part 9- unfair labor practice

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010 Hacienda Fatima and/or Patricio Villegas, Alfonso Villegas and Christine Segura vs. National Federation of Sugarcane

Workers-Food and General Trade G.R. No. 149440, January 28, 2003| PANGANIBAN, J.:

Facts: Before the Court is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,

seeking to set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals declaring complainants to have been illegally dismissed. The said decision also ordered to reinstate complainants except Luisa Rombo, Ramona Rombo, Bobong Abriga and Boboy Silva to their previous position and to pay full backwages from September 1991 until reinstated. Respondents being guilty of unfair labor practice are further ordered to pay complainant union moral and exemplary damages.

It would appear that respondents did not look with favor workers' having organized themselves into a union. Thus, when complainant union was certified as the collective bargaining representative in the certification elections, respondents under the pretext that the result was on appeal, refused to sit down with the union for the purpose of entering into a collective bargaining agreement. Moreover, the workers including complainants herein were not given work for more than one month. In protest, complainants staged a strike which was however settled upon the signing of a Memorandum of Agreement. However, respondents reneged on its commitment to sit down and bargain collectively. Instead, respondent employed all means including the use of private armed guards to prevent the organizers from entering the premises. Moreover, starting September 1991, respondents did not any more give work assignments to the complainants forcing the union to stage a strike on January 2, 1992. But due to the conciliation efforts by the DOLE, another Memorandum of Agreement was signed by the complainants and respondents pursuant thereto, the parties subsequently met and the Minutes of the Conciliation Meeting showed as follows:

The following are deemed not considered employees:

1. Luisa Rombo

2. Ramona Rombo

3. Bobong Abrega

4. Boboy Silva

'The name Orencio Rombo shall be verified in the 1990 payroll. 'The following employees shall be reinstated immediately upon

availability of work:

1. Jose Dagle 7. Alejandro Tejares

2. Rico Dagle 8. Gaudioso Rombo

3. Ricardo Dagle 9. Martin Alas-as Jr.

4. Jesus Silva 10. Cresensio Abrega

5. Fernando Silva 11. Ariston Eruela Sr.

6. Ernesto Tejares 12. Ariston Eruela Jr.'

The respondents again reneged on its commitment; complainants filed the present complaint. But for all their persistence, the risk they had to undergo in conducting a strike in the face of overwhelming odds, complainants in an ironic

twist of fate now find themselves being accused of 'refusing to work and being choosy in the kind of work they have to perform'. As found by the NLRC, the record of this case is "replete with complainants'

persistence and dogged determination in going back to work." The CA concurred with the NLRC's finding that petitioners were guilty of unfair labor practice.

Hence this Petition.

Issue: Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in upholding the NLRC's conclusion that private respondents were illegally dismissed, that petitioner[s were] guilty of unfair labor practice, and that the union be awarded moral and exemplary damages. Ruling:

The NLRC also found herein petitioners guilty of unfair labor practice. It ruled as follows:

"Indeed, from respondents' refusal to bargain, to their acts of economic inducements resulting in the promotion of those who withdrew from the union, the use of armed guards to prevent the organizers to come in, and the dismissal of union officials and members, one cannot but conclude that respondents did not want a union in their hacienda—a clear interference in the right of the workers to self-organization." 17 We uphold the CA's affirmation of the above findings. Indeed, factual findings of

labor officials, who are deemed to have acquired expertise in matters within their respective jurisdictions, are generally accorded not only respect but even finality. Their findings are binding on the Supreme Court. 18 Verily, their conclusions are accorded great weight upon appeal, especially when supported by substantial evidence. 19 Consequently, the Court is not duty-bound to delve into the accuracy of their factual findings, in the absence of a clear showing that these were arbitrary and bereft of any rational basis." The finding of unfair labor practice done in bad faith carries with it the sanction of moral and exemplary damages." (VALPARAISO)

020 PROGRESSIVE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, JORGE L. ARANETA, JUDY A. ROXAS, MANUEL B. JOVER , RAMON

LLORENTE and PROGRESSIVE EMPLOYEES UNION, petitioners, vs. COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS and ARANETA COLISEUM

EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, respondents. G.R. No. L-39546 November 29, 1977|FERNANDEZ, J.:

FACTS: In September 1962, Araneta Coliseum Employees Association (ACEA) a legitimate

labor organization in behalf of forty-eight (48) members, instituted Case No. 3304-ULP for unfair labor practice in the Court of Industrial Relations against Progressive Development Corporation (PDC), a domestic business entity operating the Araneta Coliseum, Jorge Araneta, Judy A. Roxas, Manuel B. Jover and Ramon Llorente, as officers of the corporation PDC and Progressive Employees Union (PEU), a labor organization existing in the PDC.

The complaint alleged that the PDC, through its officers, initiated a move to disauthorize the counsel of the complainant ACEA from appearing in a union conference with the respondents, petitioners herein; that the supervisors of PDC encouraged, and assisted in, the formation of the Progressive Employees Union (PEU) and coerced the employees, particularly the individual complainants, to disaffiliate from the complainant


union and to affiliate with the PEU; that in July and August 1962 the respondents, petitioners herein, discriminated against the individual complainants by either not giving them their working schedules, lessening their number of working days and eventually dismissing them from their employment, because of their refusal to disaffiliate from their union and join the Progressive Employees Union;

The respondents, corporation PDC, Jorge L. Araneta, Judy A. Roxas and Manuel B. Jover claimed in their answer that the individual complainants were merely casuals or temporary employees and their services depended on the availability of work as ushers, usherettes, guards and janitors when there were shows, performances or exhibits at the Araneta Coliseum. They alleged that they did not interfere with the complainant union and in fact they met and conferred with said union's counsel; that they did not initiate nor assist the PEU; that they did not discriminate against the individual complainants nor dismiss them as said complainants were only casuals or temporary employees; that the services of complainant Gregorio Viray were terminated because the office to which he was assigned was closed and that complainant Reynaldo Asis was dismissed for collecting his salary without actually rendering the corresponding services. 4

The Progressive Employees Union (PEU) denied that the officers and supervisors of the corporation PDC initiated and assisted in its formation and claimed that its organization is the joint efforts of the overwhelming majority of the employees and laborers of the corporation PDC, free from any undue influence, interference and/or intimidation from any party. The PEU claimed that the institution of the unfair labor practice case by the complainants is a desperate attempt to unduly delay the proceedings in Case No. 1054-MC for certification election. 5 Ramon Llorente denied all imputations against him in the complaint and alleged that Gregorio Viray, a casual janitor, was separated when his office was closed. Llorente claimed that he severed his employment with the PDC in June 1962 and could not have committed the acts complained of against him in July and August 1962.

ISSUE: Whether or not Progressive Development Corporation is guilty of unfair labor practice? HELD:

YES. It is contended by the petitioners that the individual complainants and members of the respondent ACEA were naturally hired by the petitioner company only as casuals, extras or replacements in various positions of ushers, usherettes, Porters, attendants and/or janitors, and all in rotation basis only because of the numerous other applicants for accommodation, hence there was no basis for petitioners to have dismissed with discrimination the individual complainants and members of the respondent ACEA because of petitioners' practice of hiring by rotation. 10 This contention is without merit. As testified to by Jose Generoso, Jr., President of the Progressive Employees Union, their members were also casual employees but are now regulars. This fact shows that the casual status of the members of ACEA could not have been the cause of their dismissals. Moreover, as testified to by Concordia Araiza, a witness for petitioners, it was the Personnel Manager, Ramon Llorente, who was in charge of assigning ushers and usherettes every time there were scheduled shows; and that while the Araneta Coliseum maintained only such number of ushers, usherettes and janitors, if their services were needed, every time there was a scheduled show or during show days, the Coliseum hired additional personnel. 11 It is, therefore, clear that the services of the members of the ACEA were also needed, their casual status notwithstanding.

It appears that the individual complainants, during show days, were always scheduled to work until June 1962 when they were not included in the schedule anymore.12 This virtually amounted to dismissal, without prior notice. Their not being included in the

list of schedule since June 1962 could only be the result of petitioners' earlier threat of dismissal should said complainants refuse to heed petitioners' admonition for them to resign from the ACEA.

From the facts of record, it is clear that the individual complainants were dismissed because they refused to resign from the Araneta Coliseum Employees Association and to affiliate with the Progressive Employees Union which was being aided and abetted by the Progressive Development Corporation.

The assertion of the petitioner Progressive Development Corporation and its officials that they have nothing to do with the formation of the Progressive Employees Union is not supported by the facts of record.

The President then of the Progressive Employees Union was Jose Generoso, Jr., Stage Manager of the Progressive Development Corporation. The stage Manager, Generoso, has supervisory power over the twenty-two (22) employees under him. Generoso was then the No. 2 man in the Araneta Coliseum, being an assistant of the Director of said Coliseum. While the Progressive Employees Union was allegedly organized on June 26, 1962, it was only on July 11, 1962 that its existence was publicly announced when the management of the petitioner corporation refused to meet with the Araneta Coliseum Employees Association. The Progressive Employees Union never collected dues from its members and all their members are now regular employees and are still working in the construction unit of the Philippine Development Corporation. There is evidence that the Progressive Employees Union became inactive after the death of Atty. Reonista the former counsel of the Progressive Development Corporation. 14 This shows that the Progressive Employees Union was organized to camouflage the petitioner corporation's dislike for the Araneta Coliseum Employees Association and to stave off the latter's recognition.

It is also a fact that the Progressive Employees Union, after exerting efforts to win in the Certification Election, Case No. 1054-MC, did not conclude and enter into a collective bargaining agreement with the management. According to Generoso, the Progressive Employees Union was already disbanded. 15

As regards Gregorio Viray, it is not refuted that he was an active member of the ACEA and that he was in charge of around eighteen (18) janitors. There can be no other reason for dismissal except his active membership with the Araneta Coliseum Employees Association because the office where he was working was not closed. After Ramon Llorente with whom Viray was assigned had resigned, his position was taken over by Alicia Nonado Iglesias. 16

The evidence shows that Reynaldo Asis, like the other individual complainants, was dismissed because he refused to join the Progressive Employees Union.

The petitioners were correctly found to have committed acts constituting unfair labor practice.

Under the circumstances and equity of the case, and considering the length of time and the union-busting activities of petitioner, the individual complainants are granted back wages for five (5) years without qualification or deduction.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed with the modification that the Progressive Development Corporation is ordered to reinstate the individual complainants to their former or substantially equivalent positions with the same rank and compensation and without loss of seniority and other privileges within fifteen (15) days from the promulgation of this decision and said Progressive Development Corporation is further ordered to pay the individual complainants back wages equivalent to five (5) years without qualification or deduction, with costs against the petitioners. This decision is declared immediately executory.

SO ORDERED. ARRIOLA


030 FRANCISCO SALUNGA vs. CIR G.R. No. L-22456, September 27, 1967

Facts: Petitioner had, since 1948, been an employee of the Company, which, on October 2, 1959, entered with the Union, of which respondent John de Castillo is the president, into a CBA, effective up to June 30, 1962. Section 3 thereof reads:

The company agrees to require as a condition of employment of those workers covered by this agreement who either are members of the UNION on the date of the signing of this agreement, or may join the UNION during the effectivity of this agreement, that they shall not voluntarily resign from the UNION earlier than thirty (30) days before the expiry date of this agreement as provided in Article XIII hereof, provided, however, that nothing herein contained shall be construed to require the company to enforce any sanction whatsoever against any employee or worker who fails to retain his membership in the UNION as hereinbefore stated, for any cause other than voluntary resignation or non-payment of regular union dues on the part of said employee or worker.

Petitioner was a member of the Union since 1953. Due to what he believed were irregular disbursements of union funds, he tendered his resignation from the Union, which accepted. The Company having informed him that his aforementioned resignation would result in the termination of his employment, petitioner wrote to the Union a letter revoking his resignation and advising the Union to continue deducting his monthly union dues. The company notified the Union of the receipt of said copy and that "in view thereof, we shall not take any action on this case and shall consider Mr. Salunga still a member of your union and continue deducting his union dues." The Union told the Company that petitioner's membership could not be reinstated and insisted on his separation from the service, conformably with the stipulation above-quoted. In a letter to the Company, the Union reiterated its request for implementation of said section 3, for which reason, the Company notified petitioner that, in view of the aforementioned section, "we regret we have to terminate your employment for cause. At petitioner's behest, a prosecutor of the CIR commenced the present proceedings, for unfair labor practice, against the Union, its president, respondent John de Castillo, et. al. The trial Judge decided in favor of the Petitioner and directed the respondents to readmit and to continue the membership of Salunga. On MR, this decision was reversed by the Court of Industrial Relations. Hence, this appeal by the petitioner. Issue: Who between the Employer and the Union committed ULP? Held: Only the Union committed ULP.

Although petitioner had resigned from the Union and the latter had accepted the resignation, the former had, soon later — upon learning that his withdrawal from the Union would result in his separation from the Company, owing to the closed-shop provision above referred to — revoked or withdrawn said resignation, and the Union refused to consent thereto without any just cause therefor. Consequently, it is well settled that such unions are not entitled to arbitrarily exclude qualified applicants for membership, and a closed-shop provision would not justify the employer in discharging, or a union in insisting upon the discharge of, an employee whom the union thus refuses to admit to membership, without any reasonable ground therefor.

Needless to say, if said unions may be compelled to admit new members, who have the requisite qualifications, with more reason may the law and the courts exercise the coercive power when the employee involved is a long standing union member, who, owing to provocations of union officers, was impelled to tender his resignation, which he forthwith

withdrew or revoked. Surely, he may, at least, invoke the rights of those who seek admission for the first time, and can not arbitrarily he denied readmission.

Having been denied readmission into the Union and having been dismissed from the service owing to an unfair labor practice on the part of the Union, petitioner is entitled to reinstatement as member of the Union and to his former or substantially equivalent position in the Company, without prejudice to his seniority and/or rights and privileges, and with back pay, which back pay shall be borne exclusively by the Union.

On the otherhand, We cannot agree with the finding of the trial Judge to the effect that the Company was guilty of unfair labor practice. The Company was reluctant — if not unwilling — to discharge the petitioner. Besides, the Company notified the Union that it (the Company) would not take any action on the case and would consider the petitioner, "still a member" of the Union.. And, as the Union reiterated its demand, the Company notified petitioner that it had no other alternative but to terminate his employment, and dismissed him from the service, although with "regret". Under these circumstances, the Company was not "unfair" to the petitioner. [TiredofbeingHandsome]

040 MANILA MANDARIN EMPLOYEES UNION vs. NLRC and MELBA C. BELONCIO

G.R. No. 76989 September 29, 1987|GUTIERREZ, JR., J.: FACTS:

Private respondent, Melba C. Beloncio, an employee of Manila Mandarin Hotel since 1976 and at the time of her dismissal, assistant head waitress at the hotel's coffee shop, was expelled from the petitioner Manila Mandarin Employees Union for acts allegedly inimical to the interests of the union. The charge of disloyalty against Beloncio arose from her emotional remark "Wala akong tiwala sa Union ninyo" in the course of a heated discussion with a lazy waiter who happened to be a union steward.

The union demanded the dismissal from employment of Beloncio on the basis of the union security clause of their CBA and the Hotel acceded by placing Beloncio on forced leave effective August 10, 1984.

The union security clause of the CBA provides: Section 2. Dismissals. xxx xxx xxx b) Members of the Union who cease to be such members and/or who fail to maintain their membership in good standing therein by reason of their resignation from the Union and/or by reason of their expulsion from the Union in accordance with the Constitution and By-Laws of the Union, for non-payment of union dues and other assessment for organizing, joining or forming another labor organization shall, upon written notice of such cessation of membership or failure to maintain membership in the Union and upon written demand to the company by the Union, be dismissed from employment by the Company after complying with the requisite due process requirement;

Two days before the effective date of her forced leave or on August 8, 1984,

Beloncio filed a complaint for unfair labor practice and illegal dismissal against petitioner-union and Manila Mandarin Hotel Inc. before the NLRC, Arbitration Branch. Petitioner-union filed a motion to dismiss but was denied. After hearing and submission of the parties' respective position papers, the Labor Arbiter held that the union was guilty of ULP when it demanded the separation of Beloncio. The charge against the hotel was dismissed. NLRC affirmed LA’s decision. A subsequent MR and a second MR were denied. Hence, this present petition.


ISSUE:

W/N petitioner union is guilty of ULP for demanding the dismissal from employment of Beloncio on the basis of the union security clause HELD:

YES. The CBA in this case contains a union security clause — a closed-shop agreement. A closed-shop agreement is an agreement whereby an employer binds himself to hire only members of the contracting union who must continue to remain members in good standing to keep their jobs. A closed-shop has been upheld by the Court as a valid form of union security, and such a provision in a collective bargaining agreement is not a restriction of the right of freedom of association guaranteed by the Constitution.

The Court stresses, however, that union security clauses are also governed by law and by principles of justice, fair play, and legality. Union security clauses cannot be used by union officials against an employer, much less their own members, except with a high sense of responsibility, fairness, prudence, and judiciousness.

A union member may not be expelled from her union, and consequently from her job, for personal or impetuous reasons or for causes foreign to the closed-shop agreement and in a manner characterized by arbitrariness and whimsicality.

This is particularly true in this case where Ms. Beloncio was trying her best to make a hotel bus boy do his work promptly and courteously so as to serve hotel customers in the coffee shop expeditiously and cheerfully. Union membership does not entitle waiters, janitors, and other workers to be sloppy in their work, inattentive to customers, and disrespectful to supervisors. The Union should have disciplined its erring and troublesome members instead of causing so much hardship to a member who was only doing her work for the best interests of the employer, all its employees, and the general public whom they serve. (TWEETY)

050 SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, Second Division, ILAW AT BUKLOD

NG MANGGAGAWA (IBM) G.R. No. 119293. June 10, 2003|AZCUNA, J.:

FACTS: Petitioner San Miguel Corporation (SMC) and respondent Ilaw at Buklod ng

Manggagawa (IBM), exclusive bargaining agent of petitioner’s daily-paid rank and file employees, executed a Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) under which they agreed to submit all disputes to grievance and arbitration proceedings. The CBA also included a mutually enforceable no-strike no-lockout agreement.

IBM, through its vice-president Alfredo Colomeda, filed with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) a notice of strike, against petitioner for allegedly committing: (1) illegal dismissal of union members, (2) illegal transfer, (3) violation of CBA, (4) contracting out of jobs being performed by union members, (5) labor-only contracting, (6) harassment of union officers and members, (7) non-recognition of duly-elected union officers, and (8) other acts of unfair labor practice. The next day, IBM filed another notice of strike, this time through its president Edilberto Galvez, raising similar grounds.

Petitioner thereafter filed a Motion for Severance of Notices of Strike with Motion to Dismiss, on the grounds that the notices raised non-strikeable issues and that they affected four corporations which are separate and distinct from each other. NCMB Director found that the real issues involved are non-strikeable, hence, he issued separate letter-orders to both union groups, converting their notices of strike into preventive mediation.

While separate preventive mediation conferences were ongoing, the Colomeda group filed with the NCMB a notice of holding a strike vote.

Meanwhile, the Galvez group filed its second notice of strike against petitioner. Additional grounds were set forth therein, including discrimination, coercion of employees, illegal lockout and illegal closure.

The Colomeda group notified the NCMB of the results of their strike vote, which favored the holding of a strike. In reply, NCMB issued a letter again advising them that by virtue of the PAL v. Drilon ruling, their notice of strike is deemed not to have been filed, consequently invalidating any subsequent strike for lack of compliance with the notice requirement. Despite this and the pendency of the preventive mediation proceedings, IBM went on strike. The strike paralyzed the operations of petitioner, causing it losses allegedly worth P29.98 million in daily lost production.

The NLRC issued a TRO directing free ingress to and egress from petitioner’s plants, without prejudice to the union’s right to peaceful picketing and continuous hearings on the injunction case.

To minimize further damage to itself, petitioner entered into a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) with the respondent-union, calling for a lifting of the picket lines and resumption of work in exchange of “good faith talks” between the management and the labor management committees. The picket lines ended and work was then resumed.

On November 29, 1994, the NLRC issued the challenged decision, denying the petition for injunction for lack of factual basis. It found that the circumstances at the time did not constitute or no longer constituted an actual or threatened commission of unlawful acts. Hence, this petition. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the NLRC gravely abused its discretion when it denied the petition for injuction 2. Whether or not respondent violated the no-strike provision in the CBA RULING: 1. YES. We find for the petitioner.

Under the first exception, Article 218 (e) of the Labor Code expressly confers upon the NLRC the power to “enjoin or restrain actual and threatened commission of any or all prohibited or unlawful acts, or to require the performance of a particular act in any labor dispute which, if not restrained or performed forthwith, may cause grave or irreparable damage to any party or render ineffectual any decision in favor of such party x x x.” The second exception, on the other hand, is when the labor organization or the employer engages in any of the “prohibited activities” enumerated in Article 264.

In the case at bar, petitioner sought a permanent injunction to enjoin the respondent’s strike. A strike is considered as the most effective weapon in protecting the rights of the employees to improve the terms and conditions of their employment. However, to be valid, a strike must be pursued within legal bounds. One of the procedural requisites that Article 263 of the Labor Code and its Implementing Rules prescribe is the filing of a valid notice of strike with the NCMB. Imposed for the purpose of encouraging the voluntary settlement of disputes, this requirement has been held to be mandatory, the lack of which shall render a strike illegal.

In the present case, NCMB converted IBM’s notices into preventive mediation as it found that the real issues raised are non-strikeable. The NCMB had declared the notice of strike as “appropriate for preventive mediation.” The effect of that declaration was to drop the case from the docket of notice of strikes, as provided in Rule 41 of the NCMB Rules, as if there was no notice of strike. During the pendency of preventive mediation proceedings no


strike could be legally declared. Such disregard of the mediation proceedings was a blatant violation of the Implementing Rules, which explicitly oblige the parties to bargain collectively in good faith and prohibit them from impeding or disrupting the proceedings.

Article 264(a) of the Labor Code explicitly states that a declaration of strike without first having filed the required notice is a prohibited activity, which may be prevented through an injunction in accordance with Article 254. Clearly, public respondent should have granted the injunctive relief to prevent the grave damage brought about by the unlawful strike. Petitioner herein evinced its willingness to negotiate with the union by seeking for an order from the NLRC to compel observance of the grievance and arbitration proceedings. Respondent however resorted to force without exhausting all available means within its reach. Such infringement of the aforecited CBA provisions constitutes further justification for the issuance of an injunction against the strike. As we said long ago: “Strikes held in violation of the terms contained in a collective bargaining agreement are illegal especially when they provide for conclusive arbitration clauses. These agreements must be strictly adhered to and respected if their ends have to be achieved.” 2. As to petitioner’s allegation of violation of the no-strike provision in the CBA, jurisprudence has enunciated that such clauses only bar strikes which are economic in nature, but not strikes grounded on unfair labor practices. The notices filed in the case at bar alleged unfair labor practices, the initial determination of which would entail fact-finding that is best left for the labor arbiters. Nevertheless, our finding herein of the invalidity of the notices of strike dispenses with the need to discuss this issue.

We cannot sanction the respondent-union’s brazen disregard of legal requirements imposed purposely to carry out the state policy of promoting voluntary modes of settling disputes. The state’s commitment to enforce mutual compliance therewith to foster industrial peace is affirmed by no less than our Constitution. Trade unionism and strikes are legitimate weapons of labor granted by our statutes. But misuse of these instruments can be the subject of judicial intervention to forestall grave injury to a business enterprise.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision and resolution of the NLRC in Injunction Case are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner and private respondent are hereby directed to submit the issues raised in the dismissed notices of strike to grievance procedure and proceed with arbitration proceedings as prescribed in their CBA, if necessary. (HELLO KITTY)

060 VISAYAN BICYCLE MANUFACTURING CO., INC. vs. NATIONAL

LABOR UNION AND COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS G.R. No. L-19997 / May 19, 1965 / BENGZON J.P., J.

FACTS: On 1958, the Visayan Bicycle Employees and Workers Union (VIBEMWU), headed by

its President, Pedro Evangelista and the company signed a collective bargaining agreement. Among other things it provided for union security, checkoff, wage increases, fifteen days vacation leave and fifteen days sick leave.

For the year 1960 VIBEMWU, on December 1959, re-elected Pedro Evangelista president and elected Fulgencio Besana and Felicisimo Rodiel, vice-president and secretary respectively.

On February 1960, through its executive board headed by Besana, acting as president, VIBEMWU affiliated with the National Labor Union (NLU). Subsequently, on

March 1960, the Constitution and By-laws of VIBEMWU were amended. On the same month, another election was held and Besana was chosen president thereby replacing Evangelista.

Afterwards, the national secretary of NLU, by a letter, informed the company of VIBEMWU'S affiliation to NLU, and demanded enforcement of the collective bargaining agreement. The company, however, did not accede to the demand. Consequently, on April 1960, VIBEMWU filed a notice to strike.

The Department of Labor's Conciliation Service held several hearings on the union's demands and strike notice, but the company still refused.

On April 25, 1960, the company dismissed Besana and Rodiel after they figured, on the same day, in a fight with two other employees, within the premises and during working hours. Alleging unfair labor practice, NLU, on behalf of VIBEMWU, as well as of Besana and Rodiel, filed a complaint against the company in the Court of Industrial Relations (CIR). The company answered and stated that the dismissal of Besana and Rodiel was due to violation of a company rule that penalizes "Inciting or provoking a fight or fighting during working hours or on company premises".

The Presiding Judge of the CIR, after trying the case, rendered a decision in favor of the complainant union. An unfair labor practice, according to said decision, was committed by the company in dismissing Besana and Rodiel due to their union activities.

The company then filed a motion for reconsideration. It contained no argument but reserved the "right" to file supporting memorandum within ten days from March 18, 1962. A motion, however, was filed on March 27, 1962, requesting for 15-day extension of time to file the memorandum.

Adhering to a "no extension" policy thereon, the Court of Industrial Relations en banc denied the aforesaid motion for extension to file memorandum. It further denied the motion for reconsideration. Hence, this petition for review. ISSUE: 1) Whether or not the CIR abuse its discretion in denying the motion for extension of time to file memorandum in support of the MR; 2) Whether or not the company's dismissal of Besana and Rodiel constitute unfair labor practice HELD: 1) NO. The first issue has already been settled. The denial by the Court of Industrial

Relations of a motion to extend the 10-day period to file arguments in support of a motion for reconsideration, pursuant to its standing rule against such extension, does not constitute abuse of discretion.

2) NO. The record shows that on April 25, 1960, Besana and Rodiel were provoked by Saturnino Reyes and Silvestre Pacia into a pre-arranged fight pursuant to a strategy of the company designed to provide an appparently lawful cause for their dismissal. Reyes and Pacia were hired only within that week. Besana and Rodiel were not shown to have previously figured in similar incidents before or to have violated company rules and regulations in their many years with the company.. The company did not investigate the incident, and its manager, Co Hing, admitted that Besana was dismissed because he was a "hard-headed leader of the union". It was this manager who had warned VIBEMWU'S officers responsible for the affiliation that if they will not withdraw VIBEMWU from the NLU, he would take "steps in order to dismiss them from work."

The findings of the Court of Industrial Relations to the foregoing effect are supported by substantial evidence. No reason obtains to alter the conclusion that Besana and Rodiel were in reality dismissed because of their union activities and not because of their violation of a company rule against fights in the premises or during


working hours. Furthermore, the so-called violation of company rules having been brought about by the company itself, thru the recent employment of Saturnino Reyes and Silvestre Pacia who provoked the fight as above indicated, the same cannot be regarded as a ground to punish the aforementioned employees.

Such being the case, the dismissal of Besana and Rodiel constituted unfair labor practice under Section 4(a) (1) and (4) of Republic Act 875:

SEC.4. Unfair Labor Practices. — (a) It shall be unfair labor practice for an employer:

(1) To interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their rights guaranteed in Section three;

x x x x x x x x x (4) To discriminate in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization: ... .

Since the only reason or basis for Besana and Rodiel's dismissal was in fact their actuation as officers of VIBEMWU, the dismissal is clearly discriminatory.

It is this inconsiderate act of power that makes a subordinate a rebel; it is this malicious tactic that forces labor to dislike management; this unjustifiable conduct that creates a gap between management and labor; and this attitude that makes the laborer hate the officials of the company to the detriment of all efforts to harmonize management and labor for the benefit of both as envisioned by the Industrial Peace Act. So plain from the record is the bad faith that attended the company's deliberate and calculated act of unfair labor practice that we find in the present appeal an obvious attempt to delay and carry on a pretense which this Court can ill afford to let go without stern disapproval.

WHEREFORE, the decision and resolutions appealed from are hereby affirmed. RIT PERALTA

070 THE INSULAR LIFE ASSURANCE CO., LTD., EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION-NATU vs. THE INSULAR LIFE ASSURANCE CO., LTD.

G.R. No. L-25291 January 30, 1971|CASTRO, J.: FACTS:

In a letter dated September 16, 1957, the Unions jointly submitted proposals to the Companies for a modified renewal of their respective collective bargaining contracts which were then due to expire on September 30, 1957. The parties mutually agreed and to make whatever benefits could be agreed upon retroactively effective October 1, 1957.

Thereafter, in the months of September and October 1957 negotiations were conducted on the Union's proposals, but these were snagged by a deadlock on the issue of union shop, as a result of which the Unions filed on January 27, 1958 a notice of strike for "deadlock on collective bargaining." Several conciliation conferences were held under the auspices of the Department of Labor wherein the conciliators urged the Companies to make reply to the Unions' proposals en toto so that the said Unions might consider the feasibility of dropping their demand for union security in exchange for other benefits. However, the Companies did not make any counter-proposals but, instead, insisted that the Unions first drop their demand for union security, promising money benefits if this was done.

From April 25 to May 6, 1958, the parties negotiated on the labor demands but with no satisfactory result due to a stalemate on the matter of salary increases. On May 13, 1958 the Unions demanded from the Companies final counter-proposals on their economic demands, particularly on salary increases. Instead of giving counter-proposals, the Companies on May 15, 1958 presented facts and figures and requested the Unions to

submit a workable formula which would justify their own proposals, taking into account the financial position of the former.

Forthwith the Unions voted to declare a strike in protest against what they considered the Companies' unfair labor practices.

Meanwhile, 87 unionists were reclassified as supervisors without increase in salary nor in responsibility while negotiations were going on in the Department of Labor after the notice to strike was served on the Companies. These employees resigned from the Unions.

On May 20, 1958 the Unions went on strike and picketed the offices of the Insular Life Building at Plaza Moraga.

On May 21, 1958 the Companies through their acting manager and president, the respondent Jose M. Olbes, sent to each of the strikers a letter quoted verbatim as follows: We recognize it is your privilege both to strike and to conduct picketing. However, if any of you would like to come back to work voluntarily, you may: 1. Advise the nearest police officer or security guard of your intention to do so. 2. Take your meals within the office. 3. Make a choice whether to go home at the end of the day or to sleep nights at the office where comfortable cots have been prepared. 4. Enjoy free coffee and occasional movies. 5. Be paid overtime for work performed in excess of eight hours. 6. Be sure arrangements will be made for your families. The decision to make is yours — whether you still believe in the motives of the strike or in the fairness of the Management.

The Unions, however, continued on strike, with the exception of a few unionists who were convinced to desist by the aforesaid letter of May 21, 1958.

From the date the strike was called on May 21, 1958, until it was called off on May 31, 1958, some management men tried to break thru the Unions' picket lines. Thus, on May 21, 1958 Garcia, assistant corporate secretary, and Vicente Abella, chief of the personnel records section, respectively of the Companies, tried to penetrate the picket lines in front of the Insular Life Building. Garcia, upon approaching the picket line, tossed aside the placard of a picketer, one Paulino Bugay; a fight ensued between them, in which both suffered injuries. The Companies organized three bus-loads of employees, including a photographer, who with the said respondent Olbes, succeeded in penetrating the picket lines in front of the Insular Life Building, thus causing injuries to the picketers and also to the strike-breakers due to the resistance offered by some picketers.

Alleging that some non-strikers were injured and with the use of photographs as evidence, the Companies then filed criminal charges against the strikers with the City Fiscal's Office of Manila. During the pendency of the said cases in the fiscal's office, the Companies likewise filed a petition for injunction with damages with the Court of First Instance of Manila which, on the basis of the pendency of the various criminal cases against striking members of the Unions, issued on May 31, 1958 an order restraining the strikers, until further orders of the said court, from stopping, impeding, obstructing, etc. the free and peaceful use of the Companies' gates, entrance and driveway and the free movement of persons and vehicles to and from, out and in, of the Companies' building.

On the same date, the Companies, again through the respondent Olbes, sent individually to the strikers a letter, quoted hereunder in its entirety: The first day of the strike was last 21 May 1958. Our position remains unchanged and the strike has made us even more convinced of our decision. We do not know how long you intend to stay out, but we cannot hold your positions open for long. We have continued to operate and will continue to do so with or without you. If you are still interested in continuing in the employ of the Group Companies, and if there are no criminal charges pending against you, we are giving you until 2 June 1958 to report for work at the home office. If by this date you have not yet reported, we may be forced to obtain your replacement. Before, the decisions were yours to make. So it is now.


Incidentally, all of the more than 120 criminal charges filed against the members of the Unions, except 3, were dismissed by the fiscal's office and by the courts. These three cases involved "slight physical injuries" against one striker and "light coercion" against two others.

At any rate, because of the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction against them as well as the ultimatum of the Companies giving them until June 2, 1958 to return to their jobs or else be replaced, the striking employees decided to call off their strike and to report back to work on June 2, 1958.

However, before readmitting the strikers, the Companies required them not only to secure clearances from the City Fiscal's Office of Manila but also to be screened by a management committee among the members of which were Enage and Garcia (both were former counsel of the unions subsequently hired by the companies). The screening committee initially rejected 83 strikers with pending criminal charges. However, all non-strikers with pending criminal charges which arose from the breakthrough incident were readmitted immediately by the Companies without being required to secure clearances from the fiscal's office. Subsequently, when practically all the strikers had secured clearances from the fiscal's office, the Companies readmitted only some but adamantly refused readmission to 34 officials and members of the Unions who were most active in the strike, on the ground that they committed "acts inimical to the interest of the respondents," without however stating the specific acts allegedly committed.

On July 29, 1958 the CIR prosecutor filed a complaint for unfair labor practice against the Companies under Republic Act 875. The complaint specifically charged the Companies with (1) interfering with the members of the Unions in the exercise of their right to concerted action, by sending out individual letters to them urging them to abandon their strike and return to work, with a promise of comfortable cots, free coffee and movies, and paid overtime, and, subsequently, by warning them that if they did not return to work on or before June 2, 1958, they might be replaced; and (2) discriminating against the members of the Unions as regards readmission to work after the strike on the basis of their union membership and degree of participation in the strike. ISSUE: WON the Companies are guilty of ULP. HELD:

Yes. INDIVIDUAL BARGAINING (ULP in Collective Bargaining) The letters were directed to the striking employees individually — by registered

special delivery mail at that — without being coursed through the Unions which were representing the employ.

It is an unfair labor practice for an employer operating under a collective bargaining agreement to negotiate or to attempt to negotiate with his employees individually in connection with changes in the agreement. And the basis of the prohibition regarding individual bargaining with the strikers is that although the union is on strike, the employer is still under obligation to bargain with the union as the employees' bargaining representative.

All the above-detailed activities are unfair labor practices because they tend to undermine the concerted activity of the employees, an activity to which they are entitled free from the employer's molestation.

Moreover, since the first is a letter containing promises of benefits to the employees in order to entice them to return to work, it is not protected by the free speech provisions of the Constitution. The same is true with the second letter since it contained threats to obtain replacements for the striking employees in the event they

did not report for work on June 2, 1958. The free speech protection under the Constitution is inapplicable where the expression of opinion by the employer or his agent contains a promise of benefit, or threats, or reprisal.

Indeed, when the respondents offered reinstatement and attempted to "bribe" the strikers with "comfortable cots," "free coffee and occasional movies," "overtime" pay for "work performed in excess of eight hours," and "arrangements" for their families, so they would abandon the strike and return to work, they were guilty of strike-breaking and/or union-busting and, consequently, of unfair labor practice. It is equivalent to an attempt to break a strike for an employer to offer reinstatement to striking employees individually, when they are represented by a union, since the employees thus offered reinstatement are unable to determine what the consequences of returning to work would be.

OTHER ACTS OF ULP

Likewise violative of the right to organize, form and join labor organizations are the following acts: the offer of a Christmas bonus to all "loyal" employees of a company shortly after the making of a request by the union to bargain; wage increases given for the purpose of mollifying employees after the employer has refused to bargain with the union, or for the purpose of inducing striking employees to return to work; the employer's promises of benefits in return for the strikers' abandonment of their strike in support of their union; and the employer's statement, made about 6 weeks after the strike started, to a group of strikers in a restaurant to the effect that if the strikers returned to work, they would receive new benefits in the form of hospitalization, accident insurance, profit-sharing, and a new building to work in.

The test of whether an employer has interfered with and coerced employees within the meaning of subsection (a) (1) is whether the employer has engaged in conduct which it may reasonably be said tends to interfere with the free exercise of employees' rights under section 3 of the Act, and it is not necessary that there be direct evidence that any employee was in fact intimidated or coerced by statements of threats of the employer if there is a reasonable inference that anti-union conduct of the employer does have an adverse effect on self-organization and collective bargaining.

Besides, the letters should not be considered by themselves alone but should be read in the light of the preceding and subsequent circumstances surrounding them. The letters should be interpreted according to the "totality of conduct doctrine,"

It must be recalled that previous to the petitioners' submission of proposals for an amended renewal of their respective collective bargaining agreements to the respondents, the latter hired Felipe Enage and Ramon Garcia, former legal counsels of the petitioners, as personnel manager and assistant corporate secretary, respectively, with attractive compensations. After the notice to strike was served on the Companies and negotiations were in progress in the Department of Labor, the respondents reclassified 87 employees as supervisors without increase in salary or in responsibility, in effect compelling these employees to resign from their unions. And during the negotiations in the Department of Labor, despite the fact that the petitioners granted the respondents' demand that the former drop their demand for union shop and in spite of urgings by the conciliators of the Department of Labor, the respondents adamantly refused to answer the Unions' demands en toto. Incidentally, Enage was the chairman of the negotiating panel for the Companies in the collective bargaining between the former and the Unions. After the petitioners went to strike, the strikers were individually sent letters, enticing them to abandon their strike by inducing them to return to work upon promise of special privileges. Two days later, the respondents, thru their president and manager, respondent Jose M. Olbes, brought three truckloads of non-strikers and others, escorted by armed men, who, despite the presence of eight entrances to the three buildings occupied by the Companies, entered thru only one


gate less than two meters wide and in the process, crashed thru the picket line posted in front of the premises of the Insular Life Building. This resulted in injuries on the part of the picketers and the strike-breakers. Then the respondents brought against the picketers criminal charges, only three of which were not dismissed, and these three only for slight misdemeanors. As a result of these criminal actions, the respondents were able to obtain an injunction from the court of first instance restraining the strikers from stopping, impeding, obstructing, etc. the free and peaceful use of the Companies' gates, entrance and driveway and the free movement of persons and vehicles to and from, out and in, of the Companies' buildings. On the same day that the injunction was issued, another letter was sent — again individually and by registered special delivery mail — to the strikers, threatening them with dismissal if they did not report for work on or before June 2, 1958. But when most of the petitioners reported for work, the respondents thru a screening committee — of which Ramon Garcia was a member — refused to admit 63 members of the Unions on the ground of "pending criminal charges." However, when almost all were cleared of criminal charges by the fiscal's office, the respondents adamantly refused admission to 34 officials and union members. It is not, however, disputed that all-non-strikers with pending criminal charges which arose from the breakthrough incident of May 23, 1958 were readmitted immediately by the respondents. And despite the fact that the fiscal's office found no probable cause against the petitioning strikers, the Companies adamantly refused admission to them on the pretext that they committed "acts inimical to the interest of the respondents," without stating specifically the inimical acts allegedly committed. They were soon to admit, however, that these alleged inimical acts were the same criminal charges which were dismissed by the fiscal and by the courts.

Verily, the above actuations of the respondents before and after the issuance of the letters yield the clear inference that the said letters formed of the respondents scheme to preclude if not destroy unionism within them. - Iñaki Torrres

080 SIMEON DE LEON, ET. AL., petitioners, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (NLRC), and FORTUNE TOBACCO

CORPORATION and/or MAGNUM INTEGRATED SERVICES, INC. (formerly FORTUNE INTEGRATED SERVICES, INC.), respondents.

G.R. No. 112661 May 30, 2001|Justice PUNO Facts: On August 23, 1980, Fortune Tobacco Corporation (FTC) and Fortune Integrated Services, Inc. (FISI) entered into a contract for security services where the latter undertook to provide security guards for the protection and security of the former. The petitioners were among those engaged as security guards pursuant to the contract. On February 1, 1991, the incorporators and stockholders of FISI sold out lock, stock and barrel to a group of new stockholders by executing for the purpose a "Deed of Sale of Shares of Stock". On the same date, the Articles of Incorporation of FISI was amended changing its corporate name to Magnum Integrated Services, Inc. (MISI). A new by-laws was likewise adopted and approved by the Securities and Exchange Commission on June 4, 1993. On October 15, 1991, FTC terminated the contract for security services which resulted in the displacement of some 582 security guards assigned by FISI/MISI to FTC, including the petitioners in this case. FTC engaged the services of 2 other security agencies, Asian Security Agency and Ligalig Security Services, whose security guards were posted on October 15, 1991 to replace FISI's security guards. Sometime in October 1991, the Fortune Tobacco Labor Union, an affiliate of the National Federation of Labor Unions (NAFLU), and claiming to be the bargaining agent of the security guards, sent a Notice of Strike to FISI/MISI. On

November 14, 1991, the members of the union which include petitioners picketed the premises of FTC. The Regional Trial Court of Pasig, however, issued a writ of injunction to enjoin the picket. On November 29, 1991, Simeon de Leon, together with 16 other complainants instituted the instant case before the Arbitration Branch of the NLRC. The complaint was later amended to allow the inclusion of other complainants.

Petitioners alleged that they were regular employees of FTC which was also using the corporate names Fortune Integrated Services, Inc. and Magnum Integrated Services, Inc. They were assigned to work as security guards at the company's main factory plant, its tobacco redrying plant and warehouse. They averred that they performed their duties under the control and supervision of FTC's security supervisors. Their services, however, were severed in October 1991 without valid cause and without due process. Petitioners claimed that their dismissal was part of respondents' design to bust their newly-organized union which sought to enforce their rights under the Labor Standards law. Respondent FTC, on the other hand, maintained that there was no employer-employee relationship between FTC and petitioners. It said that at the time of the termination of their services, petitioners were the employees of MISI which was a separate and distinct corporation from FTC. Hence, petitioners had no cause of action against FTC. Respondent FISI, meanwhile, denied the charge of illegal dismissal and unfair labor practice. It argued that petitioners were not dismissed from service but were merely placed on floating status pending re-assignment to other posts. It alleged that the temporary displacement of petitioners was not due to its fault but was the result of the pretermination by FTC of the contract for security services.

The Labor Arbiter found respondents liable for the charges. Rejecting FTC's argument that there was no employer-employee relationship between FTC and petitioners, he ruled that FISI and FTC should be considered as a single employer. He observed that the two corporations have common stockholders and they share the same business address. In addition, FISI had no client other than FTC and other corporations belonging to the group of companies owned by Lucio Tan. The Labor Arbiter thus found respondents guilty of union busting and illegal dismissal. He observed that not long after the stockholders of FISI sold all their stocks to a new set of stockholders, FTC terminated the contract of security services and engaged the services of two other security agencies. FTC did not give any reason for the termination of the contract. The Labor Arbiter gave credence to petitioners' theory that respondents' precipitate termination of their employment was intended to bust their union. Consequently, the Labor Arbiter ordered respondents to pay petitioners their backwages and separation pay, to refund their cash bond deposit, and to pay attorney's fees.

On appeal, the NLRC reversed and set aside the decision of the Labor Arbiter. First, it held that the Labor Arbiter erred in applying the "single employer" principle and concluding that there was an employer-employee relationship between FTC and FISI on one hand, and petitioners on the other hand. It found that at the time of the termination of the contract of security services on October 15, 1991, FISI which, at that time, had been renamed Magnum Integrated Services, Inc. had a different set of stockholders and officers from that of FTC. They also had separate offices. The NLRC held that the principle of "single employer" and the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil could not apply under the circumstances. It further ruled that the proximate cause for the displacement of petitioners was the termination of the contract for security services by FTC on October 15, 1991. FISI could not be faulted for the severance of petitioners' assignment at the premises of FTC. Consequently, the NLRC held that the charge of illegal dismissal had no basis. As regards the charge of unfair labor practice, the NLRC found that petitioners who had the burden of proof failed to adduce any evidence to support their charge of unfair labor practice against respondents. Hence, it ordered the dismissal of petitioners' complaint.


Issue: Whether or not respondents are guilty of unfair labor practice. Held: Respondents were guilty of interfering with the right of petitioners to self-organization which constitutes unfair labor practice under Article 248 of the Labor Code. Petitioners have been employed with FISI since the 1980s and have since been posted at the premises of FTC (main factory plant, tobacco redrying plant and warehouse). FISI, while having its own corporate identity, was a mere instrumentality of FTC, tasked to provide protection and security in the company premises. The 2 corporations had identical stockholders and the same business address. FISI also had no other clients except FTC and other companies belonging to the Lucio Tan group of companies. Moreover, the early payslips of petitioners show that their salaries were initially paid by FTC. To enforce their rightful benefits under the laws on Labor Standards, petitioners formed a union which was later certified as bargaining agent of all the security guards. On February 1, 1991, the stockholders of FISI sold all their participations in the corporation to a new set of stockholders which renamed the corporation Magnum Integrated Services, Inc. On October 15, 1991, FTC, without any reason, preterminated its contract of security services with MISI and contracted 2 other agencies to provide security services for its premises. This resulted in the displacement of petitioners. As MISI had no other clients, it failed to give new assignments to petitioners. Petitioners have remained unemployed since then. All these facts indicate a concerted effort on the part of respondents to remove petitioners from the company and thus abate the growth of the union and block its actions to enforce their demands in accordance with the Labor Standards laws.

The test of whether an employer has interfered with and coerced employees within the meaning of section (a) (1) is whether the employer has engaged in conduct which it may reasonably be said tends to interfere with the free exercise of employees' rights under section 3 of the Act, and it is not necessary that there be direct evidence that any employee was in fact intimidated or coerced by statements of threats of the employer if there is a reasonable inference that anti-union conduct of the employer does have an adverse effect on self-organization and collective bargaining."

A corporation is an entity separate and distinct from its stockholders and from other corporations to which it is connected. However, when the concept of separate legal entity is used to defeat public convenience, justify wrong, protect fraud or defend crime, the law will regard the corporation as an association of persons, or in case of two corporations, merge them into one. The separate juridical personality of a corporation may also be disregarded when such corporation is a mere alter ego or business conduit of another person. FISI was a mere adjunct of FTC. FISI, by virtue of a contract for security services, provided FTC with security guards to safeguard its premises. However, records show that FISI and FTC have the same owners and business address, and FISI provided security services only to FTC and other companies belonging to the Lucio Tan group of companies. The purported sale of the shares of the former stockholders to a new set of stockholders who changed the name of the corporation to Magnum Integrated Services, Inc. appears to be part of a scheme to terminate the services of FISI's security guards posted at the premises of FTC and bust their newly-organized union which was then beginning to become active in demanding the company's compliance with Labor Standards laws. Under these circumstances, the Court cannot allow FTC to use its separate corporate personality to shield itself from liability for illegal acts committed against its employees. Therefore, the Court reversed the appealed decision. -GO

part 9- unfair labor practice

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