party government and type of regime in four latin...

Seminario de Investigación #1: 4 de octubre de 2013 Mara Pegoraro

1

PARTY GOVERNMENT AND TYPE OF REGIME IN FOUR LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES: THE CASES OF ARGENTINA, ECUADOR,

URUGUAY AND VENEZUELA

Mara Pegoraro

Instituto de Iberoamérica, Universidad de Salamanca

[email protected]

Abstract

The aim of this paper is to evaluate the characteristics of government parties in 4 Latin-American political

regimes: Argentina, Uruguay, Ecuador and Venezuela. The main concern that addresses the research is if an

specific political regime generate an specific type of political party. The classification of political regime

responds to the variation of regime types according to Polity IV’s index: Argentina as a democracy, Uruguay

as a full democracy, Ecuador as an open anacrocy and Venezuela as a closed anacrocy. We distinguish types

of political parties regarding strength and cohesion. The claim of the paper is that in Ecuador and

Venezuela, pre-change parties show lower levels of strength than in Argentina and Uruguay. Likewise, we

hope to find that today’s government parties in Ecuador and Venezuela hold higher strength levels than

their predecessors. In Argentina and Uruguay, the strength levels remain the same through the selected

period of time, showing a slight increase from 2004 on and from 2007 on respectively. We analyze

government parties from 1978 on (year of Ecuadorian transition) and up to 2013.

Key Words: party government, political regime, party strength, democracy, Latin America

Mara Pegoraro: Candidata a Doctora en Procesos Políticos Contemporáneos por la Universidad de

Salamanca. Máster en Ciencia Política por la misma casa de estudios. Licenciada en Ciencia Política por la Universidad

de Buenos Aires, Argentina.

Versión borrador, por favor no citar sin autorización. Paper a ser presentado en el Seminario de Investigación Máster en Estudios Latinoamericanos, Instituto de Iberoamérica, Universidad de Salamanca.


2

1. Introduction

The purpose of this paper is to explore the relationship between party government and type of

regime. The basic idea is that different kinds of political regimes generate different types of ruling political

parties. For that purpose, we focalize in four Latin American countries: Argentina, Ecuador, Uruguay and

Venezuela, who show variations across the type of regime and the type of party government.

The analysis includes government parties from 1978 on (year of Ecuadorian transition) and up to

2012 (last presidential election in Venezuela, in which Chávez was elected). Case selection responds to the

variation of regime types according to Polity IV’s index: Argentina as a democracy, Uruguay as a full

democracy, Ecuador as an open anacrocy and Venezuela as a closed anacrocy.

The research is driven from two questions. At first we wonder: does a specific type of political

regime generate a specific ruling political party? The purpose of this question is to establish the difference

between political parties in democratic and hybrid contexts. Once we assess the difference, the paper

concentrates in the analysis of party government in hybrid political regime. The main concern about this

matter is if different kinds of hybrid – open and close anacrocy – generates different kinds of political

parties.

We intent to answer these concerns through data analysis of levels of competitiveness and

contestation in the four political systems that we are taking into account. Going into deeper analysis, we

will study party organization through evaluating its strength. Strength is operationalized into indicators

scope and cohesion. Scores for party scope and cohesion (low = 0; medium = 1; high = 2) are summed into a

composite score (0-4: 4: High; 3: Medium High; 2: Medium; 1: Medium Low; 0: Low) (Levitsky and Way

2010).

In order to observe party strength, we consider the resources available for patronage distribution.

By providing institutional mechanisms for rulers to reward loyalists and by lengthening actors’ time

horizons through the provision of future opportunities for career advancement, parties encourage elite

cooperation over defection (Levitsky and Way 2010: 26; Bueno de Mesquita 2003). Where governing

parties are weak or absent, regime elites see fewer opportunities for political advancement from within

and are thus more likely to seek power from outside the regime (Way 2002; Brownlee 2007).

The claim of this paper is that ruling political parties show higher levels of strength in hybrid

political regimes after a democratic path (transition) than those who has been govern in democratic

regimes.

According to this idea, is likely to find that ruling political parties in institutionalized hybrid regime

show higher levels of scope than cohesion. And new hybrid regime stress higher levels of cohesion despite

the level of scope.

In regard of our cases under analysis, we expect to find that in Ecuador and Venezuela, pre-change

parties show lower levels of strength than in Argentina and Uruguay. In addition, we hope to find that

today’s government parties in Ecuador and Venezuela hold higher strength levels than their predecessors.

In Argentina and Uruguay, the strength levels remain the same through the selected period of time,

showing a slight increase from 2004 on and from 2007 on respectively.

At this point of the paper, we take as independent variable the political regime and as dependent

variable the type of party government. Since the argument is built from the idea that regime type and its

stability are driven primarily by the organizational power of their incumbents (Levitsky and Way 2010: 23),

we must also take into consideration the effect that the type of the ruling political party has in the stability

or propensity in the change of a determined political regime.


3

We assume that the break inside the government party’s elite and the subsequent defection of the

challenging dominant coalition (Panebianco 1988; Geddes 1999) explains regime change both in the

authoritarian and democratic direction.

In cases in which the democratic regime has been replaced by a hybrid –open and closed anacrocy

respectively in Ecuador and Venezuela- pre-change government parties had been inefficient in their

electoral strategies and post-change government parties have privileged strategies that undermine the

legitimacy of the democratic regime. The ability to maximize the vote and to undermine the legitimacy of

the democratic regime is a result of the strength of party organization.

The paper is organized in six sections. First, we explicit the theoretical routes of our analysis and

expose the main concepts that leads to our interpretations. In the third and fourth section, we describe the

kind of political party that rules both in the democratic and hybrid regime. The fifth part of the article,

exposes the differences between democratic and hybrid regime and inside the hybrid regime world. Finally,

we expose our conclusion and suggest a research agenda.

2. Theoretical framework

In this paper we are going to work with two basic perspectives. The first one refers to the study of

political parties as organizations, the other is considered the mainstream of the studies of political regimes,

especially those who focus on the differences between democracy and authoritarianism.

First of all, is important to notice that the classification of political regimes has historically followed

two paths: dichotomous or gradual. Dichotomous classifications draw a line between democracies and non-

democracies. The gradual, however, tries to distinguish between degrees of democracy and non-

democracy, according to the presence or absence of certain attributes (Collier and Adcock 1999: 546-549).

The gradual strategy is the one we adopt in our analysis but we are not going to focalize on the

quality of democracy, we stand on gradient idea because is the one that allows us to differentiate between

democracy, hybrid regimes and basic authoritarianism.

There is a difficulty in categorizing political regimes as full democracies or pure authoritarianisms,

due the diffuse role that elections have in actual regimes (Schedler 2002b; Morse 2012; Munck 2001;

Diamond 2002; Armony and Schamis 2005). This imposes a stress on the idea that the appointment of

rulers through elections is the defining element of a democracy.

If the condition does not seem to be the electoral differentiator and we simultaneously recognize

that hybrid regimes have features of competitive and effective dispute / political struggle, is relevant to

consider the nature of party government and the party systems.

This study views the political regime as a two-dimensional concept: procedural and attitudinal

(Munck, 1996). Based on this definition, this work will take into account the rules of the game, as they

define the number and the type of players eligible to participate. This suggests a first distinction between

restrictive and participatory regimes.

The introduction of the attitudinal dimension allows us to consider changes expressed at the level

of the party system. The interaction between these two dimensions will be feasible in the analytical

relationship dimension government - opposition as characteristic of each type of political regime.

We asume that political regimes are differentiated by their dynamics. The dynamics are the result

of the interaction between formal and informal norms and the incentives that each of these distribute

among actors. To focus, on the actors allows us to concentrate on political parties as organizations, which is

our main purpose here.


4

On this basis, the regimes are distinguished by the number of actors and the resources they have.

This element affects, in particular, the strategic calculus of the opposition, which determines their

effectiveness before their possibility.

The difference between authoritarian, democratic and hybrid referred to the question of the actors

is observed at first at the level of the party system in their levels of fragmentation, competition,

competitiveness and concentration. Second, we concentrate on the characteristics of the party

government, specially the level of strength.

The analysis of the characteristics of the incumbents and respect to variations of power they hold,

is essential to define the type of political regime and thus to clarify the differences (Levitsky and Way 2010:

56).

The study of political parties from an organizational perspective will allow us to get inside the

political organization and to stress out the relationship inside de dominant coalition. For that purpose, we

stand on Panebianco´s (1982) perspective and we will consider in first place if the dominant coalition is one

of “tendency” o “factions”. The degree of factionalism that show the dominant coalition will provide a

measure of the internal conflict that de party government needs to manage.

In a complementary way, we will pay attention to the type of political party who exercises

government, assuming that the government parties manage the conflict among elites through patronage

techniques and have the resources to reward loyalists and promote cooperation over defection (Geddes

1999; Brownlee 2007; Magaloni 2008).

Following this idea, the characteristics of the party organization that is in position incumbent have

an effect on the stability of the regime and suggests a direct relationship between organizations based on

patronage and stability of competitive authoritarianism (Levitsky and Way 2010: 353). However,

organizations built around patronage / clientelism are not unique in competitive authoritarianism. They

also appear in democratic regimes and often explain the persistence of regimes associated with diminished

subtypes of democracy (O'Donnell 1996).

Survival is not an imperative policy unique to a particular type of leader in a particular political

regime. On the contrary, it is a trait shared. However, following "the selectorate theory" (Bueno de

Mesquita et al. 2003) it is conceivable that there are differences between the strategies developed by the

incumbents in democratic political systems and hybrids.

The "selectorate" is the group of people who constitute the political community and have the right

to express their preferences in choosing their political leaders. In democracies, at least formally, this group

consists of citizens.

According to their model, the political leaders who want to retain power must build minimal

winning coalitions under its "selectorate" and they can pay taxes and spend public resources depending on

public and private property at their disposal. Members of the "selectorate" are potential members of the

winning coalition holding the leader and therefore potential beneficiaries. The number of members of the

winning coalition depends in the first instance, from the formal rules and the institutions that establish the

access to power and depends on the resources and strategies used by leaders.

As a complementary indicator of the nature of the political party who exercise government we are

going to use the model suggested by Levitsky and Way (2010: 377-378) which considers party strength.

The scope range it’s translated in the following way: high: mass organization that penetrates

virtually all population centers down to village and neighborhood level and/or civil society and/or

workplace. Evidence of significant grassroots activity – during and between elections – across the national

territory; medium: party does not meet criteria for high scope but possesses a national organization that

penetrates most population centers and is capable of carrying out election campaigns and fielding


5

candidates across the national territory; low: no party or little or no party organization outside of the

capital/major urban centers.

Cohesion has the following values: high: single governing party that achieved power via violent

conflict, including revolution or national liberation struggle in which much of the current leadership

participated o established single party with evidence of non – material source of cohesion including a)

shared ideology in a context in which this ideological cleavage is dominant b) shared ethnicity in a context

in which this ethnic cleavage is dominant. Medium: established single party that does not meet the criteria

for high cohesion or new party with evidence of shared ideology or ethnicity in a context in which the

ideological or ethnic cleavage is predominant. Low: incumbents rules with no party or incumbent rules

without a single party but is supported by multiple and competing parties or new party and for which there

is no evidence of nonmaterial source of cohesion.

In terms of an addition index, strength is operationalized into indicators scope and cohesion where

scores for party scope and cohesion (low = 0; medium = 1; high = 2) are summed into a composite score (0-

4: 4: High; 3: Medium High; 2: Medium; 1: Medium Low; 0: Low) (Levitsky and Way 2010).

Finally, it is important to acknowledge that elections, together with rising levels of electoral

competition that allow regime politicians to survive, are factors that change the calculation of coalition

members. Our purpose here is to contribute to determine how changing levels of electoral competition

affect the cost –benefit calculation of regime actors.

3. Four Latin American Political Regimes in Context

In this section we present a descriptive image of the basic features of the political regime in our

four countries. We pay attention to the rules of the game and then we describe the political dynamic

focusing on the main political actors and the interaction between them.

3.1 The rules of the game

The most important thing here is to understand the rules that points out the ways to access to

power. There is a difference, and that we must take into account, between access and exercise of power

because whereas regime transitions are changes in the form of access to power, problems of institutional

quality involve the exercise of power (Mazzuca 2010).

According to this idea, we need to know how the rules of each political regime establish the set of

alternatives that are available for the political parties and also if these rules benefit an even playfield or are

designed for reinforcing the position of the party in power. The distinction between access and exercise will

allow us to establish the effects of political parties on the democratic path of the countries that we are

studying.

We assume along with Mazzuca (2010: 335), that changes in the structures of exercise of power are

normally driven by a vector of forces that is not comparable to that which produces changes in the

institutions o the access to power. In order to establish those vectors, we will present the rules and the

political context, in terms of competitiveness, of Argentina, Uruguay, Ecuador and Venezuela.


6

Table 1: Electoral system and political distribution

Argentina Uruguay Ecuador Venezuela

Electoral

system for

president

4-year term. Simple

majority with more

than 45 percent of the

vote or more than 40

percent and ten points

of difference with the

second. Reelection

permitted for a period.

Term of 5 years.

Elected by direct

popular vote. The

President has a term of

five years without

immediate reelection

until after the same

period from the

termination of his

cargo. Ballotage.

Second round simple

majority.

4 years. Reelection

permitted for a period.

Relative majority

system: more than

40% or 10 point

difference with the

second.

6 year term. Simple

plurality. No term limit.

(indefinite reelection)

Electoral

system for

legislative

Bicameralism

Chamber of deputies:

Proportional D`Hondt

257 seats; directly elected, 4 years term. Half elected every two years to four-year term. D`hondt system. Senate:

72 seats; directly elected, one-third elected every two years to six-year term

Bicameralism: Chamber of deputies: 99 members elected directly by the people under a system of proportional representation which take into count the votes cast

for each party

throughout the

country. Three ballots.

First D`hont to each

lema, then quotient

system.

Senate:30 seats. the distribution of seats is done by proxy proportional integral, awarded by the D'Hondt method, triple simultaneous vote, list closed and locked and

only national

constituency

Unicameralism.

Proportional D'Hondt and Hare 136 seats.

Unicameralism. 4 year

term. Segmented:

proportional and

mayority. D´Hondt and

plurality.

Forces

distribution

in Congress

Chambers of

Deputies: 34

parliamentary

groups.

Presidential

Political

party. FPV.

115 / 257

Chamber of deputies: 4

parliamentary groups.

Presidential political

party: 50/99.

Senate: 3 parliamentary

groups. Presidential

political party: 16/30.

12 parliamentary groups-

Presidential political party:

100/136 seats

20 parliamentary groups.

Organizados en dos polos:

oficialismo – oposición.

Presidential political party:

92/165


7

seats (see

Table 1 in

anexo)

Senate: 6

parliamentary

groups.

Presidential

Political Party

30/72

Table 2: Party government and margin victory

Año País

Argentina Uruguay Ecuador Venezuela

1978 CFP (3,84%) COPEI (3,34%)

1983 UCR (11,59%) AD (22,18%)

1984 PC (6,06%) PSC (1,53%

1988 ID (6,87%) AD (12,49%)

1989 PJ (15,04%) PN (8,22%)

1992 PUR (6,85%)

1993 CONVERGENCIA (6,86 %)

1994 PC (3,08%)

1995 PJ (21,57%)

1996 PRE (0,89%)

1998 DP (8,31%) MVR/MAS/PPT/ PCV/IPCN/GE/MEPSI/AA (16,23%)

1999 Alianza (10,1%) PC (52,52%)

2000 MVR/MAS/PPT/ PCV/IPCN/GE/MEPSI/AA (22,24%)

2002 PSP, MPD, MUPP/NP (3,06%)

2003 PJ/FPV (-2,21%)

2004 FA (16,15%)

2006 Alianza PAIS (3,99%) MVR/MAS/PPT/ PCV/IPCN/GE/MEPSI/AA (25,95%)

2007 PJ/FPV (22,25%)

2009 FA (18,89%) Alianza PAIS (23,57%)

2011 PJ/FPV (37,3%)

2012 PSUV (10,76%)

2013 PSUV (1,49%)

Source: Author’s elaboration based on official data


8

3.2 The rules of the game

In Argentina during the last 30 years only two political parties governed. Most of the time the

Partido Justicialista (PJ), also known as peronism, was the ruling party. After the crisis of 2001, the main

opposition party, Unión Cívica Radical (UCR), vanished as an alternative. When we look at the victory

margin we can see that the Argentinian political system became less competitive since 2007. The margin

victory shows this.

Despite this feature, Argentina is considered as a democratic regime since 1983. The score in the

polity IV index for 2012 is 8 and when we look the trajectory of the political regime we see that Argentina

was always in the segment of democracy experimented slightly decrease during the presidency of the

Peronist Carlos Menem between 1989 and 1999.

Uruguay is the other country that is considered inside the democratic world. In fact, Uruguay is

considered as a full democracy with a score of 10 points. Since the democratization, the Uruguayan politics

was dominated by two main parties: el Partido Colorado and the Partido Blanco. But in 2004 the political

scenario acknolewdged a new political party: the Frente Amplio – Encuentro Progresista.

It is important to notice that in both democratic countries the political party of the president

controls the majority in the Legislative. This scenario of unified government gives the ruling party an

important source of power. But if we take into account the limitation of the presidential power and

interaction between Executive and Legislative branches, the polity IV index qualifies as near parity with an

score of 6 points in Argentina and parity in Uruguay with 7 points.

Ecuador and Venezuela have a different path in regarding of the democratic regime. For over 30

years, starting in 1958, Venezuelan politics were defined by the peaceful rotation of power between the

two establishment parties, the Christian Democratic Party (COPEI) and the Democratic Action party (AD).

This was known as “Punto Fijo” agreement. In fact, till 2006 Venezuela was considered as a democratic

regime which has experimented a progressive decrease in the score of democratic index. And finally in

2006 Venezuela, entered the segment characterized as anacrocies (5 points on the Polity IV index). The

regime change is, in part, a result of the rule change promoted by President Chavez in 1999 through

referendum authorizing the formation of a Constituent Assembly to draft a new constitution. At last

Venezuela is characterized as a closed anacrocies (-3 points) since 2009, this is due to the public

referendum that was held that approved constitutional changes that further concentrated power in the

presidency and removed term limits on public office. In sum, the systematic elimination of constraints on

the presidential action after 1998 was the main element that explains why Venezuela cease to be a

democracy by any definition.

Ecuador is a country that has had more difficulty to generate frameworks minimum democratic

governance after its transition to democracy in 1978. It is argued that the pronounced regional split that

divides societies with high ideological polarization and centrifugal competition in the system party, the

political patronage, the constant change of the electoral system and the party scenario of high

fragmentation that generates governments weak with the veto power that particularistic interests have,

are the factors that explain the problems of the Andean country's democratic governance (Freidenberg

2004, 2008, 2009; Pachano 2006).

Despite the crisis of governability that has been characterized, the democratic political regime in

Ecuador and the fact that Ecuador is one of the countries that better expresses the idea of new pattern of

instability in the region (Pérez Liñán 2009) in terms of institutional and political variables to measure the

level of democracy Ecuador has shown a high score till 2000 (9 points).

The crisis of January 2000 expressed in massive social protests, the resignation of President

Mahuad, the attempted of a military-civilian junta to assume control of the government the military swore


9

in Vice President Gustavo Noboa Bejarano as the new president, marks a decline in the competitive nature

of executive recruitment. From this moment till 2006 Ecuador was in the minimum frontier of democratic

regime (6 points) and after the first election of Correa it changed to 5 points becoming an open anacrocy

with a notorious decrease in the level of competitiveness. In terms of formal rules, Ecuador also

experimented a Constitutional Reform after the referendum of 2007 that authorized President to call the

Constituent Assembly as well as indicating the strong popular support and bias plebiscite that Correa has in

the exercise of power.

As it shows in the graphics below, the four countries have a similar democratic path till a change

occurs in the formal rules of the game. In some cases, like in Argentina, the constitutional reform of 1994

did not mean the change of regime and also didn´t open and opportunity for diminishing the democratic

guarantees. The cases of Ecuador and Venezuela follow similar paths between each other after the reform

of the constitution. It is not daring to assert, then, that changes in the formal rules enable the probability of

regime change.

Chart 1: Democratic path in Argentina, Uruguay, Ecuador and Venezuela

Año Argentina Uruguay Ecuador Venezuela

1978 -9 -7 -5 9

1979 -9 -7 9 9

1980 -9 -7 9 9

1981 -8 -7 9 9

1982 -8 -7 9 9

1983 8 -7 9 9

1984 8 -7 8 9

1985 8 9 8 9

1986 8 9 8 9

1987 8 9 8 9

1988 8 9 9 9

1989 7 10 9 9

1990 7 10 9 9

1990 7 10 9 9

1991 7 10 9 8

1992 7 10 9 8

1993 7 10 9 8

1994 7 10 9 8

1995 7 10 9 8

1996 7 10 8 8

1997 7 10 9 8

1998 8 10 9 7

2000 8 10 6 7

2001 8 10 6 6

2002 8 10 6 6

2003 8 10 6 6

2004 8 10 6 6

2005 8 10 6 6


10

2006 8 10 7 5

2007 8 10 5 5

2008 8 10 5 5

2009 8 10 5 -3

2010 8 10 5 -3

2011 8 10 5 -3

2012 8 10 5 -3 Source: Polity IV Index Serie 2012

Figure 1:

Source: Polity IV Index Serie 2012

4. Four Latin American Political Regimes in Comparative Perspective

In this section, we provide a short overview of the characteristics of each party so as to understand

how they are organized and how they differ from one another. The variables to that characterize the

governing parties are: a) the nature of the dominant coalition or what is the same level of internal

factionalism and b) the strength of the party in terms of scope and cohesion.

Since our argument is constructed from the differentiation of political regimes this article takes the

actual incumbent party as the main actor under the analysis of the four cases.

4.1 Democracy and political parties

ARGENTINA

The current ruling party in Argentina is the Front for Victory (FPV) governing Argentina since 2003

adding a total of three administrations: that of Nestor Kirchner (NCK) (2003-2007) and two terms of his

wife, Cristina Fernández de Kirchner (CFK) (2007-2011, 2011-2015). The Front for Victory is today the label

that identifies the Peronists.

The election of Nestor Kirchner in 2003 was held in a climate of political fragmentation and

uncertainty and reached the presidency with only 22% of the vote. For 2007 the political landscape had

changed significantly and the election of Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner FPV consolidation meant expressed

in the large percentage of votes obtained, winning more than three-quarters of Argentina’s 23

Argentina

Uruguay

Ecuador

Venezuela


11

governorships, the Justicialist Party (PJ) and other pro-Kirchner allies won large majorities in both legislative

chambers.

In the Chamber of Deputies, the lower house of Argentina’s bicameral National Congress,

progovernment Peronists and other Kirchner allies (including pro-Kirchner Radicals) won 160 of 257 seats,

while dissident Peronists won another 10 seats. The loosely organized Civic Coalition won 31 seats, while

the UCR won 30 seats. In the Senate, the Kirchnerista forces controlled 47 of 74 seats after the election,

while another 5 seats were held by dissident Peronists. The PJ thus emerged from the election in a

dominant position. For 2011, the election was even easy and the legislative control was reinforced.

Cristina Kirchner’s victory was also rooted in the continued strength of the Peronist party machine.

Argentina’s only mass party, the PJ possessed had a stable electoral base as well as a grassroots

organization and an activist base that dwarfed those of its rivals. PJ networks operated throughout the

country, mobilizing voters through a mix of clientelistic and other appeals. In many interior provinces,

where clientelism is most extensive and Peronist machines are most dominant, Cristina Kirchner’s victory

was overwhelming. In some northern provinces (for example, Formosa, Salta, and Santiago del Estero), she

won with more than 70 percent of the vote, more than quadrupling her nearest rival. (Levitsky and Murillo

2008).

Peronism has nos also earned more but also had a greater winning margin. There are different

interpretations of the reasons for the predominance of Peronism in Argentina. The literature agrees in that

the critical role of organizational characteristics most important thing is its adaptive capacity expressed as:

(a) the transformation of the relationship with their bases, favoring one type of patronage (Levitsky 2003;

Calvo and Murillo 2004), (b) the development of strategies aimed at strengthening electoral logic cross

(Calvo and Murillo 2012) and (c) the interpenetration between the party and the state structure observed

Justicialist especially at the provincial (Scherlis 2012). It is also possible to find interpretations based on the

role of identity issues in the persistence of Peronism (Auyero 2001).

Organizational explanations realize that the PJ was and is strong at the subnational level, but it

works more like a confederation of provincial parties which project alternately territorial leaders at the

national level rather than a national party with provincial "headquarters" provincial. This dispersion of the

center of the organization is observed even in the various "isms" that are inside the PJ. Isms that

correspond with provincial leadership pipeline and in some cases, are expressed electorally, as happened in

2003, and then reach national projection (Pegoraro and Suárez-Cao 2013).

Nestor Kirchner was a strengthening figure of the presidential office compared to other institutions,

including his own party (Cherny et al. 2010; Levitsky and Murillo 2008) and partisan appointments during

this period have become an essential tool for effective control over the state apparatus and simultaneously

reconfigure Peronist party elites under the wing of the president.

The combination of Kirchner's concentration of power and the PJ's growing electoral dominance

The Core Institutions of democracy REMAIN strong in Argentina: Elections are clean, civil liberties are

broadly protected, and the military-author of six coups. Between 1930 and 1976, has withdrawn from

politics. Nestor Kirchner's ability to concentrate power was limited by robust democratic Institutions, a

strong civil society, and the nature of his own Peronist coalition

The weakness of the non-Peronist opposition has several important consequences. Most obviously,

it leaves the opposition increasingly incapable of challenging the PJ in the electoral arena.

According to this brief description and sticking to the variables considered in this article, the Front

for Victory / Peronism has a high level of organizational power, reaching the highest score 4 points. From

the size of the scope, the value is high: 2 points. For Peronism penetrating across the country territorially


12

while since the arrival of the Kirchner to power a growing interpenetration occurs with the state and are

increasingly turning to political patronage for both the electorate and to enhance partisan races.

Since the dimension of cohesion evaluation is also high. The kirchnerism seems to have managed to

overcome the factionalism that characterized the Peronist and build power from the concentration of

decisions on a minimum core and hard about the presidential figure. If we consider also the tradition that

characterized the Peronist bandwagon regarding presidential leadership and how this tradition affected the

level of cohesion of the dominant coalition especially in times of lame duck, we found that FPV has been

efficient in turning this informal institution that remained cohesion levels on an item to ensure the party's

electoral survival and increase the power organizational.

More than the absence of government party which can be seen from Kirchner's presidency is an

alternative mechanism for building and sustaining the ruling party.

URUGUAY

Uruguay has one of the systems of older political parties among modern democracies, Cavarozzi

(1995) includes the case of Uruguay in the type of "systems strong parties". But political parties have been

the main agents of nomination of candidates because the electoral system has allowed different candidates

of the same party competing for the same positions in the national election itself (Buquet 2004).

Organizations second level, i.e. between party factions are the central agents. The current configuration of

the Uruguayan party system is characterized by the presence of four parliamentary parties.

The two traditional parties, the Partido Colorado (PC) and the National Party or White (PN) that

currently are located from the center to the right of the ideological spectrum. With them other parties have

lived throughout most of the twentieth century a core of smaller parties, called "ideas", which came

together in 1971 in the formation of the Frente Amplio (FA). This party, which is clearly placed in positions

left, has ruled the country's capital - Montevideo for four consecutive periods and has become since 2004

in the ruling party.

The most characteristic feature of the main Uruguayan parties is the coexistence within different

fractions of heavy texture and great political autonomy, fractions show high stability over time. The white

and red party share an organizational feature: factionalizing internally associated bipolarity involves

caudillistic leadership. The batllistas in the Colorado Party, the herreristas in white or national.

In the case of FA was not so clearly presented bipolar scheme, although in general tends to

differentiate sectors "moderate" sectors "radical". Currently, in the internal schema of FA, we can

distinguish seven main fractions.

On one side there are three groups originated prior to FA, Advanced Democracy (Communist), Area

90 (socialist) and Popular Participation Movement (Tupamaros). On the other hand there are two major

fractions were that established and developed within their own Frente Amplio: Vertiente Artiguista and

Asamblea Uruguay. To these this must be added a sixth area called Progressive Alliance built in 1994 and

consists of white dissidents, former Communists and Democratic crisitianos. Finally, the last group is the

Nuevo Espacio de extraction batllista and founder of the FA but that 1989 was spun to return in 2004.

What at the beginning was formed as a coalition of parties (one integrated front) becomes became

then a coalition party and tends to be finally a unified party ("popular"). At its heart continue it continues to

act with its founders but also with weigh units created since its inception as nucleation frontage, with some

ancestors in the community or directly as new sectors.

At In any case, neither new nor old, they but keep their name, are autonomous parties: are

fractions of a complex conglomerate, with its own identity and its historical biography marks a major

electoral mobility scenario, the FA is in recent time the party that retains its voters more. The mobility is


13

manifested within, so variable benefiting fractions better compete in every election by vote "frontage" and

on the fringes of growth, with a good location in relation to applications on end and shift leaders (Lanzaro

2004).

In terms of territorial expansion ,in the 2005 municipal elections for the first time in the country's

history, the FA manages to get to it eight municipalities, among which there are the departments of

Paysandu, Salto, Thirty-Three , Florida, Canelones, Maldonado, Rocha and Montevideo. In the next election,

by 2010, the Broad Front loses departments of Salto, Paysandu, Thirty-Three, and Florida, but wins the

department of Artigas.

The Frente Amplio has already surpassed the four decades of existence, won two presidential

elections and has governed in a total of nine departmental governments (in one of them, for more than

two decades).

In terms of our theoretical framework in order to characterize the ruling party, we can say that the

Frente Amplio offers a medium level of scope and cohesion where de the ideological cleavage and the

electoral rules for primaries are the main factors that explains the high level of factionalism and for that

reason diminished the incumbent´s organizational power.

In fact, if we agree with the literature that conceives al the Frente Amplio as a coalition party

instead of a parties coalition and we acknowledge its territorial extension along with the structure of the

presidential power as a majority party, we need to pay attention of to the effects that the nature of

leadership has in the survival of the party in government in the future.

4.2 Hybrid regimes and political parties

ECUADOR

The Ecuadorian case analysis requires temporal segmentation. The first segment of the analysis

corresponds to consider the type of political party that ruled in Ecuador under a democratic regime. That is,

between 1978 and 2005. Then it will be necessary to consider the characteristics of the ruling party, Alianza

País – Revolución Ciudadana under the leadership of Rafael Correa, in a context of semi-democratic

political system that we call open anacrocy.

The first thing to note is the difference that the party system has made in Ecuador. The literature

points out that Ecuador is not a case of party system where the fracture territorial (mountains vs. costs)

plus the ethnic cleavage - Indian has signed Ecuadorian politics. Interparty competition tended to favor

governments of weak and minority presidents struggling to maintain some consensus (Conaghan 1996;

Mejia 2002; Pachano 2007; Sánchez 2008; Freidenberg 2008). The fall in ten years three constitutionally

elected presidents, replaced by extra-tracks and popular mobilization settings and arrangements between

elites, has noticed the tendency to disrespect the rules by various stakeholders and the ease of adaptation

of these rules to the interests of the moment.

The Ecuadorian party system during the period 1978-2006 had characteristics of multi end, where

they have competed at least five or six parties, whose electoral strength, capacity or blackmail coalition

puts them in competition with each other, with minority coalition governments, bilateral oppositions unfair

move by patrimonial or clientelistic mechanisms and have serious difficulties to cooperate on key issues.

The presence of disloyal politicians generates instability in shaping legislative blocs and favored pork barrel

politics. This is an incentive for the creation of "mobile majorities" (Freindeberg, 2013). In general we can

say that political parties were highly regionalized (Freidenberg and Alcántara 2001, Pachano 2005) and had

few incentives to coordinate with each other.

The fact that a president can be elected without a legislation block to back it up and even that rule

may have to face a major opposition block has been common currency in Ecuador between 1978 and 2006.


14

Strangely there have been they have been exceptional cases in which governments blocks were the first

majority since ever a president had an absolute majority in the legislature and only four times the President

had a large block of his party in Congress. This was in 1979 with PIC! (40.6%) in 1988 with ID (42.25%), in

1998 when DP was about 28.83% of the House and had the support of the Social and finally, in 2009 when

MPAIS now controls 47.8% of the seats (not counting its allies)

In this time period, the relationship between the Ecuadorian government and its parties has been

varied and complex. The link between members of the same party involved in different spheres of action of

the party has been of controversial character in most of the government experiences that have occurred in

the country after the democratic transition. These have led to conflicting relationships of conflict that give

gave low levels of partisanship in government and at different times the parties themselves have been the

action that hindered the government of President and others who sought his ouster. Furthermore, it is

argued that various factors have affected steadily Presidents such appointments have been made

(Freidenberg 2003).

In Ecuador, there have been has been party governments in the latter controlled the nominations

and had a greater presence in the cabinet. But this statement must be qualified by the fact of melting in the

same person the office of President of the Republic and with the top leader of the party, which made it a

very intense relationship, since the dominant coalition party gained control government.

There have been anti-party governments, led by presidents who did not believe in political parties

and independents and incorporating people from his inner circle in cabinet nonpartisan. Through these

governments sought to steadily carry out a political reform they removed importance to the parties in the

system. Protects governments have also been in parties in which the Presidents tried to alienate their own

party governance so as not to wear out with her. The consequence of this was very similar to a government

anti-party, since the party holder was removed from governance. The difference is in the attitude of the

President pro-party. That is, the party is far from the government because it is against him but to protect it

from the pressure of governing. Finally, there have been games against governments, i.e. the governments

that own party in the legislature ended up being the greatest opponent of governmental organization and

the main promoter of conflict between powers.

From the organizational perspective, Ecuadorian political parties have shared trait multiple internal

lines that meet three criteria: ideological, territorial (mountains vs. shore) and ethnic –native. The presence

of significant internal lines with their own share of power and fragmentation of leadership contributed to

anti-party trend.

According to this picture, we can say that the levels of scope and cohesion of the governing parties

in democratic Ecuador are low, assuming overall value 0 (zero). If we look at the characteristics of the

dominant coalition, volatility in composition, recurrent changes coalition members expressed ministerial

compositions (Freidenberg 2003) and the resulting factionalizing further indicate an organizational

weakness a weakness in terms of the dominant coalition which projects an image of weak governing parties

that substantially reduces the power of the incumbent.

In the 2006 presidential election, the Ecuadorian political system experienced a moment of major

upheaval. Rafael Correa, a political outsider, was elected president, marking the disappearance of a great

majority of the country’s longstanding political parties.

The victory of Correa, a political outsider with no political party backing and without presenting a

members list, could be explained form an organizational perspective form from the the strength of their

movement and the promises that he made to lead a social revolution to benefit the poor, to depoliticize

the courts, decentralize the state apparatus and rewrite the constitution in an effort to limit the power of

the traditional political parties


15

At the beginning, Alianza PAIS was conformed by several organizations: Movimiento País, Jubileo

2002, Iniciativa Ciudadana (IC), Movimiento Bolivariano Alfarista (MBA) y Acción Democrática Nacional

(ADN), together with the con el Partido Socialista-Frente Amplio with the support of several provincial

intelectual left movements( such as Ruptura 25, Foro Urbano and Alternativa Democrática) and human

rights militants.

In an April 2007 referendum, the voters gave their overwhelming support to President Correa’s

plan to re-write the constitution. President Correa’s Alianza PAIS party won 80 of 130 seats in the new

body. The new Citizens’ Assembly was given “full powers” to overrule, dissolve or replace all existing

institutions. On 29 November 2007 the Citizens’ Assembly formally convened. In their first act, the

Assembly asserted its full powers by declaring the old legislature to be “in recesses” and assumed

lawmaking powers. In addition, the assembly sacked many congressionally appointed officials in the

judiciary and executive branch. With no formal institutional oversight and with the full backing of the

Citizens’ Assembly, President Correa enhanced his powers to push through significant political and

economic reforms.

For 2009, the choice was different. The President had a majority block in the Legislative Assembly.

In opposition groupings were as different as SP (18) Wood PSCN Guerrero Civic Movement (11), PRIAN (7),

MUPPNNP (4), and even the People's Democratic Movement (5), a former ally of MPAIS. Although the

common element seemed to be "front" Correa, was unlikely that these movements and parties act as a

united opposition bloc because of their ideological differences, programmatic, regional.

When we pay attention to the composition of the cabinet to show the power inside the

government of the party, its responded to the combination of selection criteria: PAIS Alliance activists,

technocrats and people you trust the President (Pachano 2010: 311; Basabe-Serrano 2009: 13), respecting

the diversity of provincial and regional interests, regional cleavage product of Ecuadorian politics divides

(Freidenberg and Alcántara 2001). Another criterion used was that of gender, maintaining the distribution

had occurred in previous years (Pachano 2010: 312): 57.14% to 42.86% men versus women.

It is important to consider the style of leadership of Correa, especially because we have assumed that in

anacrocies the political parties are important instrument to promote the regime change and to guarantee

stability.

Correa´s primordial leadership style has been its strong facing character that is shown every week

in the “cadenas sabatinas”. His objective is to show that he is as equal as its citizens and that he differs

from the “pelucones” and the “partidocracia”. Its highlighted the President´s capacity to generate conflict

and to promote discursive polarization.

Along with this characteristics of leadership and the intention to built a political party from the

state and the use patronage politics it is important to remark how the rules of the game reinforce the

presidential power and with it the power of the incumbent organization. We are referring to the 148 article

of the new constitution. That establishes the presidential prerrogative that will disolve the legislative

assembly, mechanism that it is known as “muerte cruzada”.

The dominant coalition nucleated around the figure of Rafael Correa organized around the partisan

label MPAIS appears weak in terms of its institutionalization and dependent on personal ties to the

president. However, the political party, again in terms of time, seems to gain more and more strength and

moves towards a process of institutionalization of state power dependent power dependent state,

suggesting it could be considered as a proto cartel party. The overlap between party and government,

policy dependency and patronage allocation of responsibilities via patronage and nepotism and the

consequent difficulty of differentiation, suggests that the current ruling party in Ecuador has an average

strength - low.


16

From the regional perspective, although the strength of Correa is placed on overcoming the

territorial cleavage and political community to incorporate indigenous movement, generating an apparent

mainstreaming, it is equally true that the partisan territorial penetration process is under construction and

that is why the dimension of scope is described it to 0 (zero)

MPAIS is a new party, it has managed to survive and increase their power especially after the

constitutional reform and the legislative control. Evidence suggests that MPAIS should acquire increasing

levels of scope and cohesion and resolve internal conflicts that arise from trying to get presidential favor. If

successful, the organizational power is expected to rise over time. The question that remains is what effect

will this have on the openness of the Ecuadorian political system.

VENEZUELA

The analysis of the characteristics of the government parties in Venezuela requires, first, to note

that the Venezuelan party system happened in the course of a decade of being role models to be case

study required by its abrupt collapse. In less than a decade, the traditional parties, which held power for

nearly forty years, saw their levels of representation quotas completely minimized, and new parties, with

anti-establishment and renewal, came to occupy the new space. The collapse of the Venezuelan party

system has been studied and explained on the basis of a series of national events (Molina and Perez Baralt

2000; Seawright 2012; Dietz and Myers 2003; Morgan 2011).

From Punto Fijo, the two major political parties at that time, AD and COPEI, evolved rapidly to

become and became the only viable partners interlocutors between society and the state. The games were

highly centralized, with decisions made from the domes. Thanks to this' party (Coppedge 1994), the country

experienced three decades of relatively stable democracy (1958-1988).

The system agreed, however, had in itself the seeds of its own destruction (Coppedge 1994). For

example, the rigidity imposed from parties to ensure institutional control and prevent anti-democratic

adventure was made possible thanks to a funding based mainly on oil revenues (which until the beginning

of the 1980s were quite stable) which generated incentives for ambitious politicians to choose to

participate as members of the traditional parties (Penfold Becerra 2001: 41; Monaldi and Penfold 2006).

With the advent of the economic crisis in the 1980s, oil revenues fell significantly and the incentives in

order to stay in the political system disappeared while patronage of the same nature was made manifest

(Brewer-Carias 1988; Hellinger 1991).

Administrative decentralization allowed the governors to have a greater role in Venezuelan politics,

and thereby to increase increasing their independence vis-a-vis the national government (Cameron and

Falleti 2005: 266). When the subnational elections started, the ruling party lost the prerogative to appoint

state governors, which allowed the party leadership to control the path of its members, encouraging party

discipline and strengthening the centralization of AD and COPEI.

Also, the possibility of immediate re-election, the low barriers to of entry for new parties, and the

lack of voter turnout, increased the incentives for subnational elected officials to secede from the national

leadership. In short, the (re) election of the executive authorities at local and state level went from relying

solely on party leaders to rely solely on the voters themselves, creating a customization and voting

desideologización with implications for the party system level national.

As the vote went to the local level by customizing and membership benefits true to the major

parties were exhausted, the established party system began to show signs of weakening (Penfold-Becerra

2004).

These trends Federalists, therefore, removed from AD and COPEI certain powers in the early 1990s.

On the one hand, it took away the administrative and financial capacity of the subnational level, denying


17

the possibility of maintaining centralized control of territorial politics. On the other hand, lost the ability to

control the militants that postulated for elected local and state level.

For the first two elections of governors, AD and COPEI used their political hegemony that still exists

to dominate the electoral market. In the next election, however, this rule was weakening while the new

political organizations grew in their vote. In 1998, the MAS, for example, now controls 13% of the

governorates, the MVR controlled 17.7%, and other regional parties obtained 12.9% (Monaldi and Penfold

2006: 32).

The two major political parties of the democratic Democratic Action (AD) and the Christian Social

Party (COPEI) parties have been characterized as factions with high level of internal conflict. The conflicts of

trends since 1973 AD have completely lacked a context program-not to mention one ideological and has

been solely the result of personal rivalries (Coppedge 1994).

The traditional party system in Venezuela experienced a process of disintegration that gradually

ended up collapsing. From the point of view of the party organization, an indication it can be indicated that

what happened was a breakup of the ruling - party coalition

Figure 2: Party fragmentation in Venezuela (1997-2000)

Having established the characteristics of the main Venezuelan parties under democratic conditions

of political competition we proceed to analyze the features that adopts the ruling party from the rise of

Chavez. It is therefore important to differentiate between the party Movimiento V República, created in


18

1997 to promote the candidacy of Hugo Chavez and the current ruling party PSUV as it absorbed the

original party-movement

Chavez originally recognized the importance of having a strong party. But its parent meant a weak

electoral societal penetration and weak linkages with other organizations. In terms of Panebianco, we

might think that the MVR late institutionalization achieved through joining the PSUV as a party of

government and state, and in order to overcome the mere instrumentality that characterized electoral

MVR.

Chavez had the final say in all decisions, a prerogative accepted unanimously by party members.

Chavez favors military name for important positions alliance following a strategy of civil - military (Ellner

2006). Chavez's strategy was the mobilization of popular sectors large structured around anti-party

personality.

The "Chavez" as a political movement and penetration achieved territorial expansion

unprecedented. A decentralizing force that dragged the traditional parties responded with a strategy of

nationalization from Chavez's populist leadership. The PSUV is spread throughout the territory becoming

the only political force highly nationalized (Sagarzazu 2011).

Territorial penetration was reciprocated by building a wide network of social movement that joined

forces under the moving party. Chavez's party, both the MVR and the PSUV is a fundamental tool of

government and the prize distribution strategy through promoting careers locally and in government

positions promotes the cohesion of the coalition government.

Chavez’s death not only puts in tension the Venezuelan political system but essentially it puts in

tension the party government that must take a decision about the role that Chavez’s mythic leadership in

the survival probability of the movement and in maintaining the political regime functioning under the rules

of close anacrocy. From which the winner results from the primary election after the leaders death it will

depend the PSUV survival not only as a party government but also as a partisan expression in the

Venezuelan context. This is a remaining question that will stay here suggested thus it has not been analyzed

in the paper as a consequence of exceeding the indicated limits of the purpose of this study

Chart 1: Incumbent’s organizational power

Argentina

(FPV)

Uruguay

(FA)

Ecuador Venezuela

1978-

2006

2006-2012

(MPAIS)

1978-1999 1999-2012

(MVR/PSUV)

Party Scope 2 1 0 0 1 2

Party Cohesion 2 1 0 1 1 2

Dominant

coalition

Tendecy X (personal

linkage)

X

Factions X X X X

Total 4 2 0 1 2 4

Incumbent´s

organizational

High Medium Low Medium Medium High


19

power Low

Source: Author’s elabroration

5. Conclusion

For two decades, comparative literature indicates a growing interpenetration process between parties and

state structures (Katz and Mair 1995). In this context, understanding contemporary party organizations

requires special attention to the link they establish with the state apparatus (van Biezen and Kopecký

2007). This is particularly relevant for Latin America, where the construction of parties from the state and

party colonization of the state apparatus has been a recurring practice. Recent literature highlights the

importance of the distribution of public office for the operation of the parties (Levitsky 2003; Leiras 2007).

In the preceding pages we have concentrated in showing the characteristics of these political regimes in

four Latin American countries and the distinction between democratic regimes and hybrid (open and close

anacrocies). Simultaneously, we have sought to identify the characteristics of the government parties in

these regimes for evaluating the elements that define the access to power and the way in which the

government parties in power and build coping strategies.

We have examined the conditions under which there is the government party (party rule), paying

particular attention to highlighting organizational power level of cohesion, scope and type of dominant

coalition.

According to these criteria, two political parties in the exercise of government shows a high level of

organizational strength: Argentina and Venezuela. One in democratic context, the other on the stage of

hybrid political regime. This difference does not appear to be located in the territorial penetration of the

parties nor the level of cohesion of the dominant coalition, but whether this but in its is of factions or

tendencies.

For Argentina we identified that the dominant coalition is of factions because we understand that

the flexibility as we implies adaptive bandwagon institution generates deep internal disputes but then

there is a process behind the winning line. The Venezuelan case, by contrast, has a dominant coalition

nucleated trends around leadership and person of Hugo Chavez.

We believe that the difference lies in the leadership of the founder effect and the effect it has on

the organization of the party and the exercise of government. While Peronism, the founding leader, Peron,

died and the current leadership of Nestor and Cristina Kirchner, situational leadership are indeed, in the

case of PSUV party building simultaneously with the change of regime, a democracy to a close anacrocy,

says that the founder leader is regarding who preach loyalties and it retains the ability to moderate the

internal disputes in their favor. It is also clear that the Venezuelan leader's recent death imposes to PSUV a

tension on resolving the issue of leadership.

The Uruguayan case is presented as Frente Amplio as a party highly institutionalized and

bureaucratized a true mass bureaucratic party (Panebianco 1982). The medium level of organizational

power obeys to his coalitional component resulting in a high fragmentation of the dominant coalition.

The Ecuadorian case is the most complex of the far analyzed. The study has been segmented not

only from the change of regime, but mainly because the appearance of MPAIS represents a substantive

change in the Ecuadorian party system and its impact on the interaction between parties which promotes

polarization that may partially explain the change of regime at the expense of democracy.

The medium low value which assumes the ruling party in terms of its organizational power respond,

at our discretion, to the youth of the party. MPAIS is a new party that from its cartelization strategy has


20

succeeded mostly in Ecuador ruling while as well as is the use of the state apparatus that allows party

development.

In the same sense, the charismatic, confrontational and personalized leadership of Correa

personalizes the party not making visible yet the distinction between organization and members. It is from

our hypothesis that building a strong party organization is going to be the result of a hybrid regime

consolidation is Ecuador.

From the comparative analysis we can say that patronage is not exclusive of political parties in

authoritarian regimes. The logic of charges distribution, the empowerment of partisans careers and the

privilege of personal ties to the president seem to be rather features of parties in presidential designs that

are expressed with in higher or lower levels, with varying level of visibility as the type of regime that parties

deploy their strategies. This is evident especially when comparing Argentina and Venezuela.

In reference to the level of the dominant coalition factionalizing and the degree of personalization

of the party in the figure of the leader, the case studies suggest that hybrid regimes are the ones which

distribute more incentives, by the weak constraint that formal rules has in the power exercised.

Hybrid regimes have more incentives to build parties with lower factionalizing democratic political

regimes. The idea is that hybrid regimes promote less competition between parties, while the parties in

these regimes go through a process of cartelization almost from its inception / creation.

The idea is that frequently the maximum leader of the party is the member elected to represent the

party in the presidential elections leading to maximum driving fusion of party and government,

undermining the independence of the group, on the one hand, and subjecting the government to the direct

influence of the dominant coalition party, on the other. Traditionally, the party first goes to "capture" the

government, but ultimately ends up being co-opted and worn by him most of the time.

If democratization is the change from authoritarianism to democracy along the access to power

dimension in order to characterize the changes along the exercise dimension, we must pay attention to the

way in which the political parties process the institutional incentives and operate in them so as to change

their future access rules.

According to this idea, the paper suggests that the essential difference between political regimes

doesn´t seem to be in the access power dimension but in its natural exercise. According to this is that the

comparison of the characteristics of the ruling parties appears as a relevant in order to contribute in the

refinement in the difference between democratic and hybrid regimes


21

4. Bibliography

ALTMAN, David & PÉREZ LIÑÁN, Aníbal (1999): “Más allá de la poliarquía: una aproximación a la calidad de las democracias”, Revista Uruguaya de Ciencia Política 11, pp. 83 - 101.

ARMONY, Ariel & SCHAMIS, Héctor (2005): "Babel in democratization Studies" Jounal of Democracy 16, n 4 – October

BAUBÖCK, Rainer (2011): “Normative political theory and empirical research”, en Donatella Della Porta & Michael Keating, Approaches and methodologies in the social sciences, United Kingdom, Cambridge University Press.

BEBLER, Anton and SEROKA, Jim (1990): Contemporary political systems. Classifications and typologies. Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

BUENO DE MESQUITA, Bruce. et al. (2003): The logic of political survival, Cambridge: MIT Press. BROWNLEE, Jason (2007): “Hereditary Succession in modern autocracies”, World Politics 59, nº4, pp. 595-

628. BLONDEL, Jean (2002), Party government, patronage, and party decline in western Europe. En GUNTHER,

Richard; MONTERO, José Ramón y LINZ, Juan (eds.). Political parties: old concepts and new challenges. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007: 233-256.

BLONDEL, Jean y COTTA, Maurizio. The nature of party government. New York: Palgrave, 2000. CALVO, Ernesto y MURILLO, María Victoria. Who delivers? Partisan clients in the argentine electoral

market. American Journal of Political Science 2004, Vol. 48, (4):742-757. Bottinelli, Oscar (1991). El Sistema Electoral Uruguayo. Descripción y Análisis. Working paper 3, Instituto de

Ciencia Política, Heidelberg. Bottinelli, Oscar (1993). "La Reforma Electoral y sus Efectos", en Bottinelli et al. Buquet, Daniel y Daniel

Chasquetti (en prensa). “Presidential candidate selection in Uruguay: 1942-2004”, en Siavelis, Peter y Scott Morgenstern (eds.) Pathways to Power: Political Recruitment and Candidate Selection in Latin America, University Park, Penn State University Press.

Buquet, Daniel, Daniel Chasquetti y Juan Andrés Moraes (1998). Fragmentación Política y Gobierno en Uruguay. Facultad de Ciencias Sociales, Montevideo.

CHERESKY, Isidoro. La política después de los partidos. Buenos Aires: Prometeo Libros, 2006. CHERNY, Nicolás, FEIERHERD, Germán y NOVARO, Marcos. El presidencialismo argentina: de la crisis a la

recomposición del poder (2003-2007). América Latina Hoy, 2010, Vol. 54: 15-41. CORRALES, Javier. Presidents without parties. University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press,

2002. CAROTHERS, Julio (2006): “The End of the transition paradigm”, Journal of Democracy, Vol 13, n1 1, pp-5-

21. CARROLL, Royce, COX, Gary & PACHÓN, Mónica (2006): “How parties create electoral democracy”,

Legislatve Stuides Quaterly, Vol2, nº 2, pp. 153-174. CARROLL, Royce & SHUGART, Matthew (2006): “Neo – Madisonian Theory and Latin American Institutions”,

Center for the study of democracy, University of California, Working paper 05´01. CARROLL, Royce & LYNE, Mona (2007): “Pork-barrelling, rent – seeking and clientelism: disaggregating

political exchange”, Revised version of a paper presented at the 2006 Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, Ill.

CARROLL, Royce & KIM, Henry (2010): “Party government and the cohesive power of public plunder”, American Journal of Political Science, Vol 54, nº1, pp. 34-44.

CASE, William (2006): “ Manipulative Skills: How do Rulers Control the electoral arena?”, SCHEDLER, Andreas Electoral authoritarianism: the dynamics of unfree competition. Boulder Lynne Rienner.

CHASQUETTI, Daniel (2001): “Democracia, multipartidismo y coaliciones en América Latina: evaluando la difícil combinación”, en Jorge Lanzaro (Ed.), Tipos de Presidencialismo y Coaliciones Políticas en América Latina. Buenos Aires, CLACSO.

CHEIBUB, Jose, GANDHI, Jennifer & VREELAND, James (2010): “Democracy and dictatorship revisited”, Public Choice 143, ‘’ 67-101.


22

COLLIER, David & ADCOCK, Robert (1999): “Democracy and dichotomies: a pragmatic approach to choices about concepts” en Annual Review of Political Science, Vol. 2: 537 -565.

COLLIER, David & LEVITSKY, Steven (1996): “Democracy with adjectives: conceptual innovation in comparative research”. Working Paper#230. The Helen Kellogg Institute for International Studies University of Notre Dame.

COLLIER, David & MAHON, James (1993): “Conceptual “stretching” revisited: adapting categories in comparative analysis”, The American Political Science Review, Vol 84, nº4.

COX, Gary W (2009): “Authoritarian elections and leadership succession 1975- 2004”, Working paper. DAHL, Robert (2009): La Poliarquía, participación y oposición, España, Tecnos. [1971] DIAMOND, Larry, LIPSET, Martin S & LINZ, J Juan (1988): Democracy in developing countries, USA, Lynne

Rienner. DIAMOND, Larry (1999): Developing Democracy: toward consolidation, Johns Hopkins University Press,

USA. DIAMOND, Larry (2002): "Thinking about Hybrid Regimes" Journal of Democracy 13, nº2, pp. 21-35. DIETZ, Henry & MYERS, David (2002) “El proceso de colapso de sistemas de partidos: una comparación

entre Perú y Venezuela”, CDC, vol.19, no.50, p.1-33. DOGAN, Mattei & PELASSY, Dominique (1984): “El análisis político comparado”, Contribuciones, Nro. 4,.

Págs. 37-55. DONNO, Daniela (2011): “Elections and democratization in authoritarian regimes”, Draft prepared for

presentation at Duke´s University´s Seminar on Global Governance and Democracy. GEDDES, Barbara (1999): “What do we know about democratization after twenty years?”, Annual Political

Science Review 2, pp. 67-87. GEDDES, Barbara (2003): Paradigms and sand castles: theory building and research design in comparative

politics, United States of America, The University of Michigan Press. GEDDES, Barbara (2006): “ Why parties and elections in authoritarian regimes?”, Revised version of a paper

prepared for presentation at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington 2005.

GERVASONI, Carlos "Democracia, Autoritarismo e Hibridez en las Provincias Argentinas: La Medición y Causas de los Regímenes Subnacionales", Journal of Democracy en Español, Vol. 3, 2011.

FREIDENBERG, Flavia and LEVITSKY, Steven. Informal institutions and party organization in Latin America. En HELMKE, Gretchen y LEVITSKY, Steven (eds.). Informal Institutions and Democracy: Lessons from Latin America. Blatimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 2006:178-197.

GEDDES, Barbara. Politician´s dilemma. Building State Capacity in Latin America. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994.

GIBSON, Edward y SUAREZ CAO, Julieta (2010). “Federalized Party Systems and Subnational Party Competition: Theory and an Empirical Application to Argentina”, en Comparative Politics, Vol. 43, Nº 1.

GOERTZ, Gary (2006): Social science conepts. A user´s guide.Priceton University Pres GREENE, Kenneth (2007): Why dominant parties lose. Mexico´s democratization in Comparative

Perspective, USA, Cambridge University Press. HAGGARD, Stephen & KAUFMAN, Robert (1992): “The prospects for democracy” en HAGGARD, Stephen &

KAUFMAN, Robert (eds) The Politics of Economic Adjustment, Princeton, Princeton University Press. HAGGARD, Stephan y MCCUBBINS, Mathew (editors, 2001), Presidents, parliaments and policy, Cambridge,

Cambridge University Press. HARTLYN, Jonathan & MCCOY, Jennifer (2006): “Observer paradoxes: how to assess electoral manipulation”

en SCHEDLER, ANDREAS (ed): Electoral authoritarianism: the dynamics of unfree competition, Boulder Lynne Rienner.

HIGLEY, Johm & GUNTHER, Richard (1992): Elites and democratic consolidation In latin america and southern europe, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

HILLMAN, Richard (1992): Democracy for the privilegied: crisis and transition un Venezuela, Boulder Lynne Rienner.


23

HOWARD, Marc & ROESSLER, Philip (2006): “Liberalizing Electoral Outcomes in Competitive Authoritarian Regimes”, American Journal of Political Science,Vol 50, nº2,

HUNTIGNTON, Samuel (1994): La tercera ola: la democratización a fines del siglo XX. Paidós. pp. 365 – 381. KATZ, Richard. Party government: a rationalistic conception. En CASTLES, Francis y WILDERMANN Rudolf.

Visions and Realities of Party Government, Berlin: De Gruyter, 1986: 31-71. KATZ, Richard y MAIR, Peter. Changing Models of Party Organization and Party Democracy: The Emergence

of the Cartel Party, Party Politics, 1995, Vol.1, (1): 5-28. KATZ, Richard and MAIR, Peter. The ascendancy of the party in public office. En GUNTER, Richard;

MONTERO, José R. y LINZ, JUAN (eds.). Political parties: old concepts and new challenges, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002: 113-135.

KARL, Terry (1995): “The Hybrid Regimes of Central America”, Journal of Democracy, Vol 6, nº 3, pp. 72-86. KARL, Terry & SCHMITTER, Philippe (1991): “What democracy is… and is not”, Journal of democracy, Vol 2,

nº3, pp. 75-88. KITSCHELT, Herbert et al (1999): Post-Communist party system: competition, representation and inter party

– cooperation, Cambridge University Press, New York, USA. KITSCHELT, Herbert (2007): “Party System”, BOIX, Carles & STOKES, Susan (ed) The Oxford Handbook of

Comparative Politics, Oxford, Oxford University Press. KOPECKÝ, Petr; MAIR, Peter y SPIROVA, Maria (eds.). Party Patronage and Party Government in European

Democracies, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012. KOPECKÝ, Petr; SCHERLIS, Gerardo y SPIROVA, María. Conceptualizing and measuring party patronage.

Working paper 25, The Committee on Concepts and Methods-IPSA, Septiembre 2008. LEIRAS, Marcelo. Todos los caballos del rey, Buenos Aires: Prometeo Libros, 2007. LEVITSKY, Steven. Transforming labor-based parties in Latin America: argentine peronism in comparative

perspective. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003. LEVITSKY, Steven y MURILLO, María V. Argentina: From Kirchner to Kirchner. Journal of Democracy, 2008,

Vol. 19,(2): 16-30 LAAKSO, Markku & TAAGEPERA, Rein (1979): “Effective” Number of Parties: A Measure with Application to

West Europe”, Comparative Political Studies, Vol 12 nº1, pp 3-27, LEVITSKY, Steven & WAY, Lucan (2002): “The Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism”, Journal of Democracy,

Vol 13, nº2, pp. 51-65. LEVITSKY, Steven & WAY, Lucan (2010): Competitive authoritarianism, hybrid regimen after the cold war.

Cambridge University Press. LEVITSKY, Steven & HELMKE, Gretchen (2003): Informal institutions and comparative politics: a research

agenda, Working paper Working paper #307 LEVITSKY, Steven & HELMKE, Gretchen (2006): Informal institutions and democracy: lessons from latin

America, Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins University Press. LINZ, J Juan (1964): “An authoritarian Regime: the case of Spain” en ALLARRDT, E & LITTUNEN, Y (eds)

Cleavages, Ideologies and party systems, Helsinki, Westermarck Society. LINZ, J Juan (1989): La quiebra de las democracias, Madrid, Alianza Editorial. [1987]. LINZ, J Juan y STEPAN, Alfred (1996): Problems of democratic transition and consolidation. Southern

Europe, South America and Post Comminist Europe. Inglaterra, The Johns Hopkins University Press. LINZ, J Juan (2000): Totalitarian and authoritarian regimes, Boulder, Lynne Rienner Publishers LINZ, J Juan (2002): Fascism, breakdown of democracy, authoritarian and totalitarian regimes: coincidences

and distinctions, Working Paper 179, Centro de studios Avanzados en Ciencias Sociales. LIJPHART, Arendt (1975) "The comparable cases strategy in comparative research", en Comparative

Political Studies, vol. 8, num. 2. LIPSET, Seymour Martin y ROKKAN, Stein (1992): “Estructuras de división, sistemas de partidos y

alineamientos electorales”, en VVAA, Diez textos básicos de Ciencia Política. Barcelona: Ariel (231-275).


24

MAGALONI, Beatriz (2008): “Credible power sharing and longevity of authoritarian rule”, Comparative Political Studies 41, nº 4-5, pp. 715-741.

MAINWARING, Scott, O`DONNELL, Guillermo & VALENZUELA, Samuel (1992): Issues in democratic consolidation: the new south American democracies in comparative perspectives, USA, University of Notre Dame Press

MAINWARING, Scott and PEREZ LIÑÀN, Aníbal (forthcoming) Democracies and Dictatorships in Latin America: Emergence, Survival, and Fall. Cambridge University Press, USA.

MAIR, Peter (2011): “ Concepts and concept formation”, en Donatella Dell Porta & Michael Keating, Approaches and methodologies in the social sciences, United Kingdom, Cambridge University Press.

MAIR, Peter “Comparing Party Systems en Comparing democracies 2. New challenges in the study of elections and voting”, Londres, SAGE, 2002.

MUNCK, Gerardo (1996): Disaggregating political regime: conceptual issues in the study of democratization. Working Paper #228. The Helen Kellogg Institute for International Studies University of Notre Dame.

MUNCK, Gerardo & SKALNIK, Carol (1997): “Modes of transition and democratization”, Comparative Politics, April.

MUNCK, Gerardo (2001): "The regime question: theory building in democracy studies" World Politics 54, nº1 - October

MUNCK, Gerardo (2009a): Measuring democracy. A bridge between scholarship and politics, The Johns Hopkins University Press, USA.

MUNCK, Gerardo (2009b): Regimes and democracy in Latin America, Oxford University Press, MORLINO, Leonardo (1980): Cómo cambian los regímenes políticos, Centro de Estudios Constitucionales. MORLINO, Leonardo (1998): Democracy between consolidation and crisis: parties, groups and citizean in

southern europe, Oxford University Press, New York, USA-. MORILINO, Leonardo (2008): Hybrid regimes or regimes in transition?,70 Working paper, Fundación para

las relaciones internacionales y el diálogo exterior. MORLINO, Leonardo (2009): Democracias y democratizaciones. Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas. MORSE, Yonatan (2012): “ The Era of Electoral Authoritarianism”, World Politics, Vol 64, nº1, pp. 161-198. NEGRETO, Gabriel (2008): “Political Parties and Institutional Design: Explaining Constitutional Choice”,

Latin America British Journal of Political Science. 39, 117–139, Cambridge University Press. NORTH, Douglas (1990): Instituciones, cambio institucional y desempeño económico., Mexico, Fondo de

Cultura Económica. OCAÑA, Francisco & OÑATE, Pablo (1999) “Índices e indicadores del sistema electoral y del sistema de

partidos. Una propuesta informática para su cálculo” en Revista Española de Investigaciones Sociológicas, 84, 223 . 245pp.

O`DONNELL, Guillermo, SCHMITTER, Philippe & Whitehead, Laurence (1988): Transiciones desde un gobierno autoritario 4. Conclusiones tentativas sobre democracias inciertas, Buenos Aires, Paidós. [1986].

O’DONNELL, Guillermo (1993): “Acerca del estado, la democratización y algunos problemas conceptuales: Una perspectiva latinoamericana con referencia a países poscomunistas”, en: Desarrollo Económico, vol. 33, nro. 130.

O`DONNELL, Guillermo (1996): “Otra institucionalización”, Política y Gobierno, Vol III, nº2, pp.219 – 244. O`DONNELL, Guillermo (1997): Contrapuntos: ensayos escogidos sobre autoritarismo y democratización,

Buenos Aires, Paidós. PÉREZ LIÑÁN, Aníbal (2009): Juicio Político al presidente y nueva inestabilidad política en América Latina,

Buenos Aires, Fondo de Cultura Económica. REMMER, Karen (1985): “Exclusionary Democracy”, Studies in Comparative International Development REMMER, Karen (1989) "Neopatrimonialism: The Politics of Military Rule in Chile, 1973-1987". Comparative

Politics 21 (2) 149:170.


25

ROBERTS, Kenneth (1997). “Structural Adjustment and the Adaptation of Breakdown of Party Systems: A Comparison of Chile, Argentina, Peru and Venezuela”, Congreso Internacional de Latin America Studies Association, Guadalajara, México.

ROKKAN, Stein (): Citizens, Elections, Parties: approaches to the comparative study of the processes of development

ROSE, Richard & SHIN, Doh Chull (2001): “Democratization backwards: the problem of third-wave democracies”, British Journal of Political Science, Vol 31, nº 2, pp. 331-354.

SARTORI, Giovanni (1988): Teoría de la democracia, Vol 1 y Vol 2. Alianza. SARTORI, Giovanni (1984) La política: lógica y método en las ciencias sociales, Mexico, Fondo de Cultura

Económica. SARTORI, Giovanni (1992): Partidos y Sistemas de partidos, Madrid, Alianza. SARTORI, Giovanni (1994): Ingeniería constitucional comparada: una investigación de estructuras,

incentivos y resultados. Fondo de Cultura Económica. SARTORI, Giovanni & MORLINO, Leonardo (1994) La comparación en las ciencias sociales, Madrid, Alianza. SAUTU, Ruth; BONIOLO, Paula; DALLE, Pablo; ELBERT, Rodolfo (2005): Manual de Metodología.

Construcción del marco teórico, formulación de objetivos y elección de la metodología, Argentina, CLACSO.

SCHDLER, Andreas (2002a): “The Nested Game of Democratization by Elections,” International Political Science Review 23/1

SCHEDLER, Andreas (2002b): "The Menu of Manipulation" Journal of democracy 13, nº 2, pp. 36-50. SCHDLER, Andreas (2006): Electoral authoritarianism: the dynamics of unfree competition. Boulder Lynne

Rienner. SCHUMPETER, Joseph (1984): Capitalismo, Socialismo y democracia, Barcelona, Folio Ed. SERRAFERO, Mario (1997): “Juicio político y derrumbe institucional en Argentina (1976)”, Estudios

Interdisciplinarios de América Latina y el Caribe, Vol 8, nº2, pp. 41-66. SHAPIRO, Ian & MACEDO, Stephen (2000): Desing democratic institutions, USA, New York University Press. SHAPIRO, Ian (2002): “Problems, methods, and theories in the study of politics, or what´s wrong with

political science and what to do about ir”, Political Theory, Vol 30, Nº 4, pp. 596-619. SHAPIRO, Ian (2003): The state of democratic theory, USA , Princeton University Press. SHEPSLE, Kenneth & BONCHEK, Mark (1997): Analyzing Politics: Rationality, Behavior and Institutions,

Norton and Company, New York. SMITH, Benjamin (2005): “Life of the party. The origins of regime breakdowns and persistence under sigle –

party rule”, World Politics 57, pp. 421-451. STEPAN, Alfred (1999): “Federalism and Democracy: Beyond the US Model” Journal of Democracy, Vol. 10,

Nº 4, pp. 19-34. TAAGEPERA, Rein & SHUGART, Matthew Soberg (1989): “Seats and votes. The effects and determinants of

electoral systems”, European Journal of Political Economy, Vol 6, nº1. TAAGEPERA, Rein (2007): “Electoral System”, BOIX, Carles & STOKES, Susan (ed) The Oxford Handbook of

Comparative Politics, Oxford, Oxford University Press. TSEBELIS, George (1990): Nested Games: the rational choice in comparative politics, USA, University of

California. WEFFORT, Francisco (1992): “New Democracies, Which Democracies?”, Working Paper nº 198, Latin

American Program, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington DC. WHITEHEAD, Laurence (1992): “The Alternative to ´liberal democracy´: a latin american perspective”,

Political Studies 40. WOLIN, Sheldon (2008): Democracia S.A. La democracia dirigida y el fantasma del totalitarismo invertido,

Buenos Aires, Katz Editores. ZAKARIA, Faared (2003): El future de la libertad: las democracias “iliberales” en el mundo, España,

Santillana Ediciones Generales. Basabe-Serrano, Santiago. 2009. “Ecuador: reforma constitucional, nuevos actores políticos y viejas

prácticas partidistas”. Revista de Ciencia Política Vol. 29 (2): 381-406.


26

Basabe-Serrano, Santiago, Simón Pachano y Andrés Mejía Acosta. 2010. “La democracia inconclusa: Derechos Fundamentales, Instituciones y Rendimientos Gubernamentales en Ecuador (1979- 2008)”. Revista de Ciencia Política Vol. 30 (1): 65-85. Freidenberg, Flavia. 2012. “Elecciones, Partidos y Comportamiento Electoral en treinta años de democracia en Ecuador (1978-2009)”, en Simón Pachano. La democracia en América Latina. Quito: FLACSO (en prensa). Freidenberg, Flavia y Manuel Alcántara. 2001. “Cuestión regional y política en Ecuador: partidos de vocación nacional y apoyo regional”. América Latina Hoy Vol. 27 (abril): 123-152. Brewer-Carías, A.R. 1988. Problemas del Estado de partidos. Caracas: Editorial Jurídica Venezolana. Buxton, Julia. 2001. The failure of political reform in Venezuela. Aldershot: Ashgate Pub Ltd. Cameron, Max and Tulia Falleti. 2005. “Federalism and the Subnational Separation of Powers.” Publius

35.2: 245-271. Coppedge, Michael. 1994. Strong Parties and Lame Ducks: Presidential Partyarchy and Factionalism in

Venezuela. Stanford: Stanford University Press. COPRE, Comision para la Reforma del Estado. 1986. "Documentos para la Reforma del Estado." Cyr, Jennifer (2011). “Examinando el antes y el después. Los partidos políticos y sus recursos en Perú,

Venezuela, y Bolivia” Presentación en el Seminario Democracia y Partidos Políticos en América Latina. La Universidad de Sergio Arboleta, Bogotá, Colombia (28 abril 2011).

_______ (2012). From Collapse to Comeback? Understanding the Fates of Parties in Latin America. Dissertation defended in June 2012, Northwestern University (Evanston, IL).

Dietz, Henry A. and David J. Myers (2007). “From Thaw to Deluge: Party System Collapse in Venezuela and Peru.” Latin American Politics and Society 49.2: 59-86.

Falleti, Tulia. 2005. “A Sequential Theory of Decentralization: Latin American Cases in Comparative Perspective.” The American Political Science Review 99.3: 326-346.

Gibson, Edward L., ed. 2004. Federalism and Democracy in Latin America. Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press.

Gibson, Edward L., and Julieta Suarez-Cao. 2010. Federalized Party Systems and Subnational Party Competition: Theory and an Empirical Application to Argentina. Comparative Politics 43 (1).

Hellinger, Daniel (1996). “The Causa R and the Nuevo Sindicalismo in Venezuela.” Latin American Perspectives 23.3: 110-131.

______1991. Venezuela: Tarnished Democracy. Boulder: Westview Press. Molina, Jose E., and Angel E. Alvarez, eds. 2004. Los Partidos Politicos Venezolanos en el Siglo XXI. Caracas:

Vadell Hermanos Editores. SITIOS WEB CONSULTADOS http://www.frenteamplio.org.uy/frenteamplio http://larevolucionciudadana.com/ http://www.psuv.org.ve/

http://www.frenteamplio.org.uy/frenteamplio

http://larevolucionciudadana.com/

http://www.psuv.org.ve/

party government and type of regime in four latin...

Documents