JCS Extremely Confident

.26 .20 .15

JCS SomewhatConfident

.19 .13 .09

JCS Not Very Confident

.12 .08 .05

Casualty Tolerance andConfidence in Success

1 vs. 2 1 vs. 3 1 vs. 4

JCS Confidence 0.184 (2.50)* 0.667 (8.28)** 0.719 (8.97)**

Expected Deaths 0.109 (1.51) 0.490 (6.19)** 0.654 (8.28)**

Casualty Tolerance -0.361 (7.41)** -0.619(10.77)** -0.933(15.19)**

Ready for Force 0.138 (1.01) 0.537 (3.78)** 0.977 (7.04)**

Party ID 0.120(2.75)** 0.281 (5.93)** 0.405 (8.53)**

Age 0.000 (0.10) -0.002 (0.50) 0.006 (1.59)

IR Knowledge 0.001 (0.02) 0.084 (1.03) -0.062 (0.76)

Sex -0.134 (1.09) -0.233 (1.73) -0.093 (0.69)

Constant 0.448 (0.94) -2.030 (3.83)** -3.182(5.97)**

Observations 2973 2973 2973

Approval of Vietnam Warand Battle Deaths

Impact of casualties seems to depend on success

Pre-Tet slope only significant because of drop Mar-May 1966 Matches increase in

those saying war is a “mistake”

Post-Tet slope triples majority of population

now says war is a “mistake”

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

Aug-65

Feb-6

6

Aug-66

Feb-6

7

Aug-67

Feb-6

8

Aug-68

Feb-6

9

Aug-69

Feb-7

0

Aug-70

Feb-7

1

05000100001500020000250003000035000400004500050000

Percent Supporting Cumulative Hostile Deaths

Prais-Winsten Analysis of Battle Deaths and Support for the Vietnam War

Variable Model 1 Model 2

Log of Battle Deaths

-3.667 (2.79)* -3.956 (5.74)**

Log of Battle Deaths X Tet

-8.270 (2.85)**

Tet Offensive 77.486 (2.59)*

Constant 76.541 (6.17)** 84.969 (14.62)**

R-squared / N 0.71 / 24 0.92 / 24

Approval of Korean War and Battle Deaths

Key appears to be perceived success

Big drop in support is Aug-Dec 1950 – losing to PRC

Slope is positive from Feb-Aug 1951 - US recovers

Slope is negative in 1952 - stalemate sets in

0

5,000

10,000

15,000

20,000

25,000

30,000

35,000

Aug-50 Jan-51 Jun-51 Nov-51 Apr-52 Sep-52

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

Cumulative Hostile Deaths Percent Supporting

Capturing Saddamand Perceptions of Success in Iraq

MSNBC/WSJ Poll fielded our “success” question

Got a “natural experiment” with the capture of Saddam

Bush received 8% boost in “very likely” to succeed

Casualty tolerance should rise if this perception persists 0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

12/13 12/14

Very Likely

SomewhatLikely

Not Very Likely

Not at AllLikely

DK / Refused