Partisan ambition, policy entrepreneurs and the market for ideas:

what we can learn from policy failure.

James Walter and Matthew Laing ©1 School of Social Sciences, Monash University

Abstract The urban water reform agenda of the Coalition Liberal-National Party government in the state of Victoria led to the creation of the Office of Living Victoria (OLV) in 2012, a policy initiative intended to implement a vision for integrated water cycle management in Melbourne that had been developed during the run-up to the state election of 2010. Within three years the initiative was derailed by a combination of ethics investigations, a failure to deliver on core priorities, conflicts between senior staff, and lack of buy-in from industry and development stakeholders. This paper asks why. The case of the OLV is instructive because its creation and implementation generated a chain of decisions, both political and bureaucratic, that highlight the tensions and differing imperatives of science and politics, and illuminate the fundamental problems in translating between the two to determine policy agendas. Equally significant was the impact of partisan dissension, manifest in discontinuity between the preceding Labor administration and the new government, with change accompanied by loss of institutional memory and competition between conventional research bodies and policy entrepreneurs for the new minister’s attention. This paper reports on a comprehensive review of the OLV, based on interviews with politicians, bureaucrats, researchers and consultants, and allied documentary records. It identifies the core challenges that exist in translating good science into good policy, and why good science does not always make for good politics. We also reflect upon the nature of critical political and bureaucratic battles: those that open policy windows; those that limit options and those that ultimately determine the fate of policy initiatives.

Introduction Concerted efforts by researchers succeeded in elevating the issue of water sensitive urban design

(WSUD) in the policy domain in the early twenty first century, manifest in the award of federal and

state funding to new research bodies, such such as the Cooperative Research Centres for Catchment

Hydrology (1999-2005), eWater (2005-2012) and Water Sensitive Cities (2012-). The significance of

water management was reinforced by crisis – the millenium drought (2001-2009, see Bureau of

Meteorology 2015; Low et al. 2015). In that context, the then Victorian Labor governments, led by

Steve Bracks (1999-2007) and John Brumby (2007-2010) adopted the WSUD cause, and initiated

successful programs of behaviour change relating to water usage. They also, and notwithstanding

the simultaneous budget disruption of the Global Financial Crisis, adopted controversial and

expensive big engineeering solutions to future proof the state against further shortages: a North-

South pipeline (to bring water from the Northern agricultural/irrigation areas to Melbourne) and a

large desalination plant. Both measures were fiercely contested by the Liberal-National Party

opposition, the first as an unwarranted incursion against rural communities and the farming

economy; the second as an instance of Labor profligacy at a time when budget restraint was

necessary and whose costs would be borne by everybody. The Liberal and National Parties therefore

pledged that neither the pipline nor the deslination plant would be activated if the Coalition won

government. And yet, conscious of the need to manage the challenge to water supply, they 1 Working paper; not for citation without first referring to the corresponding author

james.a.walter@monash.edu.

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remained alert to the possibilities that WSUD and water management practices could be

recalibrated to serve their interests.

In consequence, the Liberal-National Party government of Victoria (led successively by Ted Baillieu

and Dennis Napthine), having defeated Labor in the 2010 state election, established the Office of

Living Victoria (OLV) in 2012. This masthead policy initiative was intended to implement a vision for

integrated water cycle management in Melbourne and had been developed during the run-up to its

election. Within three years the initiative was derailed by a combination of ethics investigations, a

failure to deliver on core priorities, conflicts between senior staff, and lack of buy-in from industry

and development stakeholders. Under intense scrutiny from the media and the Victorian

Ombudsman, the agency was stripped of its independent status in mid-2014 and abolished

altogether after the election of Daniel Andrews’ Labor government in late 2014. In the election of

that year, water gained scant attention from either campaign. The major party platforms since then

reveal that urban water sensitivity struggles to regain traction.

The case of the OLV is instructive because, along with the processes that led to its creation, the chain

of political and bureaucratic decisions it generated highlights the tensions and differing imperatives

of science and politics, and some of the fundamental problems in translating between the two. The

OLV’s trajectory illuminates a complex period of tension and transition regarding the transformation

of Melbourne’s water management practices. For some, the story demonstrates the intransigence

and hegemony of an iron triangle of utilities, bureaucrats, and politicians that has impeded reform of

water management for decades. Others see the OLV as merely a distraction from the otherwise

steady transition towards water sensitive urbanism that most in the urban water sector have already

embraced. Nonetheless, as a policy exercise, it is clear that the agency had little impact, though

politically it was, for a time, the catalyst of much sound and fury.

The OLV saga provides an unusually pointed case study of the nature of the critical political and

bureaucratic battles that ultimately determine the fate of policy initiatives. Yet analysing such

exercises is complicated. Policy-makers themselves often have a limited view of broader pictures

(Cohen, March and Olsen 1972). Explanations of what happened are understandably subject to

intense disagreement. Our analysis of water reform efforts in Melbourne cannot be definitive.

Nonetheless, we can identify the main episodes and the perspectives of various players within them

and explore multiple interpretations by relevant actors to help shape our understanding. Questions

about political imperatives, the role of scientists, the nature of influence-seeking, and expectations

of rationality are central to this exploration. The literatures on partisanship, policy entrepreneurs,

networks and timing are key to this study of recent developments in Melbourne’s water reform (see

Cohen 2003; Laing 2015: 45-49).

The information on which we draw was derived from interviews with approximately thirty-five

senior figures in the Melbourne water sector (primarily the OLV, the water policy departments of the

Victorian State Government, and Melbourne’s water authorities), as well as public statements, news

reports, and water sector publications (both published and unpublished). To protect the identity of

interviewees, they are identified only generically (see interview list attached). This report is

structured to conform roughly to the basic steps of the classical policy cycle model (Althaus et al.

2013: 32) – agenda-setting, option-vetting, decision-making, implementation, and evaluation.

Background, 1994-2007 Melbourne’s current water sector emerged with the creation of Melbourne Water as the bulk water

supplier (1992) and Yarra Valley Water, South East Water, and City West Water as water retailers

(1994), each with jurisdiction over a different area of the city. This was a major shift from the

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previously monolithic Melbourne and Metropolitan Board of Works, which by the 1960s and 1970s

had become one of the most powerful agencies in the state (Sharkansky 1979: 40-65). In that period

statist technocratic and engineering assumptions prevailed in urban water management. In contrast,

the reform era of the 1980s and 1990s, particularly under Liberal Premier Jeff Kennett (1992-1999)

emphasized principles of privatization, marketization, efficiency, consolidation, and deregulation.

The Labor Governments of Steve Bracks (1999-2007) and John Brumby (2007-2010) ameliorated the

trend by designating water a public good, though interviewees from both the water bureaucracy and

the wider industry identified a consistent market-oriented philosophy of water in government and

industry since the 1980s.

The consumer- and efficiency-orientation of the newly established water utilities was driven by

legislative and regulatory changes. The Water Industry Act (1994) established an Essential Services

Commission (ESC) as the regulator of water pricing and the regulatory scheme under which the

water retailers would operate. The Financial Management Act (1994) enhanced the government’s

financial and business oversight of departments and public entities. Amendments to the Water Act

in 2006 introduced section 94, which directed the water retailers to operate as commercial entities

and maintain a business focus (Department of Sustainability and Environment [DSE] 2011a: 1-10). In

the words of a long-time water industry figure, this was the major change that reinforced the move

of the Melbourne water sector away from the technocratic and solutions-orientated towards the

business and customer-orientated framework (Interview 1).

These changes coincided with the beginnings of the Water Sensitive Urban Design (WSUD) agenda in

Australia. Some aspects of WSUD and integrated water cycle management (IWCM) were embraced

in Victoria and Melbourne during the Bracks government (1999-2007) and particularly under then

Water Minister and Deputy Premier John Thwaites. These included increasing efficiencies and

reducing consumption through water-saving construction; a scientifically-informed agenda to

improve river and catchment health; initiatives and funding programs around wastewater and

stormwater programs; and larger scale projects around water recycling and distribution.

Yet progress was sporadic and inconsistent. There was opposition to large-scale investment in WSUD

within both the government and among some industry players (Interview 3; Interview 11; Interview

23). Policy was subject to frequent changes due to an uncertain water supply environment, and

WSUD initiatives were often small in scale. Critically, the exigencies of the millenium drought led to

water security becoming the government’s top priority, and plans for large-scale augmentation of

the water supply – the North-South pipeline and the desalination plant – crowded out WSUD and

IWCM discussions at a policy level within the Labor government (Interview 4; Interview 15).

Formulating the Agenda, 2007-2010 An agenda for water reform that was guided by the principles of IWCM, and ultimately the mandate

from which the Office of Living Victoria would operate, was catalyzed by the politically contentious

decisions announced in 2007 in Our Water, Our Future: The Next Stage of the Government’s Water

Plan (Department of Sustainability and Environment 2007). Political circumstances were critical in

opening a window in which a wider agenda on water could be considered by an opposition looking

to exploit the unpopularity of the government’s agenda as outlined in The Next Stage, particularly

the North-South pipeline and the desalination plant.

The millennium drought in Victoria precipitated a crisis in state water management, as water inflows

collapsed. Water supply for the city of Melbourne was in jeopardy at the height of the crisis in 2006-

2007. Decisive government action was warranted, but the release of The Next Stage policy to handle

the crisis in June 2007 was inevitably going to be contentious. Despite significant costs and financial

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complexity, The Next Stage was released just a month after the 2007-2008 State Budget, in which

only vague references were made to any impending water infrastructure investment (Department of

Treasury and Finance 2007). As observed by Paul Austin of The Age, there were unavoidable

conclusions to be drawn from locating the proposed desalination plant at Wonthaggi, traditional

Liberal Party territory, and the drawing of water for Melbourne’s needs from irrigation farming areas

north of the divide, traditional National Party territory (Austin 2007).

Moreover, the announcement of the Next Stage crowded out other alternative sources formerly

being pursued (however intermittently) through previously established policy. As the crisis shifted

the government to a water security agenda, senior political figures doubted the ability of WSUD to

contribute meaningfully to water security in the short term (Interview 32). The exigencies of the

crisis demanded tangible, large-scale supply-augmentation, and despite good will and momentum by

the scientific and practitioner community regarding stormwater utilization, policy options in this vein

were not sufficiently developed to match the specific policy needs of the government.

Despite the supply crisis, the Liberal/National opposition’s denunciation of the decisions taken in The

Next Stage began almost immediately. The north-south pipeline (formally called the Sugarloaf

Interconnector) attracted the ire of key farmer groups and the National Party. The Victorian Farmers

Federation criticized a lack of consultation or engagement with the government over the issue and

the potential threat to farming communities. Peter Ryan, then leader of the National Party, declared

his party would do what it could to prevent seeing “the future of the Goulburn Valley flushed down

Melbourne's toilets” (Rood, Guerrera & Kleinman 2007). These denunciations ran counter to the fact

that the DSE and Treasurer, John Brumby, the advocate in the Cabinet for a North-South pipeline

(Interview 3), had consulted the irrigators in northern Victoria earlier in 2007. The Northern

Victorian Irrigators Group, representing almost 1000 of the major agricultural stakeholders in the

food bowl, voted to support the government’s modernization plan and the north-south pipeline

(Austin and Rood 2007). However, as the Victorian Ombudsman (2011) and Wallis et al. (2014) both

highlight, irrigators are not one homogenous group, and the program potentially disadvantaged

smaller-scale farmers in areas of the network decommissioned as a result of the program. Thus, a

community rift and a divergence between political and policy goals emerged.

Premier Bracks announced on July 4 that The Next Stage would nullify the need for household water

restrictions and that consequently an easing of conservation targets could be expected over the next

three years. The announcement dismayed water experts, conservationists and some policy-makers,

as water conservation efforts, either through behavior change or household retrofitting and

efficiency programs, had been some of the most successfully implemented water policies of the

preceding half-decade (Interview 6). The inconsistency concerning water conservation under the

Brumby government continued until the 2010 election, with the government alternating between

inducements for water conservation efforts on the one hand, and decisions intended to diminish the

need for water restrictions on the other (for example, Our Water, Our Future 2008; 2009; 2010).

Scientific advocates in this period attempted to promote the viability of WSUD and alternative water

sources as substitutes for the beleaguered desalination and pipeline policies (Hart and Walsh 2007,

13; Coombes 2008; Doherty 2008). However, political rather than scientific calculations drove the

adoption of the WSUD agenda within the Liberal-National opposition. The Living Victoria agenda (as

it was later known), according to one senior figure within the OLV, was only partially a response to

the drought. It was primarily a politically advantageous alternative to the water policy decisions

made by the Labor government (Interview 7). The opposition’s narrative now focussed on the

desalination plant as a costly potential ‘white elephant’ and the specter of rising water bills,

economic hardship, and the claimed injustice of taking water from the Goulburn Valley for urban use.

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In early 2008, reports from the Institute of Public Affairs (IPA) and the Victorian Auditor-General

questioned the government’s accounting and analysis of its policy. They were used to substantiate

the opposition narrative attacking the government’s water policies as wasteful, ill-considered,

unnecessary and unfair (Moran 2008; VAGO 2008). However, a unified opposition narrative

regarding an alternative water policy did not immediately arise. Community and scientific groups

offered critiques from a variety of perspectives throughout 2007 and 2008, but there was little

consensus on alternatives.

The Opposition Water Policy Water remained an important political issue throughout the next two years leading to the 2010

election campaign. It remained an unpopular issue for the government throughout this period

(Lesman, Macreadie and Gardiner 2011: 3-13). Orthodox research may not have motivated the

timing and most salient political point scoring of the opposition, but the eventual development of

the Liberal/National agenda still sought a scientific evidence base to underpin policy ideas and

justifications.

The rural water spokesperson and eventual water minister, Peter Walsh, is not thought to have been

a natural ally of water sensitive urbanism (Interview 1; Interview 17). His interest and ultimate

backing of a water sensitive city agenda for Melbourne was widely thought to have come indirectly

from an interest in solving water problems in regional cities. Some catalytic influence was attributed

to Professor Tim Fletcher, who, at a climate change symposium organized by a community

environmental group (Ballarat Regional Environment and Zero Emissions, or BREAZE) in 2008, spoke

about how a region like Ballarat could become its own water supply catchment. ABC radio reports of

the speech subsequently came to Walsh’s attention (Interview 17). Professor Peter Coombes, who

had worked and consulted widely in Melbourne and was a frequent contributor to public debate

during the drought, was also providing informal advice to Walsh in this period (Interview 8).

One event was particularly influential in the formulation of the Liberal National Policy of 2010. In

2008-2009, the Environment and Natural Resources Committee (ENRC) of the Victorian Parliament

held an inquiry into Melbourne’s Future Water Supply. Given the concern prompted within all

parties by the millennium drought, this was manifestly the opening of a policy window. The ENRC

inquiry proved especially important to the formation of the opposition’s policy and the mindset of

Peter Walsh, who would become the Coalition water minister in less than two years (Interview 1;

Interview 5; Interview 7; Interview 10). Public inquiries and public submission processes serve as

pageants in which policy-makers audition various ideas and potential influencers (Prasser 1985;

Brunton 2005). In the case of the ENRC, its import could have been anticipated, given the high

political salience of the issue and the presence of high-profile politicians on the committee, not least

Walsh himself. Yet the research community seems not fully to have prepared for this opportunity.

Of the 110 submissions and 971 pages of evidence tendered, just 5 of those submissions and 39 of

those pages were from scientific or research organizations. Only two of those submissions could be

considered substantial, relative to other submissions (see CSIRO 2008; Monash University 2008).

Notably, particular ideas and examples used in submissions ended up relatively intact in the Liberal-

National policy document (cf. Environment and Natural Resources Committee 2009b; Liberal Party

of Victoria & National Party of Victoria 2010: 18). Most important for our purposes is the relative

impact of diverse scientific testimonies at the ENRC committee. In comparing the evidence

submitted by the five groups operating primarily from research bases – Uniwater, Monash University,

CSIRO, UNSW and Bonacci Water – there are clear differences in the approaches taken to presenting

science and its consequences for government policy.

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A frequently cited problem from policy-maker interviews (Interview 12; Interview 19; Interview 20)

was the lack of unity amongst scientists on options and the difficulty faced by policy-makers in

assessing which among conflicting scientific opinions to accept. Apparently, none of the evidence or

opinion tendered by leading urban water scientists had been coordinated. For example, on the

critical issue of the desalination plant, CSIRO and Monash University took no firm position or were

ambivalent; Uniwater and UNSW were proponents, and Bonacci Water was firmly against

(Environment and Natural Resources Committee 2008a: 3-4; 2008b: 4-5; 2008c: 3; 2009a: 13-14).

Lack of certainty on key issues was reinforced by the statements of some of the evidence givers. As

one team leader remarked, in response to a direct question about whether wide-scale

implementation of WSUD a decade earlier would have produced major water savings and averted

the supply crisis:

In terms of all the academics who … contributed to our submission — this is a

heated point amongst the over 20 of us — I think it would be fair to say that there

are some members, our partners in this submission, who believe both those projects

may not have been necessary if planning had been started much sooner. However,

there are other members of the submission who do not believe that is the case.

(Environment and Natural Resources Committee 2008b: 9)

Such statements do not engender confidence in either the policy option or the scientific

community’s position. And though committee members repeatedly stated that, given the number of

policy options possible, and the complexity of the problem at hand, it would be useful to eliminate

and prioritize options, the majority of researchers demurred or gave guarded answers to specific

policy questions, making it difficult for policymakers to appraise the value of what was tendered.

Equivocation does not help policy-makers, who are required to make decisions when the situation

demands, not when certainty is achieved. It also echoes the time-horizon problem encountered

between scientists and policy-makers While, for example, CSIRO alluded to a need for further

research and full investigation of the options, the committee was charged with reporting in a matter

of months about an imminent crisis thought to be facing Melbourne. The aims of the scientist and

policy-maker were not in alignment. The scientific evidence-givers at the ENRC inquiry may have

been pursuing ‘honest broker’ roles conscientiously (Pielke 2008) and presenting as many points of

view and uncertainties as possible (see Spruit et al. 2014). Whether such an approach assists the

policy development process is questionable.

In stark contrast, Bonacci Water’s presentation (given by Dr Peter Coombes) was specific and directly

discussed policy options. Coombes, in fact, went further in criticizing the status quo and suggested

policy alternatives. For example, in responding to the question on particular policy instruments that

could be used to incentivize or push water utilities to act further on WSUD, Coombes proposed

legislative and institutional changes to the regulatory framework, and government enforcement of

different cost-benefit analysis in water infrastructure development (Environment and Natural

Resources Committee 2009a: 14-15). On the question of whether earlier WSUD implementation

might have helped avert the current crisis, again Coombes presented alternative scenarios and

provided a realistic estimate of how earlier WSUD implementation might have mitigated the current

problems (Environment and Natural Resources Committee 2009a: 13). The depth and breadth of the

preparations delivered by Bonacci for the submission became clear at this point. Coombes was

prepared for and able to answer a broader range of questions than the other scientific teams that

gave evidence at hearings.

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Coombes was willing to be critical of alternative policy choices, including those already made by the

Labor government. Other scientists were much more tentative about doing so. In his evidence, he

also questioned the credibility of scientists who were in the employ or under the influence of the

industry (Environment and Natural Resources Committee 2009a: 15-16). His well-crafted narrative

engaged the committee (his session ran longer than that of other presenters), and was targeted to

what it sought – policy options rather than researcher assertions or open-ended agendas. It was of

particular interest to the opposition, which was especially interested in articulating current

deficiencies in the policy system and preferred solutions than was the government. Coombes

adopted a more entrepreneurial manner than did other scientific submissions, which balked at

explicit contest or criticism of one another. He recognised that a parliamentary inquiry is a

competition over ideas and influence. Moreover, the lack of consensus and coordination amongst

the other scientific submissions facilitated his tactic: fashioning a more focused perspective tailored

to the circumstances.

Dr. Coombes continued as an influential advisor to Peter Walsh, and would ultimately be appointed

Chief Scientist of the Office of Living Victoria. Because the inquiry was transparent, and the policy

legacy direct, this is an important analytical case for understanding how ideas and influence can

enter the policy subsystem, and why some scientific voices are potentially more effective than

others at achieving influence within that space. The ENRC episode does not tell the whole story.

Long-term influence is a function of credibility, trust and usefulness to policy-makers, factors which

are established over a much longer term than a single parliamentary inquiry (see Laing 2015: 47-51).

However, that much of Coombes’ argument would be adopted, both in policy and in action, by Peter

Walsh in government confirmed the utility of his initial approach. Although in later years Coombes’

effectiveness in providing the means for implementing government policy was increasingly debated,

at this preliminary inquiry he achieved major cut-through with a key political actor who was soon to

become an important ministerial decision-maker. Arguably, it gave the opposition the means not

only to attack the government’s commitment to the pipeline and the desalination plant, but also to

advance a responsible agenda for water management when it won power.

The Government Agenda The Coalition government, elected in late 2010, promised to act within 100 days on the water

reform agenda it had taken to the election campaign (Liberal Party of Victoria & National Party of

Victoria 2010). On 10 February 2011, half way towards that deadline, Minister Walsh appointed a

Ministerial Advisory Council (MAC) consisting of leading figures from the water sector – Sue Holliday,

Rob Adams, and Rob Skinner – chaired by Mike Waller. Waller had a distinguished record as a senior

federal and state bureaucrat and management consultant.

Mike Waller expressed reservations about the water industry and water bureaucracy that were

broadly congruent with the arguments put by Coombes at the ENRC and Coombes’ subsequent

contributions to the 2010 Coalition water policy (Interview 5). Evidently the patterns of influence

and key recommendations of those who influenced the Coalition policy were already locked-in. The

terms of reference for the MAC explicitly directed the council to work within the framework of the

2010 Coalition water policy (MAC 2011: 18). In effect, the policy window had already begun to close.

For much of Melbourne’s recent history, the water authorities – the three retailers and Melbourne

Water interacting with niche agencies – had been fundamental to the decision-making process on

water policy (Interview 5; Interview 10). That influence had diminished over time, but theirs

remained the most important stakeholder voices in water policy processes (Interview 5). Because of

the deferential attitude towards them, the water authorities had also been the most likely route for

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scientists to influence government policy in urban affairs, as they had been the most likely agencies

to engage in innovation, research and development in urban water delivery. However, Walsh and

the Coalition believed that the industry itself was a major roadblock to reform. Better oversight and

direction of the water authorities was highlighted as a pressing priority in the MAC’s 2011 report

Living Melbourne, Living Victoria: Roadmap (MAC 2011). A second report in 2012, Living Melbourne,

Living Victoria: Implementation Plan, specified such oversight as the function of an independent

regulatory agency (MAC 2012).

By creating an independent council to advise him on urban water policy, Walsh set the scene for a

complicated and conflict-ridden relationship with the state water bureaucracy, whose influence he

and others were intent on curbing. Distrust encouraged a gulf between the MAC and Walsh’s pro-

reform advisors on the one side and the Department of Sustainability and Environment on the other.

Thus, the influence of a pillar of the traditional water policy development process in Victoria – the

state water bureaucracy – over the Coalition’s urban water reform agenda was questioned and

curtailed. For their part, while supportive of the potential for integrated systems management in

WSUD, as one CEO remarked, the water retailers were frustrated by the government’s adamantly

partisan refusal even to consider the possibilities of the North-South pipeline and the desalination

plant in state-wide transfers and trading. The retailers had to carry the costs of what had now been

deemed, by government decree, stranded assets.

The marginalization of the water bureaucracy and the water authorities presented both

opportunities and constraints for scientific influence in this period. On the one hand, opportunities

for access and influence emerged for a smaller group of individuals and advisors more closely

aligned with the specifics of the science and research on WSUD. On the other hand, there was a

growing separation of the MAC from the institutions that were most experienced in providing

research-for-policy. This was to have long-term ramifications for the effectiveness of the OLV.

By setting itself up in opposition to the research work done through the bureaucracy and water

authorities, the MAC also set up an eventual rivalry between the ‘blue-sky’ thinking of the OLV and

the ‘grey-sky’ thinking of experienced professionals and authorities in the established water sphere.

However, influential figures in the MAC asserted that there was no real scientific controversy

(Interview 7). In terms of a water sensitive cities agenda, the real questions were not scientific or

technical ones, but rather questions of policy instruments and approaches to achieve the policy

agenda. Some MAC members remarked that the MAC process and its final reports would have made

sense with or without the scientific consulting and research initiated to support it – the strategic

vision rather than the scientific rationale was the key (Interview 33). In short, despite competition

for scientific influence during the MAC period, at the political level the key scientific battles and

questions had already been resolved during the agenda-setting phase.

Living Victoria, Living Melbourne The ‘Implementation Plan’, Living Victoria, Living Melbourne, was released in February of 2012. The

plan was aligned with the MAC’s reporting and the principles the government had taken to the

previous election, and asserted that there were

… problems and gaps in the current system that will continue to affect future

performance and outcomes. These include: a lack of understanding of broader

community aspirations for the water system and its role in enhancing liveability;

uncertainties around the expectations and role of the water businesses in

contributing to urban amenity; frustration of developers and new entrants wanting

to provide non-traditional solutions; and community disenchantment with water

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system planning processes following the desalination plant and the North-South

Pipeline decisions. (Living Victoria Ministerial Advisory Council 2012: 9)

It presented a threefold reformation of urban water management: the creation of a new

independent agency (the Office of Living Victoria); an overhaul of the water planning framework;

and ‘transforming’ the utilization of water resources in the state (Living Victoria Ministerial Advisory

Council 2012: 9).

The report relied primarily on input from Dr Peter Coombes and Bonacci Water. Their early

investment and strategic approach towards the ‘policy window’ of 2010 had engendered trust in

their ability to deliver the evidentiary basis for the plan. Little else was cited from the research

community in the second MAC report (Living Victoria Ministerial Advisory Council 2012). The

consulting report relied on research conducted or co-authored by Coombes himself (Bonacci Water

2012). Neither the scientific community, nor the water authorities were afforded an opportunity

critically to review this work.

Coombes’ gained influence over decision-makers though his ability to articulate a unified vision of

integrated water cycle management. The MAC described Coombes model (the systems approach) in

this way:

In contrast to other … approaches, this modelling more readily facilitates an

understanding of the influences of various localised water initiatives, occurring at

the lot or precinct scale … [It] incorporates the demographic, socio-economic and

spatial variation of the greater Melbourne system. The approach combines the

management of water resources with urban planning considerations (Living Victoria

Ministerial Advisory Council 2012, 22).

This gelled with Walsh’s agenda of a grand reform vision for the city and provided the basis from

which a whole-of-Melbourne agency could operate. It also reinforced the Minister’s suspicion of

water authority “fiefdoms” (Interview 22) not working holistically towards alternatives. Indeed, even

Bonacci’s consulting report to the MAC took aim at the water authorities for withholding data and

obstructing reform (Bonacci 2012: 143-154).

The MAC was convinced. As one of its central figures concluded:

The problem that we faced was that when we actually went out and asked [other

consultants] … to actually say, “Tell us how this system operates in an integrated

way,” you know, “… the rivers, the whole infrastructure. How does that all work

together and what are the options?” Nobody else had thought to do it. (Interview 7)

The Bonacci Report of 2012 for the MAC addressed a complex problem and promised data and

insights into pricing, planning, climate, behaviour and amenity, which made it an attractive model to

key decision-makers. However, some senior bureaucrats and utility managers doubted the claims

made and the results produced by the model (Interview 10; Interview 12; Interview 23). And as even

the most senior figures of the OLV would later concede, it is likely that decision-makers during the

MAC and OLV processes put too much faith in, and not enough resources, behind Coombes.

Thereafter, since decision-makers believed that much of the scientific case was ‘settled’, the MAC’s

subsequent reports were concerned principally with managerial questions regarding the

establishment and operations of the OLV within the governance environment. They did not review

or question the primary assumptions made in the scientific reports regarding the viability of the

general strategy (Scrafton 2011; SGS Economics & Planning 2011).

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Consultants with the considerable expertise were initially locked out of contracts for the new agency

(Interview 31). The minister’s office frequently clashed with the water bureaucracy within the state

government (Arup 2011), engendering a long-running conflict that would have serious ramifications

for the OLV and its ability to develop policy and implement its vision (Interview 7). This was in

addition to the already well publicised perception of suspicion regarding Melbourne’s water utilities,

setting the stage for a narrowly based agency.

OLV: the revolution begins Fundamentally opposing views of the mission and approach of the OLV arose in the initial

development of the OLV’s business plan and the relationship between the organisation and the

water authorities (Interview 7; Interview 1). Chris Chesterfield, a long-time expert and advocate for

WSUD in Melbourne, and former manager of waterways at Melbourne Water, would ultimately sit

at the top of the organisation for less than six months before leaving the role in October (Arup 2012).

There was contention between Chesterfield and Mike Waller, chair of the OLV’s steering committee,

around political and strategic questions: was the OLV to be a consensus-based evolutionary

organisation, or was it to be a revolutionary agency that would shake-up the industry? (Baker and

McKenzie 2014c) Chesterfield’s eventual replacement by Waller, a decision made by the minister’s

office, resolved the question in favour of the latter option (Interview 1; Interview 7; Interview 8;

Interview 25).

By the end of 2012, a series of decisions had been made that defined the policy trajectory and the

overall strategy for the government’s agenda. It had chosen some scientific and research voices, and

rejected others. It had flirted with a consensual evolutionary strategy, but had ultimately opted for a

revolutionary and confrontational strategy. Those key decisions had created the policy narrative and

strategic vision, through which new information and data were going to be filtered and through

which the credibility and trustworthiness of other entities in the policy sphere would be assessed.

Now it remained to implement this vision.

Chesterfield’s departure was indicative of another transition: organisational change that fractures

the links with experience and practitioner expertise. One water knowledge broker in Melbourne

commented on the limited depth of knowledge archives, noting that much of the research produced

for certain projects or problems tends to disappear after first use, and its continued incorporation in

practice tends to rely on staff memory and experience rather than institutionalized knowledge

transfer and storage processes (Interview 28).

This problem became clear in the OLV case, as the scientific and research agenda for the agency,

rather than being agglomerative or integrative with extant research collaborations, instead

marginalised contemporaneous research. The agency became a research ‘island’, inwardly focused

in terms of where it sourced its innovation. Ironically, such inwardly focused disconnectedness was

one of charges levelled against the water industry in Melbourne in 2010 and was part of the

rationale for creating the OLV agency in the first place (Liberal Party of Victoria & National Party of

Victoria 2010).

Implementation Having determined the priorities and strategic direction of the agency, the OLV began operations in

late 2012. The OLV Business Strategy was released in late 2012 and outlined the key implementation

tasks of the OLV (Office of Living Victoria 2012, 10-15):

Development of a Metropolitan-scale Integrated Water Cycle Strategy for Melbourne

(MIWCS)

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Development of Regional-scale Integrated Water Cycle Plans for Melbourne (IWCPs).

Implement the MIWCS and IWCPs into the planning process through coordinating the water

plans for new Precinct Structure Plans (PSPs)

Promote/develop new planning provisions (VPPs) and building codes to support the uptake

of WSUD and IWCM in Melbourne

Promote/develop new government policy and legislation to support IWCM uptake

Champion and help fund demonstration projects for IWCM in Melbourne

Promote and partner with IWCM researchers, and help facilitate knowledge sharing in the

relevant scientific and research fields

Create and deliver capacity-building programs for IWCM across all sectors of the water

industry and stakeholders in Melbourne

All of these commitments were earmarked for delivery within 18 months of the Business Plan

release (Office of Living Victoria 2012: 8). The ambitious implementation agenda would become a

hallmark of the OLV and a major factor in its difficulties, as the agency had limited time in which to

implement its agenda and score ‘runs on the board’ for the government.

Given the complexity of the implementation tasks and speed with which they were to be completed,

there was a fundamental tension over the relative influence science and independent research could

have over the OLV’s operations. On the one hand, the OLV was entering an already crowded water

policy sphere as a new authority with a reform agenda but without many statutory powers of

inducement or enforcement (though these had been mooted at various points by the Minister)

(Interview 25). Therefore its authority would have to rely on a political mandate and a persuasive

business and technical case for what it proposed. The political mandate for action was secured by

heavy ministerial backing – one former water industry executive described the OLV as essentially an

‘extension of the Minister’s office’ (Interview 11). The persuasive business and technical case

however proved much more elusive in the two years of its operations. Moreover, despite the

necessity of a solid research and technical base to justify and convince other stakeholders in the

water industry of the benefits of IWCM and the case for OLV interventions, for a variety of reasons,

scientists and researchers were relatively marginal to the OLV’s implementation efforts.

Across a range of different projects at the OLV, from stormwater reform to amendments to the

planning codes, necessary and useful research was being conducted, or commenced, and yet results

were too far away to be of use to policy makers. The necessary costs and time horizons suggested by

research organisations (such as the Melbourne based Cooperative Research Centre for Water

Sensitive Cities [CRCWSC]) were not feasible within the tight timelines to which the OLV was working.

This is a common problem in policy-making, and it became a recurrent stumbling block for the OLV

in developing co-creation processes that could integrate research with policy-making in

implementation of the OLV agenda. Some notable exceptions should be conceded, such as the Little

Stringybark Creek project under Tim Fletcher and Chris Walsh, which was specifically cited by those

working within the OLV as a good example of a successful science-agency influence pathway

(Interview 17; Interview 27; Interview 29).

Despite such instances, translatability and applicability of current research to real policy problems

was a considerable problem. As one senior OLV policy officer describes working with the CRCWSC:

I listen to [them] and think, ‘Oh, that’s amazing,’ but then I walk away and I’ve got

no idea how I’m going to apply that into my world. It’s like this research is being

12

conducted in another universe. I have no way of connecting it back, it’s just so out

there it’s not easy to translate into policy (Interview 27).

The problem of science to policy translation is common (see Laing 2015). For the OLV the problem

was exacerbated by the lack of time and resources available to iron-out the incompatibilities. As one

OLV manager commented, there was a tendency for ‘partner’ research groups with which it

collaborated to over-promise and under-deliver. (Interview 25). And when alerted to extant research

projects in relevant areas, OLV policy-makers found that such projects were not answering the

questions that were most critical to their agenda but those that were of more interest to other

scientists (Interview 25). The lack of a shared understanding between scientists and policy-makers as

to what constitutes ‘evidence’ in a policy setting was manifest. Inevitably, this led to both sides being

disappointed in what were initially projects to which all parties attached high expectations. In

consequence, many of the knowledge and evidence gaps for implementation were ultimately filled

by contract and consultancy work. A large amount of the OLV’s operating budget (much larger than

its investment into university-based research) was spent on engineering, economic and

management consultancy contracts (Department of Environment, Land, Water and Planning 2015).

Science out of the OLV The scientific research and modelling produced by the Chief Scientist and his team, intended to

underpin the actions and decisions of the OLV became another sticking point in the operations of

the OLV. At the heart of the problem was the Integrated Systems Framework (ISF). The ISF was:

A sophisticated analytical framework comprising a collection of software programs,

concepts and principles for decision making. The analysis produces probabilistic

time series forecasts of water and wastewater service demands generated by

spatial groupings of residential and non-residential properties across Greater

Melbourne over a long term planning horizon to 2050. To facilitate this it draws on

and integrates a wide range of detailed data (Office of Living Victoria 2013a: 5).

The intention announced in 2013 was to transform the complex ISF work into a proven concept that

worked city-wide to guide IWCM planning and investment decisions. The project was intended to be

collaborative and transparent and to incorporate existing research in refining and fine-tuning the

variables and algorithms of the ISF (Office of Living Victoria 2013a). The ISF was used by the Chief

Scientist and his team to guide OLV decisions and provide input into planning processes. However, it

quickly became unpopular and was fiercely criticized by the water industry (Interview 5; Interview 10;

Interview 30; Interview 31).

At the heart of the contention was that the ISF produced data that was being used to justify water

planning decisions, yet its workings were unavailable to outside scrutiny and much of the project

was not transparent. The ISF was seen as an impenetrable ‘black box’ within the industry (Interview

6; Interview 10; Interview 14; Interview 24). Amongst other researchers and water academics, it

became difficult to credit the reliability of the ISF if it was not made accessible for peer review

(Interview 16). As a then manager of a Melbourne water utility notes:

Well all I can say to you is that we haven’t applied the [ISF], we haven’t used it.

We’ve tried to understand it. We’ve tried to unpick it. We’ve tried to apply our

economic overlay on top of it and all of those efforts have proved to be fruitless.

This became a focus for distrust within the broader water industry concerning the work being done

at the OLV. Whether or not that distrust was justified, there is broad agreement that the Office of

the Chief Scientist and the OLV generally did a poor job of communicating and explaining the science

13

and data behind their modelling and decision-making (Interview 1; Interview 5; Interview 13;

Interview 14; Interview 16; Interview 27). The potential counter-explanation is that contestation

over the modelling became a proxy for resistance to OLV attempts to impose authority (Interview 7;

Interview 8; Interview 33).

Arguably, the lack of time and resources prevented the ISF’s maturation into the water management

framework for greater Melbourne. The promised staff that would support the development of the

such a framework under Coombes were never appointed (Office of Living Victoria 2013a;

Department of Environment, Land, Water and Planning 2015). The ISF was pressed into service very

quickly after the beginning of OLV’s operations, perhaps before it was ready and had sufficient

exposure within the industry to gain acceptance (Interview 7) or was developed sufficiently to

deliver the kind of independent analysis the OLV had promised (Interview 8).

One industry commentator went as far as to call much of the work of the OLV ‘appalling’ and lacking

the technical rigour needed to be persuasive to other stakeholders in the industry (Interview 31). At

least some senior figures both within the OLV and outside saw the problem as compounded by the

political isolation of the agency, which led to severe staffing difficulties as time went on (Interview 3;

Interview 7; Interview 15). The ISF, highly influential in informing the work of the MAC in 2011, did

not develop sufficiently to serve as a collaborative master tool as mooted in 2013, but was sidelined

and became a bone of contention between the OLV and the water industry.

Melbourne’s Water Future In late 2013, Melbourne’s Water Future was released as the first major policy output from the OLV.

Its mission, in its own words, was to support the development of:

An integrated and resilient water system, which is planned and managed to support

liveable and sustainable communities, protect the environmental health of urban

waterways and bays, provide secure water supplies efficiently, protect public health

and deliver affordable essential water services (Office of Living Victoria 2013c: 1).

Melbourne’s Water Future was a comprehensive urban water strategy for Melbourne. It reiterated

many of the goals stipulated by the MAC, though it went further with some expanded and some new

initiatives. The need for clarity and direction within the OLV was cited as the driving force behind the

development of Melbourne’s Water Future (Interview 8). It also aimed for a broader consensus

between the government and the water industry regarding priorities for action, with a more

conciliatory tone than had been adopted earlier. Industry observers recognised now that broad

agreement had been reached over high-level strategic conceptions (Interview 11; Interview 23). Yet

again, however, ambitious goals were announced with even less time available to deliver.

The more conciliatory tone of the OLV with respect to the industry in developing Melbourne’s Water

Future was indicative of a subtle shift, ameliorating the ‘hard road’ towards substantive water

reform. It signified the choice of an easier path of incremental change, with the water authorities

having significantly more influence in policy implementation. More reform-oriented scientific and

research influence diminished. Coombes and his team became more marginal within the agency

after this point, and in consequence there was a decline in the influence of scientists and cutting-

edge research more generally at the strategic decision-making level of the OLV.

Although Melbourne’s Water Future comprehensively detailed aims and objectives, observers

doubted the OLV’s ability to deliver on such an agenda, despite approval over its general direction:

14

I think that the policy is quite clear on what it wants to achieve, but I think they’ve

bitten off a lot … More than likely, too much. I think they’ll start to prioritise. They’ll

then start focusing on some of the big gets that they can get early and win the

confidence over. Now I know there’s been resistance out there. (Interview 23).

Metropolitan Integrated Water Cycle Strategy, Precinct Structure Plans and Regional

Initiatives This phenomenon began to play out over 2012 and 2013, with large promises being dropped in

favour of ‘quick wins’. For example, the MAC reports and the OLV Business Plan both note the

critical piece of planning and policy infrastructure for the OLV is the Metropolitan Integrated Water

Cycle Strategy (MIWCS). This overarching strategy was nominated as the lynchpin of subsequent

planning and coordinating work to be done by the OLV in implementing IWCM across Melbourne

(MAC 2). Its slated delivery in the OLV business plan of 2012 was mid-2013 (Office of Living Victoria

2012: 10), yet by the time of Melbourne’s Water Future at the end of 2013, the MIWCS (though now

going by various different titles) was still being spoken of as an ‘immediate priority’ but with no clear

timeline in place for implementation (Office of Living Victoria 2013b: 26). In fact, the MIWCS was

never produced, nor were all but one of the proposed regional plans that were to sit immediately

beneath it. And the one regional plan to reach a preliminary stage of publication, An Integrated

Water Future for Melbourne’s North (Yarra Valley Water et al. 2013), met with a lukewarm reception

from water authorities and stakeholders (Interview 11; Interview 14).

The flagship ambitions of the OLV, such as the Living Ballarat project that had earlier been cited as

indicative of the future, seemed to wither on the vine. By 2014, it was way behind schedule, and as

The Age reported (in common with other OLV projects) it was missing key technical inputs to get the

project off the ground:

Nearly three years after Water Minister Peter Walsh said Ballarat would receive $1

million to begin transforming its water cycle management, the Living Ballarat

project has yet to publicly release its stormwater harvesting plans or economic

modelling. (Baker and McKenzie 2014b).

Similarly, the OLV’s vaunted precinct structure plans (PSPs) – master plans for Melbourne’s

communities and the basic building blocks of the metropolitan planning overlay, with 10,000 to

30,000 residents projected within each PSP area, languished. The PSP process, to be overseen by the

Metropolitan Planning Authority (MPA), was intended to facilitate the uptake of WSUD in new

communities, and ensure there was the basic planning and investment structure within precincts to

support future IWCM efforts (Interview 7; Interview 25). Around two dozen PSPs for Melbourne

metropolitan precincts were under consideration and development during the OLV’s two years of

independent operations. Ten PSPs were finalized and approved by the Planning Minister.

Time again was a major constraint. The rapid pace at which the MPA was working meant that the

OLV needed immediately to engage with PSPs. Yet WSUD analysis which needed months or years to

properly complete was being demanded within weeks. ‘Science-informed planning’ within this

context was not feasible; there was little extant research to provide insight into the development of

IWCM in PSPs (Interview 13). Even the OLV’s own scientific team had insufficient time to conduct in-

depth analysis for most PSP projects (Interview 8). Given that the OLV could not produce the new

data or insights needed to influence the conventional practices of urban planning, and outside

research and data could not be quickly and effectively adapted to serve that purpose, planning

defaulted to pre-existing datasets, business models and assumptions. The OLV could at best provide

a coordinating function and gently push for small improvements in the PSPs with regard to IWCM.

15

This fell far short of the original political mission to confront and shake-up the water industry to

achieve genuinely innovative IWCM outcomes in Melbourne. Rather, in the words of one planner,

the outcome was generally ‘business as usual plus one’ (Interview 13).

Critics, even within the OLV, pointed out that truly independent analysis proved virtually impossible.

Firstly, it was because the OLV relied heavily on staff secondments and research data from the water

authorities to conduct the analysis, throwing into question the credibility of its ‘independence’

claims. The very raison d’etre of the OLV – to act as an independent authority and overseer of IWCM

in Melbourne – was questionable in such circumstances (Interview 8). Secondly, the heavily

constrained time frames and the lack of availability of other sources of relevant research or data

(that with more realistic parameters might have come from universities or research organisations)

meant that independent and rigorous analysis of alternative options could not be achieved

(Interview 25; Interview 27). An unpublished GHD review of fifteen of the projects undertaken by

the OLV during its lifespan found that only two had clear, rigorous and independent scientific and

technical foundations (Interview 31).

Towards the end of the OLV’s tenure, the government’s policy and political goals on urban water

came into conflict and in doing so began to impede the OLV’s broader mission. From a political point

of view, the need for quick wins began to prevail, and in the battle between long-term research-

informed socio-technical transition in the water sector, and short-term tangible results, the latter

began to dominate as the next election drew nearer and the difficulties of actually implementing the

OLVs ambitious agenda came into clearer view.

Decline of Political Salience One of the last major initiatives of the OLV was a new Water Bill, introduced into parliament in mid

2014. The bill was represented as a simplification of previously complex and occasionally overlapping

legislative provisions, particularly in the area of water entitlements. There were elements in the

legislation designed to facilitate the uptake of IWCM. The Exposure Draft indicated that all rights to

water in local council and water corporation stormwater pipes and drains were to be vested in the

Crown, with the rights to take and use that water expressly conferred on local councils and water

corporations. The clarification of these rights was an important victory for WSUD proponents, who

had at various stages noted the legal ambiguities surrounding stormwater. The legislative changes

were thought to be an inducement to further stormwater harvesting projects (Maddocks 2014;

Victorian Government Solicitor’s Office 2014). Moreover, the act included provisions and language

to promote water cycle management thinking in the state and amongst the water utilities

(Maddocks 2014).

Despite extensive consultation and work on the overhaul of water legislation, a process of agenda

narrowing began to occur in 2014 as the imperilled Liberal government (holding a narrow majority

with the unreliable support of former Liberal and then independent Member of Parliament, Geoff

Shaw) struggled to complete its legislative agenda. In October of 2014, with the forthcoming election

in view, a large number of bills were dropped from the government agenda, with Premier Dennis

Napthine stating that those remaining were to be prioritized for passage to ‘give a clear view to the

people of Victoria of what the Liberal-National Party Coalition believes in’ (Cook 2014). Evidently

such beliefs no longer included water reform, as the Water Bill (one of the most wide ranging and

intensively developed of the bills awaiting passage) was dropped from the docket.

The political debate in the water domain was remarkably limited in the 2014 election, given how

large the issue had loomed just four years earlier. It was at the same time entirely predictable, as the

break in the drought in 2010 shifted the public attention away from water once more. The change

16

speaks to the significance and limitation of policy windows in an area that receives only intermittent

political attention, such as urban water. Yet this decline in salience cannot be divorced from the very

public attention given to the OLV’s problems in an election year.

Demise of the OLV The OLV had become mired in scandal in 2014. Procurement and hiring irregularities emerged in the

press in early 2014 (Baker and McKenzie 2014a, 2014c), which snow-balled into an investigation by

the Victorian Ombudsman and the eventual resignation of most of the senior management team

(Victorian Ombudsman 2014). The partisanship so manifest in the Coalition’s initial distrust of water

authorities had fostered a culture of relying on its own party networks for key appointments to the

OLV, in some instances ignoring due process. Although integrity issues were the cornerstone of the

investigation, news reports and official reports in that period revealed several other overriding

issues that had dogged the OLV from the beginning of its operations.

Firstly, there were severe problems of communication and workability between the

scientific/research team led by Coombes and bureaucratic/managerial elements of the OLV. The

report of the Victorian Ombudsman highlighted basic interoperability problems between science

and implementation in the case of several on-line products being developed by the OLV (Victorian

Ombudsman 2014, 30-34). Secondly, political tensions between the OLV itself and other government

entities were manifest, most notably with the Department of Environment and Primary Industry, and

in relation to a struggle over authority in the urban water domain with other stakeholders (Baker

and McKenzie 2014b; Interview 7; Interview 8). And finally, distrust and poor relations between the

OLV and the water authorities was noted, particularly regarding the scientific modelling (and more

specifically, the ISF), which had never gained credibility in the eyes of industry practitioners (Baker

and McKenzie 2014d). Ultimately, following the Coalition’s loss in the 2014 state election, the

agency was abolished by the new Labor government (and see Walsh 2014) with the winding down of

many of its operations by the year’s end (Interview 25).

One senior industry figure observed: ‘The way I’d describe the OLV is that I’d give the policy agenda

8/10 or 9/10. I’d give the execution 1/10 and that’s being incredibly generous’. (Interview 11) Most

commentators, particularly within the water community in Melbourne, agreed that the vision and

the broad mission of the OLV was on the right track, that the scientific rationale for a water sensitive

city is sound, and that a shake-up of the status quo and a greater push towards WSUD was

commendable (Interview 10; Interview 14; Interview 23). Despite this goodwill, the implementation

of that vision failed at a number of levels. Finally the narrative of the implementation wound up

focusing on alleged details of integrity breaches, but the internecine politics of water in the city had

been present long before such allegations arose, and there were operational problems unconnected

with leadership concerns right from the beginning (Interview 7; Interview 10; Interview 13).

The implementation process revealed some of the most problematic aspects of the science to policy

translation. Though the case for water reform was well-established with political authorities by 2010,

it became highly politicized and narrowly construed to support partisan agendas during the strategic

and decision-making phase leading up to the 2010 election. Once decisions had been made and

directions for the Coalition’s new agency were set, research became increasingly tenuous in the

story of the OLV’s operations. Part was due to a continuation of the politics, but mostly it stemmed

from research bodies being ill suited to assist the OLV in its work in the time frames it had and given

the ambition of the projects being undertaken. Not even the Office of the Chief Scientist could fully

satisfy the objectives of the OLV. Nor, by the accounts of those spoken to, were research bodies,

such as the CRCWSC, positioned in a way that could assist in advancing the work of the OLV.

17

Translation, timing and relevance problems were chief amongst the factors cited as causes. Industry

and water authority research, despite being pointedly sidelined during the decision-making phase of

the MAC, perforce became essential to the work of the OLV in its operational phase.

Although there continued to be debates about which science should be influential during the

operations of the OLV, the political and ideological aspects of those debates (which were so

prevalent during the decision-making phase) diminished during the operational phase, at which

point the consideration became how science could be influential. Lack of time, lack of alignment

between research and problems, translation issues, communication issues and the paucity of

immediately usable research relevant to key aspects of the implementation process (particularly

business case calculations) meant that much of what was generated in academic institutions had

limited utility for the OLV. In conjunction with communication and management failures, it

undermined the OLV’s capacity to serve as an independent arbiter and to create momentum for

WSUD uptake in Melbourne.

Conclusions Lost cause or missed opportunity? The OLV provides a particular case of an intermingling of politics,

science, opportunity and economics, with political calculations influencing most of the major policy

initiatives. Scientists and research institutions, emphasising credibility and rigour, are justifiably

cautious of involvement in processes that may threaten either. As the OLV progressed, several major

research institutions in urban water strategically disengaged from the OLV to prevent negative

exposure and to protect their own integrity (Interview 5). In hindsight, the outcomes of the OLV

might suggest that this was a sensible strategy. However, if partisan imperatives impacted policy

decisions, the problem was compounded by the inability of research organisations to foster

influential relationships with and adjust to what policy makers sought, or to communicate their

evidence in ways that might reinvigorate viable WSUD initiatives in the new environment.

Indeed, the OLV and its policies were far from doomed to failure in the early stages. There were

significant opportunities to influence the agenda in the 2008-2010 period, yet as the ENRC inquiry

case demonstrated, few in the research community were prepared to seize the moment, leaving the

field open for the more strategic and entrepreneurial approach of Bonacci Water. Had the urban

water research community united to produce a clearer scientific consensus and a better case that

detailed specific initiatives for a water sensitive city, rather than reverting to a contested debate

over policy options, the debate and establishment of the OLV may have played out differently. Those

involved suggest that at the implementation stage, despite limited resources and time, external

assistance from a more agile research community in providing the evidence base for policy decisions

could have helped the OLV, flawed as its conception may have been, to achieve tangible outcomes

with influence on Melbourne’s future planning.

Policy windows are fleeting and political: In the event, the policy window for water reform was

transitory. The political debate shifted to alternative means of sourcing water for Melbourne only

after the unpopularity of the Bracks/Brumby government responses to the millennium drought

became apparent in around 2008 to 2009. Within five years the winds had shifted and the political

interest had ebbed. The difference between the political attention to water at the 2010 election

when compared to the 2014 election was profound. The OLV case fits the ‘punctuated equilibrium’

model of policy making and political attention (Baumgartner and Jones 1993)—where the relative

stasis and incrementalism of policy deliberation is disrupted by events or crises that open a window

for larger scale innovation or reform, but only briefly. The opportunity for scientists and WSC

18

research to influence the policy agenda was fleeting, from the highpoint of the WSC agenda at the

ENRC inquiry of 2008 to the low-point when it largely disappeared from both party agendas in 2014.

Policy windows are inevitably episodic and politically framed. Despite a temptation to conclude that

the 2010 election represented a transition to a higher level of WSC receptivity and acceptance in

Victoria (Ferguson et al. 2013), this conclusion is contestable. Arguably the OLV damaged the WSC

agenda as the political fallout from the agency persists in political memory. These travails have little

connection with the good science and research being done in the area. The WSUD and IWCM

research community had been operating long before it received a burst of intense political attention

from 2010 to 2014, but that attention was to do with the politics of water leading up to 2010 rather

than with developments within the research domain.

Identifying opportunities for promoting policy options: The OLV case demonstrates how much

political exigencies and the opportunities to which they give rise matter. Scientists must understand

the former and vigorously pursue the latter. The 2010 election provided a serious opportunity to

advance the WSC agenda. It was successfully exploited by some. The clearest takeaway from the

ENRC inquiry of 2008-2009 is that for scientists to have influence, they need to be alert to the

political context in which they are operating. Research must be presented as providing a solution to

problems confronting policy makers, rather than those preoccupying scientific agencies. In an

environment in which several scientific voices were making the case for WSC, only a handful

persuaded the government. The common theme for those who succeeded was the ability to develop

narratives around their research that addressed the political and policy needs of the government

(and opposition), developed in relation to persuasive policy options rather than policy problems

(Interview 12).

Yet an important secondary lesson is apparent. In the period 2008-2010, those who recognised that

Labor’s resort to big engineering solutions had crowded out its interest in WSUD, while the

Coalition’s vehement rejection of Labor’s decisions and enthusiasm for improved water

management offered the chance to recalibrate WSC objectives, won in the short term. However,

when their ISF approach came to be distrusted by water agencies and retailers, the attenuation of

relations with the broader WSUD research community was a barrier to accessing and developing

alternative options. The question is whether (and if so how) resilient long-term relations between

the policy and the research community can be sustained in an environment of increasing partisan

discord.

Considering the rapidity with which the water agenda arose in Victoria, scientists must think pre-

emptively about how their work can be communicated to appeal within differentiated policy

agendas, and to which policy problems they can help contribute solutions. The determination by

decision makers in 2010 concerning which research and which scientists would be influential over

the next four years hinged largely on those questions of narrative and option development. This is

not to say that scientific influence should be a competitive, zero-sum game. In academic contexts it

is the aspiration of most that it should not be thus. Yet scientists should not be naïve either, nor

should they be unprepared to make the strongest case possible, attuned to a political audience,

when the opportunities arise. The interpretive lenses applied by stakeholders will have an enormous

impact on its influence. If timing and politics are ignored, it risks an uncertain fate.

Influence is hard won: At all points the OLV sought evidence to justify, develop and implement

policy, yet that evidence could just as easily be drawn from providers other than scientists. Policy

can be developed in the absence of a wide-variety of scientific views. Just one or two major

champions might set the evidence agenda for a policy development process, and even they can

19

become marginal in future policy considerations. Scientists and researchers thus exist within a larger

competitive arena for influence over policy. Failure in this competition may marginalize the research

community within the policy-process as government and decision-makers turn to other sources –

such as engineering consultancies and think tanks – to provide the evidence-base they need.

Strong in agenda-setting, poor in implementation: Research drove the agenda-setting and decision-

making stages of the OLV’s evolution. Particularly significant was Peter Coombes, who was central to

the early development of the Coalition’s policy and the subsequent mission and design of the OLV.

However, a variety of scientific and research voices, including those within the CRCWSC, exerted

significant influence on agendas during the period of highest political attention from 2007 to 2011.

Yet critically, at the point when innovative research was most needed to support the

implementation of policies, the objectives and understandings of researchers and policy-makers

diverged. There were fundamental mismatches between the needs of policy-makers in the OLV and

the outputs of researchers in the field that inhibited the influence of the latter within the agency.

Even the OLV’s Chief Scientist suffered ongoing problems of communication, translation, and

interaction within the agency.

The OLV is not unusual in this regard – implementation is one of the hardest tasks in policy-making

(Pressman and Wildavsky 1984). A key political actor, such as the Minister for Water, Peter Walsh,

cannot be expected to have the depth of knowledge in urban water fully to appreciate the

complexity and difficulty of the agenda set for the OLV. The lack was exacerbated when, in the OLV

case, the experience of departmental and industry insiders was sidelined and party insiders were

parachuted into essential roles. Timelines were unrealistic. In such circumstances, robust research

was inevitably going to be a casualty, especially given the OLV’s ambitions. Haste may have fuelled

the political willingness to entrust so much of the scientific foundation of implementation to a

relatively small and under-resourced group of researchers and the Chief Scientist (Interview 37).

Thinking ahead is crucial: forethought about packaging research for policy-makers, and recognition

of the need for efficient and strategic timelines for delivery, is easier to accomplish within a research

organization than it is to change the frenetic pace of politics. Scientists must better prepare policy

options for the future, be ready when opportunities present themselves, and create better

structures for disseminating and adapting extant research to the expectations of policy decision-

makers.

Interdisciplinary work is critical: Many within the OLV commented on the need for interdisciplinary

evidence for policy. Too often, economic and social dimensions of WSUD options were missing in the

input of scientific research organisations. Such deficiencies were disregarded during the agenda-

setting phase, but became more noticeable in the decision-making stage, and acute within the

implementation phase. In consequence, what was needed to overcome these omissions and to

make critical connections across disciplines was sourced from the engineering and consultancy

sector, and conventional research lost out in the evidence contest. Researchers need to provide

comprehensive policy stories rather than singular research options. Research organisations need the

ability to bring together disparate research streams – scientific, economic, behavioural, for instance

– and their evidentiary bases, into coherent interdisciplinary policy proposals.

The OLV might be written-off (as it has been by media and political commentators) as a political

exercise and an abject failure. To do so prevents us from recognising the mistakes that were made

and encourages the retention of incompatible ways of thinking about science and policy. This

hinders the development of common understandings when a policy problem emerges and invites

20

unrealistic expectations from experts, scientists and decision-makers alike. The rise and fall of the

OLV is instructive in thinking about opportunity and inevitability in policy development, how and

where science can and cannot make a difference, and the importance of political literacy. Although

those in the urban water research community might be tempted to regard the OLV’s failure as

something to be attributed to ambitious politicians, cavalier scientist-entrepreneurs and

incompetent bureaucrats, we would do well to reflect on the case in more detail. There are ample

opportunities, lessons and examples of both ineptitude and persuasion that scientists can learn from.

This is what the coal-face of science and policy interaction can look like. We must accept the

challenge of understanding and learning from it.

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Interview list Interview 1 Policy Officer, State Government

Interview 2 Academic, University

Interview 3 Senior Policy Officer, Statutory Agency

Interview 4 Manager, Water Utility

Interview 5 Senior Manager, State Government

Interview 6 Senior Executive, Water Utility

Interview 7 Senior Manager, State Government

Interview 8 Manager, Water Utility

Interview 9 Senior Officer, Water Utility

Interview 10 Director, State Government

Interview 11 Manager, Local Government

Interview 12 Senior Policy Officer, State Government

Interview 13 Senior Manager, Research Institution

Interview 14 Senior Officer, Water Utility

Interview 15 Senior Manager, State and Federal Government

Interview 16 Chief Executive, Water Utility

Interview 17 Minister, State Government

Interview 18 Officer, Water Utility

Interview 19 Chief Executive, Water Utility

Interview 20 Scientist, Statutory Agency

Interview 21 Senior Manager, Local Government

Interview 22 Chief Executive, Statutory Agency

Interview 24 Senior Manager, State Government

Interview 25 Scientist, Statutory Agency

Interview 26 Senior Policy Officer, State Government

Interview 27 Chief Executive, Water Utility

Interview 29 Senior Officer, Consultancy

Interview 30 Academic, University

Interview 31 Chief Executive, Water Utility

Interview 32 Scientist, Research Institution

Interview 33 Chief Executive, Water Utility