partnership in times of crisis - eth z · partnership in times of crisis challenges for the eastern...
TRANSCRIPT
36
Rafał Sadowski
PartnershiP in times of crisischallengeS foR the eaSteRn euRopean countRieS’ integRation with euRope
36
NUMBER 36WARSAWJULY 2013
PartnershiP in times of crisischALLENgES foR thE EAStERN EURopEAN coUNtRiES’ iNtEgRAtioN With EURopE
Rafał Sadowski
© copyright by ośrodek Studiów Wschodnichim. Marka Karpia / centre for Eastern Studies
content editorsolaf osica, Adam Eberhardt, Wojciech Konończuk
EditorAnna Łabuszewska
co-operationKatarzyna Kazimierska
translationoSW
co-operationJim todd
graphic design pARA-BUch
Dtp groupMedia
figures Wojciech Mańkowski
photograph on cover: Shutterstock
pUBLiShERośrodek studiów Wschodnich im. marka Karpia centre for Eastern Studies
ul. Koszykowa 6a, Warsaw, polandphone + 48 /22/ 525 80 00fax: + 48 /22/ 525 80 40osw.waw.pl
iSBN 978-83-62936-28-1
Contents
KEY poiNtS /5
iNtRoDUctioN /8
I. EvoLUtioN of thE EU’S AppRoAch to itS EAStERN NEighBoURhooD /11
1. Partnership and Co-operation Agreements /112. European Neighbourhood Policy /113. The Eastern Partnership /134. The ENP after the ‘Arab Spring’ /14
II. LittLE chANgE iN thE EAStERN NEighBoURhooD /16
1. Democracy and regional security /172. Free-market transformations and economic development /213. Economic integration with the EU /26
III. thE pARtNERS’ pERcEptioNS of WhAt thE EU hAS to offER /28
1. European integration and the partners’ interests /282. Bureaucrats’ offers vs. politicians’ interests /31
IV. DiffERENcES WithiN thE EU /35
1. Attitude towards the Association Agreement with Ukraine /362. Attitudes towards visa liberalisation /383. The Eastern neighbourhood on the EU’s political agenda /39
V. chALLENgES foR EU poLicY /41
1. Economic slowdown /412. The future shape of the European Union /433. The Eurasian Union /44
VI. coNcLUSioNS /47
1. Limitations of the European Union’s eastern policy /472. Real influence before pressing for changes /48
PO
INT
OF
VIE
W 0
7/20
13
5
KEY POINTS
• Fouryearsafteritslaunch,theEasternPartnershipinitiativehascreatedframeworksandmechanismsfortheintegrationof Eastern Partnership countrieswith the EuropeanUnion.Nevertheless, the partner countries have so far made littlemeaningfulprogressinmodernisation,reformsorEuropeanintegration. Since the European Neighbourhood Policy waslaunched in 2004, the situation in areas of key importancefortheEU,suchasdemocratisation,free-markettransforma-tions, European integration, political stability and regionalsecurity, has not improved to a degree thatwouldmeet theUnion’sexpectations.
• The Eastern Partnership initiative, which was intended topromotetheintegrationoftheEasternEuropeanandSouth-ernCaucasuscountrieswiththeEU,hasturnedouttobepre-dominantlyabureaucratic instrumentwithlimitedpoliticalsignificance,whichhardlymatchestheEuropeanunion’sam-bitionsandthechallenges it faces intheeasternneighbour-hood.Thepartiesconcernedaremoreinterestedinmaintain-ingdialoguethaninachievingtangibleprogressinEuropeanintegration.ThisshowsthelimitsoftheEU’sabilitytoinflu-enceitseasternneighbourhood.
• Duetothegapbetweentheexpectationsofthepartnercoun-triesandtheirelitesontheonehand,andwhattheEUhastoofferontheother,theEaPcountrieshaveshownonlylimitedcommitment to integrationwith theEUand transformationalongEUmodels.Thesearelong-termprocesseswhichmightgeneratetangiblebenefitsonlyiftheirultimateaimwasclear-lydefined,whichisnotthecase(forexample,itisunclearifthoseprocessesaresupposedtoleadtomembershipintheUn-ion,ortoadifferentformofintegration).Implementingthemwouldentailconsiderablefinancialandpoliticalcosts,whichcouldnotbeoffsetbythecurrentlevelofsupportfromtheEU.
PO
INT
OF
VIE
W 0
7/20
13
6
Democraticandfree-markettransformationsrequirechangesintheeasternneighbours’modelsofgovernance,whichcouldunderminethepositionofthecurrentdominantbusinessandpolitical groups by introducing political pluralism and freecompetition.The localelites,however,aremostly interestedindefendingtheirpositions.
• As onmany other issues, the EuropeanUnion has failed todevelopacoherentpositiononitspolicytowardstheeasternneighbours.Thisappliesbothtothelong-termobjectives(cf.attitudes towards membership prospects for EaP countriesor theabolitionofvisaregimes)andcurrent issues (suchasthesignatureoftheassociationagreementwithUkraine,thepolicyofsanctionsagainstBelarus).Theeasternneighbour-hoodplaysonlyasecondaryroleintheEU’spoliticalagenda,especially in the context of the Union’s internal problems(includingthedebateonthefutureoftheUnion,theneedtoreformtheEU’sdecisionmakingprocesses,andthefinancialcrisis).Aslongastheseproblemsremainunsolved,weshouldnotexpectanychangeintheeasterndimensionofEUpolicy.However,despitethoseweaknesses,theEasternPartnershipwillremainthemainframeworkforthedevelopmentofmu-tualrelations.
• The policy of Russia poses a growing challenge to the EU’spolicyintheeasternneighbourhood.Ontheonehand,thisisdue to the limiteddynamicsofEUactions,andon theotherto a change inMoscow’s strategy.Russia’sEurasian integra-tion project (of which the customs unionwith Belarus andKazakhstan is the first phase) ismodelled on the EuropeanUnion’smodus operandi,andaimsatintegrationbasedoncom-monsupranationalinstitutionsandlegislation.ParticipationwillprecludeanydeeperintegrationwiththeEU,andsotheRussianprojectrivalsandposesachallengetoEuropeanpoli-cy.Meanwhile,Russiacontinuestoexploittheexistingpoliti-calandeconomicdependenciesofitsassociates(includingthe
PO
INT
OF
VIE
W 0
7/20
13
7
dependencyonitsenergyresources),andispreparedtoofferits partnersfinancial supportwithoutpreconditions relatedtodemocratisationoreconomictransformation.
• As the opportunities for stepping up political co-operationare limited, we should not expect any breakthrough in therelationship between the European Union and the EasternPartnershipcountries.InordertoincreasetheefficacyofEu-ropeanactionsandavert theultimate failureof theEasternPartnership initiative, it will be necessary to achieve sometangibleprogress,especiallyinthethreecrucialareasofeco-nomic integration (the signature and implementation of theDeep And Comprehensive Free Trade Agreements, increas-ing investments and trade exchange levels), visa liberalisa-tion(abolitionoftheSchengenvisaregimeforthosecountriesthathavemadethemostprogress)andthedevelopmentofthepartners’institutionalpotential.
• DespitethediplomaticeffortstheUnionhasmadesofar(ne-gotiating the Association Agreements, stimulating reforms)the EU’s economic and business relations with the easternneighbourhoodhavenotintensifiedconsiderably,norhastheEU noticeably strengthened its position as the region’s eco-nomicpartner.ThepresentpaperproposesthecreationofanEUinvestmentfundfortheEasternPartnershipasawaytotacklethisproblem.Withthisfundinplace,itwouldbepos-sibletostepupEuropeaninvestmentsintheunder-investedcountriesoftheregionandenhancetheattractivenessoftheEuropeanprojecttotheEasternPartnershipcountries,whileat thesametimegeneratingconcretefinancialandbusinessgainsforbothsides.
PO
INT
OF
VIE
W 0
7/20
13
8
INTrOducTION
The Eastern Partnership (EaP) initiative was intended to lendanewimpulsetotheEuropeanUnion’srelationswithitseasternneighbours,namelyUkraine,Moldova,Belarus,Georgia,Arme-niaandAzerbaijan.Itwaslaunchedin2009astheEasterndimen-sionoftheEuropeanNeighbourhoodpolicy.Ithasbroughtaboutaseriesofchanges intheUnion’sapproachtotheregionandinthesetofinstrumentsemployedbytheEU.However,fouryearson, thedynamicsof theEU’spolitical relationswith its easternneighbourshasbeenslowingdown,especiallysincetheendofPo-land’spresidencyoftheEUCouncilin2011.Inbilateralrelations,thepartieshavemainlybeenfocusedonbureaucraticactivities,in particular on negotiating association agreements and agree-mentsonvisa liberalisationand facilitation.However, theseef-fortshavesofarfailedtoproducetangibleoutcomesintheformofagreementssignedandimplemented,norhavetheyproducedanyqualitativechange inmutualpoliticalrelations. In themultilat-eraldimension,theactivitiesofEasternPartnershipinstitutions,suchasEuronest, theConferenceof theRegionalandLocalAu-thorities(CORELAP)andtheCivilSocietyForum,havealsofailedtoachievetheoutcomesexpected,andtheactivitiesoftheinstitu-tionsthemselveshavebeenalmostinvisibletothegeneralpublic.Finally,theeffectivenessofthesupportprogrammesfinancedbytheEUhasbeencalledintoquestion,astheirimpactonthesitua-tioninthepartnercountrieshasbeenlimited.
Inaddition,internaldevelopmentsinthepartnercountrieshavebeenacauseforconcernfortheEU.Onetheonehand,positiveexamplesofchangehavebeenemphasised.Moldova,forinstance,has made considerable progress towards rapprochement withtheEUoverthelastfouryears;inOctober2012theEUCommis-sionerforEnlargementŠtefanFülesaidthatthecountryshouldbe grantedmembership prospects1. Georgia is another positive
1 StatementbyŠtefanFüle,EuropeanCommissionerforEnlargementandEu-
PO
INT
OF
VIE
W 0
7/20
13
9
example;thecountryunderwentademocraticchangeofgovern-mentasaresultoftheparliamentaryelectionsinOctober2012.Ontheotherhand,however,criticismhasbeenmountingintheEUovertheerosionofdemocraticstandardsinBelarus,Azerbai-jan,andinparticularUkraine.TheEasternPartnershipcountrieshavealso failedtomakesubstantialprogress ineconomicmod-ernisationandEuropeanintegration.ThishasledtocriticismoftheinefficacyoftheUnion’sactions,andhasbeenraisedasanar-gumentagainststeppingupEuropeaninvolvementintheregion.
ThepartnercountriesarealsodisappointedwiththeEU’spolicy.From their point of view,what theEuropeanUnion offers doesnot match their needs. Facing deteriorating economic condi-tions,theEaPcountriesareunabletobeartheconsiderablecostsoftransformationsandintegrationwiththeEU,especiallysincetheultimateobjectiveofsuchintegrationhasnotbeenclearlyde-fined.Shoulditconsistinsomeformofcloserco-operationamongneighbours,oreconomicintegrationbasedonafreetradearea?Orperhapsthepartnercountriescouldbegrantedmembershipprospectsattheendoftheroad?
UnliketheCentralEuropeancountries,whichinthe1990sstakedeverything on Euro-Atlantic integration, European integrationisnottheonlyoptionfortheEasternEuropeanstates.Otherac-tors, includingRussia inparticular,occupy importantpositionsin their foreign policies. Russia has initiated its own Eurasianintegrationproject,which is intendedtobearivalundertakingtoEuropeanintegrationandposesageopoliticalchallengetotheEuropeanUnion.
Anotherproblemconcernsthemajorchangesthathavebeenoc-curringwithintheEuropeanUnion,whichindirectlycreateanewcontextforitsrelationswiththeEasternPartnershipcountries.
ropeanNeighbourhoodPolicy,attheEU-MoldovaForuminBerlin,Germany,22October2012,http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-12-753_en.htm
PO
INT
OF
VIE
W 0
7/20
13
10
ThosechangesarerelatedmainlytotheEurocrisisand,moreim-portantly,thedebateonthefutureoftheUnionanditspossibledivision into several circlesor speedsof integration.The resultisthattheEUmemberstateshavebeenlosinginterestinforeignpolicy,andcertainlyintheeasternneighbourhood.
Inthiscontext,itislegitimatetoaskquestionsabouttheextenttowhichtheEuropeanNeighbourhoodPolicyandtheEasternPart-nershiphavebrought theUnioncloser toachieving itsdeclaredobjectivesintherelationswitheasternneighbours.Whatistheunderlying cause of the dwindling involvement and declininginterest inachievingrealprogress inintegration?Howmaytheevents thathavebeendominating thepoliticalagenda– i.e. theEU’sfinancial crisis, thedebateon the futureof theUnion,butalsothepoliticalprocessestakingplacewithinthepartnercoun-tries–affectthefutureofmutualrelations?
Thepresentpaperbeginswithapresentationofthebasicobjec-tives and assumptions of the European Union’s eastern policy.ItthengoesontodiscussdevelopmentsintheindividualEasternPartnership countries since the launch of the EuropeanNeigh-bourhoodPolicy,andattemptstoanswerthequestionoftowhatextentthesocial,politicalandeconomicchangestakingplaceintheregionareinlinewiththeUnion’sexpectations.Thenextpartpresents the approaches towards European integration of thepartnercountriesandtheirpoliticalelites.Thenthepapergoesontodiscussthemostimportantpoliticalprocessesthatwillaf-fectthefuturedevelopmentoftheeasterndimensionoftheEu-ropeanNeighbourhoodPolicy–thefinancialcrisisintheUnionandtheeconomiccrisisinthepartnercountries,thedebateonthefutureoftheEUandthepolicyofRussia.TheconclusionoutlinesactionsthatcanbetakenwithintheframeworkoftheEU’sEast-ernpolicyatthisstage.
PO
INT
OF
VIE
W 0
7/20
13
11
I. EvOluTION Of ThE Eu’S aPPrOach TO ITS EaSTErN NEIghbOurhOOd
1. Partnership and Co-operation Agreements
TheshapeofEUpolicy towards thecountriesofEasternEuropeandtheSouthernCaucasus2hasevolvedgraduallysincethe1990s.Inthebeginning,thosecountrieswerenotregardedastheEuro-peanUnion’sneighbourhood.Rather,theywereseenasbelongingto thepost-Sovietarea inwhichRussiaplayedadominantrole3.Thefirststage in theevolutionof theEUpolicy instrumentsad-dressing the countrieswhich arenowparticipating in theEast-ern Partnership consisted in the conclusion of Partnership andCo-operationAgreements (PCA),whichweresignedwithall theformerSovietcountriesexcept for theBaltic statesandBelarus.ThePCAstookeffectinthelate1990s,andlaiddowntheprinciplesofeconomicco-operationandcreatedtheframeworksforpoliticaldialogue.Theyalsoenvisagedasituationwherethepartnercoun-trieswouldgraduallyalignthemselvestoEuropeanstandards,al-thoughtheprovisionsonthiswerenotveryspecificandhavenotbeenregardedasmandatory.ThePCAscontinuetoconstitutethetreatybasisfortheEU’srelationswiththeeasternneighbourhood.
2. European Neighbourhood Policy
TheEasternEuropeancountriesbecamedirectneighboursoftheUnionaftertheCentralEuropeanstatesjointedtheEUinthe2004waveofenlargement.ThatgeopoliticalchangeledtothelaunchofanewinstrumentinEUpolicy–theEuropeanNeighbourhoodPolicy (ENP), which covered the sixteen countries in Eastern
2 Inthepresentpaper,theterm“EasternEurope”referstothecountriespar-ticipating in theEasternPartnership initiative, i.e.Armenia,Azerbaijan,Belarus,Georgia,MoldovaandUkraine.
3 KatarzynaPełczyńska-Nałęcz,Integrationorimitation?EUpolicytowardsitsEasternNeighbours,OSWStudies,No36,CentreforEasternStudies,Warsaw2011,p.29,http://www.osw.waw.pl/sites/default/files/PRACE_36_en.pdf.
PO
INT
OF
VIE
W 0
7/20
13
12
Europe and the SouthernMediterranean4. The ENP introducedasignificantchangeintheUnion’sattitudetowardsEasternEu-rope.TheEUstartedtorecognisetheregionasitsdirectneigh-bourhood, and consequently it becamenecessary for theUnionto step up its political and financial involvement there. At thesame time, a separation was introduced in EU policy betweentheEasternEuropeancountries andRussia,whichdidnotpar-ticipateintheENP5.ThismeantasignificantchangeintheEU’sperceptionof thecountriesof theregion,whichwereno longerseen as theRussian-dominatedpost-Soviet area, but as theUn-ion’sneighbourswithprospectsofrapprochementwiththeEU6.TheprimaryobjectiveoftheENPwasdefinedas“strengtheningthestability,securityandprosperity”of theUnionanditseast-ernneighbours,buildingclosermutualrelations,andachievingeconomicandpoliticalintegration.TheEUalsocommitteditselfto steppingupefforts to resolve regional conflicts7.ThescaleofEUinvolvementbecameconditionalonitsneighboursrespectingdemocraticvalues,humanrights,theprinciplesofmarketecono-myandsustainabledevelopment.ItwasemphasisedthattheENPhadnotbeenconceivedofasaninstrumentofEUenlargement,althoughmembership prospectswere not ruled out. The scopeof theENPwas expanded in 2007 to include the strengthening
4 CommunicationfromtheEuropeanCommission,EuropeanNeighbourhoodPolicystrategypaper,12.05.2004,http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/strat-egy/strategy_paper_en.pdf
5 RussiawasnotinterestedinparticipatingintheENP.TheEUandRussiaco-operatewithintheframeworkoftheso-calledCommonSpaces.In2010theparties reached agreement on the Partnership forModernisation,whichwas supposed to lend a new impulse to the EU-Russia relations. See theJointStatementon thePartnership forModernisationEU-RussiaSummit31 May-1 June 2010, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/er/114747.pdf
6 OneoftheobjectivesoftheENPwasto“preventtheemergenceofnewdi-vidinglinesbetweentheenlargedEUanditsneighbours”.EuropeanNeigh-bourhoodPolicystrategypaper,p.3,op. cit.
7 Thefrozenconflictsintheeasternneighbourhoodinclude:Moldova’scon-flictwiththebreakawayregionofTransnistria;Georgia’sconflictwiththebreakawayregionsofAbkhaziaandSouthOssetia;andtheconflictbetweenArmeniaandAzerbaijanovertheNagorno-Karabakhregion.
PO
INT
OF
VIE
W 0
7/20
13
13
of trade and economic co-operation (through the launch of ne-gotiationsonfreetradeareas),startingco-operationonmobility(negotiationsonvisafacilitationsandreadmission),steppingupsectoralco-operation,andintroducinganoptionforneighbourstoparticipateintheEUprogrammesandagencies8.
3. The Eastern Partnership
Maintainingasingleframeworkforthedisparateneighbourhoodsintheeastandinthesouthturnedouttobedifficult.Asaresult,tworegionaldimensionsof theENPweredefined: theUnion fortheMediterranean,coveringtenNorthAfricanandMiddleEast-erncountriesin2008,andtheEasternPartnershipforEasternEu-ropeandtheSouthernCaucasusin2009.ThismovewasinfluencedalsobyinternalrivalrybetweenthoseEUmemberstatesthatwereinterestedinsteppingupEUinvolvementinthesouth,andthoseseekingagreaterEUpresenceintheeast.LaunchedinaperiodofeconomicprosperityintheEU,thetworegionaldimensionswerealso intended to strengthen the Union’s position as a global ac-tor.Theobjectivesofensuringstability in theneighbourhood, inwhichtheinvolvementoftheUnitedStateswasdecreasing,andofstrengtheningEUinfluence,reflectedtheUnion’sfaithinitsownpowerandanambitiontoplayakeyroleininternationalpolitics.
TheprincipalobjectiveoftheEaPwasdefinedas“thepoliticalas-sociationandeconomicintegration”oftheEUandtheinterestedpartnercountries9.Inpractice,thatwassupposedtomeancreatingacommonfreetradearea,aswellastheintegrationofthepartner
8 CommunicationfromtheEuropeanCommission,StrengtheningtheEuro-peanNeighbourhoodPolicy,4December2006,http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/com06_726_en.pdf
CommunicationfromtheCommission,AStrongEuropeanNeighbourhoodPol-icy,5December2007,http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/com07_774_en.pdf
9 Joint Declaration of the Prague Eastern Partnership Summit, Prague,7.05.2009,p.6,http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/neighbourhood/east-ern_partnership/documents/prague_summit_declaration_en.pdf
PO
INT
OF
VIE
W 0
7/20
13
14
countries’economieswiththeEuropeanmarket.However,stillnodecisionsweretakenongranting(orrefusing)membershippros-pectstotheEaPcountries.Onthatoccasion,theoriginalobjectivesof theENPwere also restated as stimulating themodernisationanddevelopmentofthepartnercountriesinlinewithEuropeanmodels,andpromotingco-operationbasedondemocraticandfree-marketvalues.The setofEUpolicy instrumentswasexpanded,andthepolicyitself,whichuntilthenhadbeenimplementedonabilateralbasis,wasextendedtoincludeamultilateraldimensionaimednotonlyatbuildingcloserrelationsbetweentheEUandtheregion,butalsoamongtheindividualEasternEuropeancountries.The main focus was placed on negotiating new kinds of treatyagreements(AssociationAgreementsandDeepAndComprehen-siveFreeTradeAreaAgreementsthatwouldreplacethePCAsdat-ingbacktothe1990s)anddevelopingpositiveco-operation(eco-nomic integration, EU support for reforms andmodernisations,measurestostrengthencivilsociety,etc.).Indoingso,theEUtriedtoavoidproblemsthatcouldobstruct the implementationof theinitiative, suchaspossible confrontationwithRussia, aswell asissuessuchasregionalsecurityandtheregulationoffrozencon-flicts(whichde factowerenotincludedintotheEaPscopebutwerecoveredbytheCommonSecurityandDefencePolicy).
4. The ENP after the ‘Arab Spring’
Intheperiodafter2004,theENPwasimplementedinarelativelystablepoliticalenvironmentunaffectedbyunpredictablecrises10thatcouldunderminethispolicy.Intheeast,theRussianinter-ventioninGeorgiawastheonlyexception,whichtosomeextentinfluenced the Union’s decision to launch the Eastern Partner-ship.The‘Arabspring’inearly2011andthetopplingofregimesinTunisia,EgyptandLibya,aswellastheprotestsintheothercoun-tries of Northern Africa, fundamentally changed the political
10 Theprotracted Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the instability inLebanonarelastingfeaturesofthepoliticalconditionsintheMiddleEast.
PO
INT
OF
VIE
W 0
7/20
13
15
contextoftheENPandforcedtheEUtomakemorechangestoitspolicies towards theneighbours.Those events called intoques-tion theEU’soriginalapproach to thesouthernneighbourhood,where thepriorityhadbeen toensurestabilityandsecuritybyco-operatingwiththelocalauthoritarianregimesattheexpenseof support for democratisation or civil society.Meanwhile, au-thoritariantendencieswerealsoontheriseintheeasternneigh-bourhood.Asaresult,theEUstartedtomakemodificationstoitsneighbourhoodpolicy;thesedidnotconsiderablyalterthebasicassumptionsofthatpolicy,butwereprimarilyaimedatimprov-ingtheeffectivenessof its instruments.Thechangesconcernedinparticular:(1)adoptingamorevariedapproachtobettertakeinto account each neighbour’s local conditions and aspirationswithregardtotheEU;(2)strengtheningconditionalitybyintro-ducingthe‘moreformore’rulewhichmadethescaleofEUsup-portdependentofprogressinEuropeanintegrationandreforms;(3)attachinggreatersignificanceto,andbecomingmoreinvolvedin,co-operationwithcivilsociety11.
***
Still, the Union has been largely reactive in implementing itsneighbourhood policy: changes were always introduced in re-sponsetodevelopments,andneveranticipatedevents.TheENPwaslaunchedbecauseoftheEU’seastwardenlargementandthepressurefromthenewCentralEuropeanmembers.InthecaseoftheEasternPartnership,oneoftheimpulsescamefromtheRus-sianinterventioninGeorgiawhichthreatenedtodestabilisetheentireSouthernCaucasus,andindirectly,alsofromtheRussian-Ukrainiangascrisisintheearly2009.Finally,theENPreformaf-ter2011wasaconsequenceofthe‘ArabSpring’,overtheoutbreakofwhichtheEUhadhadnoinfluence.
11 RafałSadowski,EuropeanNeighbourhoodPolicyPackage–ConclusionsfortheEasternPartners’,OSW Commentary,CentreforEasternStudies,25May2012,http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-commentary/2012-05-25/european-neighbourhood-policy-package-conclusions-eastern-partn
PO
INT
OF
VIE
W 0
7/20
13
16
II. lITTlE chaNgE IN ThE EaSTErN NEIghbOurhOOd
Thearrestandconvictionin2011ofUkraine’sformerprimemin-isterYuliaTymoshenkotriggeredanintensivedebateonthecon-ditionofdemocracyinthecountriesofEasternEurope.TheEaPcountrieswerecriticisedfortheriseofundemocratictendencies:thisrefersnotonlytoUkraine,butalsotoGeorgia,aswellasBela-rusandAzerbaijan, the twoEaPcountriesregardedasauthori-tarian12.IntheEU’sperception,theerosionofdemocracyintheeastern neighbourhood became even more pre-eminent whenviewedagainst thebackgroundof the changes triggeredby the‘ArabSpring’inNorthAfrica.
DevelopmentsintheeasternneighbourhoodsincethelaunchoftheENPin2004havehardlymettheEU’sexpectations.MeasuredbythecriteriaofthemainobjectivesofEUpolicy,i.e.stabilityandregional security, democratic and free-market transformations,andintegrationwiththeEU,thesituationinthecountriesoftheregionhasnotchangedconsiderably,andhasworsenedinsomerespects. Analysis of the various criteria and indexes describ-ingthechangeinthoseareassince2004showsthatthegrowing
12 Tadeusz Iwański, Rafał Sadowski, Anna Kwiatkowska-Drożdż, ArturCiechanowicz,ThecrisisinEU/UkrainerelationssurroundingTymoshen-ko,Eastweek,CentreforEasternStudies,9May2012,http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/eastweek/2012-05-09/crisis-eu/ukraine-relations-sur-rounding-tymoshenko
KamilKłysiński,RafałSadowski,Belarus’sdiplomaticwarwiththeEuro-peanUnion,Eastweek,CentreforEasternStudies,29February2012,http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/eastweek/2012-02-29/belaruss-diplomat-ic-war-european-union
AleksandraJarosiewicz,Eurovision:Azerbaijan’sfailuretopromoteitself,Eastweek, Centre forEasternStudies, 30May 2012, http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/eastweek/2012-05-30/eurovision-azerbaijan-s-failure-to-promote-itself
Georgia: Police break up protest aimed at preventing Independence Dayparade,Eastweek,CentreforEasternStudies,1June2011,http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/eastweek/2011-06-01/georgia-police-break-protest-aimed-preventing-independence-day-parade
PO
INT
OF
VIE
W 0
7/20
13
17
involvementoftheEUandthedevelopmentofitsbureaucraticin-strumentshasfailedtobringaboutanyrealimprovementsintheneighbourhood, revealing the limitsof theEU’s ability to influ-encethesituationintheEaPcountries.
1. Democracy and regional security
NoneofthesixEaPcountriesaredemocraticstatesbyEuropeanstandards.Accordingtovariousrankings,theyareeitherpartlydemocratic (Moldova, Ukraine, Georgia, Armenia) or authori-tarian regimes (Belarus andAzerbaijan).None of the countrieshave reported considerable improvement in this respect since2004,andinmostofthemthesituationhashardlychangedatall.Ukraine, where the situation deteriorated markedly after 2010following aperiodof growingpolitical freedomsafter the 2004OrangeRevolution,isoneofthenegativeexamples.
Figure 1.DemocracyIndex(EconomistIntelligenceUnit)
2.0
2.5
3.0
3.5
4.0
4.5
5.0
5.5
6.0
6.5
7.0
Ukraine
Moldova
Georgia
Azerbaijan
Belarus
Armenia
2006 2008 2010 2011 2012
4.15 4.09 4.09 4.09 4.09
4.904.62 4.59
3.31 3.19 3.153.15
3.15
3.163.343.343.34
3.04
4.74
5.53
1-no
dem
ocra
cy; 1
0-fu
ll de
moc
racy
5.91
6.326.326.336.506.50
5.946.30
6.946.94
Source:EconomistIntelligenceUnit,https://www.eiu.com/public/topical_re-port.aspx?campaignid=DemocracyIndex12
PO
INT
OF
VIE
W 0
7/20
13
18
country freedom in the world(1 = free – 7 = not free)
year 2004 2007 2009 2011 2012 2013
PR CL
statu
s
PR CL
statu
s
PR CL
statu
s
PR CL
statu
s
PR CL
statu
s
PR CL
armenia 4 4 PF 5↓ 4 PF 6↓ 4 PF 6 4 PF 6 4 PF 5↑ 4
azerbaijan 6 5 NF 6 5 NF 6 5 NF 6 5 NF 6 5 NF 6 5
belarus 6 6 NF 7↓ 6 NF 7 6 NF 7 6 NF 7 6 NF 7 6
georgia 4 4 PF 3↑ 3↑ PF 4↓ 4↓ PF 4 3↑ PF 4 3 PF 3↑ 3
Moldova 4 3 PF 4 3 PF 4 4↓ PF 3↑ 3↑ PF 3 3 PF 3 3
ukraine 4 4 F 3↑ 2↑ F 3 2 PF 3 3↓ PF 4↓ 3 PF 4 3
PR–politicalrights F–free NF–notfreeCL–civilliberties PF–partlyfree ↑–improvement↓–decline
Source:FreedomHouseFoundation,http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-2013
Theabsenceofprogressindemocratisationisvisibleinhowelec-tionshavebeenheldintheregion’scountriesoverrecentyears.Thecharacterofballots isoneofthemost importantcriteria inassessingtheconditionofdemocraticinstitutions,andtheEUhasmadeitsactivitiesintheneighbourhoodconditionalonsuchas-sessments.ElectionsheldinalltheEaPcountriesafter2008weremarred bymore or less serious infringements of voting proce-dures.Thisreferstotechnicalissuesandtheorganisationofelec-tions,butalso,moreimportantly,torespect(orlackthereof)forthefundamentalprincipleoffreedomofchoice.Apositiveexam-plecomesfromGeorgia,andespeciallyitsmostrecentparliamen-taryelectionsheldon1October2012,whenademocraticchangeofgovernmenttookplace,andtheOSCErecognisedtheelection
PO
INT
OF
VIE
W 0
7/20
13
19
as free, despite some shortcomings13.The situationhas also im-provednoticeablyinMoldova,wheretheOSCEpositivelyassessedthelastparliamentaryelectionsin201014andcommendeditasanimprovement over the rigged elections ofApril 2009.OSCE re-portshavebeenquitepositiveabouttheelectionsinArmeniainrecentyears,eventhoughtheyhavepointedtoanumberofshort-comings,asaresultofwhichtheelectionscouldnotberecognisedasfullydemocratic.Ukraine,ontheotherhand,hasexperiencedarelapse,bestexemplifiedbytheparliamentaryelectionsinOc-tober2012,15whichreceivedmuchmorecriticismfromtheOSCEobserversthanthepreviousballotin2010.Intheremainingtwocountries, i.e.AzerbaijanandBelarus,noneof thegeneralelec-tionsofrecentyearsmetthecriteriaofafreeanddemocraticvote.
Norhastherebeenhardlyanyprogressintermsofregionalse-curity.Innoneofthefourregionalconflictshasthesituationim-proved;onthecontrary,allhaveremainedhighlyvolatile.InthecasesofAbkhaziaandSouthOssetiainGeorgia,thefeasibilityofapeacefulresolutionhasdiminishedconsiderablyasaresultoftheGeorgian-RussianwarinAugust2008,afterwhichthetwocoun-triesbrokeoffdiplomaticrelations.ThestatusoftheArmenian-AzericonflictoverNagorno-Karabakhalsoremainsveryvolatile,and a newoutbreak of armed operations cannot be ruled out16.
13 OfficeforDemocraticInstitutionsandHumanRights,GeorgiaParliamen-taryElections1October2012,OSCE/ODIHRElectionObservationMission,FinalReport,Warsaw,2012,http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/98399
14 OfficeforDemocraticInstitutionsandHumanRights, RepublicofMoldovaEar-lyParliamentaryElections28November2010,OSCE/ODIHRElectionObserva-tionMission,FinalReport,Warsaw,2011,http://www.osce.org/odihr/75118
15 OfficeforDemocraticInstitutionsandHumanRights,UkraineParliamen-taryElections28October2012,OSCE/ODIHRElectionObservationMission,FinalReport,Warsaw,2013,http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/98578
16 LawrenceSheets,A‘FrozenConflict’ThatCouldBoilOver,The International Herald Tribune,8March2012.
Aleksandra Jarosiewicz, Krzysztof Strachota, ‘Nagorno-Karabakh – con-flictunfreezing’,OSW Commentary,CentreforEasternStudies,26October2011, http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-commentary/2011-10-26/nagornokarabakh-conflict-unfreezing
PO
INT
OF
VIE
W 0
7/20
13
20
Thecountriesinvolved,especiallyAzerbaijan,havebeenarmingthemselvesmoreintensivelyinrecentyears,andthenumberofincidents intheborderareashasalso increased,with63peoplekilledbetweenthebeginningof2011andmid-201217.TherelativestabilisationoftheTransnistrianconflictinmid-2012,whenChis-inauandthebreakawayregionresumedcontacts,hardlyconsti-tuted a breakthrough. Transnistria has subsequently adoptedamorerigidstanceinthepeacetalkswithMoldovainmid-2012,asaresultofwhichthenegotiationsarestuckinstalemate,andanincreasednumberofincidentsbetweenthetwosideshasbeenreportedsincethespringof201318.Theriskoftheconflictescalat-ingwouldincrease,particularlyifrealrapprochementoccurredbetweenChisinauandtheEU;thiswouldthreatenthegeopoliti-calinterestsofTiraspol’smainprotector,Russia,whichcouldusetheconflictinstrumentallytoblocktheprogressofMoldova’sEu-ropeanintegration.RussiahasbeencontinuallyactiveinTransn-istria in thefieldofsecurity (forexample, in2012 it steppedupcontrolofTransnistria’sinstitutionsofforce,andincidentshavebeenreportedintheborderareain2013)19,whichshowsthatsuchascenarioisindeedpossible.
Despite the European Union’s declared ambitions, its impactontheresolutionofanyoftheseconflictshasbeen limited.The
17 JoshuaKucera,SeriousEscalation inArmenia-AzerbaijanViolenceGreetsClinton,Eurasianet.org,http://www.eurasianet.org/node/65501
Morethan30peoplediedin2012alone(source:AgenceFrancePress).18 For example, inApril 2013 threeMoldovanpolice officerswere beaten in
BenderbypeopleassociatedwiththeTransnistriansecurityservices;theTransnistrianauthoritiesstagedablockadeoftheChisinau-controlledpris-oninBender;andtheTransnistrianauthoritiesunsuccessfullyattemptedtoestablishacustomscontrolpost inthevillageofVarniţa locatedinthesecurityzoneandcontrolledbyMoldova(formoreinformationonthelatterincident, seeEvgeniy Sholar,Nikolai Pakholnitsky,TatianaGyska,Voen-nayagra«Varnitsa»,Kommersant Moldova,27April2013,http://www.kom-mersant.md/node/16593).
19 Wojciech Konończuk,Witold Rodkiewicz, Could Transnistria blockMol-dova’s integration with the EU?, OSW Commentary, Centre for EasternStudies, 23.10.2012, http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-commen-tary/2012-10-23/could-transnistria-block-moldovas-integration-eu
PO
INT
OF
VIE
W 0
7/20
13
21
reasonsincludetheEU’sweakpoliticalpositionintheregion,andthe fact that theUnion lacks effective instruments to influencethepartiesinvolved(forexample,incontrasttotheWesternBal-kans,wheremembershipprospectsandtheambitionofallcoun-triesintheregiontointegratewiththeEUwereamongthemostimportantinstruments).
2. Free-market transformations and economic development
EconomicandsocialtransformationsintheEaPcountriespresentamixedpicture.Noneofthecountrieshavemadethesubstantialprogresswhichwouldmeet theEU’sexpectations.Transforma-tionsofthesystemofgovernmentintheEasternEuropeancoun-triesareslowandhavestumbledonmanymoreproblemsthanwasthecaseintheCentralEuropeancountrieswhichbecameEUmembersin2004and2007.
The Bertelsmann Foundation Transformation Index, whichmeasurestheconditionofdemocracyandtheprogressofmarketeconomyreforms,pointstotwopositiveexamplesofMoldovaandGeorgia, the twocountries thatdidmakeconsiderableprogressbetween2003and2012. In thecaseofGeorgia this inter alia re-flectsthedemocraticchangesthatoccurredafterthe2003‘RoseRevolution’;andinthecaseofMoldova,therisetopowerofapro-Europeancoalitionin2009. Intheothercountriesthesituationworsenedduringthesameperiod,mostnotablyinArmeniaafter2008(asaresultofthedeeppoliticalcrisisafterthe2008generalelection, among other factors20) and in Ukraine (which experi-encedarelapseafterthesuccessofthe2004OrangeRevolution).
20 FormoreinformationseeInternationalCrisisGroup,Armenia:Pickingupthe Pieces, 2008, http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/europe/b48_armenia_picking_up_the_pieces.pdf
PO
INT
OF
VIE
W 0
7/20
13
22
Figure 2.Democracyandmarketeconomy(BertelsmannTrans-formationIndex)
Ukraine
Moldova
Georgia
Belarus
Azerbaijan
Armenia
2003*
* based on 2010 methodology
2008 2010 2012
1-w
orst
sco
re; 1
0-be
st s
core
3.0
3.5
4.0
4.5
5.0
5.5
6.0
6.5
7.0
5.74
5.91
6.93
6.55
5.966.24
5.795.93
3.99
6.41
5.755.59
4.47 4.524.36
4.47
4.06
6.60
6.03
5.88
4.51
4.85 4.85
Source:BertelsmannFoundation,http://www.bti-project.org/index/
Belarus,whichdoesnothavewell-developedrelationswith theEUandistheEaPcountrywithwhichtheEUisleastinvolved,hasperformedbestintermsofthehumandevelopmentindexoftheUnitedNations Development Programme (UNDP), and in rank-ingsofeconomicdevelopmentmeasuredbyGDPper capitabasedonpurchasingpowerparity.
PO
INT
OF
VIE
W 0
7/20
13
23
countryhuman development Index
(0.000 worst score – 1.000 best score)/ position in ranking
year 2005 2010 2011 2012
armenia 0.775/83 0.695/76 0.716/86 0.729/87
azerbaijan 0.746/98 0.713/67 0.700/91 0.734/82
belarus 0.804/64 0.732/61 0.756/65 0.793/50
georgia 0.754/96 0.698/74 0.733/75 0.745/72
Moldova 0.708/111 0.623/99 0.649/111 0.660/113
ukraine 0.788/76 0.710/69 0.729/76 0.740/78
Source:UNDP,http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/
AzerbaijanhasmarkedlyreducedthegapseparatingitseconomyfromtheEU,but thishashappened irrespectiveofEUsupport,primarilythankstothecountry’snaturalresourcewealthanditsrevenuesfromexportstotheEuropeanUnion.
Figure 3.GDPPPPofEaPcountriesas%ofEUGDPPPP
Ukraine
Moldova
Georgia
Belarus
Azerbaijan
Armenia
2004 2007 2009 2011 20120
10
20
30
40
50 [%]
13
8 9 10 11 11
14
26
2123
2123 24
2932
3632 33
5047
43
18 1817 17
Source:Author’sowncalculationsbasedonIMFdata,www.imf.org
PO
INT
OF
VIE
W 0
7/20
13
24
Ontheotherhand,thecountriesmostcommittedtorapproche-mentwiththeUnion,principallyMoldovabutalsoUkraine,havereported little improvement of their development indexes. Thesame applies to performancewith regard to economic freedomandtheeaseofdoingbusiness,withMoldovaandUkrainebeingtheworstperformers.
countryIndex of economic freedom
(heritage foundation & Wall Street Journal) (0 worst score – 100 best score)/position in ranking
year 2004 2007 2009 2011 2012 2013
armenia 70.3/23 68.6/34 69.8/31 69.7/36 68.8/39 69.4/38
azerbaijan 53.4/116 54.6/111 57.9/97 59.7/91 58.9/91 59.7/87
belarus 43.1/146 47.0/144 44.9/167 47.9/155 49.0/153 48.0/153
georgia 58.9/78 69.3/30 69.7/32 70.4/28 69.4/34 72.2/21
Moldova 57.1/93 58.7/83 54.8/120 55.7/120 54.4/124 55.5/115
ukraine 53.7/114 51.5/134 48.8/152 45.8/163 46.1/163 46.3/161
Source:HeritageFoundationandWall Street Journal,http://www.heritage.org/index/
PO
INT
OF
VIE
W 0
7/20
13
25
Figure 4.DoingBusiness
Ukraine
Moldova
Georgia
Belarus
Azerbaijan
Armenia
2006 2008 2010 2012 2013
160 [position in ranking]
140
120
100
80
60
40
20
0
46
98
83 9287
81 83
97
67
106100
115
64 69
58
41
2113 16 9
44
144 147 152
137
124
5555
66
32
Source:WorldBank/DoingBusinessProject,http://www.doingbusiness.org/rankings
Oneoftheprioritiesofco-operationundertheENPistocombatcor-ruption.However,withtheexceptionofGeorgia,andtoalesserex-tentMoldova,noneoftheEaPcountrieshavereportedanymarkedimprovementinthisrespectcomparedtothesituationin2004.
Figure 5.CorruptionPerceptionsIndex(TransparencyInternational)
Ukraine
Moldova
Georgia
Belarus
Azerbaijan
Armenia
2004 2007 2009
1-co
rrup
t; 10
-no
corr
uptio
n
2011 20121
2
3
4
5
6
3.13.3
1.92.0
2.32.3
2.62.73.13.43.6
5.2
2.62.9
4.1
2.22.1 2.2
2.42.7
3.3
4.1
2.72.83.0
3.4
Source:TransparencyInternational,www.transparency.org/research/cpi/
PO
INT
OF
VIE
W 0
7/20
13
26
3. Economic integration with the EU
TheEU’seffortstodeveloprelationswiththeeasternneighbour-hoodhavenotresultedinclosereconomicintegrationeither.De-spite themeasures takentoremovebarriers to tradeexchange,andtheoverallincreaseinthevolumeoftrade,theUnion’ssharein the EaP countries’ trade did not change significantly in theyears2004–2011.Moldovaisanexceptionhere:theUnion’sshareinitstradeincreasedby11percentintheperiodinquestion(from43%to54%forMoldova’stotaltradeturnover).Interestingly,theEU’s shares in the tradeofUkraineandGeorgia, the twocoun-trieswhichalongwithMoldovahavemadethegreatestprogressinpoliticalrapprochementandfree-tradeareanegotiationswiththeUnion,aresmallerthanitssharesinthetradeoftheotherEaPcountries.
Figure 6.EUshareintradeofEaPcountries
Ukraine
Moldova
GeorgiaBelarus
Azerbaijan
Armenia
200620052004
[%]
20082007 2010 2011200920
30
40
50
60
28
32 3232
3232 32
33 33
38 38 3839
41
44 45 45
45
47 47 46
3030
29 29
28 2828
27 27
25
26
31
32
35
45
53 5452
3433
43
45
Source:Author’sowncalculationsbasedonIMFdata
ThedynamicsoftradeexchangehavemainlybeeninfluencedbytheeconomicdevelopmentsintheEuropeanUnionandthesitu-ationonglobalmarkets.TheUnion’sfirstfinancialcrisisin2009ledtoanoticeabledecreaseintradewiththeEasternPartnership
PO
INT
OF
VIE
W 0
7/20
13
27
countries,anditwasonlyin2011thatthevolumeoftradestartedtoreturntothe2008levels.Thisshowsthattheeconomicsitua-tionintheEUandintheneighbourcountrieshasamuchgreaterimpactontheintensityofeconomicco-operationthanthemeas-urestakenaspartoftheENP.
Figure 7.TotalEaPexportstoandimportsfromEU[US$ bn]
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 201110
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
EaP exports to EU
18.9 20.726.1
25.9 27.7
44.7
27.232.5
43.6
61.0
26.4
32.3
51.8
34.5
19.515.9
EaP imports from EU
Source:Author’sowncalculationsbasedonIMFdata,www.imf.org
PO
INT
OF
VIE
W 0
7/20
13
28
III. ThE ParTNErS’ PErcEPTIONS Of WhaT ThE Eu haS TO OffEr
TheEuropeanUnionisnottheonlypartytoexperienceasenseofunfulfilledexpectationswithregardtorelationsbetweenitselfandtheEaPcountries.Thepartnercountriesalsoareincreasing-lydisillusionedwithEUpolicy,becausewhattheUnionhastoof-ferdoesnotmatchtheirexpectations.Despitedeclarationsabout“co-ownership”oftheEaPinitiativeandthefactthatactionsun-dertheENPshouldbejointlyagreedbytheUnionandthepart-ner countries, the ENP and the EaP are primarily instrumentsofEUpolicydesigned to serve thepursuitof theEU’s interests.Withinthisframework,theUnionhasproposedacertainmodelofrelationstowhichthepartnercountriesareexpectedtoadapt,withoutinfacthavinganyinfluenceonitsshape.ThepartnersdonotperceiveEuropeanintegrationastheirownproject.NeitherdotheelitesofEaPcountriesconsiderintegrationtobetheonlypathofdevelopmentavailabletothem.Thepartnercountries’at-titudestowardstheEUandtheleveloftheircommitmenttore-lationswith theUniondependonthecurrentpoliticalandeco-nomicsituationandtheshort-terminterestsoftherulingelites.
1. European integration and the partners’ interests
TheEuropeanNeighbourhoodPolicyandtheEasternPartnershipemploy themechanismsof theEUenlargementpolicy, includingtheadoptionoftheEU’sextensiveacquis bythepartners,inreturnforfinancialandtechnicalsupportorotherbenefitssuchastradepreferencesoraccess toEUprogrammesandagencies.However,notallEaPcountriesareinterestedinrapprochementwiththeUn-iononsuchterms.ForBelarusorAzerbaijan,thepriorityobjectivesincludeeconomicandtradeco-operation,technologytransferandeasieraccess to theEuropeanmarket (withcontinuedprotectionfortheirownmarkets).Theleadershipinbothcountriesopposespoliticalandeconomicliberalisation,whichisperceivedasathreattotherulingelites’positionontheinternalpoliticalscene.Belarus
PO
INT
OF
VIE
W 0
7/20
13
29
isfurthermoreinvolvedineconomicandpoliticalintegrationwithRussiawithintheframeworkoftheCustomsUnion.ForAzerbai-jan,ontheotherhand,thepriorityobjectiveistoselloiltotheEUmarkets(oilaccountsfor99.5%ofAzerbaijan’sexportstotheEU21).Thankstoitsoilexportrevenues,BakudoesnotdependonEUfi-nancial assistance,while theUnion is to some extent dependentonco-operationwithAzerbaijan,asitisoneofthemostimportantsuppliersofoiltotheEUmarkets,accountingfor4.7%ofEU’soilimportsin201122.
InthosecountriesforwhichintegrationwiththeEUisadeclaredpriority (Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine, Armenia), the problem isthatintegrationdoesnotoffersufficientbenefitswhichcouldoff-setitshighfinancialandsocialcosts.Theabsenceofmembershipprospectsundermines thesensibilityofadoptingEU legislationand standards, as thepartner countrieshaveno say in the for-mulationofEUlawsandsolutions,andhavenowaytorealisethebenefitsthattheseoffer.
Becauseofthefinancialcrisis intheeurozone,theeasternpart-nershaveceasedtoregardtheEUeconomicmodelastheoptimalwaytoachieveprosperityfortheircountries.ThisisallthemoreimportantasintegrationwiththeEuropeanUnionisnottheonlyoptionavailabletotheeasternneighbours.Analternativeispro-videdbytheintegrationprojectsinitiatedbyRussia,namelytheCustomsUnionwhichisexpectedtotransformintotheEurasianUnionin2015.Thetwoprojects, integrationwiththeEUandin-tegrationundertheaegisofRussia,aremutuallyexclusive.Thisis leading to growing rivalry between them, and is forcing theEaPcountriestochoosetheir integrationmodelsanddirections.Still, for thosecountries in the sharedneighbourhoodof theEU
21 2011figuresfromtheEuropeanCommission’sDirectorateGeneralforTrade:http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/september/tradoc_113347.pdf
22 EuropeanCommission,DirectorateGeneralforEnergy,RegistrationofCrudeOilImportsandDeliveriesintheEuropeanUnion(EU27),MarketObservatoryforEnergy,http://ec.europa.eu/energy/observatory/oil/import_export_en.htm
PO
INT
OF
VIE
W 0
7/20
13
30
and Russia which have strong economic, political and culturaltieswithbothsides,itisimportanttomaintainasgoodrelationsaspossiblewithbothbigneighbours.Thisiswhyallthepartnercountries(withthesoleexceptionofGeorgia)havebeentryingtopursueapolicyofbalancingbetweentheEUandRussiaandgain-ingbenefitsfrombothsides(includingfinancialassistance,tradepreferences, economic subsidies, political support, etc.). At thesametime,becauseoftheirheavyeconomicandpoliticaldepend-ence on Russia, the EU’s eastern neighbours have beenwary ofanysignificantdeteriorationintheirrelationswithRussia,whichrapprochementwithEuropecouldcause.Meanwhile,Russiaseestheregionasitsownsphereofinfluence,andhasbeentryingtocounteract its closer integrationwith theEU structures. For in-stance,theRussiangovernmenthasalreadythreatenedtorestrictUkraine’s access to the Russianmarket if the country signs thefree tradeagreementwith theUnion23. Inanother tellingexam-ple,MoldovahadtopostponethedeadlineforcomplyingwithitsobligationsundertheEnergyCommunity24underpressurefromRussia25.Withoutmeasurableeconomiccompensationandpoliti-calsupportfromtheUnion,thepartnercountrieswillnotriskanydeteriorationintheirrelationswithRussia.Ontheotherhand,the
23 Forexample,duringtheEurasianEconomicCommunitysummitinMos-cowon19March2012,theRussianpresidentDmitriMedvedevsaid:“Wehave talked about the benefits, and also about the difficulties, thatmayariseandarealreadyarisinginthecountrieswhicharenotmembersofthe CustomsUnion. This is life; if you are amember of an internation-al structure,yougetspecificprivileges. Ifyouoptout,youcanrun intotrouble.” Quoted in Vladimir Solovyov, Sergei Sidorenko, Bezotkaznayastrategia,Kommersant Ukraina,Issue45(1535),20March2012,http://kom-mersant.ua/doc/1896790
24 Thecommitmentsconcerntheliberalisationofacountry’senergymarketanditsintegrationwiththeEuropeanUnionunderEUlegislation(includ-ingtheimplementationoftheThirdEnergyPackage).
25 WitoldRodkiewicz,Moldovasignalsthatitmaywithdrawfromimplement-ingtheThirdEnergyPackage,Eastweek,CentreforEasternStudies,11July2012,http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/eastweek/2012-07-11/moldo-va-signals-it-may-withdraw-implementing-third-energy-package
EnergyCommunity,10thEnergyCommunityMinisterialCouncil,MeetingConclusions,Budva, 18October2012,http://www.energy-community.org/pls/portal/docs/1766216.PDF
PO
INT
OF
VIE
W 0
7/20
13
31
easternneighboursdoseedialogueandrapprochementwiththeUnionasawaytocounterbalancetheasymmetryintheirrelationswithRussia.TheEaPcountriesareafraidofabreakdownoftheprocessofEuropeanintegration,becausethatwouldconsiderablyunderminetheirpositionsvis-à-visMoscow.Belarusisacaseinpoint,asthecountry’sdependenceonRussiaincreasedafteritsre-lationshipwithBrusselsbrokedowninDecember2010,aftertheBelarusianregimesteppeduprepressionagainstthepublic.
ThepoliticalweaknessshownbytheUnioninitseffortstoman-agetheregionalconflicts inEasternEuropehasdiminishedtheimportanceofEuropeanintegrationonthepartnercountries’po-liticalagendas.ThisappliesforinstancetoAzerbaijanandArme-nia, forwhomtheir conflictover theNagorno-Karabakhregionisakeyissue.BecausetheEUpresenceinandimpactontheNa-gorno-Karabakhconflictislimited,itisnotperceivedasaninflu-entialpoliticalplayer.Nordo theEaPcountriesviewtheUnionasanactorthatcouldsupporttheminthepursuitoftheirmostimportantforeignpolicyobjectives;asaresult,theyarelessinter-estedinrealrapprochementwiththeUnion.ThisiswhatsetsthesituationintheEasternPartnershipapartfromearlierdevelop-mentsintheWesternBalkans,wheretheUnionplayedadecisiveroleintheresolutionofregionalconflicts,whichalsoboostedtheWesternBalkan countries’ commitment to theprocess ofEuro-peanintegration26.
2. Bureaucrats’ offers vs. politicians’ interests
The attitudes of the local political elites are crucial if any pro-gressistobemadeindevelopingcloserrelationswiththeEU.Po-liticalleadersinthepartnercountriesoftenuserapprochementwiththeUnioninstrumentallyasameanstoachieveshort-term
26 JanMuś,RafałSadowski(ed.),BałkanyZachodnieiintegracjaeuropejska:perspektywy i implikacje,Officeof theCommittee forEuropean Integra-tion,CentreforEasternStudies,Warsaw2008.
PO
INT
OF
VIE
W 0
7/20
13
32
politicalandeconomicgains.TheiraimsinrelationswiththeEUincludeinparticular:(1)usingEUsupporttoachievetheirforeignpolicyobjectives, (2)obtainingfinancialsupport for theircoun-tries,inwhichtheyareguidedbymercantilistattitudes,(3)us-ingcontactswiththeEUtoboosttheirownpoliticalpositions,(4)improvingtheirownimageinternationally,(5)legitimisingtheirregimes,inthecasesoftheundemocraticstates.
Becauseof thediscrepancybetween the statedobjectives of in-tegrationand the timeframes inwhich theyare supposed tobeachieved(adozenyearsormore)ontheonehand,andthecur-rent interestsofpoliticians in thepartnercountries (with timehorizonsofoneortwoyears)ontheother, theultimatesuccessofintegrationisofnoimportanceforthelatter.Thepoliticalandfinancialcostsof implementingreformshavealsobeendentingthe political will to achieve real progress. Any stimulus to re-formcomesnotfromtheideaofrapprochementwiththeUnion,but from those current economic and social challenges whicharelikelytounderminethepositionofthepoliticalelite.Itisthethreatofeconomiccrises,whichcouldleadtosocialprotests,andnotageneralvisionofbuildingprosperityhandinhandwiththeUnion,thatforcestheleaderstoundertakereforms.Insuchcas-es, thepartner statesoftenconsiderco-operationwith interna-tionalfinancial institutionssuchastheInternationalMonetaryFund,whichiscapableofquicklyprovidingconcreteadviceandfinancialassistance,tobemoreeffectivethanco-operationwiththeUnion. Ukraine’s co-operationwith the IMF after the 2009crisis isa case inpoint: somereformswere implemented inre-turnforfinancialassistance, includingtheadoptionofa lawonpensions,partialreformofthegasmarket,changesinthefiscalandbudgetpolicies,andbankingsectorrestructuring27.Belarusisanotherexample:after the2009economiccrisis, thecountry
27 See: SławomirMatuszak, Arkadiusz Sarna, From stabilisation to stagna-tion.ViktorYanukovych’sreforms,PointofView,CentreforEasternStud-ies, Warsaw, 2013, p. 21–22, http://www.osw.waw.pl/sites/default/files/PW_32_ANG_net.pdf
PO
INT
OF
VIE
W 0
7/20
13
33
implementedsomelimitedchangesinco-operationwiththeIMF(whichgranteditaloanofUS$3.5billion),asaresultofwhichthecountryconsiderablyimproveditsscoreintheWorldBank’sDo-ingBusinessranking.
ThepublicintheEaPcountriesexertsverylittlepressureontheleaders to pursue closer integration with the European Union.WiththeexceptionofMoldovaandGeorgia,thisissuehashadnoimpactonthegovernments’approvalratings,norisitdecisiveforsuccessattheballotbox.Fromthepublic’spointofview,theENPprocessisincomprehensible,anditseffectsbarelyvisible.Foror-dinarypeople,thekeyissueisvisaliberalisation,which,howev-er,isalong-termprocess.
Theoligarchicnatureoftheeasternneighbours’politicalsystemsandtheclosetiesbetweenthepoliticalandbusinesselites(todif-ferentdegreesandindifferentforms,dependingonthecountry)arealsoimportantfactorsinthiscontext.ThesehavetwokindsofseriousconsequencesfortheprospectsofintegrationwithEurope.
Firstly, the political elites are interested mainly in defendingtheirownpositionswithintheexistingsystemofpower,whichensuresbusinessinfluenceforthem.Asaresult,theyseektokeeptheexisting systems intact andare reluctant to implementanydeeperreforms.ThisapproachrunscountertotheassumptionsofEUpolicy,atthecoreofwhichtherearepoliticalandeconomicliberalisationandtransparencyofthesystemsofpower.ThemostextremeexamplescomefromtheauthoritarianregimesinBela-rusandAzerbaijan,butsimilarphenomenacanalsobeobservedin the other countries, where power and business assets havebeendividedupamongaclosedpoliticalclass.
The second consequence of this character of the political sys-temsconcernstheconsiderableinfluencethatoligarchicbusinessgroupshaveongovernmentdecisions.Theactionsofthosegroupsareguidedbycalculationsofself-interest,whichmaybefocused
PO
INT
OF
VIE
W 0
7/20
13
34
on maintaining dominant positions in certain sectors of theeconomy,businessbenefits,etc.Forthisreason,introducingfreecompetitionoropeninginternalmarkets–stepsenvisagedbythefree-tradeagreementwithUkraine,forinstance–maybedamag-ingtotheoligarchs.Ontheotherhand,theagreementalsocreatesnewopportunities for them, including access to theEUmarket(which is crucial to entrepreneursoperating inexport sectors).Consequently,thebusinesselitesdonottakeconsistentattitudestowardstheprocessofEuropeanintegrationorthereforms.Anyprogressinthisrespectwilldependoninternalconditions:someactionswillbeblocked,whileothersmaybeimplemented.
PO
INT
OF
VIE
W 0
7/20
13
35
Iv. dIffErENcES WIThIN ThE Eu
Apartfromtheobviousdifferencesbetweentheindividualpart-nercountries’relationswiththeEuropeanUnion,therearealsodifferences within the Union, as its members have not takenauniformpositionon theeasternpolicy.Thosedifferencesbe-tween the various players in the EU, the institutions and thememberstates,havecometotheforegroundasaresultofmount-ing internal problems, including the dispute over the futureshapeoftheEU,thefinancialcrisisandinstabilityinthesouth-ernneighbourhood.Whilethereisconsensusonthegeneralob-jectives of the neighbourhood policy, positions on the detailedissues differ according to the individual actors’ interests andpoliticalaims.Currently,threeissuesarekey:(1)thesignatureof the Association Agreements and the Deep And Comprehen-siveFreeTradeAgreements(DCFTAs),especiallywithUkraine;(2)visa liberalisationandtheshapeofmigrationpolicy;(3) thescale of EU involvement in the eastern neighbourhood. At thecoreofthedifferencesofpositionsontheseissuesaredifferentperceptions of the ultimate objective of European integration,and the related question about attitudes towards granting thepartnerstatesprospectsofmembership.
Inviewof theexistingdifferences, theEU’spolicy isacompro-misebasedonthelowestcommondenominator.Asthelong-termstrategicobjectiveof theneighbourhoodpolicy (membership intheUnion, or a different form of integration) is not clearly de-fined,andastheeasternneighbourhoodisoflittleimportanceforthemajorityoftheEUmembers,theEUinstitutionshavemainlybeentakingad hocactions.Consequently,theireffortsarenotfo-cusedonreachingspecific long-termpoliticalobjectives,butonfulfillingsuccessivebureaucraticprocedures(suchasnegotiatingsuccessivearticlesoftheAssociationAgreementsorvisaliberali-sationagreements,etc.),whicherodesthepoliticalsignificanceoftheEasternPartnership.
PO
INT
OF
VIE
W 0
7/20
13
36
1. Attitude towards the Association Agreement with Ukraine
WithregardtotheAssociationAgreementsandtheDCFTAs,thedifferencesintheindividualEUmembers’attitudesareduetothefact thatsomeof themtreatsignatureasan instrumentofcon-ditionality,whileothersseeitasaninstrumenttostimulatere-formsanddurablybindthepartnerswiththeEU.Intheformercase,theAgreementsareviewedasakindof‘stickandcarrot’;thebenefitstheyofferareseenasarewardforprogressintransfor-mation,andrefusaltosignasapunishmentforfailuretodeliveroncommitments.Inthelattercase,theAgreementsaretreatedasamechanismservingthepurposesofmodernisationandintegra-tionwiththeEUmoreeffectivelythanthemechanismsoriginallyprovidedforintheENP(forinstance,theylaydownspecificob-ligationsanddetailedschedulesfortheimplementationofasub-stantialportionoftheEU’sacquis).
Those differences have become most prominent in the case ofUkraine, and the EU’s decision to suspend the signature of theAssociationAgreementand theDCFTA initialled in201228 in re-sponsetothe2011imprisonmentofoppositionleaders,includingtheformerPMYuliaTymoshenkoandtheInteriorMinisterYuriLutsenko.Inresponse,in2012theEUformulatedthreeconditionsthatUkrainewouldhavetofulfilinorderforthesuspensiontoberevoked;theseconcernedstoppingrepression,conductingdemo-craticelections,andachievingprogressinreforms29.However,thepoliticalpressurefromtheEUfailedtopersuadeKyivtomeettheconditions.Inthissituationsomememberstatesandcivilsociety
28 Initialledintwostepson30Marchand18July.29 Štefan Füle, Speech at themeeting of theEU-UkraineParliamentaryCo-
operation Committee, 14 July 2012, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-12-448_en.htm?locale=en
TheconditionswererestatedintheEUcouncilconclusionsof10December2012,see:CounciloftheEU, CouncilconclusionsonUkraine,3209thForeignAffairsCouncilmeeting,Brussels,10.12.2012,http://www.consilium.euro-pa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/134136.pdf
PO
INT
OF
VIE
W 0
7/20
13
37
organisations argued that the agreements shouldnot be signed,pointinginthefirstplacetotheneedtostandupforhumanrights,whichisregardedasacornerstoneofEUpolicies.Fromthispointofview, it important for theEUtosave faceandrespondappro-priatelytothefactthatKyivhadignoreditscallstorespectdemo-cratic standards.On theotherhand, theadvocatesof signature,including some member states and business circles in the EU,pragmaticallyhighlightedtheneedtodefendeconomic interests(bysafeguardingtheinterestsofcompaniesdoingbusinessontheUkrainianmarket)andpoliticalobjectives(itwasarguedthattheagreementwasan instrument forbuildingcloser relationswiththeEU,andcouldpreventrapprochementwithRussia).Speedyim-plementationoftheobligationsundertheAssociationAgreement/DCFTAwasalsoexpectedtostimulatereforms.Failure tosigntheAgreement,ontheotherhand,wassaidtobelikelytobringnegativeconsequences for the futureofrelationswith theothercountriesintheeasternneighbourhood,andtoerodethepoliticalsignificanceoftheagreementsandthepoliticalwilltosignthem.
Itwasonlyinthespringof2013thattheUkrainiangovernmentgrad-uallystartedtotakeactiontomeettheEU’sconditions.On12Marchthe Ukrainian president issued a decree on European integration(obligingstateinstitutionstotakefasteractiontoimplementthenec-essarylegislativechanges,carryoutreformsandco-operatewithEUinstitutions),andon7April,YuriLutsenkowaspardoned.However,thosestepscanreasonablyberegardedasincomplete,andlargelyin-tendedasimage-improvingmeasures.ThedecreeonEuropeaninte-grationcontainsonlyverygeneralprovisions,whereaswhattheEUexpectsistangibleprogress.AsregardsLutsenko,hewasreleasedfromjailafterservinghalfhissentence,buthisconvictionwasnotlegallyoverturned,whichmeansthathewillnotbeabletoruninanyelectionsbeforetheconvictionrecordisexpungedin202130.
30 TadeuszA.Olszański,Ukraine:YuriLutsenkopardoned’,Eastweek,CentreforEasternStudies, 10April 2013,http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/eastweek/2013-04-10/ukraine-yuri-lutsenko-pardoned
PO
INT
OF
VIE
W 0
7/20
13
38
2. Attitudes towards visa liberalisation
Another contentious issue concerns the prospect of abolishingthevisaregimefortheeasternneighbours.Thisisanimportantquestionbecausevisaliberalisationiswhatmainlyintereststheleadershipsandpeopleofthepartnercountries.Inthecontextofamountingcrisis intheEU’smigrationpolicy,aswellasthefi-nancialcrisis,manyEUcountriesareunwillingtoproceedwithvisaliberalisation.InternalpoliticalconditionsandtheaversionofsomeEuropeansocietiestoeasingthevisaregimesandoffer-ing immigrants more access to labour markets are importantfactorshere31.Theadvocatesofquickliberalisation,ontheotherhand,believethatvisa-freetravelwouldcreateopportunitiesforthedevelopmentofhumancontacts,andseeitasaninstrumentto stimulate bottom-up transformations through co-operationat the level of civic society.Migration from the culturally closecountriesofEasternEuropeisalsoregardedasapotentialinstru-mentinsolvingthedemographicproblemsexperiencedbytheEUcountries.Finally,theeconomicaspects–namelyeconomicgainsfor the EU countries, promotion of border-area trade, develop-mentoftourismintheEUcountriesandthedevelopmentofbusi-nessco-operation–arealsoimportant32.Thedivisionbetweentheadvocatesandopponentsofvisaliberalisationrunspartlyalongcountrylines.ThememberstatesinfavourincludetheVisegradGroup, the Baltic States and Romania, while Germany, France,Austria and theNetherlands are against it.However, there are
31 Forexample,accordingtoaTransatlanticTrendssurveyfrom2011,52%ofEuropeansregardedimmigrationasaproblem,ratherthananopportuni-ty.TransatlanticTrends:Immigration,TheGermanMarshallFundoftheUnitedStates,2012,http://trends.gmfus.org/files/2011/12/TTImmigration_final_web1.pdf
32 Formoreinformationontheprospectsofvisa-freetravelbetweentheEUand its eastern neighbours seeMarta Jaroszewicz, ‘Making the impossi-blepossible.Theprospectsforvisa-freemovementbetweentheEUanditseasternpartners’,PointofView,CentreforEasternStudies,Warsaw,2012,http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/policy-briefs/2012-06-06/making-impossible-possible-prospects-visafree-movement-between-e
PO
INT
OF
VIE
W 0
7/20
13
39
alsodivisionswithincountries;whilebusinesscommunities,civ-ilsocietyorganisationsanddiplomatsgenerallyadvocateliberali-sation,institutionsinchargeofsecurity(suchasinteriorminis-triesandmigrationservices)tendtoopposeit.Insomecountries,significantsectionsofthepublicarealsoagainsteasingthevisaregime,whichaffectspoliticalparties’stancesontheissue.
3. The Eastern neighbourhood on the EU’s political agenda
DifferentactorsintheUnionalsohavedifferentviewsoftheroleoftheeasternneighbourhoodinEUpolicy.GiventheEU’smultipleprioritiesandlimitedpotential, thepositionoccupiedbyagivenregion in the EU’s political agenda is inevitably reflected in thescaleoftheUnion’srealpoliticalandfinancialinvolvementthere.OnthescaleoftheEU’sglobalinterests,theEaPcountriesareofsecondaryimportancebecauseoftheirlimitedeconomicandpolit-icalpotential.IntheUnion’stradepolicy,relationswiththeUnitedStates and other strategic partners such as India, China, Japan,CanadaandRussiaarecrucial. It is thosedirections thatattracttheattentionandinvolvementofEUofficialsinthefirstplace.
However,evenasfarastheUnion’simmediateneighbourhoodisconcerned,manyEUcountrieshavebeenattachinggreater sig-nificancetothedevelopmentofrelationswiththeUnion’ssouth-ern neighbours. The rivalry between the EUmembers focusedontheeasternneighbourhood,andthoseforwhomthesouthernneighbourhoodismoreimportant,isasoldastheENPitself33.Thedebatebetweenthetwocampsresumedinearly2011withtheout-breakofrevolutionsinNorthAfricaandthenegotiationsofthenewmulti-annualfinancialframeworkfortheyears2014–2020.Theexchange triggeredbya letterandanon-paperreleasedbysixsouthernEUmembersinFebruary2011,inwhichtheycalled
33 IvánMartín,NewcontextoftheUnionfortheMediterraneanandtheEast-ern Partnership, EaPCommunity, 2011, http://www.easternpartnership.org/community/interview/new-context-union-mediterranean-and-east-ern-partnership.
PO
INT
OF
VIE
W 0
7/20
13
40
for funds to be transferred from the eastern neighbourhood tothesoutherndimension,isacaseinpoint34.Eventthoughinsuc-cessive documents the European Commission tried to presentapictureofbalancedinvolvementinbothareas,thechangesim-plementedasaresultoftheENPreviewandtheactionsactuallybeing taken show that thedynamicsof theUnion’spolitical in-volvementisstrongertowardsthesouththanintheeast35.ThistendencywillcontinuebecauseofthecivilwarinSyria,instabil-ityinEgyptandLibya,andthemarkedriseinterrorthreatsandal-Qaeda-relatedactivitiesinNorthAfrica,whichhasalreadyledtotheFrenchmilitaryinterventionandthedeploymentofanEUtrainingmissioninMaliinearly2013.
34 SzymonAnanicz,Tug-of-waroverEU’spolicytowardsitsneighbours,OSWCommentary, Centre for Eastern Studies, 9 March 2011, http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-commentary/2011-03-09/tug-war-over-eu-s-policy-towards-its-neighbours
35 RafałSadowski,EuropeanNeighbourhoodPolicyPackage–ConclusionsfortheEasternPartners,OSW Commentary,CentreforEasternStudies,25May2012,http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-commentary/2012-05-25/european-neighbourhood-policy-package-conclusions-eastern-partn.
PO
INT
OF
VIE
W 0
7/20
13
41
v. challENgES fOr Eu POlIcY
InthecurrentpoliticalandeconomicsituationinEurope,threeprocesseswillhavethegreatestimpactonthefutureoftheUn-ion’s relations with its eastern partners: (1) economic develop-mentsintheEUmembercountriesandinEasternEuropeinthecontextoftheEU’sfinancialcrisisandeconomicslowdownintheEaPcountries;(2)possiblechangestotheUnion’sdecision-makingprocessesandinstitutionalmake-up;(3)Russia’spolicytowardstheregion.
1. Economic slowdown
Thecurrenteconomicconditionsarehardlyconducivetodevelop-ingcloserco-operationwiththeeasternneighboursintheimme-diatefuture.Figuresfor2012andforecastsfor2013showthatthepartnercountries’economieshavebecomeincreasinglyunstable.Over the last twoyears, theEaP countrieshavebeengraduallymakingupfor the losses incurredasaresultof the2009crisis,but thenewwaveof thefinancial crisis inEuropehas subduedgrowth.SlowereconomicgrowthhasbeenreportedeverywhereexceptArmenia andGeorgia36.Moreover, all the partner coun-triesapartfromAzerbaijanandBelarushaveseentheirforeigntrade deficits rise37, and all have been experiencing mountingbudgetaryproblems.
36 EveninGeorgia,whoseGDPgrew7.5%in2012,growthinthelastquarterof2012wasmarkedlyslower,at2.3%accordingtopreliminarydata.
37 Azerbaijanowesitstradesurplustorevenuesfromoilexports,andinBela-rus the surplus is largelygeneratedby theexport of oil andpetrochemi-calproductsmanufacturedinBelarusianplants,whichreceiveenergyre-sourcesfromRussiaatpreferentialprices.
PO
INT
OF
VIE
W 0
7/20
13
42
Macroeconomic data of the EaP countries for 2012
gdP change
in %
Infla-tion in %
foreign trade balance in uS$bln / as percentage of
gdP
Standard & Poor’s credit
rating*
armenia 7.2% 2.6% -2.55/26.3% nodata
azerbaijan 2.2% 1.1% +22.58/32.8% BBB-
belarus 1.5% 59.2% +0.2/0.3% B-
georgia 7.5% -0.3% -5.47/36.2% BB-
Moldova -0.8% 4.6% -3.05/43,5% nodata
ukraine 0.2% -0.2% -13.78/8% B
*Asof23April2013.ApartfromAzerbaijan,whichhasthelowestinvestment-graderating,theremainingcountrieshavespeculative-graderatings.
Source:Officialfiguresfromnationalstatisticaloffices,Standard&Poor’s,creditratings,http://www.standardandpoors.com(accesson23.04.2013)
ThedeterioratingeconomicsituationintheEUwillleadtolowerdynamicsoftradeexchangeandinvestment(aswasthecasedur-ingthe2009crisis),andwillmakeEUbusinesseslessinterestedintheeasternmarkets.ThefinancialsectorofUkraine,theonlyEaPcountrywhereEuropeanbankshadmademajorinvestments,is a case inpoint; in2012 several largeEuropeanbanks includ-ingErsteBank,Commerzbank,Swedbank,SociétéGénérale,SEBGroupandVolksbank sold thebanks theyowned inUkraine tolocalorRussianinvestors38.
38 RomanOlearchyk,Erste:latestEUbanktodumpUkraine,beyondbricsFinan-cial Times,20December2012,http://blogs.ft.com/beyond-brics/2012/12/20/erste-latest-eu-bank-to-dump-ukraine
YelenaGubar,RuslanChorniy,Ukrainameniayet investorov,Kommersant Ukraina,25December2012,http://www.kommersant.ua/doc/2097907
PO
INT
OF
VIE
W 0
7/20
13
43
ThisdeclineintheEuropeanentrepreneurs’ interest intheEaPmarketsmayhavepoliticalconsequencesanddiminish the twosides’politicalwilltosignandimplementtheAssociationAgree-mentsandfree-tradeagreements.Ontheonehand,thisappliestoEUbusinesses,andconsequentlyEUmemberstatesandinstitu-tionsalso.However,thefinancialcrisisandeconomicslowdownintheEUwillalsomakethepartnercountrieslessinterestedineconomicintegration,andthuslesswillingtobeartherelatedfi-nancialandpoliticalcosts.TheaboveexampleofUkraine’sbank-ingsectorshowsthatotherplayers,includingRussianinvestorsinparticular,maytakeadvantageofthedisinvestmentofEuro-peancapital.
ItappearsthattheeconomicdeclineinEuropeanmarketsandinthepartnercountriesmayhaveshort-andmedium-termconsequencesformutualeconomicrelations.IfthesituationintheEUimproves,interestindevelopingeconomicco-operationmayriseagain,aswasthecaseafterthe2009crisis, for instance,wheninvestmentsandtradeexchangedynamicsgrewintheperiodfrom2010to2011.
2. The future shape of the European Union
ThecurrentcrisisoftheUnion’sdecision-makingprocessesandthedebateontheEU’sfuturedevelopment,theprospectivescaleofpoliticalandeconomicintegration(includingquestionsaboutapoliticalunion),thepotentialformationofamultiple-speedEu-rope(asaresultoftheEurozoneseparatingitselffromtherest,among other factors), and finally the possible institutional re-form,willallaffecttheEU’srelationswiththeeasternpartnersevenmorethantheeconomiccrisis.Thecrucialquestionaboutthelong-termobjectivesofrelationswiththeeasternneighbourswillprobablyremainunanswereduntiltheUnionresolvesthesefundamentalissues.ThismeansthatanewdebateonathoroughreformoftheEU’spolicytowardsitsneighbourswillnotbepos-sibleinthecurrentconditions,andtheENPandtheEaPwillre-maintheprincipalinstrumentsofEUpolicy.
PO
INT
OF
VIE
W 0
7/20
13
44
The separation of theEuro zone and thepotential formation ofamultiple-speedEuropeanUnionwillhavevery serious conse-quencesfortheUnion’srelationswithitseasternneighbours,andmaypushtheregiondowntheEU’spoliticalagenda.MostoftheEUmember states interested in theEaP region,whichhithertohavebeenactivelystimulatingEUactivitiesintheeasternneigh-bourhood,will remain outside the Euro zone for a longer time(withtheexceptionsofSlovakia,EstoniaandeventuallyLatvia),andthismayunderminetheirinfluenceonthedirectionofdis-cussionsandEUpolicy.IfthedivisionswithintheUniondeepen,questionsaboutpossibleeastwardenlargementandtheeasternneighbourhood’sintegrationwithEuropewillloserelevance.Ontheotherhand,iftheEUsplitsintoseveralcirclesofintegration,itmightbetheoreticallyeasierfortheEaPcountriestoenterthelowestcircle.However,thatwouldbearlesspoliticalsignificancethan fullmembershipdoes today,and thebenefits that theEaPcountries could reap frommembership would be limited. Thatin turnwouldmakeEuropean integration less attractive to thepoliticalelitesandpublicsintheeasternneighbours,andwouldthuserodethepoliticalwilltopursuetransformationsbasedonEuropeanmodels.
3. The Eurasian Union
The fact that the EuropeanUnion is currently unprepared andlacks the politicalwill to deepen real integrationwith its east-ern partners is creating opportunities for Russia. In 2009Rus-sia launcheditsownprojectforEurasianintegration,conceivedof as competition for integrationwith theEU.Before that,Rus-sia’sstrategytowardstheEasternEuropeanstateswasbasedonbilateralactionandexploitedthosestates’politicalandeconomicdependencesonit,whichneverthelessfailedtoproducegenuineintegration.Eurasian integrationhas introducedanewelementtoRussia’s policy. Importantly,Russia’s project is nowbased oncommon legislation and supranational institutions, inwhich itresemblesEuropeanintegration.Russiaoffersmembercountries
PO
INT
OF
VIE
W 0
7/20
13
45
variousbenefits,mainlyofaneconomicnature,includingeasieraccesstotheRussianmarket,financialsupport(includingcheaploans)andpreferentialpricesforenergyresources.Ontheotherhand,itthreatenstotakethepreferencesbackifitsofferofinte-grationisdeclined.
UnlikeRussia’s previous initiatives, theCustomsUnion createdwithBelarusandKazakhstan,intendedasthefirststageofEura-sianintegration,isgraduallybecomingreality.Theconcretere-sultofthisforEUpolicyisthatnobroadereconomicintegrationbetweenBelarusandtheUnionwillbepossible,eveniftheatti-tudesoftheleadershipinMinskchange.Atstakeisnotonlythepossibilityofcreatingadeepandcomprehensivefreetradearea,but also the feasibility of negotiating an association agreement(especiallyconcerningthechaptersoneconomicco-operation)39.Armenia is another country where Russia’s strong dominancemayblockrealintegrationwiththeEU.RussiaisArmenia’smainpoliticalandsecuritypartner:itisthecountry’schiefallyinitsconflictswithAzerbaijanandTurkey,andmaintainsamilitarybaseinGiumri.Itisalsothemaineconomicpartnerasitprovidesmostofthecountry’sinvestments,isthebiggesttradingpartner,and also the most important destination for migrant workersfromArmenia,whoseremittancesaccountforamajorproportionofincome.EventhoughArmeniahasstartednegotiationsontheassociationagreementandtheDCFTA,theirimplementation,orevenratification,isveryuncertaingiventhescaleofthecountry’spoliticalandeconomicdependenceonRussia.
Russia has been focused on lobbying and pressuring UkraineandMoldova, the two countriesmost committed to rapproche-mentwiththeEuropeanUnion,tojointheEurasianUnion.ThechoicetobemadebyUkraine,thelargestcountryandthebiggesteconomy in the region (accounting for around 60% of the total
39 Azerbaijan,whichisnotaWTOmember,hasbeennegotiatinganassocia-tionagreementwiththeEUwithouttheDCFTApart.
PO
INT
OF
VIE
W 0
7/20
13
46
populationoftheEaPandaround55%ofGDPPPPofalltheeasternpartners)willbedecisive for thesuccessof the two integrationprojects. For now, continuing the policy of balance in relationswiththeEuropeanUnionandRussiahasbecomeanincreasinglydifficult task for theUkrainian leadership.Despite the fact thatintegrationwiththeEUremainsthedeclaredpriority,andthatUkrainehasconcludedthenegotiationsofitsAssociationAgree-ment,Kyivhasrepeatedlysignalledsincelate2012thatitiscon-sideringthepossibilityofjoiningtheCustomsUnion40.InviewofthecurrentcrisisinUkraine’srelationswiththeUnion,thedete-rioratingeconomicsituationandtheintensifiedinternalpoliticalstrugglesaheadofthepresidentialelectionstobeheldin2015,thescenarioofUkrainechoosingintegrationwiththeCustomsUnioncannot be completely ruled out. And while its eventual acces-siontotheCustomsUnionwouldbeverydifficulttocarryoutforavarietyofreasons,includinglegalobstacles(theneedtoamendthecountry’sconstitution)andeconomicconsiderations(theeco-nomicbenefitswouldbesmallerthanthoseofferedbyafreetradeareawiththeEU41),Russiahasverystronginstrumentsatitsdis-posaltoinfluenceUkraine,includingtheabilitytoofferlowergaspricesorgranteconomicbenefitswithoutrequiringanychangestothepoliticalsystem,whichtheEUcannotdo.
40 Tadeusz Iwański, Rafał Sadowski, Ukraine: between the European UnionandtheCustomsUnion,Eastweek,CentreforEasternStudies, 12December2012, http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/eastweek/2012-12-12/ukraine-between-european-union-and-customs-union
41 VeronikaMovchan,VolodymyrShportyuk,Between twounions: optimalregionalintegrationstrategyforUkraine,13thAnnualConferenceoftheEu-ropeanTradeStudyGroup,Copenhagen,August2011,http://204.3.197.155/ETSG2011/Papers/Movchan.pdf
InthecaseofMoldova,too,economicbenefitsfromjoiningtheDCFTAwouldbegreaterthanthebenefitsoftheCustomsUnion.SeeValeriuProhniţchi,StrategiccomparisonofMoldova’sIntegrationoptions:DeepandCompre-hensiveEconomicIntegrationwiththe EUversustheAccessiontotheRus-sia-Belarus-KazakhstanCustomsUnion,Economic Analysis and Forecast Pa-perNr. 3/2012,Expert-Grup,Chişinau2012,http://pasos.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/Moldova-DCFTA_versus_RBK_CU_English.pdf
PO
INT
OF
VIE
W 0
7/20
13
47
vI. cONcluSIONS
1. Limitations of the European Union’s eastern policy
Four years after its launch, the European Partnership initiativehascreatedtheframeworksandmechanismfortheintegrationoftheEaPcountrieswiththeEuropeanUnion.Despitethat,ithasnotgainedanymajorpoliticalsignificancethatwouldhavematchedtheEuropeanUnion’sambitionsandthechallengesaheadofit.Theimpactoftheinitiativehasturnedouttobelimitedbecauseofthedifferences of interests among the parties involved (EU institu-tions,EUmemberstatesandthepartnercountries).Theprogressoftransformationsintheneighbourcountrieshasfallenshortofexpectations,whichrevealedmajorlimitationsoftheEUandtheinstrumentsithasbeenusingtostimulatechange.The European union has failed to become an agent of change in the region to the extent that would match its ambitions. ThestructuresandbureaucraticinstrumentsdevelopedwithintheframeworkoftheENPandtheEaPcannotquicklyrespondtothedynamicpoliticalprocessestakingplaceintheEasternEuropeandintheEUitself.Inthissituation,therealpoliticalsignificanceoftheeasternneigh-bours’integrationwiththeUnionhasbeendiminishing,andtheprocessitselfhasbecomedominatedbybureaucraticprocedures.The parties involved are interested in maintaining dialogue rather than achieving measurable progress in integration with the Eu.IntheEuropeanUnion’sforeignpolicy,includingtheEasternPartnership,buildinginternalconsensustakesmoretimeandeffortthancanbedevotedtoachievingtangibleoutcomesout-sidetheUnion.Wherethereisnopoliticalwilltopursuedeeperintegrationwith theneighbours,norunanimity about the long-termobjectivesofintegration,strategicdecisionsanddeliveryonspecificcommitments(suchasabolishingthevisaregime)canbepostponed.Thepartnercountries,ontheotherhand,canusethissituationdomesticallytoavoidpayingthehighpoliticalandeco-nomiccostsofrealreformsandtransformations,andexternallytopursueapolicyofbalancingbetweentheEUandRussia.
PO
INT
OF
VIE
W 0
7/20
13
48
currently, a breakthrough in mutual relations seems unlike-ly to happen in the short term.TheEUwillnotreformitspolicytowardstheneighboursuntilithassolveditsinternalproblemsrelated to the financial crisis and, evenmore importantly, hasmanagedtostreamline itsdecision-makingprocessesandmadeachoiceaboutthefuturedirectionofitsdevelopment.Moreover,thesituationintheeasternneighbourhoodseemstoberelativelystableatthemomentandposesnothreatstotheUnion,asare-sultofwhichtheEUisnotforcedtopursueamoreactivepolicy.Nor are thepartner countries likely tomakemajorprogress inimplementinginternaltransformations,whichcouldpotentiallybeanimpulsefortheEUtobecomemoreinvolvedintheregion.Even in the case ofMoldova, regarded as the leader among theEaPcountries,thereformsthathavebeenimplementedaresub-jecttoanumberofreservations(forexample,thekeystructuralandeconomicreformshavenotyetbeencarriedout)42.Asdeeperpolitical integration does not seem feasible, actions within theframeworkoftheEasternPartnershipwillfocusonbureaucraticmeasuresandthenegotiationsofindividualagreements(Associa-tionAgreements/DCFTA, visa liberalisationdeals), and sectoralco-operationinthoseareasinwhichtheEUandthepartnershavesharedinterests.
2. Real influence before pressing for changes
SincetheEuropeanUnioncurrentlyhastoo little influenceandlackseffectiveinstrumentstoimposethechangeitwantsintheeasternneighbourhood,itwouldbereasonabletopartlyreformu-late itsapproach.Firstly, it isnecessary tobuild thecapacity togenuinely influencetheEaPcountries.Onlythenwill itbepos-sibletoeffectivelyinducechange,oncefavourableconditionsfor
42 FormoreinformationonthereformprocessinMoldova,seeKamilCałus,ReformsinMoldova:Moderateprogressandanuncertainoutlookforthefuture, Commentary, Centre for Eastern Studies, 23 January 2013, http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-commentary/2013-01-23/reforms-moldova-moderate-progress-and-uncertain-outlook-future
PO
INT
OF
VIE
W 0
7/20
13
49
thatareinplace(thatis,whentheEUhasovercomeitsinternalfinancialanddecision-makingcrises,theeconomicsituationim-proves,etc.).Thanks tosuchanapproach, itwouldalsobepos-sibletoavoidthedilemmaaboutwhethertheEUshouldsticktoitsprinciplesand imposestrict conditions,orbepragmaticandpursueitsself-interest.TheEU’spolicyshouldcombinethesetwoapproaches,althoughtheemphasismayshiftdependingoncur-rentconditions.Forexample,grantingtheEaPcountrieseconom-icpreferencesthatwouldboosttradeandinvestment,inreturnforregulatoryreformsandreformsofthejudiciary,wouldinthelongertermalsocontributetoimprovementintermsoftheruleoflaw,andthatinturnwouldpositivelyaffectotherareas,includ-ingdemocratisation.
InordertopreventthedynamicsofactionundertheENPandEaPfromcollapsing,itseemsnecessarytofocusonthreeelements:
1) Intensification of concrete actions that can produce tangible out-comes in a short time
It isdiscouraging that theEasternPartnershiphasachievednovisibleoutcomesforthepartnerstatesandtheirpeoplesinceitslaunchin2009.ThesuccessiveroundsofnegotiationsontheAs-sociationAgreementsorvisaliberalisationhardlycountassuch.Contrary to the partners’ expectations, the Association Agree-mentsandtheDCFTAshavenotbeenimplemented,andthevisaregimehasnotbeenabolished.EventhemostadvancedoftheEaPcountrieswillonlyhavethechancetoseethoseobjectivesmate-rialisefirstin2015–2016,i.e.5to8yearsafterthenegotiationsfirststarted.
Considering this, it would be reasonable to split the process oftheEaPcountries’Europeanintegrationandtheactionstakenaspartofitintosmallerstages,sothatthepartnershaveachanceofquicklyobtainingsomemeasurablebenefitsaftermeetingcer-taingroupsofconditions.Asaresult,theEUwouldbeabletostep
PO
INT
OF
VIE
W 0
7/20
13
50
upitsactivities;thesystemofincentiveswouldbecomestronger;theimageofEuropeanintegrationwouldimprove;andmostim-portantly,thethreatoftherapprochementprocessgettingstuckinprotractedbureaucraticprocedureswouldbeaverted.Forex-ample,with regard to visa liberalisation, the partner countriesshouldbe granted considerable facilitations (suchas abolishingvisa charges, or considerably simplifying visa issuance proce-dures)uponcompleting thefirstphaseof theirplanof action43.ThesameshouldapplytootherelementsoftheUnion’sactivities,including the implementation of the Association Agreements,associationagendas,etc.Atthesametime,theEUshouldtothegreatest extentpossible cut the time it takes tomakedecisions(forinstance,ittooktheEUCouncilfivemonthstoadoptthedeci-sionallowingMoldovaintothesecondphaseofthevisaliberalisa-tionactionplan44).
2) Focus on key issues and adjusting objectives and actions to the cur-rent capacity of the EU and its partners
Because thepotential of theEUadministration and, evenmoreimportantly,ofthepartnerstatesislimited,itisimportanttofo-cusonselectedprioritiesandimplementactionsonastep-by-stepbasis.Statesandsocietiescannotundergofastanddeeptransfor-mationsinallareasatthesametime.Thequestionofvisaliberali-sationisacaseinpoint:inadditiontothetechnicalandsecurityrequirements,itisalsoconditionalonthepartnercountries’per-formanceinotherareas,suchastheadoptionofanti-discrimina-tionlaws,amatterwhichhasconsiderablyprolongedtheentirevisaliberalisationprocedure.
43 The visa liberalisation process is divided into two phases: preparations,duringwhichthereformsandlegislativechangesareelaborated,andim-plementation,whenthereformsarecarriedout.Fordetails,seeMartaJaro-szewicz,Makingtheimpossiblepossible,op.cit.,p.22–23.
44 RafałSadowski,EUvisaliberalisation:successforMoldova,slowprogressforUkraine,Eastweek,CentreforEasternStudies,28November2012,http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/eastweek/2012-11-28/eu-visa-liberalisa-tion-success-moldova-slow-progress-ukraine
PO
INT
OF
VIE
W 0
7/20
13
51
Threeobjectivesappeartobeofcrucialimportanceatthisstage:a) economic integration; (b) bringing the societies of the EaPcountriesclosertoEuropebyabolishingthevisaregimeandpro-motingmobility;(c)strengtheningstateinstitutionsandbuildingadministrativecapacityinthepartnercountries.Byfocusingontheseareas,theEuropeanUnioncouldbetterusethelimitedre-sourcesavailable,makingtheentirepolicymoreeffective.Block-ingorslowingdownprogressinthesekeyissues,eitherforpoliti-calorforbureaucraticreasons,willunderminethechancesoftheentireEuropeanintegrationprocesssucceeding.Achievingcon-creteprogressinthoseareas,ontheotherhand,willenabletheEUtoeffectivelyinfluenceotherspheres,inparticularrespectfordemocraticvaluesandtheruleoflaw.
3) Creation of an EU investment fund
Thereareatleasttwoargumentsformakingthecreationofsucha fund a priority. Firstly, economic co-operation benefits bothsides,andthegainsmayevenbegreaterfortheEUcountriesandbusinessthanfortheEaPside.Secondly,economicintegrationandthecreationofaDeepAndComprehensiveFreeTradeAreawouldtrulybindthepartnercountrieswiththeEUandstrengthentheUnion’sinstrumentsofinfluence.Thefundcouldalsobecomeaneffectiveinstrumentstimulatingchangeintheotherareas,suchasinsociallifeandpolitics.
TheEuropeanUnionisattractivetoitspartnersnotbecauseofitsmodelofgovernance,itsdemocraticsystemofpoweroritspoliti-cal clout, butbecause of itsfinancial capacity,new technologiesandthepotential itoffers forbusinessco-operation.Theactionstaken so far in this area, including the negotiations concerningthe Association Agreements and the DCFTAs, and the creationofinstrumentstosupportbusinessandinvestments(suchastheprogrammesof theEuropean InvestmentBankand theEurope-anBank forReconstructionandDevelopment, theEasternPart-nersFacility,theNeighbourhoodInvestmentFacility,andtheEaP
PO
INT
OF
VIE
W 0
7/20
13
52
flagshipinitiativeforsmall-andmedium-sizedenterprises45)werestepsintherightdirection,buthavefailedtosubstantiallychangethecharacterofmutualeconomicrelations46.Animportantprob-lem in this regard concerns the fact that the partner countries’markets are relatively unattractive to companies from the EU,afactwhichhasanumberofunderlyingcausesincludingthebusi-nessclimateinthepartnercountries,butalsolackofknowledgeabouttheregion.EstablishinganEUinvestmentfundfortheeast-ernneighbourhoodwouldofferasolutiontothisproblem.
ThisfundcouldbefinancedbytheEUfinancialinstitutions,thebudgetsofthememberstates,privatecapital,orperhapsalsotheEUbudget.Itsaimwouldbetocarryoutvariousinvestmentpro-jects in the partner countries, ranging from micro-projects tolarge investments spread over several years. Furthermore, thefundcouldfinanceprojectsfromdifferentareasandsectorsoftheeconomy. Its activities could extend to infrastructural projects,undertakingsintheprivateequityandventurecapitalmarkets,and business-incubator activities. The fundwould not only in-vestmoney,but– thanks to the involvementof itsmanagers intheprojectsbeingfinanced–couldalsocontributetothetransferofstate-of-the-artmanagementmethodsand,inthisway,tothetrainingoflocalmanagers.
Thefundwouldofferthreemaincategoriesofbenefits.Firstly,itwouldincreaseinvestmentsinthecountriesexperiencinginvest-mentshortages,whichconstituteaseriousobstacletostimulatingtransformations and economic development. Secondly, itwouldbemoreeffectivethantheinstrumentsusedhithertoinpromot-ing the development of innovative sectors and industries, andtransfersof technologiesandstate-of-the-artbusinessadminis-trationmethods.Inthisway,itwouldfacilitateamoreeffective
45 Formoreinformationsee:EaPCommunity,WorkwithEU,Forprivatesec-tor,http://www.easternpartnership.org/work-with-eu/private-sector
46 DescribedinchaptersII.2.andII.3ofthispaper.
PO
INT
OF
VIE
W 0
7/20
13
53
transformationofthepost-Sovieteconomiesintomodernmarketeconomies. Finally, the activities of the fundwould financiallybenefitall sides (investors fromtheEUcountriesandentrepre-neurs from the partner countries),while the partner countrieswouldgainadditionallyfromthetransferofbusinessknow-howand new technologies. The fund could also stimulate market-orientedinstitutionalandlegalchangesintheEaPcountries.Itsprofitscouldbeusedtofinancenewbusinessprojectsintheeast-ernneighbourhood,which in the longer termwouldreduce thecostoftheUnion’sfinancialassistance.
ThecreationofthiskindofinstrumentwouldstrengthentheEU’simage as an important business partner and could attract localbusinesselites.Thisalsoappliestothosestatesandareaswhicharecurrentlylessinterestedinco-operationwiththeEU,suchasBela-rus,orpossiblyevenbreakawayregionssuchasTransnistria47.
rafał SadOWSKIWork on this text finished in May 2013
47 TheauthorwouldliketothankLyndonAllinforaninspiringconversationonthesubject.
centre for eastern studies
the centre for Eastern Studies (oSW) is an expert institution that monitors and analyses the political, economic and social situation in Russia, the caucasus, central Asia, central and Eastern Europe, germany and the Balkans.
oSW was founded in 1990 and is fully financed from the state budget. in 2006 the centre was named in honour of its founder Marek Karp.
our studies are addressed mainly to state institutions including the chancellery of the president of the Republic of poland, the chancellery of the prime Minister, ministries and government agencies, as well as the Sejm and Senate of the Republic of poland.
We are particularly active in discussions concerning the European Union’s Eastern policy, challenges to energy security, as well as the political, social and economic transformation processes in countries neighbouring poland.
Many of our publications are available online at: osw.waw.pl
Publication series
Point of View – short analytical studies presenting the opinions of our experts on current policy issues, published in polish and in English.
osW studies – large analytical studies devoted to major political, social and economic processes taking place in oSW’s area of interest; published in polish and in English.
OSW newsletters
eastWeeK – a weekly analytical newsletter on Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, the caucasus and central Asia (published in polish as tydzień na Wschodzie).
ceWeeKLY (central European Weekly) – a weekly analytical newsletter on the Baltic States, central Europe, germany and the Balkans (published in polish as Best osW).
osW commentary – a series of more in-depth analyses concerning the most important events and developments in our area of interest (published in polish as Komentarze osW).
oSW newsletters are available free of charge, subject to subscription