patchwork democracy - laniclanic.utexas.edu/project/hemisphereinitiatives/patchwork.pdf · david r....

David R. DyeDavid R. Dyeby

Nicaraguan Politics Ten YearsAfter the FallAfter the Fall

PatchworkDemocracy

with Jack Spence and George Vickers

November 2000

Copyright 2000 Hemisphere Initiatives

The report may be quoted at length if attributed. Itmay not be reproduced in whole or in part withoutthe permission of Hemisphere Initiatives, Inc.

David R. Dye, a Managua based research journalisthas resided in and provided political and economicanalysis on Central America for eighteen years. Hetook principal responsibility for research and writingthis report.

Jack Spence is President of Hemisphere Initiativesand is Associate Professor of Political Science at theUniversity of Massachusetts Boston. Spence coordinat-ed the research, made two field trips to Nicaragua,and edited all sections of the report.

George Vickers is Executive Director of theWashington Office on Latin America (WOLA) andTreasurer of Hemisphere Initiatives. He edited all sec-tions of the report, made two field trips to Nicaraguaincluding during the November 5th elections, and,along with Spence, wrote the analysis of the results ofthe election and the performance of the SupremeElectoral Council during the weeks leading up to theelection.

We would like to thank all those who granted us timefor interviews. They are mentioned in the endnotes. Inaddition Claudia Ferreira Talero not only has translat-ed the report into Spanish but also provided help inmaking arrangements for printing and delivery of thereports. Nick Thorkelson of Thorkelson Graphics,Somerville, Massachusetts (www.nickthorkelson.com)did the graphic design and layout. Diane Chomsky,Guillermo Fernandez, and Kathy Sevilla provided

timely and able help in making arrangements forprinting and mailing. Carlos Fernando Chamorroprovided helpful information on printing and graphicsand he along with Nobel León helped point towardelection data. Rachel Farley of WOLA ably handledlogistics for printing and delivery. In Managua Y madeimplemented arrangements for printing and delivery.

We gratefully acknowledge a grant from PRODECAthat made this report possible and covered almost allof the expenses. WOLA covered travel expenses forVickers and a portion of administrative costs. A por-tion of Spence’s travel expenses was covered by aresearch grant from the John W. McCormackInstitute at the University of Massachusetts Boston.

Final editorial content is the responsibility of Spenceand Vickers and Hemisphere Initiatives. Additionalcopies of this report and other Hemisphere Initiativesreports (listed on the inside back cover) can beobtained from

Hemisphere Initiatives [email protected] [email protected]

Or at the Hemisphere Initiatives web site athttp://www.geocities.com/hem_init/

Or from

Washington Office on Latin America 1630 Connecticut Avenue NW Washington, DC 20009 202 797-2171 [email protected]

CONTENTS

Prologue 1

Basic Political Trends: 1990-2000 2

The Pact 7

Who Benefits? 12

The Pact’s Impacts 18

Conclusions 35

Endnotes 40

PROLOGUE

Patchwork DemocracyNicaraguan Politics Ten Years

After the Fall

Over the past fifteen years, most coun-tries of Latin America have passed fromauthoritarian dictatorship to having

democratically elected governments. In theseprocedural democracies, as some political scientistscall them, officials are elected in a free and fairmanner, and there is inclusive suffrage, freedomof expression and organization, and association-al autonomy.1

It is proving more difficult, however, formany of these countries to move beyond theelectoral trappings of democracy to constructeffective democratic institutions capable of pro-viding justice, protecting rights, and deliveringboth security and economic betterment.According to one cogent appraisal, “electoralprocedures are being institutionalized in anumber of countries, to be sure, but all toooften these co-exist with pervasive clientelism,imbedded injustice, massive corruption, fla-grant impunity and reserved domains beyondthe authority of government and the rule oflaw.”2 While such practices are found to vary-ing degrees in established democracies as well,in the context of recent transition in LatinAmerica they are eroding faith in the democra-tic option.

Now neglected by foreign academics andnews media, Nicaragua has not been one of thecountries prompting special concern. In spite ofpolitical vicissitudes and the recent disaster ofHurricane Mitch, it has appeared to make fitfulprogress toward the general goals of democraticdevelopment. Since Violeta Chamorro’s defeat

of the revolutionary Sandinista government inFebruary 1990, the country passed through asecond peaceful election for national and localauthorities in October 1996. The army haskept itself aloof from the political fray since areform of civil-military relations in 1994. Andin recent years, the vigorous efforts of a crusad-ing comptroller-general offered promise of acleanup of the nation’s endemic corruption.

Ten years after local and internationalupheavals thrust Nicaragua on the path towardliberal democracy, however, a closer look sug-gests that democratic rule and governability inNicaragua remain fragile. During theChamorro administration, Nicaragua’s NationalAssembly passed important constitutionalreforms and timid institutional reforms began.The advances achieved during the Chamorroadministration were a kind of crazy quiltstitched together by ad hoc, unstable compro-mises following political battles over funda-mental issues of governance and economic func-tion. Foreign aid has helped hold the patchestogether. But key problems of governance arelikely to continue until the country begins tograpple more seriously with its central politicalproblem—the consolidation of the rule of law,or as a noted scholar of politics has called it, thedemocratic state of law.3

Although there were variations of degree, formost of the last century Nicaraguan politicalleaders looked upon government as a fount ofenrichment and a cornucopia of resources withwhich to pay off friends and build political

2 Patchwork Democracy

empires. To protect this corruption they haveneeded impunity: pliant legislators, venalcourts, auditors who could be easily bribed.Though constitutional facelifts have been fre-quent, the political will necessary to seriouslyreform “intermediate” institutions of the demo-cratic state such as courts and systems of con-trol has been notoriously weak.

The most recent political reform in Nicaraguawas a pact signed in January 2000 by the coun-try’s two principal political forces. The signers— the ruling Liberal Constitutionalist Party(PLC) of president Arnoldo Aleman and theSandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN)headed by Daniel Ortega — argue that theiraccord will strengthen democratic institutionsand bolster governability. Critics of the agree-ment insist that it will do just the opposite.

This report raises strong doubts aboutwhether the new rules for political competitionand institutional functioning legislated thisyear are laying the groundwork for furtherprogress toward fortifying the rule of law or forNicaragua’s democratic progress more general-ly. These rules may be fomenting a stable sys-tem of deal making among a few players in anatmosphere marked by public cynicism andapathy. But they also may be creating condi-tions for a new political crisis that will thrustNicaragua once again into the arena of hemi-spheric concern.

Nicaragua cannot be content with a “patch-work democracy.” The country’s history sug-gests that a political system based on exclusionand that allows injustice and corruption to fes-ter, is likely to generate growing discontent tothe point where a breakdown of democraticorder becomes thinkable. We recognize thatconsolidation of democracy is a long-termproblem — only a short interval has elapsedsince 1990. But vigilance in the Nicaraguancase is warranted. The country does not possessmany of the normal requisites for democraticstability. Poverty is rife and inequality glaring.And the political culture remains permeated bythe legacy of authoritarianism and violence thathas marked the country’s history.

Eleven years after Hemisphere Initiatives’first report on political transition in Nicaragua,this report examines the nature, the roots andthe likely consequences of the Liberal-Sandinista pact. The document that followssketches a portrait of recent Nicaraguan poli-tics, details the content and origins of the newpolitical accord, and assesses the impacts of theagreement after six months in the areas of insti-tution-building and functioning, and politicalparty competition

The body of this report was written beforethe November 5th elections. The Conclusioncontains a brief analysis of the elections.

BASIC POLITICAL TRENDS: 1990–2000

Over the last two decades, Nicaragua hasundergone extraordinary and wrench-ing changes of a magnitude and inten-

sity matched by few other countries. In 1979,it passed abruptly from 46 years of unbrokendespotic rule by the Somoza family into a con-vulsive period of economic and political changeas the revolutionary Sandinista NationalLiberation Front (FSLN) took power andattempted to remake Nicaraguan society undernovel quasi-socialist rules.4 Hostile relations

with the U.S. and copious US assistance toNicaragua’s contra rebels led to a highlydestructive war. That and failure of the revolu-tion’s economic project set the stage for theelection of Violeta Chamorro as president.5

In the early 1990s, presidency ministerAntonio Lacayo, the chief decision-maker inthe Chamorro government, took to referring tothe upheavals then under way as a “triple tran-sition.” After 1990, Nicaragua passed militari-ly from war to peace, politically from revolu-

tionary authoritarianism to liberal democracy,and economically from quasi-socialism to amarket-driven system. Each passage wasattended by trauma.

In the political sphere, president Chamorrohad to grapple with constraints on her freedomfor maneuver deriving from the 1987Sandinista constitution and from the de factosituation of dual power which prevailed in theaftermath of the National Opposition Union(UNO)’s election victory on February 25, 1990.The Sandinistas retained control of the armedforces under Gen. Humberto Ortega as well asof the police, and had nominated a majority ofloyal Supreme Court justices shortly beforeleaving power. The FSLN also held 42% (36 of92) National Assembly seats, making constitu-tional amendments, which require 60% majori-ties in two successive legislative years, a distantprospect.

However, the strongly presidentialist cast ofthe 1987 charter gave the executive wide pow-ers to act without the need to seek legislativeapproval for economic and tax measures. Thispower proved crucial to the government’s abili-ty both to ram through harsh stabilization andadjustment measures and to negotiate compro-mises with its Sandinista adversaries. But italso ended up generating strong objections,both from Sandinistas and from much of thecoalition that had brought Chamorro to office.6

Until late 1993, politics during Chamorro’sterm were dominated by raw political combatunder rules that were themselves one of thechief objects of struggle. Violent clashes overproperty rights and stabilization policies com-bined with the rearmament of former contraand Sandinista combatants to keep Nicaraguain episodic turmoil. When the conflicts reachedthe point of crisis, some originally in Mrs.Chamorro’s camp were seeking her ouster frompower.7

Between late 1993 and early 1996, splits inthe principal political camps (UNO and FSLN)ushered in a period of compromise that averteda deepening of the crisis. Striving to forge amodus vivendi, reform-minded elements in the

two camps negotiated major changes to the1987 Sandinista constitution, reordering thebalance of powers in the state and promotingthe autonomy and development of key democ-ratic institutions. The reforms preventedincumbent presidents from running for a sec-ond term, and gave the legislature much morepower. This phase, which enjoyed the supportof powerful external players but sidelined bothAntonio Lacayo and Daniel Ortega, reachedfruition in constitutional reforms passed inJune 1995.

The 1995 reforms to the constitution offeredsome hope for change in institutions. In anoverly presidential system, they augmented thepowers of the National Assembly in matters ofeconomic and tax legislation. They alsochanged the rules for electing magistrates tothe Supreme Court (CSJ) and Comptroller(CGR), forcing the president to share the con-trol of these nominations with the Assemblyand with civil society. In theory, this affordedthe institutions a measure of independencefrom executive control. The Supreme ElectoralCouncil (CSE) had already established a reputa-tion for honesty and professionalism duringelections in 1984 and 1990.

Once the new magistrates took office, more-over, Nicaragua seemed to be taking tentativesteps toward consolidating the rule of law. As isanalyzed below, timid reforms began the ardu-ous process of cleansing the court system. Forthe first time, the country also witnessed thenovelty of a Comptroller General activelyengaged in attempts to root out corruption.The aggressive performance of Agustin JarquinAnaya in office was not only unprecedented inNicaragua, but had few parallels elsewhere inLatin America.

However, when it came time in 1995 toselect new authorities to the CSJ and CGR, thepolitical interests of the small parties that hadcrafted the reforms prevailed. In successiveelections in 1995 and 1996, a hodgepodge ofminor parties placed loyal followers on theSupreme Court, while a Christian Democratsecured the Comptroller’s job. This outcome

Prologue 3

left today’s dominant parties with little directrepresentation at the upper reaches of theseinstitutions. For both the FSLN and the PLC,this trend was problematic.

The election of Arnoldo Aleman as Presidenton October 20, 1996 initiated a period of insti-tutional tensions and strains. The new presi-dent quickly displayed strong caudillo-like ten-dencies that ran counter to the efforts at insti-tutional consolidation emanating from the1995 amendments.8 Unlike Mrs. Chamorro,who could not count on solid backing from theincoherent UNO coalition, Aleman initiallyenjoyed the support of a tightly controlledLiberal Alliance bench of 42 deputies. Evenwith this majority, however, the Aleman gov-ernment was unable to overcome fundamentalweaknesses in the Nicaraguan political system.Among the most important were the following:

• Weak governmental effectiveness and legiti-macy. Nicaragua’s macroeconomy has grownat an annual rate of 4.5% per year since1994, not high enough or long enough tomend much of the previous 16 years of dete-rioration. Adjustment, privatization andother policies generated a strongly regressivetrend in income distribution as owners fromthe Somoza era recovered properties, exilesreturned from the United States, and a newmiddle class sprouted.9 Though they havedeclined in recent years, unemployment andunderemployment also remain severe.10 Realincome per capita is less than $500 per year.Nor has growth since 1994 clearly demon-strated an impact on entrenched poverty,estimated by some measures to afflict 75% ofthe population.11 Though declining, confu-sion about property rights has impeded amore vigorous recovery.For the ordinary Nicaraguan, then, democra-cy has not yet paid off. In addition, the cred-ibility of government has been underminedby intense public suspicion about corruptionin the ordinary exercise of power and in theprivatization of state assets. During theChamorro period, doubts swirled around thesale of 350 state enterprises in operations

conducted without the benefit of legislativeauthorization. Under Aleman, the privatiza-tion of a bank and the attempted sale of thepublic telephone system excited speculationabout further irregularities, while the presshas uncovered extensive purchases of ruralproperties by the president and evidence ofmisdeeds by his cronies.

• Persistent property clashes. For a decade,the leitmotives of Nicaraguan politics havebeen clash and combat between Sandinistaand anti-Sandinista forces around issues ofproperty and economic adjustment. Somozaera elites have tried to regain control of hold-ings they lost during the Sandinista revolu-tion. Sandinistas have defended their proper-ty gains. Violent clashes were common, par-ticularly in the early 1990s as former contrasand some military veterans rearmed. Due tothe balance of political forces, both post-1990 governments have been forced to com-promise with the Sandinista opposition inorder to be able to govern, making outright“counterrevolution” impossible. However,the result of the compromises has been toleave the property problem, after ten years,still partly unresolved.

• Inadequate Representation. One of the over-riding problems in Nicaragua’s politicalsetup is the use of the party list system ofproportional representation (PR) in choosingthe people’s representatives. Voting for aparty list rather than individual candidates isnot in itself undemocratic and occurs inmany countries. But in Nicaragua, where theprincipal parties are now dominated by oneleader, such a system produces cohorts ofAssembly deputies who are politicallybeholden to, and subservient to, the caudillosleading the parties rather than being respon-sive to the needs of their electors. The domi-nation by the major party leaders of theirrespective party blocs also undermines theAssembly’s independence. A feature in PRsystems that provides a corrective to this sit-uation is the relative ease with which newparties can gain a presence in the legislature.


But when this avenue is closed off by restric-tive rules, a crisis in representation mayresult.

• Fragile Institutions. Over the years, progressin devising and building democratic institu-tions has been sporadic, and reformers havenot enjoyed sufficient political backing topush their efforts to fruition. Nor havereformers convinced the public of their hand-iwork — polls regularly show the faith ofNicaraguans in the basic institutions of con-stitutional democracy to be abysmally low.12

In reality, the consolidation of democraticgovernment is at best in its early stages.Separation among the powers of state is par-ticularly inadequate. Dominance of the legis-lature by authoritarian party leaders favorsthe politicized selection of the magistrateswho preside over the other powers of stateand organs of control — the Supreme Court,the Supreme Electoral Council and theComptroller General. This makes their polit-ical independence from the executive ques-tionable.

The Nicaraguan Army and NationalPolice, bodies created during the Sandinistarevolution which continue to be staffed byholdovers from that era, have too much inde-pendence, creating problems for the execu-tion of governmental and judicial orders.Both bodies are more professional now, andFSLN party control has disappeared. Statutespassed during the Chamorro administrationhave also regularized procedures for turnoverin the army and police leadership. But nei-ther of the recently elected governments hasbeen willing to risk exerting real civiliansupremacy over the armed institutions bystrengthening the civilian ministries towhich they are formally subordinated. Thescarcity of civilians trained to deal withquestions of national defense and citizensecurity contributes to this inertia.13

Finally, power is excessively centralized.The ethnically diverse and historically sepa-rate regions of the Atlantic Coast are in theo-ry governed by an autonomy statute, pro-

mulgated in 1987. The 151 municipalitiesare also guaranteed autonomy by a 1988 law.However, in neither case is the principle ofautonomous exercise of power matched byeffective rights to raise the revenue necessaryto give subnational units of government gen-uine financial clout and hence political inde-pendence from the central government.14

This in turn inhibits meaningful participa-tion at the local level.

• Caudillism and Clientelism. Politics inNicaragua operates within a matrix of politi-cal culture that foments caudillism, clien-telism and corruption.15 Postwar polarizationhas aggravated the tendency for the principalpolitical parties to be dominated by leaderswho demand blind loyalty and brook littledissent. At all levels of the system, one of theprincipal motives of those seeking politicaloffice is to use it for their private economicgain. Many of those seeking higher office tryto recruit clienteles to whom they promisethe spoils of lower office. Daily politicalcombat is marked by tendencies toward vio-lence and political chicanery not excludingcrude blackmail.

Among the elite, an authoritarian politicalethos prevails marked by disregard for insti-tutional rules, a tendency toward violent res-olution of conflicts, and a zero-sum notion ofpolitics. Many ordinary Nicaraguans alsomanifest a belief in the need for strong polit-ical leaders and parties to achieve stability,and lack the interpersonal trust necessary tosocial and political cooperation. Despitethese cultural features, the citizenry displaysrelatively strong support for the democraticsystem as such as well as tolerance for thepolitical rights of others.16 This somewhatpuzzling pattern may be partly explained bythe “postwar syndrome”— the tiredness ofNicaraguans with the violent confrontationof the revolution and immediate post-revolu-tionary years.17

• Sandinista-Anti-Sandinista Polarization. Tenyears after the Sandinista revolution, thebasic cleavage in Nicaraguan politics is still

Prologue 5

between Sandinistas and anti-Sandinistas.Polls of the electorate normally show thateach major party, the LiberalConstitutionalist Party (PLC) and theSandinista National Liberation Front(FSLN), enjoys a solid core of 20–25% ofpotential voters. In addition, as a result ofthe revolution and contra war, strong politi-cal hatreds persist in segments of the popula-tion that, while small, nonetheless form thebackbone of the two major parties’ electoralsupport.18 Potential for political polarizationis thus constant.

• Tenuous Governability. As a consequence ofall the above, Nicaragua is plagued by chron-ic low-level instability. This instability is notstrong enough to reach the point of crisis butis not clearly receding. Symptoms ofungovernability may be seen in the frequentand opportunistic rearmament of former mil-itary personnel seeking to extract resourcesfrom government, in strikes and violentdemonstrations by social groups, and in dis-ruptions in the work of the NationalAssembly by the political parties.19 Foreigngovernments and donors, in particular theUSA, have had to exercise occasional politi-cal tutelage to prevent crisis. This behaviorreinforces the country’s deep economicdependence; ten years after the fall,Nicaragua is one of the world’s highest percapita recipients of foreign aid.

Despite this litany of problems, someprogress has been made in basic democraticpractices. Voter turnout in elections has beensurprisingly high — far higher than in twoother post-war Central American countriesafter many events that could and did contributeto cynicism. In one expert opinion, decentlyrun elections and foundations for non-electoralparticipation laid down in earlier years under-pin this behavior.20 In addition, after its jarring11-year revolutionary experience, Nicaragua isno longer a country in which a traditional,clientelistic reading of political culture wholly

applies.21 The salience of corruption as the keyissue of public debate over the last three yearscasts doubt on the contention that mostNicaraguans passively accept self-seekingbehavior from public officials.

Nevertheless, in the face of the weaknessesjust reviewed, even the most sincerely democra-tic government would face difficulty in gettingitself re-elected. In fact, as a result of theirpolitical compromises and of short-term eco-nomic policy outcomes, both governmentssince 1990 have suffered more or less rapid ero-sion in popular support. This failure has nothelped other political parties. However adiverse array of political groups opposed toboth the PLC and the FSLN have not been ableto unite or to mobilize popular dissatisfaction.No other political force yet receives more than10% of the vote. Despite electoral rules favor-ing small parties, the two big parties capturedall but 15 of 93 seats in the Assembly in 1996.And those 15 seats were divided among nineparties, most of which had nothing to do withthe constitutional reforms.

Neither Aleman nor the Sandinistas havetaken much comfort from their dominance. Inthe final weeks of the 1996 campaign, DanielOrtega watched as supposedly neutral politicalforces such as the Church and the United Statesweighed in against his candidacy.22 In subse-quent elections, he concluded, the new two-round system for presidential voting would leadto second rounds in which all the other partiesganged up on the FSLN. Moreover, followinghis 1996 defeat, he continuously blamed theSupreme Electoral Council for the irregularitieshe claimed had prevented his victory.23

Given these antecedents, it is perhaps notsurprising that leaders of the PLC and FSLNdecided to turn the tables on their minor partyadversaries by ejecting them from positions ofinstitutional power. Those who had shaped thereforms were not well positioned to defendthem. In the next section we examine the extra-ordinary pact signed last January by Ortegaand Aleman.


Arnoldo Aleman and Daniel Ortega arepolitical enemies of long standing. At thebeginning of their revolution, the

Sandinistas briefly threw Aleman in jail and laterstripped him of certain properties. From his postas mayor of Managua (1990–95), the Liberalleader rode to the presidency largely by bashingthe Sandinistas and castigating Violeta Chamorrofor compromising with them. The two men’sparties were bitter rivals in the 1996 campaign.In April 1997, shortly after Aleman took office,pro-Sandinista forces confronted the new govern-ment with a violent protest movement seeking toforce it into an early compromise over Aleman’seconomic policies. The historical irony in theJanuary 2000 pact is thus strong.

The pact negotiations, only semi-secret,occupied the front pages of Nicaraguan news-papers intermittently for a year and a halfbefore the deal was finally struck in December1999. From the beginning, news filtering outfrom the bargaining table made clear that theLiberal and Sandinista negotiators were strivingto do at least two main things: establish jointparty control of three key institutions of state—the Comptroller-General’s Office (CGR), theSupreme Court of Justice (CSJ) and theSupreme Electoral Council (CSE) — dividingthat control between them according to theirrespective political weights; and truncate polit-ical competition through changes in the elec-toral law. The press dubbed this a drive forbipartisan dominance.

The public portions of the Liberal-Sandinistapact consist of changes to the constitution, tothe electoral law, and to ordinary legislation.24

Each of the changes benefit the interests of thesigners to the exclusion of other actors.

CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGES

The constitutional reforms completed in January2000 restructure the three key institutions men-tioned above. They create a collegial, five-personComptroller-General’s Office whose members

are elected by the National Assembly for six-yearterms and who then choose a comptroller andvice-comptroller from their own ranks. Theyexpand the Supreme Court from 12 to 16 jus-tices, and augment the Supreme ElectoralCouncil from five to seven magistrates whileshortening their terms from six to five years.

In each body, the number of top leadershipposts was increased in order to facilitate a polit-ical balance between the PLC and the FSLN.Subsequent elections have packed the threeinstitutions with Liberal and Sandinista repre-sentatives, displacing most other forces. In thecase of the CGR and CSE, the elections left thedominant PLC with a majority and the FSLN asubstantial minority of the top spots. In theSupreme Court, neither party as yet prevails,though elections to replace retiring magistratesin coming years may well produce the samebalance of positions.

The changes also afforded the party leadersrevenge against their respective nemeses. ForAleman, the reform was plainly devised towrest the Comptroller’s office from the grip ofAgustin Jarquin, the president’s most bother-some opponent. For Daniel Ortega, the reformwas a prelude to summarily removing CSEpresident Rosa Marina Zelaya, whom Ortegahas long blamed publicly for the FSLN’s 1996election loss.

The reforms also provide the Liberal andSandinista leaders with impunity. The amend-ments made it significantly more difficult forthe National Assembly to sanction a sittingpresident by raising the percentage of votesneeded to strip him of his immunity, from 50%plus one to two-thirds. The reforms also createda future Assembly post for Arnoldo Aleman, bystipulating that an outgoing president auto-matically becomes an member of the legislatureafter his term of office. These changes likewisefavor Ortega; the second place finisher in apresidential race also receives an Assemblyseat.25 Deputies are immune from prosecution,a point of concern to Aleman due to charges of

THE PACT

corruption and to Ortega owing to accusationsof child abuse by his stepdaughter ZoilamericaNarvaez.

Still another amendment changes the criteriafor winning a presidential election. It lowers to40% the majority needed to win outright onthe first round of the two round system, and to35% in case the gap between the first and sec-ond place finishers exceeds 5%. This change isregarded by most observers as a key concessionby Aleman to Daniel Ortega, as it facilitateswinning an election on the first ballot, therebyobviating a second round in which other con-tenders would unite against the FSLN. Ortegawon 41% of the vote in 1990 and 38% in 1996.

Another change reinstated the right to run forpublic office to Nicaraguans who at any time inthe past have relinquished their citizenship.However, such aspirants must renounce theiralternate citizenship at least four years prior toelection day and reside continuously inNicaragua during the same period. This plankapplies mainly to people who went into exileduring the Sandinista revolution, and was osten-sibly designed to benefit two Liberal presidentialhopefuls, Jose Antonio Alvarado and Jose RizoCastellon, who, as we will see later, subsequentlyfailed to receive Aleman’s blessing.26

Still another amendment changed residencerequirements for candidates in mayoral elec-tions. The change made it necessary for an aspi-rant both to have been born in, and currentlyreside in, the district he or she intends to repre-sent. This plank deprived a popular non-partypolitician, Pedro Solorzano, of a chance to runfor mayor of Managua.27 An ordinary lawdividing the municipality of Managua intothree parts later accompanied this change tothe constitution. This division also worked toSolorzano’s detriment after an administrativeruling in January 2000 declared that his cur-rent residence lay outside the city of Managua’sredrawn boundaries.

These constitutional amendments signifi-cantly restrict political competition. The subse-quent changes in the election law reinforcethese restrictions.

CHANGES TO THE ELECTORAL LAW

In the view of international election experts,Nicaragua’s new law creates Latin America’smost restrictive electoral system and one whoselikely outcome will be the demise of most of theexisting parties.28

Political Parties, Alliances, and IndependentCandidates. The new law places very strong,possibly insurmountable obstacles in the way offorming new political parties. It requires the for-mation of party leadership committees not onlyat the national (1) and departmental (14) level,but also in every one of Nicaragua’s 151 munic-ipalities.29 No Latin American country saveCosta Rica stipulates the latter requirement.

To register, a new party must also present alist containing a number of citizen signaturesequivalent to 3% of those voting in the lastelection, with each signature accompanied bythe person’s cedula (national ID card) number.Moreover, such signatures must be unique—ifthey have appeared on the registration petitionof any other party, they are discounted. Thus,the parties that submit lists first diminish thepool available to other parties. The new partymust then repeat this process in order to regis-ter its candidates. The 3% threshold is one ofthe highest in Latin America, exceeded only byPeru’s 4%.

For this year’s municipal voting, any existingparty that did not attain 3% of the votes in thelast national election must, as in the case ofnew contenders, reconfirm its legal status bysubmitting the same 3% signature list.30 Andif it does not obtain 4% of the vote when theelection is held, its registration is annulled andit must start all over again.

The law also eliminates Nicaraguans’ previ-ous right to organize non-party or “popularsubscription” candidacies for mayor, i.e., peoplewho do not run on a party ticket. Furthermore,if a group of parties wants to strengthen itselfby forming an alliance, it must present a num-ber of signatures equal to 3% of voters multi-plied by the number of parties forming thealliance. This plank, which has no parallel any-


where, requires astronomic minima for main-taining registration — if the alliance fails togain 4% of the vote for every party participat-ing, all the participants lose their registrationand have to go back to square one. Theseplanks are so leonine that they have dissuadedany parties from forming alliances in this year’smayoral races. Had they been instituted by theSandinistas prior to the 1990 election, absentany international protest, the Chamorro run forthe presidency would have been stillborn.

Calendar. If the above barriers to participationwere not sufficient, the new law furtherdemands that parties desiring to present candi-dates must have acquired their legal statustwelve months prior to a national election andsix months prior to municipal elections. For themunicipal balloting scheduled for November 5,2000, this meant that parties had to have theirstatus clear by May 4 — under the terms of alaw that only went into effect on January 24.

Any party that fails to get 4% of the vote inNovember’s municipal balloting will be unableto run candidates in the national contest sched-uled for November 2001, unless it re-registersby fulfilling all the above requirements. Inaddition, parties may not sit-out an electionconvoked by the CSE—if they do not run, theyare also out. Among Latin American countries,this rule applies only in Costa Rica.

Election Finance. The new law limits the abili-ty of parties to receive public funds, whichsince 1996 have been granted for election par-ticipation. Such funds will henceforth be givenonly after the fact, i.e., only after a party winsthe coveted 4% of the vote it needs to stayalive. This reform greatly reduces the incentivefor opportunistic politicians to form unseriousparties simply to acquire money, and is one ofthe few reforms supported by mostNicaraguans. However, it places new parties inthe position of having to borrow money to runa campaign.

Proportional Representation Formula. Thereform alters the method used in 1996 for cal-

culating vote remainders in Nicaragua’s pro-portional representation scheme. Whereas the1996 formula allowed a proliferation of minorparties to obtain legislative seats, the new(“D’Hondt”) formula does the opposite, servingto entrench the positions of the two largest par-ties in the legislature.

Election Apparatus. The National Assembly, inwhich the PLC and FSLN are the dominant par-ties, names the CSE’s magistrates. Though it isnot stipulated in the law, the logic of the Liberal-Sandinista pact has been to insist that those cho-sen be loyal party cadres. The Assembly choseLiberal deputy Silvio Calderon and Emmet Lang,FSLN party chief in Managua, to fill the newposts created by the council’s expansion. Both areveterans of their parties’ 1996 election campaignefforts. On July 3, 2000 the dominant partieswent on to select other party stalwarts to replacefour of the five council members chosen in 1995.

Equally important, Law 331 mandates thatthe lower levels of the election system—depart-mental and municipal councils and the VoteReception Boards be composed of three mem-bers again chosen according to political criteria.The president and the first member of each ofthese bodies are selected alternately from slatespresented by the first and second-place partiesin the last election, i.e., the PLC and FSLN.Only in the choice of the “second member” doother parties have a voice. By implication, eachof these bodies will be controlled by Liberalsand Sandinistas, making big party dominationof the election apparatus complete.

At a number of junctures in his presidency,Arnoldo Aleman has floated a proposal for aconstituyente (constituent assembly) to entirelyrewrite Nicaragua’s 1987 constitution.Immediately after the pact’s signing, Alemanresurrected this idea in a new form. The pro-posal raised eyebrows both for its timing andits specifics: this time Aleman suggested thatelection for a constituent assembly couldreplace the national election scheduled forNovember 2001.

The Pact 9

REACTIONS TO THE PACT

The PLC and the FSLN argue that the new electionrules will increase governability. In their view theprevious rules jeopardized governability in theparty system and the legislature by favoring theproliferation of what they call “microparties.”31

After the 1996 elections, nine small parties gainedrepresentation in the Assembly and occupied 15 ofthe 93 total seats. This made legislative coalition-building difficult, as the big players were forcedinto arduous negotiations with a welter of tinypolitical groupings. Daniel Ortega has insinuatedthat small parties’ votes got sold to the highestbidder.32 Perhaps more important to the two partyleaders, incentives for party formation encouragedsplits from the big two. With such incentivesremoved, potential party dissidents must now toethe line or face political oblivion.

The big parties also assert that institutionsin which the major political forces are repre-sented according to their respective weightswill work better than when institutions werecolonized by other, minor players. A prominentLiberal defender of the pact, Central Bank pres-ident Noel Ramirez, has argued that the fightagainst corruption will be more effectivelyserved by the deliberations of a collegial bodythan by the capricious decisions of an individ-ual (Agustin Jarquin).33 Daniel Ortega hasargued that reform of the CSE will guaranteecleaner elections. Although international elec-tion observers do not agree, Ortega has persis-tently charged that the Liberals won the 1996elections through fraud which was covered upby the CSE, then run by a member of theSandinista Renewal Movement (MRS), anFSLN splinter party.

However, the dominant parties have tendedto assert that improved institutional function-ing will occur rather than spell out why or how.Denying that comptrollers chosen by the PLCand FSLN would simply obey their parties’ dic-tates, Ortega initially promised that the CGR“is going to be controlled by efficient, honestand capable people.” But he did not explainwhat incentive the parties would have for nom-inating such worthy delegates.

Ortega has further argued that the pactedreforms have helped Nicaraguans avert anotherarmed confrontation. By giving the FSLN achance to win again, the political pact has per-mitted a “popular alternative” to return topower through the ballot box rather than bymilitant demonstrations or even force of arms.According to diplomatic sources, Aleman hasmade the same argument.

Critics of the pact fear that it will endanger,if not reverse, the fragile progress the countryhas made toward democratic development. In aparticularly pessimistic version, veteran jour-nalist Guillermo Cortes wrote, “The democraticwave that began with the Esquipulas accords in1987 has practically come to an end. Twelveyears were worth nothing against an authoritar-ian tradition of four centuries.”34

Other commentators are unwilling to be socategorical. But pact critics have broadly shareda fear of regression to authoritarianism andincreasingly compare the political pretensionsof president Aleman to those of the Somozas.Most of them argue that the Court,Comptroller, and CSE are being re-politicized,losing autonomy from the narrow interests ofthe two big parties. This will, they say, torpedofurther progress toward strengthening the ruleof law and combating corruption. FormerAssembly president Luis Humberto Guzman, aleader of the 1995 reform movement, hasasked, “can anyone now have confidence in theindependence of these powers?”35

Critics are also convinced that the new elec-toral law will reverse the political pluralismhard won in Nicaragua since the 1980s, creat-ing insuperable barriers to the entry of newaspirants. A former CSE president, MarianoFiallos, has argued that although “some of thesemeasures are found in the electoral laws ofother countries...in none is there a set ofrequirements and obstacles so obviouslydesigned to produce bipartisanship.”36 By arti-ficially entrenching two-party dominance withthe Liberals and Sandinistas as the only seriousforces, the pact will moreover close off space forcivic opposition generally.


Though it is less widely held, a corollaryargument is that partisan control of the electionmachinery will be taken to the point whereelection fraud—the normal practice during theSomoza epoch — once again becomes think-able.37 Initial implementation of Law 331 hassparked outraged accusations by numeroussmall parties that the reformed CSE is operatingto produce just such an outcome. (see below.)

Other arguments against the new electionlaw have been advanced. Critics argue thatrequiring cedula numbers from party petitionsigners is discriminatory, in that significantnumbers of people still do not have this docu-ment. Similarly, allowing a person to affix his orher signature to only one party petition isincompatible with a citizen’s right to engage incross-party voting or simply to support a party’schance to run without intending to vote for it.

Finally, international electoral expertHoracio Boneo has argued persuasively that theproblems of party fragmentation and parlia-mentary management generated by the previ-ous electoral rules could easily have been solvedwithout Law 331, and required only smallchanges in provisions regarding public cam-paign money and the method for calculatingremainder votes in the PR system.38 The rest ofthe law, Boneo argued, is only comprehensibleif one assumes that the main motive of thepacting parties was torestrict competitionfrom other forces.

Public opinion hasbeen strongly againstthe terms of the pact. Ina December 1999 surveyin Managua, 67% ofrespondents said that thetwo parties had madetheir pact simply to“divide up spoils” (repar-tirse cargos). Even 54% ofSandinista supportersand 58% of Liberal sup-porters espoused thiscynical view. By con-trast, a mere 28% of the

sample thought the accord would bolster gov-ernability. Although the minority of respon-dents who were PLC or FSLN sympathizersthought that the pact would guarantee cleanelections in 2001, those without party identifi-cation disagreed by 48–40%. Most strikingly, amonth before the pact was voted into law,absolute majorities of Sandinistas (57%)Liberals (62%), and others (68%) called on theparty leaders to desist from further dickering.39

In a national survey conducted in lateFebruary 2000 by the Institute of NicaraguanStudies (IEN), 61% of respondents assertedthat the pact only benefitted the interests of thetwo pacting parties, while only 8% believedthat it “benefitted the nation.”40 A detailedbreakdown of the IEN survey reveals thatNicaraguans disapprove of virtually every facetof the bipartisan agreement, often by very largemargins.

However, opposition to the agreement inprinciple has not been accompanied by publicprotests. As the pact was enacted into law inJanuary, opponents were able to mount onlyfeeble demonstrations against it. A drive togain 50,000 signatures on a petition to havethe reforms submitted to a popular referendumkicked off with much fanfare—the first signerwas former president Violeta Chamorro — butsubsequently ran aground.

The Pact 11

IEN FEBRUARY 2000 NATIONAL SURVEY

FOR% AGAINST%

Elimination of “popular subscription” 21 67

Division of Managua 9 55

Deputyship for Aleman as former president 9 87

Chance to run for renouncers of Nica nationality 37 58

CSE, CSJ composed of Liberals and Sandinistas by quota 13 42

Collegial Comptroller 21 61

CSE should nominate election officials rather than parties 55 32

Compose CSE of notables with merit, not party delegates 71 14

Submit Reforms to Referendum 81

On the face of it, the pact between theLiberal Constitutionalist Party (PLC)and the Sandinista National Liberation

Front (FSLN) is aimed at creating a two-partypolitical system that effectively excludes themyriad of microparties that have complicated gov-ernance in Nicaragua over the past decade, andthat promises greater stability by establishing adegree of power-sharing between the PLC andthe FSLN. That, at least, is the justification putforth by Arnoldo Aleman and Daniel Ortega.

A closer look at the evolution of the two bigparties over the last ten years, however, raisesprofound questions about whether the kind ofarrangements promoted by the pact will deependemocracy and encourage political stability.The more disturbing and likely possibility isthat the pact will facilitate a trend towardrenewed caudillo-style dominance within thetwo major parties. The main features of theevolution of the PLC and the FSLN over thepast decade have been a reduction in internaldemocracy and increasing personal control byAleman and Ortega. It is hard to find any evi-dence that this has fostered transparency, effi-ciency or greater participation in the instru-ments of governance in Nicaragua.

THE GROWTH OF THE PLC AND THEROLE OF ALEMAN

The Liberal Constitutionalist Party was aninsignificant force in 1990. It originated as anoffshoot from Somoza’s Nationalist Liberals inthe nineteen-sixties, and the party was one of 14mini-parties that coalesced in 1989 intoChamorro’s National Opposition Union (UNO).Today, however, the PLC is organized throughoutthe country. Arnoldo Aleman is personallyresponsible for this transformation. When hebegan his political career as mayor of Managua in1990, Aleman used the resources afforded by themayoralty along with donations from friends inMiami to build up the PLC as a national politicalorganization loyal to himself. His principal ideo-

logical appeal was to anti-Sandinismo, and manypeople joined or sympathized with the party outof hatred of the FSLN and from a desire to recoupconfiscated properties. Part of the PLC’s expan-sion in the 1990s is believed to rest on reincorpo-ration of elements from the Somozas’ PLN.

Another key pillar of support was theCatholic Church. Implacably hostile to theSandinistas, the Church hierarchy played a keysupport role in Aleman’s 1996 election. Sincehis election, in order to pre-empt criticism fromthe bishops over his performance in govern-ment, Aleman has given patronage jobs toCatholic priests and supported the Church’splans to build a regional seminary in Nicaragua.Though not without its problems, this strategyhas been successful enough that Nicaraguansincreasingly identify Cardinal Miguel ObandoBravo as a political ally of the president.41

Though a member of the LiberalInternational, the PLC does not evince a dis-tinctive ideological profile nor are internal poli-cy debates evident.42 The chief Liberal ideo-logue, Dr. Sergio Garcia Quintero, soon aban-doned the party in frustration and has becomeone of the most vehement critics of Aleman’sautocracy.43 Instead, Liberal party life appearsto turn mostly around intrigues among a seriesof second-level figures to position themselves tobecome Aleman’s successor.

There are few leaders in the PLC capable ofchallenging Aleman. Jaime Cuadra, a coffee-grower from Matagalpa and former agricultureminister, enjoys widespread allegiance from aninformal “northern bloc” of local party leaders.And Aleman has permitted vice-presidentEnrique Bolanos, until recently not a PLC partymember, to control government nominations inhis home department of Masaya.44 To preservetheir positions, however, such figures mustmake public obeisance to the dictates of el hom-bre, as Aleman is known (mimicking Somoza-era jargon).

Failure to do this can bring swift punish-ment. When deputy Arnulfo Barrantes failed to


WHO BENEFITS?

observe party discipline in a 1997 vote in theAssembly, Aleman responded by ejecting all ofBarrantes’ supporters from governmental postsin the latter’s home town of Esteli. Others whohad the nerve to challenge him have been simi-larly punished, including by seeing their rela-tives who had been appointed to consular anddiplomatic posts displaced.45

He has also prevented alternative aspirantsfor the 2001 Liberal nomination from consoli-dating fiefdoms from which to challenge hiscontrol of party affairs. When Jose AntonioAlvarado attempted to use the education min-istry as a national political platform in 1999,Aleman summarily shunted him off to theminor post of defense minister. Similarly, JoseRizo Castellon’s desire to utilize the municipalaffairs institute INIFOM as his power base wasthwarted by Aleman’s insistence on naming allof the body’s key personnel himself.46

Choice of candidates in municipal electionsis another arena where the Aleman style hasgenerated friction within the party. Both in1996 and again in 2000, Aleman promised touse local opinion polls to help select potablecandidates. But when it suited his purposes, hedid not hesitate to overrule these to securemayoral nominees loyal to himself.

On the whole, Aleman has displayed unex-pected skill at managing these complicatedpolitical relationships. But his harsh controlhas not prevented a tendency toward splits. Theminiscule Nationalist Liberal Party (PLN), acomponent of the 1996 Liberal Alliance, wentinto opposition even before Aleman was inau-gurated, alleging that he had reneged on apledge to make its leader, Enrique SanchezHerdocia, head of the National Assembly. Themajor schism to date came in mid-1998, whenMasaya party leader Eliseo Nunez exited, mak-ing harsh criticisms of Aleman for favoringexiles from Miami and concentrating control ofpatronage in his own hands.47

Aleman’s Style of Governance. By all reports,Aleman exercises iron personal control over thepublic administration. From the outset heinsisted on personally naming people to gov-

ernmental posts at virtually all levels. In thisfashion, he has been able to monitor and con-trol the actions of his ministers and foment theflow of information and loyalty to the top. Hehas further engaged in frequent and capriciousrotations of his cabinet; to all appearances,these are designed to keep intra-party rivalswho are his subordinates in government off bal-ance, thus preserving space to orchestrate hiscontinuance in power after the scheduled end ofhis term.48

But constant rotation of key personnel hasalso impeded the development of key policies.An example is a master plan for educationreform drawn up, with much civil societyinput, by one of Aleman’s rivals for control ofthe PLC. In September 1999, when educationminister Jose Antonio Alvarado was rotated outin a patent move to lower his profile, work onthe plan all but stopped. In May 2000, it wasannounced that the plan would not be readyuntil the end of the year, and its implementa-tion would then depend on the availability offoreign aid funds that apparently had not yetbeen pledged.49

In addition, Aleman has continued themarked centralism in relations between thenational executive and sub-national units ofgovernment inherited from his predecessors.Though his discourse supports decentralization,he has prevented the National Institute forMunicipal Development (INIFOM) from func-tioning autonomously, partly in order to corralintra-party rival Jose Rizo. Through the 1997tax justice law, he also effectively re-centralizedgovernmental finances, depriving the municipiosof traditional sources of tax revenue.50

The politics of clientelism have furtherallowed Aleman strong influence over otherpowers of state. Through his personal domina-tion of the PLC apparatus, Aleman has firstkept his party’s deputies in the NationalAssembly tightly under his thumb.51 His loyalally in this effort has been Assembly presidentIvan Escobar Fornos, whose adherence toAleman’s legislative dictates has been so slavishas to subject him to public ridicule.

Who Benefits? 13

Initially lacking a favorable balance of loyal-ties in the Supreme Court, and unable to exertmuch influence in the army, Aleman hasadroitly dispensed favors and allowed discre-tionary use of resources in order to buy offpotential opposition. By naming relatives ofSupreme Court justices to diplomatic posts,among other favors, Aleman has helped tosecure the neutrality of the court on constitu-tional challenges affecting the government’sinterests. On another front, through a de factogrant of autonomy, he has permitted theNicaraguan army to benefit from diverse busi-nesses acquired from the public weal and tofend off demands for return of confiscated prop-erties ceded to its care during the 1980s.52

Managing relations with another power cen-ter, the foreign “donor community”, has forcedAleman to take a tack partially at odds with hisoverall style. In order to show aid givers a posi-tive face, the president has named technocratsof recognized capacity as well as representativesof the domestic banking and business sectors tothe principal economic cabinet posts. Thiscohort of trained officials drew up a major 1997tax reform and in March 1998 concluded a sec-ond ESAF (Extended Structural AdjustmentFacility) agreement with the IMF. Despite laterrows over other issues, these policies havecemented a basic working relationship betweenthe Aleman government and the internationalfinancial institutions.

But suspicions of corruption and the politi-cized administration of aid projects have madethe government’s relations with bilateraldonors periodically tense. For example, in ahighly publicized dispute with the EuropeanUnion in 1999, Aleman tried to allocate hous-ing units built under a EU-funded constructionproject to members of his personal staff.53 Afteran extended diplomatic quarrel, he was forcedto back off. But among certain Europeandonors, the episode reinforced an image ofAleman as a primitive and anachronistic throw-back to the 1970s.

Aleman has also attempted to exert controlover important parts of civil society. Reviving

an odious practice of the Somozas, he has forcedpublic employees to contribute 5% of theirmonthly wages, inscribed as “voluntary quo-tas,” to the PLC.” He has tried to stifle opposi-tion in business circles by liberally ordering taxaudits of business people who oppose him. Inresponse, some in the private sector havedecried “fiscal terrorism.”54 And most complainof a lack of clear rules for investment.55

Furthermore, he has exercised pressures tobring the media and non-governmental organi-zations (NGOs) to heel, albeit with only limitedeffect. Soon after Aleman’s advent, Nicaragua’smedia organs began complaining that the gov-ernment was dispensing official advertising onlyto its media friends. The principle daily paper,La Prensa, later charged that the governmentwas subjecting it to tax harassment as a reprisalfor its exposes of corruption.56 Finally, Alemanand his subordinates have engaged in periodicrows with many of the country’s NGOs, whichthe government is convinced are pro-Sandinistaand out to undermine its control of local-leveldevelopment. In one instance, the governmentthreatened to review the naturalized Nicaraguancitizenship of Mexican born Ana Quiros, thenhead of the post-Mitch Coordinadora Civil parala Emergencia y la Reconstruccion.

Allegations of Corruption. The most publi-cized allegations against Aleman have to dowith what many in Nicaragua regard as his fail-ure to explain the rapid increase in his personalwealth. (Aleman has admitted the increase.)57

According to insistent press reports, thatincrease has allowed the president, under theguise of dummy business interests, to acquire asizable network of rural properties in variousdepartments of the country. Once in Aleman’shands, it is further alleged, governmental agen-cies have improved these farms with infrastruc-ture at the public’s expense. In a notoriousexample, a government ministry paved a 20-km long road through a virtually unpopulatedpart of southern Managua department to pro-vide the president easy access to his holdings.58

Many other allegations revolve aroundrigged-bidding or favoritism in public works.


In one prominent case, a firm calledModultecsa, run by a Cuban-American friendof the president, received government contractsto do post-hurricane reconstruction work andpromptly made a mess of it.59 The companyalso initially employed Aleman’s number oneson-in-law. In another case, suspect biddingprocedures allowed foreign business interestslinked to Aleman to garner a lucrative contractto provide electric energy.60

Doubts about the government’s probity haveextended to the privatization of state assets.The Banco Nicaraguense (BANIC) was sold for$11 million in January 1999. A number of theCentral American buyers were revealed to bebusiness partners of an Aleman intimate namedDonald Spencer, who was one of the directors ofthe state-owned bank before its sale. Moreover,it has been alleged that suspect loans made bythe same state administration were illegallyused to purchase the bank to begin with.61

The major prize in the Nicaraguan privati-zation scramble is the state telephone compa-ny ENITEL. Here suspicions swirled aroundAleman’s political connections to Jorge MasCanosa, then powerful head of the anti-CastroCuban-American Foundation in Miami and afunder of Aleman’s political ambitions as earlyas 1989. In 1998, ENITEL signed a contractto provide 100,000 new phone lines withMasTec, one of Mas Canosa’s companies. It waslater revealed that the price negotiated for thelines was 40% above going rates. The govern-ment then wanted the eventual purchaser ofENITEL to honor the overpriced deal, arequirement that helped scuttle the govern-ment’s first attempt to sell ENITEL in May1999. Under pressure from multilateraldonors, Aleman was forced to rescind the con-tract.62

Aleman’s Interest in a Pact with the FSLN.Given this description, it may seem odd thatAleman would have any interest in a power-sharing pact with the FSLN. Aleman undoubt-edly believes he has stabilized the PLC’s domi-nant position in the system by eliminatingpotential competitors. He has fortified his

dominance over party affairs to the point ofdaring to float a proposal for a constituentassembly in 2001 that he calculates will lead toanother presidential term. He has moreoverconquered space and quotas of power in stateinstitutions where the PLC has heretofore beenweak or absent, and guaranteed himself, for atleast five years, immunity from investigationinto what are alleged to be illicit dealings.

Moreover, and despite the devastationwrought by Hurricane Mitch, his governmentcan also claim a number of achievements todate. Economic growth over 1997–99 averaged5% annually, open unemployment has dropped,and a significant number of foreign investorshave arrived willing to play by the govern-ment’s peculiar discretionary rules. What thenis the problem? Why does Aleman need a pactwith Daniel Ortega?

Aleman’s first problem is that his managementof government is not credible to Nicaraguans.Except for brief interludes, the president hasreceived negative ratings for his performance inoffice ranging from -5% to -10% over thecourse of his term.63 His party, which won 51%of the national vote in 1996, has lost popularityto the point where it holds the loyalty of only20% of the citizenry. Its position in nationalpolitics is less firm than it appears. In particu-lar, the local level political base Aleman builtup between 1990–1995 has been underminedby his financially weak government’s inabilityto provide significant resources to municipali-ties. The PLC moreover lacks a strong, elec-table figure to serve as its next candidate, asAleman has steadfastly resisted grooming a suc-cessor.

In addition, Comptroller-General AgustinJarquin came perilously close to uncoveringand documenting allegations about the growthof the president’s patrimony and the machina-tions surrounding BANIC. Control over theCGR, therefore, became imperative in order tothwart such investigations. If an iron ring ofimpunity could be forged involving theNational Assembly and the Supreme Court, somuch the better.

Who Benefits? 15

Aleman’s strength has come from the use offour classic techniques of authoritarian leaders inNicaragua: ruthless domination of the officialparty, centralized and personalistic control ofgovernmental affairs, clientelistic manipulationof other power centers, and attempts at intimi-dation of civil society. Coupled with these meth-ods has gone, in the view of most Nicaraguans,Aleman’s avid pursuit of personal enrichment.But the very familiarity of these techniques hasgenerated a backlash in public sentiment.

THE FSLN IN OPPOSITION.

During the early years of the Chamorro era thearmy, police and much of the court system werein Sandinista hands. The Sandinista front fur-thermore enjoyed a prominent position in themedia and controlled a powerful public-sectorunion apparatus. Less visible resources allowedpressure to be exerted through intimidation.This pattern nurtured Daniel Ortega’s beliefthat the FSLN could “govern from below,”exercising a political weight out of proportionto its 1990 vote result. The FSLN’s key objec-tive became the transfer and legalization ofnumerous properties to Sandinista leaders andtheir followers. In the shadow of these opera-tions, a clique of Sandinista entrepreneurs wasborn with an interest in the system.

Throughout the early 1990s, this strategyenjoyed some success. Despite cries about anillicit “pinata,” the Chamorro administrationratified the bulk of the property transfers madeby the Sandinistas to their followers in the1980s, including agrarian reform lands, build-ing lots and housing. Chamorro also agreed todivide up state-owned farmland and industriesthen being privatized, ceding up to 25% ofvarious sectors to Sandinista workers. Therewas and remains a key stumbling block: mostbeneficiaries of these transfers have still notreceived clear title to these possessions.

However, the FSLN’s leverage proved to beunstable, and gradually weakened. Foreignpressures forced Sandinista-era police chiefRene Vivas from office in September 1992, andlater led to the ouster of Ortega’s brother,

Humberto, from the leadership of theNicaraguan army. The balance of forces in theSupreme Court also changed, and both theCourt and the Chamorro government had aninterest in gradually purging at least the lowercourts of openly Sandinista (and incompetent)judges. The ability of confiscated propertyholders to bring suit in local courts to recovertheir holdings then put the interests of FSLNleaders and their clients at risk. The riskincreased when Aleman entered office threaten-ing to take back properties from Sandinistas.Recovering lost ground in terms of institution-al space thus became one of the FSLN’s mainconcerns.

The FSLN’s social base has also badly deteri-orated. Powerful in the early 1990s, Sandinistapublic-sector unions have largely lost thecapacity to mobilize their respective sectors.Internal wrangling has also taken its toll.Union leaders who gained access to “workersproperties” through the 1990s “concertation”agreements were unable to reconcile their new-found role as entrepreneurs with the traditionalfunction of representing workers. Many fellinto disfavor with their bases due to accusationsof corruption and abuse of their positions. By1996, the Sandinista Workers’ Central (CST)had suffered a serious split.64

The Consolidation of FSLN Control byDaniel Ortega. This erosion, coupled withlosses in two consecutive elections, threatenedDaniel Ortega’s power within the party. Duringthe revolution, Ortega had enjoyed the status ofprimus inter pares among FSLN comandantes.But after 1990 his predominance became anissue. In part, this was due to his unmatchedpersonal activism. While other historic leadersfloundered in indecision, and mid-level leaderswere forced to find jobs outside the party andgovernment, Ortega personally spearheaded thestruggles of Sandinista workers and peasants tokeep control of farms and factories. With thisleadership, Ortega consolidated loyalties in theparty to his person.

The result of this concentration of partypower has been a frustrating and ultimately


incomplete process of internal democratizationin the FSLN. After losing government power,the FSLN leadership could no longer resist pent-up pressures from lower echelons to account insome fashion to the base. A 1994 Congress evendeclared the formerly consultative “SandinistaAssembly” as the party’s top policy-makingorgan. However, Ortega’s personal dominanceand drive have continually thwarted schemes touse the National Directorate and the partyassembly to keep the maximum leader undersome semblance of control. As in the PLC, theyhave also impeded the emergence of any alterna-tive leader to assume the reigns in a transitionthat in another context would be inevitable,given that Ortega has suffered consecutivedefeats as the party’s standard-bearer.

After the FSLN’s second election loss in1996, a process of internal reflection groped fora horizontal reformulation. But the process wasresisted and ran aground after some months.Thereafter, the Directorate virtually ceased tofunction, leaving real coordination of the FSLNin the hands of Ortega and the party secretariesin the departments. At the same time, in theview of today’s party dissidents, the top leader-ship took a strong lurch to the right, decidingto put protection of its property interests fore-most. The party officials and entrepreneurscharged with running a shadowy network ofSandinista businesses became increasinglyinfluential.65

In the last FSLN Congress, held in May1998, pressures for internal party transforma-tion bubbling up from the base spent them-selves. On the Congress floor, party founderand former Sandinista interior minister, TomasBorge, helped Ortega turn back an effort bydeputy Victor Hugo Tinoco to groom himselfas the leader’s successor, initially by running forthe party’s second post of vice-secretarygeneral.66 At the same time, business elementsassociated with Ortega also rose to posts in theparty directorate.

Ortega’s Interest in a Pact with the PLC.While Daniel Ortega has managed to consoli-date supreme power in the FSLN, the party

itself has become weaker over time. Splits anddefections have occurred in the party base, thepower of popular organizations linked to theFSLN was waned, and corruption in some hasset in. A historic congress in May 1994 saw for-mer vice president Sergio Ramirez and a sizablechunk of the party’s original leadership (andmost of its intelligentsia) part company withOrtega. After the party’s debilitating 1996 lossled to further erosion, explosive allegations ofchild abuse over many years against Ortega byhis stepdaughter, Zoilamerica Narvaez, causedthe party to close ranks around Ortega in1998.67 But the attrition has been unstoppable;in the estimate of one party leader, more than90% of some three hundred original second-echelon cadre from the revolutionary era haveleft the FSLN or became completely inactive.Some loyalists who remained steadfast throughthis series of crises were then shaken by thepact with archenemy Aleman.68

Unlike the PLC, the FSLN is an ideologicalparty. The internal debates of the early 1990smay have given way to mere intrigue, but theparty retains a vision of itself as “socialist” and“revolutionary”. Many in and out of the partyspent their adult lives in political activismagainst both the Somoza dictatorship and U.S.domination of Nicaragua. For purposes ofdemocratic consolidation, clinging to thisidentity is problematic. At least on Ortega’spart, it has gone hand in hand with a tradi-tional leftist rejection of liberal democracy(“which is not really democracy”) as a valuedpolitical form.69

However, an ideologically-based divisionexists within the FSLN structure that provides acertain counterpoint to this position. In recentyears, a current calling itself the “DemocraticLeft” in the FSLN has opposed what it sees asright-wing tendencies in the Ortega-dominatedleadership. Unexpectedly, this current has alsoespoused some support for institutional consol-idation, and notably defended Comptroller-General Jarquin against Arnoldo Aleman’sattacks. In part for this reason, four Sandinistadeputies in the Assembly took the risky step of

Who Benefits? 17

voting against the Sandinista-Liberal pact inJanuary.

From Ortega’s perspective, a pact with thePLC offers hope of preventing further decline ofFSLN influence. The agreement promises to sta-bilize the party’s role as at least the second forcein Nicaraguan politics. It gives the party a chanceto overtake the PLC in 2001. Reoccupation ofkey institutional spaces also allows propertyand other interests to be defended. Finally, thepact affords Ortega impunity and longevity inpower.

As this analysis suggests, however, Ortega’swillingness to bargain is born of weaknessrather than of strength. Poll findings have reg-ularly shown the public’s perception of Ortega,both as a person and as opposition leader, to behighly negative. As presidential candidate heappears to have little chance of increasing theparty’s 1996 vote total, and may gain muchless. An opportunity to win a presidential elec-tion with 35% of the vote is thus attractive. Inthe negotiation, his lieutenants achieved thecoveted 35% vote criterion that Ortega hopeswill return him to power. But this victory cameonly at the price of accepting exclusionary rulesfor party confirmation. Ortega has apparentlygambled that the rules will not be so exclusion-ary as to rule out parties that would be strongenough to take votes away from the Liberalsand make possible a 35% victory for the FSLN.

Like Aleman, Ortega has also had to dealwith the limits of his resource base. His capaci-ty to shape events has declined, and his partyhad been pushed out of key institutional spaces.

For the FSLN and its leader, colonization of theCGR, CSJ and CSE thus became of primeimportance.

Who Benefits? As can be seen, Arnoldo Alemanand Daniel Ortega have several interests incommon. Though Aleman enjoys a somewhatfreer hand in his party than does Ortega in theFSLN, both leaders aspire to go on being king-makers in their respective parties indefinitely.Both also have an interest in excluding politicalcompetitors, although the interest is not exact-ly equivalent. They are especially interested inpreventing competition from parties that havesplit off from their own flanks. To guaranteesuch exclusion, joint control of the electionapparatus is ideal.

The two leaders also benefit by protectingthemselves from prying eyes. Aleman wants toward off investigations into the myriad accusa-tions of corruption that have marred his presi-dency. Ortega is interested in squelching seri-ous inquiry into allegations of child abusebrought by his stepdaughter, and covering upthe origin of forms of wealth in the hands ofcertain party leaders and followers. The twomen thus have a shared interest in controllinggovernment organs such as the court systemand CGR, where investigations might origi-nate.

For more than nine months, Nicaragua’spolitical institutions have been operating underthe pact’s new rules. Whether they will func-tion well or badly is the next question to whichwe turn.

Nine months is only a short time inwhich to assess the effects the Liberal-Sandinista pact will ultimately have

on Nicaraguan politics. But some things canalready be said.

In terms of institutional functioning, theoperation of the pact thus far has tended to con-firm the critics’ fears. Far from ferreting out cor-

ruption, the collegial Comptroller General of theRepublic (CGR), in its first test, issued a rulingthat protects the interests of the executive.Apparently biased and negligent decisions atvarious levels have further damaged the reputa-tion of the judiciary. The new Supreme ElectoralCouncil (CSE) has meanwhile become mired in acontroversy over verifying the signatures sub-


THE PACT’S IMPACTS

mitted by the political parties for registration.As election approached, fraud charges flew andthreats to disrupt the electoral process loomed.

The following review suggests that not allspace for continued institutional developmenthas been closed off. Implementation of the pacthas, from the beginning, been intertwined with“HIPC politics” (i.e., with the Aleman govern-ment’s drive to convince international donors togrant it large-scale debt relief under the IMF-World Bank scheme to pardon the debts ofHighly Indebted Poor Countries). To do so itneeds to convince donors that it is makingprogress toward transparency and good gover-nance. This gives national and internationalactors some leverage to work for continuedinstitutional strengthening.

Evidence for the entrenchment of bipartisanLiberal-Sandinista dominance is so far not con-clusive. The party re-registration process hasleft in its wake a semi-exclusionary outcome interms of opportunities to compete inNovember’s municipal elections. But it didleave one other, possibly major, contender inthe race. Meanwhile, the big parties have suf-fered from dissension and attrition in the initialstages of pact implementation, suggesting thatif other contenders develop strength and elec-tions remain fair, the dominant players couldbe vulnerable.

THE COMPTROLLER-GENERAL

The status of the Comptroller General of theRepublic (CGR) was greatly enhanced by the1995 constitutional reforms, which declared itthe supreme body for oversight of publicadministration and control of state assets andresources, as well as of any private organizationsfunded by the government. Formally, then, theComptroller’s purview is vast. In practice, priorto the May 1996 election of ComptrollerAgustin Jarquin Anaya, the CGR was ineffec-tive and vulnerable. It usually did no morethan sporadic financial audits of governmentagencies. In 1992, the Chamorro governmentengineered the summary removal of the exist-ing comptroller for opposing its wishes.

Shortly after taking office, Jarquin embarkedupon an ambitious program to upgrade theinstitution’s capacity, securing $5.2 millionfrom the four Nordic countries plus other assis-tance. The new comptroller sought to endowthe CGR with the capacity to audit not onlyindividual agencies but the state’s entire con-solidated accounts, which include autonomousagencies and the state banking sector. Thestrengthening program further aimed to givethe CGR the ability to audit the performanceof government bodies (i.e, to evaluate the effec-tiveness of government spending, not simply toverify that money was being spent according tobudget).70

This radical expansion of the Comptroller’srole was threatening to Arnoldo Aleman.Jarquin thus had to devise a political strategyfor dealing with governmental obstruction. Hedid this in large part by attempting to reachout to the citizenry and keep himself and hisinstitution before the media. Jarquin’s tacticsbrought criticism from some corners, includingcertain donors who found his style of high-pro-file auditing unnecessarily confrontational.

Though Jarquin succeeded in greatlyexpanding staff and budget, and overhauled theCGR’s internal organization, the CGR devel-oped only a portion of its planned capabilities,and remained limited primarily to financialauditing. Despite strenuous efforts, the CGRalso made little progress in bolstering theinternal auditors in government agencies or inreducing discretionality in the management ofthe public budget.71 Probably the most impor-tant achievement of the Jarquin period was togreatly raise the profile of the institution. Evenminor officials became aware of the CGR.Equally important, Jarquin’s efforts increasedthe public credibility of the institution and itsauditors, unleashing a pack of denunciationsthat were often more effective in ferreting outmisconduct than the audits themselves.72

By the same token, the Comptroller-Generalcame under ever more intense pressure torespond to the public’s demand for actionagainst official thievery. Such pressure out-


stripped the institution’s capacity to respond.The Comptroller peppered the governmentwith a steady barrage of investigations. But atcertain moments staff weaknesses underminedhis efforts, as in 1998 when the CGR’s chiefeconomist was unable to sustain an accusationthat the central bank could not account forsome $500 million in foreign exchangereceipts.

The Aleman government increasinglyresponded by refusing GGR auditors access. Inthe Banco Nicaraguense (BANIC) case, thistactic thwarted an investigation into the bank’sflawed privatization. A Supreme Court decisionin 1998 also lowered the evidentiary weight ofCGR audit findings.73 By late 1999, accordingto insiders, the institution’s capacity to act hadbeen largely frozen by these tactics and by thelooming presence of the pact.

Comptroller Jarquin’s downfall began inMarch 1999, with revelations that he had sur-reptitiously engaged a prominent journalist inan unethical contract to provide the CGR withpolitically sensitive information. This misstep,which Jarquin later admitted, handed the gov-ernment a pretext to pursue him in court onfraud charges. He was jailed in November1999, in what was widely seen as a reprisalorchestrated in the politicized court system.74

Due to ensuing public criticism, an appealscourt ruling freed the Comptroller after 45days in prison.

The Collegial Comptrollers. The election thisyear of five members to form the new col-legium of Comptrollers was followed by theirselection of Guillermo Arguello Poessy, a for-mer vice-minister of finance for property affairsand vice-foreign minister, as the president ofthe CGR. Two other places are occupied byauditors loyal to Aleman, while the FSLN posi-tioned its foreign relations secretary, Jose PasosMarciaq, as a fourth member. The FSLN sup-ported Jarquin to stay on as the fifth memberuntil his resignation at the end of June.

Arguello’s initial statements betrayed a con-ception of his role that some donors to theinstitution found troubling.75 He declared that

he would give priority to investigating casesrelating to the previous Chamorro government;rather than to auditing the current budget.Arguello also indicated that his overriding goalwas to change the public’s “perception” of theprobity of government officials—as if that weremore important than making sure they behavedthemselves.76

The CGR’s initial decisions aggravateddonors’ concerns. The new Comptrollerspromptly sacked Jarquin’s staff and began mak-ing changes in ongoing investigations.77 In themost publicized of these, the full collegiumresolved to shelve an investigation into theabuse of state resources to improve the proper-ties of president Aleman.78 Although Jarquinprotested vigorously, CGR vice-presidentFrancisco Ramirez argued that the proceedingagainst Aleman should not have been openedbecause, as president, Aleman enjoys immunityfrom prosecution. The other Comptrollersdecided to throw the investigation of Aleman’spatrimony into the lap of the Assembly, wherethe president’s supporters could presumablybury it.

This began what Jarquin has argued is apattern of institutional “self-limitation.” InMarch, the four Nordic countries suspendedtheir assistance, arguing that the changesmade to the structure might threaten the goalsof their assistance. Other donors, includingthe United States, nevertheless continued toprovide aid. To these, the comptrollers com-mitted themselves to draft a reform to theinstitution’s Organic Law as well as a probitylaw, and to resolve more than 20 outstandingcases of alleged misuse of governmentresources.

The Byron Jerez Case. More than these initialdevelopments, a high-profile corruption inves-tigation has called the impartiality of thereformed CGR into question. In March, thedaily newspaper La Prensa embarked on aseries of exposes of alleged wrongdoing on thepart of a key Aleman ally. As head of thefinance ministry’s General Tax Division (DGI),Byron Jerez was one of the most powerful offi-


cials of the Aleman government and treasurerof the ruling PLC.

Over a period of weeks, La Prensa unearthedsupposedly shady procurement practicesinvolving purchases by the DGI from compa-nies run by Jerez’s brother in Miami. Thepaper then focused on a missing check for$200,000 issued by Jerez’s office, that hadnever reached its destination in the state insur-ance company INISER. Almost immediately,it became known that Comptroller Jarquin hadbeen pursuing the trail of 13 other tax creditchecks issued under suspect procedures, manyof which had passed through the offices of thestate-owned oil distributor PETRONIC beforethe money allegedly reached the coffers ofJerez’s US relative.

La Prensa’s denunciations goaded the newCGR into announcing a special investigationinto the DGI. The Comptrollers also beganaudits of PETRONIC and INISER, and calledon Jerez to clarify his relationship with compa-nies in Miami.79 However, Jerez was unable orunwilling to give a satisfactory explanation ofwhere the $200,000 had gone, produce the per-son he claimed had cashed the missing check,or supply documentation demanded of him. Onthe Monday after Easter, the Comptrollersissued the official an ultimatum to respond.When Jerez cavalierly ignored them, the CGRsummoned him to appear forthwith.80

It was not until two weeks after a crucialWashington donors meeting in May, however,and under continuing foreign strong pressure,that the Comptrollers finally announced theirverdict. By a 3–2 decision dominated by theLiberals, the Comptrollers recommended ByronJerez’s destitution and the imposition of a fine,but refrained from establishing a presumptioneither of civil or of criminal responsibility. Themajority view was that irrefutable evidence thatJerez had committed a crime had not been pre-sented.81

The decision was met with a hail of indigna-tion. A consultant to the CGR made a pointedand reasoned criticism of the decision, notingthat the GGR’s investigation had been unduly

short and incomplete. Particularly damagingwas the Comptrollers’ inexplicable, and appar-ently deliberate, inaction in seeking the aid ofthe courts to compel parties under investiga-tion to testify and hand over documents.82 Thislaxity was crucial, as “lack of evidence of acrime” was the CGR’s official rationale for notfinding in favor of civil or penal responsibilityfor Jerez.

Terming himself vindicated and abovereproach, Jerez resigned his post just hoursafter the verdict on June 7. Although he hadloudly proclaimed for weeks that he wouldabide by the Comptrollers’ recommendations,president Aleman did not immediately move tofire his subordinate. And in a vote of confi-dence in Jerez, Aleman kept him on as treasur-er of the PLC. Those opposed to the Liberal-Sandinista pact took the CGR’s ruling andAleman’s inaction in the Jerez case as proof thatthe pact was confirming their fears.83

Legal And Administrative Reforms. The Jerezruling suggests that the CGR can no longer becounted on to impartially investigate corrup-tion charges against high-ranking governmentofficials. Will damage to the CGR go further?Official plans to revamp its powers suggest thatpossibility.

In May, in the midst of the Jerez case,Aleman sent a proposal to reform the CGR tothe Assembly. Terming the bill “an abuse”,Agustin Jarquin asserted that the governmenthad not consulted the Comptrollers and hadpre-empted the efforts of foreign consultantsworking on the issue.84 Sandinista members ofthe CGR had prepared reform legislation thatconflicted with Aleman’s desire to centralizeCGR power in president Arguello. The presi-dent’s version also appeared subtly to reinforcethe trend toward institutional “self-limitation.”In particular, the government draft embodiedthe principle of “prior control”, giving theCGR the right to supervise governmental oper-ations such as contracting at all steps, not justafter the fact. Ostensibly a device to make theinstitution stronger, experts argued that priorcontrol would actually work to weaken the


CGR’s position, as it diluted the moral respon-sibility of public officials for the results of theirdecisions, making subsequent sanctions of theirbehavior by the courts problematic. At theCGR’s behest, foreign consultants worked toreconcile the several drafts. The president latersent an improved version of the bill to theAssembly.

Other donors, meanwhile, took a differenttack. In March, the Inter-American DevelopmentBank announced that it was working with thegovernment to establish a system for overseeingpublic contracting and purchasing.85 The ambi-tious, $21 million “efficiency and transparency”program again appeared to embody a system ofpreventive control of government operations.86

A “project inspectorate” run by an internationalfirm would be empowered to enter into anyinstitution without advance notice, oversee allstages of a contract process, and train govern-mental officials in contracting and purchasemanagement.

Neither the reform of the CCR’s OrganicLaw or the IDB transparency proposal has yetbeen approved or put into effect. However,both are part of the international community’srequirements for relief of Nicaragua’s burden-some foreign debt. For that reason, “HIPC pol-itics” has created pressure for administrativecleanup, which in addition to these initiativesincludes passage of a revised probity law. Inappearance, the Aleman government has acced-ed, at least in part, to the donors’ pressure. Theultimate outcome of these initiatives neverthe-less remains to be seen.

The Judicial System. Nicaragua’s judicial sys-tem is regarded by seasoned observers of poli-tics as the weakest and most corrupt institutionin the country.87 They regard its weaknesses asso grave and tangled that it is usually impossi-ble to distinguish whether the system is failingto act in a credible manner due to its intrinsicincapacity, to political interference, or to cor-ruption. The system’s credibility with the gen-eral public is also extremely low.

Appointments to the Supreme Court ofJustice (CSJ) have always been political. The

Court has traditionally failed to rule expedi-tiously on many of the constitutional chal-lenges brought before it, giving rise to a beliefthat the substance and timing of the judgmentsit eventually renders are negotiated, usuallywith the executive. In some cases, challengeslanguish for years. Nor has it acted with rapidi-ty on the several legal challenges to the pact.88

The internal independence of judges is virtu-ally non-existent. The CSJ has divided up thesystem into territorial fiefdoms where groups ofjustices control lower court nominations,cementing a combination of party and personalloyalties. A judicial career law, increasinglyadopted in other countries in Central America,is still on the drawing board. Procedures forhiring, promoting, disciplining and firing jus-tices (appointed without fixed terms) are thusarbitrary, giving Supreme Court magistratesenormous leverage over the lower ranks.

The lack of adequate separation between thefunctions of state attorney (procurador) and pub-lic prosecutor (fiscal) creates a conflict of inter-est which further undermines judicial indepen-dence from the executive.89 Finally, the justicesystem currently rests on an outmoded statuto-ry foundation dating from the 19th century.That foundation mandates a judicial processthat fails to mesh the functions of judge, prose-cutor, police and defense attorney in a mannernecessary to administer justice in a way that isboth efficacious and protects the rights ofdefendants to due process.90

Reform Efforts. Since 1990, efforts to reformaspects of the legal system have been legion.91

With help from the United Nations DevelopmentProgramme (UNDP) and Sweden, the post-revo-lutionary CSJ developed a master plan thatemphasized judicial training and creation of mini-mal material conditions for a court system to func-tion. When the official Escuela Judicial wasfounded in 1993, many judges were not evenlawyers and had no judicial training. Also withSwedish cooperation, 123 local judicial centers(casas de justicia) have been established in munici-palities in an effort to expand access to the system.All judges are now required at least to have law


degrees. And although deficient, legal traininghas slowly changed the concept of what it means tobe a judge at the local level, emphasizing disputemediation where possible over litigation.92

In 1995 constitutional reforms aimed forgreater judicial independence. They lengthenedCSJ terms of office and reduced the president’spower over their selection. Whereas before onlythe president could propose slates of candidates,Assembly deputies now also have this preroga-tive after consultations with civil society. Thereforms also mandated allocation of a minimum4% of the ordinary national budget to the judi-cial system.93

Complementing the 1995 reforms, a newOrganic Law of the Judicial Power passed theNational Assembly in mid-1998. In principle,this law mandated a series of reforms only someof which have been put into effect. The mostimportant of these was creation of aCommission for the Judicial Career, which ischarged with drafting legislation on the sub-ject. While this reform has stagnated, the CSJhas set up an internal disciplinary commission,aided by a judicial inspectorate, which has gonesome way toward weeding out corrupt andincompetent personnel.

Most of the recent advances took placebetween 1996 and 1999, under the leadershipof Supreme Court president Guillermo VargasSandino, a Liberal, and vice-president Alba LuzRamos, a Sandinista. Under their aegis, theCourt divided itself into four chambers andbegan resolving cases much more rapidly. TheVargas-Ramos team removed more than 200judges and court secretaries who flagrantlyabused their office. This created the impressionof a less politicized, somewhat cleaner system; asurvey of local-level opinion indicated that insmaller cities and towns, few people perceivetheir local court as corrupt.94 Despite improve-ments in recent years, however, the quality ofjudicial training remains very low, and knowl-edge of what laws are applicable is weak — attimes even in the CSJ.

In spite of these advances, the experts con-sulted by HI believe that judicial politicization

and corruption remain intense, particularly inManagua. There few local or district leveljudges have been removed or sanctioned.Sentences, it is alleged, are bought and sold.Suspicion extends especially to the ManaguaAppeals Court, and even to the high courtitself. A former Appeals Court magistraterevealed that judges in Managua have accumu-lated up to 20 complaints without decisive dis-ciplinary action being taken.95 Young localjudges put in positions of heavy responsibilityhave resigned in frustration.

The Impact of the Pact. The first signs thatthe pact, once finished, would pack the courtsystem with new judges from the PLC andFSLN came in August 1999, when theSupreme Court underwent its annual electionof authorities.96 This unleashed a bout of politi-cal intrigue and jockeying for position that par-alyzed the CSJ for six weeks. The pact in gesta-tion appeared to foment a re-alignment of thecourt’s twelve members into Liberal, Sandinistaand independent groups, with the latter hold-ing the balance of power. In the end, theVargas-Ramos reform team was replaced by aLiberal CSJ president, Francisco Plata, and anFSLN vice-president, Yadira Centeno. Thisresult foreshadowed the pact-to-come, whichreinforced the dominance of these two parties.

The four magistrates to the expanded 16-mem-ber CSJ were finally elected in March 2000.Against the wishes of some of its deputies, thePLC acceded to the FSLN’s choice of Managuaappellate court justice Armengol Cuadra, whohad headed the feared Anti-Somocista PopularTribunals during the revolutionary years. TheFSLN also added former deputy Rafael Solis,while the Liberals selected deputies Carlos Guerraand Guillermo Selva. Analyses of the precisepolitical composition of the expanded court var-ied according to who was counted in what camp.For the moment, fluidity appears to prevail, withno court faction enjoying a majority, and a quo-rum of two thirds is required for decisions.97

Political Manipulation. Meanwhile, there isample evidence that blatant political manipula-


tion of the court system continues. Two casesinvolve apparent reprisals by the pact leadersagainst their political enemies. In one, men-tioned above, Comptroller Jarquin was sent tojail. After international donors balked and vis-ited him, and Jarquin’s wife threatened ahunger strike, the government appeared torelent. The Managua appellate court then over-turned the district court’s ruling. Insidersregarded both the original and the appellatedecision as politically dictated.

In a second notorious case, a local judge ofSandinista background sentenced then FSLNmember Carlos Guadamuz to two years inprison for causing a violent row in Managua’smunicipal council in May 1999. Long a thornin the side of Daniel Ortega, Guadamuz hadexcoriated his party brethren for the pact, espe-cially for agreeing to divide the capital city intothree parts. Separate legal maneuvers by aLiberal judge then deprived Guadamuz of con-trol of a radio station (Radio Ya) whose owner-ship he disputed with the FSLN. Analystsinterpreted the two actions as reprisals orches-trated in tandem by the pact participants toprepare Guadamuz’s exclusion as a candidate inthe Managua mayoral race.98

Other cases suggest the judiciary’s permeabil-ity to the interests of the executive. One suspectruling, this time by the Supreme Court,occurred in May. The Court had earlier admit-ted a writ of amparo,99 from an investmentgroup called “Inversiones Iberoamericanas”,against a ruling by Comptroller Jarquin thathad declared the January 1999 privatization ofthe Banco Nicaraguense (BANIC) in thegroup’s favor as null and void. The Court ruledthat Jarquin had exceeded his powers, as onlythe courts could rule the privatization actioninvalid.100

The Court soon found that it had embar-rassed itself, as it had based its decision on aclause of the CGR’s 1981 Organic Law thathad been repealed in 1984. When ComptrollerGuillermo Arguello asked the court to clarifyits ruling, magistrate Josefina Ramos, presi-dent of the CSJ’s constitutional chamber, was

forced to admit that the justices had made amistake.101

This admission implied that theComptrollers indeed had the power to nullifyadministrative actions without such a rulinginfringing on the jurisdiction of the legal sys-tem. Jarquin then insisted that the justices passthe case to the chief Procurator for legal actionto determine whether or not the privatizationhad been legally conducted.102 The Court, how-ever, refused to retract the amparo it had award-ed to the investors, leaving intact a sale whichhas been strongly questioned as rigged in favorof cronies of Arnoldo Aleman.

The court case that followed the CGR’s rul-ing on Byron Jerez has reinforced the impres-sion of political bias. On June 8, a former audi-tor, Rafael Cordova, decided to go to criminalcourt to denounce Byron Jerez in the case of themissing checks, which Cordova had investigat-ed during his tenure in the CGR.103 In theabsence of a mechanism for distributing judi-cial proceedings, Cordova lodged his suit inManagua’s first criminal court, headed by judgeMarta Quezada. Of Sandinista backgroundpolitically, Quezada is one of the few judges inNicaragua who enjoy a reputation for impar-tiality.

In response, Jerez’ lawyers lodged an “objec-tion of partiality” (recusacion). They argued thatjudge Quezada had “displayed interest” in han-dling the case. Though this accusation of biaswas not backed by evidence, the maneuver wassufficient to throw the case to alternate judgeWalter Solis, who ruled in favor of the objec-tion and assumed responsibility for hearing thecase himself. Solis then proceeded to conductwhat has been characterized as a superficialexamination of the evidence.104

The denunciation against Jerez also put pres-sure on Prosecutor General Julio Centeno toassume a role in the case. But Centeno vacillated—he avoided clarifying the state’s stance towardthe denunciation, and hid behind the CGR’sfinding that no criminal responsibilityapplied.105 In turn, judge Solis hid behindCenteno’s disinclination to pursue a case in which


the state was theoretically the offended party. Henot only refrained from calling Rafael Cordova—the plaintiff—to testify, but failed to pursue theinvestigative avenues left untrodden earlier bythe CGR. On July 1, Solis issued a verdict absolv-ing Jerez of criminal responsibility.

The judge promptly met a storm of criticismfor having shirked his duty.106 Solis thenblamed the Procurator for not exercising hisrole properly and ironically argued that if he,Solis, had been more diligent in pursuing evi-dence, the defense lawyers would have accusedhim of “displaying interest.”107

Thwarting Reform. In recent years, Nicaraguahas witnessed myriad initiatives funded by for-eign donors to improve the very low quality ofits judicial system. Of the initiatives thatimpinge on the twin problems of judicialpoliticization and corruption, two of the mostimportant are the law of the judicial career andthe law of the public ministry. Along with anew law on administrative suits, these initia-tives have had mixed success.

Though the judicial career was foreseen in the1995 amendments to the constitution, the CSJformally set up a commission to draft a bill onthe subject only in 1999. Believing it has acommitment from the Court to move forwardon the issue, the IDB has drawn up a $24 mil-lion “Program for Judicial Independence andTransparency,” one of whose major componentsis institutionalizing the judicial career andimproving the quality and credibility ofjudges.108 The project will design rules andmechanisms for selecting, promoting, disci-plining and firing judges and court secretaries,and formulate standards for training judges inthe universities.

Despite this incentive, little action on theissue has been visible to date. In the short term,according to Court insiders consulted by HI,the lineup of forces does not favor the neededlegislation. To begin with, the commission todraft the law is headed by a Liberal justice whois considered Aleman’s closest ally on thebench. In addition, only a minority of SupremeCourt justices are known to currently support

the idea, though they include the court presi-dent and vice president. According to a justiceinterviewed by HI, the majority of court mem-bers are unwilling to relinquish control overtheir fiefdoms by getting behind a genuinereform in this area.

In contrast to the judicial career, there brieflyappeared to be progress toward the creation ofan independent public prosecutor. On May 2, with-out opposition, the National Assemblyapproved the Law of the Public Ministry, whichcreates an independent prosecuting attorney(fiscal general) separate from the state attorney(procurador general). Whereas the latter official isnamed by the president, the Assembly willchoose the chief prosecutor and deputy fromslates of candidates to be presented by the exec-utive and by the Assembly itself.109

In appearance, the law not only separatedfunctions but granted the Fiscal broad powers toinvestigate and pursue crime ex-officio or actingfrom a denunciation. But in comparison withdrafts prepared by foreign consultants, the lawthat emerged from the Assembly was weak. Forexample, the Fiscal would have to await judg-ments from the CGR before prosecuting govern-ment officials for corruption. On the organiza-tional side, he lacked the services of a secretary-general, an executive assistant, or an auditor.

Unexpectedly, Procurator General JulioCenteno, who had backed the bill initially, laterannounced that Aleman would veto parts of thenew law. Centeno argued that the legislatorshad taken away some of the Fiscal’s essentialpowers, conditioning these on a later reform ofpenal procedure.110 His proposed amendmentsstipulated that the fiscales, not the police,would direct investigations into alleged crimes.Given the chronic weakness of police criminalinvestigations, this is a necessary feature of anyreform of the system of criminal justice. Butsubordinating the work of police investigatorsto the Fiscalia would infringe the autonomy theNational Police presently enjoys in the state,and was sensitive politically.

In the Assembly, Aleman’s veto gave rise toquarreling between the pact-makers. The


Sandinistas’ star deputy, Walmaro Gutierrez,argued that the idea of subordinating policeinvestigations to the new prosecutor could vio-late the constitution.111 Other critics arguedthat the veto process was a ruse by presidentAleman to prevent a strong bill from seeing thelight of day.

In contrast to the public ministry bill, thelaw for administrative litigation112 has met a bet-ter fate. This law has a complex-sounding titlebut is based on a simple premise: citizensshould have the right to sue if they feel theirrights are infringed by administrative rulingsmade by government agencies. Such a lawcould be extremely valuable in protectingNicaraguans from abusive government prac-tices. Fearing any initiative that could exposeofficials to financial responsibility, the govern-ment dragged its feet, and the bill remainedshelved for three years.113 Pressures from theUnited States government and the IMF led tonew movement on the bill in late 1999. On thegovernment’s side, a desire to have somethingpositive to show a May 2000 donors’ meetingoperated as a stimulus.

During Assembly debate on the bill,obstructionist maneuvers made themselves felt.In particular, Liberal deputies attempted torevise the bill to allow the government to evadepayment of damages when it lost suits in thenew courts to be created. Unexpectedly, magis-trates from the Supreme Court then arrived toscold the lawmakers for their obstruction, andwere backed by Sandinista legislators. TheLiberal deputies then caved in. The bill finallypassed in mid-May, albeit only after the majorparties negotiated a 16-month lapse before thelegislation would go into effect, making theAleman government immune from its impact.With this outcome, a basically positive piece oflegislation appeared to emerge.

THE SUPREME ELECTORAL COUNCIL

The CSE was founded in 1984, and until thisyear has been headed by only two people, bothoriginally Sandinista militants. The CSE’s pres-ident until 1996 was a respected intellectual

figure, Mariano Fiallos Oyanguren. Despite thepartisan loyalties of its staff, Fiallos and RosaMarina Zelaya built the CSE into one of themost professional bodies of the Nicaraguanstate and conducted two national elections, in1984 and 1990, which were generally regardedas free and fair and in which voter turnoutexceeded 75%. In the second of these, theFSLN fell from power. Indicating the level ofnational and international approval of his per-formance, the National Assembly re-electedFiallos with little opposition in 1995.

Key to this high level performance was thatthe CSE leadership selected lower and mid-ech-elon personnel according to their professionalqualifications and not according to party dic-tates or criteria. However, this situationchanged abruptly as a result of election lawreforms in 1995 that stipulated that the politi-cal parties would name candidates to staff thelower-level electoral councils and vote boardsduring the 1996 campaign. The parties thendominant in the Assembly argued that this plu-ralism would help guard against fraud. Fearingthe advent of a politicized process that wouldundo his handiwork, Fiallos promptly resigned.

Rosa Marina Zelaya occupied the CSE’s helmfrom early 1996 to March 2000. To Zelaya fellthe excruciating task of managing a polarizedand highly complex national and local election,the rules for which were changed several timesin the year before the voting.114 She also had tograpple with a massive job of training inexperi-enced party delegates down to the level of localvote boards about their responsibilities.Underfunded and overburdened by mammothtasks, the Council barely limped through toelection day on October 20, 1996.

During the vote count, the system brokedown in places, and a substantial minority ofthe ballots were lost. In the view of mostobservers, this outcome was due to insufficienttime, inexperienced officials, and lack ofresources leading to administrative disorganiza-tion rather than to political manipulation.115

Immediately after the vote count began, how-ever, FSLN leader Daniel Ortega began to


charge that serious fraud had been committed.Although his party has not provided convinc-ing evidence, he has maintained that claim eversince, alleging that Liberals carried out fraudand that Rosa Marina Zelaya, who had departedthe FSLN for the Sandinista RenewalMovement (MRS) after the 1994 party split,covered it up.

Whether there was fraud or not, the reputa-tion of the CSE in the eyes of the publicdropped sharply as a result of the 1996 ballotmess. The CSE recovered its balance somewhatin March 1998, when voting for regional coun-cils on the Atlantic Coast was held.116 But asthe poll data cited above indicate, the institu-tion has not been able to recoup the very highcredibility it enjoyed before 1996.

New Electoral Authorities. In March 2000, thepact-makers altered the political balance of theCSE by adding two members, Liberal SilvioCalderon and Sandinista Emmet Lang. A quickinternal election then shunted aside RosaMarina Zelaya as Council president before theend of her term. Elected in her stead wasRoberto Rivas, a close aide of Cardinal MiguelObando, who has admitted to Liberal sympa-thies but denies being a PLC member. Thepacters thus established a foothold, and despitebeing temporarily in a minority, quickly domi-nated the Council’s decisions.

This interim council managed the first phaseof the 2000 municipal election process. Almostimmediately, constitutional challenges to theelection law reform sprang forth from numerouscorners of society.117 Complementing these wasa suit by Zelaya challenging the shortening ofher term of office as unconstitutional. Zelaya’sbrief also challenged the procedure whereby theAssembly changed the content of the constitu-tional amendments voted on in the 1999 leg-islative session during the 2000 session. TheCSJ agreed to hear this writ on May 18.

In mid-June, with the magistrates elected in1995 nearing the end of their terms, theNational Assembly prepared to elect theirreplacements. Zelaya denounced the upcomingelection as illegal, given that the Supreme Court

had not yet ruled on her suit, which affected thenumber of magistrates to be chosen. Rumorsalso circulated to the effect that the governmentwas pressuring magistrate Fernando Silva toresign, although his term still had a year to go.Silva did resign on June 16, citing ill health anddenying that he had accepted a hefty indemnityfrom the executive.118 His move allowed theLiberals to go on to elect five instead of four newmagistrates, thereby assuring that within theframework of the pact, the PLC would enjoy amajority of four on the seven-member Council.

On July 3, the Assembly proceeded to electthe five. The Liberals confirmed Roberto Rivasas a magistrate and added MauricioMontealegre and Jorge Incer Barquero, whilethe Sandinistas voted in Jose Luis Villavicencioand Miguel Cordoba. The very same day, theSupreme Court issued a 13–2 ruling rejectingZelaya’s suit against the reforms.119

As happened with the CGR, the new CSEmagistrates immediately began making person-nel changes in the apparatus. The new authori-ties dumped key administrative staffers of long-standing merit who had previously handledelection-mapping and cedula issuance, replac-ing them with Liberals. After a short time, theonly major holdover from the Zelaya periodwas the head of the information systems divi-sion. According to recent interpretations, theSandinista side of the new Council came todominate the operative core of the CSE’sadministration, the so-called electoral affairsdivision; this would lead later to charges thattechnical fraud was being prepared.120

Implementing the New Law. Under the pact,political parties that did not win 3% of thevote in 1996 must re-register by submitting aquantity of signatures (with their cedula or IDcard numbers) equal to 3% of the last nationalvote. Of some two dozen parties, only theFSLN and Camino Cristiano, a small evangeli-cal party that has lent the PLC consistent sup-port in the Assembly, were exempt. Because thePLC had run in 1996 as part of an alliancerather than individually, it was subject to therequirement.


The PLC was the first party to flex its politi-cal muscle by fielding activists to collect theneeded names and cedula numbers. Accordingto some reports, it applied pressure on publicemployees to obtain signatures: a young audi-tor in the DGI charged that he had been firedat the express order of Byron Jerez for refusingto sign.121 Whatever the case, the results of itsinitial drive heralded the problems than mostparties would face in the signature race. TheCSE threw out 20,000 of an initial batch of160,000 signatures submitted, on the groundsthat the names and numbers entered did notcorrespond to those in CSE files.122

The CSE adopted a controversial, laboriousprocedure for signature verification. CSE stafftyped the names and cedula numbers submit-ted into the Council’s computers, with partyrepresentatives observing. They then checkedto see if the names and numbers correspondedto those in CSE records, then cross checkedagainst the names submitted by other parties toweed out duplicated names. By having its totallist of 220,000 submitted first, the PLC effec-tively made it impossible for any other party touse any names on its list, even those in excess ofthe 3% requirement (76,623).123

By the mid-July cutoff date, eight partieshad presented lists as follows:124

These results belied predictions that it wouldbe impossible for small parties to meet therequirement. But the law placed an enormous

burden on the parties, the CSE and the elec-torate. The above numbers add up to 42% ofthose who registered for the 1996 election, and66% of those who actually voted. Strapped fortime and with a heavy burden made still heav-ier for those who were not as swift as the PLC,many parties appeared to throw their signaturedrives together hastily. Each had to go wellabove the 3% requirement out of worry overname duplication, typing errors and otherobstacles.

In contrast to the PLC, two Liberal splinterparties, the PLN and the Liberal SalvationMovement (MSL), appeared to fail, as largemajorities of their initial signature batcheswere ruled invalid. As the examination processwore on, leaders of both groups complainedthat the CSE, at the PLC’s behest, was commit-ting fraud against them, and warned of violenceif the attempts continued.125

The Conservative Party presented what itclaimed were 180,000 valid signatures to theCSE on April 27. Mayoral aspirant PedroSolorzano confirmed to HI that, like other par-ties, the Conservatives had hurriedly throwntogether their initial signature drive.126 Hence itcame as no surprise that during the first verifica-tion phase, the CSE rejected 102,127 of the sig-natures due to the fact that names and cedulanumbers did not correspond.127 Though this leftthe PCN over the required minimum, the partywent out to collect a new batch of 50,000 names

in order to bolsterits cushion forphase two.

Another of thegroupings that pre-sented signatures tothe CSE was theMDN-Alliance (seebelow). However,this amalgam ofsmall partiespromptly broke up,with the MDNparty splitting offfrom the rest. The


PARTY SIGNATURES

Partido Liberal Constitucionalista (PLC) 220,000Partido Liberal Nacionalista (PLN) 169,728Movimiento de Salvacion Liberal (MSL) 151,270Partido Conservador de Nicaragua (PCN) 250,820Movimiento Democratico Nicaraguense (MDN) 86,193Movimiento de Unidad Cristiana (MUC) 134,720Movimiento Renovador Sandinista (MRS) 145,950Alianza Conservadora (ALCON) 94,697

alliance had formed under the MDN’s party name toavoid the law’s requirements that a multipartyalliance would have to gather the minimum 3% sig-natures for each party. In early June, the alliance’slegal representative asked the Council to return the86,000 signatures, arguing that citizens had beenasked to sign in favor of an alliance, not just theMDN. By a 6 –1 vote (Zelaya dissenting), theCouncil refused this request. The decision alsodenied the right of the remaining alliance parties tore-validate the signatures and resubmit them. OnJune 9, former president Violeta Chamorro called onthe CSE to return or annul the signature she hadaffixed to an MDN petition.128

In the wake of this decision, the SandinistaRenewal Movement (MRS) regrouped some ofthe pieces of the fractured MDN-Allianceunder its own banner. This new MRS-Alliancethen sought to re-register by submitting73,450 signatures of its own to the Council onJuly 6.129 Party spokespeople claimed that theMRS had pre-checked its names and numbersagainst the official electoral roll. But the MRSfared no better. On the eve of the July 15 cutoffdate, the verification process left it with only34,110 valid signatures.130

Demands For Reform. By the end of June, thetrend in the CSE’s decisions led to a protest bynine parties banded into an “anti-fraud move-ment.” The nine argued that the law did notcall for verification at all, and that the CSE hadviolated the rights of Nicaraguans who did nothave cedulas, could not write, or were forced toturn a private party preference into a publicact.131 The group demanded suspension of theverification process or an emergency reform ofthe law, and threatened to call for civil disobe-dience.132 President Arnoldo Aleman respond-ed by accusing what he called “micro-parties”of trying to perpetrate fraud themselves by fob-bing off masses of phony signatures. Alemanalso ventured to predict that only three parties— the PLC, FSLN, and Camino Cristiano —would be participating in the November elec-tion. This prediction led to a volley of criti-cism, and a threat from former contra chieftainSalvador Talavera that his followers could block

roads, take over CSE buildings, and even occu-py the embassies of the principal foreigndonors.133

Verifying Signatures: Phase 2. In addition tochecking the correspondence between names andnumbers, the CSE decided in early June on aprocedure for verifying the authenticity of thesignatures. The scheme required a direct opti-cal comparison between submitted signaturesand those in CSE files. As the Council couldnot examine huge numbers of signatures, itopted to take a random sample of 416 from thefirst 72,623 signatures entered by a givenparty. If, for example, 10% of the sample wasruled invalid, 10% of the first 72,623 would bestruck. Then, if the party had submitted addi-tional signatures, the procedure could berepeated until it reached, or failed to reach, the3% minimum.134

There were obvious problems. Whether twosignatures by the same person are really alike issomething that even police experts often cannotdetermine. Before the exercise began, the partyfiscales met and worked out a set of criteria. Asit turned out, the criteria were exceedingly rig-orous, so demanding, in fact, that the rulingPLC only made the grade because its huge sig-nature total, about 220,000, allowed it fivepasses through the procedure just outlined.

The test of the procedure came on July 14,when the Conservatives got their turn to passmuster. This party had submitted even more sig-natures than the PLC, some 227,000. In the opin-ion of analysts, however, the PCN was ArnoldoAleman’s nightmare. If the Conservatives made itinto the election race they would likely take votesaway from the Liberals, which would help theFSLN.

Contrary to most expectations, the Con-servatives made it over the second hurdle andinto the election race. The chief PLC fiscalchallenged the Council’s decision, while anFSLN magistrate defended it.135 Three inter-pretations of this outcome quickly emerged: (1)pressure from international organizations haddictated that the PCN get its chance; (2) theFSLN wanted the PCN to be eligible and exer-


cised its control of the information center toachieve this end; and (3) the PCN passed clean-ly. The national observer organization Ethicsand Transparency, the only independent andneutral observer on the spot, subscribed to thelast interpretation.

Denouement. By the time the verificationprocess ended on July 17, the interests of thepact-makers appeared largely to prevail. TheCSE announced that out of nine aspiringnational-level forces, only the PLC, FSLN,Camino Cristiano and the Conservative Partywould be allowed to participate in theNovember municipal elections. The PLC sawtwo potential rivals on its flank sidelined (thePLN and MSL), the FSLN one (the MRS). Inthe one case where the pacters’ interestsdiverged (the PCN), the outcome had favoredthe FSLN.

The denouement did not pass withoutprotest. Leaders of the PLN promptly began ahunger strike outside CSE headquarters. A planby PLN and Resistance activists to disrupt roadtraffic in the interior was soon aborted bypolice. Far from improving governability inNicaragua, implementation of the political pactseemed to be adding one more potential causefor instability.

THE POLITICAL PARTIES

The outcome of the verification suggests thatthe pact is operating successfully to restrict,though not annul, competition amongNicaragua’s political parties. But whether theaccord will cement bipartisan hegemony remainsto be seen. In addition to the fate of the smallparties, questions about the two pact makerssimmer. Will dissent inside the big parties bestifled? Will the agreement contribute to theelectoral decay of its signers?

On the last point, results from a March 2000survey by the CID-Gallup organization may besuggestive. The combined preferences for theLiberal (21%) and Sandinista (20%) partiesdropped to 41%, the lowest level in five years. Atthe same time, those holding a favorable opinion

of the two party leaders, Aleman (33%) andOrtega (29%), dropped to levels not previouslyrecorded.136 Both major parties have also experi-enced strong internal tensions and a tendencytoward defections. Though attrition has not yetbeen dangerous to either, caudillistic control inthe PLC and FSLN has weakened the electoralappeal of the two parties to municipal voters.

Meanwhile, the new election law practicallycommands Nicaragua’s smaller parties to allythemselves together in some fashion in order tosurvive, but makes doing so extremely difficult.With a certain amount of funding from oli-garchic sources, minor parties seeking avenuesfor their participation have in fact regrouped,in sometimes unexpected combinations.Although only one of these has so far gottenitself into this year’s municipal election game,others will make the attempt by seeking to par-ticipate in the national race in 2001.

The PLC. During the period in which the pactwas negotiated, few in the ruling PLC werewilling to air publicly their fears about theagreement’s possible impact on the party’s for-tunes. But since the pact’s consummation, openopposition has emerged in a party that for yearsappeared to be totally dominated by the will ofone individual. Although the president’s holdover party affairs has not been seriously chal-lenged, the post-pact period has illustrated thecontradictions created by, and limits to, theexercise of Aleman’s clientelistic control.

The challenge to Arnoldo Aleman’s controlof the ruling PLC does not stem from any dif-ferences over the pact’s contents. The dissenthas instead sprung from Aleman’s attempt touse the agreement as a springboard for remain-ing indefinitely in power. From the beginning,the PLC has contained a series of figures vyingfiercely to be the Aleman’s successor in 2002.Though all of these have an interest in thwart-ing Aleman’s pretensions, only one has so farhad the temerity to try.

In the months following the pact, Alemancontinued to brandish the option of a constitu-tional convention, or “constituyente.” In May, hebroached the idea that after voters elected a


president and Assembly deputies in November2001, the latter could double as constitutionalconventioneers. After rewriting the constitu-tion in a year and a half, the “sovereign” consti-tuyente could call fresh elections. Though he didnot say so, it was obvious that in those elec-tions, Arnoldo Aleman could once again be acandidate, as the rule against consecutive termswould not be violated.

Opposition to Aleman from within the PLChad already surfaced by this point. In March,another presidential hopeful, INIFOM directorJose Rizo, suddenly advocated letting barredpre-candidate Pedro Solorzano run for mayor ofManagua.137 The PLC’s leader in Managua,Eddy Gomez, then criticized Aleman’s hand-picked candidate for mayor, who was scoringpoorly in the polls.138 In retaliation, Alemanimmediately engineered Rizo’s ouster as PLCparty chief in his native Jinotega, and in aanother lightning reprisal removed Gomezfrom his post as party chief in the capital.

Despite this blunt exercise of presidentialpower, a high-ranking member of the partyexecutive committee, defense minister JoseAntonio Alvarado, insisted on publicly reject-ing Aleman’s idea for a constituyente. When thePLC’s nominating convention opened April 30,Alvarado further proposed a primary in 2001 tochoose the party’s candidate for president. Thesuggestion was fraught with risk, as such amechanism would deprive the party executivecommittee, headed by Aleman and Byron Jerez,of much of their discretionary control overnominations.

A few days later, Alvarado announced his res-ignation as defense minister. In the PLC, thismove was unprecedented independence, as forthe first time a Liberal “good soldier” wasrefusing to be detailed where the chief dictated.Though he couched his critique in timid lan-guage, Alvarado scored Aleman for failing toseparate the strategic interests of his govern-ment from those of the PLC. More to the point,he stated “I am promoting an internal reexami-nation to give space for the aspirations of every-one [in the party].”139

The president’s reprisal was once again swift.On May 16, governance minister Rene Herreraannounced that Alvarado’s 1990 reacquisition ofNicaraguan citizenship was being annulled.140

This would bar a presidential candidacy. A cam-paign to discredit the dissident was thenunleashed—other party officials began callingAlvarado a traitor and indicated he might beexpelled temporarily from the party. But privatehuman rights organizations in Nicaragua and theofficial Human Rights Procurator both support-ed Alvarado, as did the Catholic Church.141

Though support from these sources was note-worthy, other PLC bigwigs failed to come toAlvarado’s aid against the president. Accordingto informed sources, Aleman meanwhile workedbehind the scenes relentlessly to punish anyonein the municipios who showed a sign of backinghis rival. In early July, the dissident leaderannounced the formation of an internal move-ment he called “Liberals for Change”.142 Leadersof the Liberal party youth organization promptlycame out publicly in support, accompanied byfigures covered in red hoods (red is the Liberalparty’s color) claiming to be public employeeswho also backed the dissident leader but were notshowing their faces for fear of losing their jobs.143

In the end, however, the dissidents decidedthey could not maintain a foothold within theparty structure in the face of Aleman’s relent-less pressure. On July 25, Alvarado announceda rupture with the PLC and an intention toconvert his movement into a new “DemocraticLiberal Party.” With this action, the PLC suf-fered its third split since the 1996 elections andthe first related directly to the pact.

According to sources close to the party,Alvarado’s move complements serious attritiontaking place at the base of the PLC for otherreasons. Another major cause of disaffection hasbeen Aleman’s insistence on controlling partynominations, a practice that clashes with thepreferences of local party bodies. On the eve ofthe PLC’s nominating convention, La Prensapublished a list of 21 municipios, 15% of thetotal, where infighting in Liberal ranks had bro-ken out.144 At the convention, delegations from


the cities of Chinandega and Jinotega walkedout after the conclave ratified official slates withwhich they disagreed. Managua party leaderGomez and Matagalpa mayor Jaime Castrobolted to the PLN, which received them withopen arms and named them as its own candi-dates for mayor of their respective cities.145 InMasaya, a party faction resentful over control ofthe party’s mayoral candidates by vice-presidentBolanos also jumped to the PLN.146

The FSLN. Like Aleman, Daniel Ortegaappears to be dropping in the polls due to thepact. The February IEN survey indicated that65% of those polled disapproved of Ortega’sperformance as leader of the principal opposi-tion, as compared with 53% in September1999. Also like his rival, Ortega has had tomanage serious dissidence in his party generat-ed by the pact’s negotiation and later imple-mentation. This process has cost the FSLN thedefection of previously important party figuresand will probably weaken its election effort.

The first Ortega opponent to go wasManagua mayoral aspirant Carlos Guadamuz,who had obtained the FSLN’s nomination formayor in 1996 against Ortega’s wishes.Evangelical leader Miguel Angel Casco, whooffered the fallen Guadamuz moral support,was then summarily removed from control ofthe FSLN’s Religious Affairs Commission. Inresponse, Casco, the leader of the FSLN teamthat had negotiated the pact in the NationalAssembly, declared publicly that he had notbeen privy to the more hidden aspects of thebig-party bargain, resigned as a member of theFSLN’s National Directorate, and later with-drew from the party.147

Mariano Fiallos, the former president of theCSE who was slated to have become foreignminister had Daniel Ortega won in 1996, alsoleft the FSLN to become national coordinatorof the MDN-alliance (see below), while hisbrother Alvaro, vice-president of the NationalUnion of Farmers and Ranchers (UNAG) andOrtega’s 1996 campaign chief, withdrew hissupport from the Sandinista party saying “theFSLN has ceased to be an electoral option.”148

In contrast to these figures, the group of fourFSLN deputies who voted against the pact onthe Assembly floor have stuck it out in theparty despite an invitation to them by Ortegato decamp.149 By March, the “Democratic Left”was organizing a campaign to be recognized asa legitimate intra-party current and openly dis-cussed names of leaders who might take overthe helm from Ortega.150 By early May, deputyVictor Hugo Tinoco broached the possibility ofrunning against Ortega for his party’s nomina-tion in 2001.151

The Sandinista leader has tried to clampdown on the dissidents in the course of prepar-ing for the upcoming elections. The FSLN hasnominated a significant number of formerSandinista military and interior ministry per-sonnel to its posts on the departmental councilsof the CSE.152 And it put in charge of its appa-ratus to defend the vote none other than formerstate security chief Lenin Cerna.153 Dissidentdeputies have charged that this apparatus hastried to thwart their internal organizing andcreated an atmosphere of fear in party ranks.

The FSLN is now making what appear to befeverish preparations for November. There is rea-son to doubt, however, that the party will matchits 1996 election effort, which was judged byinsiders as notoriously deficient.154 Apathy inthe party base is palpable — in Managua, onlysome 20,000 party members participated in therecent “popular consultation” to select theparty’s candidates compared to more than100,000 four years ago. In the country at large,moreover, the consulta was marked by numerousirregularities and squabbles over the ensuingresults. As in the PLC, interference in the localselection process by party higher-ups has causedfrictions, leading Daniel Ortega to spend muchtime in the hinterland mending fences. Thoughin some cases Ortega had to accept candidates hedid not want, his imposed choices in severalmajor towns led local candidates to bolt fromthe party and join Camino Cristiano.

Beyond the party apparatus per se, the pacthas created strains and division within most ofthe social organizations still linked in some


fashion to the FSLN.155 The most loyal of theseis the National Workers Front (FNT), a unionumbrella grouping whose leaders aspire toplace their cadre in FSLN electoral slots. Butthe National Union of Farmers and Ranchers(UNAG), which formed the backbone of theFront’s 1996 election effort in rural areas,announced in June that it was distancing itselffrom the party’s campaign. Differences over thepact also split the Nicaraguan CommunalMovement (MCN), where a leadership loyal toOrtega recently regained control. In June, thisorganization also announced that it was sup-porting candidates of different parties, and con-ditioned its support for FSLN municipal candi-dates on acceptance of an agenda of interest tocommunity residents.

The most surprising opposition came fromagricultural workers and cooperative peasantswho occupy much agrarian reform land that isstill untitled and contested by former owners.These were supposed to be among the principalbeneficiaries of a side-pact on properties sup-posedly negotiated along with the constitution-al and election reforms. But when Ortega pro-posed a reform to the 1997 property law toextend the period allowed for them to purchasetheir holdings, they opposed him, apparentlyfearing that high-ranking Sandinistas couldmanipulate a requirement that they take outnew mortgages to ultimately gain possession ofthe land for themselves.156

Small Party Opposition To The Pact. As antici-pated, the restrictive electoral rules spurred aserious regrouping of Nicaragua’s small partiesin an effort to forge viable alternatives to thePLC and FSLN. Expectations centered initiallyon an existing grouping called the PatriaMovement, which since 1998 had served as aforum for small-party bargaining. However,unity talks in this movement broke down andtwo strands emerged, one represented by theNicaraguan Conservative Party (PCN), theother by a broad array of small forces. In light ofthe extremely fractious history of Nicaraguanparties, the failure to unite was not surprising.But with polls indicating a third force might

gain 20% of the vote in November, it was dis-appointing to many.157

In part, the emergence of competing “thirdforce” projects reflected the interests of wealthymembers of the Nicaraguan oligarchy who donot traditionally participate openly in politics.Since 1997, government policies have damagedthe economic interests of several of these elitefamilies. Combined with upper class disdain forthe arriviste elements surrounding Aleman,this has sparked strong antipathy to the Liberalpresident. Carlos Pellas, whose principal inter-ests are in sugar producing and the sale ofToyota automobiles, has emerged openly as theprincipal funder of the Conservative Party,while Manuel Ignacio Lacayo, who competeswith Pellas by selling Nissan cars, hasbankrolled the “third force” and participateddirectly in its organization.

The MDN-Alliance. This coalition of smallparties elicited much initial sympathy as a plu-ralistic conglomeration in which leaders new tothe political scene blended with familiar facesin Nicaraguan politics. Some of the latter hadmade positive contributions to democraticinstitutionalization during the Chamorro years.For the sake of survival under the new electionrules, the alliance registered with the CSEunder the aegis of the Nicaraguan DemocraticMovement (MDN), a letterhead party possessedof an appropriately neutral label. By late April,three presidential pre-candidates had surfacedin the alliance’s ranks. These were formerComptroller Agustin Jarquin, originally asocial Christian; former army chief JoaquinCuadra, once a Sandinista; and Ernesto Leal,until recently an MDN adherent In May, thegrouping announced that Lucia Salvo, arespected businesswoman new to the politicalrough and tumble, would be its candidate formayor of Managua.

The same month, however, a political maneu-ver torpedoed the grouping. Several members ofthe MDN decided to disavow the coalition,protesting that MDN party members had beenmarginalized by the avalanche of new faces. InJune, the alliance suddenly fell apart amidst


accusations that both the Liberals and theConservatives were maneuvering to undermineit. Led by former minister Leal, the MDN partythen exited for greener pastures in the form ofan alliance with the Conservatives.

After the exit of the MDN, other small partiessimilarly sought options elsewhere. A number ofparties led by the MRS, and supported by theNicaragua Puede and Nicaragua Joven move-ments, decided to seek fresh signatures and con-test the municipal elections under the MRS ban-ner. Former Sandinista guerrilla commanderDora Maria Tellez replaced Lucia Salvo as theMRS-Alliance’s mayoral candidate. But formerComptroller Agustin Jarquin and the SocialChristian Union (USC) took another route short-ly thereafter, entering into talks about a possibleelection alliance with the FSLN.158

The other putative alliance leader, JoaquinCuadra, announced that he would absent him-self from the municipal race to work to create aseparate national movement. Chief of theNicaraguan army from 1995–2000, former gen-eral Cuadra is a scion of a wealthy Granada fam-ily involved in producing and exporting coffee.On June 22, he presented the CSE the initialdocumentation necessary to found a new partywhich he named the “Movement of NationalUnity” (MUN). To all appearances, Cuadra’sstrategy was to work slowly to set the structuresof his new party in place while the CSE eitherruled existing parties out of existence or the lat-ter stumbled in the 2000 municipal elections,thus losing their legal status. The new partywould then be positioned to serve as a catchallfor political forces with nowhere else to go,putting the general in the driver’s seat.159

The Nicaraguan Conservative Party (PCN).Heir to a political tradition stretching back tothe early nineteenth century, the ConservativeParty seems to have the best chance of forging aviable opposition to the pacting parties in theupcoming elections.

Upon the breakup of the Patria Movement,then PCN party leader Noel Vidaurreannounced he would attempt to forge a broadalliance under the Conservative banner. The

immediate aim of this drive was to secure theadhesion of independent mayoral candidatePedro Solorzano, whose mass following inManagua made him a prized acquisition oncehe could no longer run under the “popular sub-scription” formula. Solorzano had vaulted intopublic prominence in the early 1990s by orga-nizing what became an immensely popularsporting event for the poor, the so-called “BenHur chariot race” for horse cart drivers. CID-Gallup’s March poll showed him running neckin neck with Sandinista candidate HertyLewites, each man garnering about 25% of thevote in Managua. Its August poll showedSolorzano in second place (17%) to Ortega(21%) when respondents were asked to state apresidential candidate preference.

Solorzano vacillated at first between theConservatives and the MDN-Alliance (seebelow), eventually choosing the former on thegrounds that they evinced superior organizationand cohesion. In addition to absorbing his “VivaManagua” movement, a PCN convention electedSolorzano as party president on June 25. Bringingthis fresh face on board has clearly helped thePCN improve its image. However, the CSE ruledunanimously on August 8 to bar Solorzano’s can-didacy for mayor of Managua on the grounds thathe is no longer a capital resident.160

In all probability, this decision backfired,helping to turn the Conservatives into a signifi-cant rival of the pacters. But to become a majorplayer, the PCN will need to undergo furtherchange. Under Vidaurre, the PCN portrayeditself as an implaccable enemy of corruption andhas recently been a vigorous opponent of thepact. But critics complain that the party has notundergone programmatic updating and lacksinternal democracy. The party will also have todemonstrate some potential in this year’s may-oral races to be a credible contender in 2001.Finally a three-way struggle for the PCN’s pres-idential nomination among Solorzano, formerparty president Vidaurre and newcomer ErnestoLeal, who was foreign minister in the Chamorroadministration, is now likely. The fight promis-es to test the party’s uneasy unity.


In August news reports in Nicaraguaclaimed that president Arnoldo Alemanhad issued instructions that all public

employees above a certain income level mustcontribute an entire month’s wages to helpfund the PLC’s 2000 municipal election cam-paign or lose their jobs. In November the elec-tion observation team from The Carter Centerraised the issue of campaign finance withPresident Aleman. He agreed that it would beincorrect to deduct employee contributionsfrom government paychecks. The CarterCenter, in its report, expressed the hope thatPresident Aleman would personally see thatsuch a practice not take place.161

No mention was made of other means ofmaking contributions. These reports suggestthe clientalistic excesses that have marked, andmarred, the Aleman administration’s exercise ofpower.

Throughout this report, we have stressedthat the pact-making which has dominatedrecent Nicaraguan politics has deep structuraland historical roots in the country. In this tra-dition, leaders strive to accumulate personalpower and exercise it in caudillo-like fashion,without regard for institutional constraints.They dispense favors in order to develop a sup-port-base that will do their bidding loyally andwithout complaint. In a society just beginningto recover from a destructive experience withrevolution and war, finding such clienteles isrelatively easy. An economy that does not pro-vide avenues for social mobility by creatingjobs and a legal system that does not affordsecurity for beneficiaries of revolutionary prop-erty reforms contribute mightily to nourishingsuch followings.

This tradition seems to be reflected in thestyle and behavior of the two principal pact-makers, Arnoldo Aleman and Daniel Ortega.The behavior of these leaders over the course ofthe last decade, and the pass to which they havenow led the country, has led many Nicaraguansto fear that the country is reverting to authori-

tarian patterns that existed prior to theSandinista revolution in 1979. The two leadershave submerged deep-seated personal and ideo-logical animosities to collaborate in a pact thatmaintains democratic forms but diminishesdemocratic content in key institutions.

THE LIMITS OF HISTORICAL ANALOGY

The fears of Nicaraguan analysts about thepotential impact of the Liberal-Sandinistaagreement are shaped by a 180-year nationalhistory in which political “pacts” have hadnefarious consequences. As ex-foreign ministerEmilio Alvarez Montalvan put it, “all the pactscelebrated in Nicaragua, about a dozen, havehad the common denominator of limiting com-petition from parties that were not part of thearrangement.”162 The Somozas also typicallyused pacts with the Conservative party of theirera to engineer their re-election as presidents ofthe republic.

Today’s Liberal-Sandinista entente cannot becompared directly to pacts of the past. TheNicaragua of the Somozas was a true dictator-ship, with military power centralized in thehands of a familial dynasty, which rigged elec-tions to stay in power, did not brook real oppo-sition, and suffered no institutional counter-weights. During most of the Cold War, theSomoza tyranny also enjoyed firm foreign back-ing from the United States. None of this holdstrue today. Though institutional counter-weights to executive power remain weak, thearmed forces are no longer simply an instru-ment of presidential whim. The country haspassed through several elections which, whilenot unblemished, have been more or less fairlycontested. Though they are currently domi-nant, the resurgent Liberals cannot count onremaining in power for decades.

The falsity of easy historical analogies, how-ever, does not dispel deep concern about thetrend of Nicaraguan politics. A prime worry isover the fate of democratic institutions, whose

CONCLUSIONS

consolidation since 1993 has been at best errat-ic. The denouement of the Jerez affair suggeststhe direction in which big-party colonization ofkey positions of institutional power may leadboth the CGR and the court system, the twoinstitutions on which any eventual consolida-tion of the fragile rule of law in Nicaraguamost depends.

There are countervailing forces workingagainst this troubling trend. In Nicaragua’s pri-vate sector, both the large oligarchic interests andthe lesser elements represented in the HigherCouncil of Private Enterprise (COSEP) haverecently bestirred themselves to more vigorouslyoppose corruption and governmental authoritar-ianism. Though prone to sensationalism, thenews media have also displayed greater tenacityand sophistication in investigating malfeasanceby those in public office. And both internationalorganizations and NGOs have funded myriadinitiatives to strengthen institutions.

Though important, the role of internationalactors in the consolidation process should notbe overstated. Aleman has signaled to donorcountries that his aid-dependency calculus isdifferent from Mrs. Chamorro’s. In semi-chron-ic crisis during her administration, Nicaraguawas vulnerable to threats of aid cut-offs. In con-trast, with a degree of economic recoveryunderway and fortified by his pact with theFSLN, Aleman appears to believe that thetables have turned — international donors haveinvested so much in Nicaragua, and developedso many vested interests, that they need to aidhim as much as he needs their assistance. If thiscalculus prevails, international leverage overNicaragua’s political evolution diminishes.

The UNDP, IDB, IRBD, USAID and a hostof foreign governments have executed animpressive range of programs designed tostrengthen democratic institutions at al levels.These programs are increasingly complementedby efforts to assist the growth of advocacy capa-bilities in civil society. As the pact negotiationwas winding up, a number of these expresseddiscontent and dismay over the changes theysaw coming. But the foreign players were

unable to prevent the pact from coming tofruition.

Since January 2000, important bilateralactors have exerted pressures designed to steerthe agreement’s implementation. But, as theexample of the Nordics and the Comptrollersuggests, it cannot be convincingly argued thatthey have exercised much influence over howthe political pact has played out so far. On July11, a delegation of bilateral donors visited theCSE to urge greater inclusiveness in this year’smunicipal race, only to be met with chargesthat they were interfering in Nicaragua’s inter-nal affairs.163

In the course of the HIPC process, foreigndonors will continue to provide incentives andexpertise to promote further institutionalstrengthening. But in all likelihood, the IMFand World Bank will vote to permit Nicaraguato reach “decision point” in the HIPC debtreduction procedure before the end of the year2000, in exchange for a series of commitmentsfrom the government to strengthen institutionslater. A decision point occurs when countriesdeclared eligible for debt reduction are formallyaccepted into the HIPC program. Theyundoubtedly believe that getting Alemanonboard HIPC now will give them greaterleverage down the line. But whether those com-mitments will be fulfilled before HIPC “com-pletion point” remains to be seen, and will besubject to further bargaining. At “completionpoint,” a large volume of bilateral and multilat-eral debt stock will, in theory, be forgiven.

THE PRICE OF POLITICAL EXCLUSION

Institutional consolidation, then, depends fun-damentally on what Nicaraguans do. With thedominant party leadership blocking systematicreform, progress in this area depends vitally onthe emergence of new competitors and newleaders — in short, on a turnover in the partypolitical elite. But as we have seen, thereformed election law is working to inhibit thisturnover. The law and its implementation haveproven to be so burdensome on all but thelargest parties as to invite haste, lead to frustra-


tion, and provide incentives to drop out of par-ticipation.164

The circle of players in Nicaraguan politics istherefore narrowing.

There is merit to arguments that the newelections law has worked to end the formationof “sofa” parties of one or two leaders whohoped to benefit from easy public campaignmoney and a chance to squeeze over the rela-tively low threshold necessary to win publicoffice. But they have also worked to shut outparticipation by new actors, including youngpeople and honest business elements enteringthe political game for the first time.

As a test of the pact-makers’ power toachieve their objectives the reformed electionprocedures worked almost to perfection.Although fraud charges flew freely during andafter the signature verification, they were notsubstantiated, and the national observer groupEthics and Transparency has not supportedthem. To all appearances, a draconian law wasitself sufficient to exclude most of those whomthe pacters wanted to exclude without havingto resort to the rigging of results.

Only one group seeking to form a new polit-ical party managed to place a completed appli-cation before the CSE, the National UnityMovement (MUN) headed by former DefenseMinister Joaquin Cuadra. Jose AntonioAlvarado’s Democratic Liberal Party (PLD)began the qualification process, but they failedto get CSE certification that they had formedmunicipal boards in all municipalities asrequired by law. Alvarado alleges that theboards were established but that representativesof Departmental Electoral Councils failed toshow up to verify the process. CSE PresidentRivas confirmed to Carter Center representa-tives that electoral authorities did not have thecapacity to meet the rigorous timetable sub-mitted by the PLD. Alvarado has filed suitagainst the CSE.

In the case of the MUN, the CSE has con-firmed that a sufficient number of signatures ofeligible voters were submitted, but is conduct-ing a signature-by-signature verification of

authenticity. The Council must also certify thatthe MUN formed municipal boards in accor-dance with the law. During the process of veri-fication, the CSE ruled that all signatures mustbe from voters on the rolls in 1996, and notfrom voters since added to the rolls. This rulingwas not applied to other parties who appliedearlier. When it became obvious that the CSEcould not complete the verification processprior to the November 5 municipal elections(the electoral law says that for parties to be eli-gible to compete in national elections next yearthey must have been certified by the time ofthe municipal elections), after significant inter-nal arguments between FMLN and PLC magis-trates the CSE decided to postpone a decisionuntil after the municipal elections but to makethe date of postponement the effective date ofcertification.

This last decision came after significantinternational pressure from donor governmentsand election observer missions, but it is not atall clear whether the MUN will ultimately becertified. FSLN magistrates have privately sug-gested that there are problems with some of themunicipal boards of the MUN, and former CSEpresident Mariano Fialos believes that the deci-sion to make the effective date prior to themunicipal elections even though the actualdecision will be made later is vulnerable to con-stitutional challenge under Nicaraguan law.165

After analyzing the outcome of the signa-tures tangle, the national observer group Ethicsand Transparency criticized the 3% signaturesrequirement in Law 331 as unnecessary andonerous. The group pointed out that, in effect,this requirement had forced parties to presentup to 250,000 signatures, nearly 10% of theelectoral roll, to pass the verification hurdle.Ethics and Transparency closed its brief callingfor “a prompt reform of the current election lawto suppress this requisite, which has beendemonstrated in practice...to be a mechanismthat promotes the undemocratic exclusion ofdifferent political options, contradicting thepolitical pluralism guaranteed in the constitu-tion.”166

Conclusions 37

To this we add that the laws requirementsfor coalitions in effect outlawed them.

For a democratic system that must constant-ly renew people’s faith in the possibilities forpeaceful alternation in office, this is a danger-ous outcome and one that, if prolonged, canonly breed future discontent and apathy.Indeed, as indicated below, voter turnout inNovember was substantially down. Comparedto 1996, voters who might have preferred analternative to the Liberals or the FSLN but sawnone that they liked stayed home in very largenumbers.

WILL THE PACT ABIDE?

With the pacting parties in firm control of theNational Assembly, what are the prospects forfurther election reform? As long as the PLC andFSLN remain united in their purposes, theanswer is probably “none.” But if ArnoldoAleman and Daniel Ortega have a joint interestin sharing space in institutions, they are — atleast for the moment — still electoral rivals.Each leader gambled that the pact would favorhis pretensions—the constituyente in the case ofAleman and a comeback chance for Ortega—aswell as provide them with protection andimmunity from attack.

Arnoldo Aleman wants the political battlesin 2000 and 2001 restricted basically to thePLC and FSLN. Given the lingeringSandinista-anti-Sandinista polarization amongvoters, he believes an election featuring onlythe two big players is one his party cannot lose.In contrast, Daniel Ortega needs at least oneother contender to thwart this scenario. TheConservative Party’s qualification to participatein the coming elections was thus a boost forOrtega’s fortunes, and an indication that he,not Aleman, had won the pact gamble.

The results of the municipal elections at firstglance seem to support this interpretation. Theoverall number of municipalities controlled bythe FSLN and the PLC did not change. (TheLiberals bested the FSLN 92–51 in 1996 and94–52 this year, with the Conservatives taking5 this year.) But the Sandinistas did significant-

ly better in larger cities, taking Managua,Matagalpa, Chinandega, Tipitapa, Diriambaand Juigalpa from Liberal incumbent govern-ments and winning again in Leon and Esteli.The PLC held on to Masaya and Jinotega, butin Granada the incumbent Liberal forces fin-ished third while the Conservative Party gainedcontrol. The FSLN also increased its share ofthe valid vote over the 1996 municipal resultsfrom 31% to 40.4%, closing a 9 point gap to 1point.167

However, a closer look at the results doesnot suggest an overall pattern of the Liberalslosing percentage share due to gains of theConservatives benefiting the Sandinistas.Rather the Liberals suffered an absolute votedecline of 9%. The conservative party did gain,but votes going to parties other than the bigtwo declined drastically, by 43%. And theSandinistas gained absolute numbers of votes(15%).168

The results of the election suggest that theexclusionary impact of the pact affected voterparticipation. The number of valid votes castwas 174,000 less than in the 1996 municipalelections despite an increase of 366,000 regis-tered voters. Some of the decline is probablydue to the fact that this was the first timemunicipal elections were held separately frompresidential and national assembly elections.But the extent of the decline, viewed in light ofthe above cited public opinion polls about thePact, strongly indicates an increase in votercynicism and apathy. Calculating valid votes asa percentage of the electoral roll there wouldappear to have been a drop in turnout of 20points, from 75% to 55%.169

The distribution of the vote also suggeststhat the elimination of parties, and the virtualoutlawing of coalitions, was a significant factorin the decline. Votes for all other partiesdeclined by 42.5%.

Decline in participation very likely workedto the advantage of the Sandinistas. TheSandinistas made it a closer contest and cantake heart in increasing their votes. But giventhe increase in the number of registered voters


it is much easier to perceive a strong decline ininterest than an increase in popularity. TheSandinistas increased vote amounted to exactlythe same percentage of registered voters (22%)that they got in 1996.

Given these results, President Alemanbacked off from his proposed constituyente inearly December, again an indicate of a relativeincrease in FSLN strength. But the FSLN’s suc-cess, particularly in Managua may well havebeen due to another chapter in the Pact’s exclu-sionary strategy — the crude gerrymander thatprevented a mayoral run by the popular newmember of the Conservative Party, PedroSolorzano. The Pactmakers cleaved off twoareas of Managua into separate municipalities(one won by the FSLN, the other by Aleman)and declared that Solorzano no longer lived inManagua.

A December, 1999 poll in Managua ratedthe positive images of twenty two political fig-ures (subtracting unfavorable ratings fromfavorable). Solorzano easily topped the fieldwith a plus 68. Others who did well includedformer president Violetta Chamorro (plus 57),soon-to-ousted Comptroller Jarquin (plus 47).Herty Lewites (the FSLN candidate who thendid win Managua) had a plus 18 and CardenalObando y Bravo a plus 17. At the bottom ofthe pack were D. Ortega (minus 10) and AAleman (minus 18).170

With a year to go, the Conservatives havetime to build on their limited success in themunicipal elections, and in Pedro Solorzanowould have a popular candidate who could notbe gerrymandered out. With Aleman apparent-ly out, Ortega (and so far Aleman has prevent-ed the emergence of any strong alternativePNC candidate) could end up in the scenario hewanted to avoid — a two man race. Solorzanocould pull votes from Liberals (and so farAleman’s monopoly in the party has not pre-vented a strong, nationally known figure), fromConservatives, and from the many thousandswho sat out the 2000 election..

The results may also lead to a significantfight within the CSE over certification of the

MUN. The PLC can only interpret the resultsto mean that its chances are diminished with-out the presence of a party that can draw votesaway from the FSLN. At the same time, theSandinistas are likely to be even more vigorousin trying to exclude the MUN. Infightingbetween the pact-makers could conceivably cre-ate an opening for positive change. The crunchmay come in November 2001 if theConservative party gathers enough strength tobe a serious contender for power. Would theparties in control of the CSE then conspire toblock a Conservative victory? Alternatively,would one of the two negotiate with theConservatives to produce some other outcome?

Our own view is that Nicaragua is not pre-destined to suffer a new breakdown of politicalorder. But in a region where democraticprogress has appeared to run aground in severalcountries, its current course is worrying. Tenyears after the fall of revolution, Nicaraguaappears to be trapped in a vicious cycle. In thiscycle, politics is dominated by caudillos whobenefit from the public treasury while institu-tions fail to curb the impunity of the powerful.Meanwhile government is insufficiently effec-tive at overcoming entrenched poverty. As aresult, people’s faith in democracy sputters,large numbers of voters stay home, and prob-lems of public order simmer. At the end of onecycle, unending poverty and the attendant lackof opportunities in life prompt a new cohort ofpolitical hopefuls to eye the government purse,and the cycle begins anew.

While Nicaragua’s international friends canand must firmly support the strengthening ofenfeebled democratic institutions and makeclear their opposition to today’s trends, the bur-den of preventing a failure of the democraticproject will fall, as it has so many times in thepast, on Nicaraguans, themselves. Their longhistory of resistance to authoritarian rulers andcontinuing struggles to participate effectivelyin governance provide reasons to be optimistic,even as the pact-makers celebrate the fruits oftheir uneasy alliance.

Conclusions 39

PROLOGUE(pages 1–2)

1 Samuel Huntington, La tercera ola: la democratización afinales del siglo XX (Barcelona: Paidos, 1994), ch.1.; Robert A.Dahl, Democracy and its Critics (New Haven: Yale UniversityPress, 1989).

2 Abraham F. Lowenthal and Jorge I. Dominguez,“Introduction” to same authors eds., Constructing DemocraticGovernance: Mexico, Central America and the Caribbean in the1990s (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1996).

3 Guillermo O’Donnell, “Polyarchies and the rule of law inLatin America,” in Juan Mendez, Guillermo O’Donnell andPaulo Sergio Pinheiro, The Rule of Law and the Underprivileged inLatin America (Notre Dame: Notre Dame University Press,1998).

BASIC POLITICAL TRENDS: 1990-2000(pages 2–6)

4 The vicissitudes of the Sandinista economic experimentare chronicled in Phil Ryan, The Fall and Rise of the Market inSandinista Nicaragua (Montreal: MacGill-Queen’s UniversityPress, 1995); Carlos M. Vilas, Transición desde el subdesarrollo(Caracas: Nueva Sociedad, 1989); and in Alejandro MartínezCuenca, Nicaragua: una década de retos (Managua: NuevaNicaragua, 1990).

5 On the 1990 elections, essential readings are William I.Robinson, A Faustian Bargain (Boulder, Westview Press, 1992)and Vanessa Castro and Gary Prevost eds., The 1990 Elections inNicaragua and their Aftermath (Lanham, Maryland: Rowham andLittlefield, 1992).

6 The basic book on Nicaraguan politics in this period isDavid Close, Nicaragua: The Chamorro Years (Boulder, LynnRienner, 1999).

7 See David R. Dye, “Notes on the Nicaraguan Transition,”in Nicaragua’s Search for Democratic Consensus: A Conference Report,ed. Cynthia J. Arnson, Joseph S Tulchin and Bernice Romero,Woodrow Wilson Center Working Paper 213, 1995; andDavid R. Dye et al, Contesting Everything, Winning Nothing,Hemisphere Initiatives, August, 1995.

8 Cf. David Close, “Constructing a Delegative Democracy:Lessons from Contemporary Nicaragua,” paper presented to theannual meeting of the Canadian Association of Latin Americanand Caribbean Studies, Ottawa, August, 1999.

9 Comparative data to document this assertion are lacking,but a Nicaraguan economist has calculated based on an official1998 survey that in 1998, the 20% of poorest families receiveda negligible 0.4% of total income while the upper quintile gar-nered an extraordinary 67.5% of the same total. NestorAvendaño, “La distribución de ingresos en Nicaragua,” 7 DíasIlustrado, March 16–23, 2000.

10 For different measures, see Sonia Agurto, “Tendencias delmercado de trabajo en las ciudades de Managua, León y

Granada: 1992–1999,” El Observador Económico, FIDEG, no. 94,November 1999; and Banco Central de Nicaragua, InformeAnual 1999, pp.23–24.

11 The Alemán government has recently presented data pur-portedly demonstrating a 2.4% drop in overall poverty levelsbetween 1993 and 1998. However, the Instituto Nicaragüensede Estadística y Censos (INEC) has not published a convincingargument for the comparabilty of the data samples on whichthis claim is based. For the government’s version, see Repúblicade Nicaragua, “Estrategia de Reducción de la Pobreza, PrimeraParte: Diagnóstico y Lineamientos,” Managua, January 21,2000.

12 For an example, see IEN, La gobernabilidad en Nicaragua,May 1997, p.23.

13 On civil-military and police relations, see Roberto J.Cajina, Transición política y reconversión militar en Nicaragua,1990–1995, Managua: CRIES, 1997, and “Nicaragua: de laseguridad del Estado a la inseguridad ciudadana,” Managua,February, 2000.

14 Interview with municipal expert Manuel Ortega Hegg,June 20, 2000.

15 For a traditional reading, see Emilio Alvarez Montalván,Cultura política nicaraguense, 2nd edition (Managua: Hispamer,2000), part 5.

16 Rodolfo Delgado R., “Por una cultura política democráti-ca en Nicaragua,” in Margarita Vannini and Francis Kinloch,eds., Política, cultura y sociedad en Centroamérica (Managua:Instituto Histórico-UCA, 1998).

17 Interview with Rodolfo Delgado Romero, director of theInstituto de Investigaciones Nicaragüenses (IEN), June 14,2000.

18 Cf. Rodolfo Delgado R., “Por una Cultura PolíticaDemocrática en Nicaragua,” mimeo, 1997, p.10.

19 For a discussion of governability problems during theChamorro period, see Angel Saldomando, Nicaragua con el futuroen juego (Managua: CRIES, 1996).

20 William A. Barnes, “Incomplete Democracy in CentralAmerica: Polarization and Voter Turnout in Nicaragua and ElSalvador,” Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, v.40. No. 3, 1998, pp. 63–101.

21 For local-level evidence, see Manuel Ortega Hegg andMarcelino Castillo Venerio, Cultura politica local y percepción ciu-dadana en 14 municipios de las Segovias (Managua: CASC-DANI-DA, 1996), pp.65–76.

22 For an analysis of the 1996 pre-election political scene, see Judy Butler et al, Democracy and its Discontents,Hemisphere Initiatives, October, 1996, pp.7–16. Losingpresidential candidates who achieve a minimum number ofvotes (a bit over 1%) are awarded seats in the Assembly. The 1990–1996 Assembly had 92 seats, and the current onehas 93.

23 For an analysis of what went wrong, see HemisphereInitiatives, Democracy Weakened?: A Report on the October 20,1996 Nicaraguan Elections, November 1997.

ENDNOTES

Endnotes 41

THE PACT(pages 7–11)

24 For official texts of the constitutional and electoralchanges, see Constitución Política de la República de Nicaragua,First Edition 2000 and La Gaceta: Diario Oficial, January 24,2000, pp.361–88.

25 This reform changes the previous system whereby alldefeated presidential candidates who managed to receive a certainminimum vote total automatically became deputies. The currentAssembly holds three such candidates including Daniel Ortega.

26 Alvarado and Rizo spent the revolutionary years in theUSA and Chile, acquiring the respective citizenships.

27 Confidencial, “Managua: Pedro Solorzano adelante,”December 12–28, 2000.

28 Daniel Zovatto and Tatiana Benavides, “Análisis de lareforma electoral nicaragüense promulgada el 24 de enero2000,” mimeo, n.d. See also Confidencial, “Ley electoral nicadespunta con barreras,” March 12–18, 2000.

29 A municipio in Nicaragua is similar to a county in theUS, and generally consists of one or more major towns sur-rounded by a rural hinterland.

30 In the 1996 elections, only the PLC, the FSLN and theevangelical party Camino Cristiano exceeded this 3% thresh-old.

31 La Prensa, “Atol con el dedo,” January 27, 2000.

32 Interview with Daniel Ortega in El Nuevo Diario, “Ortegadescalifica toda disidencia,” November 27, 1999.

33 Confidencial, “Un tecnócrata con mira presidencial,”August 8–14, 1999.

34 Guillermo Cortés Dominguez, “Vientos dictatoriales,” inEl Semanario, January 20–26, 2000.

35 La Tribuna, “¿Qué se hicieron los democratas?,” February7, 2000.

36 La Prensa (Enfoque), “PLC y FSLN dominan columna ver-tebral del poder electoral,” June 14, 2000.

37 See comment by deputy Jorge Samper, “Se podría pensaren un gigantesco fraude,” in El Semanario, February 3–9, 2000.

38 Horacio Boneo, “La reforma electoral nicaragüense:¿Gobernabilidad o exclusion?,” mimeo, May 2000. Boneo wasthe top United Nations electoral expert in Nicaragua in 1990,a frequent UN contributor to El Salvador’s first post war elec-tion in 1994, and head of the UN election office for a numberof years thereafter.

39 MyR Consultores, 2a. Encuesta: Elecciones MunicipalesManagua 2000, December 1999, pp.24–25.

40 Instituto de Estudios Nicaragüenses, “Las Fracturas en laGobernabilidad Democrática en Nicaragua,” April, 2000.

WHO BENEFITS?(pages 12–18)

41 CID-Gallup, Estudio Opinión Pública #31, Nicaragua,November, 1999, p.38. In this poll 56% of respondents charac-terized Obando’s political inclinations as “Liberal.”

42 Interview with Josefina Vannini, former Liberal vice-min-ister for foreign relations, July 20, 2000.

43 For a sample, see La Tribuna, “Reflexiones en cuanto a lacrisis del PLC,” May 11, 1999; “Adendum a mis reflexionesliberales,” September 10, 1999.

44 La Prensa, “Bolaños condena checazo y pide que haya san-ción,” March 26, 2000.

45 Interview, Jose Antonio Alvarado, July 5, 2000.

46 Confidencial, “Duro golpe al municipalismo,” March14–20, 2000.

47 Confidencial, ”Me asfixió la bota,” June 14–20, 1998.

48 Confidencial, “Lógica política en la rotación del gabi-nete,” July 26–August 1, 1998; “Rotación partidaria,”September 26–October 2, 1999.

49 La Tribuna, “Anuncian Plan Nacional de Educación paraadecuarlo al desarrollo del país,” May 7, 2000.

50 Interview, municipal expert Manuel Ortega Hegg, June20, 2000.

51 Confidencial, “Ejecutivo realizara carambola a dos bandos,”November 2–8, 1997.

52 Confidencial, “El rostro empresarial del ejércitonicaragüense,” November 30–December 6, 1997.

53 Confidencial, “Suspensión de proyecto podría repatriar fon-dos europeos,” July 25–31, 1999; “Provivienda sigue paraliza-do,” August 15–21, 1999.

54 Confidencial, “Represión fiscal asfixia a empresarios,”November 21–27, 1999.

55 Confidencial, “No hay reglas del juego claras,” September5–11, 1999.

56 Interview with La Prensa editor Luis Sánchez, June 25,2000.

57 La Prensa, “¿Cuánto posee Alemán?”, March 6, 2000.

58 Confidencial, “La supercarretera de Alemán,” March 7–13,1999.

59 Confidencial, “Modultecsa en millonaria construccion depuentes,” March 21–27, 1999.

60 Confidencial, “Cooperantes inquietos por contratación de50 megavatios,” April 19–25, 1998.

61 La Prensa, “Donald Spencer: es trama política,”September 8, 1999.

62 La Prensa, “Hay que anular lo de ENITEL,” April 8,1999; La Tribuna, “Gato encerrado,” April 7, 1999.

63 The Costa Rican polling firm CID-Gallup creates thesescores by subtracting the percentages of respondents with nega-tive judgments of a government’s performance from those witha positive judgment.

64 El Semanario, “Movimiento obrero: más reflujos queluchas,” April 27–May 2, 2000. It is noteworthy that in thisinternal strife, Ortega has sided with the elements regarded asmost corrupt.

65 Confidencial, “DN-FSLN analiza propuesta de overhaul,”October 12–18, 1997; 7 Días Ilustrado, “Me siento más coman-dante que doña,”March 23–30, 2000. HI interview, MónicaBaltodano, July 13, 2000.

66 Confidencial, “Ortega fortalece su liderazgo partidario,”May 24–30, 1998.

67 Ortega’s immunity as an Assembly deputy has prevented acourt case brought against him by Narváez from going forward.


68 Confidencial, “División persigue al sandinismo,” May16–22, 2000.69 Interview with Daniel Ortega in El Nuevo Diario,November 27, 1999.

THE PACT’S IMPACTS(pages 18–34)

70 IMAC, “Proposal to Strengthen the InstitutionalCapacity of the Comptroller General of Nicaragua,” October27, 1997

71 Interview, Agustín Jarquín Anaya, July 3, 2000.

72 Interview with former CGR official Rafael Córdova, June16, 2000.

73 Confidencial, “Sala Constitucional pone manos arriba alContralor,” November 22–28, 1998.

74 Confidencial, “Hay indicios de una dictadura,” November14–20, 1999.

75 7 Días Ilustrado, “Mi elección fue a propuesta del presi-dente,” March 16 –23, 2000.

76 El Semanario, “Pide tiempo para combatir la corrupción,”March 16 –22, 2000.

77 Interview with Guillermo Argüello, “No hay personalpara investigar bienes del presidente Alemán,” Confidencial,March 12–18, 2000.

78 La Tribuna, “Cierran el caso de Alemán,” March 25, 2000.

79 La Prensa, “¿Fantasma en checazo?,” March 24, 2000;“Salen nuevos checazos,” March 28, 2000; “Contraloría exigirárespuestas a Jerez,” April 5, 2000.

80 La Prensa, “Jerez atropella y enreda,” April 4, 2000; “Secae versión de Jerez,” April 6, 2000; “Jerez se abanica con audi-toría,” April 26, 2000.

81 El Nuevo Diario, “INRI a Contraloría,” June 8, 2000.

82 La Prensa, “Asesor de CGR propone trámite penal,” June7, 2000.

83 Although this was true, it was not the whole story.Alemán allegedly prevailed on Arguello to let Jerez off easy bynaming his two daughters to high government posts. LaPrensa, “Argüello Poessy cambió tres veces de opinión,” June12, 2000.

84 La Prensa, “Alemán pretende eliminar controles al gobier-no,” May 11, 2000; El Nuevo Diario, “Jaque mate aContraloría;” La Prensa, “Gobierno incumple acuerdos conagencias de cooperación,” May 12, 2000.

85 La Noticia, “Nicaragua acuerda sistema de controles conel BID,” March 31, 2000.

86 La Prensa, “BID prioriza transparencia en contratacionesdel Estado,” May 12, 2000; La Noticia, “Presentan plan detransparencia para compras y contrataciones,” May 14, 2000.

87 HI has derived its portrait of the judicial system throughconsultations with four Nicaraguan and international experts.Their names are withheld on request.

88 El Nuevo Diario, “Suprema da largas a recursos contra lasreformas del pacto,” April 26, 2000.

89 Procuraduría General del Estado, Plan MaestroCuatrienal, September 24, 1998, p.5.

90 Marvin Aguilar, “Algunas características del procesopenal nicaragüense,” in Justicia (Revista del Poder JudicialNicaragüense), Febrero 2000, pp.17–21.

91 Dirección de Relaciones Públicas, Corte Suprema deJusticia, “Una década de cambios en el Poder Judicial,” May1999 presents the Court’s flattering self-appraisal of the results.

92 Corte Suprema de Justicia, “El poder judicial hacia elnuevo milenio con dignidad y desarrollo,” September, 1999.

93 Interview, former National Assembly president CairoManuel López, July 15, 2000.

94 Agencia Sueca de Cooperación Internacional para elDesarrollo (ASDI), “Acceso a la Justicia en la Nicaragua Rural,”May 1999.

95 El Nuevo Diario, “Política y justicia pagada,” April 9, 2000.

96 Confidencial, “Temor por retroceso en CSJ,” July 18–24,1999; “Elección política en la Suprema,” August 22–28, 1999.

97 La Prensa, “Eligen a cuatro magistrados más para la CSJ,”March 21, 2000; El Nuevo Diario, “Dos para vos...dos para mi,”March 21 2000; Confidencial, “Complejo reacomodo interno enCSJ,” March 26–April 1, 2000.

98 La Prensa, “Jueza Méndez en líos legales,” and“Exabogado acusa a Carlos Guadamuz,” March 4, 2000.

99 An amparo is a court order enjoining a public official torefrain from a particular action whose legality has been ques-tioned until a court decides whether it may proceed.

100 La Noticia, “Corte acepta alegato contra Jarquín en el casoBANIC,” May 21, 2000.

101 El Nuevo Diario, “Suprema en otra crisis,” May 27, 2000.

102 El Nuevo Diario, “Jerez en capilla,” May 28, 2000.

103 La Prensa, “Juicio a Jerez,” June 9, 2000.

104 La Prensa, “Jerez hace su gusto con juez,” June 22, 2000;El Nuevo Diario, “Aumentan evidencias de juicio venal,”

June 23, 2000.

105 El Nuevo Diario, “Centeno reta y Cordova replica,” June24, 2000; La Prensa, “Aquí no hay evidencias,” July 3, 2000.

106 El Nuevo Diario, “Byron Jerez absuelto”; La Prensa, “Juezlimpia checazos,” July 2, 2000; La Prensa, “Los misterios sinresolver de los checazos,” July 3, 2000.

107 La Prensa, “Juez Walter Solís culpa al sistema,” July 4,2000.

108 Confidencial, “Complejo reacomodo,” op.cit; La Noticia,“Presentan Plan de Transparencia para compras y contrata-ciones,” May 14, 2000.

109 El Nuevo Diario, “Aprobada Ley de Ministerio Público,”;La Tribuna, “Crean Fiscalía General de la República 2000,”May 3, 2000.

110 Centeno gave his arguments to La Prensa, “Un veto nece-sario,” June 28, 2000.

111 La Tribuna, “Veto presidencial a fiscal general;” La Prensa,“Alemán veta Ley creadora de la Fiscalía,” June 21, 2000.

112 This law is known in Spanish as the Ley de lo ContenciosoAdministrativo.

113 Confidencial, “Ley de lo Contencioso Adminstrativo esfundamental,” November 7–13, 1999.

114 For a detailed examination of the 1996 electoral process,see Hemisphere Initiatives, Democracy and Its Discontents,

October 1996 and Hemisphere Initiatives/WOLA, DemocracyWeakened? A Report on the October 20, 1996 Nicaraguan Elections,November, 1997.

115 Confidencial, “OEA presenta informe final elecciones1996,” November 9–15, 1997.

116 Confidencial, “Observadores certifican tranparencia decomicios,” March 15–21, 1998.

117 La Prensa, “Piden suspender aplicación de Ley Electoral,”March 17, 2000; La Tribuna, “La nueva ley electoral y los recur-sos en su contra,” March 26, 2000.

118 El Nuevo Diario, “Renuncias bajo el humo de loscañones,” June 17, 2000.

119 La Prensa, “Corte Suprema sostiene pacto,” July 4, 2000.

120 Confidencial, “FSLN controla columna vertebral de elec-ciones,” July 23–29, 2000.

121 La Prensa, “Le corrieron en el DGI por negar la firma alPLC”, March 17, 2000.

122 La Prensa, “Rebotan firmas de respaldo al PLC,” April 27,2000.

123 In early May, the CSE decided it would not review thetotality of the signatures submitted by a given party, only anumber sufficient to establish if the party had reached the 3%requirement. Observers later criticized the Council for not pro-ceeding to publish lists of the signatures left unreviewed so thatother parties could know if they could use them or not. Etica yTransparencia, “ See “Pronunciamiento de Etica y Transparenciaen torno al proceso electoral municipal,” July 18, 2000.

124 The numbers below are official data of the CSE.

125 La Tribuna, “PLC y FSLN preparan fraude electoral,” June2, 2000.

126 Interview, Pedro Solórzano, June 27, 2000.

127 El Nuevo Diario, “Sigue el jueguito fraudulento en elCSE,”June 27, 2000; La Prensa, “Alerta verde en PartidoConservador,”June 29, 2000.

128 La Prensa, “Firmas son del MDN,” June 7, 2000; ElSemanario, “La firma,” June 8–14, 2000; La Prensa, “DoñaVioleta pide al CSE que le anulen su firma,” June 10, 2000.

129 La Tribuna, “MRS exige transparencia al CSE,” July 7,2000.

130 El Nuevo Diario, “CSE dedicado a confiscar firmas,” July15, 2000; La Prensa, “MRS al filo de la inhibición,” July 15,2000.

131 El Nuevo Diario, “Bloque contra fraude,” July 1, 2000.The parties included were the PCN, MRS, PLN, MSLN, MUC,MUN, MPDN, PRN. and ALCON.

132 El Nuevo Diario, “Ultimatum al CSE,” July 2, 2000.

133 La Prensa, “Movimiento antifraude llamará a protestas siCSE no elimina verificación,” July 5, 2000; La Tribuna,“Denuncian ante cuerpo diplomático las arbitrariedades delCSE,” July 7, 2000.

134 La Prensa, “CSE inicia verificación de firmas,” June 8–14,2000. HI wishes to thank the national observer group Etica yTransparencia for clarifying the mechanics of this procedure.Interview, Nadia Arévalo, ET training coordinator, July 21, 2000.

135 La Prensa, “Conservadores a la pelea,” July 16, 2000.

136 CID-Gallup Latinoamérica, Opinión Pública Nicaragua:Abril 2000, pp.14,21. The poll was conducted March 23–29, 2000.

137 El Nuevo Diario, “Dejen que participe Pedro Solórzano,”El Nuevo Diario, March 19, 2000.

138 La Prensa, “Navarro no levanta cabeza”, and “La candi-datura de Wilfredo Navarro no logra impactar”, March 13,2000.

139 La Prensa, “Alvarado adelanta renuncia,” May 7, 2000.

140 La Tribuna, “Alvarado inhibido;” El Nuevo Diario, “Brutalgolpe a Alvarado,” May 17, 2000.

141 La Tribuna, “Juicio político afecta al país;” La Prensa,“Podemos encontrar dificultades en Washington,” May 22,2000.

142 La Tribuna, “Surge Movimiento de Liberales por elCambio,” July 7, 2000.

143 El Nuevo Diario, “Juventud del PLC apoya a Alvarado;”La Prensa, “Encapuchados salen en apoyo de Alvarado,” July 15,2000.

144 La Prensa, “Se esperan enfrentamientos liberales por deda-zos,” April 29, 2000.

145 El Nuevo Diario, “Gómez: Alemán nos traicionó,” May 8,2000; Se pasan al PLN en medio de vivas a los Somoza,” May11, 2000.

146 La Tribuna, “Directivos de Masaya abandonan el PLC,”May 9, 2000.

147 El Nuevo Diario, “Casco oficializa su renuncia,” March 25,2000.

148 El Semanario, “El FSLN dejo de ser opción electoral,”February 2–8, 2000.

149 7 Días Ilustrado, “Me siento más comandante que doña,”March 23–30, 2000; El Semanario, “En Nicaragua no hay oposi-ción,” March 23–29, 2000.

150 El Nuevo Diario, “Mencionan a varios candidatos FSLN,”March 27, 2000.

151 La Tribuna, “Ortega no debe postularse,” May 7, 2000.

152 El Nuevo Diario, “Vencer el miedo,” March 14, 2000.[Vilma Nuñez]. El Semanario, “Hay terrorismo interno en elFrente Sandinista,” March 9–15, 2000.

153 La Prensa, “FSLN se miitariza,” June 12, 2000.

154 La Prensa, “Maquinaria electoral rojinegra falló en 1996,”July 10, 2000.

155 Confidencial, “UNAG toma distancia; FNT mantieneapoyo,” June 25–July 1, 2000.156 El Semanario, “Contrarreforma agraria a la vista,” March9–15, 2000; “Campesinos toman la palabra a diputado,” March16–22, 2000.

157 La Tribuna, “La tercera fuerza, el eslabón perdido de lapolíica nacional,” February 6, 2000; Confidencial, “¿Tercerafuerza?: Un enigma,” January 23–29, 2000; Confidencial,“Intento de “tercera fuerza” se dispersa,” February 13–19,2000; El Semanario, “Coalición es programática, no ideológica,”February 24 –March 1, 2000; La Prensa, “MDN postula a LucíaSalvo,” March 22, 2000.

158 The parties were prior to Jarquín’s move: MovimientoDemocrático Nicaragüense (MDN), Unidad Social Cristiana(USC), Movimiento Renovador Sandinista (MRS), ProyectoNacional (PRONAL), Movimiento de Unidad Revolucionaria(MUR), Alianza Popular Conservadora (APC), Nicaragua Puedeand Nicaragua Joven.

Endnotes 43

159 Tiempos del Mundo, “General Cuadra no se siente amenaza-do por abandonar el FSLN,” May 25, 2000. The Conservativeshave in fact negotiated support from other parties too small tosurvive on their own, and will go into the municipal electionsbacked by the Liberal Independent party (PLI),the NicaraguanDemocratic Movement (MDN) and other groupings. La Prensa,Triple Empate, August 22, 2000.

160 La Prensa, “Solorzano inhibido,” August 9, 2000.

CONCLUSIONS(pages 35–39)

161 The accusation was aired on Channel 2’s national newsprogram TV Noticias on August 15. See also El Nuevo Diario,“Confirman atraco PLC,” August 16, 2000. Second Report ofThe Carter Center Mission to Evaluate the NicaraguanMunicipal Elections, November 1– 8, 2000.

162 Interview in Tiempos del Mundo, “Si no se consolida latercera vía, habrá liberalismo para rato,” February 24, 2000.

163 El Nuevo Diario, “ACSE aferrado al fraude,” July 13,2000.

164 Even the Conservatives, the only party to make itthrough, lost 53% of its 227,454 signatures in the first verifi-cation phase. The losses included 57,296 (25%) due to invalidcédula numbers, 26,545 (12%) due to duplication with otherparties, and 17,551 (8%) to duplication on its own list. OfficialConsejo Supremo Electoral data, July 15, 2000.

165 Interview with Mariano Fialos, November 5, 2000.

166 Ethics and Transparency, “Pronunciamiento en torno alproceso electoral municipal,” July 18, 2000.

167 This is in contrast to the 1996 presidential vote in whichAlemán won 51% and Ortega 38%. Other parties captured a

larger share of the municipal and Assembly votes in 1996 thanthey did in the presidential election.

168 The national totals mask significant regional and urbanrural differences. In 91 small municipalities with under 7500valid votes cast the Liberals had 46% of the vote compared tothe FSLN’s 36%. The Liberals took 67, often by huge marginsparticularly in Madriz, rural Matagalpa, Chontales, Boaco,Nueva Segovia and the Southern Atlantic Autonomous Region.The Liberals also outdistanced the FSLN in medium sizedmunicipalities (measured by numbers of valid votes) by 8points, but in the 8 largest municipalities (not countingManagua) the FSLN finished 7 points ahead of the Liberals.

169 A more normal calculation of turnout is the percent oftotal votes to registered voters, but those data are not availableto us as we go to press. Our calculations of 1996 municipaldata are based on data published in the daily newspaper LaPrensa for each municipality. Those calculations are made moredifficult by the fact that election problems in 1996 eliminatedthe counting of the votes of about 5% of the voting tables, pre-dominantly in the municipalities of Managua and Matagalpa.

After the election the final playing out of the vote count proba-bly increased citizen cynicism. The Sandinistas claimed Liberalson the CSE were preventing final results by boycotting CSEmeetings. While the delay went on, disturbances broke out inseveral municipalities. Then, more than three weeks after theelection, Daniel Ortega mounted demonstrations against theCSE demanding correct final results. The CSE produced theresults in the midst of this political theater. This endgame didnot exactly shore up the pactmakers’ argument that better gov-ernability would result from the Pact.

170 M&R Consultores, 2da. Encuesta, Elecciones MunicipalesManagua 2000, December 1–8, 1999.


Hemisphere Initiatives has published the following reports. Please send requests to Hemisphere Initiatives c/o JackSpence, [email protected] or [email protected].

Establishing the Ground Rules: A Report on the Nicaraguan Electoral Process, Jack Spence, George Vickers, Ralph Fine andDavid Krusé, August, 1989.

Nicaragua’s Elections: A Step Towards Democracy?, Ralph Fine, Jack Spence, George Vickers and David Krusé, January1990.

Endgame: A Progress Report on Implementation of the Salvadoran Peace Accords,* George Vickers and Jack Spence with DavidHoliday, Margaret Popkin and Philip Williams, December 3, 1992, 16,500 words.

Justice Impugned: The Salvadoran Peace Accords and the Problem of Impunity, Margaret Popkin with Vickers and Spence,June 1993, 11,000 words.

The Voter Registration Tangle,* Madalene O’Donnell with Vickers and Spence, July 1993, 11,000 words.

Risking Failure: The Problems and Promise of the New Civilian Police in El Salvador, Bill Stanley with Vickers and Spence,September 1993, 15,000 words.

Voter Registration and the Tasks Ahead,* Madalene O’Donnell with Vickers and Spence, November 1993, 11,000 words.

Toward a Level Playing Field?: A Report on the Post-War Salvadoran Electoral Process,* Jack Spence and George Vickers,January 1994, 15,000 words.

A Negotiated Revolution? A Two Year Progress Report on the Salvadoran Peace Accords,* Jack Spence and George Vickerswith Margaret Popkin, Philip Williams and Kevin Murray, March 1994, 24,000 words.

Rescuing Reconstruction: The Debate on Post-War Economic Recovery in El Salvador,* Kevin Murray, with Ellen Coletti, andJack Spence, and Cynthia Curtis, Garth David Cheff, René Ramos, José Chacón, Mary Thompson, May 1994, 35,000words.

El Salvador’s Elections of the Century: Results, Recommendations, Analysis,* Jack Spence, David Dye, and George Vickerswith Garth David Cheff, Carol Lynne D’Arcangelis and Ken Ward, July 1994, 25,000 words.

Justice Delayed: The Slow Pace of Judicial Reform in El Salvador, Margaret Popkin with Jack Spence and George Vickers,December 1994, 12,000 words.

The Salvadoran Peace Accords and Democratization: A Three Year Progress Report and Recommendations, Jack Spence, GeorgeVickers and David Dye, March 1995, 25,000 words.

Contesting Everything, Winning Nothing: The Search for Consensus in Nicaragua, 1990–1995,* David R. Dye. Judy Butler,Deena Abu-Lughod, Jack Spence, with George Vickers, November 1995, 24,000 words.

Chapúltepec Five Years Later: El Salvador’s Political Reality and Uncertain Future,* Jack Spence, David R. Dye, MikeLanchin, and Geoff Thale, with George Vickers, January 1997, 28,000 words.

Democracy and Its Discontents, Judy Butler, David R. Dye, and Jack Spence with George Vickers, October 1996, 24,000 words.

Democracy Weakened: A Report on the October 20, 1996 Nicaraguan Elections,* Jack Spence, November 1997, 15,000 words.A co-production of Hemisphere Initiatives and the Washington Office on Latin America.

Promise and Reality: Implementation of the Guatemalan Peace Accords, Jack Spence, David R. Dye, Paula Worby, Carmen Rosade Leon-Escribano, George Vickers, and Mike Lanchin, August 1998, 37,000 words.

* available in Spanish

Hemisphere Initiatives was formed in 1989 to monitor the Central American peace process and

efforts to establish and strengthen democratic institutions throefforts to establish and strengthen democratic institutions throughout the region. It extensivelyughout the region. It extensively

reported on the Nicaraguan electoral process from May 1989 through the February 1990 election.

Hemisphere Initiatives has monitored the peace and electoral processes in El Salvador since the

signing of the Chapúltepec Peace Accords and has published 11 full reports on various aspects

of the accords, as well as two short pre-election updates.

Hemisphere Initiatives has initiated work in Guatemala. Beginning in 1995 it returned to

Nicaragua to monitor the peace and electoral processes.

Members of Hemisphere Initiatives visit the region regularly, document events, and meet with

an array of political actors covering the political spectrum, independent observers, journalists and

representatives of international organizations. It enlists the research and writing skills of known

experts on various topics, all of whom have long term commitments to and experience with these

countries. Its reports aim to air views of a diverse group of political actors, to make its own

independent analysis and to offer recommendations. Its efforts have been supported by grants

from foundations, private individuals and international NGOs.

patchwork democracy - laniclanic.utexas.edu/project/hemisphereinitiatives/patchwork.pdf · david r....

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