part iii: postproduction. chapter 6: postdebate news coverage · 2004. 10. 5. · postproduction....
TRANSCRIPT
Part III
p o s t p r o d u c t i o n
When the first Kennedy-Nixon debate signed off the air
at : p.m. Eastern Daylight time on September , , the broadcast
networks did not follow the event with news analysis. Instead, they resumed
their regular programming: the Original Amateur Hour on ABC; Jackpot
Bowling with Milton Berle on NBC; and, on CBS, a prerecorded interview
between Walter Cronkite and Lyndon Johnson that ran as part of the
Presidential Countdown series. For the duration of the debates, televi-
sion scrupulously refrained from instant commentary and postevent news
specials. Remarkable as it may seem to contemporary audiences, the mil-
lions of Americans who tuned in for the debates had to wait until the
next morning’s newspapers to catch the reviews.
In this programming isolation ended, and today no presidential
debate exists in a vacuum. Starting with the Ford-Carter matches and con-
tinuing to the present, a live debate has come to represent only the center-
piece of the larger media marathon that begins weeks before air time and
Chapter Seven
p ostdebate news coverage
ends well after the program fades to black. The power of the press reaches
its apogee in the aftermath of a debate, when two things happen: First, the
pundits have their say in the period immediately following the broadcast,
and, second, the ninety-minute event is reduced to a collection of sound-
bite highlights that will be played over and over as a kind of shorthand for
the complete program. The news media thus create a parallel version of the
debate that may overtake the audience’s original perception of what it saw.
This was hardly the case in . That year, for the first and last time, the
debate story belonged not to television but to the pencil press. At the time
of the Kennedy-Nixon debates, TV news scarcely registered in the national
consciousness, much less as the country’s primary conduit of political news.
The day after the first event, none of the three network newscasts led with
the debate. CBS ran only a brief mention of the joint appearance as the tenth
story in its lineup, after such items as the arrival in Washington of Japanese
Crown Prince Akihito and Crown Princess Michiko, Nigerian independence
preparations, and a plane crash in Moscow.1
TV news outlets approached the debates warily, perhaps because the
programs were produced and sponsored by the very networks that would
then have to provide objective coverage. By today’s standards, television’s
underplaying of the events seems almost irrationally circumspect. Not a sin-
gle newscast excerpted sound bites from the Kennedy-Nixon broadcasts.
Neither the candidates nor their surrogates came forth with any on-camera
spin, and anchormen and reporters studiously avoided anything but the
most cursory debate references.
Newspaper accounts were considerably less diffident. Richard Nixon’s
anemic performance handed print reporters a story line that would sustain
momentum for the remainder of the series. The morning after the Chicago
debate, the Christian Science Monitor’s Richard L. Strout was among the first
to assess the effect of the reaction shots: “The cameras showed close-ups of
the listening candidate’s face while the other talked . . . Nixon looking to
many weary from endless campaigning, with chin perspiring under the hot
TV lamps.” Peter Lisagor, in the Chicago Daily News, wrote that Nixon’s face
“looked drawn, and beads of perspiration on his chin were plainly visible as
he spoke.” The Boston Globe’s Percy Shain also used the word drawn to
describe Nixon, and added, “Kennedy was almost chubby by contrast.”2
In the days that followed, journalists had no difficulty keeping this tale
alive. Nixon’s people did their part by issuing hasty proclamations of their
candidate’s vitality. Press secretary Herbert Klein announced that “Mr.
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Nixon is in excellent health and looks good in person.” Patricia Nixon told a
reporter that she didn’t know if her husband had lost weight “because Dick
and I aren’t the types who weigh in every day.” Nixon himself said, “I think
I lost a couple of pounds, and it may show up in my face.”3
Three days after the first debate, the Chicago Daily News goosed the nar-
rative with a copyrighted front-page article that ran under the headline
“Was Nixon Sabotaged by TV Makeup Artist?”4 The story quoted an offi-
cial from the Makeup Artists and Hair Stylists union in New York as saying
that he believed Nixon had been worked on by a Democrat. “They loused
him up so badly that a Republican couldn’t have done the job,” the union
rep told the paper. Although no evidence was advanced to support this
claim, the Daily News nonetheless used the quote to trump up the possi-
bility of a conspiracy. Network officials denied the charge, and the vice
president’s aides stepped forward to admit that they had done their own
cosmetic work.
The matter of Nixon’s camera presence snowballed in the press. By the
time the weekly news magazines published their accounts of the first debate,
the conventional wisdom had been set in concrete. “Within minutes after
the candidates went off the air,” wrote Newsweek, “the whole country
seemed to be chattering about who did what to whom. But the one question
that was on almost everyone’s lips was: Why did Nixon look so haggard, so
worn, and so grim?”5 Even Nixon himself got into the act. During a visit to
the set of the TV series 77 Sunset Strip, the vice president joked to actor
Efrem Zimbalist Jr., “How come you look like yourself with makeup and I
don’t?”6
The tale of Richard Nixon’s on-camera visage illustrates the highly self-
referential nature of postdebate news coverage. Today, as in , the cumu-
lative effect of journalistic reporting is to reinforce existing perceptions and
perpetuate particular story lines. In each debate reporters hope for an angle
that will provide grist for the news mill; the best stories are those with a
whiff of controversy and a prolonged shelf life. In Nixon’s lack of prepared-
ness, the political press corps of found a narrative thread with which to
weave a veritable tapestry. Even now, forty years after the fact, the disparity
in appearance between John F. Kennedy and Richard Nixon remains the
legacy of history’s first televised debate.
But an even bigger headline to come out of the debates is one that
eluded the news media of the day, perhaps because the story was too close
at hand to be properly observed. Russell Baker, who covered the Kennedy-
Postdebate News Coverage
Nixon debates for the New York Times, would write nearly thirty years later
of the significance of the first broadcast.“That night,” Baker said,“television
replaced newspapers as the most important communications medium in
American politics.”7 Indeed, few such transitions in the nation’s history have
been so clearly demarcated. Not only newspapers were knocked off their
throne; so was radio. And so, for that matter, was the accepted formula for
waging a presidential campaign.
At the time only a few journalists sensed the shifting ground beneath
their feet.“Both sides have found that television has added a new element to
politics—one that is not yet fully appraised,” wrote a contributer to U.S.
News and World Report.8 Atlanta Constitution publisher Ralph McGill con-
fessed, “We and the candidates are up against the fact that we do not under-
stand all we would like to know about the impact of television.” McGill
recounted the outcome of an informal experiment he had conducted, one
that would quickly enter the received wisdom of presidential debates. He
had arranged for “a number of persons” to listen to the first Kennedy-Nixon
debate on radio, to see if they would react differently than television view-
ers.“It is interesting to report they unanimously thought Mr. Nixon had the
better of it,” McGill concluded. Despite later, more scientific data to the con-
trary, this early finding took root as a shibboleth.9
McGill’s poll, specifying neither sample size nor methodology, reflects
the casual approach the news media of took toward the audience reac-
tion story. Instead of slavishly collecting and reporting survey data, journal-
ists favored random “man-on-the-street” roundups of public opinion. The
Los Angeles Times published one of the more commendable examples of this
genre, devoting a full page to viewer responses the morning after the first
debate. Next to each comment, the article featured a photo of the intervie-
wee watching television. A brief introduction stressed that “in this effort to
learn what people said and thought during and after the first of the Great
Debates, the Times deliberately ignored political leaders, candidates, and
active party workers.”10
In years to come this same constituency that the newspaper so assiduously
shunned would be dubbed “spinners,” and their comments, along with those
of the journalists themselves, would dominate the postdebate agenda.
Sixteen years after the Kennedy-Nixon series, when TV news had grown up,
debate coverage underwent a radical change. Presidential debaters no longer
played to win just the audience at home; they played to sway the media as
well.
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the birth of instant analysis
In a wholly unplanned way, the twenty-seven-minute audio gap that inter-
rupted the first presidential debate begat the era of punditry that view-
ers now take for granted. Network anchors and reporters, desperate to plug
the hole caused when the sound failed, started their coverage with pre-
dictable filler: sketchy statements about the technical problem and cau-
tiously worded, well-balanced summaries of the debate to that point. But as
the minutes ticked on, the on-air personnel found themselves drifting fur-
ther into uncharted waters in an attempt to stay afloat.
A review of NBC’s coverage during the audio gap demonstrates the pitfalls
of off-the-cuff reporting. A few seconds after the problem arises, David
Brinkley comes on-screen to repeat the obvious: The cause of the failure is
unknown. After a bit of vamping, Brinkley throws to reporter Douglas Kiker
inside the debate hall, and the two of them kill time. Brinkley asks if his col-
league has a screwdriver and a pair of pliers, and Kiker launches into a lengthy
recap of the debate, which ends when Ford press secretary Ron Nessen steps
into the lobby where Kiker is standing. Kiker collars Nessen for an impromp-
tu interview, asking, “How is your guy doing so far?” “It’s a clear-cut victory
for the president,” Nessen says, adding that Ford had come across as “being in
command of the situation, being in control.” Kiker, trying to soften Nessen’s
partisan tone, points out that the same could be said of Carter.
Next, Kiker insinuates himself to a nearby interview in progress between
CBS’s Lesley Stahl and Democratic National Chairman Robert Strauss, who
calls it a “good night for the American people and a great night for Jimmy
Carter.” Kiker listens, then grabs Strauss for himself. A few seconds into the
questioning, Kiker gets a cue to return to the candidates. Announcing that
the audio is back, he throws to the debate stage, where in fact the problem
has not been fixed.
David Brinkley reappears and, continuing to stretch, adds his judgment
to that of the campaign managers. Brinkley calls it a “pretty lively debate,
each one landing a few blows on the other, though I don’t think anyone was
permanently disabled, politically speaking.” After yet another recap,
Brinkley tosses back to Douglas Kiker, who interviews Republican adviser
James Baker about Ford’s debate preparations. Baker tells Kiker, “I think the
president did an excellent job.”
Kiker then commandeers Carter press secretary Jody Powell, again away
Postdebate News Coverage
from Lesley Stahl. Kiker follows up Powell’s pro-Carter spin by asking if he
knows why the microphones went dead. Powell demurs: “I assume it was a
technical problem, as sometimes happens.” Strangely, Kiker then proceeds
to raise the possibility of “a conspiracy at work,” telling Powell, “It’s been my
experience in a situation like this that there’s always a theory held by a lot of
people that, oh, there was a conspiracy to cut him off. We have no proof of
that, it was just simply a technical foul-up as far as we can determine, isn’t
that correct?” Powell’s comeback is biting: “Not only do you have no proof,
but nobody’s brought up the subject that I know of, have they?”11
The audio gap, with its twenty-seven minutes of ad hoc political
spin and reporter commentary, marks a turning point in media coverage of
presidential debates. Even without the technical malfunction, however,
changes were poised to happen. The networks that had been so averse to
postdebate programming in now inaugurated a tradition from which
there would be no retreat: instant analysis.
Roger Mudd of CBS was among the first reporters to offer his opinion
when the opening Ford-Carter debate came to an end.“It certainly wasn’t the
most scintillating television that we’ve ever witnessed,” Mudd declared. “In
fact, I think we could honestly call it dull.”Though the TV pundits of were
willing to pass general judgments of this sort, they steered clear of outright
proclamations of winners and losers.“To some measure,”said Walter Cronkite
in a characteristically tactful observation, “each probably succeeded.”12
In the years since the Ford-Carter debates journalists have overcome
their shyness about calling victors. With the help of instant polls, on-cam-
era reporters now routinely assess the performances within minutes of the
closing statements, and print analysts, like theater critics, rush to write their
accounts for the next day’s papers. Even though presidential debates are
nowhere near as conclusive as football games or beauty pageants or awards
shows, the press cannot resist the impulse to attach resolution to conflict, to
wrap up the yarn with a definitive ending.
The problem with declaring winners and losers, according to David
Broder of the Washington Post, is that, more often than not, the outcome
is murky. “I thought that Clinton in Richmond was an easy one to be con-
fident about,” Broder said, “although by way of self-criticism I did not
notice and therefore did not remark upon what everybody remembers
from that debate, which was George Bush looking at his watch. That went
right by me.”13
As this comment of Broder’s points out, even seasoned journalists can
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miss things. In his book Behind the Front Page, Broder outlined the difficul-
ties of rendering postdebate judgments:
A reporter has to jump three hurdles to handle the debate assessment
well. We are trained to make a balanced judgment, so we score the
debate by rounds, as if it were a prize-fight: we say A did well on Points
one, four, six and seven, but B probably came out ahead on Points two,
three, five and eight. As a result our verdicts tend to be cautious and
fuzzy.
Second, being somewhat familiar with the issues, we are inclined to
give some weight—perhaps undue weight—to the candidates’ accu-
racy and skill in answering policy questions. Ironically our perform-
ance as instant analysts is handicapped by qualities our critics say we
lack: a desire to be fair and an interest in substance.
The third point—which took me a long time to understand—is
that our overall assessment of the debate must be based on who seems
more in command. That is the test. And if you realize that television
news shows will quickly capsulize the whole debate into that moment
or two when one candidate or the other takes command, your atten-
tion can focus on recognizing that moment and can put it into the
context of the campaign situation.14
Scholars like Diana Carlin have noted that journalists evaluate debates
differently from regular viewers. “Many of the people who do the cri-
tiquing of debates . . . are far more knowledgeable and involved than the
average voter,” Carlin said at a debate symposium in . “Most voters are
not that intimately involved in the process until the last few weeks. So for
most . . . this is the first time they really know what someone’s position
might be.”15
The audience’s perception of debates as informational would appear to
conflict with the criteria by which reporters pass postdebate judgments. As
Bob Schieffer, a CBS analyst in every debate series since , explained,
“The first thing I always try to do is see if there’s any news there. Did one of
these candidates say something he hadn’t said before? Next you ask, did one
guy get the better of the other one, and how’s this going to play on the eleven
o’clock news, and what impact is it going to have on the campaign?”16 The
general public may watch for information, but journalists watch for differ-
ent things: departures from the norm and strategic maneuvers.
Postdebate News Coverage
Critics have long charged reporters with prizing performance over sub-
stance. Scholar James B. Lemert found that, in , percent of postdebate
journalistic statements about the first two Ford-Carter debates pertained to
issues. Four years later that amount dropped by more than half. By the
percentage of content coverage had dipped to less than percent of all the
postdebate reporting on television news. Over the same period the number
of references to performance and tactics rose dramatically.
Lemert made another interesting observation: In and the net-
works followed the debates with only brief remarks from the anchors, wait-
ing until after the local newscasts had aired to return with full programs of
postdebate commentary.17 More recently an increasing share of follow-up
analysis has taken place immediately after the event, giving reporters little or
no time to collect thoughts and contemplate judgments before communi-
cating them live on the air. The stepped-up rhythm of modern television
demands glib, on-the-spot analysis.
Perhaps the least savory example of postdebate punditry occurred in
, when George Will of ABC went on camera after the Reagan-Carter
debate and praised Reagan’s “thoroughbred performance,” neglecting to
disclose that he had helped prep the Republican candidate.“Far from result-
ing in Will’s losing his job, the controversy only added to the Willian lore,
further blurring the lines between the watchdogs and the watched,” wrote
media critic Eric Alterman. “By the end of the controversy, Will’s political
status was so great he was also beyond virtually all accepted journalistic
rules and practices.”18 Nearly two decades later George Will remains a high-
profile debate commentator.
the early years of p ostdebate spin
In the hours after the first debate Nixon press secretary Herbert Klein
gathered up a handful of aides and made the rounds of Chicago’s hotel bars
to talk with some of the reporters who had covered the event for the morn-
ing papers. “I thought it was highly important to put on a confident front
and to find out what they really thought,” Klein wrote. “Most of them had
concentrated so much on the content of the debate that they offered few
opinions on the outcome, and the initial stories generally treated the “joint
appearance” with balance.”19 Interestingly Klein and his team made no
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attempt to directly influence journalistic opinion; by the time the conversa-
tions took place, the reporters had already filed their stories.
Compared to today’s tarantella of spinning, the political establishment of
exercised admirable restraint in its postevent dealings with the press.
Of course the absence of follow-up programming by the TV networks
erased the need for on-air spinners. The debate reaction story belonged to
newspapers, which focused on matters other than how campaign aides felt
their candidates had fared. For the most part the journalists and the han-
dlers maintained a respectful distance from each other.
In the New York Times’s morning-after account of the first debate, an
unusual sidebar story on page did deal with reactions from the Kennedy
and Nixon camps. JFK’s brother and campaign manager, Robert F. Kennedy,
said that the Kennedy team had been “tremendously pleased,” and Nixon
press secretary Klein allowed that the vice president “presented the issues,
and when he does that he always comes out very well.” The story went on to
note,“Some Kennedy aides, asking not to be quoted, said they felt their can-
didate had scored more points and over-all had made the best impression.”20
The air of modesty conveyed in this sentence would soon become a relic of
the past.
The candidates themselves offered virtually no comment in the press
about their debate performances, leaving behind a woefully slim record
for historians. After the first debate Kennedy was quoted only as saying
that the exchange had been “very useful.” Nixon told reporters, “A debater
never knows who wins. That will be decided by the people November
eighth. I thought he presented his case very well.”21 Later debates in the
series produced similarly tepid candidate reactions in the media or
no reactions at all.
Over the years the public has come to expect its presidential debaters to
deliver a pithy postevent sound bite, either at a rally that evening or the next
day on the campaign trail. At the end of the first debate NBC’s Tim
Russert conducted the fastest postdebate interview in history by nabbing
Bill and Hillary Clinton just seconds after the program concluded.
Materializing at the apron of the stage, Russert stuck a microphone in the
president’s face and asked for a self-assessment. “I did the best I could,” said
the grinning Clinton. Russert then asked the First Lady how the next day’s
headlines would read. “President outlines his vision for America in the
twenty-first century,” Mrs. Clinton replied. A few minutes later, Russert
Postdebate News Coverage
returned with quick sound bites from Bob and Elizabeth Dole, though only
Elizabeth’s made it on the air.22
Russert’s postdebate floor interviews touched off an angry protest from
campaign representatives and competing journalists, who complained that
NBC had violated the ground rules—as, in fact, they had. Without permis-
sion from the sponsors, technicians had strung an audio cable from back-
stage to the front of the house, where Russert was seated. Just as the debate
went off the air, a crew member hooked up the microphone and handed it
to Russert. “In the annals of spin,” wrote media critic Howard Kurtz, “this
was a new indoor record.”23
In , when the Ford-Carter audio breakdown prematurely initiated the
practice of organized spin, the two campaigns were well positioned to sup-
ply representatives to plug the silence. As part of their press strategies, both
operations had assigned key individuals to appear on the networks’ postde-
bate specials with the goal of creating a positive buzz. According to Ford
press secretary Ron Nessen, Republican aides held a conference call before
the debate ended to agree on a “line” they would follow in talking to
reporters. “We decided to declare flatly that the president was the clear win-
ner—decisive, specific, in control of the situation and in command of the
facts. Our theory was that our own enthusiasm would sway the judgments
of voters and press commentators trying to decide who won.”24
Larry Speakes, press secretary to Republican vice presidential can-
didate Bob Dole, deployed a trio of spinners to go on the networks imme-
diately after the Dole-Mondale debate: the candidate’s wife, Elizabeth; Texas
governor John Connally; and Vice President Nelson Rockefeller. “As the
debate ended they were to get out of their front-row seats, go straight to an
assigned camera, beating the Mondale aides to the airwaves,” Speakes wrote.
“Each one claimed debate victory for Dole on each of the three networks, so
we had nine at-bats.”25
Speakes and his team also contrived a made-for-TV telephone call in
which President Ford publicly congratulated Bob Dole on his performance.
Dole took the call in his backstage holding room, where network cameras
had been set up. Ford’s side of this staged-managed conversation, heard but
not seen by television viewers, is a classic of transparent postdebate spin:
ford: Bob?
dole: Yes, Mr. President?
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ford: You did great. And Betty and I on our anniversary are very,
very grateful for the anniversary present because your perform-
ance was superb and we all are applauding and very, very proud of
your accomplishments.
dole: Well, I’m very proud of you, Mr. President. I hope I did a good
job. I had a bad cold, but I guess my voice held out long enough.
ford: You were confident, you hit hard but hit fairly and you differ-
entiated the issues, I think very effectively between their platform
and ours, between our promises and theirs, where we have consis-
tently said that taxes ought to be reduced and they have, as we all
know, played both sides of the street. You’ve done a fine job in
showing that they’re the big spenders and we’re the ones that think
we should spend responsibly and effectively.
As Walter Cronkite reported at the end of the exchange, “President Ford,
in congratulating him, got in some more campaign licks of his own
tonight.”26 Meanwhile ABC’s Hal Bruno was among the reporters present in
Dole’s green room during the call. “They hung up,” Bruno recalled, “and
Dole turned to me and said, ‘I wonder what he was watching.’ ”27
By contemporary standards the spinning in seems measured, bal-
anced, and lacking in the desperation that makes later political reaction so
excruciating to sit through. Audiences today are accustomed to shameless
ballyhooing by everyone from running mates and spouses to the lowliest
aides. But spinners did not burst onto the scene fully formed; instead,
their profile as players in the postdebate drama has advanced incremen-
tally. “We had three or four people who’d go out and talk to the media
afterward,” said Michael Deaver of the campaigns of and , in
which he served as an aide to Ronald Reagan, “but it was nothing like it is
now.”28
As early as the Reagan-Mondale debates of network analysts had
begun to openly disparage spinning, even as they gave it a thorough airing.
NBC’s postevent coverage of the Bush-Ferraro vice presidential debate
featured a three-way interview between Roger Mudd and a handler from
each of the two campaigns that began with Mudd asking his guests to “raise
your right hands and swear to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing
but the truth.”After dutifully complying, the predictable propaganda kicked
in. At the end of the chat, Mudd said, “I’m going to get indictments of per-
jury on you two guys,” and the three shared a laugh, united in appreciation
Postdebate News Coverage
of the fatuousness of postdebate gamesmanship, yet unable to break them-
selves of the habit.29
the rise and fall of the spin d o ctor
Although the word spin appears to have come into common use around
, the Bush-Dukakis election of is generally considered the “year of
the spin doctor.” Media researcher James Lemert and colleagues found a
threefold increase in spin doctor references between and , the year
partisan endorsements reached the level of an art.30 As Tom Brokaw said on
NBC after the vice presidential debate, “There was so much spinning
going on here tonight it’s a wonder that the Omaha Civic Auditorium did-
n’t lift off into orbit.”31
Michael Oreskes, analyzing the trend in the New York Times, wrote, after
the first match, that the campaigns “spent almost as much time and
effort trying to influence what was said after the debate as they spent decid-
ing what [the candidates] should say in the debate.” Oreskes likened the
spinners’ arrival in the press facility at the end of the program to an “inva-
sion landing force,” and added: “A decade ago campaign staff members were
evicted from press rooms on occasion for interfering with reporters at work
on debate stories. But tonight they were quickly surrounded by reporters,
cameramen and photographers recording their views.”32 As Oreskes’s com-
ment suggests, the collusionary aspect of postdebate spin is what makes the
whole custom so creepy.
Listen to what the journalists themselves have to say: “I think it’s a for-
mat that we ought to kill off” (Tom Brokaw of NBC); “it’s an embarrassing,
horrible zoo” (Richard Berke of the New York Times); “the spinning has
become a self-parody” (CNN political director Tom Hannon); “it’s useless,
preposterous” (CBS’s Bob Schieffer);33 and so on. Almost to a person,
reporters profess disgust at postdebate spin, but in fact the press has allowed
the practice to thrive. According to political journalist Roger Simon: “Spin
fulfills two essential purposes: It fills stories with official “react,” and it is an
excuse for reporters to leave home. Consider: Reporters fly hundreds of
miles, staying in expensive hotels, eating expense account meals, to watch an
event on TV that they could just as easily watch from their newsrooms or at
home.”34
On some level, members of the media regard postdebate spinning as a
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show staged for their own amusement. The external audience, the public,
gets almost nothing out of the spectacle except, perhaps, a perverse strain of
secondary entertainment. But postdebate spin is not about the television
viewers of America, it is about the cast of characters—the journalists and
politicos—who inhabit Spin Alley. “I’ve never known anybody who in any
way was influenced by the spinning,” says ABC’s Hal Bruno.“It’s sort of a rit-
ual that we all do together—it’s kind of fun if you don’t take it seriously.”35
Unfortunately for viewers, some of the most amusing spin never makes the
air waves: In a Dukakis operative told Jeff Greenfield that Bernard
Shaw’s “raped and murdered” question had allowed the candidate to
“humanize himself” because he had not flinched at the query.36
With every election cycle Spin Alley undergoes a population explosion.
For the first debate in , reporters were expected at WBBM;
showed up, and a second press room had to be installed in an adjacent stu-
dio. By the s each presidential debate could expect to draw as many as
fifteen hundred accredited journalists. In that figure topped two thou-
sand. The more reporters, the more spinners; like an arms race, the numbers
escalate as each side piles on. “It’s always been bad,” says Bill Nichols, White
House correspondent for USA Today, “but I think now it’s almost a separate
event from the debate itself, with its own separate set of rules and expecta-
tions and cliches.”37
In recent years Spin Alley has gotten so big it has moved out of the debate
hall and into an off-site facility. “It’s an amazing scene,” says Richard Berke
of the New York Times.“You see five people sitting side by side on stools, each
talking to different affiliates and saying the same thing. It’s like a factory.”38
With factory expansion has come a stepped-up production timetable. In
Clinton operatives handed journalists in the press center a six-page set
of talking points called “Prebuttal: Dole versus the Facts” twenty minutes
before the first debate began.39
To its credit, the elite national press, especially the written press, has
largely backed away from covering spinners. According to David Broder of
the Washington Post: “It’s been a problem for us, in fact, to the point that we
generally take a copy aide or somebody out just to stand guard and keep
people away from the reporters who are writing the debate on the scene.
Because the spinners are very aggressive.”40 Some of the TV networks have
also banned live political interviews after presidential debates, offering
viewers a “spin-free zone” that is long on reporter commentary and short on
partisan cheerleading.
Postdebate News Coverage
As network and print journalists grow more wary of the practice, spin-
ners have successfully sought to ply their wares to regional news organiza-
tions. “In an era when the national media have become more skeptical in
their attitude toward the candidates, technology and the growing appetite of
local news is allowing the presidential campaigns to simply bypass them,”
wrote Thomas Rosenstiel in the Los Angeles Times during the cam-
paign.41 Much of the action has moved to local television newscasts, which
remain fertile ground for political spin, particularly from a hometown
celebrity like a governor or senator. Before the San Diego debate
Clinton press secretary Mike McCurry had this advice for his troupe of
spinners: “The national press, talk to them, but as quickly as you can, get to
regional press—that’s where you are likely to get more coverage.”42
In rare instances, when it is used to undo damage incurred during the live
broadcast, postdebate spin may actually qualify as news. In the wake of
Gerald Ford’s verbal slip about Eastern Europe, campaigns learned that a
candidate’s misstatements must be rectified as hastily as possible. During
the first debate of George Bush implied that women who obtained ille-
gal abortions might be considered criminals; the next day campaign man-
ager James Baker appeared on the morning news shows to announce that,
after reconsidering, Bush did not believe that a woman seeking an abortion
should be deemed a criminal. As Brit Hume said on ABC, “This was fast
action to head off political trouble, something this campaign is good at.”43
Handlers face a more daunting hurdle when the task requires putting a
good face on a bad performance. In the wake of Ronald Reagan’s stumbling
loss in the first debate against Walter Mondale, Baker did a live inter-
view with Roger Mudd on NBC in which Mudd suggested that “the presi-
dent was off his form . . . At times he seemed to get lost and he was not as
sharp as past debate experience would have led us to believe.” Baker, with-
out missing a beat, replied, “All of us felt unanimously that he was relaxed,
confident, in command both of the issues and the debate.” Four years later
Dan Quayle’s abysmal showing in the vice presidential debate was too
much even for the silver-tongued Baker.“When you think about what could
have happened,” Baker said on CNN, in a remarkably unguarded comment,
“we have to be pretty happy.”44
The campaign documentary The War Room, by D. A. Pennebaker and
Chris Hegedus, offers a rare behind-the-scenes journey into one of the most
impressive of all spin machines, the Clinton operation. In the film
Clinton aide George Stephanopoulos is seen sprinting toward Spin Alley to
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take part in the postevent feeding frenzy just as one of the TV debates is
wrapping up. Poking his head into a backstage staff room, he energetically
exhorts aides to remember the party line: “Bush was on the defensive. Keep
repeating, ‘Bush was on the defensive.’ ” When Stephanopoulos finally
makes his way onto the set and goes on air, the first words out of his mouth
are, “Bush was on the defensive all night long.”45
Shortly after the election, at a debate postmortem at Harvard
University, Stephanopoulos admitted that “one of the lessons we learned
from this campaign is that spin after debate doesn’t matter because of the
preponderance of polling and focus groups.” According to Stephanopoulos,
the networks’ postdebate poll results have impeded campaign efforts to
shape the media agenda. In the future, he said, spin “may not matter at all.”46
Even so, given its entrenchment, the custom does not appear likely to go
down without a fight.
p ostdebate p olling
The morning after the first Kennedy-Nixon debate the New York Times con-
tacted a Mr. and Mrs. John F. Kennedy of Stuyvesant Town, New York City,
for their comment on the big event. “What show you talking about?” asked
Mrs. Kennedy. “Oh, the television show. We didn’t get around to it. We were
out visiting.”47 This quote, included in a larger roundup of viewer opinion,
typifies the down-home nature of audience-reaction coverage in .
Individual reactions counted more than either aggregate numbers or pro-
fessional pundits.
Press emphasis was not so much on who had won the debate but on
whether people had changed their minds. In a Times survey of several hun-
dred Americans after the first debate, only one viewer reported shifting his
allegiance, a “Negro janitor” in Topeka, Kansas, who went from Nixon to
Kennedy. A “Baptist housewife” from Tallahassee, Florida, said, “I just can’t
bring myself to vote for a Catholic,” and a Republican Party worker in
Austin, Texas, complained that Nixon had looked “too grim” and that he had
been “trying to be too liberal.”48
In the s audience-reaction stories have come to rely less on quirky
individual opinions than on broadly collected scientific data. Like so much
in modern politics, viewer response to presidential debates is now a matter
for polling.“These instant polls, which have all manner of flaws to them, are
Postdebate News Coverage
very important,” says Democratic debate strategist Tom Donilon. Donilon
describes the surveys as “pernicious” because of their tendency to create a
bandwagon effect among debate analysts. “Watch the postdebate coverage
some night,” Donilon said. “The commentators will come on and they’ll be
a little leery about who won. With the instant poll results, the commentators
all go the way of the poll. Lock-cinch pattern.”49
Polls give reporters an opportunity to render win-loss judgments that
rise above personal opinion. “Quantifying an ambiguous situation imparts
a greater sense of objectivity,” explains political scholar Christopher
Arterton. Arterton has written that polls serve not the public but “the
media’s need to reduce uncertainty by using numbers. The goal of debates,
after all, is to present a discussion of the issues and the men themselves, not
to provoke a discussion of how to win a debate.”50
The most egregious example of debate polling by the media happened in
, when ABC commissioned a telephone survey that immediately
became mired in controversy. Viewers were invited to call in and vote for
their favorite candidate at fifty cents a pop. Some seven hundred thousand
did so, naming Reagan the winner over Carter by a two-to-one margin. Even
as ABC disclaimed the poll as “strictly unscientific,” results were projected
on a map of the United States whose graphics resembled election-night
returns.51
The next day newspapers reported that the system set up to tally the votes
had not properly functioned. As Robert G. Kaiser said in the Washington
Post, “The lines jammed and clogged, tens or hundreds of thousands of
Americans never got through, and some who thought they were registering
a pro-Carter sentiment apparently got counted in the Reagan column.”
Kaiser dismissed the poll as a “nonfunctioning nonsample of nonrepresen-
tative Americans,” a sentiment widely shared.52
John J. O’Connor, in the New York Times, wrote that ABC tellingly
opened its postevent coverage not from the debate site “but with a remote
pick-up from Bell Laboratories in New Jersey. This above all in electronic
coverage: technology marches on.”53 Indeed, ABC’s analysis, presented in
the Nightline time slot and anchored by Ted Koppel, is a singularly silly
demonstration of media gimmickry. Throughout the program, in a series of
eight updates, Koppel returned to the AT&T operations center in New Jersey
where reporter Ron Miller would pull the latest numbers off a machine and
announce them on the air. At one point Koppel informed viewers that peo-
ple in urban areas were having difficulty getting through, adding, “There is
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the possibility that some of you are trying to stack the deck.” The results
were being disavowed even as they were being reported.54
Hal Bruno, then political director of ABC News, recalled arriving at
LaGuardia Airport in New York the morning after the debate with
Barbara Walters, who had moderated the program. When Bruno saw the
pack of reporters waiting at the gate, he assumed they wanted to interview
Walters. Instead, they were there for Bruno; the phone-in poll had become
big news. Looking back on the episode, Bruno admitted, “Sometimes you
think you have a good idea, and you don’t know what the unforeseen con-
sequences are.”55
After the pounding ABC took in the press for its experiment, media
polling became more efficient, if only somewhat less whimsical. Among
other innovations, news organizations borrowed a survey technique from
the campaigns that allowed viewers to indicate their ongoing, real-time
debate reactions by pressing buttons on a handheld measuring device. For
the second debate of , local station KHQ in Spokane, Washington, pio-
neered the technique on television, gathering a studio audience of ninety
voters and displaying their live reaction by way of a superimposed graph.
CNN adopted the gimmick for its debate coverage, creating a “liv-
ing graph” that showed the unfolding responses of uncommitted voters on
a moment-to-moment basis. Howard Rosenberg, in the Los Angeles Times,
called the poll “goofy,” and said,“If you thought Perot was sidesplitting, then
you should have caught CNN commentator William Schneider trying to
explain what it all meant.” Four years later NBC carried its own moment-to-
moment graph, which Washington Post critic Howard Kurtz termed
“incomprehensible.”56
However clumsy, these efforts at postdebate polling at least give the pub-
lic a voice in the national reaction. To the press’s further credit, journalists
in recent elections have attempted to go beyond the faceless numbers-
crunching of audience surveys and cover presidential debates in a more per-
sonal way. The Washington Post is one of several news organizations that
assembles small groups of debate watchers and sends its reporters to write
about them. Still, media accounts of citizen reaction to presidential debates
often feel perfunctory, added to the mix in order to mute the louder, more
insistent voices of the pundits and the spinners.
Not all audience-reaction stories have been unimaginative. After the first
Ford-Carter debate in NBC reporter Jack Perkins filed an unusual per-
son-on-the-street piece that started at one end of the country and ended at
Postdebate News Coverage
the other. Perkins began his report on the campus of UCLA, where he inter-
viewed a series of students, two of whom confessed to being more confused
after the debate than they were before. The crew then hopped a midnight
flight heading east from California, recording mid-air debate reactions from
fellow passengers and a flight attendant. In Arlington Heights, Illinois,
Perkins boarded the : a.m. commuter train for downtown Chicago, col-
lecting more responses before proceeding to the bluegrass country of
Kentucky for interviews with a farmer in his field and a woman in her gar-
den. Perkins ended his cross-country trek soliciting opinions in the New
York City subway.57 If not the most methodologically advanced of audience
survey stories, this certainly ranks among the most creative.
keeping the story alive:the eastern europe gaffe
Reporters covering presidential debates pray to the news gods that the
encounter will produce a follow-up story that extends into the days beyond.
The shelf life of most debates is less than twenty-four hours: recaps later that
night in local news programs and network specials, and again on the next
day’s morning shows and newscasts. Debates then vanish into the mists of
history, memorable only if they contain a transcendent clip for the “greatest
hits” reel. As with so many big-ticket TV events, like lackluster Super Bowls
and long-winded Oscar shows, presidential debates often deliver less than
they promise.
In , and again in the first debate of , production problems—
Richard Nixon’s appearance, the audio gap—dominated postdebate cover-
age. The first major performance story to break from a televised presidential
debate was Gerald Ford’s Eastern Europe gaffe, committed in the second
program of and kept alive by a combination of Ford’s stubborn refusal
to retract the misstatement and media insistence on an apology.
In the initial postdebate television coverage, commentators were slow to
recognize the error. On CBS, Walter Cronkite’s first summation of the event
failed to note what Time magazine would call “the blooper heard round the
world.”58 Harry Reasoner also ignored the issue in his close-of-program
remarks on ABC. Only during the later news specials did the subject crop
up. CBS diplomatic correspondent Marvin Kalb held that the president’s
comment would “come as a great surprise to the people in Eastern Europe,”
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and Bob Schieffer called it “a major blunder.” David Brinkley of NBC spec-
ulated that Ford’s “rather curious statement . . . may have been a slip of the
tongue. We think he may have meant Western Europe.”59 As Brinkley’s line
suggests, reporters at this point were more baffled than derisive.
In the next morning’s newspapers the story evolved from curiosity to
folly. The New York Times devoted a front-page sidebar exclusively to Ford’s
slip of the tongue. The Boston Globe quoted exultant Carter aides, one of
whom described it as an “incredible statement.” A Washington Post account
included a prescient observation from Hamilton Jordan, Carter’s campaign
manager, who said of the error, “You will hear a great deal about that in the
next few days.”60
Just as Jordan forecast, within twenty-four hours the story had exploded.
The gaffe dominated network newscasts the evening after the debate, lead-
ing all three networks. Coverage was extensive, including reaction stories
from Eastern European ethnic communities in the United States, as well as
response from around the world. Jimmy Carter used the occasion to say his
opponent had “disgraced our country,” and vice presidential candidate
Walter Mondale joked that after the telecast he had gone looking for a Polish
bar, certain that drinks would be on the house for Democrats.61
The day after the San Francisco debate, Ford embarked on an ill-fated
odyssey of clarification that for the better part of a week effectively brought
his campaign to a standstill. At an event at the University of Southern
California the president offered a lukewarm amendment to his original dec-
laration. “Last night in the debate I spoke of America’s firm support for the
aspirations for independence of the nations of Eastern Europe,” Ford stated,
then added that the United States “has never conceded and will never con-
cede their domination by the Soviet Union.” As Marilyn Berger said on
NBC, “It was a stab at correcting a costly impression.”62
For the news media, it was also insufficient. Again the next day Ford
labored to explain himself, first at a breakfast appearance before business
supporters in Los Angeles. Recalling a trip to Poland, the president said
that Polish citizens “don’t believe they are going to be forever dominated—
if they are—by the Soviet Union. They believe in the independence of that
great country and so do I. We’re going to make certain, to the best of our
ability, that any allegation of dominance is not a fact.”
Things got even fuzzier in an impromptu statement to the press a few
hours later, just after a midday rally in Glendale. Bizarrely Ford read his
explanation into a walkie-talkie, sound from which was transmitted to the
Postdebate News Coverage
press buses via the handlers’ walkie-talkies. Speaking in the third person,
Ford said, “President Ford does not believe that the Polish people over the
long run—whether they are in Poland or whether they are Polish-
Americans here—will ever condone domination by a foreign force.”63
Finally, on October , six days after the debate, a chastened Ford flatly
admitted, albeit off-camera, that he had made a mistake. In a meeting with
ethnic leaders at the White House, the president finally spoke the words the
news media had been waiting to hear. “Let me be blunt,” he said. “I did not
express myself clearly when this question came up in the debate. The coun-
tries of Eastern Europe are, of course, dominated by the Soviet Union.”64
The apology was duly reported, and the press moved on to greener pastures.
Why did Ford take so long to perform his ritual act of contrition?
According to press secretary Ron Nessen, advisers urged the president the
morning after the debate to acknowledge that he had misspoken, but he
refused. “I can be very stubborn when I think I’m right,” Ford wrote in his
memoirs, “and I just didn’t want to apologize for something that was a
minor mistake.”65
On the same day he issued his final apology Ford took the press to task
in a meeting with New York newspaper and broadcasting executives,
lamenting that percent of reporting on the San Francisco debate involved
the single remark about Soviet domination. “There was such a concentra-
tion on that one point, ignoring virtually everything else, that I think the
news media didn’t give a full and accurate picture of the substance in many
of the questions and many of the answers,” Ford said.66
What may at first appear to be an effort to shift blame is, on closer inspec-
tion, a legitimate complaint. Why should journalists have fixated on Ford’s
mistake to the exclusion of almost everything else? Why was the president
of the United States hounded into issuing an apology when he felt none was
required? Is it the proper function of the news media to demand atonement
from public figures? As political scientist Thomas Patterson notes: “The
candidate usually has no choice but to respond to the press’s demands for a
mea culpa. The price of silence is crippling news coverage for days on end.”
Ford aide Richard Cheney described the incident as a case of reporters
extracting their “pound of flesh.”67
Media coverage of the Ford gaffe offers a case study in the power of the
press to alter perceptions. Right after the debate, between eleven at night
and one o’clock the next morning, Republican pollster Robert Teeter con-
ducted a poll of viewers who named Ford the winner by a percentage point.
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After news reports of the mistake appeared the next day, the surveys began
to reflect a downward trend; Teeter’s poll showed that percent of those
queried between : p.m. and midnight the day after the debate thought
Carter had done the better job, compared to percent for Ford.“Reports of
the debate had reemphasized the president as a mistake prone, inept bum-
bler, exactly what we had spent six or seven weeks trying to get away from,”
Teeter said.68
“The volunteered descriptions of the debate by voters surveyed immedi-
ately after the debate included no mentions of Ford’s statement on Eastern
Europe,” wrote researcher Fred Steeper of the Republican study. “Not until
the afternoon of the next day did such references appear, and by Thursday
night they were the most frequent criticism given of Ford’s performance.” A
voter who participated in a different research study said: “I thought that
Ford had won. But the papers say it was Carter. So it must be Carter.”As Ford
press secretary Ron Nessen put it, “The average guy in his living room
watching the debate didn’t see the Eastern European comment as a monu-
mental mistake. But after twenty-four hours of being told how bad a mis-
take it was, people changed their minds.”69
other p ostdebate story lines:the “age issue” and beyond
The first presidential debate of ignited perhaps the biggest follow-up
story in debate history: Was Ronald Reagan competent to lead the country?
Like the Ford gaffe, the matter did not fully surface in the program’s imme-
diate aftermath. Bruce Morton, on CBS, hinted at a problem, saying that
Reagan “floundered” more than usual and appeared “ill at ease.” John
Chancellor, on NBC, asserted that “the president got very tired at the end
and seemed quite disorganized in his closing statements.”70 But none of the
analysts came close to questioning Reagan’s fitness for office.
Morning-after newspaper accounts also noted President Reagan’s tenta-
tive delivery without linking the debate to a discussion of jobworthiness.
“Mr. Reagan appeared less confident than he customarily does on televi-
sion,” wrote Howell Raines in the New York Times, in a typically subdued
comment, and Tom Shales in the Washington Post joked, “Obviously, it’s
back to the old briefing books for the Reagan team.”71
Ronald Reagan’s inferior performance did not morph into the “age issue”
Postdebate News Coverage
until two mornings after the debate, when the Wall Street Journal ran a story
with the headline, “New Question in Race: Is Oldest U.S. President Now
Showing His Age?” The article, by Rich Jaroslovsky and James M. Perry, got
to the point in its fourth paragraph: “Until Sunday night’s debate, age had-
n’t been much of an issue in the election campaign. That may now be chang-
ing. The president’s rambling responses and occasional apparent confusion
injected an unpredictable new element into the race.”
The story went on to quote from a psychologist and Reagan supporter
who said: “I’d be concerned to put him into a corporate presidency. I’d be all
the more concerned to put him into the U.S. presidency.” Democratic con-
gressman Tony Coelho of California told the Journal: “He created an issue
that has not yet come in this campaign—age. He looked old and acted old.”
The piece ended with thoughts on how other presidents had aged in office,
interviews about the warning signs of senility, and a reminder that candi-
date Reagan in had pledged to undergo regular tests for senility if he
became president.72
The same day the story by Jaroslovsky and Perry ran, the Washington Post
carried an op-ed column by influential political writer David Broder. Broder
also candidly addressed the broader implications of Reagan’s performance:
He let the age issue emerge as it had not done in any of his previous
campaigns. On the big screen in the press room where I watched the
debate, the contrast in physical appearance between Mondale and
Reagan was at least as great as the seventeen-year difference in their
ages—probably the most startling contrast since that between the
healthy John F. Kennedy and the infection-weakened, underweight
Richard M. Nixon in the first debate.73
The combination of the Journal article and Broder’s column seemed to
unleash pent-up energy in the press, legitimizing the age issue as fair game
for media scrutiny. “It was as if the men and women of the press felt they
needed permission before they could truthfully describe what they had seen
the night before,” wrote media critic Mark Hertsgaard. Hertsgaard castigat-
ed journalists for “poaching” off the Journal story instead of undertaking
their own investigations into Reagan’s health.74
The same day the newspaper pieces ran, the networks scrambled to air
TV versions of the story. “This was one of those rare days in schizophrenic
Washington when the whole town seemed to focus on one thing—Ronald
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Reagan’s age,” said Jim Wooten on ABC. Wooten’s piece included a series of
unflattering shots: a debate sound bite in which Reagan sputtered and stum-
bled, a clip that showed the president nodding off during an audience with
the pope, and an excerpt in which First Lady Nancy Reagan appeared to be
prompting her husband in response to a reporter’s question.75
CBS ran a similar montage, a “worst-of” collection of Reagan bloopers
that included some of the same moments ABC had used. As Thomas
Rosenstiel wrote in the Los Angeles Times: “The abbreviated tape clips had
an impact far beyond what they had in their original context. Reagan’s
debate fumbles in clip form seemed more drastic than they did live during
the debate.”76 The networks also brought on doctors and psychiatrists to
speak about the effects of aging on mental acuity.
At first the president’s vaunted team of public relations experts appeared
caught off-guard by the barrage of bad press. “I’ll challenge him to an arm-
wrestle any time,” Reagan told reporters on the day the Journal and Broder
stories ran, but for once the joke rang hollow.77 The White House came back
the next day with a statement about the president’s physical health that said,
“Mr. Reagan is a mentally alert, robust man who appears younger that his
stated age.” Reagan’s personal physician, Dr. Donald Ruge, was trotted out to
describe his patient as being in “excellent” health, though when asked if
Reagan had lost any of his stamina over the past four years, the doctor
replied, “I don’t know, you have to ask him.”78
“I wasn’t tired,” Reagan informed the press corps, and to underscore the
point Republican strategists made sure that their candidate was pho-
tographed getting out of his limousine at a campaign stop and taking an
“impromptu” on-camera stroll.“The White House today did everything but
put a Superman cape on President Reagan as it wrestled with questions
about his age and fitness,” said Tom Brokaw on NBC.79
The relentless coverage took an obvious personal toll on Reagan.
Displaying an uncharacteristic testiness, the president grumbled about his
opponent, “If I had as much makeup on as he did, I’d have looked younger,
too.”Reagan insisted to reporters that he never wore makeup, even as an actor.
This claim prompted a Los Angeles Times story that quoted one Hollywood
makeup artist as saying Reagan had used cosmetics on TV’s General Electric
Theater, and another from the Warner Brothers film studio who said Reagan
avoided makeup in the movies. Mondale himself joined the dialogue, telling
a crowd in Pittsburgh, “Mr. President, the problem isn’t makeup on the face,
it’s the makeup on those answers that gave you a problem.”80
Postdebate News Coverage
Just as media reaction upended voter opinion after Gerald Ford’s
Eastern Europe gaffe, so did coverage of the “age issue” realign public
thinking about the first debate. “The initial public response was that
Reagan had won; with the passage of time and news media spin, his early
victory turned into something approaching a historic defeat,” wrote polit-
ical scientist Austin Ranney. The first poll on ABC, taken during the final
minutes of the telecast, had Reagan in the lead by three points. An hour
later, after negative reviews came in for the president, the lead had shifted
to Mondale by a point. Two days after the debate a CBS News–New York
Times poll showed an edge for Mondale of forty-nine points. The unceas-
ing media focus on the “age issue” had completely reversed public opinion
about who won the match.81
The unprecedented drubbing of Dan Quayle in the debate with Lloyd
Bentsen sparked a narrative line that would sustain several days of lively
coverage. The specific impetus for the story was Bentsen’s “You’re no Jack
Kennedy” sound bite, an irresistible snippet of videotape that was like cat-
nip to television news producers. As Bob Schieffer predicted on CBS imme-
diately after the broadcast, this was the bite the whole country would see,
even those who had not watched the debate. When ABC’s Nightline came on
the air half an hour after the debate, the program opened with the clip. The
next day NBC aired the exchange four times on its morning show, and all
three major networks repeated it in their evening newscasts.82
Intentionally or not, George Bush exacerbated Quayle’s problems by not
appearing in public with his running mate the day after the debate, as Michael
Dukakis did with Lloyd Bentsen. Damage control instead fell to President
Reagan, who called Bentsen’s line a “cheap shot and unbecoming to a senator
of the United States.” Quayle himself attempted a belated response to the
question about his qualifications for office.“There is no doubt I would main-
tain and build on the excellent policies of President George Bush,” Quayle
forcefully declaimed at a rally the next day in Joplin, Missouri.83
Meanwhile, in half a dozen postdebate appearances, Bush failed even to
mention his running mate, a fact that did not go unnoticed by the press.
Two days after the event, reporters were still waiting for Bush to endorse
Quayle’s performance. Finally the vice president had little choice but to
issue a statement of support. Maureen Dowd of the New York Times
sketched the scene, which took place outside Bush’s official Washington res-
idence just after an unrelated press event:
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Vice President Bush was walking back up the steps of his home . . .
when someone called out a question about Senator Dan Quayle’s
much-debated performance as his running mate.
Mr. Bush, whose carefully managed campaign avoids press confer-
ences for weeks at a time, spun on his heels and returned to the micro-
phone to defend Senator Quayle in what seemed to be a planned
expression of outrage.
“The concept that I see in some of these reports that I am not sup-
portive of Dan Quayle are absolutely ludicrous,” he said. “They are
ridiculous. He did well in that debate, he has my full support, and he
is getting strong support since the debate and before around this
country.”84
The postdebate journey of Dan Quayle then veered off in a new direction.
Angry at what he perceived as a lack of support from Bush insiders, Quayle
made a display in the press of taking charge of his own fate—and, not coinci-
dentally, seizing control of the narrative. “I got tired of all the publicity,”
Quayle told ABC’s Jackie Judd on board his campaign bus.“I figured it could-
n’t get any worse, and I was going to take over.”Quayle declared that from now
on “I’m the person that’s going to do the spinning.” Bob Schieffer, in a report
on CBS, questioned this new tactic: “It was all so unexpected, some wondered
if Bush aides had planned the whole thing to show Quayle was his own man.”85
In a strange way the negative aftermath of the debate seemed to liberate
Dan Quayle. As B. Drummond Ayres wrote in the New York Times,
“Something happened to Dan Quayle in Omaha, or shortly thereafter, some-
thing besides that ‘You’re no Jack Kennedy’ verbal leveling administered by
Senator Bentsen. Mr. Quayle came away a changed campaigner.”86 At the very
least the news media perceived him as a changed campaigner. Once he had
acted out his little role in the drama and obliged reporters by offering up a
fresh angle on the story, Dan Quayle started getting better press.
One week after Quayle’s devastation in the vice presidential debate,
Michael Dukakis suffered a mortal blow of his own at the hands of Bernard
Shaw. Just as Dan Quayle continued to address the bungled question about
qualifications in his postdebate appearances, so did Dukakis take to the air
waves to recast his response to Shaw’s hypothetical about capital punish-
ment. As both candidates proved, a debater’s second crack at a question can-
not always undo the original answer.
Postdebate News Coverage
Several days before Election Day Dukakis appeared in a CNN inter-
view with Shaw, arranged at the request of Democratic handlers. Early in the
exchange, before the anchorman had a chance to mention it, Dukakis
brought up the notorious opening volley. Assuring Shaw that the question
had been fair and reasonable, Dukakis added that he had been thinking
about his response and how he might better have stated it.
dukakis: Let me just say this: Kitty is probably the most—is the
most—precious thing, she and my family, that I have in this world.
And obviously, if what happened to her was the kind of thing that
you described, I would have the same feelings as any loving hus-
band and father.
shaw: Would you kill him?
dukakis: I think I would have that kind of emotion. On the other
hand, this is not a country where we glorify vengeance.87
As journalist Roger Simon observed, “This is what campaigning had
come down to. Anyone who wanted to be the leader of a great nation and do
great things . . . had to show emotion. And in order to be likable, he had to
tell people that, yes, he would want to take a human life.”88
We conclude our survey of postdebate media coverage with two tempest-in-
a-teapot incidents that spawned a flurry of tongue-in-cheek reporting:
President Carter’s reference during the debate to his daughter, Amy,
and Vice President Bush’s assertion after the Ferraro match that he had
“kicked a little ass.”
The so-called Amy gaffe, in which Carter recounted a conversation with
his daughter on the topic of nuclear weapons, provoked an immediate wave
of ridicule in the media. In ABC’s postdebate special Barbara Walters, who
had moderated the debate, named Amy the winner of the match, and said,
“I’m going home to my child, who’s the same age as Amy, and if she doesn’t
tell me that nuclear proliferation is the major concern on her mind, she’s
going to hear it from her mother.” Former secretary of state Henry Kissinger
told a reporter, “I gag at that kind of stuff in general, although I like Amy.”89
The next day ABC reporter Bettina Gregory turned up at Amy’s school in
Washington and conducted an ambush interview with the thirteen-year-old
First Daughter. Amy confirmed to Gregory and several other reporters that
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she and her father had discussed nuclear war. From there, the conversation
degenerated:
reporter: Does he talk to you often about your opinions?
amy: Yeah.
reporter: What else is important?
amy: I don’t know.
reporter: Were you surprised to hear him mention that he had
talked to you about it in the speech?
amy: Yeah, kind of.90
Four years later, in the George Bush episode, it was an indiscreet remark
to a group of New Jersey longshoremen that got the media clucking. “We
tried to kick a little ass last night,” Bush told the dockworkers the morning
after the vice presidential debate, just in time to notice that a sound
man from a local TV station was standing nearby with a boom microphone.
“Whoops—oh, God, he heard me!” Bush cried, then implored the news
crew to “turn that thing off!” As the Washington Post pointed out, “Minutes
earlier, Bush had described Ferraro to reporters as ‘gracious’ and declined to
declare himself the winner.”
After videotape of the putdown was made available to journalists, Bush
called a news conference to extinguish the media brush fire. The vice presi-
dent defended his comment as an “old Texas football expression,” adding
that he had no intention of apologizing. “I stand behind it, I use it all the
time,” he said. “My kids use it, everybody who competes in sports uses it. I
just don’t like to use it in public.” The story led two of the network newscasts
and ran prominently in the next morning’s newspapers, though the New
York Times primly identified the phrase only as a “locker room vulgarity.” In
an interview on NBC, Ferraro told Tom Brokaw, “I think Mr. Bush was
about as accurate in his assessment of the result of the debate as he was in
the facts and figures he put forth during the debate.”91
Bush never did apologize, but in the context of other anti-Ferraro rum-
blings from the Republican camp, the slur seemed curiously ill-advised.
Time magazine called it “one of the silliest blunders of the campaign,”92 as it
most certainly was. What Time failed to add is that for the news media silly
blunders are manna from heaven.
Postdebate News Coverage