Pakistan-Iran

Implications of the deal (26-07-2015)The recently concluded US-Iran nuclear agreement is likely to change the regional balance of power in the Middle East and bring about a major shift in South Asian geopolitics. In the anticipation of the possible changes, the regional states will reposition themselves and adjust their existing polices accordingly.

For Pakistan, the Iran nuclear deal will have immediate short- and long-term consequences. The deal has created both challenges and opportunities for Pakistan depending on the role Iran plays in the Middle East and South Asia. Subsequently, Pakistans diplomacy and future regional policies will also determine whether it stands to gain or lose from the deal.

On the positive side, the deal has revived hopes of the revival of the stalled Iran-Pakistan gas pipeline, signed in March 2013. Iran has the worlds second largest gas reserves and it offers the cheapest and quickest route to meet Pakistans crippling energy crisis with a daily deficit of over two billion cubic feet. The energy crisis in Pakistan has not only slowed the national economy but also resulted in a flight of foreign direct investment.

Iran has already constructed its part of the pipeline up to Pakistans borders in 2013, but Pakistan shelved the plans in the same year after the US and other western powers imposed sanctions on Iran. After the conclusion of the nuclear deal, Pakistan has decided to start construction of the gas pipeline on its side of the border. The contract of the pipeline has been given to a Chinese company to build an 80 kilometre section of the gas pipeline in six months. Meanwhile, the remaining 800 kilometres section of the pipeline will be completed in about 30 months.

Second, the lifting of sanctions will also improve the regional environment for trade. Pakistan can enhance and improve the volume of its bilateral trade and commerce with Iran. At same time, in addition to the China-Pakistan-Economic Corridor (CPEC), we can once again take the initiative of reviving the defunct Regional Cooperation for Development (RCD) renamed Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) between Pakistan, Iran and Turkey.

The third positive impact of the deal for Pakistan is that it can team up with Iran and Afghanistan to fight the common danger of the Islamic State (IS) in the region. Iran-Pakistan-Afghanistan cooperation to this end will help a great deal in curtailing the IS rising influence in the region. The Iran nuclear deal has also created a set of challenges for Pakistan, for which the country will need to bring together its diplomatic acumen to formulate polices that will help it navigate these challenges. Three major challenges could confront Pakistan as a consequence of the nuclear deal.

First, on several issues in the region including the conflict in Afghanistan, terrorism and religious extremism the Iranian stance is closer to the Indian position. Iran has already offered India an expanded role by inviting it to invest in the strategic Chabahar port in southeast Iran. The Chabahar port will remove Indian dependence on Pakistan to open up trade and energy links with Afghanistan and Central Asian states.

In 2008, India also completed construction of the 200 kilometre Delaram-Zaranj Highway that connects Irans Nimroz province with Afghanistans Farah province. The highway provides Afghanistan an alternative opening to the Arabian Sea and the Persian Gulf through Iran, instead of relying on the Karachi port through which most of Afghanistans trade takes place. Another purpose of developing the Chabahar port is to outflank Pakistans Gwadar Port built with Chinese assistance. Chinas involvement in the Gwadar Port and Indian involvement in the Chabahar port can fuel serious Sino-Indian competition for influence.

Iran also shares the Indian interest of ensuring that post-2014 Afghanistan does not return to Pakistans fold and to stop the re-emergence of Taliban rule in Afghanistan. It is quite likely that once the economic sanctions are lifted and tensions ease between Iran and the US the latter may move closer to the former on Afghanistan, which will be beneficial for India.

Second, the Iranian deal will increase Saudi anxieties in the Middle East along with other Sunni Arab states. When the unshackled Iran will assert itself in the Middle East, the Saudis will turn to Pakistan for help against Iran. Given the level of animosity with Iran, the Saudis will go to any extent to counter the Iranian influence in the Middle East in particular and the Muslim world in general. The Saudis will seek security cooperation from Pakistan through the purchase of weapons and provisions of ground troops. It is a fact that we cannot alienate Saudi Arabia which has been our long-term ally and economic partner. At the same time we also cannot afford to antagonise Iran.

For all practical intent and purposes, Pakistan has its plate full on the domestic front, the hostile border situation with India and the ongoing reconciliation process in Afghanistan. In this situation, we can ill afford to engage in the Saudi-Iranian ideological conflict. Ideally, Pakistan should de-link itself from the never-ending geo-sectarian conflicts of Iran and Saudi Arabia. Any partisan position from us on this matter will once again turn the country into a proxy-battlefield of the two.

Third, there is a strong possibility that after the Iranian nuclear deal, pressure may increase on Pakistan, the only Muslim nuclear state, from the international community to sign the Fissile Material Cut off Treaty. In all likelihood the influential Indian lobby in the US can launch a vicious propaganda campaign against Pakistans nuclear programme, highlighting issues such as nuclear proliferation and the risks of our nukes ending up in the hands of extremist groups.

Pakistans political and military establishment need to carefully handle the changing geo-political situation in the region and the Middle East to maximise the benefits and minimise the negative consequences. Our diplomatic and policy measures in response to the Iran nuclear deal will determine whether the nuclear will largely work in our favour, or lead to further complications.

Irans Strategic BreakoutTHE agreement on Irans nuclear programme announced in Vienna on July 14 marks a watershed in world politics. Iran made major concessions to secure the deal, agreeing: not to produce highly enriched uranium; remove two-thirds of its centrifuges; not to use its advanced centrifuges; give up 98pc of its existing enriched uranium stockpile (for 15 years); modify the Arak heavy water reactor to block production of weapons-grade plutonium and not build other heavy water reactors for 15 years; put its entire nuclear fuel cycle under full-time IAEA inspections, provide managed access to suspicious locations and as required to, clarify past nuclear activities.If implemented, the agreement will, as President Obama asserted, close all avenues for Iran to acquire nuclear weapons for at least 15 years.However, the agreement would fulfil three major Iranian objectives. One, recognise its right under the NPT to nuclear enrichment. Apart from pride, this will give Iran the capability to develop nuclear weapons if it chooses to do so in future. Two, lift economic, trade and financial sanctions almost immediately and arms and missile embargoes within a few years. Iran will get access to billions in frozen assets; be able to enlarge oil exports up to one million barrels per day quickly and to trade freely; and receive major inflows of investment and technology, especially in the oil and gas sector.Three, restore its status as a normal state, free to pursue its legitimate national interests, with respectful if not yet close relations with the major powers.All the major powers have economic interests to promote in Iran and see its cooperation as indispensable in stabilising the Middle East. This agreement will obviously be an important part of Obamas legacy. He will defend it vigorously. He rightly believes that the agreement is the best, perhaps only, option for the US and its allies to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons, at least in the near term, since a resort to force would be disastrous not only for the Iranians but for the entire region and the global security order.Obamas gamble is that the agreement will open the way for the US to cooperate with Iran on a host of regional issues: joint operations against the self-styled Islamic State (IS); a political settlement in Syria; stabilisation of Afghanistan and Yemen; moderating Hezbollahs confrontation with Israel; even assistance in easing the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. The Iranian foreign minister has made quiet references to such possible cooperation. The US has so far publicly disavowed such broader plans. But, de facto collaboration is already under way in fighting IS in Iraq and could be extended to the other aforementioned issues.The implementation of this win-win agreement could yet be scuppered by the US Congress. The Republicans, prodded by Israeli hardliners, want to eliminate Irans nuclear capabilities, not just constrain them. They desperately want to deny Obama a major foreign policy achievement. They have a majority in both the Senate and the House. The Israeli lobby could persuade even some Democrats to oppose the deal.President Obama has threatened to veto any legislation which seeks to block the deal. His opponents are unlikely to be able to mobilise a two-thirds majority in the Senate and the House to override an Obama veto, should he be obliged to exercise it. Moreover, the agreement has been already approved in a binding Security Council resolution. If the US Congress pushes through legislation to prevent US implementation of the Vienna agreement, it would unravel the deal but also the UN sanctions regime. Iran would be free of most international sanctions and free to pursue its nuclear programme.Netanyahus opposition to the agreement is visceral but cynical. There is little danger that Iran would ever have the capability or intention to wipe out Israel, given Israels own undeclared (and unquestioned) nuclear weapons arsenal. The real rub is that a US-Iranian normalisation will reduce American reliance on its Israeli ally in the Middle East. Global attention could turn to negotiating a fair settlement with the Palestinians, and the US could even come around to supporting the idea of a nuclear-free zone in the Middle East.The concerns of Saudi Arabia and its Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) partners are more genuine. Iran has been allowed to possess enrichment capabilities unlikely to ever be offered to them. An Iran liberated from sanctions could consolidate its influence in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Yemen, acquire a larger role in Afghanistan and Central Asia and escalate its interventions on behalf of Shia minorities in GCC countries. Most importantly, the GCC members are concerned at the prospect of a collaborative relationship between their major patron the US and their principal regional rival. The Obama administration is making intense efforts to assuage both Israel and its GCC friends.Riyadh has sought to demonstrate its independence from the US, through its actions in Yemen and the overture to Russia. In the final analysis, however, the Saudis and the GCC have limited options to replace the security umbrella provided by the US. They will need to adjust to the new strategic configuration in the region.The agreement has major implications, most positive, some negative, for Pakistan. The Iran-Pakistan gas pipeline can now become a reality. Pakistani enterprises can trade openly with Iran, importing oil and exporting rice and food products. The two countries can cooperate in stabilising Afghanistan. But an unshackled Iran will be more assertive in demanding action to control Jundullah and other Sunni extremist groups crossing into Sistan-Baluchistan from Pakistan. Without the American opposition, India will intensify its relations with Iran, including building a route to Central Asia through Chabahar, possibly as a counter to the planned China-Pakistan Economic Corridor. Pakistan is an integral part of the Gulfs power relationships. It will need to carefully manage its relations with a more assertive Iran and an anxious Saudi Arabia.As Iran emerges from isolation, an opportunity presents itself to create a regional security structure that connects the GCC with the members of the former CENTO and RCD Pakistan, Iran, Turkey and Iraq. Such a broad platform could be useful to address mutual differences and promote shared objectives. It could also provide the structure for cooperation with and among the major powers to promote regional security and stability.