pareto_the parliamentary regime in italy (december 1, 1893)

7/29/2019 Pareto_The Parliamentary Regime in Italy (December 1, 1893)

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THE PARLIAMENTARY REGIME IN ITALY.A MARKED advance has been made in the study ofphysiology and anatomy by the introductionof thecomparative method. It may even be asserted that it isimpossible to understand human physiology and anatomyunless comparisonis made between man and other animals.An analogous method ofstudying he physiology f the socialorganism leads to equally important results. It is bycomparing civilized with savage society that modern sociol-ogists,following he traditionsof inductivepoliticswhich havecome down to us fromAristotle,have been able to lay thebasis for a new science,whose progress during our centuryhas been trulyremarkable. The same methodofstudy appliedto the details of the organizationof society ought also to beproductiveofgreat results. This is a truth ofwhich M. LeonDonat shows thoroughcomprehension n his book on experi-mental politics and perhaps the day is not far offwhen theinductive methodwill acquire the same absolute masteryinpolitical science that it alreadyholds in physical science. Itis from this point of view that a study of the effectsofparliamentary ule in Italy appears to me worthy f consider-ation. If only the political phenomena which are due tospecific nd peculiar conditions n Italy can be separated fromthose which are due to general causes that might operateequally elsewhere, such an investigation promises to yieldresultsofgeneral validity nd value.Two facts chiefly strike the observer who studies thepolitico-socialcondition of Italy. The first,which manifestsitself on the most superficialexamination, s the almost entireabsence ofpoliticalparties. The other,whichto be thoroughlyunderstood requires minute observation, is the enormousextension of the functionsof the state,which reduces almostto nullity he private initiative and economicindependenceofthe citizens.


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678 POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY. [VOL. VIII.I.

As toparties, hesecertainlyxist, nname; butthenamesserve only to designatebodies of men united by certainstrictly ersonal interests or by a certain communityftemperament. t is impossible o findany real differencebetween hesenominal arties s regardsheir ttitudeowardsthe political nd social problemswithwhich the country sconfronted.To thisruletheextremists,ndeed, onstitutenexception;but they renot at all numerous. Strictly peak-ing, there are threeextreme arties, f which, owever, neonly s really ctive,namely,he Socialists. The RepublicanPartymaintains proudreserve,nd as to theClericalParty,it effacestself ntirelyn thepolitical tage.In Italy there are two kindsof socialism, f whichone,agriculturalocialism, s indigenous, hile the other, ndus-trial socialism, s onlythe reflection f French and, evenmore, fGerman deas. This latterhas its chiefstrengthnMilan,which s industriallyhe most mportantity n Italy;but it has someadherentsnall theother entres f ndustry,such as Turin, pezia andGenoa. The head of thispartysthe awyer urati, resident fMilan,whopublishes here wosocialistic papers- a review entitled Critica Sociale (SocialCriticism),and a small weekly paper called Lotta di Classe(Struggle of theClasses). This last name is sufficient o showthat this party akes,in general, he pointof viewof KarlMarx. Turati s a manof muchtalent. He is well informedand active,and probablywill yet play an important8le inItaly. He has been lucky enoughto make one importantconvert Sig. de Amicis, he well-knownovelist,who livesin Turin. The socialismof de Amicis, o tell thetruth, oesnotgo furtherhan vaguedesireforthe amelioration f thelot of the people bycollectivisticaws. He does not appeartohave a very lear dea of the measures o be desiredorofthe effectwhichtheywouldproduce. But the simplefactthat de Amicis has becomea follower f the Socialistshasincreased heir eputationndprobablyontributed,t thelast


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No. 4.] PARLIAAfENTARY GOVERNMENT IN ITALY. 679election,to the success ofthe Socialist candidate,Sig. Merlani.This election is very significant, s Merlani was opposed byGeneral Pelloux, and Turin is a strongholdof the militaryparty. In Milan the Socialist Party presented a very clearprogram the contest of the masses against the bour-geoisie. Their candidates only registereda small numberofvotes. Turati had 352 out of 2,569 votes, while his chiefopponent had I,458. Another of their candidates, Sig.Gnocchi Viani, a clever man, obtained 620 out of 3,095votes.Agricultural socialism is spreading in the provinces ofMantua and Parma, and in some southernprovinces,whereittakes the form f a simpledesireforthe partitionof the land.In former imes its centrewas in Romagna, but it now seemsto have lost ground there. It was in Romagna thatCipriani,who was unjustly condemned and imprisoned by the Italiancourts,was returnedas a Socialist deputy. Under Crispi'sministry,t was thought well that the king should make atour in Romagna, and, to mark the happy event, he wasinduced to pardon Cipriani. The king was well received bythe people of Romagna; and since then he has loadedpopularsocieties withhis favors,for which reason socialismislosing ground little by little. But in the southernprovincesthereis a real agrarianquestion. To understand t thoroughlywe mustretracethe course of theirhistory little.The revolution in Italy was chiefly the work of thebourgeois,who naturally oughtto turn the new state of affairsto theirown advantagewherever t was possible to do so. Thenorth nd centreof Italy were like other civilized countries inthat the distinction f classes was not very definite and hereit was not possible forone partyof the bourgeoisieto enrichitselfdirectly t the expense either of the otherpartyor of thepeople. It was necessaryto have recourse to the means whichpoliticians employ n all countries, nd which are based uponthe intervention f the state. But in the southernprovincesthe bourgeois-, ithoutrenouncing hese means, adoptedothersmore direct, which caused their yoke to weigh very heavily


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68o POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY [VOL. VIII.upon the lower classes. They took possession ofthe communaladministrationnd drew from t a profit isible to the eyes ofall. In the ancient kingdomof Naples many large fortuneswere formerlymade by the misappropriation f the propertyof the communes. The liberal r6gimehas changed the formbut not the substance of these usurpations. In certainplacesthe propertyof the commune is leased to figure-heads,r tothe friends of the communal councilors, at ridiculous rents;in others t is sold outright, nd fornext to nothing, o men ofstraw, all serious bidders being kept away from he auctions.The government does nothing to suppress these abuses,because the same persons who dominate the communalcouncils are the chief electors of the deputies,who, in theirturn, mploytheir nfluencewiththe government o screen themisdeeds of theirfriends nd partisans.The oppression of the people in the villages has led tofrequent uprisings. Racioppi, in the tenth chapter of hisStoria dei Moti della Basilicata net I86o, writes:

The public and (ager ublicus) as been occupied unjustly y thenew bourgeois atricians. And this is how t happensthat a mantries to gain justicewithhis own hands,whiletheywhosedutyit is to administerustice are deaf to his complaints nd unmovedby his prayers. . . Not finding he municipalrepresentative,elected by the bourgeoisie, ithervery isinterestedr verymuchconcerned bout social problems, he people endeavorto cut theGordianknotby frequentnsurrection.These seditions have continued up to the present time, andwe have had some veryrecent examples of them at Forenzaand at Caltavuturo.1

1 The outbreakat Forenza was attributed ythe Minister f the Interior,nan address n theChamber,February 2, I892, to the establishment f a house-hold or family ax (tassa di fuocaticoo di famiglia),whichis levied or not in adistrict ccording o the pleasureoftheauthorities f the commune. The deputyGiantureo,n replying,aid: "The communewithwhichwe have to deal was oneof the richest n the Basilicata. A fewyearsago the councilof thecommunewasdissolved,the royal commissionhavingfound thattheseriouschargesofcorruptadministration hich had beenbrought against it were onlytoo well grounded;but, notwithstandinghis, the same memberswere re-elected."Caltavuturo is a small commune n Sicily. The disturbancehere, in which


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No. 4.] PARLIAMENTARPY GOVERNMENT IN ITALY. 68IThe same oppression was one of the causes of brigandage.'Brigands have disappeared,2but the oppression under whichthe people suffer has not much diminished. Here is whatSig. Leopoldo Franchetti wrote n I875 of the bourgeois classwhich rules the Neapolitan communes:Suchpersons eing entrusted ith he administrationfthe publicpatrimony,t was to be expected that many among themwouldconsidert merely meansto the ncrease f their rivate ortunes;

and in factso prevalents this idea that no attempts made toconceal it, and when any one's financial ffairs re in a bad con-dition t is not nfrequento hear topenly roposed hathe shouldbe elected o someoffice to recouphimself." . . The people nwhose hands our laws apparentlyntend o place the localgovern-ment regenerally ivided ntotwo lasses: those hathavefollowedthe lucrative areerof local employees, nd thosewho,whiletoohonest o takepart nthese buses,nevertheless o not preventheiroccurrence. . . In thisway councils and local boards, and theboards f administrationfcharitablenstitutionsnd"piousworksare oftenfull of ruinedpeople who make an income out of thepublic patrimony. . . The corruption f the chiefs naturallycommunicatestself o their ubordinates.The surveillance f thecommunal unds ivestheguardiansndother nferiormployees heopportunityfmaking quantityf littleperquisites f a lucrativekind, ll of which rea loss to thefund. Everyusurper f communalpropertyorruptss much s his opportunitiesllowhim that is, uptoa certaingrade n thesocial scale,whenpower akesthe place ofmoney. . . The crownprosecutor fAvezzano, n his speechofJanuary , I872, on theadministrationf justice page 29), lamentstherapidfelling f thetrees nthedistrict,nd says that theforestguardsconnive t depredations; hatthey reso manyArgusesntracing hefagotswhichthe poorman takes forhimself, ut aremanyiveswere ost, roseout ofanattemptythepeasantsoassert ossessionof land whichtheyclaimed was communalproperty nd had been usurpedbyprivate ndividuals. SignorColajanni declared n theChamber,January0, I893,that the peasantswere rightand that the legal proceedings showed that morethan oO hectareshad been usurped.1 Cf thework ofRossi on TheBasilicata, page 571,wherethecareer ofCoppa,a most ferociousbrigand,s thusexplained.

2 The disappearance of brigandage s due mainly o theexcellentroadswhichnow traverse he country.


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682 POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY. [VOL. VIII.blind and dumb to the devastations hat the richmake in thewoods.'

In the rest of Italy many analogous facts occur; but thepolitician's art in strippinghis fellow-citizenss there morerefined,whereas in the Neapolitan communal administrationit is brutallyoppressive,and is the cause of an intensehatredfor the bourgeoisie on the part of the poor people Theirresentmenthas been ferociouslymanifestedas often as therestraints of public force have been relaxed, and undersimilar circumstanceswe are likely to witness similar out-breaks.The Republican Party is composed of the remains ofMazzini's party. It is not large, but it consists almostexclusively of men whose honesty and straightforwardnessare above suspicion. As a rule,it refusesto take part in thepolitical elections, allowing its adherents, at most, to assistin communal elections only. The Fratellanza Artigiana ofFlorence,which preserves the purest Mazzinian traditions, sin favor of absolute abstention from voting. At the lastelections (I892) it declared:

It is a sacredduty fthedemocraticartyo abstain from oting,abandoning orever warwhichservesonly o hardenthe heartsand intellects f youngmen,by upholding system gainstwhichtheonly hing hat could succeedwouldbe an open and loyalwarmadebythepeople nthe nameof thepeople,claiming heir ights.Remember, lectors,whatGiuseppeMazzini said! Whoever riesto perpetuate n institution hichhas had a death-blows tryingtodo impossibilities.Galvanicactionmay imulate ifefor briefmoment,ut cannotgive treality.I Franchetti, he Economical and Administrativeonditionsof the Neapolitan

Provinces, p. 28, 29. The author s a member fthemajority, ho almostalwaysvoteswith hegovernment,nd is inclined o exaggerate heprosperityather hantheevil condition f thecountry. In politicaland social questions, s in courtsoflaw,thetestimonymost worthy fconfidences thatof personswho acknowledgefactscontraryo theirgeneralmode ofthinking,rwho acknowledge heir riendsto be in the wrong. It is on testimonyf thisnaturethat I have tried s muchas possibleto rely, ejecting he testimonyf personswho are speaking in favorof theirfriends nd againsttheir dversaries,


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No. 4.] PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENT IN ITALY. 683At Milan,however, circumstanceccurredwhichsenttheRepublicansto the ballot-box. Their candidate,Sig. deAndreis,was not elected, ut he obtained 121 votesagainstI967 castforhisopponent, ho was supported ythegovern-ment. These 1121 votes,however, ere not all givenbytheRepublicans; manyothers votedfor Sig. de Andreis, s aprotest gainstgovernmentalorruptionndoppression. hesefacts tend to showhow utterly ull is the influence f theRepublicanParty n Italianpolitical ife.

The influencef the ClericalParty s scarcely reater. Itis said thatthe pope,when askedwhyhewouldnot allowthefaithfulovote, nswered: "When one of our followers etsinto Parliamentwe lose him." Whetherthese wordsweresaidornot, hey refull ftruth. Notonly hosewho get ntoParliament,utthosewhohaveemploymentnder he govern-ment and nearlyall have become lukewarm artisans.Personswellacquaintedwith the families f themost lericalof the Romanaristocracymaintain hat if theywereto votesecretly hetherr no theywould iveRome backto thepope,thenegativeswould be morenumerous han the affirmatives,since hesefamilies ouldnot risk osing heenormousncreaseofvalue which heremoval f the capitalto Rome has givento theirhouses. It is often aid thatwhen heClericalPartydoes vote in Italy,a great changewill take place in Italianpolitical ife. This is an error. In Rome the Clericalsvoteat the communal lections, nd yet theydo not succeed ingetting ossession f themunicipalffices. WhentheSyndicof Rome,Torlonia,was removedfrom ffice orhaving paida visit to the cardinalvicar, they had not the courageeven to protest. Nor do they protestnow when it is pro-posed to hold an exhibitionn Rome, nd to open it on theaDniversaryf the takingof the city by the Italian troops.Owing to the fact that the Clerical electors in Rome aremostlymalltrades-peoplehom he exhibition ouldbenefit,somemunicipalouncilorselongingo thepartyven voted nfavorof the exhibition,n spite of the date selected foritsopeningan evidenceof lukewarmnessf whichthe popecomplaineditterly.


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684 POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY. [VOL. VIII.This last illustrationbrings us close to the limits where theconfusionof Italian parties begins. In order to realize thedegree of confusion that prevails, a comparison betweenEnglish and American political leaders on the one hand,and Italian public men on the other,will be found service-able.In England and in the United States a certain connection sestablished between the names of public men and the ideasthey represent; so that it is sufficient,or example,to learn

that Mr. Gladstone has obtained a majority t the elections inorderto know thathe will propose to solve the Irish question;or to learn that the Democratic Partyhas triumphed n theUnited States under the leadership of Mr. Cleveland in orderto infer that the country will not continue to increase itscustoms duties. With Italian politicians nothingof the sortis possible. For example, Sig. Minghetti fell from officebecause he proposed thatthe controlof the railwaysshould begiven over to the state. His attitude on this question was notdictated by politicalexigencies ; it was the result of a life-longinclinationon his parttowards state socialism. He consideredit absolutely ndispensableforthe good of the country o takeaway the railways fromthe plutocracywho owned them; andto attain this end he did not hesitateto separatefromhis oldcompanions who remained faithful to the liberal policy ofCount Cavour, and thus to cause the dissolutionof the oldparty of the Right. It would hence have been natural tosuppose that this project would become the chief object ofSig. Minghetti'sfuture fforts,s home rule has become thatof Mr. Gladstone. Nothing of the sort. A very few yearslater, Sig. Minghetti was seen supporting a ministry, hechief point in whose programwas the abandonment of therailwaysto privatecontrol. Further, Sig. Minghettivoted fora lawwhichput the administration f the railways n the handsof a ring much worse than that which he had desired todestroy. Facts like these occur occasiona-lly verywhere, utwhat is remarkablein Italy is that they are the general ruleand that they seem quite natural. To realize this state


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No. 4.] PARLIAMENTAR Y GOVERNMENT IN ITAL Y. 685of things,the Americanor English reader must pictureto himself condition f feeling n England,forexample,which wouldmake it seem naturalthat the day afterMr.Gladstonehad obtainedoffice, ord Salisburyshouldunitewithhimin layingbefore he House some bill to establishhome rule in Ireland. And it is necessary obear nmindthat Sig. Minghettiwas a perfectlyonorableman, nd thatit would not enter any one's mindthat he had otherthanhonorablemotives orhis changeof opinion. This,ofcourse,is not alwaysthe case as regards he changesof opinion fotherpoliticians. It is impossible o denythat n thecase ofmanypublicmen the desireforpecuniary dvantageor forsome satisfactiono theirvanitycountsfor a greatdeal intheir requenthangesof attitude. Butwhatevermaybe themotive or uchchanges, he Italian electors ppearto regardthem s natural,nd showno dispositiono hold their urn-coat representativeso a strict ccount. There werein thelast Chamber, or instance, certainnumber f deputiesofthe extreme eft,who one fineday decided to support hegovernment,ndwhotookthe nameof"LegitimateRadicals."Thesegentlemen adalmost ll obtained heir eats as violentopponents f the Triple Alliance; but on becoming riendsof the governmenthey becameall at once partisans f theTriple Alliance and delivered peeches strongly ontrastingwiththosewhich they had made before lection. Notwith-standing his,the same electorsre-electedhem. This factalone would not suffice o prove that the majority f theelectors ad become turncoatsike theirdeputies, or n Italythe governmentxercises greatinfluence vertheelections;but a certain numberof the electors, t least, must havechanged heir pinions.

One result f this tateof things,which s at thesame timea proof f its prevalence,s the carewithwhichmany talianpublicmenavoid committinghemselves. In ordernot to beembarrassed y the expression f theirold opinionswhen hetime may come to have new ones, they make a point ofspeaking n an ambiguousmannerwhichrecalls that of the


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686 POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY. [VOL. VIII.ancient oracles.' One candidate,who was chosen at the lastelections,said that he would support any governmentwhichhad the welfareofthe nationsincerely t heart,- a declarationwhich certainlythrew little light upon the speaker's personalconvictions. Not all candidates carrythe methodso far; butin nearly all electoral programs phrases occur whose objectis to avoid all precise treatmentof the problems which areagitating the country. A candidate states,for example,thathe " will vote for such military nd naval expendituresas arenecessary for the good of the country." This statementsatisfiesequally thosepeople who believe that the good of thecountry equiresan increase of these expenses, and those whobelieve that it is necessary,on the contrary,o curtail them.Another,followingthe programof MinisterGiolitti,declaresthathe will not vote for new taxes unless theyare absolutelynecessary; whichevidently ommitshim in no way,since newtaxes are invariablydeclared necessary by those who proposethem. A similarvagueness characterizesmany recent utter-ances on the tariffquestion. By the customs law of 1887Italy entered upon a policy of protection; yet the authorsof the tariffand their friends have never franklycalledthemselves protectionists, s M. Meline and his adherentshave done in France. They represent the new systemas an inevitable expedient under the conditions of thetimes, and they speak much of the natural law of freeexchange, which is to guide economic policy when circum-stances make it possible. The lack of positive principJeis illustrated by an incident during the discussion of thetariff aw. Sig. Magliani, the Minister of Finance, at firstdeclared himselfopposed to a duty on foreignwheat (origi-nally three francs on the i 00 kilos, and now five francs);

1 [American readerswill findnothingpeculiarly talian in this phenomenon.Manyof themwill involuntarilyecall theutterances f Lowell's "Candidate forthePresidency,"n theBiglozw apers, e.g.:" I stan' upontheConstitution,Ez preudunt tatesmen ay, who'veplannedA wayto get themostprofusionO' chances ez to ware they11 tand." - EDS.]


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No.4.] PARLIAMENTARY GO VERNMENT IN ITALY. 687but when it became evident that the defectionof the so-calledAgrarians,who desired such a duty,might destroytheprotec-tionist majority,Magliani supported the proposal and madethe House vote it. While the question was pending, Sig.Grimaldi,Minister of Commerce,who had not been advisedof any change of view on the part of the ministry,made aspeech at Colle Val d'Elsa, in which he said that " theministrywould never accept a tax on foreign grain." Onlya few weeks afterthis speech thedutyon wheatwas proposedby the ministry,and the bill bore the signature of Sig.Grimaldi.Another consequence of this state of things is that, as arule,the Italian electorshave no platformsubmittedto them,as in England or America. They are called upon to pronounceupon men, seldomon facts or events. There was an occasionlately I890) when it seemed thata clear and definite uestionwas to be laid beforethe country. The premier, ig. Crispi,at least, had a program. He wished to follow a policywhich was characterizedas "imperial." According to Crispi,Italy was to become a great military nd naval power,and wasto play a r6le of great importance n the European politicalworld. To carry out this policy the nation must make thenecessary sacrifices; it mustnot be niggardlyn bearing taxesand incurringdebts. Others Sig. Jaciniin the name of theConservatives and Sig. Cavalloti for the extreme Left -regardedthe economical questionas firstn importance. Theywished for no new taxes and no new debts, and preferredto sacrificethe importantr6le that Crispi proposed to playin foreign politics. Here, then, were two clear programsbetween which the country might decide. But, at thismoment, Sig. di Rudini and his friends of the Old Rightcame to the front nd executed a manceuvrewhichafterwardsbrought hem ntopower,butwhichhas increased, f possible,the confusionofparties. Di Rudini and his friendsdeclaredthat bothaims could be attainedand bothprograms xecuted;that, by economies in the budget, new taxes and new debtscould be avoided and military expenditures continued on


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688 POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY. [VOL. VIII.a scale whichwouldenable Italy to take a leading positionin foreignffairs. This satisfiedverybody- the court,whichinsistedon the maintenancef the Triple Allianceand theexpenditureshichsucha policynecessarilyntailed, nd thetaxpayers, ho protestedgainstnew taxes. Crispiallowedhimself o be overreached ytheOld Rightand adopted hesameprogram,t least in its chieffeatures. The plan,how-ever,was impracticablea fact which ts originatorsmighthave suspectedbut agreedto ignore. Here is a list of theexpendituresf Italy duringthe financialyear I889-90, inmillions f francs:

Unavoidableexpenses interest n the permanentand redeemablepublic debt,pensions,tc.) 700Military xpenses .422All other xpenses. 515Total .1,637

The last item of 5 5 millionswas the only place wheredi Rudini's economies could be exercised. But even herethere were expenses which it was impossible to reduceexpenses, for example, incidental to the collection of taxes;expenses for the maintenanceof the police, etc. It could notbe seriously hoped to introducehere economies sufficientocover the large sums of which Italy stood in need. In diRudini's program this difficultywas simply evaded. Aspremier,di Rudini was forced, n spite of his program, o con-tractnew debts,and neverthelesshe failed to reestablishtheequilibriumof the budget. Impelled by necessity,he thoughtof lessening the military expenses. It was then that heencounteredthe resistanceof the court. An intrigue, leverlyconducted by an employee of the royal household, broughtSig. Giolitti into power and permittedhim to dissolve theChamber and control the ensuing elections. MinisterGiolittiis maintaining he equilibriumof the budget by loans. He isopenly borrowingthirtymillion francsa year forthe construc-tion of railways. He is also borrowing ndirectly, hrough an


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No.4.] PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENT IN ITALY. 689operation in annuities; and, probably,he will be obliged toborrow tillmoreon otherpretexts.There is doubtlesssomethingto be said in favorof each ofthe threemethodsby which the balance of the budgetcan bemaintained,viz., loans, increase of taxation and diminutionof militaryexpenditures; but the politicians steadily avoidcommitting hemselves to any one of these differentmethods,and the country s nevercalled upon to make a choice betweenthem.

Ministerial crises in Italy rarely ead to an entirechange ofthe cabinet. It is generally matterof reorganization; andthe opposition ofyesterdaymaybecome a part of the ministryit had previously opposed. A newspaper inspired by Sig.Nicotera (minister of the interior in di Rudini's cabinet)states that when Giolitti,for a long time a partisan of diRudini, attacked him, the members of di Rudini's cabinetagreed not to take part in anyministrywhich Giolittimightform. Two members the minister f war and the ministerofmarine did notkeep theirword,and took officeunderthenew ministry. Sig. Grimaldi was one of the warmestsupportersof di Rudini's ministry; in factitwas understoodthat he was about to become a memberof it. On the 5thofMay he made a speech in the House whichwas mostfavorableto di Rudini. He said, speaking of Giolitti and his friends,that their change of attitudewas "illogical," and that it didnot seem right to him that those who had accompanied theministryn its brightestdaysshould abandon it when itseemedfalling. He presented the order of the day in favorof theministry, hichwas rejected. Consequently the ministry ell,and Giolittitook up the succession. But a short time elapsedbeforeGrimaldibecame minister f finance n the new cabinet.

A very interestingreport has been published,giving thevotes of the deputies duringthe last legislativeperiod. Fromthis report it appears that twenty-five eputies who, on the3 st of January, I89I, voted that they had confidenceinCrispi's ministry,voted on the 21st of March in favor of aresolutiondeclaring that the House had entire confidencein


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69o POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY. (VOL.VIII.his successor,di Rudini. There were onlytwenty-threemem-bers out of fivehundred nd eightwhowere constant nvotingagainst Crispi's ministrynd were afterwards onstant n sup-porting hatof di Rudini. This is a smallnumber o constitutea real party. But what is more remarkable s to see how eventhe members of Crispi's cabinet voted when di Rudini hadoverturned he ministry o whichtheybelonged. To translatetheiraction into English values it must be imagined that themembers of Lord Salisbury's cabinet, directlyafter havingfallen frompower,shouldvote,all but one, in favorof a Glad-stonianministry,nd thattheir lectorsshouldthink tperfectlynaturalforthemto do this.The political conditionof Italy to-day is in some degreeanalogous to its social condition n the time of the Compagniedi Ventura. Then the cleverestor mostfortunate eader drewroundhimthe strongestbands; now the politicianfromwhomthe greatest advantages can be expected attractsthe greatestnumberofdeputies,who abandonhim withoutscruple foranyother leader who seems better able to serve their interests;and sometimes theyabandon him frommere love of change.Matters have been at their worst, in this regard, since theministry fDepretis. Cynicaland corrupt, epretis destroyedthe last remaining vestiges of parties and it was thenthat the name "Transformists" was coined to designate thepoliticians of the new era. Politically, the Italian Trans-formistscorrespondto the French Opportunists; and it isworthy f note thatat nearly he same timewhenOpportunismappeared in France and Transformismn Italy,the old linesbetween Whigs and Tories began to disappear or to shiftconsiderably in England. It would almost seem as if thesame causes had been operative n the threecountries- withdifferentegrees of intensity,ndeed,and withresults varyingby reason ofdifferencesn character nd institutions.Several leading Italian politicianshave tried to modify hissituation,but their effortshave completelymiscarried. Wemust note,first f all, the attemptswhich have been made topromote the organizationof parties through changes in the


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No. 4.] PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENT IN ITALY. 69Ielectoral aw. The law of December17, I 86o, was basedupon a propertyualification.The systemwas modified ythe aw of September4, I882, which onsiderablyugmentedthe number felectors.' It washoped, y nterestinglargernumber f persons n thepolitical ifeof thecountry,o formlargepolitical arties. Withthe same end n viewthescrutinde liste, or election by generalticket,was introduced;thekingdom eingdivided ntoelectoraldistricts r "colleges,"ineach of which rom hree ofive eputieswereto be chosen.In the districts lecting ive eputiesprovisionwas madeforminorityepresentationhrough he systemof the limitedvote, ach voter eing llowed o writebutfournames on hisballot. This law was bornunderbad auspices. Its approvalin the committee f the Senate was obtainedby a bargain,as a resultofwhichthe statebought heVenetian ailways.As far as the constitution f partieswas concerned, heresultswere absolutely ull. It wasnotunusualto see threecandidates f nominallyiversepartiesunite nd theelectorswouldvotefor his ncongruousist without he leastscruple.It was thereforeesolved oreturn o the crutinuninominale,or district icket,whichwas reestablished y the electorallaws of March 5, I89I, and June i8, I892. The electionsof November6, I892, weregovernedby these later aws,but the resultswerepreciselyhe same as at the antecedentelections.

1The firstgeneral election took place January 7, i86i. The Kingdom ofItaly did not then nclude Venice or Rome. The elections of October 22, 1865,were completedby the electionsof November 5, i866, in the province fVenice.Finally theelectionsof November 0, I870, includedthe province f Rome. Thefollowing able shows the total number of qualified electors under the law ofi86o, and theextent o which heyparticipated n the elections:ENTITLED TO ACTUALLY PERCENT-

VOTE. VOTING. AGE.January 7, i86i . . . . . 48,696 239,583 57.22October 22, I865 . . . . . 504,263 271,923 53.92March io, I867 . . . . . . 498,208 258,243 5I.83November 20, I870 . . . 530,0I8 240,974 45-47November 8, I874 . . . . . 571,939 318,517 55.69November 5, I876 . . . . . 605,007 358,I58 59.22May i6, I88o . . . . . . 62I,896 369,627 59.44


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692 POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY. [VOL.VIII.It has also been proposed to give greater authority o theSenate by changing the manner of selecting Senators.' TheMarquis Alfieri,who represents he liberal traditions f CountCavour,is one of the most active promotersof this reform;but for the moment it is impossible to foresee whether theproposal will be adopted, or what result t would produce.Of late years a certain number of eminent men have triedto draw up programs which might serve to rally and con-solidate parties. Sig. Cavallotti,the recognized leader of the

extreme Left, who undoubtedly represents the highest aimsand clearest ideas of this group, drew up such a programunder the name of Patto di Roma (i890). It was completeand practical, nd mightwell have servedto solidify he RadicalParty; and, in fact, the candidates claiming to belong to thisparty went before the country in I890 with this program.But after the elections they soon ignored it, and left theirleader alone with a few faithful dherents.In I889 an excellent platformfor a Liberal-ConservativeParty was drawn up by Senator Jacini, ince deceased. Jacinihad been minister everal times, nd had a profoundknowledgeof the political life of the country. In I89I he still thoughtthe circumstances favorablefor the establishment of such aparty,but indicated that he had little hope of its formation.In a pamphletentitled The Conservative trength f New Italy(Florence, I89i), he wrote:

All the old partieshave disappeared except the extreme eft(which up to the present ime s not united), nd no newpartieshave been formed. There are some groups, omepartisans, omeministerialst any cost,no matterwhomaybe in the government,butnothingmore. This is certainly condition f things avorableto theformationf a party uch as we have spokenof. . . But1 Senators are appointedbythe king and for life. Theymust be over fortyyearsof age, and are selectedfrom mong the ecclesiastical dignitariesnd thosewho have held important olitical positions, ppointiveor elective. Eligiblealsoare members of the Academy,five years after nomination,men of scientificeminence, nd persons who for threeyears have paid threethousandfrancsayear n direct taxes. Besides these the princesof the royal family orma partof theSenate.


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No. 4.] PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENT IN ITALY. 693the character f the Conservativess anything ut energetic,ndone mustnotask of themwhattheyhave not the strengthogive.Left othemselves,lthough hepresent ircumstances avor hem,theywouldnot succeed in constituting militant arty. The diffi-cultys increased y thefact hatno mancapableofbecomingheirhead is to be foundn their anks.

At the time of the last general elections Zanardelli, of theOld Left, made a speech in whichhe suggesteda very ogicalbasis fora division of parties. He thoughtthat theyshouldgroup themselves according to the greater or less extensionwhich they were willing to give to the functions of govern-ment. But all such proposals have been treated as puretheory. Neither the politicians nor the electors have shownany interest n them. The politicians and their constituentshave more direct,more practical and above all more personalends in view. The electors ask the candidate what he willdo forthem and the deputy puts the same question to theministry hat solicitshis support.Sig. Bonghi,a leading man of letters, ttributes his defeatat the last elections,not to his hostility o the Triple Alliance,as the semi-officialapersexplainit,but to the fact thathe hadnot occupied himselfenough with the pettyprivateaffairs fhis constituents. A certain Piedmontese deputy s absolutelythefactotum f his electors. There is no littleservice that hewill not perform, ven to lookingafterthe commissionsof hisconstituents'wives among Roman dressmakersand milliners.This memberholds his seat in permanence; nobodywoulddaredisputeit. Other membersget elected by paying iberally;buttheir position is always less secure than that of the deputieswho can procurefortheirelectorsthe favorof the governmentand of the financial ompaniesthatdepend on the government.As for the opinions of a representative, hese are generallyregarded byhis constituents as immaterial, o long as they donot interferewith his keeping in the good graces of each andevery ministry. When they do interferewith this supremeduty,theyare felt to be detrimental.


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694 POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY. [VOL. VIII.II.

There is perhapsno country,xceptEngland,where n im-portant art of the economicnterestsf the citizensdo notdepend nthe tate; buttheproportionhich hispartbears othe wholediffersn various ountries;and it is especially hisproportionhatwe must keep in viewwhenwewish to studythe effects f the extensionof governmentalunctions. Incountrieswhereprotection revails,he protectedmerchants,and those who aspire to be protected,vidently ependonthe state. Theycan haveonlyone aim to take possessionof the government,r to sell theirsupport o the politicalpartyreadyto pay for t by the utmostpossible protection.Agricultural rotectionspeciallyhas the effect f deprivingof their ndependence he class of great andedproprietors,whowould otherwise e in a position o conduct hemselveswith ntire reedomn political uestions.Some states,besides protecting hrough ustomsduties,pursuea policy f a financial rotectionwhichputs mostofthe enterprisesf the countryn their ower,mainlyhroughthe mediumof charteredbanks, or state banks of issue.Accessory rotectionmust also be considered;suchas steam-ship subsidies, he monopoliesccorded o private ndividuals,the privileges f the credit oncier, tc. All these forms fgovernmentalnterferencere foundunited n Italy; and iftheydo not producegreater vilsthanthoseactually xisting,it must be ascribedto a happymoderationn the Italiancharacter hichpreventshegovernmentromaking s muchadvantageof its power as it mightor as much as othergovernmentso. On studyinghisquestionmoredeeply,t isimpossiblenot to be struckwith the absolute economicdependenceof the citizens on the state. In England,manufacturers,griculturistsnd merchantshope to maketheir ortunesytheir wn abor nd notthroughhe favors fthe state. France,even,which s oneof the countries hat nthisrespectresemble taly,has several branches f nationalproductionwhich are satisfiedwithaskingthe state not to


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No. 4.1 PARLIAMENITARY GOVERNMENT IN ITAL Y. 695injure hem. The largewineproducers,he silkmanufacturersanddyers fLyons, he manufacturersf articles eParis,etc.,expectnothingrom he state xcept hat t shouldnotpreventthem from selling their products abroad, by provokingretaliationhroughbsurd ustoms uties. But nItaly hepro-portionf ndependentroducerss far maller.There remanysilkweavers nd wine producers, ut that is all. The otherproducers ither njoyor seek stateprotection.In Italy, as in France,the railway ompanies re closelydependent n the state. In Italythe railways ave revertedto the state, which has leased themto privatecompanies.These leases are marked ya greatdefect. A fixedharetwenty-sevennd one-half er cent1 of the net profitsstakenby the state. Thus the railways re prevented rompursuinghe method fall modernndustries,. e.,to producelargely ndtobe contentwith mallprofits.The governmentis not inclined o makereductions n the tariffsossiblebyreducingtspercentage ftheearnings,ecause tinstinctivelyfeels hat thesereductions ould notalwaysbe made norderto developtraffic,ut thattheywouldsoon be dependent npolitical nfluence, itha greatresultant oss to the govern-mentrevenues. Butwhat s more seriousfrom ur presentpointof viewis,that the railwayompaniesderive ery ittleprofit romthe workingof the old lines. Their principalearnings omefrom he new ineswhich their ontractswiththe governmentave allowedthemto construct.This putsthem n strictdependence nthegovernment,hich hey reobliged opropitiaten order o be able tomake ontracts hatwillbe advantageousn thefuture.The Bank of France is closely onnectedwiththe govern-ment, ut t is never eenusing tsinfluenceo aid enterprisesprotected y the government.Of the correspondingnstitu-tions n Italythe same cannotbe said. For example, n themonthlyalance heet of the banksof issuepublished y the

1This s theproportionaidbythe hiefines. There s besides set of linescalledsecondary,herehecompanies eceive nlyhalfof thegrossprofit,utreceive esides fixedubsidyf3,000francserkilometre.


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696 POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLLY. [VOL.VIII.government there may be read a note explaining the surpluscirculation ftheRanca Nazionale. The balance sheet of March3 st containsthe following: "Assets, 64,793, 25 francs: repre-sented by I I,043, I25 innotes of the Bank ofRome; 3,750,000sabsidy to the provinceof Cagliari; 50,ooo,ooo extraordinaryissue to the banks of Turin." Each of these items calls forsome wordsof explanation. Whydidthe Banca Nazionale keepin its coffers he notes of the Bank of Rome, instead of payingthemout as change? As has nowbeen abundantlyproved, hegovernmentknewfrom he reportof the inspectors,presentedin I889 by Senator Alvisi,that the Bank of Rome had a secretcirculationoftwenty-five illions. It was to aid in preventingthe discovery of this fact that the Banca Nazionale wasrequiredto retainthe notes of the Bank of Rome. As forthesubsidyto the province of Cagliari,that was givenwhen thesavingsbank ofthisprovince,whose directorwas a memberofthe majority, ecame bankrupt. The directorwas tried andconvicted by the court of assizes of Genoa. In the courseof his trial he said : "sI am convicted simplybecause fortunehas not favoredme. Many other banks do what mine hasdone, only success up to the present saves them." Recentrevelationswithregardto the Bank of Rome show that thesewords were prophetic. The subsidy to the banks of Turinwas given chieflyto the Tiberina Bank to prevent it fromfailing. It was on thisoccasion that the government ermittedthe banks to refuse redemptionof their notes, and thiswasthe originof the presentfinancial risis in Italy.These are factswhichcannot be denied. It maybe objectedthatup to the present time proofsare wantingthat the banksof issue provided the governmentwith funds for electionexpenses. It is certain that the government spends for theelections much more than its secret service fund can place atits disposal, but this does notprovethat the banks providetherest. Other enterprisesdependenton thegovernmentmay alsorender ssistance. Companieswhichreceive,orhopeto receive,subsidies, privileges,monopolies,make good use of theirfundsin sustaining governmentwhichpromises hemfavors. There


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No. 4.] PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNAMENT N ITALY. 697are reports that in the last elections the gratitudeof certainpersons who were made Senators was manifested n offersoffunds to the government or election purposes. But here,too,proofs are wanting. It is probablyfrom fear of elicitingtoomuch information n the means employedbythe governmentand its allies in obtaining moneythatthe proposed parliamen-tary nquiry nto the Bank of Rome has been stifled.Many enterprises are supported only by continual renewalsof their bills, discounted by the banks of issue; and naturallythe discount is most freelygranted to those which enjoy thefavorof the government. It should be noted that the legaltender quality of the bank notes is granted only for a veryshorttime, generally six monthsor a year. This has kept thebanks in strictdependence on the government nd the legis-lative power. To secure their good will the banks have beenobliged to have what is called a political portfolio. This nameis given to bills discounted to legislatorsor influentialournal-ists, which are renewed indefinitely.As to the sort of protectionwhichI have called accessory,one example will suffice. On the 2 I st of last FebruaryDeputyColajanni, speaking upon the subsidies to be granted to theGeneral Navigation Company, said:

The honorableSig. Bettolo has enumerated he causes whythedividend f the GeneralNavigation ompany mounted o onlyfiveper cent,while otherprivate ompaniespaid twice and even threetimes as much. He said that the General Navigation Companyspentmorefor coal, and also that theirgeneral expenditure asgreater. . . While othercompaniespay twenty rancs ton fortheir coal, the GeneralNavigationpays thirtyrancs... Whydoes the General Navigation pend so much ncoal,when tmightspend some millions ess? It seems that the contractors ndbrokers f the company re most fortunate eople.Sig. Colajanni then proceeded to point out similar abuses inthe repairs of the steamers belonging to the company.These details illustrate the very wide diffusion of gainsresulting rom he protectiongranted bythe state. Those whonominally njoy the profit re obliged to share it with a great


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698 POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY. [VOL. VIII.numberof auxiliaries. An immense governmentalpatronagehas been developed, ike thatwhich existed in the laterperiodof the Roman Republic. Every enterprise enjoying govern-mentalprotectionhas a great number of hangers-on. Theseshare the gains, and it is their duty to defend with all theirmightthe privileges fromwhich the gains are derived. Asin ancient Rome, therefore, he political elections are largelycontrolledby those who are indirectly nterested n governmentcontracts.

If now we leave the economic fieldand consider the otherfieldsof social activity,we still find he influence of the statepreponderant. One domain alone is free from it - that ofreligion. The dissensions between the papacy and the monarchyhave luckily put the clergy beyondthe influence f the govern-ment. This is the real reasonwhythe Italian politicians areso hostile to thepapacy. Foreignerswhoattribute hishostiltyto anti-religiousfeeling make a great mistake. It cannotbedenied that such a sentiment xists among some adversariesofthe papacy, but the great majorityof the politicians haveno strong feelingeitherfor or against religion. They simplyfeel regretat not having the influenceof the clergyon theirside to consolidatetheirauthority. Many veryhonorable menhave a similarfeeling,which seems to them purelypatriotic;theywish to see the papacy use its influence n behalf of theItalian fatherland; but theydo not generallydistinguishthe

1 On this subjecttherehas appeareda very ingularpamphlet yG. Toscanelli,entitled: Religionand Country ttackedby the Pope. Should ItalyDefend Her-self (Florence, 890.) SignorToscanelli,a memberof Parliament,was a goodCatholic. He was deputed by Signor Depretis to negotiate an arrangementwith the pope. Depretis, a great purchaser of consciences,wished to havethose of the Catholic priests n his service. (Sig. Crispi also, according o whatToscanelli tells us,was in treaty or an arrangement iththe pope.) The pope,however,was not to be persuaded. The spirit n which Sig. Toscanelli writes sindicated bythe following assages: "The presentcontemporaryoliticsof thepope oughtto be taught, nalyzed and censured n the upperschools" (p. 104)." In orderto wrestlewiththe policyof the pope, the state has three methods.One consists n not grantinghim the temporal power. This meansis not at allefficacious. . . Another is that of refusing o recognize any pope who is notproposed by the government,nd punishinghim if he exercisesany acts ofjurisdiction" p. Iio).


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No. 4.] PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENT IN ITALY. 699welfare of their countryfromthe welfareof their own par-ticular party. The laws which their Parliament makes givethem full control of every one's body, and by means of theclergythey would like to reach the soul also. Many desire aconcordat ike that concludedby Napoleon I.In default of the church there remain the schools. InAmerica and England universityprofessors are absolutelyindependent. In France theyare beginning to be dependentupon the government; but a certain number of savants escapeits control, hanks to a reputationwhich enables them to dowithout its favors. In Italy these exceptions are extremelyrare: nearly ll the higher nstructors re completely ependenton the government. Even in theeducational nstitutionswhichare supportedby the provinces the teaching staff s not freefromgovernmental nterference. At Bari, for example, thereis a higher commercial choolwhich is a local institution. Itsdirector, ntilrecently,was Sig. Pantaleoni, verydistinguishedeconomist,whosewritings re as well-known broad as in Italy.Sig. Pantaleoni had published a scientific tudyon the draw-backs on alcohol, in which he pointed out the inconvenienceswhich the interference of the deputies had caused in thismatter. This study, which appeared in the Giornale degliEconomisti,passed unnoticed; but being quoted by a foreignmagazine,' it aroused the attentionand the resentment f thegovernment. The president of the council of the school atBari wrote to Sig. Pantaleoni complainingthat he had set thegovernment gainst them,"while he knew the school had needof its help." Sig. Pantaleoniwas subjected to an inquiry, nda vote of censure was passed on him. To this he naturallyrefusedto submit, nd consequently ost his place. Sig. Bonghihas been subjected to a similar inquiryon account of twonewspaperarticles. Bonghi, t is true, s no longera professor;he is a councilor of state; and this, though it cannot ustify,may at least serve as a more plausible pretextfor the pro-ceedings against him. Let me hasten to add that such cases

1 In an articleby thepresentwriter,n the Revuedes Deux Mondes,October 5,I89I.


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700 POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY. [VOL. VIII.are rare. The governmentgenerallyhas no need to punishan independencewhichis quite exceptional; it onlytakes careto proportion ts rewardsto the zeal shown n serving t.The influence f the government xtends also to the courtsof justice. In Italy, as in England and France, there are noabsolutely ndependentcourts, uch as are found n the UnitedStates. But even where the courtsare legally dependent uponthe government as in England, where theyare the creaturesof Parliament), complete judicial independence may in factexist. In examiningthe conditionof the Italian judiciary,wemustrigidlyreject all testimonywhich appears to be dictatedby personal or party hostility. But unfavorable evidenceproceedingfrompersons friendlyo the existing regime,andabove all, from he judges themselves, eems conclusive. Anofficialournal has recently reated the questionwith unusualfrankness. It begins by observing that for some time pastpublic opinionhas regardedthe judiciaryas less impartialthanit ought to be, and it adds:

The fault s to some extentgeneral. It is in the parliamentarysystem, he deputies, he government,he press; in short, t lieswith ll thosewhohave minedout of the rock of justicea veinofpersonalbenefit. Once upon a timethe judges were obliged tobowto one strong yrant nly;nowthey re subjectedto the willof thousands, nd in theirown interest heymustsubmitto theinfluence f great and small. Look at the struggle mong thejudges, fromthe praetorships1f the small provincesup to theordinaryribunals nd thecourtsof appeal. Study hepsychologyof their most legitimate mbitions; rebuildthe history f theirdreams, ncouragedbythe smiles of the syndics, rotected ytheprefects or the sake of their electoralinfluence,r lighted bythebenevolentmilesof the egal deputies, romwhose mallgoldenmedalsat audiences hinepromises frecommendationor romotionand changeofplace. Let us turneven to thehighest tepof theladderand read the inmost houghtsf themagistrate ho, itherbytact or by open complaisance nd obedience othegovernment,becomes a political eader instead of a chiefdispenser f justice.They beginwith ompromisendfinish y surrendering.The best,

1 [The Italianpretor orresponds loselyto theFrenchuge de paix. - EDS.]


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No.4.] PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENT IN ITALY. 701seeing that the most pliable are so oftenpreferredo them,getdisgusted nd leave theprofession.Thus the intellectualevel ofthe udiciary endstodecline.

In Italy the government annot remove a judge fromofficeor degradehim,but it mayassign him to another tribunal ofequal or higherrank. The government ewards ts friendsbypromotion nd punishes its enemies by transferringhemfromcourts situated in the principal towns to smaller and lessdesirable places. In France the judicial tenure is legallysecure,both as to grade and as to residence. It has recentlybeen proposed to change the ruleas to residenceand empowerthe government to transfer the judges. It was franklyadmittedby the Opportunistpress thatthisproposal was madewith a view of increasingthe influence f the governmentoverthe judiciary. In Italy a minister f the Right,Sig. Vigliani,tried to take the judiciary out of politics by protecting itagainst the government. He caused a royal decree to beissued, October 3, I873, establishingrules forthe transfer fjudges to new residences. But in less than fiveyears (January3, I878) anotherdecree was issued at the instanceofa ministerof the Left,abolishingthese rules ; and since then the judgeshave been subject, in thismatter, o the absolute powerof theministry. AttorneyGeneral La Francesca observes on thissubject:The removalof a magistraterom ne place to anothernjureshimfinancially; estroys is ties of friendship,is habitsand hisdignity; disturbs and troubles the security f his mind, andunderminesis liberty.The practical esult fsuchthingsndicateswhy hey re done. We have seen justicegrowtorpidundertheinfluencefremovals."These words are especially significantbecause of the officialposition held by the writer. Still more significant s anutteranceof Sig. Eula, who holds one of the highest positionsin the judiciary of the kingdom that of president of thecourt of appeals at Turin. Sig. Eula said publicly to Sig.

1 Del Pubblico Ministero ell' OrdineGiustiziarioNaples, i88o).


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702 POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY. [VOL. VIII.Zanardelli that he commended him for not having asked thejudges to renderhim,while on the road to the ministry,hoseservicesthat his predecessors had required.Sig. Minghetti,whose optimisticview of Italian politics hasalready been referredto, laid great stress on the growingdependence of the judiciary. He wrote:

It would be difficulto furnish roofs f the interferencef thedeputiesn the nominationf udges,but t is one of thosenotoriousthingsof which the public conscience s a witness. Some facts,however, e can cite,which howthat histhing s not regarded sforbidden r irregular.A deputy,with real but unusual candor,defendedhimself gainst the troublesomettacks of a newspaperthat ccusedhimof begging he ministryo exile the judges of hisprovince rom he tribunal,y answering:" How could theymakesuchan unaccountable harge To contradictt, tis enough o saythatthe tribunals suchas it is thanks o me. Manyof the judgeswho compose t wereespecially uggested ymetothe ministry."

Sig. Minghetti lso quotes an appeal sent to the ministry fjustice, bearing the signaturesof several deputies,askinghimto select a prot6g6of theirs for the place of attorneygeneral.He adds :In the investigationf crimes nd the search fortheir uthors,judges have oftenpaused and drawnback when hey oundbeforethempowerfulriminalsnd accomplices. The first o be corrupted

by the ocal influence as beenthegovernment; otformoney,t strue, ut forvotes. . . Hence, old and worthymenexpressthefear, and some venture the assertion, hat under the Italiangovernmentsrom815 to i86o justicewasbetter dministeredndthe judges as a classweremorerespectablehan s the case to-day.I do not agree withthisopinion. However, f one wishes to beimpartial e must cknowledgehat,where herewas no questionofpolitics, hecourts fthatperiod generallyentencedwithsufficientauthority.A politician on the other side of the House, Sig. Boccarini,whowas one of the leaders of the Left, in a speech deliveredMay i6, i886, alluded to "the discredit intowhich the courts

1 Minghetti, olitical Parties and their nterference ith Justice nd Adminis-tration I88I).


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No. 4.1 PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENT IN ITALYE 703have fallen." On the26th f May, ig. Cavallotti ited letterin which Sig. Baggiarini,Attorney eneral n the Court ofAppeals, enderedhis resignation,nd in whichhe stated ashis reason forresigning hathe was notwilling orender hegovernmenterviceswhichwere gainsthis conscience.1The trial f Strigelli t Turin n I884 was a case inwhichserious pressurewas shownto have been exercisedby thegovernment.Strigelli,who was accused of having forgedbank-notes,as under heprotectionf theprefect f Turin;and this prefect,who was an excellentelectoralagent ofDepretis' ministry, btainedfrom the government lmostanythinghathewished. Sig. Noce,whohad been attorneygeneral fthe court fappealsatTurin, aveevidencen courtthat his substitute, ig. Torti,had been persecuted y thegovernmentecausehe hadhad thecourage oprosecute gentsof the police. A letterwrittenytheprefect asproducedncourt, he purposeof whichwas to prevent he case againstStrigelli rom eingpushedthrough.2Strigelliwas sentencedtopenal servitude.I might ite othercases, but these seem sufficient. willonly ddthe evidenceof a judge of high position, ig. CarloLozzi, Presidentof the Courtof Appeals. In a pamphlet

1 Here is part of the letter: " I hoped to die in this career to which I wasbound by ties of love,habit and study. I was obliged to abandonitwhen wasexpectedto givewhatthe dignity fmyrobe and the conscienceof a magistrateforbademy giving."2The letter f the prefect Casalis), whichwas read in court on the 25th ofJanuary, ontained he following entence: " It is useless forme to point outhow seriously desire that Strigellishould not have the smallest annoyance."Sig. Noce deposed: " The officials hargedwith heprosecutionnsisted that weshould proceed, t not being possible to construct case without mplicatingStrigelli. Then I wentto Rome and explained the situation o the keeperof theseals. I said that the prefect,lthough he had no guarantees n his favor,hada great nterestn that man." This time Sig. Noce accomplishednothing. Buthe adds: " I returned second time to Rome, and Sig. Zanardelli . . told meto go ahead." We mustbear inmind that the questionwas one of forgery,ndthat the prefectknew the judicial antecedentsof the accused man, whichwereabsolutelydeplorable. Strigelli,aking dvantageof the protection f theprefect,was afterwardsn accomplice n the robbery fa goldsmith amedLacarini,andhad some innocent people condemnedas guilty. When all was discovered, hepolice offered ,5oofrancs o Lacarini f he wouldwithdraw he accusation.


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704 POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY. [VOL. VIII.which was published at Bologna in i883,1 he observes thatjudges are not as independent s theyoughtto be, and alludesto the undue influence xercisedbydeputieswho are membersof the bar.2 He speaks ofscandalouspromotions, hich are attributedy public opiniontopoliticalprotectors;and removalswhich are said to have beenobtainedbylegal deputiesbecause theywould have lost orfearedto lose a case bythe decisionof a particularudge,so that t wasneedful o send him away at any cost. Let the firstpresident,SenatorPaoli,tellwhathappenedamongthepersonsemployednthe court of appeals in Florence,without is knowledge,nd onemay lmost ay, n spiteof him.

The men who govern the countryhave almost unlimitedpower to protect and enrich their friendsand to ruin theirenemies3 -parcere sublectiset debellare uperbosbut theydonot oftentake fulladvantage of their authority. Apart fromsome exceptionalcases (as when the Left came into power inI876), the menwho alternatelyhold and lose authority especteach others'friends nd partisans. This is a consequence ofthat moderation which is a distinct feature in the Italiancharacter. It is also a policy dictated by intelligent self-interest. The minister of to-day spares the partisans of hispredecessorthat his ownpartisansmayafterwards e sparedby

I Carlo Lozzi, the Magistracybefore the new Parliament. Observations apropos.2 In theCorriere i Napoli of March I3, I893, the following orrespondencefromPalermoappeared: " To-daya civilsuitwas to be arguedbefore thecourtof appeals, in which Crispi was defendingone of the parties.. . Someof Crispi's friendsmade a demonstration n his favor a demonstration oenergetic hat the awyer ortheoppositeside had tosuspendhis addressbecauseof thecry: ' Let Crispi speak.' The president fthe courtof ustice had notthecourageto clear thehall; he bowed to Crispi's powerand the suitwas broughtto a conclusionwithoutarther rgument"3 When itis desirableto get rid of commonpeoplewho displease the authori-ties, they re usuallycondemned or resistance o the officersfthepolice. It iseasyforthe atter oprovokethiscrime, nd in case ofnecessity hey alsifyacts.It is particularlyf lateyearsthatthisdevicehas been employed. The numberof offences f thissort reportedto the courts in i88o was io; i88i, 7,904;I882, 8,033; I883, 8,763; I884, 9,560; I885, 66i ; i886, 10,152; I887, I0,669;i888, Io,669; I889, 10,204; 1890, 1,437.


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No. 4.] PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENT IN ITALY. 705his successor. But any attempt at organized opposition, notagainst this or thatparticularministry ut against the presentsystem of government,would be promptly nd unsparinglycrushed. To wish for a part of the favorsdispensed by thestate is deemed a legitimate mbition,whichmaybe combatedbut cannotreasonablybe punished; but to wish to arrest theflowof its favorsaltogether, s considered an act of rebellionwhich deserves chastisement. In thismatter ven indifferenceis culpable. There is no place in Italy for a citizen who, topreserve his independence, refuses to be a partyto politicalpatronage. He findshimself in about the same position as aHindoo who has no caste. He is an outlaw, a man whomeveryone can attack. If a lawyer,he has no clients ; if anengineer,nobodyemploys him; if a merchantor tradesman,he is ruined; if a landownerhe is exposed to petty nnoyancesfrom prefects and syndics. Every door is closed to him,everyonerepulses him,until the day comeswhen the govern-mentdoes him the honorto thinkhim dangerous,and then itfinds ome way to have him condemned by a court of justicefor an imaginary rime.The government justifies all this by saying that thesepeople are generally factious. There is some truth in thestatement. In countrieswhere legal resistance is impossible,popular discontent tends to faction and ends in sedition.Of all the numerous changes of ministry n Italy, none hasbeen due to a spontaneous expression of public opinion. Amovement ike that of the Cobden Club in England for freetrade, or like that which forced the Reform Bill throughParliament, s absolutely mpossible n Italy. The governmenthas at its call friendspowerful noughto crush any movementof this sort as soon as it seems to acquire any importance.There was never a moreunpopulartax in Italy than the gristtax (macinato). The popular discontent aroused by this taxoffered unique occasion for a great political league, such asare formed in the United States and in England. Such amovementwas at first ttempted; but thegovernment issolvedthe society that had originatedit and the movement was at


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706 POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY. [VOL. VIII.once arrested. Some years after,when the people had grownaccustomedto the tax and had ceased to protest, he govern-ment spontaneouslyabolished it. The people, never havingseen such movementscome to anything, ook upon them asabsolutelyvain and fruitless, nd are not disposed to occupythemselves bout them. Men who,when theirhardshipshavebecome absolutely insupportable, permit themselves to beimplicated n movements of a seditious character,will refuseto join a society that aims at the legal abolition of theirgrievances. They are sure that such a course would exposethem uselesslyto thevengeance of those who hold the reinsofpowerand of theirpolitical dependents.In the eyes not onlyof the people but of a great part ofthe bourgeoisie, politics are a luxurywhich onlythe man whohas a following,who has clients n the old Latin sense of theterm, can permithimself. A fathermay oftenbe heard topraise his son by saying: "He has no vices, does not keepevil company, and does not occupy himself with politics."This feeling explains a singularphenomenon, bservable fromtime to time the unanimous abstentionof all the electors ina particular ocalityby way of protestagainst the government.A law passed not long ago removed the justices of the peace(pretor) n a numberof small places. The electorsofsome ofthese places now abstain fromvoting at all elections. Consid-ering that theirrights have been ignored,theyrevenge them-selves by sulking at their masters, not by attempting toselect new ones. I once reproached a workman,who was avery honestman,forhaving taken ten francs to vote in favorof a deputy. I represented to him that if he joined withhis companionsthey could elect some one who would under-take to get the heavy taxes lessened. He answered: "Allthat is useless ; the heads will always do what they desire.The only good we can get is some bank notes at electiontime."Election expenses, however, are not very large. As faras can be judged fromrather incomplete information, hirtythousandfrancs seems to be the average for candidates who


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No. 4.] PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENT IZ ZTAL Y. 707have local supportas well as that of the government. If thissupport is wanting, the expense is naturally much greater.The examplegivenformerly y England shows that purchasesof electionsare not incompatiblewiththe good working f theparliamentary egime. The deputywho has bought his seatis sometimes fairly ndependent of the governmentand ofelectoral coteries. A person worthyof credence told mean anecdote that illustrates this point. Some friendswereendeavoring o make a deputychange his opinions. Theytoldhim that his electorswould not be content f he did not followthe governmentn all its evolutions. The deputy argued withthem for a time,and then, osing patience, said " Let themleave me in peace. I have paid them and we are quits, andI mean to vote accordingto myconscience." But such casesas this are exceptional. Generallythe candidates regard thisoutlay as an investment,1nd they wish to see their capitalreturnedwitha good profit.Laws, of course, exist against electoralcorruption, ut theyare neverput in force. A justice of the peace and a publicprosecutor in Venice, who were foolish enough to take theprovisions fthese laws seriously,were removedby di Rudini'sministry, nd the suit was dropped. On this occasion thenewspapers openly said that it was ridiculous to attempt topunishthe buyingof votes,which had become a general andordinary ustom.The supportof the government, owever, s more effective

1I Corriere i Nato/i assertsthat the ast electionshave brought uantities fthenotes of the Bank of Rome into circulation n Tuscany,wherebefore heywerehardly nown. I cannotvouch for thetruth fthisstatement. But anotherassertionhas beenmade which is supportedby strong circumstantial vidence.It is said thatduringthe last elections several candidates gave theirelectorshalves of bank-notes orfiveor tenfrancs, romising o furnish he otherhalvesif theywereelected. It is certain hat hortly fter he electionsthe quantity fbank-notesn circulation,omposed of odd halves stuck together,was so greatthat thefinancial gentsof thegovernment ereobliged to apply to theTreasuryfor ruling n the matter. It seemsthat theelectorswhosecandidateswerenotsuccessful, ereobliged to sticktogether heodd halveswhichtheyhad received;and it seems thateven thosewhosecandidateswere elected, nd whoreceived hesecondhalfofthenotes ofwhichthey lreadyheld the firsthalf,made frequentmistakesn matching heirhalfnotes.


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708 POLITICAL SCIENCE QUA RTERLY. [VOL. VIII.than money; and the most effectiveform of governmentalinterference s, of course, the appointing and removing ofofficials. On the 2nd of July, 886, Sig. Nicotera,who hastwicebeen minister of the interior, aid in the Chamber thathe was readyto furnish a long list of government lerks inthe province of Avellino who had been recalled or had losttheir employments for electoral reasons, and he added incharacteristicwords " Certain thingsmay be done, but theymust be done well. The ministry as done them, and donethembadly."Sig. Cavallotti, speaking in the Chamber on the 30th ofJune, i886, said:

In the collegeof Pesaro at Cagli (of this I have documentaryevidence)the communalmessenger istributed,ogetherwiththeelectoral oll tickets,hegovernmentalist of candidates, nd addeda franc or ach name. . . At Arezzo rates werea littlehigher.The generaltariff or ministerialotes, s is shownby trustworthytestimony,as a franc iftyentimes.Depretis (Minister of the Interior) interjected: "No, it wasa franc at Arezzo too." Cavallotti answered:

Excuseme, hat s an error;exactly francfiftyas the averageprice; I havewrittenestimonyf thisdeposited t a notary's ffice.AtModena,sixfrancs at Alatri, college in the Romandistrict,eight,ten and even one hundredfrancs. . . The asylumofTutra an asylumfor the poor]receivesa subsidy f 400 francsthroughhe kindness f thecandidateN. . . . In the hird lectiondistrict f Novara a paperwas distributedn whichwas written:" f youvoteforthese four andidates, herewillbe IO,OOO francsforthe asylum." In the third lection istrict t Milana printedpaperwas distributedhich ead: "Choice s easy. . . . We havefourtriedmen of honor,who have procuredfor us the railwaystations, he telegraph nd post-offices,nd who a fewdays agoobtained orus the followingubsidies:500 francsforthe InfantAsylum,5oo for the School of Design, I5oo for the CharityAssembly" . . At Folignothe ministerialandidateobtainedforthecorporation loan of 450,000 francs rom hegovernment...In the second Roman electiondistrict certainFerri, originallyfromVallinfreda,wherehe exercisedconsiderable nfluence, ad


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No. 4.1 PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENT IN ITALY. 709been condemnedforwoundingthe syndic)to eighteenmonths'imprisonment.He was sufferinghe punishmentf his crimewhenit was foundthat his presence n the electoral struggle ouldbeuseful. Applicationwas made to the ministerial andidate,andthree rfourdaysbefore heelections e waspardoned,ndreturnedto the electoral ommunityustin time opayhisdebt of gratitude.

Sig. Cavallotti's party is the Left. Sig. di Rudini, whobelongsto the Right and who has recentlybeen presidentofthe council,said on the i6th of May, i886:It is necessary o check the degeneration f the parliamentarysystem. The public administration,he assemblies, he schools,seem tohave becomepartsof a greatmachine orgetting otes.'It is said that the evil is increasing. This is true if we goback to the earlier days of the parliamentary 6gime n Italyand compare the condition obtaining thenwith the conditionobtainingnow; butthings eem to be scarcelyworse at presentthanunder the Depretis ministry.It is evidentenoughthatthe variousfacts thatwe have ex-amined stand in close connection,each withthe rest; but it isnot easy to say whetherthe political disorganization f Italy is

I Sig. Minghetti, peaking of the degenerationof the parliamentarydgimein Italy, said: "When a deputyno longer representsprinciples, s no longermoved by national sentiments; when he is the patron, the solicitor,theagentof those who sendhim,there xists every ignof corruption . . On theotherhand,a ministryhat s not able to bring together majority epresentingsome idea, is obligedto fill ts place by securingthe supportof single deputies,who receivefrom thonors,favorsand power." (OQp.it.p. 8.)Sig. Giolitti,who is nowpresident f the council,made certain remarks n aspeech delivered February 24, I886, which he appears since to have entirelyforgotten: " And we go on creating niversityrofessorswhohave no pupils tohearthem, mployments here here s no real work to be done,and all this inorder to findplaces for personswho belong in society o the large class of theidle and needy. Henceforward thinkwe shall be able to applyto our budgetthedefinitionhat Bastiatproposedforthestate,namely, great fiction nwhichevery ne triesto live at the expenseof others."Senator Jacini observes that for many politiciansour parliamentaryegime"with all itsrottenness,ndeed because of itsflaws, onstitutes real canonry,nwhichwithout ntellectual ffort r culture, utwitha littlerhetoric nd a fewconventionalphrases, little ntriguend a fewdependents mongst ournalists,anyone can succeed in havinggreat nfluence."- Pensieri ulla Politica Italiana(Florence, 1889),p. 40.


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7IO POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY. [VOL.VIII.the cause or the result of the existing corruption. Stronglyorganizedpoliticalpartieswould exercise a certain controloverthe coteriesthatare formed o divide thespoils wrungfrom hetaxpayers; but it is precisely these coteries that impede theformation f real parties. Neither religiousfeelingnor aristo-cratic pride,two of the strongest sentimentswhich influencehuman action,have been able to prevent talians of the highestclass from sking forplaces, enrollingthemselvesamongthosedependenton the government nd takingservice underpoliti-cians whomthey thoroughly espise. The absence ofpoliticalparties favors the extensionof the functionsof government,because to obtain a majoritythe ministersare obliged tosubstitutemotivesof personal interestfor motives of politicalinterest or passions which do not exist. But the extensionofgovernmental unctions s, in its turn, seriousobstacle to theformation f parties. As a royalistFrench paper,now alliedto the republic,has said: "The people must end by under-standingthat it is notby resistingthe government hat theywill obtain its favors."I am inclinedto thinkthatthe want of political parties andthe extensionofgovernmental ctivity re the consequences ofmore general causes. Some ofthese causes are peculiar to thecountriesof the Latin race, and some to Italy; 1 othersare inoperation n almost all civilized states. To disentanglethesecauses and discoverthemodes inwhichthey ct wouldbe a veryinteresting ask, but it is one that cannot be attempted n thisessay.

III.For several years Italy's foreign policyhas been uniform;it has adheredto the alliance withGermany nd Austria. Theprime reason of this is the court's fear that the republicanformof governmentmay pass fromFrance into Italy,and itsbelief that the alliance with the German Empire is favorable

1 Sig. Turiello, of Naples, has published a very remarkablestudyon thepeculiarities f the Italian character nd their nfluencen thepolitical ife of thecountry. It wouldbe well,however, o give more consideration hanhe does totheeconomic ide of thequestion.


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No. 4.] PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENT IN ITALY. 711to the permanence of the dynastyin Italy. To become aminister you must accept the Triple Alliance. This is thereason that the Radicals who now aspire to powerhave beenobliged to retract, o sing the praises of the Triple Allianceand declare themselves ts partisans.But it is not only the sympathy f the court that maintainsthe Germanalliance; it is also thefeelingof a partofthe Italianbourgeoisie and the interest of the political coteries. Thegreatest obstacle to the establishment f the protective ystemin Italy was the treaty of commercewith France. All whoexpected any advantage from higher duties were impelled tofavor n economic rupturewith France; andwiththis aim theyturned to Germany. Again, the great contractorsfor theministries f war and marine, mong others the powerful teel-works company of Terni, found t to their interest o spreadthrough the country the fear of war with France, in orderthat the military nd naval expendituresmightbe increased.But in additionto those who expected a direct profit rom hebreach with France, the minds of a part of the bourgeoisiewere haunted by sentimentswhich Senator Jacinihas admirablydescribed as " megalomania." The Italian revolution wasratherthe work of the bourgeoisie than of the people. Manyof those who had helped to establish the new r6gime profitedby it and became much richer. They became rich enough tothink they could afford hemselves luxuries; and, unhappily,the taste of the Italian middle class turned to one of the mostexpensive uxuries that of glory nd military onquests.' It

1 Sig. de Molinari has put the facts excellently. Speaking of the Italianbourgeoisie,he says: " The Italian middle class is more numerous andnecessitous than the class formerlyredominant,nd it needed a larger peningto satisfy ts craving for dominion and enjoymenta cravingwhich had beensharpenedby a long fast. Like allparvenus, its memberswished besidestomakean ostentatious isplayof theirrecently cquired powerand fortune. . . Theythrew themselves into a path of ostentatious and expensive policy, whichflattered heir vanity and at the same time widened theiropportunities. Thearmyand navy were not put on a footingsuitable to a great power withoutoffering o the offspringf the governingclass additional aristocratic mploy-ments,whichraised themto the level of the sons of the aristocracynd, at thesame time,gave themsecure ncomes."- G. de Molinari,Les Lois Naturellesdel'Economie Politique (Paris, 1887),p. I69.


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712 POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY. [VOL.VIII.was partlyto satisfy his desire that Depretis sent troops toMassowah. But thistoy was notsufficient or he Italian middleclass, who dreamt of great military nterprises. The govern-ments that succeeded each other n France erred n not takingthis sentiment nto account; and they gave particularoffenseby the Tunis expedition. France might perfectlywell havetaken possession of Tunis without quarreling with Italy,provided t had considered and sought to conciliate the amourpropre of the governing class of Italians. But, on thecontrary, he French government seemed bent on humiliatingthe Italians. The German governmentdid not commit thiserror. Prince Bismarck was too profounda connoisseur ofhuman passions not to see how he could turn to account, inthe interest of his country,the sentiment of the Italiangoverningclass. By gratifying ts vanity,a thing that costhim nothing,he bought the alliance of Italy and incited thiscountry to an expenditure quite out of proportionto itsstraightenedmeans.This expenditure has been defended as necessary tomaintain the independenceof the country. Such is the officialtheory, nd many persons believe it to be true. But in realitythe independenceof Italy is not threatenedby France; and ifby any chance the lattercountry hould conceive the idea ofconquering Italy, the other European powers would certainlyintervene,whetherformal alliances demanded such action ornot. This even the most determinedpartisansof the TripleAlliance are oftenobliged to confess.'

1 Sig. Chiala, writing f Crispi's visit to Berlin in I876 to offer he Italianalliance, says: " Who, untilthen,had everdoubted that Germanywould haveconsidered t to her interest o help Italy if she wereattacked by France, evenwithout treaty? Had not the German chancellor declaredthiswithout ircum-locution to Count von Arnim n his letter ofJanuary 8, I874, whichhad beenmade public - Chiala, Pagine di Storia Contemporanea, p. 279, 280.Senator Jacini,who is far from feelingthe same enthusiasmfor the TripleAlliance as Sig. Chiala, observes: " Germanywas the one of the allies that hadthestrongest, eason to be satisfied. Let us allow that there is precise equalityamong the three llies as to the obligationof mutual defence. But, comingtoconcrete facts, re all three on an equal footing n respect to their territorialclaims? Certainly ot. Who will dispute the integrityf the Italian territoryif we do not quarrelwith our neighbors Austria s in a less perfect osition,


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No. 4.] PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENT IN ITALY. 713In I875 Italy spent only 2I6 millions a yearforher armyand navy. These expenses went on increasing until, inI888-89, they reached 554 millions. Since then they havedecreased to 359 millions (i891-92). But this diminutionhas been obtained by expedients which cannot be persistentlyemployed. Soldiers under arms have been dischargedbeforetheirtime has expired, and companieshave been reducedto anabsurdly insufficient ffectiveforce. The provisions of themilitarymagazines,includingeven those on the frontiers, ave

been used up.' Militaryauthoritiessay,with reason, that ifItaly wishes to pursue a policywhichmay involvea war withFrance, its armament must be equal to this contingency, ndto obtain this result much more mustbe spentthan at present.But how the nation will meet increased expenditures is aproblem still unsolved. Up to the present time the govern-ment has attempted to balance the budget by increasingthetaxes and continuallymaking new debts. But can such acourse be pursued indefinitely? The possibilities of taxation,both as to objects and rates,seem nearlyexhausted. There aremanyindications that an augmentationof imposts would notproduce a sensible increase of revenue.2 As to the publicdebt, the examples of Greece, Portugal, Spain and thebecause of thedifferentaces that live withinher confines. But Germany as inview,not a vague contingency, ut thecertainty f a struggleto defend the con-quest it has made of Alsace and Lorraine." - Jacini,Pensieri sulla PoliticaItaliana, pp. 107, io8.1 It is characteristic f the Italian political regime that it tends always tosacrifice eality o appearances. The government ishes to have an armywhichis strong, t least on paper. It therefore eeps up theframework hile t reducesthe effectiveorceto a limit hatcompromises he instruction nd solidity f thearmy.

2 Sig. Mazzola has shown, n the Giornaledegli Economisti, hat of late yearsthe consumptionof wheat has diminished in Italy. In the Journal desEconomistes,MaTch, 892, I have given an estimatewhich indicates that theconsumption fwool,whichin I886 was 68 kilos forevery oo inhabitants, asreduced n I889-9o to 6o kilos.The following able showsthequantity fcoffeemportednto Italyin quintals(xookilos): I887. I888. I889. I890. 1891.142,650 140,267 135,484 139,824 138,166The reduction in consumptionis evident; and diminishingconsumptiongenerally ndicatesan impoverishmentf the country.


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714 POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY. [VOL. VIII.Argentine epublic howthat taly s still farfrom he limitat which countryo longer indsoans; but sheis verynearthe pointwhere a future inancial atastrophes inevitable.Afterthe abolition f the forced urrencyn i88o and theloan of644 millions f francswhichwas contracted orthispurpose, he greatbook of the national ebtwas closed. Butthisonlymeans hat Italyhas no longerborrowed ndertheform f fiveper cent consols. It has continued o borrowmorethan ever in otherways. Civil and military ensionshave once alreadyserved to conceal a loan (by the sale ofannuities); nd now tis planned o make hem erve hesamepurpose secondtime; andthere eemsto be no reasonwhythesemethods hould not be continuedndefinitely. hesecrookedcoursesare amongthe consequencesof the parlia-mentary 6gime n its Italianform. Chamber nd ministersare notfar-sighted.Theyare contented o live fromday today withouthinking f the future. The policy f di Rudini'scabinet,whichwas rathermoreopen thanthat of its prede-cessors, roughthecountryoa pointwhere t wasnecessaryeither o submit o new axes orto reducethe army xpenses.Di Rudini ndhisfriends,s we have seen,triedto avoid thedifficultyy proposing conomyn all expenses exceptthoseof the army; but thispolicy proved mpracticable.At thepresentmoment he governments struggling iththesamedifficulty,nd Sig. Giolitti is trying o escape fromthedilemma y contractingewdebts. It is probable hat thispolicyof expedientswill be continued s long as possible,sinceeverybodyeems satisfied ith t.A few ableswillbestshow hefinancial onditionsnrecentyears. All numbers epresentmillions ffrancs.

Fluctuationsof theNational Debt.FUNDIED FLOATINGDEBT. DEBT. TOTAL.I882 .1 1,29 220 11,249

I889-90 . . . . . 12,442 352 12,794i890o-i . . . . 12,634 442 13,076I891-92 . . . . . 12,768 458 13,226


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No. 4.] PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENT IN ITALY. 7I5Expenditureon accountofNational Debt.

PERMANENT. REDEEMABLE. FLOATING ANNUITIES. TOTAL1882 . . . 401 70 47 64 58II889-9o . * 438 107 85 68 698I890-i . . 442 io6 87 69 704I89I1-92 . * 449 105 92 7I 717

Communaland Provincial Debts.COMMUNAL. PROVINCIAL. TOTAL.I882 .764 137 90II889 .1,037 170 I,207

MortgageDebts.BEARING INTEREST. WITHOUT INTERBST.I871. 6,009 4,583i88I . 6,805 5,005I89I. 9,466 6,152

State Revenue,showing ncreaseof Taxation.I882. I89I-I892.State propertyincludinghe railways) 77 85

Tax onhousesand land . . .89 I9ITax on affairssuccessions,mortgages,tc.). I69 220Incometax ..193 234Customs uties, ocal octroissalt,tobacco). 492 577Lottery . . .. . . . . . . . 73 74Post andtelegraph . . . . . . . . . 44 62Various axes includingax on annuities) 55 71ITotal regularncome. .1.,292 I,5I4Provincial and CommunalRevenue, in Totals.

COMMUNES. PROVINCES. TOTAL.I871. 292 75 367I882 .391 107 498I889 .523 103 626

Provincial and CommunalRevenue, Classifted.1871 1882. I889.Taxes on consumption,nd similar axes 1.00 149 199

Tax on landandbuildings127 19I 202Incomefromhe statedomain36 44 47Loans,sales ofpublic ands, tc. 104 114 178Total .367 498 626

1 The cost of the lottery,n I891-92, was forty-sevenmillions; that of thepostal and telegraph ervicewas fiftymillions.


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7I6 POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY. [VOL. VIII.These figuresrea littled

pareto_the parliamentary regime in italy (december 1, 1893)

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