pages from the second front
TRANSCRIPT
-
8/3/2019 Pages From The Second Front
1/30
The Second FronT1943-1944
Scott Nicholas Romaniuk
-
8/3/2019 Pages From The Second Front
2/30
-
8/3/2019 Pages From The Second Front
3/30
AcknowledgemenTS
No aspect o the history o Allied operations during theSecond World War in Europe is more controversial than the
Normandy landings. Even prior to the cessation o the greatest
confagration in the history o human warare, a passionate
debate was unleashed about the timing and execution o the
second ront, which continues to reverberate today. Historians
and scholars alike have since applied an intensely fickering
intellectual candle to the debate. This tempest o historicityinspired me to produce a succinct but powerul account o
the Allies invasion o Europe, which emphasizes the logistical
perspective rom both the Allied and German points o view.
The events o the Second World War do not dey explanation
in conventional military terms. High casualty rates were an
inevitable concomitant to the resistance o Nazism and the
deence o the Third Reich in every sense.
Many o the Allies peripheral operations during their
approach to the invasion were harbingers o darker things to
come. Remaining actively malign was part o a systematic,
though disquieting, lead-up to 6 June 1944. The beleaguered
remnants o the Allied orces let the continent our years
earlier, and returned to a war o unexampled erocity. Though
many historians deny the Allies inability to strike at the heart
o Hitlers empire at will, readers will be struck by the parallels
to be drawn between the planning o D-Day and the broader
events within the European theatre o war.
This work could not have been completed without the
assistance o a great many people who have been a pillar o
support throughout the entire process. First among those whodeserve my gratitude is Dr. Daniel Byers, whose steady guidance
-
8/3/2019 Pages From The Second Front
4/30
or which I am greatly appreciative. I am particularly grateul to
Drs. Scot Robertson and Per Rudling or the guidance they gave
me in navigating my way through the literature o warare and
history o the Second World War in Europe. They extended to
me their interminable knowledge and dedication to the critical
review o my research and writing.
I am also indebted to the archivists and personnel in
the various institutions where the research or this book wascarried-out. Many thanks to the University o Alberta and
to McGill University, the State o Baden-Wrttemberg, the
Library or Contemporary History in Stuttgart, the United
States Holocaust Memorial Museum in Washington, D.C., the
National Archives and Records Administration in College Park,
Maryland, and the German Federal Military Archive in Freiburg.
I am certainly grateul to have studied alongside a supportivegroup o peers during my studies at home and abroad. I wish
to express my appreciation to Dale Youngman o PageMaster
Publication Services Inc., my riends, and to my amily or their
encouragement during my studies.
Scott Nicholas Romaniuk
2009
-
8/3/2019 Pages From The Second Front
5/30
Foreword
As a ormer proessor o Scotts, I am happy to write a ore-
word in support o his present book. Scott is one o those people
who are a joy to teach - he was always a very keen student, espe-
cially when it came to studying any topic related to war, military
aairs, or international relations. His passion or his subject is ob-
vious in the pages that ollow, which have grown out o a numbero years o work that draws together his various interests. The be-
ginning student in particular should fnd this book to be a useul
introduction to the various issues that inuenced Allied decision-
making regarding the June 6, 1944 invasion o Normandy.
Scott observes events rom the perspective o German as well
as Allied strategists, and provides a thorough overview o the many
specifc actors that shaped the actual preparations or D-Day onboth sides. He also pays attention not just to the traditional con-
cerns o western historians, but the implications o Germanys
ongoing war with the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe or military
planners. The result is a study that intricately sets the D-Day inva-
sion into its larger context, and should be a useul addition to the
libraries o readers interested in learning more about the back-
ground to one o the greatest military events in history.
Daniel Byers, Ph.D.
Assistant Proessor o History,
Laurentian University at Georgian
College B.A. Program,
Barrie, Ontario, Canada
2009
-
8/3/2019 Pages From The Second Front
6/30
PreFAce
Operation Overlord was the Allies master stroke againstthe parapets o Festung Europa. What the Allies began planning in
late 1941, initially projecting to relieve pressure on the Red Army,
sought to re-establish their military presence in Europe or the
ultimate deeat o Nazi Germany. Crossing the English Channel
thereore became the precursor or Allied victory in Western
Europe. Conceptualization o this mission was not simple at any
rate and its planners aced what seemed to be illimitable obstacles
at nearly every turn.
While addressing the act that many elements were vital
or the induction o D-Day, it is necessary to make clear that the
rontier o this books analysis is controlled by the degree to which
such elements relate overall to the grand picture o Allied strategy
and deliberation over the campaign. This may seem obvious, but
in certain cases, obscure branches o the war have been observed
and recounted or the purpose o increased topic proundity, but
again, this has been done through careul restriction. Limiting my
study to select cases o the war has created what may be perceived
as naturally occurring gaps in my investigation and subsequent
polemic account.
My aim was to ocus predominantly on two aspects o mil-itary operations: those o logistics and strategy. I agree with schol-
ars that imperial notions resonated in the planning o and pre-
operations strategy o Overlord, but hold that peripheral action
undertaken by the Allies was pivotal or the orchestration o such
delicate aairs as those dealt with in the ollowing chapters. There
is always something to be gained through the decline o rather
banal reasons or superfcial pretexts why certain decisions were
made throughout history and the Second World War delivers no
-
8/3/2019 Pages From The Second Front
7/30
x The Second Front
yond value or what was to ollow, especially in multi-national
concerted action. On the other hand, it consumed a large portion
o the Allies timetable and delivered very little territory into Allied
hands in lieu o their struggle and the commitment o orce argu-
ably went ar beyond the return.
The availability o essential men and matriel to continue
any oensive inland unabated was the pivotal component that
dictated against the Allies capacity to invade prior to 1944 and
was uppermost in Allied minds rom the very beginning but as aharbinger o Allied inability it has oten been rejected by historians.
In examining and measuring the risks and rewards o the Allies
undertaking the Second Front in 1944, I attempt to reveal with
the best possible line o reasoning the peril o an Allied invasion in
1943. I provide a history not merely o a logistical perspective on
planning the Second Front but o the many intricate dimensions
that inuenced Allied planning during the Second World War as
a whole. That is, beyond the impediment presented by a shortage
o manpower, the overall currents o the war in Europe and the
politico-military relationships were actors that dictated the suc-
cess o Overlord.
Waging strategic war was not a new concept by the time
World War II slammed the Continent, but orchestrating coalition
warare in a way that embroiled all three major elements o the
military in a symbiotic relationship was certainly unamiliar terri-
tory or all participants in the conict - especially in an era when
military technology had developed beyond its ability to be tested in
true battle. The Allied orces were not unaware o the imbalance
o power that existed in the early years o the war, and certainly
they remained aware o their weaknesses up until the cessation ohostilities. In every way, operating in parity was the core o condi-
-
8/3/2019 Pages From The Second Front
8/30
xiPreface
quantitative and qualitative assessments have been made on re-
spective resource availability or the Western Allies and Germany
during both 1943 and 1944 while taking into account the evolu-
tion o the Allied and German armies over the course o the war. A
ocus has also been made on the prevailing actors that governed
the timing and location o this oray, which military scholars and
historians continue to debate today.
History, it has been observed, possesses truth that remains
hidden amid ultimate parable and oreseeable ambiguity. Giventhat persistent study within this discipline routinely turns out
more uncertainty than clarity and maybe even truth, it remains
perhaps one o the most onerous felds o work in which one could
engage. It is my sincere hope that this book reects my respect or
history as a discipline and o it, meritorious authors and historians
past and present. A great number o colleagues, riends, proessors
as well as casual acquaintances have played a role, both large and
small, in the fnal orm o my work and it is or this single reason
that wish to extend my gratitude to all o them, or the content o
this book is the product o a combined eort.
Emerging rom an article that I had begun writing during
my undergraduate career as a student o history, I had begun my
planning and research or this book while embracing my studies
in Germany. I continued its composition during the remainder
o my degree in Canada, while simultaneously attempting to pur-
sue many other interests within as well as external to academia.
Originally I conceived the idea o the original article as appropri-
ate homage to the sixtieth anniversary o D-Day and to those who
ought so adamantly whether with guns or tools, at the ront or in
the actories, on either side o Europe against the ideological ap-paratus o Nazi Germany.
-
8/3/2019 Pages From The Second Front
9/30
xii The Second Front
Kingdom and Canada comprised its principle participants and
while the primary Allied ormations that saw combat in Normandy
came rom these three countries, they were certainly not alone.
In the eyes o German and Allied soldiers alike, the campaign
in Normandy, like those o Italy and Arica, were represented by
the determination and spirit o the collective orces involved. It
is through this magnifcent historical representation o a united
ront that I eel it not only appropriate but absolutely necessary
to recognize that Free French, Polish, Belgians, Czechoslovakians,Greeks, Dutch and Norwegians also participated in the many bat-
tles o Normandy.
The sheer scale o operational, logistical and strategic plan-
ning that was invested into the preliminary planning while con-
currently maintaining the fght against the Axis powers in multiple
theatres o war in Europe intrigued me above all else. D-Day was
no simple operation. Likewise it was no single operation. Overlord
was part o a broad strategy, relying on the successul conclusion
o preliminary campaigns that brought courageous young men
rom the crescent bays o Morocco, through the canyons o the
Apennine spine and all the way to the retted coasts o France.
Setting aside the items that were vitally important to the
success o an amphibious invasion o France, across some rather
portentous waters o Europe, and while eeding the insatiable ap-
petite o military ronts the world over, was an issue that lingered
in mind throughout my research and as I articulated my assertions
in the ollowing pages.
It may seem peculiar that while my amily is o Ukrainian
background, I grew up learning German and French; only as o
late, have I unearthed the time and energy to tackle Ukrainianand Russian. The history o World War II, like the study o mod-
-
8/3/2019 Pages From The Second Front
10/30
xiiiPreface
pondering o the many discreet and indiscreet acets o the Second
World War in Europe as well as the Pacifc, yet my natural inclina-
tion was always to approach the general conict rom the Allied
point o view. Believing that no more value should be aorded to
the Allied position than should be proered to Germany and her
allies, and since war is never one-dimensional, my approach to
this subject has thus not been inuenced by anything more than
this single enlargement.
Without the co-operation within the United Nations,Overlord would certainly not have been possible. This contention
will always be genuine and sound in my mind. Nevertheless, it is
my estimation that without the sacrifces made by innumerable
men and women o diverse ethnic origin in the Soviet Union, our
Western eorts would have been utterly ruitless. Soviet strength
and ortitude against the military might o Nazi Germany reected
on the Allies; upon my own volition, I extend my gratitude to the
men and women o the ormer Soviet Republics or their inde-
structible courage and or their pivotal role in our shared victory
and esteemed reedom.
This book attempts to set out the record o the Allied plan-
ning o D-Day by providing both description and explanation o
events that orm the basis o a second ront in North-West Europe.
Although no single book could provide absolute coverage and ex-
planation o any chapter o history, my hope is that this view o
the second ront will describe the military and political encounters
that prooundly sculpted Overlord, and produce some new per-
spectives o its ormative events and the conditions that dictated
its execution and early success.
While this book attempts to cover the major acets o thisextensive military movement, it does not present a complete his-
-
8/3/2019 Pages From The Second Front
11/30
xiv The Second Front
various sections o this book have ultimately escaped my initial
intention or their sel-containment. I have thus set Overlord andits expedients soundly within the broader strategic ramework o
the war in Europe and slightly urther abroad. This ramework,
however, defnes no clear boundary on its own. Deciding where
to limit my analysis was difcult, since countless elements were
indicative o either Allied success or ailure, it would be nearly
impossible to ft them all into a single book.
The dominant problem in tackling this specifc topic, as isthe case with many in the history o the Second World War, is the
sheer scope o literature that has since become available. Given
this seemingly boundless abyss o accessible literature, I ound it
tricky and at times quite awkward to ascertain which issues ultim-
ately aected the planning o the Allied second ront in unique
ways. My central argument has been careully reerenced with a
diverse mixture o events rom the outset o the war in Europe.
With circumspect, I chose to include terms that are and were o
impending importance to the Combined Chies o Sta as well as
those eminent elements that plagued the echelons o OKW and
the war eort until what Generaleldmarschall Erwin Rommel
termed the longest day.
This book is divided into three parts, the frst oering anaccount o German military power and Allied strategic resource
availability through an examination o the military transition that
had taken place in Europe early in the war, the second providing
an analysis o steps that attempted to oretell the probability o
success or an invasion o Nazi-occupied Europe while ollowing
the most signifcant changes in the combatants strategic posture.
The fnal chapters o this book serve as a countdown, ollowingthrough advanced phases o D-Day preparation and address a
-
8/3/2019 Pages From The Second Front
12/30
xvPreface
intention was never to compile a text book per se, but rather a
work that would fnd its appeal in the hearts o those who havea passion or the feld o history, and those who wish to pursue
military history in academia or o their own leisurely accord. At
the same time however, my belie is that this book is suitable or
proessors at the University level teaching courses or directing
seminars on twentieth Century warare, World War II or War and
Society in the Modern World.
Having appreciably based my research on original docu-mentation, I spent many unsociable hours poring over German
military archives, war diaries and what seemed to me at the time
to be illimitable correspondence in English, French, German and
Dutch. But a large portion o my investigation involved secondary
works as well and provided many hours o sheer enjoyment, enter-
tainment and ulfllment. Above all, I wanted to revisit this event
sixty years past and explain the delicate nature o conception and
progression, not with a contumacious attitude or with negative re-
pose, but simply to reect and exhibit not only my interpretations
but such events as seen through the eyes o senior commanders
on the timing o this grandiose military undertaking or what it
simply was: a spectacular eat
-
8/3/2019 Pages From The Second Front
13/30
conTenTS
Introduction 1
Embattled Europe
Allusion o Victory 19
A Calculated Strategy 49
Trial and Error 62
Epochal Campaigns
Distant Shores 87
Girding the Initiative 102
Strategic Overtures 122
Countdown to Victory
Along the Channel 149
A Paralyzing Ordeal 158
Hitlers Vainglorious Citadel 163
Triumphant Tide 183
Appendices
Comment on Sources 212
Chronology 214
Diagrams 228
Principle Persons 229
Glossary 235Maps 241
-
8/3/2019 Pages From The Second Front
14/30
Winston Churchill6 June 1944
What a plan! This vast operation is undoubtedly the mostcomplicated and difcult that has ever taken place.
Adol Hitler3 November 1943
In the East, the vastness o space will permit a loss o territory without suering a mortal blow to Germanyschance or survival. Not so in the West! I the enemy heresucceeds consequences o staggering proportions will
ollow within a short time.
Joseph Stalin12 October 1942
[What place does the possibility o a second ront oc-cupy in the Soviet estimates o the current situation?] Amost important place; one might say a place o frst rate-importance.
Generaleldmarschall Erwin RommelJune 1944
Well have only one chance to stop the enemy and thatswhile hes in the water. Everything we have must be on thecoast the frst 24 hours o the invasion will be decisive.For the Allies as well as Germany, it will be the longestday.
General Dwight D. Eisenhower6 June 1944
People o Western Europe: A landing was made thismorning on the coast o France by troops o the AlliedExpeditionary Force. This landing is part o the concertedUnited Nations plan or the liberation o Europe, madein conjunction with our great Russian allies I call uponall who love reedom to stand with us. Keep your aithstaunch. Our arms are resolute. Together we shall achieve
victory.
-
8/3/2019 Pages From The Second Front
15/30
InTroducTIon
Sure, we want to go home. We want this war over
with. The quickest way to get it over with is to go
get the bastards who started it. The quicker they
are whipped, the quicker we can go home.
- General George S. Patton
Ill at ease on the eve o Operation Overlord, General Dwight D.
Eisenhower knew that the Allies were about to subject their ar-
mies, perhaps to an untenable situation in Normandy. Tension
among Allied leaders ran at a high pitch in the weeks beore thou-
sands o men set sail or the coast opposite England. During a
tense moment, Eisenhower stated probably no one who does nothave to bear the specifc and direct responsibility o making the
fnal decision as to what to do can understand the intensity o
these burdens.1
What Eisenhower and the Allies knew was nearly equal in
orce to that which they knew nothing about and could do de-
ceptively little to inuence. Obvious were the many thousands o
hours o eort that had been devoted to the creation o ortifed
Europe; but less overt was the notion o how events would actually
unold come H-Hour, and i Operation Bowsprit would herald the
eventual cancellation o Operation Overlord. One such compon-
ent, never acting entirely as riend or oe, was the weather. For
this was an element that no amount o planning, preparation or
prediction could aect in any degree o realism.
Within sixty years o the Allied assault into Basse Normandy,
-
8/3/2019 Pages From The Second Front
16/30
2 The Second Front
a great deal o military historians attention. Strategy shadowed
by the Allies is criticized in a multiplicity o ways. Chie among
these include the Allies committing to an engagement with the
Wehrmacht in North-West Europe too late, an artifcial deerral o
obligations to the Soviet Union, prolongation o the war in Europe
through the abandonment o a short-road policy or the deeat
o Germany, and an eort to leverage the Allies politico-military
posture in the post-war world. The aoresaid orm the crux o
many such diatribe.Predominantly, this discourse centers on the most acute
question: would a combined Allied invasion o North-West Europe
in 1943 have been a military success or would it have been a pre-
mature aair, devoid o necessary oensive strength that would
have ultimately materialized as a strategic ailure?
On 6 March, JCS moved to accept the argument put or-
ward by Eisenhower, making clear that they were in agreement
with his overall opinion, I the war is to be won in Europe, land
orces must be developed and trained which are capable o landing
on the continent and advancing under the support o an over-
whelming air orce.2
From this point, Stephen Ambrose added, The United States
now had a strategic solution to the problem o victory in World
War II but what the Allies had, in realistic terms, was a strategic
thought, a simple idea supported by little more than liquid courage
and confdence to which substance was lent by the United States
dormant industrial rump o the decade previous.3 The British had
accepted both organization and thought on strategy with little
reservation.
With the frst stepping stone laid, the Americans sought toconvince the British o abandoning their general plan o simply
-
8/3/2019 Pages From The Second Front
17/30
3Introduction
closing the ring on Germany, and to adopt the strategy that
General George C. Marshall was putting together instead.
With comparatively much weight behind the new idea,
would the course o the war deviate ar rom the vagueness o the
British route? Why was the British plan so ormless, the ensuing
raids having been undertaken in relatively small terms and in a
seemingly haphazard manner, or better yet, why was the American
plan so large and so ocused on pushing straight into Europe?
The origins o this are closely tied to American politicaloresight. The orceul nature o the U.S. plan was indicative o
American post-war interests and establishment o authority that
escaped the nation ater the First World War. The direct push
against nazim would showcase American splendour, a remark-
able exploit in the ace o world events.
Since the cessation o hostilities in Europe 8 May 1945, the
primary realization on this specifc acet o military history is that
D-Day was certainly not a sure thing. Even beore the invasion, it
was not prescribed any degree o guaranteed success. Hours prior
to droves o invasion eets setting sail rom southern England,
ears echoed in the minds o those who planned the invasion.
The risk was understood by no one person better than
General Dwight D. Eisenhower. During the night o 5 June 1944,
Eisenhower wrote out the text o the press release that he hoped he
would never have to deliver. The note read:
Our landings have ailed to gain a satisactory oothold
and I have withdrawn the troops. My decision to attack
at this time and place was based on the best inormation
available. The troops, the air and the Navy did all that
bravery and devotion to duty could do. I any blame or
ault attaches to the attempt it is mine alone.4
-
8/3/2019 Pages From The Second Front
18/30
4 The Second Front
ing sentiment and the Second Front thus remains a point o mil-
itary controversy. In his account o the Second World War, Basil
Liddell Hart endorses the notion that any endeavour by the British
Chies o Sta to cross the Channel in 1943 would have ended in
disaster in which their estimation will hardly by questioned in
historical retrospect.5
Generals and historians have devoted little attention to the
many diverse dimensions o preparation that the Allies undertook
to prime their armies or the coming invasion o France, leavingmany to believe that D-Day represents a specifc point in history.
Indeed, the joint venture was a precise point in time in which
Allied orces attempted to punch a gap in German deences o
the Atlantic Wall; yet D-Day as an intricate component o the
war could not have existed without years o historical ramework.
For this reason, it is impossible to discuss the success or ailure
o D-Day without expanding ones basis o analysis rom days, to
months to even years leading-up to H-Hour.
When in the middle o March, the British Joint Sta Mission
in Washington, D.C., deliberated over a study that needed to be
made on specifc landing measures, a concrete pillar to that very
history was driven deep into the ground. It was not the only pillar
to be laid and it was also not the earliest. Who were the principle
persons laying these pillars, building the oundation and coming-
up with strategic ormulation? In the beginning, the plan was be-
ing laid-out by arm-chair generals.
In nmay t th Balti, Field Marshal Viscount
Montgomery wrote inconsequentially on the matter insomuch
that his ocus o several pages measures rather signifcantly in
comparison to generals, commanders and numerous ofcers othe Normandy campaign who did not remark on the subject o
-
8/3/2019 Pages From The Second Front
19/30
5Introduction
rather distant rom the battle-ront. His thinking and conceptual
need was also rather disconnected. Surprisingly, to an extraordin-
ary degree, this issue has not been deeply scrutinized as other as-
pects as the Second World War have.
Even as many notable historians and authors have invari-
ably established unique opinions on this issue within the histor-
ical feld, only recently have studies o Allied strategy and army
preparation fgured markedly in the feld.
David French, author o Ivaig eup: Th Bitih Amya it Ppaati th nmay campaig, 1942-44 observes
that many historians are breaking new ground in analyzing the
measures taken by the Allies to prepare their orces or Overlord.
Canadian historian J. A. English has recently made a micro-
study on the Canadian units that were prescribed to Normandy.
Carlo Deste and Roy Conyers Nesbit, who have also adopted a
greater circumerence o interpretation o American, British and
Canadian military traction toward a realistic plan or the invasion
o Europe, also depict essential, but oten over-looked dimensions
o this matter.
Contemplating the intensity o the battles o Normandy,
Stephen E. Ambrose posthumously uels the growth o inorma-
tion and insight o Overlord: drawing on the personal account o
more than 1,400 ordinary German, British, French, Canadian and
American soldiers rom it in d-day, Ju 6, 1944: Th climati
Battl Wl Wa II, he grasps the hidden nature o this trial by
battle; while John Keegan invariably remains one o the oremost
authorities on the history or warare in general. Producing books
that include battle-by-battle coverage o conict, Keegan has con-
tributed signifcantly to the historiography in modern warare andthemes in World War II and Operation Overlord is certainly no
-
8/3/2019 Pages From The Second Front
20/30
6 The Second Front
rested a uture adversary o the Western Alliance. Marked with
histories o hostility and even bloodshed with the West, Soviet
Russia was less amiable at nearly every step o developmental
planning.
Conventional opinion within the Soviet Union has always
ollowed Communist Party doctrine as a design or enhancing
anti-Western pose, deending the contemptuous view that the mo-
tive o the British and Americans was to acilitate blood-letting o
Soviet military strength within the Russo-German theatre o war.That the Allies lethargically prepared or an invasion whilst
truly conserving their military and economic resources to establish
post-war dominance within Europe by way o flling the subse-
quent power vacancy that at the time was expected ater the deeat
o Nazi Germany is a standpoint that mainstream opinion with-
in the U.S.S.R. had typically assumed. In ruia at Wa, Alexander
Werth recalls the general sentiments o the typical Soviet citizen as
he observed during his 1942 visits to Karelia:
[Churchill was] ...an old enemy o the Soviet Union [and
the] Soviets considered themselves lucky at the very least
that Churchill did not choose to side with Hitler.6
The majority o Soviets doubted whether there would be a
Second Front or a very long time, or at all, as long as Churchillwas in power.7 This cold sentiment remained and hampered rela-
tions between the two camps.
Werth alleges that both Churchill and Franklin Roosevelt
were eager to avoid the creation o a large ront in North-West
Europe while George F. Kennan contends in ruia a th Wt
u Li a stali that Roosevelt possessed an eagerness or
the Second Front based on the desire to placate Stalin, reconcil-
ing him to the deerment o discussing the issues o territory in
-
8/3/2019 Pages From The Second Front
21/30
7Introduction
Eastern Europe until the time when the fnal peace conerence
would provide an opportunity or urther engagement.8
The most signifcant attitude was brewing in the East. The
West, viewed as sitting idly by dispassionately while the Soviet
Union absorbed almost the entire impact o the German war
machine, was incapable o practicable military perormance on
a scale large enough to curb these sorts o eelings. They were
convincing the East through inaction that they were looking to
the post-war world and simply sought an upper-hand in post-warterritorial negotiations and the political carving o Europe ater
German capitulation.9
That the Western Allies were simply interested in the deteri-
oration o Soviet military power is a rather curious line o argu-
ment to espouse, particularly since the need or a multi-ront war
was ully recognized by the Allied powers. Roosevelt understood
how the process o two-ront war could and would reduce German
military strength to a point where the outcome would be simple
and obvious. So too was the basic concept and military arithmetic
appreciated by Marshall, Eisenhower and Churchill in this very
nature.
To posit that many politicians in the Soviet Union were be-
coming increasingly disapprovative o the West or the consistent
lethargy and inertia o their armies since the German invasion o
the Soviet Union would be an accurate conjecture. Indeed, many
months passed as German molestation o the Soviet Union had
taken place. Yet even during the grim summer o 1940, Britain
understood the importance o expanding the war as much as
possible despite the generality o the British strategy o basically
tightening the ring around Germany, there were necessary steps toollow and simultaneous expansion was just another mechanism.
-
8/3/2019 Pages From The Second Front
22/30
8 The Second Front
Building sympathy by way o the other side o the coin is a
uphill battle indeed, since ultimately casualty rates or the Soviet
Union soared in comparison to the deaths experienced in the West.
When dozens o deaths during the London Blitz were received with
shock, what sort o impact Soviet casualty rates would have on the
general public o Britain is an interesting notion to countenance.
Failure to mount a ront in ull orce outside o the
Mediterranean Theatre was not acceptable to the highest levels o
strategic command within the Allied camp according to StephenE. Ambrose in d-day: Th climati Battl Wl Wa II.10 The
act that the United States and Great Britain could have remained
militarily inert while the Soviet Union deeated the German Army
in 1943 and 1944 is a sentiment that he sharply opposed given
that ailure to ultimately mount another ront would have been
viewed by the U.S.S.R. as a blatant double-cross.11
Ambrose explains that a betrayal o the Soviet Union
through the ailure to launch a second ront might lead to a sep-
arate Nazi-Soviet treaty, or even the possibility o Red Army lib-
eration and post-war occupation o Western Europe.12 Since the
Allies were still able to think in like terms to that o the paranoid
mind o Stalin, plans were set in motion in the event that this had
occurred.
Ideals afxed with Churchills opposition to an early in-
vasion o the continent deliver a defnitive statement on Allied
plans to seek alternative routes to re-enter Nazi occupied Europe.
Wiliam R. Keylor and Jerry Bannister evoke in Th Twtith-
ctuy Wl that two considerations ultimately brought the
-
8/3/2019 Pages From The Second Front
23/30
9Introduction
British Prime Minister and the American President to oppose an
early landing in North-West Europe.13
The frst was borne in sensible concern: [1] insufcient
availability o landing-crat o a variety o types required or the
sae deliverance o Allied men and equipment, [2] U-Boat threat
o the North Atlantic, which was likened to the trench warare o
the First World War only at sea; [3] ortifed German divisions
along the Channel coast.14
This multi-aceted perspective incorporates elements thatare logistical, tactical and strategic in nature. They are broad, but
the main elements that dictated the success o ailure o Overlord.
With these in mind, they attempt to consider the broader picture,
elucidating to the need o avoiding the divisions o variables in the
deliberation o the busting back into Europe.
Keylor and Bannister, commenting on the spectre o British
deeat at Gallipoli in 1915, diversiy their perspective, and or this
reason, Churchill remained conscientious o the like ate o a pre-
mature, under-manned invasions carried-out by ill-equipped sol-
diers in lieu o the act that Churchill was blamed or the Gallipoli
ailure in 1915 while acting as frst lord o the Admiralty.15
Funds and supplies will be critical or the success o any
military operation regardless o the scale and the period o time
involved. In todays military world and in tomorrows as much as
the case has been in the distant past, victory cannot be bought.
Victory is or the most part, a wishul nostalgia that constantly de-
mands determination, dedication and endurance, while parading
as something rather easily attainable at times, is deceptively elu-
sive. This is the very thought that ran through Eisenhowers mind
when he visited the War Department in early 1942. Invasion wasonly the frst step in a series o balancing acts to support and con-
-
8/3/2019 Pages From The Second Front
24/30
10 The Second Front
stantly supply the combat units o the Allied invasion orce, as it
would eventually push its way inland rom once it had established
itsel in the lodgement area.
Roosevelt made a sensible decision in response to the prob-
lem presented to him over which theatre to commit the next sev-
eral years o orce build-up to. The scales were tipped in avour
o Operation Bolero as oppose to the trafc o American orces
to Australia. Admiral King had none-the-less ought or the U.S.
Navy to receive the attention o the President and the orces thathe could supply it with saying, important as the mounting o
[Operation] Bolero may be, the Pacifc problem is no less so, and
is certainly the more urgent it must be aced w.
Generals and commanding sta were bound to the decision
o their President and Prime Minister, but both were bound to
the will o a ar greater power, that o the general citizenry o the
United States and o Great Britain. Here, though, was an indica-
tion that choices were made in part by the general population liv-
ing in the United States. Roosevelts position was a precarious one
since the U.S. immediate enemy was made clear by a little over
200 planes in the frst week o December. This was where America
had entered the war, but to enter it in oot-dragging ashion would
have been a difcult policy to pass-by and have approved by the
American people. Thereore a decision needed be reached and
quickly. Speed was given to the decision while attention was given
to Europe but not the Pacifc.
The second consideration that saw Churchill and Roosevelt
oppose an untimely landing in North-West Europe according to
Keylor and Bannister rest in the Churchills conviction that the
North Arican coast was a ar more inviting alternative to an in-vasion o France. North Aricas coastline, or the most part, was
-
8/3/2019 Pages From The Second Front
25/30
11Introduction
subsequent invasion o the Italian mainland.16 Aricas coast pro-
vided a variety o attractive opportunities or Allied exploitation
but at the same time the theatre prescribed an over abundance o
obstacles that no amount o conceptual planning could mitigate.
Two predominant points o view should be adopted with
respect to Allied movement in the Western Mediterranean. First,
the invasion o North Arica served as a model or success since all
went well or Allied planners; Operation Torch was a success story
on a small scale that was thence applied to France, albeit muchlater in the war. Second, considering that experience accrued
rom military training and the experience bequeathed on an army
through actual combat is fnely demarcated, British and American
orces participating in Torch would show that home-land training
did not always accord with live combat; divisions that returned
home rom the Mediterranean theatre were composed o nothing
less than battle-hardened veterans.
Prior to the instigation o disagreement over the Allied
Second Front, fghting during the Second World War progressed,
death tolls soared as the war in the European theatre climaxed and
the largest invasion in the history o warare drew near. Eisenhower
made clear the situation that Allied soldiers would ace when they
returned to the continent in a statement that preceded the am-
phibious landings:
You [Allied coalition orces] will bring about the destruc-
tion o the German war machine, the elimination o Nazi
tyranny over the oppressed peoples o Europe, and secur-
ity or ourselves in a ree world. Your task will not be an
easy one. Your enemy is well trained, well equipped, and
battle-hardened. He [the German soldier] will fght savage-
ly... The ree men o the world are marching together to
victory I have ull confdence in your courage devotion to
-
8/3/2019 Pages From The Second Front
26/30
12 The Second Front
ull victory. Good luck, and let us all beseech the blessings
o Almighty God upon this great and noble undertaking.
- General Dwight D. Eisenhower17
On 6 June 1944 Normandy became the most important
theatre o the Second World War. Overlord had become the Allies
principle campaign and the soldiers o the Allied coalition against
Nazi Germany ought vigorously in opening the long awaited
Second Front in Europe.18 By the end o the day, a delicate toehold
was established in Western France with 156,000 American, British
and Canadian troops, as the orerunner to an army that eventually
grew to roughly two million men.
The ew kilometres o beach that were seized on the frst day
represented the frst step in the liberation o Paris and the even-
tual Allied crossing o the Rhine. This was achieved by way o a
marvellously executed coalition operation amid littoral conditions
that was the beginning o the end o German military dominance
in Western Europe. As the end-game began, Axis leadership could
only act to postpone what appeared to be an inevitable deeat.
Operation Overlord and its expedients were the result o
meticulous deliberation and collaboration between the chie na-
tions o the Allies that were directly involved in Overlords execu-
tion: Great Britain and the United States. Through a successiveseries o German and Italian military deeats rom the turn o
1943, the Allies had the opportunity to ascend as the dominant
orce in the European and peripheral theatres. Since Germanys
colossal invasion o the Soviet Union 22 June 1941 the need o
opening another ront in Europe was stressed by Joseph Stalin in
order to siphon German units away rom the Eastern Front and
17 General Dwight D. Eisenhower, 6 June 1944, embarkation speech on the mor- h d
-
8/3/2019 Pages From The Second Front
27/30
13Introduction
alleviate pressure that Hitlers campaign was placing on the Red
Army.
Soviet Russias alliance with the Western Allies may be char-
acterized as a precarious partnership at best and having many im-
plications on Churchill and Roosevelts decision to assume a dir-
ect strategy against Germany as well as their decision to re-enter
Europe. Deluged by sudden war, tension resounded in the politico-
military relations, ostering subsequent hostility and suspicion on
both ends o the partnership.Extreme logistical and strategic limitations impeded the
United States and Britains capacity to pursue a direct strategy
against Germany in 1943. Achievement o victory seemed possible
only through projecting a 1944 invasion o Western Europe. As a
result, 1943 was utilized as a year or peripheral drills to aid the
success o Overlord. Friction between the Western Allies and the
Soviet Union heightened as a result o this adaptation and repeat-
ed postponements o the Second Front.
Returning to Europe in 1943 presented the Allies with sub-
stantial risks in contrast to the date eected in 1944; in making an
account o the risks and rewards o creating the Second Front it is
essential to examine several main acets o the war in Europe.
From the all o France in June 1940, German military
strength steadily grew. National Socialist muscle stood at the pin-
nacle o military achievement by the early stages o Babaa.
Slowly, the German military position in the Soviet Union receded
as the war in Eastern Europe unolded and yet despite these un-
olding events, Germany retained a capacity to wage a potent o-
ensive war against both the Allies and the Soviets on two ronts
until the late summer o 1943.A cross-analysis between 1943 and 1944 German military
-
8/3/2019 Pages From The Second Front
28/30
14 The Second Front
posed a real threat to an Allied landing in 1943, creating the con-
fnes or the Allied oensive-deensive trade-o.
Establishment o Allied air and naval supremacy was an-
other vital actor inuencing the inception o a substantial lodge-
ment ahead regardless o when it was to commence. Air-power
potential was frmly proven at the very beginning o the war in
Europe in 1939. Likewise, the necessity o naval supremacy or
a successul amphibious manoeuvre was demonstrated beyond
reservation soon ater. The need or SHAEF to assert aerial andnaval dominance in Europe and over the area directly concerning
the point o invasion became a critical proviso in returning to the
continent.
Investigating Allied pre-ops in the European periphery pre-
liminary oensives undertaken in late 1942 through 1943 and the
beginning o 1944 illustrates how such moves acted as stepping
stones that laid oundation or Overlords eventual laurel.
In order to concentrate on the issue o the Second Front
while directly relating to Allied strategic planning, this book de-
ers the issue o partisan actions, including Balkan partisan orces
in Yugoslavia led by Josep Broz-Tito, f faai LItiu
[Maquis] activity as well as the impact o partisan orces operat-
ing behind German lines in the Soviet Union or elsewhere among
the many countries under German administration in occupied
Europe.
Attending to all levels o conict in the engagement o any
historical domain, while avoiding arbitration between intra-na-
tional dierences o attitude and perspective, is always a rather
pernicious challenge or historians. Accepting the recognition o
the complexity o nation-specifc interpretations and paying par-ticular attention to the various power relations that are involved in
-
8/3/2019 Pages From The Second Front
29/30
15Introduction
an integral role in the grandeur o orchestrating large-scale coali-
tion warare during the Second World War.
Map 1: Europe in 1939 Beore the StormFrom conise Historial Atlas of World War 2 by Story, R (2005`)
used by permission o Oxord University Press, Inc.
-
8/3/2019 Pages From The Second Front
30/30
Purchase this book and others at http://ShopPagemaster.ca
http://shoppagemaster.ca/http://shoppagemaster.ca/