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PAINS OF THE COMPREHENSIVE AGREEMENT ON THE BANGSAMORO

by: Zainal Dimaukom Kulidtod, PhD1 Caveat Voltaire once said, I may not agree with what you say, but I will defend to death your right to say it. This hallmark foundation of the freedom of expression is what I expect the readers to bear in mind when reading this manuscript. Since this writing tackles the different factors that could possibly explain the foreseen failure of the Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro (CAB), it contains a lot of thought-provoking issues and probably even offensive propositions. In this paper, I intentionally adopted the rigid Islamic perspective in organizing my thoughts, not because I want to follow the track of extremism, but to analyze the present peace engagement between the Government of the Philippines (GPH) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) in the most objective way possible using the Islamists perspective since they are the most radical members of the Bangsamoro society.

I expect varied reactions to my presentation. Some may find both positive as well as negative points in this work. But those who could not or would refuse to see the truth and wisdom of this writing may find only the negative aspects. Expectedly, they might even consider me as a peace-spoiler, if not an outright enemy of the peace process.

Nevertheless, let it be known that with all sincerity and honesty in my heart, it is never

my intention to hurt anyone or any group. My sole aim is to present the perspective of the most radical segment of the Moro separatist fighters for our reconsideration and evaluation so that real peace may finally reign in this troubled land. It is my conviction that unless the grievance of the most militant Moro is addressed, real and everlasting peace in Mindanao will remain an elusive dream. It should be remembered that this band of freedom fighters has the strongest capability, the burning determination and the iron will to sow disturbances in our midst in the name of long-aspired justice and freedom.

Moreover, knowing and understanding the real causes and genuine motives of this

conflict would bring us closer to our quest for justice for the thousands of lost lives from both sides, and ultimately for the direct victims of this war. Then, we can say we are already one step closer to its ultimate resolution.

Looking at the provisions of the Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro and its Annexes, one will notice that it contains both substantive as well as procedural shortcomings. Presented hereunder are some of the more serious ones. The first seven are considered as substantive while the rest are procedural. Substantial Limitations

1 Dr. Zainal D. Kulidtod, a native of DatuPiang, Maguindanao, is the former Assistant Dean of the College of Social

Sciences and Humanities, Mindanao State University, Main Campus at Marawi City. He holds the following

degrees: AB Political Science (CUM LAUDE), Master in Public Administration, Doctor of Philippine Studies and

Bachelor of Laws, all taken in the same university.

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[1] The Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro recognizes the spirit and embodies some principles of the 1987 Philippine Constitution. The foremost evidence of this is the provision of the Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro (FAB)2 in Paragraph 7 of the section on Transition and Implementation that The Bangsamoro Basic Law submitted by the Transition Commission shall be certified as an urgent bill3 by the President. Clearly, this provision of the Agreement is a constitutional framework emphasizing a constitutional process that all statutory laws emanate from the Philippine Congress whose passage may be expedited when the President certifies the urgency of the bill. This, indeed, championed the legal sovereignty of the Congress of the Philippines being the ultimate repository of the state legislative power. Consequently, the above provision affirms the spirit of the Philippine Constitution being embodied in the Framework Agreement.

Therefore, since the Comprehensive Agreement recognizes the fundamental law, it may be safely concluded that the MILF finally conceded to the granting of only an autonomous government, being the only possible highest degree of self-determination that can be validly established under the existing Constitution.4 It is worth remembering that any form of local governmental set-up different and higher in degree of autonomy than the present ARMM would require a change of the Constitution.5 And because the Framework Agreement does not require the change in the fundamental law, it follows that only an autonomous region/government (like the ARMM) is affirmed as the constitutionally-prescribed form or degree of internal self-determination for the Bangsamoro people. Consequently, the only way for it to go higher in degree of self-determination is through a constitutional change.6 In short, it may be safely deduced that because the questioned peace formula does not require amendment to the Constitution, we can hardly expect any form of government substantially higher in degree of autonomy than the ARMM set-up.

Time and again, peace advocates have been consistent in their proposition that the

present set-up of autonomy prevailing in Mindanao is never the solution to the Moro problem. In fact, no less than President Benigno S. Aquino III7 categorically said that the ARMM is a failed experiment. Otherwise, if this ARMM is the ultimate solution, it could have put a rest to the worsening peace and order situation in Mindanao which started in August 1989 and continues for more than 25 years (as of press time).

It is a fatal mistake to believe that there could be another form of autonomy higher than

the so-called Expanded-ARMM which could possibly and validly be established under the

2Signed on October 15, 2012, this is a roadmap agreement whose details are provided in the Comprehensive

Agreement on the Bangsamoro (CAB). 3In the landmark case of Tolentino vs. Secretary of Finance, the Supreme Court clarified the two objectives of the

Presidents certification, viz: The presidential certification dispensed with the requirement not only of printing but also that of reading the bill on separate days. [G.R. No. 115455, August 25, 1994, 235 SCRA 630]. 4Section 15, Article X, 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines.

5Soliman M. Santos, Jr., Legal Notes on the Right of Self-Determination and on Secession: The Real and Realistic Score, REFERENDUM ON POLITICAL OPTIONS FOR THE BANGSAMORO: Study Papers on the Legal and Historical Basis. Cotabato City: Mindanao Peoples Peace Movement, 2010, p. 39. 6Ibid.

7He is popularly known among Filipinos as PNoy (President Noynoy).

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existing 1987 constitution. This frame of mind is a sheer ignorance of the Philippine constitutional law as well as the Philippine jurisprudence.

Putting the blame on the Philippine legal system as the ultimate obstacle to our public

quest for lasting peace in Mindanao, one writer opined: The Philippine legal systems seem to be unfriendly to a Peace Agreement like the FPA. Many of the agreements provisions strike discordant chords with the body of Philippine jurisprudence and the Constitution itself, which is adverse to separatist tendencies.8

Since the present ARMM set-up, which is the highest degree of self-rule that could be legally granted to the Moros, is an autonomy formula established under the present constitution but never solved the Mindanao crisis, the envisioned Bangsamoro Government to be organized in 2016 may also likely fail as it is to be created also under the same constitution. [2] Contrary to the claim of some sectors of our society that the Bangsamoro Government prescribed in the Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro (CAB) is a variant of sub-state, which is a real form of political autonomy, the fact remains that this political arrangement also envisions a version of just an administrative autonomy experimented by previous Philippine Administrations.

In clarifying the difference between an administrative autonomy (decentralization of administration) and a political autonomy (decentralization of power), the Supreme Court pronounced in the landmark case of Limbona vs. Mangelin, G.R. No. 80391, February 28, 1989; 170 SCRA 786, the following:

Autonomy is either decentralization of administration or decentralization of power. There is decentralization of administration when the central government delegates administrative powers to political subdivisions in order to broaden the base of government power and in the process to make local governments more responsive and accountable, and ensure their fullest development as self-reliant communities and make them more effective partners in the pursuit of national development and social progress. At the same time, it relieves the central government of the burden of managing local affairs and enables it to concentrate on national concerns. The President exercises general supervision over them, but only to ensure that local affairs are administered according to law. He has no control over their acts in the sense that he can substitute their judgments with his own.

Decentralization of power, on the other hand, involves an abdication of political power in favor of local government units declared to be autonomous. In that case, the autonomous government is free to chart its own destiny and shape its future with minimum intervention from central authorities. According to a

8AUTONOMY AND PEACE REVIEW: The 1996 Final Peace Agreement Between the Government of the

Republic of the Philippines and Moro National Liberation Front: An In-depth Analysis, Highlights of the 1996 Final Peace Agreement and Conflicting Claims of Interpretation. Cotabato City: Institute of Autonomy and Governance, January-March, 2009, p. 12.

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constitutional author, decentralization of power amounts to self-immolation, since in that event, the autonomous government becomes accountable not to the central authorities but to its constituency. [Italics supplied]

In short, political autonomy happens when the people are given the right to freely determine their political status, and to freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development without any imposition, dictation or intervention from outside forces. Along this line, one could infer that all forms of autonomy given to the Moro (from the Marcos Regional Autonomous Governments [RAGs], to Corys Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao [ARMM], to Arroyos Expanded Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao [E-ARMM] and finally to Aquino IIIs Bangsamoro) are just shades of administrative decentralization pursuant to decentralization principles embodied in the Constitution as well as in the existing laws governing local governments. In all these variants of autonomy, the Bangsamoro people have never been given the freedom to chart their political destiny. This is done by the Philippine Congress, being the legal sovereign in the country.9

In other words, the system of life for the Muslims in Mindanao is prescribed not by the

Bangsamoro themselves but by someone else. Can the Christian-majority Philippine Congress10 prescribe what system of life is best suited for the Muslims? Plain reason dictates that it cannot. In the same manner, the Moro cannot prescribe what system of life is appropriate for the Christians.

Following this logic, observers of the Mindanao conflict commonly share the view that

all variants of autonomy offered by the Philippine government aimed at resolving the conflict finally ended as failed experiments because they were all authored by people foreign to the Moros. Obviously, since these law-makers do not know the peculiarities and intricacies of the Moros system of life, they prescribed the wrong solutions.

Because the ARMM is just a version of an administrative autonomy, it is not surprising

that the Supreme Court, in Kida vs. Senate,11 considered it as a local government unit justifying that autonomous regions fall under Article X of the Constitution which is entitled Local Government. Consequently, the fate of this local autonomy12 in the country, where the ARMM belongs, was clarified by the same Court in the most celebrated case of Pimentel vs. Aguirre, G.R. No. 132988, July 19, 2000, where the highest court lauded:

Under the Philippine concept of local autonomy, the national government has not completely relinquished all its powers over local governments, including autonomous regions. Only administrative powers over

9 In the R.A. 9054, its preamble provides: The people of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao . . . do

ordain and promulgate this Organic Act through the Congress of the Philippines. [underline supplied] 10

As of the Sixteenth Congress, the total membership of the Philippine National Legislature is 314, consisting of 290

Representatives and 24 Senators. Of this number, only 9 or 2.87% are Muslims, all belong to the Lower House.

[http://www.congress.gov.ph/members/] and [http://www.senate.gov.ph/senators/sen16th.asp], both accessed on

6/27/2014. 11

G.R. No. 196271, October 18, 2011. 12

Since the proposed Bangsamoro Government is also categorized as a version of local autonomy prescribed by the

Congress, it is also bound by this ruling of the Court.

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local affairs are delegated to political subdivisions. The purpose of the delegation is to make governance more directly responsive and effective at the local levels. In turn, economic, political and social development at the smaller political units are expected to propel social and economic growth and development. But to enable the country to develop as a whole, the programs and policies effected locally must be integrated and coordinated towards a common national goal. Thus, policy-setting for the entire country still lies in the President and Congress. [Italics supplied]

[3] The New Political Entity to be organized by 2016 shall have no control over the LGUs in its territorial jurisdiction since their IRAs shall automatically be given to them without passing through the future Bangsamoro Government.

The Philippine Constitution provides that Local government units shall have a just share, as determined by law, in the national taxes which shall be automatically released to them.13 This non-self-executing provision is given life by the Local Government Code of 1991 in further stating that The share of each local government unit shall be released, without need of any further action, directly to the provincial, city, municipal or barangay treasurer, as the case may be, on a quarterly basis within (5) days after the end of each quarter, and which shall not be subject to any lien or holdback that may be imposed by the national government for whatever purpose.14

Due to the statutory injunction for the National Government to automatically and

regularly release the Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA) of any Local Government Unit (LGU), either within or outside the proposed Bangsamoro Political Entity, these LGUs shall still be fiscally dependent on Manila. In short, LGUs in the future Bangsamoro Government shall only be administratively under the Regional Government but they shall still be politically and fiscally dependent on the Central Government. Thus, these LGUs shall be accountable and, therefore, loyal not to the Bangsamoro Government but to the National Government.

In the Pimentel case, the Supreme Court of the Philippines laid down the following legal doctrines relative to the fiscal autonomy of the LGUs regarding their shares in the national internal revenue taxes. With only three Justices dissenting in an en banc decision, the Court nullified Administrative Order No. 372 decreed by former President Ramos, entitled Adoption of Economy Measures in Government for FY 1998, which ordained in its Section 4 thereof that: Pending the assessment and evaluation by the Development Budget Coordinating Committee of the emerging fiscal situation, the amount equivalent to 10% of the internal revenue allotment to local government units shall be withheld. Says the Court:

A basic feature of local fiscal autonomy is the automatic release of the shares of LGUs in the national internal revenue. This is mandated by no less than the Constitution. The Local Government Code specifies further that the release shall be made directly to the LGU concerned within five (5) days after every

13

Section 6, Article X, Philippine Constitution. 14

Section 286, Paragraph (a), Chapter 1, Title III, Republic Act No. 7160 (otherwise known as the Local

Government of 1991.

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quarter of the year and shall not be subject to any lien or holdback that may be imposed by the national government for whatever purpose. [italics supplied]

The above pronouncement of the Court is now a legal principle mandating that even the Chief Executive of the Philippines cannot hold back or make any deduction in the IRAs of the LGUs irrespective of his intention and purpose.

This judicial ruling also holds true even if the one making any lien or holdback in the IRA is the Philippine Congress as settled in the Alternative Center for Organizational Reforms and Development, Inc. (ACORD), et.al. vs. Ronaldo Zamora, et.al., G.R. No. 144256, June 8, 2005. In that case, the national legislature enacted the General Appropriations Act (GAA) for the Year 2000 which provided that an amount of P10,000,000,000 (P10 Billion) appropriated for UNPROGRAMMED FUND, shall be released only when the original revenue targets submitted by the President to Congress can be realized based on a quarterly assessment to be conducted by certain committees enumerated by this law.

In invalidating such act of Congress, the highest court amplifies:

As the Constitution lays upon the executive the duty to automatically release the just share of local governments in the national taxes, so it enjoins the legislature not to pass laws that might prevent the executive from performing this duty. To hold that the executive branch may disregard constitutional provisions which define its duties, provided it has the backing of statute, is virtually to make the Constitution amendable by statute - a proposition which is patently absurd. [Italics supplied]

In conclusion, for as long as the 1987 Philippine Constitution remains un-amended, both the President as well as Congress cannot impose any lien, holdback or encumbrance of whatever kind to the IRAs of the LGUs which would prevent them from their automatic release, much more for rechanneling the release of these revenue allotments to other entity, such as to the future Bangsamoro Government.

Since the LGUs in the future Bangsamoro Government shall remain politically and fiscally under the Central Government, can the New Political Entity to be established in 2016 control and institute effective reforms in these government units? [4] On several occasions, the Peace Panel of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) have made several appeals to their counterparts in the government side not to offer them the same propositions already enjoyed by the present ARMM. Apparently, the MILF want to be given a substantially higher degree of self-rule, politically and fiscally, than that granted to the MNLF-inspired ARMM. However, a cursory reading of the CAB suggests that the MILF has only minor achievements as compared to the MNLF. The most notable ones are the following.

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(4.I) The shifting from a presidential-like ARMM to a parliamentary-like Bangsamoro Government.15 To some peace observers, this is the essence of asymmetry contemplated by the MILF in the Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro (FAB) as stipulated in Section I, Paragraph 2 of said Agreement which mandated that the government of the Bangsamoro shall have a ministerial form. As can be recalled, both peace panels conceded that the status quo16 is unacceptable, hence, the proposal for the parliamentary system.

Some of the manifestations of the claim that ARMM exhibited a presidential form are as

follows: First, the law creating it stipulates that the legislative power of the autonomous government shall be vested in the Regional Assembly whose members are elected by popular vote.17 And second, its executive power shall be vested in a Regional Governor who shall be elected by the qualified voters of the autonomous region. Since he is the chief executive of the Region, the Regional Governor appoints all the members of the cabinet.18

Accordingly, the above provisions indicate that the law-making body of the autonomous

region is distinctly separate from its law-implementing body both in terms of their memberships and functions. Moreover, as opposed to a parliamentary system whose head of government is voted indirectly by the electorates, the chief executive of the ARMM is directly elected by popular votes. Hence, it exhibits a presidential system.

On the other hand, the Annex on Power Sharing19 indicated the following salient

features of the proposed Bangsamoro Government which exemplify a parliamentary system.

15Presidential government is one wherein the state makes the executive constitutionally independent of the legislature as regards his tenure and, to a large extent, as regards his policies and acts, and furnishes him with

sufficient powers to prevent the legislature from trenching upon the sphere marked out by the constitution as the

executives independence and prerogatives. This suggests that presidential government possesses three basic characteristics: (1) there is a separation of powers between the legislative, executive and judicial departments, (2)

the chief executive (i.e., President) is directly chosen by the people and not by the legislature, and (3) heads of

executive agencies and administrative departments are normally members of the presidents party. The first feature suggests three attributes, such as: (a) each department is equal to the other, (b) everyone must coordinate with the

activities of the other, and (c) each is independent within its own sphere.

By comparison, parliamentary system (sometimes known as Cabinet government) is one in which the state confers upon the legislature the power to terminate the term of office of the real executive. Under this system, the

Cabinet or ministry is immediately and legally responsible to the legislature and politically responsible to the

electorate, while the titular, nominal, ceremonial or symbolic executive chief of state (monarch or president) occupies the position of irresponsibility. Among the most outstanding features of parliamentary system are: (1) there is a union or fusion between the legislative and executive departments, (2) the chief executive is the Prime

Minister who selects the ministers of government to constitute the Cabinet, (3) the Prime Minister is not only head

of government but also the leader of his party and, consequently, the leader of the parliamentary majority, (4) the

citizens do not vote for the chief executive but vote only for the legislative representatives, and (5) the cabinet

system separates the ceremonial executive from the real working executive. 16

This concept was once a source of misunderstanding between the GPH and MILF Peace Panels. On one hand, in

using this term status quo, the MILF was obviously referring to the system of the National Government in the Philippines which has been prejudicial to the Bangsamoros quest for self-rule. Therefore, it needs to be changed to accommodate the sentiments of the Moro. On the other hand, the Central Government was consistently interpreting

this term to mean the present ARMM. Thus, instead of changing the whole Philippine governmental structure, what

needs to be changed is only its subpart, the ARMM. 17

See Sections 1 and 2, Article VI, R.A. No. 9054. 18

See Sections 1 and 2, Article VII, R.A. No. 9054. 19

Signed on 8 December 2013, it is the 3rd

Annex of the Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro.

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It shall have a ministerial form of government that is democratically constituted and representative of the people in the region, and reflective of the diversity of the Bangsamoro. The central seat of governmental power is the Bangsamoro Assembly whose members are to be chosen through democratic means. Being vested with power to legislate,20 this Assembly will select from among themselves a primus inter pares (literally means first among equals), known as Chief Minister, who will appoint his cabinet members, known as Ministers, majority of whom shall also come from the members of said Assembly.

Composed of the Chief Minister, the Deputy Minister and other ministers, the Cabinet

performs the executive functions of government. By a vote of at least two-thirds (2/3) of its members, it may be dissolved by the Assembly through a vote of no-confidence proceeding. Furthermore, serving as the advisory body to the Assembly is a separate Council of Leaders to be composed of LGU chief executives of provinces and chartered cities and such other representatives coming from non-Moro indigenous communities, women, settler communities and other sectors.

With the proposal to replace the ARMM by a parliamentary-like Bangsamoro, will all the

present problems of the former be addressed by the latter? Could the so-called Moro problem, being articulated at present by the Islamic elements of the Bangsamoro society, be effectively solved by a ministerial system of government? Is the conflict in Mindanao a question of what government type is given to the Moro, or is it a question of how much do they control their system of life?

(4.II) If we compare the Wealth Sharing Annex of the MILFs CAB and the present law

governing the ARMM,21 there are two most striking areas worth mentioning. First is the internal revenue taxes collected in the region. Article I (Taxation), Section A (Taking Powers), Paragraph 4, Subparagraphs (a) and (b) of the Wealth Sharing Annex proffers that: Central Government taxes, fees and charges collected in the Bangsamoro . . . shall be shared as follows: (a) Twenty five (25%) percent to the Central Government, and (b) Seventy (75%) percent to the Bangsamoro . . . On the other hand, Article IX, Section 9 of RA 9054 provides that seventy (70%) percent of The collections of a province or city from national internal revenue taxes, fees and charges, and taxes imposed on natural resources shall be given to the regional government including the local government units therein, while the remaining thirty (30%) percent goes to the national government. In other words, the share of the proposed Bangsamoro Government from incomes collected in its territory is increased to only five (5%) percent as compared to the share of the present ARMM from taxes collected in the region. Second is the sharing arrangement on matters of potential sources of energy in the region. The Annex on Wealth Sharing in Paragraph 3, Section VII (Natural Resources) thereof states that: With respect to fossil fuels (petroleum, natural gas, and coal) and uranium, the same shall be shared equally between the Central and Bangsamoro governments . . . This means that the sharing of income derived from exploration, development and utilization of all natural

20

Implied from Item 9, Part Two of the Annex on Power Sharing, p. 4. 21

Republic Act No. 9054, or otherwise known as An Act to Strengthen and Expand the Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, Amending for the Purpose Republic Act No. 6734, Entitled An Act Providing for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, As Amended. Promulgated on March 31, 2001.

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resources within the Bangsamoro between the Central and Bangsamoro governments is in fifty-fifty (50:50) ratio. On the other hand, Paragraph (b), Section 5, Article XII (Economy and Patrimony) of RA 9054 also recognized and mandated that: Fifty percent (50%) of the revenues, taxes, or fees derived from the use and development of the strategic minerals22 shall accrue and be remitted to the Regional Government . . . The other fifty percent (50%) shall accrue to the central government or national government. This entails that on matters of regional economy and patrimony, there is no difference between the present ARMM law and the newly-signed Wealth Sharing agreement.

Based on these facts, radical sectors of the Bangsamoro society posit the conclusion that

the MILF have not achieved anything on matters of control of the regions strategic minerals as compared to the present ARMM set-up.

(4.III) Under the CAB, the term Bangsamoro is given three meanings: (1) as a form of political entity, (2) as a national identity, and (3) as a territory.

The first is found in Paragraph 1 of Section I which provides that The Bangsamoro is the

new autonomous political entity (NPE)23 which shall be established to replace the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). It will exhibit a ministerial form and Cabinet system of government which must reflect the Bangsamoro system of life and meet internationally-accepted standards of governance. It must have an electoral system suitable to a ministerial form of government which shall allow democratic participation, ensure accountability of public officers primary to their constituents and encourage formation of genuinely principled political parties.

The second meaning of the abovementioned term is stated in Paragraph 5 of the same

Section which discloses that the Bangsamoro refers to those who at the time of conquest and colonization were considered natives or original inhabitants of Mindanao and the Sulu archipelago and its adjacent islands including Palawan, and their descendants whether of mixed or of full blood Their spouses shall also carry the same identity. Obviously, this definition extends the meaning of Bangsamoro as a national identity beyond residency.

Under R.A 6734, Bangsa Moro people are citizens of the Philippines residing in the

Autonomous Region who are also considered as indigenous cultural community on account of their descent from the populations that inhabited the country or a distinct geographical area at the time of conquest or colonization and who, irrespective of their legal status, retain some or all of their own socioeconomic, cultural and political institutions. On the other hand, the new ARMM law (R.A 9054) defines Bangsa Moro people as those citizens of the Philippines residing in the Autonomous Region belonging to the indigenous cultural community who are believers in Islam and who have retained some or all of their own social, economic, cultural, and political

22

Paragraph (a) of same Section defined the term strategic minerals to include uranium, petroleum, and other fossil

fuels, mineral oils, all sources of potential energy. 23

The FAB envisions The government of the Bangsamoro shall have a ministerial form with an electoral system suitable to a ministerial form of government. And, The relationship between the Central Government with the Bangsamoro Government shall be asymmetric.

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institutions. Essentially, while the former law clarified the term Banga Moro/Bangsamoro using a cultural perspective, the latter statute defines it in religious viewpoint. Does it make any sense? One thing is certain that in both definitions the term Bangsa Moro is only confined to ones residency as qualified by the phrase residing in the Autonomous Region.

The final meaning is stipulated in Sections 1 and 3, Article V of the FAB enumerating the

core territory24 to constitute the Bangsamoro. As agreed upon by the Panels and subject to the results of a plebiscite, the New Political Entity shall consist of the following:25

First is the present geographical area of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao

(ARMM). This covers the five (5) provinces of Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Basilan, Sulu and Tawi-Tawi, and the cities of Marawi and Lamitan. It is interesting to note that the cities of Cotabato in Maguindanao and Isabela of Basilan do not form part of the ARMM, although they are located right in the very heart of the Muslim Autonomy.

Second are those local government units adjacent to the ARMM that voted for inclusion

in ARMM during the 2001 plebiscite, like the municipalities of Baloi, Munai, Nunungan, Pantar, Tagoloan, and Tangkal in the Province of Lanao del Norte and some barangays in the municipalities of Kabacan, Carmen, Aleosan, Pigkawayan, Pikit, and Midsayap.26

Some legal luminaries in the country have reservations on the validity of this political

consensus arguing that in the 2001 plebiscite, the residents of these 37 barangays in North Cotabato were asked whether they were or were not interested to be included in the territory of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), and not to the territory of the future Bangsamoro Government. In other words, considering that the ARMM and the Bangsamoro Government are two different and distinct political entities, is it legally permissible to say that the peoples initial preference to be included in the former is the same preference to be included in the latter? This invites a doctrinal pronouncement by the Supreme Court. However, this doubt could be clarified in the result of the plebiscite for the ratification of the Bangsamoro Basic Law. After all, the Constitution affirms that sovereignty resides in the people.

The third core area is the cities of Cotabato in the Maguindanao Province and Isabela in

the Basilan Province. Between these two cities, it is the case of Cotabato City which is more intriguing. It should be recalled that since the first establishment of the ARMM in 1989 under the old law (R.A 6734), this City has been the seat of the Regional Government, although it is not a part of its territory. Thus, a government employee in Cotabato City was quoted saying: Actually, a single step immediately outside the Main Gate of the ORG (Office of the Regional

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Following the provision of Article V, Section 2 of the FAB, these areas are not be automatically form part of the

Bangsamoro Government. Instead, they are still to be subjected to a plebiscite in pursuance to the mandate of the

Constitution that The creation of the autonomous region shall be effective when approved by majority of the votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite called for the purpose, provided that only provinces, cities, and

geographic areas voting favorably in such plebiscite shall be included in the autonomous region.. [See Article X, Section 18] 25

Article V, Sections 1 and 3, Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro (FAB). 26

Based on the 2001 Plebiscite Results from the COMELEC (Commission on Elections), the number of barangays

in each of these 6 Municipalities in North Cotabato is distributed as follows: Aleosan has 3 out of its 19 barangays;

Carmen, 2 out of 28; Kabacan, 3 out of 24; Midsayap, 12 out of 57; Pigkawayan, 6 out of 40; and, Pikit has 11 out

of its 40 barangays.In short, the barangays in question are 37 all in all.

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Governor) Compound is already outside the ARMM. How is this awkward situation legally permissible? Can one LGU in the Philippines legally hold its office in another LGU?27

The fourth category includes those other contiguous areas28 where at least 10% of the

qualified voters pass a resolution or a petition in their LGU asking for their inclusion, at least two months prior to the conduct of the ratification of the Bangsamoro Basic Law and the process

The phrase other contiguous areas includes those communities of Muslims contiguous

to, but outside, the first three categories of the core territory previously mentioned. As intended by the Parties, these areas shall also be subjected to a plebiscite where at least 10% of the qualified voters therein would indicate their initial preference to be covered by the Bangsamoro Government through their LGU resolution or a petition. Such intention for inclusion must be filed at least two months prior to the conduct of the ratification of the law abolishing the ARMM.

But why is it that only at least 10 percent is required, why not at least a majority? It

requires a long stretch of imagination to believe that in the intention for inclusion (say) only 10 percent of the residents consented, but two months thereafter and during the formal ratification majority of them agree. This statistical improvement from 10 percent approval to a majority (say, 50 percent plus 1) approval is highly improbable, if not impossible, considering the very short period of two months which is to be used both for providing basic services in these communities and thereafter campaigning for their acceptability of the new law.

The fifth and final category of the Bangsamoro territory is those areas which are

contiguous and outside the core territory where there are substantial populations of the Bangsamoro that would opt anytime to be part of the territory upon petition of at least ten percent (10%) of the residents and approved by a majority of qualified voters in a plebiscite.29

This last category refers to those Muslim communities contiguous to, but outside, the

first four categories of the core territory that may opt anytime to be part of the territory of the Bangsamoro. In other words, as compared to the fourth category, the filing of their intention for inclusion shall be done after the popular ratification of the new law. However, for them to be validly under the Bangsamoro, the final approval of the majority of the qualified voters therein is also required.

Why does the FAB contemplate expanding the Bangsamoro territory after its first

plebiscite? This is mandated in Article VI, Section 4 that protects the rights of the Bangsamoro people residing outside the territory of the Bangsamoro and undertakes programs for the rehabilitation and development of their communities. It further states that The Bangsamoro

27

In the case of Kida vs. Senate, G.R. No. 196271, October 18, 2011, the Supreme Court considered the ARMM as a

local government unit because autonomous regions fall under Article X of the Constitution which is entitled Local Government. 28

Relate this to Article I, Section 2, Paragraph (b), GRP-MNLF Final Peace Agreement which says: . . . clusters of contiguous Muslim-dominated municipalities voting in favor of autonomy be merged and constituted into a new

province(s) which shall become part of the new Autonomous Region. 29

Paragraph 3, Article V, Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro.

12

Government may provide assistance to their communities to enhance their economic, social and cultural development. Thus, it is believed that once their communities are rehabilitated and developed by the new government they would eventually opt to join. On the contrary, should the new political entity fail to meet their expectations, these communities may refuse to be a part of this new autonomous government.

Among the three interpretations of the term Bangsamoro, what can be considered as a

new achievement in the FAB, as compared to the GRP-MNLF Final Agreement, is the recognition of the Bangsamoro as a national identity. According to MILF sympathizers, this is what makes the new Agreement one step ahead of the old one. However, it must be emphasized that said recognition is just a national identity liberation, not the liberation of the Bangsamoro homeland from the bondage of tyranny, oppression and injustice.

(4.IV) Even before the signing of the Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro in

October 2012, there were already several foreign development agencies actively involved in the peace process in Mindanao. Among the most visible ones were the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), The Asia Foundation (TAF), and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). Their involvement was formalized and expanded in pursuance to the third identified mandate of the International Monitoring Team (IMT) to implement socio-economic assistance in the conflict-affected communities.30

However, after the signing of the FAB, a great number of development agencies joined

such as: the World Bank, International Organization for Migration (IOM), United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), United Nations World Food Programme (UNWFP), United Nations Children Education Fund (UNICEF), United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organizations (UNESCO), Asian Development Bank (ADB), and the Australian Agency for International Development, among others. Moreover, experts on peace building are telling us that still other foreign development partners are ready and very eager to extend their assistance once the Bangsmoro Government is in place. As one peace builder noted, Within the first three years of the regional government, many donors are expected to offer their contribution for the success of the Bangsamoro experiment.

This expected influx of development agencies shall always carry with them their

corresponding flooding of funds which may be interpreted by some as bribe to the rebels in the guise of development. This impending sponsoring of massive development efforts in the Moro communities is based on the mistaken belief that this war in Mindanao is a rebellion motivated dominantly by poverty and social injustice. Perhaps, this is true in the early days of the Moro struggle under the banner of the MNLF31 as its Manifesto lauded: We, the five million oppressed Bangsamoro people,wishing to free ourselves from the terror, oppression and tyranny of Filipino colonialism which has caused us untold sufferings and miseries by criminality usurping our land, . . . and murdering our innocent brothers, sisters and old folks in a genocidal

30See the Terms of Reference of the International Monitoring Team (IMT) signed by the GRP-MILF Peace Panels on 27 August 2007 at Cyberjaya, Malaysia. 31

Notwithstanding its Manifesto, the MNLF Draft Demand submitted by Nur Misuari to Undersecretary Barbero in

February 1977, Tripoli, Libya sought to establish an Autonomous Bangsamoro Islamic Government (ABIG). [Italics in the text quoted supplied]

13

campaign of terrifying magnitude . . . With such declaration, the common direction of all peace efforts in Mindanao is veering towards massive development initiatives. Thus, the creation of the Zone of Peace and Development, the Southern Philippine Council for Peace and Development, and the Southern Philippine Development Authority.

However, if we review the evolution of the Moro cause, we would realize that it is

getting deeper and more radical. A good case in point is the pronouncement made by the founding MILF Chairman, Salamat Hashim, when he confided, The ultimate objective of a Muslim community or Ummah is to make supreme the Word of Allah by (1) The establishment of a true Muslim community; (2) The establishment of a genuine Islamic system of government; and, (3) The application of a real Islamic way of life in all aspects of our life.32 Obviously, the same ideological line is followed by the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF). Having been inspired by Salamats teachings, this Islamist Moro group preferred to be under a government run like hell by the Bangsamoro, as long as the Shariah law is observed to the fullest extent possible, rather than a government run like heaven by non-Moro whose laws promote all forms of immoralities and injustices.

Therefore, this may take to mean that even if all the Moro shall become millionaires

overnight, this conflict shall not necessarily end. As noted earlier, the ultimate aim of every Mujahid33 is to make supreme the words of Allah. And contrary to the poisonous propaganda of the West, this long-aspired system of life by the Moro will not result to fundamentalism as it is already practiced in such liberal Muslim countries as Indonesia (Banda Aceh), Malaysia, and Turkey.

(4.V) Another notable achievement of the MILF in the CAB is the direct channeling of

the development programs of the government in the Moro areas (i.e., the Sajahatra Programs) to the MILF. Predictably, this avoids the phenomenon of Low Intensity Conflict (LIC), as a strategy of central governments to defeat liberation movements, by winning the hearts of their civilian supporters while fighting the rebels. In highlighting the strategy of the LIC program, one author made this pronouncement:

Instead of using economic aid as leverage for substantial reforms, LIC

advocates increased use of humanitarian assistance . . . as a way to soften, not solve socioeconomic problems. Also humanitarian assistance is being used for military support and as part of psychological operations . . . The goal is to erode or eliminate base of popular support34

32

Salamat Hashim.THE BANGSAMORO MUJAHID: His Objectives and Responsibilities: Mindanao: Bangsamoro

Publications, 1985, p.8. 33Interpreted by some as Islamic freedom fighters, this term Mujahid (singular for Mujahideen) differs from the word rebel. While a rebel aims for social justice and human dignity, a Mujahid ultimately aims for the establishment

of an Islamic system of life. Applying this to the ongoing GPH-MILF Peace Process, all those rebel-inclined MILF

elements shall interpret the CAB as the endpoint of their struggle, while those Mujahid-inclined ones shall continue

it until such time that Islam finally reigns in the Bangsamoro Homeland. 34

Tom Barry. Low Intensity Conflict: The New Battlefield in Central America. The Resources Center, Vol. 34, No.

4, 1986, pp.10-12.

14

As correctly observed by one rebel leader, the relationship between the rebels and their mass-supporters is analogous to that of a fish and its water habitat. If you remove the fish from the water it will eventually die. Applying this to a conflict setting, if one party wins the sympathy of the support base by providing them economic benefits, they will be isolated and eventually, neutralized.

Avoiding this political trick, the GPH, as a sign of sincerity, has directly given these

government programs intended for rehabilitation of the war-torn areas to the MILF. (4.VI) From the MNLF point of view, their peace agreements35 with the GRP did not

succeed because they were all implemented unilaterally by the government. Their participation in the peace process was only up to the signing of the agreements. After which, the GPH took over the implementation of the entire agreement.

Take the case of the Tripoli Agreement of 1976. In following its Third stipulation,

Paragraph 16,36 President Marcos unilaterally implemented the said peace deal. On March 25, 1977, he issued Proclamation No. 1628 declaring autonomy in Southern Philippines. It was followed by the enactment of the Batas Pambansa Blg. 20 which provided for the organization of the Sangguniang Pampook (Regional Assembly) in Regions IX (Central Mindanao) and XII (Western Mindanao).37 After the election of the representatives to the two Sangguiang Pampook was held on May 7, 1979, the President issued Presidential Decree No. 1618 implementing the organization of the Sangguniang Pampook and the Lupong Tagapagpaganap ng Pook (Regional Executive Council) in the said two Regions.

The same process happened during the administration of President Corazon Aquino.

Immediately after her short meeting with Misuari on September 5, 1986 in Jolo, Sulu, she facilitated the realization of the Muslim Autonomy by constitutionalizing the autonomy formula.38 Subsequently, following the Section 18, Article X of the Constitution,39 President Aquino appointed all the members of the Regional Consultative Commission (RCC) that drafted the bill which finally metamorphosed into Republic Act No. 6734. The appointed commissioners were representatives of multi-sectoral bodies, not necessarily MNLF members or sympathizers.

Even when the 1996 Peace Agreement was implemented by incorporating its provisions

in the Expanded-ARMM Law, there was still no involvement of the MNLF. They were not even required to submit their proposal on how to accommodate the provisions of said agreement to the proposed bill. As a result, both the formulation and implementation of this law were solely done by the Philippine Congress.

35There are two major peace agreements signed by the Government and the MNLF: the Tripoli Agreement (signed on December 23, 1976) and the GRP-MNLF Final Peace Agreement (signed on September 2, 1996). 36The Government of the Philippines shall take all necessary constitutional processes for the implementation of the entire Agreement. 37

It may be noticed that, although the 1976 Tripoli Agreement contemplated only one autonomous region but,

Marcos finally implemented two autonomous regions (i.e., Regions IV and XII) for reasons only known to him. 38

See Article X, Section 15, 1987 Constitution. 39

The Congress shall enact an organic act for each autonomous region with the assistance and participation of the regional consultative commission composed of representatives appointed by the President from a list of nominees

from multi-sectoral bodies . . .

15

In other words, all necessary steps, legal or otherwise, were done unilaterally by the

GPH. For these reasons, till now, the MNLF have never recognized their participation in the implementation of either of the two major agreements which they have signed with the Philippine government.

Thus, to avoid this same pitfall, the FAB proffers that This Agreement shall not be

implemented unilaterally. Apparently, this provision signals the bilateral participation of both parties in its implementation.

(4.VII) As an off-shoot of this on-going peace settlement, the MILF shall be given the chance to hold political power. Also, its high ranking members are expected to occupy key positions in the National Government. More properly termed as a pacification campaign, this approach is known to some as the policy of accommodation, if not attraction. However, it is feared that if there are no adequate safeguarding measures instituted, the MILF may just fall into the same pitfalls of the MNLF.

As a sign of their gradual integration into the government body politic, some of the top

MNLF leaders, supporters or their relatives were either appointed or elected to government posts. Among the elected ones were MNLF Chairman Nur Misuari (former ARMM Governor), MNLF Foreign Affairs Officer Parouk Hussin (former ARMM Governor), MNLF Commander Abdulgani Salapuddin (former Deputy Speaker for Mindanao, Philippine Congress), MNLF Council of 15 Secretary-General Muslimin Sema (former Mayor of Cotabato City), MNLF Council of 15 Interim Chairman Hatimil Hassan (former Assemblyman, ARMM Regional Assembly), MNLF Commander Alhabsi Hassan (former Assemblyman, ARMM Regional Assembly), MNLF Commander Omar Solitario Ali (former Mayor of Marawi City), MNLF Field Commander Cassan Capal Kumander Posao (former Mayor of Saguiaran), and MNLF Field Commander Datu Ben Mokalid (former Mayor of Datu Piang), to name only a few.

These appointed MNLF members or supporters included Yusop Jikiri (SPDA Chair),

Bainon Karon (SPDA board member), Alvarez Isnaji (DOST-ARMM Secretary), Duma Sani (DILG-ARMM Secretary), Abraham Iribani (DILG Undersecretary), Bai Sandra Sema (DECS Undersecretary), among others. Today, some of the MNLF members returned to civilian life, while others simply followed the path of banditry. There were also those who became the poorest of the poor.

Commenting on the final fate of the 1996 Final Peace Agreement, Salah Jubair

elucidates that instead of giving genuine self-rule or autonomy to the Bangsamoro people, as a distinct historical, religious, cultural group, the FPA integrated the MNLF, including its leaders and combatants, into the government body politic . . .40

More telling on the plight of the MNLF in this pacification campaign was the findings of

the IAG in its January-March 2009 publication illuminating:

40

Salah Jubair, THE LONG ROAD TO PEACE: Inside the GRP-MILF Peace Process. Cotabato City: Institute of

Bangsamoro Studies, 2007, p. 13.

16

During the Marcos regime, government jobs were offered to MNLF commanders in exchange for allegiance to government. Such vestiges of parceling government positions for pacification of Moro leaders live on today. Instead of facilitating Moro representation in national affairs, government jobs have become instruments for co-opting Moro leaders.

By being governor of the ARMM, Misuari presided over an institution that his revolutionary group rejected many times over. More significantly, he was perceived to have allowed himself to be co-opted at a time when he was expected to provide the visionary leadership for the Bangsamoro. The regular mentoring provided by high government officials to Misuari at the beginning of his term as ARMM governor evoked the pathetic image of a revolutionary eaten up by the system he wanted to change.41 Would the MILF not suffer the same blunder as that of the MNLF? (4.VIII) Aspiring to free the Bangsamoro people from the human rights abuses and

sufferings committed and perpetrated by the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), the FAB mandated that In a phased and gradual manner, all law enforcement functions shall be transferred from the Armed Forces of the Philippines to the police force of the Bangsamoro.42 Pursuant to this objective, The government shall redeploy AFP units and troops from or within the Bangsamoro, consistent with a normal and peaceful life . . . The AFP shall only retain installations necessary for national defense and security.43 Obviously, this is the government response to the consensus that the MILF shall decommission its forces and put their weapons beyond use. Under this decommissioning component of the peace deal, those MILF fighters who can qualify as members of the Regional Police Force of the Bangsamoro may have the opportunity to work in the government and shall become the security forces of their homeland. In the course of time, it is finally envisioned that all law enforcement activities and programs related to the maintenance of peace and order in the region shall be solely delegated to this police force.

Provisions of the Agreement implicitly state that the MILF could establish a special

regional police force which would take charge of all law enforcement activities in the region, except those relating to national security and external defense. To perform this mandate, it is necessary that such police force must be separate and distinct from the regular members of the Philippine National Police (PNP); otherwise, it cannot perform its especially delegated law enforcement function. Could this be possible?

Anent thereto, Section 6, Article XVI of the Constitution enjoins that The State shall establish and maintain one police force, which shall be national in scope and civilian in character, to be administered and controlled by a national police commission.44 Since the FAB embodies the spirit of the Constitution, this above-quoted provision shall always prevail over any of the expressed or implied stipulations of the Parties. Thus, following the imports of said

41

AUTONOMY AND PEACE REVIEW:, 2097, Supra, pp. 96-97. 42

Article VIII, Section 6, FAB. 43

Paragraphs 1 and 2, Section D, Annex on Normalization. 44

[italics supplied]

17

provision, the Philippine Constitution recognizes no other unit of the PNP doing law enforcement activities in the land except the nationally-constituted police unit administered and controlled by the Central Government. Consequently, an establishment of any special police force, with different uniform, insignias, badges, or coat of arms from the regular PNP personnel, shall definitely be an affront to the fundamental law and, therefore, illegal. This stand of the MILF in establishing a special regional force for the Bangsamoro is not a new development in the Mindanao peace process. As a matter of fact, the MNLF have always insisted on its inclusion in many instances. First was in the 1976 Tripoli Agreement which stipulated that Special Regional Security Forces are to be set up in the area of the Autonomy for the Muslims in the South of the Philippines. The relationship between these forces and the Central security forces shall be fixed later.45 In clarifying the functions of these forces, the 1977 MNLF Draft Demand posited that:

A Regional Security Force shall be set up and maintained within the Autonomous Bangsamoro Islamic Region for the following purposes: 1. To Maintain law and order within the Region; 2. To protect the lives and properties and honor of the nationals of the Autonomous Bangsamoro Islamic Government; 3. To perform such other functions as the Majlis As-Shura may, by law, provide.46

The final attempt of the MNLF in this aspiration was embodied in the 1996 FPA which

provides: . . . there shall be created or constituted a PNP Regional Command for the new Autonomous Region, which shall be the Special Regional Security Forces (SRSF) as referred to in Paragraph 8, Article III of the Tripoli Agreement. With this stipulation of the FPA, the proposed separate and distinct character47 of the SRSF from the regular police personnel of the country, being contemplated in the Tripoli Agreement as well as in the MNLF Draft Demand, had already gotten blurred. Thus, to erase further any cloud of separateness or distinctiveness from the regular PNP, the Agreement in question already allowed the SRSF to be composed of the existing PNP units in the area of autonomy, the MNLF elements and other residents of the area who may later on be recruited into the force. This political fine-tuning effort was intended to be consistent with the constitutional provision that there shall be one police force in the country which is national in scope and civilian in character.

Putting the blame on the government side for the failure of this integration formula, the

MNLF explained, the GRP did not organize the MNLF integrees into separate units under the command of a Deputy Commander. Furthermore, they claimed that the GRP deploys the MNLF integrees in combat duties to fight their Muslim brothers from the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF).

45

Paragraph 8, Article III, Tripoli Agreement. 46

Article 21, MNLF Draft Demand, Supra. 47

In explaining the proper interpretation of the MNLF on the nature of the SRSF, the Institute of Autonomy and

Governance (IAG), after series of their FGDs, disclosed the MNLF understands the SRSF as distinct from a regular PNP regional command, since it brings together PNP and MNLF members into a single security unit. [AUTONOMY AND PEACE REVIEW, Supra.,p.38.]

18

In reference to the GPH-MILF CAB, both parties have to meet immediately to thresh out problems and arrive at a common interpretation of all its provisions to avoid future conflicting interpretations. Take a closer scrutiny of that part of the Agreement which says The government shall redeploy AFP units and . . . shall only retain installations necessary for national defense and security. Parenthetically, in the minds of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, all military units, troops, installations, establishments and camps in the country are intended and necessary for national security. In short, the term redeploy is emasculated by its qualifying phrase necessary for defense and national security.

Furthermore, another very alarming issue of decommissioning is raised by a radical

Moro professional who preferred anonymity. In comparing the MILF CAB to the MNLF FPA, he pointed out that What is even more shocking provision of the CAB is the obligation on the part of the MILF to decommission its forces by putting their weapons beyond use regardless of whether they will join the proposed regional police force or not. On this note, the FPA was far better than the CAB. As can be recalled, the former agreement obliged only those MNLF combatants who intended to join in the AFP to surrender their firearms, while those who joined the PNP were exempted from this requirement. In the case of the CAB, all MILF forces are mandated to disarm themselves whether they will join the regional police force or return to a civilian life. Did the MILF achieve more in the CAB than what the MNLF achieved in the FPA?

In conclusion, this envisioned integration of the Bangsamoro Islamic Armed Forces

(BIAF) to become regular members of the PNP is still considered by some as a pain of the CAB. Have they sacrificed for more than four decades only to become policemen? If this were so, to my mind, they could have spent the good forty years or so of their struggle in known universities where they could have become generals by now!

Perhaps the MILF leadership and the Bangsamoro people could learn a rewarding lesson

from the experience of the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) in Indonesia relative to the decommissioning of their forces. In highlighting the points of growing dissatisfaction among the Acehnese in the course of the implementation of their peace agreement, one author says:48

. . . there were voices of dissent in regards to the compensation as the

combatants are claiming that the amount is not enough, while non-combatants are asking why they are left out in the compensation process as they too have been victims of the conflict . . .

There have been claims that the compensation given was not what was originally promised . . . there have also been rumors of dissatisfaction among the GAM rank and file with the way the GAM leadership is benefitting . . . many of them have now become rich overnight by being contractors, government officials . . . and other types of employment, while the majority of the rank and file continues to live in poverty and hardship.

48Kamarulzaman Askandar, The Struggle for Self-Determination in Aceh, AUTONOMY AND PEACE REVIEW: International Experiences of Self-determination. Cotabato City: Institute of Autonomy and Governance, April-June

2007, pp. 55-56.

19

If the above-cited development in the Banda Aceh would happen in the implementation of the recently-signed CAB, it would confirm the prediction that this peace agreement will solve only the problem of the post-Salamat MILF leadership, but not the problem of the Bangsamoro people.

[5] Since the signing of the FAB in October 2012, the GPH-MILF peace panels have already conducted countless peace advocacies or consultations in different parts of Mindanao. But some participants are wondering why they can hardly ask diagnostic questions pointing to sensitive issues on the CAB (which may be the reasons for its failure) because they were automatically branded as peace spoilers or, worse, BIFF sympathizers. Are the GPH-MILF peace panels espousing a dictated peace? Why is it that only questions supportive of the peace process are well entertained during those consultations?

In order to know the possible implications of this policy of the peace panels in our quest for sustainable peace in southern Philippines, we have to understand what dictated peace is all about.

Using the manner of its attainment as the criterion, peace can be classified as either negotiated or dictated. The former is believed to last long since the interests of both parties are addressed, while the latter is temporary as the interest of only one party is served.

There are two ways of committing this dictated peace. First is when one party in a negotiation imposes its will, interests or condition to the other party. This is sometimes known as horizontal-dictation because the parties involved are presumed to be in equal footing. And, second is when the negotiators are imposing to their supporters/followers the will of the other party in exchange for any political consensus which may or may not redound to the benefit of the stakeholders. This manner of imposition is labelled by peace experts as vertical-dictation since the flow of decision or control is from the top to the bottom.

Commenting on the final destiny of this phenomenon of a dictated peace, a writer in the IAG made the following pronouncement:

. . . peacebuilding is not about the imposition of solutions . . . Community harmony and peace can be achieved if people are allowed to participate in activities that redound to their welfare. Enduring or sustainable peace can be achieved when people . . . can share their views before any decision is made.49

[6] Under the CAB, funds from the National Government shall come to the Bangsamoro in five forms, viz:

(a) The 75% share of the Bangsamoro in the national taxes, fees and charges levied within the Region (Article I, Section A, Paragraph 4, Annex on Revenue Generation and Wealth Sharing Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro);

49

AUTONOMY AND PEACE REVIEW, 2009, Supra., pp. 55 and 58.

20

(b) Internal Revenue Allotments (IRAs) of the Local Government Units within the Region (Section 286, Paragraph (a), Chapter 1, Title III, Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as The Local Government Code of 1991);

(c) The Block Grant (Article V, Paragraph A, Annex on Revenue Generation and Wealth Sharing Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro);

(d) The Special Development Funds (Article V, Paragraph B, Annex on Revenue Generation and Wealth Sharing Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro); and,

(e) Funds for the socio-economic components of the normalization (Item G, Paragraphs 1-6, Annex on Normalization Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro).

This enumeration is not exclusive as the CAB also contemplates to attract multi-donor

country support, assistance and pledges to the normalization process. As mentioned earlier on, many are anticipating that Within the first three years of the regional government, it is expected that many donors will be on parade wanting to contribute to the success of the Bangsamoro experiment.

Those who are closely monitoring this recently-signed Agreement have noted that

among these five identified funds from the National Government, what appears to be new are the last three as the first two are already enjoyed by the ARMM.

The Bangsmoro block grant (BBG) is an amount that Central Government will provide

annually for the operation of the Bangsamoro Government. This fiscal management system is aimed to free the future Bangsamoro Government from the difficulties of the usual annual budgetary process in which the budget allocations for the Region is negotiated with the Congress. Hence, the ARMM never enjoyed fiscal autonomy since both the approval as well as the amount of its budgetary appropriation are under the dictate and mercy of the Congress. Such difficulty is even aggravated by the national governments policy of prescribing ceiling amount for the Regions fiscal allotment.

On the other hand, under this block grant system, the Bangsamoro shall be

automatically provided with block subsidies to be allotted to it yearly without undergoing the difficult process of budget hearing before the Committee on Appropriations in the Lower House. As mandated by the agreement, its total amount shall not be less than the last budget received by the ARMM immediately before the establishment of the Bangsamoro.

With this new fiscal arrangement between the New Political Entity and the Central

Government, many are made to believe that this block grant is a unique achievement of the MILF. However, if we try to scan the provisions of the 1996 FPA one would realize that it also provided almost the same stipulation when it proffers in its Paragraph 44 that:50 The Regional Autonomous Government in the area of autonomy shall enjoy fiscal autonomy in budgeting its own revenue resources and block subsidies granted to it by the National Government . . .51

50

The Final Agreement on the Implementation of the 1976 Tripoii Agreement Betweenthe Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) with the Participation of the

Organization of Islamic Conference Ministerial Committee of Six and the Secretary General of the Organization of

Islamic Conference, signed on September 2, 1996. 51

[italics and bold face supplied]

21

Moreover, another analogous stipulations found in the MILF-CAB and the MNLF-FPA

relate to development funds. The former provides: The Central Government shall also provide for a Special Development Funds to the Bangsamoro for rehabilitation and development . . . while the latter stipulated: The National Government shall appropriate for the area of autonomy a sufficient amount . . . for infrastructure projects which shall be based on a development plan duly approved by the Regional Autonomous Government . . .52

Funds for the normalization process are mandated by the provision of the Agreement which obliged both Parties to intensify development efforts for rehabilitation, reconstruction and development of the Bangsamoro, and institute programs to address the needs of BIAF members and that of their communities. For this purpose, negotiators of both Parties envisioned to establish a Trust Fund to ensure the efficient, transparent and accountable release of the funds to be provided by multi-donor country support, assistance and pledges.

Given this wide range of fiscal provisions of the CAB, peace building experts are

predicting that if there are no rigid mechanisms for transparency, accountability and monitoring of public spending, excessive funding of the future Bangsamoro Government may result to rampant graft and corruption among new public servants (and their families) who are fresh from their difficult life in the forest. This common anticipation has been based on post-conflict peace building experiences in other countries.

[7] As already mentioned , there has been a developing perception that the CAB will solve only the problem of the post-Salamat MILF leadership, but not the problem of the Bangsamoro people, especially those sectors of the Bangsamoro society aiming for a real Islamic system of life aspired by the late MILF founder.53 For them, this peace formula cannot solve the Islamic elements of the Bangsamoro struggle because only the basic dimensions of it are intended to be addressed by the said Agreement, such as its economic, social and historical components. Since the CAB recognizes the Bangsamoro as a national identity, the perceived victory of the MILF in the Agreement is considered by some as just a national identity liberation (at most) but never a political liberation. Regrettably, this is against (or even an insult to) the name of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front, as conceived by the late Sheik Salamat Hashim (Allaho Yarhamu). As can be recalled, the MILF broke away from its mother organization as an off-shoot of the secular ideological line followed by the MNLF. Thus, this Islamic Front was aimed at Islamic Liberation being the essential requisite of establishing a genuine Islamic government proposed by its late founder.

52

[italics supplied] 53In his book, the founding Chairman mentioned the following: The ultimate objective of a Muslim community or Ummah is to make supreme the Word of Allah . . . The meaning of making supreme the Word of Allah is capsulized

in the following: 1. The establishment of a true Muslim community; 2. The establishment of a genuine Islamic

system of government; and, 3. The application of a real Islamic way of life in all aspects of our life. [Salamat Hashim, THE BANGSAMORO MUJAHID: His Objectives and Responsibilities. Mindanao: Bangsamoro

Publications, 1985, pp. 8-9.]

22

However, after the death of Sheik Salamat Hashim in 2003, some of the MILFs former members have been accusing its new leadership of leaning towards the secular path.54 Some of their justifications are the following:

First, in their negotiation with the government, the MILF Peace Panel does not have any ulama member while the GPH Panel has one (i.e., Dr. Hamid Barra). With this arrangement, we cannot expect the MILF negotiators to be properly guided by Islamic principles of diplomacy since all of them have limited background in Islam. What is even worse is they can be easily manipulated by their counterparts in the government who are more equipped with secular knowledge.

Second, among the four justifications55 of the MILF in negotiating with the Philippine government, there was no mention of any Islamic concern. Although, the MILF is an Islamic front but the foundation of its negotiation is very much secular.

Third, it is personally witnessed by some observers of the MILF-Central Committee that

decision-making in the group is dominated by non-ulamas. Those members who are learned in Islam cannot (or refused to) have meaningful participation even in highly critical issues as their opinions are suppressed by the secular-minded members. This emerging development in the present MILF leadership seems an affront to the Islamic social contract developed by Caliph Abubakar As-Siddique when, upon his formal enthronement as the khaleefah (literally means successor) of Prophet Mohammad (s.a.w.) to lead the Muslim Ummah, he mentioned before the Muslim crowd the following: I have been chosen to govern you, though I am not the best among you. Help me if am right; correct me if I am wrong. The weak among you will be strong until I have attained for him his due, and the strong among you will be weak until I have made him give what he owes. Obey me as long as I obey ALLAH (s.w.t.) and his Prophet (s.a.w.); if I do not obey them, you owe me no obedience.56 This pronouncement of Caliph Abubakar became the foundation of the universally-accepted principle of Islamic governance practiced in the Muslim world Wa Amruhum Shra Baynahum (Consultative Mandate). Moreover, the afore cited passages lay down the duty of individual Muslims to their rulers, that is, to object those decisions done contrary to Islamic teachings and manners. Allegedly, however, this duty is no longer faithfully observed in the Central Committee of the MILF after Salamats demise. One interview said that if the ones making decisions in the group are those more senior or lawyer members, whether or not they have enough knowledge on Islam, their views are usually controlling and conclusive even without further consultation from the ulamas.

Is this alleged practice in the MILF-CC also present in the MILF Peace Panel? It must be recalled that during the leadership of Sheik Salamat Hashim in the MILF, this

revolutionary organization have been faithfully adopting the Islamic principle of consultative

54

This is based on the interviews conducted by the author with a BIFF high ranking officer sometimes in February of

2014. According to the interviewee, these are some of their grounds in breaking away from the MILF. 55

The four justifications are enumerated in the book of Salah Jubair (pseudonym of Mohagher Iqbal), The Long

Road to Peace: Inside the GRP-MILF Peace Process.Cotabato City: Institute of Bangsamoro Studies, 2007, pp. 13-

14. 56

http://um-bs.com/2011/02/06/what-does-islam-say-about-leadership/. Accessed on August 8, 2014. [underscoring

and italics in the quoted text supplied]

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decision-making. In fact, in his little book, the late founder had vividly prescribed the general guidelines used by the MILF in formulating its decisions and policies, viz:

One of the hallmarks of the MILF is its policy of CONSULTATIVE and

COLLECTIVE Leadership. Essentially, this policy means that no major decisions could be formulated and implemented without first resorting to Shra (consultations) in general meetings attended by Central Committee members in the Homeland and representatives from different regions.57

For many sympathizers of the MILF, this long-cherished policy of the Front has been

relaxed in many instances since the loss of its founder. In particular, among the Sangir58 Bangsamoro, they have the emerging perception that the current MILF Leadership serves only the interests of the major Moro tribes, like the Maguindanaon, the Iranun and the Meranaw. For example, during the signing of CAB on March 27, 2014, when one of the Sangir Bangsamoro Mujahideen, who was fatally wounded during the All-Out-War Policy of President Estrada in 2000, was asked on his reaction, he flippantly replied:Ang pakiramdam namin ngayon ay parang hindi na kami importante sa Jihad natin, lalo na ang katulad namin na walang pinag-aralan. Hindi kasi kami nakapag-aral dahil sa Jihad natin. Masakit talaga sa amin na mga Sangir na kahit isa ay wala man lang pinasama ng MILF sa Manila. Anu pa kaya kapag mag-gubirno na sila. [We feel that we are no longer important in our struggle, especially those uneducated Moro like us. We failed to study because of our Jihad. It is painful to us Sangir Bangsamoro that no one of us was invited to join the MILF delegation in Manila. What more if they are the ones running the government.]59

Seemingly, the MILF Peace Panel members, in particular, are perceived by some peace

advocates in Mindanao as having adopted a centralist-democracy policy. It has been generally observed that all critical commentators to the present peace process are collectively labelled as peace spoilers regardless of their honest intentions or the merit of their contentions. This observation became more apparent in August 2013 when a group of Bangsamoro youth drafted their press release containing their strongly felt frustrations on the recently-signed Annex on Wealth Sharing. Motivated by their honest intention to remind the MILF Peace Panel on the sensitivity of their peace journey with the Philippine government, the press release made a bold declaration which reads in part:60

The future leaders of the Bangsamoro people would like to make it known to the Peace Panels of both the Government of the Philippines (GPH) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) that we are closely monitoring the on-going peace negotiation between you. We know that whatever peace agreement you may have agreed will certainly shape our future in Mindanao.

57

Salamat Hashim, Supra, p. 57. 58The term Sangil, coined by misinformed history writers and professors, to refer to those Islamized natives in the Sarangani and the Balut Islands, is inaccurate. In the same manner that the Islamized natives of the Maguindanao

and the Cotabato provinces must be correctly referred to as Maguindanaon, NOT Maguindanao. 59

The respondent, who requested not to be named, is one of the members of the MILF-National Guard who were the

close-in bodyguards of Chairman Salamat Hashim. 60Entitled PRESS RELEASE FROM THE BANGSAMORO YOUTH OF THE MOROLAND, it was released on July 31, 2013, Bangsamoro Homeland.

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For the MILF, we want to remind you again to please solve the Bangsamoro problem in such a manner that it would benefit the past, present and future generations of the Bangsamoro people. How we wish that the present MILF leadership after Chairman Salamat Hashim would not be like that of the MNLF which served only the interests of its present-day members. Being motivated by personal interests, the MNLF was demobilized and lost its credibility even among the poorest sectors of the Bangsamoro society because each of its members saved only his own worldly and material benefits by either joining the AFP/PNP or becoming local politicians, without solving the Bangsamoro problem. Out of frustration, others simply turned into a civilian life and became the poorest of the poor.

If the MILF is really committed to represent the common interests of the oppressed Bangsamoro people, it is even needless to remind you not to repeat the same mistakes done by the MNLF in its two (2) peace agreements with the Government (i.e., 1976 Tripoli Agreement and the 1996 Final Peace Agreement).

Furthermore, may we remind you again of our cries during the Second Bangsamoro Consultative Assembly of June 1-3, 2001, where we delegates were calling that the only just, meaningful, and permanent solution to the Mindanao problem is the complete independence of the Bangsamoro people and the territories they now actually occupy? And, if you can still remember, the delegates even warned you in that assembly:

That in view of the forthcoming peace negotiations between the MILF and GRP, we are giving our full support and mandate to the MILF to represent us in said negotiations provided, however, that the MILF does not deviate from our demand for complete independence and accept a compromise formula short of this aforesaid demand. Should the MILF choose to deviate, these supports or mandates are automatically rescinded and withdrawn. [Italics supplied]

We are hereby expressing our overwhelming frustration to the recently-signed Annex on Wealth Sharing, because we have noticed that the MILF Peace Panel violated its pronouncements not to accept any agreement with the GPH having the same tenor with that of the present ARMM Law . . .

. . . on matters of regional economy and patrimony, there is no difference between the present ARMM law and the newly-signed Wealth Sharing agreement. Or, to be brutally frank, the MILF has not achieved anything on matters of control of the regions strategic/metallic minerals as compared to the present ARMM set-up . . .

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However, instead of entertaining the merit of the above call, the official website of the MILFs Committee on Information (www.luwaran.com) stated in part in its August 8, 2013 Editorial, entitled The ideal is only in the mind, the following:61

There is always no perfect agreement in negotiation. If one tries to find fault, say the annex on wealth-sharing, he or she can always see one or two . . .

The idealists, mainly coming from the inexperienced, always look for the perfect thing but they wouldnt find any, because it does not exist . . .

It is very easy to criticize, because it is only the tongue that waggles. The critics assume this role . . .

Often those who did not taste being bitten by mosquitoes for years or even decades or have almost starved to death for days, or have suffered or involved in bloody battles are the bitterest of critics of those who have dedicated their whole life in the struggle.

Sometimes, those who are receiving regular salaries from government are among those harsh critics . . . Experience tells us that those self-anointed leaders of the MNLF in the 70s, usually the lovers of limelight, pretenders, and the credit-seekers, were the first to abandon the struggle. Some of them are in government now . . . criticism hurled outside of what Islam allows is tantamount to assuming the task of the enemy or at least that of a spoiler.

A close scrutiny of this reaction shows that the MILF Peace Panel is no longer open for

any criticism or suggestion, no matter how constructive it may be. Whatever is its idea, correct or wrong, is controlling and final. Again, isnt the MILF Panel espousing a dictated peace for the Bangsamoro?

This perceived close door policy was confirmed further during the BDP community visioning conducted in different parts of Mindanao last February 2014.62 In those occasions, I have consistently emphasized to the participants that the safest stance to be taken by the Moro people in view of these sprouting hopes from all corners of the Mindanao society relative to the ongoing peace process is, while expecting some good things from this peace negotiation, we too must be ready and prepared for the worst. However, immediately, a week after the conclusion of said community activities, the official website of the MILFs Committee on Information released its Editorial on March 8, 2014, with the title Spoilers in the guise of helpers, emphasizing the following:

All sorts of people from genuine friends of the peace process to outright

spoilers are what peace builders have to grapple with as they struggle to conclude the negotiations.

Sometimes spoilers are dressed in sheepskin and pretend to be allies only to expose their real color later after they have already sown virus in the

61

http://www.luwaran.com/index.php/editorial/item/489-the-ideal-is-only-in-the-mind.Accessed on July 25, 2014. 62

This author had attended almost all of the community visioning organized by the Bangsamoro Development

Agency (BDA) in crafting the Bangsamoro Development Plan (BDP).

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peace efforts. Even the best of allies can also create problem in how they frame their ideas, especially if they insist on them.

More seriously, there are those who pretend to help but their real

agenda is how to promote their rigid ideological line that tend to create trouble rather than harmony . . .

This pronouncement from the MILFs Committee on Information confirmed the

observation that opinions critical to the MILF position in the peace process are bound to be suppressed. What shall be the effect of this suppressive character of the negotiators to the peace process?

Along this line, it is important to mention the most leading case of West Virginia Board of Education vs. Bernadette, where the United States Supreme Court castigated this suppressive tendency of those in authority. In this case, the said tribunal passionately stated:

Struggles to coerce uniformity of sentiments in support of some end thought essential to their time and country have been waged by many good as well as by evil men. . . As governmental pressure toward unity becomes greater, so strife becomes more bitter as to whose unity it shall be . . . Those who begin coercive elimination of dissent soon find themselves exterminating dissenters. Compulsory unification of opinion achieves only the unanimity of the graveyard.63 [Italics supplied]

Procedural Limitations [8] Expert peace builders proffer their comment that the Mindanao-wide consultation process done by the Peace Panel is against the procedure recogniz