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7:0 Partnership and the Programme Stages Overview This section examines and illustrates in some detail the workings of partnership in practice at each of the programme stages (sub-section 7.1) and then elaborate further on some of the case material presented in this section and in other sections with the aim of identifying good practice (sub-section 7.2). Sub-section 7.1, begins with a number of general observations concerning the division of labour in partnerships; different modes of partnership operation; relationships between different partnerships; the influence of prior partnership histories; and the use of technical support (recapping on material presented in previous sections and prefiguring what follows). It then looks in detail at partnership in practice at each of the programme stages, namely; The programme stages

• Planning and preparation Programme preparation Negotiating programme content Identifying which spatial areas should receive assistance Deciding on project selection criteria Ex-ante programme evaluation Other activities

• Operational management

Selection of projects Programme management Use of technical assistance Undertaking actual projects

• Monitoring and evaluation

Project monitoring Programme monitoring Programme adjustments and re-programming Evaluation

Under ‘Operational management’ the influence of the level of collaboration between partners; changes in attitudes and behaviour over the programme cycle; evolution of strategies at different programme levels; and organisational learning and innovative behaviours and lessons learned in partnership are considered.

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Sub-section 7.2, addresses five issues which appear important across the case studies undertaken. These are:

• partnership inclusiveness at different programme stages, • the contribution of partnership to efficiency, • inclusiveness and the effectiveness of partnerships, • the management of the participation of beneficiaries, and • strategies to promote innovation through partnership.

7.1 Partnership in practice Introduction Partnership may not exist in every phase of the programme cycle and typically its form will vary from phase to phase. In part this is because some partnership functions are specialised - reflecting the roles and capacities of different organisations in the partnership: in programme development and in project selection. In part this is because the executive powers of key partners dominate certain stages, for example at programme negotiation and at programme evaluation. Variations in form can be explained in terms of functional divisions of labour and in terms of which categories of potential partners are considered to be legitimate by gate keepers such as Member States and regional governments. As has been seen, some partnerships are open to all possible partners while others are effectively restricted to a chosen few.1 More generally, as shall be seen in what follows, partnership can and is required to operate through many different modes including consultation, negotiation, co-option, co-operation and selective inclusion at different programme stages. A number of general influences on partnership in practice can be observed throughout the programming period:

• relationships between and across different partnerships,

• approaches to managing partnership boundaries,

• histories of previous co-operation, 1 In this regard lobbying by external organisations and groups can imply a degree of transparency - i.e. those who are lobbying know with whom they need to communicate (as is often the case in Belgium, for example). However, extensive lobbying can be an indication of too narrowly drawn partnership arrangements and a failure to include some of the relevant actors (as can be the case in Greece, for example).

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• histories of previous development initiatives,

• outcomes of common understandings between partners, and

• the presence and absence of technical support. The relationships between and across different partnerships may also be important. This especially so where territorial programmes are spatially adjacent, overlapping or where economic and social policies intersect. Exhibit 7.1a: Relationships between and across different partnerships Examples of territorial programmes that are spatially adjacent include Merseyside Objective 1 programme and north-east England Objective 2 programme which together effectively compose a single socio-economic region; overlapping partnerships are exemplified by the Luxembourg/Belgium/France Interreg programme and various territorial programmes in the border areas of the three countries; and economic and social policies intersect in virtually every Objective and Initiative.

Where boundaries and roles are blurred and overlapping this can lead to legitimacy problems but, by the same token, inflexibility in inter-programme boundaries leads to less effective partnerships and sub-optimal SF outcomes: The programme may not define the appropriate partnership unit and in practice many partnerships who have struggled with boundary issues would welcome progress towards the principle of ‘one programme per region’. Exhibit 7.1b: Approaches to managing partnership boundaries In Finland as programmes do not coincide with regional boundaries the same regional tier of government has to manage both programmes within its area.

Whether as regards variations in form, modes of operation or boundary arrangements, actual partnership performance depends very much on the history of previous development initiatives in the programme area. Generally, as has been seen in Section 6, in those cases where there is a history of co-operation between partners in previous Structural Fund programmes, this tended to have a positive impact on the efficiency and effectiveness of the current partnership. In particular, previous familiarity was seen to result in effective and established working relationships, quick start-ups and effective fund absorption. Conversely the absence of previous partnership experience was widely observed to lead to bottlenecks, mis-understandings and poor decision making.

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Exhibit 7.1c: Histories of previous co-operation In the case of the Objective 1 ROP in Macedonia, a previous history of partnership under the Structural Funds ensured that the programme began with established management and implementation mechanisms and good collaborative practices. The partnership experienced no delay in establishing working procedures and there was no questioning of the roles and contributions of the different partners. This in turn ensured swift implementation and limited competition for resources between beneficiaries. By contrast, lack of previous co-operation and familiarity between partners was a dominant factor in limited role of partnership in the preparation and planning of the Objective 1 programme for Saxony-Anhalt. Despite a strong commitment to decentralisation at a sub-regional level and to participatory forms of programme organisation, social partners and others could not be successfully integrated into programme operation until the subsequent operation and management stage.

A wider history of previous development initiatives particularly Structural Fund initiatives generally makes a contribution to successful partnership functioning: Exhibit 7.1d: Histories of previous development initiatives In the Objective 2 programme in Bremen, both the Structural Funds and the related partnership arrangements are an integral part of an ongoing and dynamic planning process for the City State’s regional and employment policies. This has resulted in the speedy finalisation of the programming documents elaborated by the responsible Bremen authorities.

It is often the extent to which as a result of such histories a common understanding between partners of their roles has been established that certain positive outcomes such as speed of decision making, quality and legitimacy of decision making, and smooth day-to-day operations are made possible. Exhibit 7.1e: Outcomes of common understandings between partners In the Objective 2 programme in Bremen levels of trust between partners are said to be very high and this favours a high level of debate over strategic issues in the Monitoring Committee and on tactical priority setting within its sub-committees.

However, previous development or partnership history is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for smooth partnership functioning. While it is true that partnership requires capacities and competencies which can in most cases only be developed over time and incrementally, time alone will not necessarily produce effective partnerships. A previous history of poor relationships can burden partnerships if structural problems are allowed to persist.

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Other factors must also be present: partnership is heavily dependant, as has been seen in Section 4 and elsewhere, on the level of resources and expertise available to partners. The cases reviewed in Section 6 show many examples of both how the presence of technical support increases partnership effectiveness and how its absence may limit the contribution of horizontal partners. Exhibit 7.1g: The presence and absence of technical support In Objective 5b and LEADER programmes in both Hessen and Toscana the establishment of well supported working groups/parties enhanced ‘grass roots’ participation and the development of local partnerships and local development capacity. In the Objective 1 programme for Saxony Anhalt, the gap between the high level of resources at the disposal of the state administration and the inadequate resource base of the regional social partners prevented the latter from participating more intensively and thus bottlenecks that occurred were not foreseen or identified.

7.1.1 Planning and preparation Programme preparation In a majority of the fifty four cases reviewed partnership was reported to make a significant or large contribution to improved programme preparation and management. However in a small minority of cases partnership was reported to make little or no contribution to programme preparation and management. 2 Within the programme and planning stage, partnership (in it’s widest manifestation) was reported to have it’s strongest impact at the point of programme preparation, while partnership (in a narrower manifestation of Commission/Member State partnership) unsurprisingly was also reported to have a strong impact at the point of negotiating programme content. Wider partnerships were also reported to have some impact on deciding project selection criteria but little impact on either ex-ante evaluation or on the identification of which spatial areas should receive targeted assistance.3

2 Analysis of Table D.3: Contribution of partnership to beneficial outcomes in the case study reports 3 Analysis of Table D.1: Impact of partnership arrangements at the various programming stages in the case study reports

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Exhibit 7.1h: Extensive partnership at the programme development stage In the German Objective 1 CSF, informal vertical and horizontal co-operation between Federal and regional levels saw Länder draft their OPs autonomously and the Member State compile them in a Regional Development Plan. This ensured both a decentralised approach in practice and smooth compliance with regulations. In the UK north-west England Objective 2 programme, the regional government office drafted the programme with assistance of local partners such as Local Authorities, Training and Enterprise Councils and voluntary sector organisations. This was seen by all as a marked improvement on pervious arrangements. For the Swedish Objective 4 programme an special ‘utredare’ (inspector) was appointed to draw up proposals, while prospective partners commented on drafts. Partners felt involved and consulted while the programme was developed rapidly.

The reasons for limited contribution at programme development stage tend to be some combination of the following:

• de facto absence of partnership,

• key content agreed at Member State/Commission level,

• short lead times on programme preparation, and

• absence of previous partnership history. The absence of partnership at the programme development stage (other than the mandatory, if at times conflictual, partnership between the Member State and the Commission) may arise for a number of reasons: internal policy conflict between central government ministries4, effective political agreements to confine key decisions to Member State and Regional Authority5, or lack of acceptance of the legitimacy of certain potential partners6. At times such an absence of partnership manifests itself in the prior agreement of key content solely between the Member State and the Commission. As has been seen in Section 6, this is particularly likely to happen where central government wishes to closely align Structural Fund activities with broader state policies (as in the German new Länder or as in Spain, albeit in conjunction with the Autonomous Governments) or where sub-national capacity is particularly weak (again in the German new Länder, in Greece and in Portugal). The development of programme content may be restricted to the Member State and the Commission to the degree to which there are very short lead times on programme preparation as happened on the accession of Sweden to the

4 Greek Industry programme 5 Some Spanish ROPs 6 UK Objective 3

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Union. Programme content may also be delegated to a particular regional or local organisation with limited capacity. Finally, absence of previous partnership history may make it difficult to develop programmes in partnership unless considerable technical assistance is employed to involve partners either in programme development or, failing that, immediately at the point of programme start-up. Exhibit 7.1i: Limited partnership at the programme preparation stage In the Hainault Objective 1 programme the preparation work was undertaken by the Ministries of Economics and External Relations, concerned governmental bodies and academic experts. While the programme was technically coherent, a lack of integration of the political dimension produced operational difficulties subsequently. For the Bristol Urban programme, two local partners prepared the programme content. With limited initial central guidance considerable delay was experienced while central government subsequently tried to resolve a host of technical issues.

Negotiating programme content Actual programme content is always negotiated between the Member State and the Commission and only rarely in the cases reviewed were regional actors directly concerned with negotiation even were regional authorities were the dominant actor at all other programme stages. At this stage the main challenge for the Member State is to achieve an effective consensus between its own departments and organs. By and large debate between the Member State and the Commission is regarded as constructive and is seen to enhance programme content (there are certain exceptions to this as seen in Section 4). Exhibit 7.1j: Negotiating programme content In Objective 4 for North Rhine-Westphalia the Commission favoured a target group approach whereas the federal Ministry preferred a thematic approach. The Member State and the Commission agreed to let both approaches be pursued in the intervention after a period of considerable debate. For the Centre Objective 2 programme, the Commission, DATAR, and the Prefect of the region, were involved with the negotiation of programme content. This ensured unity of purpose on the French side but at the expense of distance from actors on the ground not all of whom had been fully involved at the programme development phase.

Identifying which spatial areas should receive assistance Procedures, and satisfaction with procedures, for selecting spatial areas to receive assistance vary greatly between cases and countries. Generally,

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where wider consultation takes place the ‘fit’ between the spatial areas of programmes and territorial socio-economic realities seems to be better and ‘ownership’ of the programme by territorial actors is enhanced. Exhibit 7.1k: ‘Fitting’ programmes to territories In the Objective 1 programme for Saxony-Anhalt and for the CSF as a whole careful co-ordination between federal and regional Finance and Economics Ministries in the context of the Joint Programme and the use of ‘objective’ criteria helped identify the areas most in need of specific types of assistance. In the Objective 1 programme for Guadeloupe the establishment of a single Department programme allowed simplicity and logic in programme delivery. In the Interreg programme for Luxembourg/Belgium/France, initiatives cover precise areas which do not necessarily correspond to development axes.

However, in many cases, even when consultation at the sub-national level is limited, the territory to be covered is ‘obvious’ and uncontentious. Even the somewhat mechanistic application of ‘objective’ socio-economic criteria by the Commission is seen as a helpful, transparent and welcome process by territorial actors. Exhibit 7.1l: Uncontentious selection of areas In the Bristol Urban programme the area the territory ‘choose itself’ and did not require negotiation. In Macedonia (Objective 1), Catalonia (Objective 2), UK (Objective 3) and Sweden (Objective 4) the use of ‘objective’ criteria was seen to minimise political conflict and expedite the selection process.

Nevertheless, there are cases where areas selected are seen as not corresponding to socio-economic realties - i.e. the territory is not a single or articulated territory in any meaningful sense, and this has given rise to subsequent operational difficulties and weak partnerships. Exhibit 7.1m: Inappropriate selection of areas Areas for assistance were selected as part of the negotiations for the accession of Finland to the Union between the Member State and the Commission. Regions were defined somewhat mechanically according to Commission criteria. The regional tier did not really understand the differences between Objectives 2 and 6 and this resulted in both programmes spreading over more than one region and single regions divided between two programmes.

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On the other hand, at times the ‘creation’ of a region by Structural Fund programming has created useful and needed capacity and identity where none previously existed. Exhibit 7.1n: ‘Creation’ of regions One local partner in the UK North West Objective 2 programme reported that ‘both the map and the programme were foisted on the region by central government and the Commission … local partners were completely outside the decision making loop’. Yet improved local participation since then and a newly created regional identity have helped overcome a history of inter city rivalry and 'balkanised' development strategies.

Overall, even if the regulation requires this decision by the Commission and Member State, the use of objective criteria together with consultation with putative local partners can be seen to be the most effective means of selecting appropriate spatial areas. Deciding on project selection criteria Generally the role of partnership in establishing project selection criteria is much more central than in the selection of areas to receive assistance. In most cases project selection criteria are developed and agreed within the Monitoring Committee and involves all formal partners. This can be a particularly important opportunity for Social Partners, who may otherwise find it difficult to participate in every aspect of partnership activities, to influence programme development. However, establishing project selection criteria can be a point of considerable dispute in partnerships. For example, central government views tend to prevail which at times alienates some local partners. Exhibit 7.1p: Deciding on project selection criteria In the Objective 2 programmes for Finland criteria were derived both from the various funding partners and from regional programmes (which differed from the national Single Programming Document.) Also in Finland under Objective 3 there was some discussion between the Commission and the Member State as to what extent it was acceptable to leave selection criteria up to regional labour administrations. In France for both Objective 5b and Objective 2 criteria agreed nationally between the Commission and the Member State made it difficult to take local specificities into account. Reconciling Community, national and regional policy priorities is the chief challenge for partnership at the stage of establishing project selection criteria. One solution may be found in having strong input from regional partners into the formation of national policy.

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Ex-ante programme evaluation Some degree of formal or informal ex-ante evaluation inevitably takes place in almost all cases of programme development and negotiation. Often however this mainly consists of individual partners undertaking their own ex-ante evaluations, the results of which may be kept confidential. Only in a few of the cases reviewed was a shared ex-ante evaluation explicitly used by a partnership as a formal tool for programme development. Where interim evaluations exist from an earlier programme these tend to have more influence on partners. Exhibit 7.1q: Use of ex-ante programme evaluation by different partners In Finland Objective 2 and 6 programmes the Commission commissioned its own confidential ex-ante evaluations. In Spain the ex-ante evaluation helped integrate the national, regional and sub-regional frameworks but while consensus was achieved between the National Government, Regional Governments and the Social Partners, the Commission did not participate in the process. In Ireland, Monitoring Committees are assisted in their monitoring and evaluation functions by a CSF Evaluation Unit established by the Commission and the Department of Finance. Three other operational programmes also have their own evaluation units located in their lead government department, other programmes rely on external consultants for on-going evaluation.

In general, greater use of jointly commissioned and shared evaluations is likely to lead to evaluations having more influence on partners’ decision making. Other activities Most Member States also use the planning and preparation stage as a point at which appropriate management systems for programmes can be put in place but these are rarely if ever designed in partnership (other than in Federal States). Exhibit 7.1r: Design of management systems In Spain, in the both the cases of the Objective 2 programme for Catalonia and the Objective 1 programme for Galicia, discussions at the planning stage between the Regional Governments, Central Government and the Commission led to a clear division of labour for the management of the programmes.

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7.1.2 Operational management In about half the cases reviewed partnership was reported to have a strong impact on the selection of which projects to fund and on the general management of the programme. The key benefit of this impact was in the contribution of the partnership mechanism to improved understanding of actual projects and their potential beneficiaries. In the majority of cases reviewed partnership was said to have a strong impact on improving operational understanding of projects and project participants.7 The contribution of partnership to operational management is circumscribed the quality of the resources and expertise available to them. As has been seen in Section 4 above, relationships between ‘secretariats’ and Monitoring Committees are often unsatisfactory in that the secretariat, in theory responsible to the Monitoring Committees, is often in practice provided by the dominant (state) partner, who may also be the official or de facto ‘managing authority’. Generally where to some degree an autonomous secretariat or programme management structure exists the partnership, as a full partnership, is able to have more operational control over events. Selection of projects Alongside programme preparation, project selection is the other main programme stage where partnership is most in evidence. However arrangements for project selection vary enormously from country to country, objective to objective, and programme to programme. It is therefore difficult to make general statements about partnership and selection, but a number of more or less common themes may be discerned:

• more inclusive forms of partnership can give rise to potential conflicts of interest which must be carefully managed,

• funding partners may predominate in decision making over representatives of funded partners,

• procedural arrangements (conformance with regulations, pre-set project selection criteria, competitive bidding or other conditions) may limit the flexibility of decision making and thus the capacity of the partnership to strategically manage the programme.

Conflicts of interest arise where programme beneficiaries are also partners within the programme management structure. This is most often an issue where municipalities are included within the Monitoring Committee. Frequently the tendency is towards a 'carve-up' where every area gets ‘its share’ of funding and the strategic focus of the programme is lost. Member States have adopted various responses to this. In the UK territorial programmes there tends to be some representation of the municipal view but not every municipality is invited to be a member of the Monitoring Committee; and in

7 Analysis of Table D.1

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Sweden municipalities are expected to withdraw when their applications are under consideration. More commonly municipalities are simply excluded from decision making (which is then either simply technocratic or determined by more subterranean political processes) which makes things procedurally simpler but affects the quality of decision making. Appropriate project selection is very dependant on the capacity of the partnership to act as a partnership with shared goals and interests. (In sub-section 7.2 below are found some good practice examples of how these challenges can be successfully managed in practice.) Programme management In principle Monitoring Committees do not manage programmes but rather they oversee programme operation. In practice programme management is undertaken by central or regional government or by some ad hoc management agency specifically created for the programme. As observed in Section 4, the influence of partnerships over programme managers tends to be weak in most cases as the programme manager (central or regional government) is also the dominant partner. Specifically created management authorities tend to be more responsive to Monitoring Committee direction. In most cases programme management is undertaken by the relevant central or regiona l government departments or other competent organs of State. Programme management committees which act as de facto operational sub-committees of Monitoring Committees can be found in some Member States (although formally their power derive from the competent organs of state) while in some other Member States autonomous management authorities are de facto steered directly by Monitoring Committees, but these are exceptional. Exhibit 7.1s: Management arrangements In Objectives 2 and 6 in Finland programmes are run by regional management committees with assistance from Regional Councils although formally these committees have no legal powers which rests with the Regional Councils. In the Objective 5b programme for rural Wales, day to day programme management is carried out by the Welsh European Office which acts as an executive agency for the Welsh Office.

Use of technical assistance As has been seen in Section 3 above, technical assistance to partnerships is usually provided by the main funding partners and by the designated management authority (normally central or regional government). More occasionally technical assistance is provided by a specialist state agency. The provision of technical assistance by dominant partners can raise questions

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about how responsive those providing technical assistance are to the partnership as a whole, while the provision of additional technical assistance, say, through outside consultants may create conflict as to who should pay for it. Exhibit 7.1t: Use of technical assistance In the Objective 1 programme for Saxony Anhalt technical assistance is provided by the Ländesforderinstitut (Regional Assistance Institute) which is in charge of the pre-selection of proposals, approval and payment to projects and provides continuous co-ordination between the various actors in the partnership. In the Objective 2 programme for north-west England the partner local authorities sought technical assistance funding but the Commission disallowed this as it was unconvinced of the need for the scale of technical assistance sought. The local authorities see this as a serious difficulty, arguing that whilst it is right that they should bear the costs of developing and promoting projects in their own areas, there is also a need to financially support the contribution they make to the effective management of the programme as a whole.

Undertaking actual projects Actual projects are undertaken by beneficiaries of funding who may or may not be part of the formal partnership, and who, if they are public authorities are effectively accountable to themselves. Section 4 discussed the strengths (aligning of projects with programme intentions) and weaknesses (conflicts of interest and less than strategic project selection) of the involvement of beneficiaries in partnerships. The role of partnership in undertaking actual projects varies enormously from programme to programme. Thus, in some cases it is central, and in others marginal. Clarity as to the division of labour between strategic (formal partnership) and operational activities also varies widely. Interestingly, where programmes have opted for extensive formal partnerships this division of labour is often clearest (as in the case of Toscana, see sub-section 6). More generally, the operational management of partnership over time is affected by:8

• the level of collaboration between partners,

• changes in attitudes and behaviour over the programming cycle,

• evolution of strategies at different programme levels, and

• organisational learning.

8 Analysis of Table D.2: Factors, effects and outcomes of partnerships in the case study reports

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The level of collaboration between partners The closeness and informality of collaboration between partners is, like trust between partners (which was discussed in Section 4), an important ‘soft’ variable in programme performance. As has been seen (in Section 4 and above in this section), a clear and accepted division of labour between partners is important for programmes effectiveness. Where a clear division of labour does exist then practical collaboration, particularly at the project level, will add to programme performance. Generally, close, informal and practical collaboration between partners is seen to contribute to quicker decisions, better fund-absorption and more successful projects. Exhibit 7.1u: Presence and absence of collaboration between partners In the Objective 4 programme for North Rhine-Westphalia, high levels of co-operation between the regional ministries and the economic and social partners had an especially positive effect on the programme leading to practical solutions to sectoral bottlenecks and ensuring users’ needs were addressed. In Finland, a rather rigid division of labour between funding, non-funding and social partners was seen to result in programme fragmentation and a passive stance by social partners.

Changes in attitudes and behaviour over the programming cycle Where there is little previous history of partnership, levels of collaboration and overall partnership functioning can be observed to improve in the most of the cases reviewed over the programming cycle. Exhibit 7.1v: Beneficial effects and positive outcomes of the development of partnership Within the Objective 1 programme for Guadalope the partnership was said to move from, and through, conflict to consensus and a better adjustment of the programme to priorities defined at an intra-regional level. In the Objective 1 programme for Saxony Anhalt the initially ‘unhelpful’ administration was said to later adopt a new, more open-minded approach allowing active participation by the social partners and thus better fund absorption, transparency and adjustment of user needs.

Of course (as observed in above and in Section 4) there can also be negative effects on attitudes and behaviour if problems persist and trust is eroded. Some partners may simply learn that participation is not really beneficial for them.

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Exhibit 7.1w: Partners ‘drop out’ over time Under the Urban initiative in Venice, social partners tended to drop out after the planning phase and the definition of project selection criteria as they are not very interested in programme management. Under the Urban initiative in Bristol, some partners left the partnership once they realised that membership was not a guarantee of funding.

The beneficial effects and consequent positive outcomes for programmes as partnerships develop over the programming cycle is a strong finding of our review of these fifty four cases as the following table indicates: Exhibit 7.1x: Beneficial effects and positive outcomes of the growth of partnership9

Effect Outcome

In the North Jutland Objective 2 programme the partnership is said to be more integrated as the result of collective learning

The inter-organisational links can be observed to be working better beyond the confines of the programme

In the Objective 1 CSF in Germany, the acceptance of the role of the environment ministries and the strategic role of the consultation group members has grown during the programme period

Environmental issues are now on the agenda

The Objective 1 programme for Merseyside saw a growing familiarity with the rules and procedures by the partners

There was also a shift among partners to a less parochial view of the programme

Resource management has improved and programme quality has been enhanced Preparations for programme content in the next CSF are now more strategic

In the Objective 1 programme for Basilicata, a culture of Community intervention is becoming more diffused

It is likely that future partnership will be able to start from more mutual knowledge and partnerships will be easier to manage

In the Objective 1 programme for Galicia and Objective 2 for Catalonia, more information has been disseminated to more people

Partners are identifying more opportunities for participation

9 Derived from Tables D.2 in the relevant case study reports

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Evolution of strategies at different programme levels

There is some limited evidence that as attitudes and behaviours evolve over time so can strategies. However, few programme partnerships are sufficiently integrated in their decision making to consider strategic issues from first principles – this is remains largely confined to the Commission/Member State partnership. Exhibit 7.1y: Partnerships which effect the evolution of strategies Involvement in Interreg has lead to closer co-operation between Austria and Hungary over the years and the development of mutual longer term perspectives. In Ireland there are limited opportunities to consider strategic aspects of programmes at Monitoring Committee level.

Organisational learning Generally partnership was seen to contribute to a great deal of organisational learning both for individual partner organisations and for partnerships as a whole. By this it is meant that practices originating in Structural Fund Partnerships are adapted within the members of the partnerships as part of their mainstream (non-Structural Fund) activities. Exhibit 7.1z: Organisational learning effects and outcomes In the Objective 5b programme for Niederosterreich the partnership based approach to regional policy significantly contributed to an overall ‘professionalisation’ of the Land’s own policy. In the Austria/Hungary Interreg programme there was an overall improvement in informal co-operation between key actors' ‘outside’ the formal partnership thus increasing informal cross border co-ordination in a range of spheres. In the Adapt initiative in Ireland, partners have been able to consider at programme level the broad lessons emerging from a diverse set of projects providing a basis for ‘mainstreaming’ positive results beyond the programme.

Innovative behaviours and lessons learned in partnership As has been seen in Sections 4 and 6 the chief innovative behaviours and lessons learned in partnership are reported to be those connected with capacity building, particularly as regards the development of decentralised management structures in programmes, and inclusiveness, particularly as regards the inclusion of social partners and NGOs at a regional level.

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7.1.3 Monitoring and evaluation Partnership is said to have a positive impact on the monitoring of projects and programmes in about half the cases reviewed. However the extent of this monitoring is rather limited and is largely confined to ensuring procedural conformance and adequate rates of absorption of funds. Although partnership is also said to have a strong impact on decisions on programme adjustments and re-programming in about half our cases, there is little evidence that such decisions are much influenced by formal evaluation. Usually it is simply the case that poor fund-absorption figures collected through routine monitoring alerts the Monitoring Committee to problems. Further, partnership is reported to have little or no impact on ex-post programme evaluation in the majority of cases reviewed and, in turn, formal evaluation is would appear to have little influence on partnership decision making.10 The exception to this is in the Community Initiatives ADAPT and Employment, because the importance of innovation spills over into mainstream ESF programmes, requiring extensive monitoring and ex-post evaluation. Project monitoring Across programmes, project monitoring tends to concentrate on financial monitoring and is largely undertaken by the relevant funding authorities and/or dedicated programme managers. Where projects have dedicated steering committees these may either be self appointed or agreed with programme managers. Only the largest projects tend to get specific attention from Monitoring Committees. Partnership does not appear to play a significant role in project monitoring although project steering committees may well involve some element of partnership. Programme monitoring In the fifty four cases reviewed in this study programme monitoring was almost entirely restricted to the monitoring of fund absorption. While Monitoring Committees, and to that extent partnerships, are charged with this monitoring task, most partners generally find the combination of detailed financial presentations with a high degree of aggregation difficult to engage with other than in a superficial fashion. However very low rates of fund absorption often does trigger questions which lead to some more fundamental investigations by managing authorities. Programme adjustments and re-programming Programme adjustments tend to be decided by the same key partners responsible for programme negotiation: that is the Member State, regional governments and the Commission. Programme adjustments tend to be concentrated on re-balancing budgets in the light of events rather than on any strategic changes in direction. However, there are examples of intermediate

10 Analysis of Table D.1

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evaluations contributing to re-programming 11 evaluation per se does not appear to be an important influence on re-programming. Evaluation Formally Monitoring Committees adopt the terms of reference for evaluations and receive and review evaluation reports. While some Monitoring Committees have established steering groups to oversee the evaluation process, others are quite passive in the formulation of evaluations with managing authorities tending to develop the evaluation brief, set the priorities and recruit the evaluators. Where partners formally receive and review evaluation reports but have not had a great influence in practice over the content of the evaluation, they tend not to exhibit a great deal of ownership nor does the evaluation directly effect programme decision-making. External technical assistance is routinely used for interim and ex-post evaluations. However often the evaluators brief is narrow and encourages concentration on the type of financial indicators already generated through routine programme monitoring and/or on rather de-contextualised quantitative indicators of outputs set by national governments. External evaluators are usually recruited by the Member State and may see government rather than the partnership as their client. Finally, it is frequently observed that there are considerable delays in the appointment of external evaluators and evaluation reports may arrive too late in the lifecycle of the programme to have an appreciable influence. Evaluation has an important contribution to make to programme reflexivity and partnership effectiveness, yet, as has been seen, evaluation is typically weak and disconnected from programme decision making and partners concerns. In part this may be a problem of motivation – where a lack of belief in or enthusiasm for evaluation betrays a lack of belief/enthusiasm for partnership or even the programme as a whole. Partners' commitment to evaluation is related to the extent to which it is seen as being of some benefit for themselves: too often evaluation is seen merely as an obligation to the Commission. This is unfortunate in that, even from the limited time spent looking at individual programmes in this study, it is clear that there is a great deal of learning of use to all partners which can be derived from more extensive and embedded evaluation procedures:12 Such learning may include issues such as:

The level of collaboration between the partnership and other agencies: Within the partnership structure of programmes may lie opportunities for a wider exploitation of partnership arrangements with actors not directly involved with the programme.

11 Such as in the case of the Objective 1 programme for Hainault 12 Analysis of Table D.2

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The integration of the Structural Fund programmes with other national, regional or local programmes: Often these opportunities will revolve around better co-ordination of Structural Fund programmes with other programmes avoiding duplication of funding regimes, simplifying participation for horizontal partners and more efficiently directing projects to appropriate programmes. While this is commonly attempted at the programme preparation stage it is difficult to optimise without extensive cross-programme partnership arrangements. Unexpected consequences of partnership activities: At times such cross programme collaboration can have strategic effects, even on public policy as a whole.13

7.1.4 Impact of partnership arrangements The following table summaries the degree to which the partnership arrangements reviewed were found to impact (positive + or negative - ) on the various programme states (rated from ‘strong impact’ through ‘significant impact’ to ‘some impact’ or ‘no impact’): Table 7a: Impact of partnership arrangements

Task Impact

I. Preparation & Planning

programme preparation + strong impact

negotiating programme content between the Commission and national government

+ strong impact

identifying which spatial areas should receive targeted assistance

+ some impact

deciding on project selection criteria + significant impact

programme evaluation (ex-ante) + some impact

II. Implementation & Management

selection of which projects to fund + significant impact

management of the programme + significant impact

use of technical assistance + some impact understanding actual projects (as beneficiaries) + strong impact

13 In the Greek Objective 1 Industry programme the emergence of inter-ministry co-operation concerning industry policy and industrial assistance and of closer links between the public and private sectors with the latter becoming a key partner in developing policy has provided a basis for developing a systematic industry policy at a national level beyond the confines of the Structural Funds

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Table 7a: Impact of partnership arrangements cont.

Task Impact

III. Monitoring and Evaluation

m) monitoring of projects + significant impact

n) programme monitoring + significant impact

o) deciding on programme adjustments including re-programming

+ significant impact

p) programme evaluation (ex-post) + some impact

q) use of technical assistance + some impact 7.2 Partnership Strategies that work The purpose of this section is to elaborate further on case material previously presented, especially in Section 3 and above in sub-section 7.1, with the aim of identifying positive partnership contributions. In particular to identify partnership arrangements that appear successful in order to begin to clarify good practice strategies. The section addresses five issues that appear important across case studies undertaken. These are:

• partnership inclusiveness, • the contribution of partnership to efficiency, • inclusiveness at different programme stages and the effectiveness of

partnerships, • how to manage the participation of beneficiaries, and • strategies to promote innovation through partnership.

As indicated in previous sections, more inclusive partnerships can lead to positive results. Thus in Section 3 and throughout the text it has been indicated that inclusion is of key importance in partnerships and is itself of intrinsic value. It brings together partners and builds social capital by encouraging the exchange of ideas and beneficial interactions as well as providing a source of democratisation and empowerment. Inclusive strategies bring policy closer to user needs and facilitate the better fit with complex local circumstances and locality needs. As the Commission now favours the extension of partnerships and the appropriate empowerment of communities and individuals that will follow on from this process, this analysis seeks not only to present findings but also to derive ways of ensuring that more inclusive partnerships yield the maximum positive value.

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7.2.1 Inclusiveness at different programme stages While there is strong evidence to suggest that inclusiveness in partnership arrangements is most needed, and most desired, at the (pre-negotiation) programme development stage, the litmus test of inclusion and democratisation is essentially the presence or absence of co-decision making. Consultation practices have an important role in programme development, but when partners are excluded from decision-making then the partnership is often perceived to be less legitimate and demotivation can ensue. As has been seen in Section 6, wide-scale informal practices are applied in different partnerships across the EU, which effectively widen inclusion and participation through informal partnership channels. Strategies for inclusion of actors are especially well developed in the states of Austria, Sweden, and Denmark. Informal links can operate in an effective and optimal way in partnerships which are embedded in an environment where trust predominates. Where trust is less diffused then transparency and legitimacy issues emerge. As seen in sub-section 6.2 there are examples of this tension surrounding the use of informal channels in France. Numerous examples of the negative consequences of not including partners in Structural Fund decision making have also been seen. Exhibit 7.2.a: Problems of partnership inclusivity In the Objective 4 case study in North Rhine Westphalia social and economic partners were not informed at the national level until programme preparation had been concluded. In the Greek Objective 1 CSF partnership, decisions are made during technical meetings and the broader partnership is informed of the result in the subsequent monitoring Committee meeting. In the Netherlands Objective 2 case in SE Brabant, the rewriting of locally elaborated programmes by the Commission caused a widespread de-motivation and expectations were dashed at the local partnership level. In Portugal there is a suggestion that non-obligatory partners do not wish to actively participate in partnerships because they believe their work will be overruled by the formal (state) partners.14

In general the case studies suggest that the difficulties that arise because of the exclusion of key partners are greater than those consequent on a more inclusive partnership strategy. Despite fears that widespread inclusion of regional and local actors will lead to a decline of effectiveness and efficiency in the management of the Structural Funds, this worry has been unfounded. (This issue will be elucidated in more detail in sub-section 7.2.2 below.) The notion of inclusion should not, however, be seen as an undifferentiated 14 Discussion with national experts at DG XVI, 29 October, 1998

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practice. Wide partnership is not needed or required at every programme stage. Extensive partnership may exist in some phases of the policy cycle and not in others. There is often no vertical partnership in the implementation phase for example. Some partnership functions can be specialised, reflecting the specialisation of different groups in the partnership (partnership capacity). Some partnerships are open to anyone in particular phases of the policy cycle (normally the pre-consultation phase) and others are closed to non-members and broader societal influences in general (e.g. the Galician Objective 1 partnership). While a degree of specialisation has its own merit, it can also be indicative of closed and exclusive partnerships. Many partnerships favour the accumulation of expertise in technical and advisory bodies as this does not entail abandoning the principles of democratic involvement in exchange for a technocratic partnership system. Inclusion in partnership can create burdens and costs both for the included partners themselves and for the obligatory partners also. The examples given below suggest that inclusive partnership must be appropriate to the programming stage and that appropriate administrative and technical support ideally needs to be offered. Exhibit 7.2.b: Different partnership arrangements In the Austrian INTERREG case study the social partners are able to participate fully and effectively as partners in strategy elaboration but have found the lack of administrative support makes participation in project selection burdensome. In the case of the Objective 1 CSF partnership in Germany the initial high motivation of participants has given way to only 4-5 social partner organisations out of the original 16 attending meetings of the partnership on a regular basis. This is because of their lack of involvement in strategic discussions and a preoccupation with administrative and financial matters in the meetings that they attended. In the UK in the Merseyside (Objective 1) case study, organisations with no interest in the programme do not seek involvement in the partnership. This makes the need to select appropriate partners less of an issue. In the UK Objective 3 case study social partner organisations rarely attend national monitoring committee meetings and are generally seen to have only a minor interest and expertise in the field. They are said to have had little impact in the planning, implementation and monitoring of Objective 3.

It follows that not only is there a need to differentiate between the different phases of the policy cycles at which partners can optimally be included, but partnerships also need to consider ways of supporting the participation of partners at the different phases of the policy cycle where their need is judged to be the most appropriate. The inclusion of the wider stakeholder community is especially important at the programme design stage. This is likely to ensure that programmes are better tailored to user needs. It effectively contributes to decentralisation of programming. In this way the important issues for regional development are

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better understood and addressed in programme content. It is generally accepted that regional development which is planned for remotely is seldom able to contend with the complexity of local economies and the socio–cultural environments within which they are embedded. The argument for inclusion is therefore a strong one. Partnership can help meet users’ needs better by appropriate partner selection and inclusion. One useful indicator of the appropriateness or otherwise of the composition of existing partnerships is the extent of lobbying activity by external organisations and groups. In some circumstances this can imply a degree of transparency – i.e. those who are lobbying know with whom they need to communicate. However, extensive lobbying is often an indication of too narrowly drawn partnership arrangements and a lack of inclusivity of some of the relevant actors. Table 7.1 below both summarises conclusions about current practice regarding the inclusion of partners at different programme stages and identifies some of the more successful strategies that have been encountered. These form the basis for possible good practice recommendations arising from this evaluation. Table 7b: Partnership inclusivity and programme stages

Current state of inclusivity in Structural Fund partnerships

Successful strategies as a basis for good practice in partnerships

At present inclusiveness in partnership arrangements is most valued at the (pre-negotiation) programme development stage. Often what is required at this stage is extensive consultation rather than a more formal arrangement. Once this programme development stage is over the extent of partnership involvement diminishes.

It is already becoming commonplace for there to be a broader involvement of partners not only at the programming stage but also at subsequent stages in the programme. The risk of a strategy which is entirely focused on inclusion at the pre-negotiation stage is that people will feel excluded and insufficiently involved in decision-making.

Partnership membership can place a considerable, and sometimes unwelcome, burden of participation on certain classes of partners such as Social Partners. This is a particular problem in smaller and less strategic programmes where the relationship between input and return is weak.

The strategies that have been used to overcome the burden on social partners of their greater involvement in partnerships include: 1. Minimising the technical content by transferring this function to technical committees 2. Minimising the burden of paperwork where possible 3. Sending out paperwork in good time 4. Rotating the responsibility for participation among different social partners in accordance with an agreed time frame 5. Paying social partners from the technical assistance budget in accordance with pre-established procedures which prevent exploit-ation and conflicts of interest

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Table 7b: Partnership inclusivity and programme stages cont.

Current state of inclusivity in Structural Fund partnerships

Successful strategies as a basis for good practice in partnerships

The degree of partnership inclusivity changes according to the stage of the policy cycle in question. There are also open or closed partnerships (although this is a dimension rather than a simple distinction). Thus an open partnership is not only inclusive in terms of the composition of its membership but also encouraged communication and access with a wide spectrum of social actors.

A more explicit understanding of the appropriateness of involving particular partners at particular stages in the policy cycle should be encouraged. Much can be achieved by supporting an open and communicative orientation to non partners. In some instances this may be a preferable alternative to a substantial expansion in the size of the partnership.

Some partnership functions can be specialised – reflecting the specialisation of different socio-economic actors in the partnership. In a few instances expert advisers are inappropriately involved as partners rather than in their expert capacity.

Specialisation is a useful effectiveness strategy and signifies partnership maturity. There is a need to ensure that this approach is not over used with the result that the partnerships are distanced from the stakeholders. Ideally experts should be advisors to partnerships rather than constitute the partnership itself.

National institutional traditions appear to be an important determinant of the degree of inclusivity of partnerships, particularly at horizontal level. Thus countries such as Austria, Germany, Denmark, Finland and to a lesser extent Sweden and Ireland, are more likely to involve local/regional stakeholders and other end users than Greece, Portugal, France, Italy and Spain.

Where local/regional stakeholders, and other end users, are involved there is likely to be better adaptation of programmes to user needs and a higher level of democratic involvement, transparency and acceptability.

7.2.2 Strategies for efficiency and effectiveness It is often argued that there is an inevitable trade-off between the size and inclusiveness of partnerships and their efficiency and effectiveness. The evidence of this evaluation is that these fears are largely unjustified. In the majority of the cases reviewed increased inclusivity was said to have increased programme effectiveness. In none of the cases was evidence found to indicate a loss in efficiency through extending inclusiveness.

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A number of different ways in which more inclusive partnerships lead to positive results have been found. For example, the involvement of more partners:

• brings in more specialist knowledge, thus improving the quality of decision-making15;

• builds a consensus that allows programming documents to be

finalised more quickly16; • leads to rapid decisions at the implementation stage17.

Exhibit 7.2.c: The benefits of inclusivity In the Objective 2 programme for North Jutland in Denmark, the broad inclusion of a wide range of partners has facilitated the development of a core of specialist knowledge which has enhanced innovation and programme development. However, the ‘successful’ management of inclusion requires the development of a partnership capacity. For example in the Danish case the wide inclusion of non-obligatory partners requires the early start up of preparations prior to the final approval being obtained from the state level and from the Commission. The Danish report states that: ‘the delegation of power to the regional level, combined with a clearly defined state level responsibility for monitoring, results in highly efficient and legitimate routines of decision-making’ (p.56)

Partnerships can increase the efficiency of Structural fund administration because the consensus and ground preparation enables the rapid approval and implementation of programmes. In addition, strategically selected partners also enable the partnership to accrue a body of experience and know-how from which it can ultimately benefit. Improved capacity leads to more efficient administration and management of the Structural Funds. In the light of the comments above, it is clear that effective/successful programme management (by whatever criteria might be used) requires a much more differentiated conception of the roles of partners for different classes of decisions. While the role of different types of partners in decision making will vary greatly depending on the policies and institutions of Member States and the specific substantive content of programmes, Table 7C summarises schematically the main points at which a role is desirable:

15 As for example in key role of the Social Partners in the Advisory Panel for the North Rhine Westphalia Objective 4 programme 16 As for example with the informal vertical and horizontal co-operation between Federal and regional levels in Germany in developing the Objective 1 CSF. 17 As for example in Kokkola Objective 2 programme in Finland.

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Table 7c: Schematic summary of desirable presence in decision making

Programme Stage

Commission

Member State

Regional Admin

Social Partners

Muncipalities

NGOs

Preparation & planning

X X X X X X

Programme development

X X X X X X

Programme negotiation

X X X

Identifying spatial areas

X X X X

Project selection criteria

X X X X X X

Ex-ante evaluation

X X X X X X

Operational management

X X

Selection of projects

X X

Programme management

X X

Undertaking projects

X X X X X

Monitoring & evaluation

X X X X X X

Project monitoring

X X

Programme monitoring

X X X

Re-programming

X X X

Evaluation X X X X X X

One aspect of efficiency benefits that follow from the broad involvement of socio-economic actors is where partnerships can be instrumental in lessening delays and ensuring timely decision making.

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Exhibit 7.2.d: Partnership, consensus and speed of decision making in Objective 2 programmes In the case of the Objective 2 programme for Brabant, informal interactions between partners enabled difficult issues to be smoothed over in advance of monitoring and steering committee meetings, which meant that programme adjustment did not experience major delay.

In addition, a number of case studies show that the absence of partnership itself in different phases of the policy cycle can be detrimental to the smooth operation of programmes. The Spanish Objective 1 case study of Galicia is an example of this. The difficulties which the Commission experienced in acting as a full partner in the partnership (outlined in sub-section 4.1) show how delay can be the result of the absence of a unified partnership approach to Structural Fund administration. It is clear however that partnerships can themselves generate delays and complexities, and can also be adversely effected by delays and complexities which come from outside the partnership. This often implies delays which are created from within the vertical partnership at member state level or from the Commission. Table 7d: Possible efficiency benefits of inclusive partnerships

Conclusion about current state of

efficiency and partnership Strategies for promoting efficiency in

partnerships

Inclusiveness is not always at the expense of efficiency. There are many occasions when inclusiveness can increase efficiency, for example in the selection of better quality funded projects. This again reflects on the different role the partners have at the different stages of the programme.

Programme managers need to be aware of possible efficiency gains and involve horizontal partners in order to maximise the likelihood that such gains will be achieved. Using the know-how of specialist partners at the project selection stage and encouraging consensus within the partnership and examples of effective strategies.

Partnerships can, by fostering consensus, help reduce delay and complexity, but partnerships can also be adversely effected by delays imposed in particular by vertical partners.

Consensus building is often a pre-condition for minimising delays, in particular those that derive from the vetoes of those who have not agreed to formal decision at an earlier stage in the programme. Consensus development skills are an important part of partnership management and support.

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7.2.3 Strategies for partnership effectiveness A number of strategies have been identified across case studies to promote the effectiveness of partnerships. These include:

• Animation, steering and leadership • Setting up quasi-autonomous organisations • Promoting reflexivity through evaluation • Maintaining flexibility in programme boundaries • Achieving unity in the face of external challenges

Animation, steering and leadership Effective/successful partnerships (by whatever criteria might be used) require animation, steering and leadership. The Commission, as the senior partner, has a role in this because - as seen in sub-section 4.1 - the provision of guidance and support by the Commission is appreciated by many national and sub-national partners. This entails assisting the partnership to function effectively within the spirit of the regulations. This role is particularly important in Italy, Greece and Spain where institutional capacity is often undergoing a process of development and enhancement as the result of the impact of the Structural Funds and of partnership itself. When this role is not performed by the Commission the results can be problematic in terms of the demise of trust and the fragmentation of the partnership. Quasi-autonomous programme management organisations Quasi-autonomous programme management organisations can provide the focus and operational coherence which allow partnerships to work effectively. As seen in sub-section 4.2.3, examples of this kind of programme management organisation are quite rare and tend to be a feature of the UK system where there is an institutional history of quangos and more recently of agency structures within the public administration. While agencies such as the Welsh Development Agency are essentially a part of the public administration (in the UK), examples have been found elsewhere of structures created to by-pass state institutions as the result of lack of capacity. An example is the old Industrial Development Authority in Ireland which is more of an agency designed to compensate for the absence of existing structures in the public administration or the role of DATAR in France. Partnership capacity evolves over slow time and it therefore follows that the acquisition of this capacity requires public administrations as well as horizontal partners to experience the initial stages and teething difficulties which condition the early stages of the forging of partnership working practices and culture. The delegation and by-passing of partnership participation by public administrations may not help to build up capacity and can in some

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circumstances avoid the need to confront structural weaknesses in institutional performance within the public sector. There is therefore the risk that the formation of new semi-autonomous bodies will not bring the benefits of partnership to state structures. Through whatever means, public administrations need themselves to engage with partnerships. Evaluation as a mechanism for generating capacity Evaluation can make an important contribution to programme reflexivity and partnership effectiveness, yet in a number of the cases reviewed evaluation is weak and disconnected from programme decision making and partners concerns. In these cases the partnerships are currently not benefiting from a potential mechanism which can raise their effectiveness beyond the scope they are currently able to achieve. Unfortunately the partners commitment to evaluation is related to the extent to which it is seen as being related to some benefit for themselves. Too often evaluation is seen to be an obligation to the Commission. Flexibility in programme boundaries Partnership effectiveness requires some flexibility in programming boundaries. In the Structural Funds programmes may not always define appropriate units, it is for this reason that progress towards the principle of ‘one programme per region’ is to welcomed. Through such a mechanism partners are able to look across programmes for the most appropriate mechanism for implementing desirable projects and initiatives. In order for this to happen the application of the regulations must allow space for innovation and for the programmes to best fit the localities in which they are implemented.

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Exhibit 7.2.c: The flexibility of programme boundaries and partnership membership In the case of the Italian Objective 1 (ROP) programme for Basilicata is an illustration of the need for greater flexibility between programming boundaries. While the Community Initiatives for EMPLOYMENT and ADAPT and the Territorial Employment Pacts have better enabled the development of horizontal partnerships in the region this level of partnership has been difficult to achieve in the case of the Objective 1 ROP. The case of the Austrian INTERREG programme (Austria-Hungary) is an interesting illumination of the difficulties of inflexibility in programme boundaries. The incompatibility of the INTERREG IIa and PHARE-CBC structures has been instrumental in preventing the development of a real partnership approach (Austria INTERREG case study, p.31). In the Finnish Objective 2 and 6 programmes, the regional management committee supervises both an Objective 2 (Kokkola area) and an Objective 6 sub-region (Kaustinen area) (Finnish case study p.8). The Regional State Offices of Central Ostrobothnia find themselves in the position of being able to allocate projects between different Objectives and programmes. This is said to have created flexibility between programmes enabling a fairly rigid implementation at the programme level. (p.9). In Finland there have been, historically, fairly rigid boundaries between sectors and this rigidity has made the financing of programmes difficult. The overlap of programmes within the jurisdiction of the Central Ostrobothnia region has been one mechanism for allowing flexibility to occur in programme allocation.

External challenge as a force for unity On occasion, partners unite together when negotiating with vertical partners. This is usually as part of negotiations with the Commission regarding the content of the SPD. It may also occur as horizontal partners unite in the face of pressures from national or federal authorities. The forging of unity within partnerships does, in most cases, operate as a force for effectiveness. The Commission on occasion plays a ‘dialectical’ role as an external protagonist forcing ‘internal’ partners to form and present a coherent position. Excluded social partners and NGOs/ municipalities may also co-operate and unite in order to gain a voice. However, when rivalry exists between partners then no co-operation can occur. Rivalry between partners is one of the most pervasive difficulties which partnerships face, nonetheless external threat often brings together groups which previously did not identify with each other. Examples of the partners uniting in the face of a perceived threat may be found in a number of countries and the INTERREG case studies provide particularly rich data in this respect. The Commission’s approach to the membership of the partnerships in the case of INTERREG programmes involving non-EU members (Baltic Sea, Austria-Hungary, Greece-Bulgaria) has been correct and legitimate. Generally speaking, however, the national and regional partners in these cases have, understandably, differed in their approach, seeking to gain better integration of non-EU members into the partnerships structures.

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The impact of the Commission as a force for unity is also observable in the case of non-INTERREG programmes. In the case of the French Rhone Alpes case study, for example, the national and regional partners held pre-meetings in order to co-ordinate a common position in negotiations with the Commission about the content of the SPD. While partnerships tend to unite in the face of differences of opinions with governments which have a higher level authority (Member State/Commission) there is also evidence that this unity can be damaged by rivalries. The German CSF (Objective 1) partnership illustrates this well. In this case, existing rivalries between partners undermined the hope of unity. The local associations and social partners had different perceptions of their roles and accordingly the local associations opted out from the Consultation Group - intended to be an inclusive structure of the partnership - preferring instead to belong to the monitoring committees as non-voting members. The low level of consultation and co-operation in this case was therefore increased because of rivalry between social partners and local associations. Conclusion This section has identified a number of strategies used to promote the effectiveness of partnership operations. These have included:

• animation in order to promote partnership capacity; • setting up new forms of public administration within or alongside

State structures; • using evaluation to promote reflexivity; • integrating partnerships across programmes to ensure inter-

programme flexibility; • bringing together diverse socio-economic actors unused to co-

operation in the face of external challenges and threats. The above strategies are unevenly developed across case studies included in this evaluation. In order to encourage the more general application of such strategies a variety of further support measures are needed. These include inter alia allowing for flexibility in the way regulations are applied within and between programmes and giving greater emphasis to the potentially positive benefits of evaluation. These and similar recommendations are developed further in Section 9 of this report.

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7.2.4 Managing the participation of beneficiaries The presence of programme beneficiaries and co-funders in partnerships while increasing programme ‘fit’ can give rise to situations of conflict of interest and even to ‘pork barrel’ outcomes. Excessive territorialism in the distribution of projects can, for example, undermine the strategic coherence and value added of programmes. Particular examples of this can be found in Belgium and to a lesser extent in Spain and Greece. The inclusion of more NGOs and municipalities and other ultimate beneficiaries of programmes could increase the pressures in this regard. However the mere existence of formal conflicts of interest is not of itself necessarily a problem. There are a number of examples of conflicts of interest being managed in honest and effective ways in ‘trust based’ partnerships. Finland offers a good example in this regard, especially in Objective 2 and Objective 6 programmes where special structures have been developed. The Regional Management Committee has a working group of public officials which are responsible for dealing with commercially sensitive information. However non-funding partners are weak and have been marginalised. The establishment of a working group which takes responsibility for decisions which would otherwise yield accusations of conflicts of interest if left in the hands of the main body of the partnership is one way to ensure fairness in project selection procedures. The inclusive nature of the partnership also ensures that transparency is built into the system. The worry about the emergence of territorialism undermining the coherence of programmes would appear to be a real one in the face of the trend towards decentralisation evident across the EU. In part this is a matter of the level of trust and the way trust is managed within partnerships. Regulations also offer a means of setting firm boundaries within which trust can develop. In such circumstances it is less likely that territorialism per se becomes the dominant principle for resource allocation. The involvement of ultimate beneficiaries can also be a strength within partnership, particularly when NGOs or Municipalities co-operate and unite with their fellows in order to gain a voice. In areas of sparse population (Objective 6) or particularly small countries such as Luxembourg, the participation of beneficiaries is unavoidable. Transparency of process becomes particularly important in these circumstances.

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Exhibit 7.2.e: Managing the involvement of beneficiaries The Finnish case report points out that: “Many potential project owners are partners of formal and informal partnership. It is difficult to have in practice the adjustment of projects outside the formal and informal partnership organisation. There cannot be a strict border between partners participating in decision making concerning the programmes and project selections and project applicants. In small regions, the resources of everybody are needed for regional development and programme work. The regional development with the help of programme work occurs in partnership of all relevant actors.” 18

The participation of beneficiaries is often unavoidable and can bring with it its own benefits. Although excessive territorialism in the distribution of resources can undermine the strategic coherence and value added of programmes, this does not necessarily follow. Trust based management and appropriate regulations can prevent an unacceptable level of ‘pork barrel’ outcomes. Notwithstanding the above, problems remain with the involvement of less well organised socio-economic partners, e.g. the marginalised and socially excluded. 7.2.5 Strategies for promoting innovation through partnership Innovation is a positive means of applying new ideas and practices within a particular context, which can be of benefit to partnership operations. It is necessarily multifaceted in form as the following examples identified during the course of this evaluation indicate, for example

• Partnerships which are innovative because they are particularly inclusive (e.g. Ireland Objective 1 LURD, and ESF actions in Portugal)

• Partnerships which are innovative because they are because

dynamic and changing (e.g. Finland Objectives 2 and 6) • Partnerships which are innovative because they are different to

mainstream institutional culture (e.g. Italy Objective 1 ROP, Tuscany) • Partnerships which are innovative because they have identified and

operationalised new and effective working practices (e.g. Sweden Objective 4, and Luxembourg INTERREG)

While there are many examples of innovative partnership practices, examples of partnerships which are less innovative can also be identified. Partnerships in this category tend to be more static and rigid and find it difficult to respond to changing external circumstances. An external shock, such as an economic

18 Finnish Objective 2 &6 case study, p.31

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recession or change of government, can either demobilise partnerships or animate them. However the evidence points to a remarkable resilience of partnerships in the face of external shocks which generally tends to produce greater partnership unity As has been seen in Section 3, the overlapping institutional membership of different partnerships provides the basis for the transfer of innovation in partnership practice between programmes over time. As noted, generally, in the Cohesion States, where the Structural Funds are a key component of public policy and spending, innovation tends to transfer from the smaller programmes to the mainstream programmes. In the non-Cohesion Countries, where the Structural Funds are more marginal to public policy and spending, the Structural Fund programmes as a whole seem to play a role as test-beds or pathfinders for innovative partnership practices to transfer into mainstream national programmes and more generally into national institutional practice. Overlapping partnerships facilitate the transfer of good practice. This, like other forms of partnership capacity evolves slowly over time. The necessary density of partnership links within a particular locality or region leads to the growth of a partnership culture. Indeed, broadly based partnerships become a mechanism for diffusing more inclusive and innovative approaches to governance and participation across different levels of civil society. The Commission and member states need to allow time for such dense partnership networks to evolve. Too much should not be expected from partnerships in the early stages of their evolution. This comment has particular implications for the post-1999 widening of the EU. Exhibit 7.2.f: Overlapping partnerships and innovation In the case of the Irish ADAPT programme, the experiences of other Human Resource Community Initiatives such as Euroform have been drawn on in the elaboration of the ADAPT OP. Innovation achieved in these trans-national partnerships has been drawn on in ADAPT, as has the innovation which emerged from the existence of a number of strong consortia in Euroform. The ADAPT programme therefore sought to incorporate these partnership innovations into its OP and project selection. In the case of the UK Objective 3 programme the prevalence of co-operation between partners outside the forum of the national monitoring committee has also contributed to effective implementation in other Structural Fund Initiatives. In the case of the Finnish Objective 3 programmes there is evidence of innovative experiments being undertaken to mobilise potential partners. Innovative national workshops for employment have been expanded to include young people under the Objective 3 programme.

In Section 3 it was noted the possibilities of tension between smooth programme fund absorption and programme innovation. This includes innovations in the management of programmes (and by implication innovative programme partnership arrangements). The favouring of fund absorption

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rather than innovation can be seen as a form of goal displacement. Examples of this occur in a handful of member sta tes, e.g. Germany, Spain and Greece. In this section it has been argued that innovation in particular Structural Fund contexts is multi-faceted. It is particularly enhanced by overlapping partnerships which become a conduit for the diffusion of innovation. The timescale for the evolution of such networks can be quite extended. Too much should not be expected from partnerships in the early stages of their evolution. Given the endemic nature of the problems that Structural Funds confront, it is unlikely that well established solutions will be sufficient. It is for this reason that the innovative potential of partnerships is able to generate new and creative solutions as being especially important. Fund absorption can become a surrogate for necessary innovation, and on the basis of this evaluation the widespread use of fund absorption indicators on their own as a measure of partnership effectiveness can be questioned. 7.3 Conclusions In this section, and the sections which preceded it, can be seen an enormous variety of partnership forms, practices and experiences depending on a range of contextual and dynamic factors, and the purposes of programmes and initiatives themselves. In this section it can be seen that the need, opportunity and role of partnership and for specific partners also varies at each programme stage. Notwithstanding this variety, a number of general observations can be made across the range of partnerships reviewed. Specifically, it has been seen in this section that partnership has a wide range of beneficial effects for programme performance, and it has also been seen that there remain very substantial opportunities to improve partnership arrangements and operation, building on existing best practice, and so further improve programme performance. In the next section general conclusions are presented and in the following section a number of general recommendations.