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PACIFIC STATES/BRITISH COLUMBIAOIL SPILL TASK FORCE

2005 ANNUAL REPORT

PACIFIC STATES/BRITISH COLUMBIAOIL SPILL TASK FORCE

2005 ANNUAL REPORT

Editor: JEAN CAMERON

Executive CoordinatorPacific States/British Columbia Oil Spill Task Force

Art, Design & CHRISTY SUTTON

Production: Sutton Design Ventures

Printed on recycled paper

iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PREFACE PAGE 1

VISION, MISSION, GOALS AND OBJECTIVES 2

KEY TASK FORCE PERSONNEL 3

FROM THE EXECUTIVE COORDINATOR 4

2004-2005 IN REVIEW 6

Oil Spill Task Force Activities and Accomplishments

Spill Prevention Projects 6Spill Preparedness and

Response Projects 17

Communications Projectsand Activities 20

Task Force Member Agency Activities and Accomplishments

Alaska 24British Columbia 30California 32Hawaii 39Oregon 42Washington 44

iv

The states of Alaska, Washington,Oregon, California, and Hawaiihave joined with the Province ofBritish Columbia in order tocombine resources and coordinateefforts to protect their sharedwaters and 56,660 miles ofsensitive coastlines from thedevastating impacts of oil spills.

ALASKA

BRITISH COLUMBIA

WASHINGTON

OREGON

CALIFORNIA

HAWAII

Honolulu

Los Angeles

San Francisco

Portland

Vancouver

Seattle/Tacoma

Prince Rupert

Ketchitan

Juneau

Valdez

AnchorageYukon

Territory

Mexico

PACIFIC STATES/BRITISH COLUMBIA OIL SPILL TASK FORCE

This Annual Report of the Pacific States/BritishColumbia Oil Spill Task Force is submitted to thePremier of British Columbia and the Governors ofCalifornia, Oregon, Washington, Hawaii, andAlaska, as well as to the citizens whom theyrepresent. It provides information on the activitiesand accomplishments of the Task Force and itsmember agencies from July 2004 through June2005.

The States/British Columbia Oil Spill Task Forcewas established by a Memorandum of Cooperationsigned in 1989, following two West Coast oil spillincidents. The first involved the barge Nestucca,which spilled oil impacting the coasts ofWashington and British Columbia in December of1988. The second incident was the catastrophicspill by the T/V Exxon Valdez in Alaska's PrinceWilliam Sound in March of 1989. These eventshighlighted common concerns shared by WestCoast states and the Province of British Columbiarelated to spill risks from coastal vessel traffic, theneed for cooperation across shared borders, and ashared commitment among West Coast citizens ofboth the US and Canada to protect their uniquemarine resources.

The Oil Spill Task Force produced a report inOctober of 1990 that included 46 jointrecommendations for spill prevention andresponse, as well as recommendations specific toeach member's jurisdiction. Most of theserecommendations have since been incorporatedinto state or provincial statutes, rules, orprograms. They are also reflected in the USFederal Oil Pollution Act passed in 1990 (OPA

'90), as well as the Canadian Shipping ActAmendments adopted in 1993.

As state/provincial and federal policies andprograms are implemented, the continuing focusof the Task Force is on fostering regulatorycompatibility, sharing information and resources,and coordinating regional projects to improve oilspill prevention, preparedness, and response inthe shared Pacific waters of the US and Canada.These efforts are guided by our five-year StrategicPlans and are based on our Mission, Goals, andObjectives as stated on the following page.

When the State of Hawaii authorized itsDepartment of Health, Environmental HealthDivision, to join the Task Force in 2001, thegoverning Memorandum of Cooperation wasupdated and signed by Hawaii Governor BenjaminCayetano, Alaska Governor Tony Knowles,Washington Governor Gary Locke, OregonGovernor John Kitzhaber, California GovernorGray Davis, and Gordon Campbell, Premier ofBritish Columbia. The organization’s name waschanged to the Pacific States/British Columbia OilSpill Task Force.

◆

This Annual Report does not reflect oil spillprevention and response activities on the part ofany federal agencies or industry organizationsexcept as may have occurred in response to or incooperation with the Pacific States/BritishColumbia Oil Spill Task Force or a memberagency.

1

PREFACE

Ongoing Goals:

To prevent both large oil spills that causecatastrophic impacts in the waters of our memberjurisdictions and the cumulative impacts ofchronic small spills;

To coordinate communication, policy development,response capabilities, prevention andpreparedness initiatives, and education in orderto maximize efficiency of effort; to learn from oneanother and share ideas and “products”;

To clarify the roles and responsibilities of state,provincial, and federal agencies in order toreduce regulatory gaps, overlaps, and conflicts;

To advocate in national and international arenas onselected issues of common concern, earningrespect through credibility, clarity of purpose,and collaboration;

To work cooperatively with federal agencies, vesseland facility operators, the oil industry, responsecontractors, public interest groups, and allconcerned citizens to create opportunities forpolitical and technological breakthroughs byserving as a catalyst for progressive change;

To educate the public on the impacts of oil spills andissues relating to spill prevention, preparedness,response, and restoration; and

To serve as a model of regional cooperation andcoordination.

Objectives:

Spill Prevention: To prevent oil spills from vessels,pipelines, facilities, vehicles and railroadsthrough development and implementation ofregulatory and public/private partnerships.

Spill Preparedness and Response: To enhance oilspill preparedness and response capabilities in USand Canadian Pacific coastal areas.

Communications: To continuously improvecommunications within the Task Force as well aswith key stakeholders and the general public, andto maintain a high level of public and stakeholderinvolvement in Task Force activities.

2

VISION, MISSION, GOALS, and OBJECTIVES

Long Term Vision Statement:No Spilled Oil.

Mission Statement:The mission of the Oil Spill Task Force is to strengthen state and Provincial abilities to prevent, prepare for, andrespond to oil spills.

KEY TASK FORCE PERSONNEL

Task Force MembersKURT FREDRIKSSON (2004-2005)

COMMISSIONER, Alaska Department ofEnvironmental Conservation

LAURENCE LAU (2003-2005)DEPUTY DIRECTOR, Hawaii Division ofEnvironmental Health

JAY MANNING (2005)DIRECTOR, Washington Department of Ecology

CARL MOORE (2003-2005)ADMINISTRATOR, Office of SpillPrevention and Response, California Department of Fish and Game

PAUL SLYMAN (2001-2005)DEPUTY DIRECTOR, Oregon Departmentof Environmental Quality

CHRIS TRUMPY (2005)DEPUTY MINISTER, British ColumbiaMinistry of Environment

Coordinating Committee Members:LISA CURTIS (2005)

Office of Spill Prevention andResponse, California Department ofFish and Game

LARRY DIETRICK (1999-2005)Alaska Department of EnvironmentalConservation

CURTIS MARTIN (2001-2005)Office of Hazard Evaluation andEmergency Response

JON NEEL (1989-1998, 2005)Washington Department of Ecology

STAFFORD REID (1992-1999, 2004-2005) British Columbia Ministry of Water,Land and Air Protection

MIKE ZOLLITSCH (1997-2005)Oregon Department of Environmental Quality

Executive Coordinator:JEAN CAMERON (1993-2005)

Pacific States/British Columbia Oil Spill Task Force

3

FROM THE EXECUTIVE COORDINATOR

Looking back on our 2004-2005 work year, I’m impressed by the remarkable amount of effort

which the Task Force is able to leverage on a regional basis. The contributions of multiple

agencies and persons was most noticeable in the Places of Refuge project, which brought together

thirty-eight workgroup members and alternates representing thirty agencies and organizations. In

less than one year, they produced a template for planning and expedited decision-making to deal

with Places of Refuge requests from ships in need of assistance. Other initiatives which involved

member agencies and regional stakeholders included a focus on improving prevention,

preparedness, and response to truck spills as well as a focus on spills during oil transfers.

Besides these new initiatives, we continued and improved on a number of efforts. The Database

Workgroup not only provided new information on transfer spills, but was also successful in fine-

tuning their data gathering in order to allow us to better target our spill prevention projects. The

Pacific Oil Spill Prevention Education Team (POSPET) expanded its membership and met twice

to share oil spill outreach strategies and plan cooperative projects to prevent small spills. Our

website has been fine-tuned to provide information to stakeholders regarding our activities and

has been heavily used. Our 2004 Annual Meeting was our 15th anniversary, and we were

honored to include remarks from three of our “founders” as well as several Legacy Award

winners.

The Task Force maintains a growing number of “ongoing” efforts, ranging from the 1-800-OILS-

911 spill reporting number to tracking the status of TransAlaska Pipeline (TAPS) tankers plying

our shared waters. Keeping in mind that our mission is to “strengthen state and Provincial

abilities to prevent, prepare for, and respond to oil spills,” we also revisited a 1995 agreement on

credit for Drills and Exercises and agreed that the decade-old protocols were no longer feasible.

Our member agencies are still willing to allow credit for drills/exercises in other member

jurisdictions on a case-by-case basis, but will no longer follow the 1995 protocols.

I definitely want to acknowledge the good working relationships we enjoy with a number of US

and Canadian federal agencies. In particular, I would like to thank the US Coast Guard and

Transport Canada for the extensive effort they invested to develop the Places of Refuge annex. In4

Dear Reader,

addition, US EPA, the Canadian Coast Guard, and Environment Canada were able to meet with

the Task Force Coordinating Committee during the past year to share updates and look for

opportunities for collaboration.

The Task Force welcomed three new Members this year: Jay Manning, Director of the

Washington Department of Ecology, Chris Trumpy, Deputy Minister of British Columbia Ministry

of Environment, and Kurt Fredriksson, Commissioner of the Alaska Department of

Environmental Conservation. Actually, it’s “welcome back” to Kurt, who served on the Task Force

Coordinating Committee in the past. We also welcome Jon Neel back as Ecology’s Coordinating

Committee member and Lisa Curtis to the Coordinating Committee for the California Office of

Spill Prevention and Response. It’s a good team, and one that’s well qualified for the work

ahead!

Sincerely,

Jean R. Cameron

Executive Coordinator

5

SPILL PREVENTION PROJECTS:

THE DATABASE PROJECT

The Task Force’s regional oil spill database débutedin 2003. Each year our annual report includes acompilation of regional data from the prior year aswell as a trend analysis. Our ongoing goal iscontinuous improvement of this database in order toprovide information on spill trends and causalfactors; this allows us to better target our spillprevention efforts.

The Database Workgroup is chaired by Jack Barfieldof the Washington Department of Ecology. Othermembers include Christell Spinelli and Spencer Ungof the California Office of Spill Prevention andResponse, Mary Lou Perry of the Oregon Dept. ofEnvironmental Quality, Marcia Graf and CurtisMartin of the Hawaii Office of Hazard Evaluationand Emergency Response, Stafford Reid of the BCMinistry of Environment, and Camille Stevens of theAlaska Dept. of Environmental Conservation.

The Database Workgroup endeavors to refine datasubmittals consistent with the Task Force DataDictionary, with particular emphasis on reducing theamount of data categorized as “other” or“unknown” to no more than 5% in any category. Itis an ongoing challenge to refine information enteredinto the database to a level of specificity thatsupports effective analysis while also conforming tothe varied collection capabilities of memberagencies.

The 2004 data is available below. In the interest ofclarity, only those products whose contribution isgreater than 5% of the total spill volume arepresented.

Spill data from 2002 and 2003 are available on theTask Force website at www.oilspilltaskforce.org.Please note that our database is created andmaintained for information purposes only. The datarepresents the respective agencies’ best informationat the time it was entered into the database. Eachagency that assists in the creation and maintenanceof the Task Force database in no way guarantees theaccuracy of the information and no guarantee ofaccuracy shall be expressed or implied.

One way in which we promote consistentapplication of the Data Dictionary among ourmember agencies is to sponsor an AccidentInvestigation course taught by Det Norske Veritas

every other year. The course has been refined andenhanced over more than two decades by lossmanagement experts. Investigators are trained tosystematically evaluate and analyze information anddata in order to determine the root causes andcontributing factors that lead to near-misses,incidents, accidents, and/or spills. Determining rootcauses and contributing factors is essential to thedevelopment of effective prevention andenforcement programs by government agencies andindustry operating companies. The 2005 course washosted by OSPR in Sacramento May 10-12th; thanksto Megan Walton, OSPR’s Training Coordinator fororganizing the event. A total of twenty-four personsfrom OSPR, Ecology, and HEER attending the event.

NON-CRUDE SPILLS

6

2004-2005 IN REVIEW:

OIL SPILL TASK FORCE ACTIVITIES AND ACCOMPLISHMENTS

Note: total includes two spills totaling290,175 gallons. Excluding these two spills,the 2004 total is consistent with 2003.

NON-CRUDE GALLONSBunker Oil/HFO 272023Diesel oil 136513Aviation fuel 125822Gasoline 50506Asphalt/Creosote 23600Other 17766Drill waste/process water 16002Transformer oil 8003Lube oil 6178Oily water mixture 5640Kerosene 4332Home heating oil 3022Waste oil 2459Hydraulic oil 2014Unknown 1295TOTAL 675,175

0

50000

100000

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Non-Crude Spills by Product >5% ThresholdBy Jurisdiction - 2004

Bunker Oil/HFODiesel oilAviation fuelGasoline

Non-Crude Spills by Product Regional - 2004

19%, 12582221%, 136513

41%, 272023

1%

2%

3%, 17776

3%, 23600

7%, 50506

Bunker Oil/HFODiesel oilAviation fuelGasolineAsphalt/CreosoteOtherDrill waste/process waterTransformer oilLube oilOily water mixtureKeroseneHome heating oilWaste oilHydraulic oilUnknown

SUMMARY BY PRODUCT SPILLED

FOCUS:

“Diesel Oil” and “Gasoline” were thelargest contributors in 2003. The 2004data also includes “Bunker oil” and“Aviation fuel” in the top categories;however these latter two are heavilyskewed by the two large spillsreferenced above. Without these twospills – a Weyerhaeuser bunker oilspill in WA and a pipeline aviation fuelspill in CA - the major contributors ofdiesel and gasoline are consistentwith the 2003 data.

The combined total of “Other” and“Unknown” product spilled was 2.8%in 2004. This represents a significantimprovement over the 12% in 2003.

7



In the interest of clarity, only those productswhose contribution is greater than 5% of thetotal spill volume are presented.

Non-Crude Spills by Source Regional - 2004

6%, 41228

10%, 67358

19%, 131353

60%, 404336

4%, 259291%

FacilityPipelineVehicleVesselUnknownOther

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Non-Crude Spills by Source By Jurisdiction - 2004

FacilityPipelineVehicleVessel

SUMMARY OF SPILLSBY SOURCE

FOCUS:

“Facilities” and “Vehicles” were thelargest contributors in 2003. In 2004,the analysis of the spill source is againskewed by the large WA facility spill(Weyerhaueser) and the CA pipelinespill. These two spills caused thefacility contribution to increase from48% to 60% and the pipelinecontribution to be ranked as thesecond highest contributor at 19%.

The combined total of “Other” and“Unknown” spill sources was 4.6%compared to the 13% of the 2003data. This shows a continuingsignificant improvement in the qualityof the data collected.

The top two contributors towardsfacility spills in 2004 were“Commercial/industrial Facilities” andthe “Other” category; this isconsistent with the 2003 results.

The commercial/industrial facilityshare increased from 39% to 77%,skewed by the WashingtonWeyerhaeuser spill.

The “Other” category decreased to10% (from 25% in 2003), but is stillabove the target threshold of 5%. Themajor contributors to the “Other”category were 109 spills in AK andnine spills in WA.

8



Non-Crude Spills by Vehicle Type Regional - 2004

19%, 12554

36%, 24318

42%, 28811

2%, 1020

1%

TrainCommercial TruckTank TruckOtherAircraftUnknown

Non-Crude Spills by Facility Type Regional - 2004

10%, 40453

77%, 310846

9%, 357912%, 8962

1%

1%

Commercial/industrial facilityOtherBulk Oil FacilityRefineryResidential Fuel Storage TankRetail petroleum outletMarina

SUMMARY OF SPILLSBY SOURCE

FOCUS: (continued)

Spills by trains continue to be themajor component of spills by vehicles,contributing 42%, compared to 45%in 2003.

Consequent to the review of the 2003data, the category of “CommercialTruck” under the vehicle heading wasadded for the 2004 data. Commercialtrucks were the second-largestcontributor, representing 36% of thevolume spilled by vehicles.

The following two graphics show the breakoutof spills by facilities and vehicles.

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Non-Crude by Causal Factor Regional - 2004

6%, 41083

36%, 244781 53%, 358700

3%, 18696

1%

1% Human Error

Equipment Failure

Other

Unknown

External conditions

Organization/ManagementFailure

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Non-Crude Spills by Causal Factor By Jurisdiction - 2004

Human ErrorEquipment FailureOther

SUMMARY OF SPILLSBY CAUSAL FACTOR

FOCUS:

The top two Causal Factorcontributors in 2004 were “HumanError” (53%) and “Equipment Failure”(36%). This is consistent with the 2003data, although human error increasedfrom the 2003 value of 30% (skewedby the WA Weyerhaeuser spill).

The category of “Unknown” showeda substantial decrease from a share of17% of the spill volume in 2003 to 3%in 2004.

The “Other” category decreased from8% in 2003 to 6% in 2004, but is stillabove the target threshold of 5%.

10



Non-Crude Spills by Human Error 2004

20%, 71256

76%, 270210

1%1% 1%

1%

0%0%

JudgementunknownInattentionImproper equipment useDumpingFatigueProcedural ErrorOther

Non-Crude Spills by Equipment Failure

2004

6%, 14884

6%, 14019

86%, 210604

2%, 4574

Structural FailureMechanical FailureUnknownOtherElectrical failure

SUMMARY OF SPILLSBY CAUSAL FACTOR

EQUIPMENT FAILURE:

“Structural Failure” and “MechanicalFailure” continue to be the top twocontributors to spills caused byequipment failure. The structuralfailure share increased to 86% from70% in 2003, skewed by the WAWeyerhaeuser facility spill. Theequipment failure contributiondecreased to 6% from 22% in 2003.However these percentage resultswere also skewed by the increasedtotal volume of spills; the actualvolume spilled remained fairlyconstant at approximately 15,000gals. For both years.

HUMAN ERROR:

Within the overall “Human Error”causal category, “Judgement” wasthe largest contributor, heavilyskewed by the WA Weyerhaeuserfacility spill.

Of note is that although the largest2003 contributor, “Unknown,”decreased from 54% to 20%, theactual spill volume due to this factorincreased from 36,738 gals in 2003 to71,256 gals in 2004.

The conclusion is that our ability todrill down and determine moreprecise causal relationships, beyondthe basic four factors, is limited bylack of investigational resources.

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Non-Crude Spills by Activity Regional - 2004

29%, 193994

40%, 270560

14%, 94170

3%, 20492

4%, 25916

8%, 55973

2%, 13070

Maintenance/testingOtherUnreportedOil transferUnknownUnderwayStationaryBallasting/deballasting

Non-Crude Spills by Oil Transfer Evolution Regional - 2004

2%, 20012%, 1614

33%, 4276

53%, 6980

FuelingOil transfer (non-fuel)Loading/discharging (Cargo)Internal transfer

2%, 20012%, 1614

33%, 4276

53%, 6980

FuelingOil transfer (non-fuel)Loading/discharging (Cargo)Internal transfer

0

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Non-Crude Spills by Activity By Agency - 2004

Maintenance/testingOtherUnreportedUnknownOil transfer

SUMMARY OF SPILLSBY ACTIVITY

FOCUS:

The Workgroup was assigned, for thefirst time in 2004, the task of analyzingspills from the standpoint of theactivity in progress at the time of spill.

This effort showed marginal initialvalue due to the large number ofspills for which the activity was“Unknown” or unreported, and thoseassigned to the “Other” category.Unknown/Unreported comprised 22%of the total volume spilled and Otherwas 29%.

The major contributors to theUnknown/Unreported category wasAK with 256 spills. The “Other”category was dominated by OR with122 spills. CA had only four spills inthe “Other” category, but the largepipeline spill is reflected in the graphof the volume spilled.

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A specific breakout of spills during oil transfer evolutionsshows that fueling is the largest contributor.

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Crude Spills by Source Regional 2004

FacilityOther

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Crude Spills by Causal Factor Regional 2004

UnknownEquipment FailureHuman Error

Crude vs. Non-Crude2004

0%, 2092

CrudeNon-Crude

0%, 2092

100%, 675175

CrudeNon-Crude

SUMMARY OF CRUDE SPILLS

ANALYSIS:

The analysis of crude oil spills is notinstructive due to the low number andvolume of these spills – crudeaccounted for only seven spillsrepresenting 0.3% of the total volumespilled. All of these spills were in AK,and all but one unknown spill of 100gals. originated at a facility.

CRUDE SPILLS

13



14



PREVENTING AND CONTAINING SPILLSDURING OIL TRANSFERS

Another project during our 2004-2005 work yearfocused on preventing spills which occur during thetransfer of petroleum products. Stan Norman andLinda Pilkey-Jarvis of the Washington Department ofEcology served as project leaders.

Jack Barfield and the other members of the DatabaseWorkgroup compiled information on activitiesduring transfer spills over the past five years;summaries follow:

• Crude oil spill volumes tended to be muchlarger than diesel; there were only nine crudeoil spills, while there were 47 diesel spills.See Table below:

• Although Commercial/Industrial Facilitywas the dominant source type, there wereonly five spills in this category during thereporting period. The data is influenced byone 38,000 gallon spill in AK. See Tablefollowing:

• The causal data is consistent withWashington State results for rigorouslyinvestigated incidents, which indicate thatabout 80% of all incidents have as aproximate cause either Human Error orOrganizational/ Management Failure. Bycontrast, spills that are not rigorouslyinvestigated have tended to assign EquipmentFailure as the dominant cause.

• The Alaska DEC did not collect “Activity”on spills during this period. Hence, thedecision to include (or not) a spill was basedon whether the data as a whole seemed likelyto point to a transfer spill. In most of the AKdata, it was not possible to determine aprecise activity, hence the large proportion of

SOURCE TYPE GALLONSCommercial/Industrial Facility 38634Tank Ship 20517Tank Barge 14664Fishing Vessel 13650Tank Truck 9840Bulk Oil Facility 3523Container/Cargo Ship 2578Public Vessel 2016Recreational Vessel 510Passenger Ship/Ferry 360Marina 75Other 6313

TOTAL 112,680

IMMEDIATE CAUSE GALLONSHuman Error 104106Equipment Failure 6257Organization/Management Failure 1374

External Conditions 300Other 200Unknown 443

TOTAL 112,680

TYPE OIL GALLONSCrude oil 48913Diesel oil 35419Bunker oil/HFO 15959Gasoline 8592IFO 1558Home heating oil 140Lube oil 400Kerosene 900Other 215Unknown 584

TOTAL 112,680

“Unknown” in this graphic. If the“Unknown” spills are discarded, the primarycontribution is from fueling (bunkering), aswould be expected. Cargo oil transfersaccount for the second largest contribution.

We also compiled information on the regulations ofour member agencies - as well as US federalagencies - governing oil transfers. These arepresented in a table format and are available on ourwebsite at: http://www.oilspilltaskforce.org/docs/project_reports/OilTransferRegulatoryMatrix.pdf.

The table also provides a link to the voluntaryguidelines for Tank Truck to Marine Vessel OilTransfers, developed by the Canadian Coast Guardand Environment Canada.

We will continue to track spill activity informationand the Task Force member agencies will track thetransfer regulations developed by the State ofWashington. The Task Force provides a forum formember agencies to share policy initiatives, learnfrom one another, and strive for consistency.

BEST INDUSTRY SPILL PREVENTION PRACTICES

Following the Locke vs. Intertanko U.S. SupremeCourt decision in March 2000, the 13th Coast GuardDistrict and the Washington Department of Ecologyset out to identify gaps between the existinginternational and federal regulatory regimes for tankvessels and the Washington State standards thatwere pre-empted by the Supreme Court decision.Once the gaps were identified, they were ranked byCoast Guard marine safety professionals and thelicensed mariners at Ecology to determine whichgaps were most important for reducing the risk of anoil spill. The gaps for tankers and tank barges wereidentified and ranked separately. Consensus wasreached on the relative ranking of the gaps.

In 2003, the Task Force took the gap analysis to thenext level by enlisting the input of industry leadersin the ranking process; Stan Norman served as thelead on this project. Based on the strongrecommendation of the very experienced andrespected tanker operators that contributed to theranking process, the gap analysis for self-propelledtank vessels was expanded to include all largecommercial vessels. To access our report on thisproject and the industry rankings, please go to thefollowing site: http://www.oilspilltaskforce.org/docs/project_reports/VesselBipReport.pdf.

Our next step is to find ways to close these gapsthrough voluntary, non-regulatory measures.Washington and the 13th District have enjoyed somesuccess in introducing voluntary measures byincorporating them in Harbor Safety Plans asStandards of Care. Based on the Washingtonexperience, the Pacific States/BC Oil Spill Task Forcehas requested that the Marine Safety Office of the USCoast Guard (USCG) Pacific Area forward the LargeCommercial Vessel Best Industry Practices to PacificArea Harbor Safety Committees through the Districts,recommending incorporation in Harbor Safety Plans.We also requested that USCG Pacific Area convenethe Pacific Area USCG/AWO Quality SteeringCommittee to consider the adoption of the Tank BargeBest Industry Practices through Harbor Safety Plansand/or the AWO Responsible Carrier Program.

THE PACIFIC OIL SPILL PREVENTIONEDUCATION TEAM

The Pacific Oil Spill Prevention Education Team(POSPET) met in October 2004 and again in April of2005 to share outreach strategies and plan forcollaborative projects. POSPET members representWashington Sea Grant, Washington’s Departmentsof Ecology and Natural Resources, the PugetSoundkeeper Alliance, the USCG Marine SafetyAuxiliary, OceanWatch Boaters Association of BritishColumbia, the BC Ministry of Water, Land, and AirProtection, the Canadian Marine EnvironmentProtection Society, the Georgia Strait Alliance,Oregon DEQ, the Oregon Marine Board, the PacificStates Marine Fisheries Commission HabitatEducation Program, the California CoastalCommission, and the California Office of SpillPrevention and Response. POSPET is chaired by EricOlsson of Washington Sea Grant.

POSPET evolved from the simple premise that smalloil spills are a regional problem that can best be 15



ACTIVITY GALLONSUnknown 58444Fueling 27806Cargo Operations 20782Internal Transfer 4970Oil Transfer (non-fuel) 100Ballasting/Deballasting 578

TOTAL 112,680

16

remedied through collaborative projects drawingfrom existing talent and resources. For over adecade, POSPET has served as a forum forexchanging information and outreach ideas whileproviding boat and marina operators with aconsistent and accurate spill prevention message.

POSPET encourages networking to both exchangeideas and to help its members adopt innovativeapproaches. Through informal collaboration andaccess to beneficial member review and feedback,POSPET adds value and has improved the qualityand reach of individual efforts.

In addition to its successful Spills Aren’t Slickcampaign, POSPET has also been instrumental inpromoting the innovative 1-800-OILS-911 spillreporting number in British Columbia, Washington,Oregon, and California. Using this easy-to-remembernumber, a boater reporting an oil spill isautomatically routed to the correct emergencyresponse call center in any of those jurisdictions.The Pacific States/BC Oil Spill Task Force providesstaff support for POSPET and maintains this valuablespill reporting number.

More information about POSPET and its memberscan be found on our website at www.oilspilltaskforce.org.

MONITORING TAPS TANKERS AND VESSELSTRANSITING BETWEEN JURISDICTIONS

Laura Stratton of the Washington Department ofEcology provides the Task Force agencies withquarterly information on the status of the Trans-Alaska Pipeline (TAPS) tankers that transit the WestCoast. These reports cover owner/operator, date ofbuild or scheduled date of build, hull configuration,deadweight tonnage, conversion date if single hull ordouble bottom, and retirement date. Thisinformation is available on the Task Force websiteat: http://www.ecy.wa.gov/programs/spills/prevention/bap/TAPS%20Trade%20Tanker%20Report.pdf

The Task Force member agencies also track trends inthe US Coast Guard’s Critical Area InspectionProgram for TAPS tankers. In addition, Task Forcemember agencies share information amongthemselves regarding casualties and incidentsinvolving both tank and non-tank vessels that aretransiting between our member jurisdictions.

SPILL PREVENTION TOPICS OF CONCERN

Each year the Coordinating Committee monitors andshares information on selected spill preventiontopics. Our spill prevention topics for 2004-2005included:

• Cruise ship operations with regard to spillsand other water pollution impacts

• Oil spill prevention research and development• Pipeline spill prevention• Offshore Lightering• Oil spill risks from sunken vessels• Waste oil dumping• Salvage capabilities and regulations• Liquefied Natural Gas shipping and terminal

operations





17

SPILL PREPAREDNESS ANDRESPONSE PROJECTS:

PLACES OF REFUGE

After the T/V Prestige incident off the coast of Spainin late 2002, the Members of the Pacific States/BCOil Spill Task Force recognized the possibility that aPlace of Refuge incident could happen on theUS/Canadian West Coast as well. They agreed tosponsor a Roundtable discussion on Places of Refugein conjunction with their 2003 Annual Meeting.After participating in that discussion, they invitedthe US Coast Guard and Canadian authorities to jointhem in sponsoring a stakeholder workgroup toaddress the issue of Places of Refuge and developrecommendations.

The Places of Refuge Project Workgroup convenedin February, 2004. They adopted a project charterand established a Subcommittee to develop anannex for US Area Plans that would operationalizethe Guidelines on Places of Refuge for Ships in Needof Assistance which had been adopted by theInternational Maritime Organization in December, 2003.

That Subcommittee worked throughout the spring of2004 to draft a Places of Refuge Area Plan Annex.The Project Workgroup and West Coast AreaCommittees reviewed the draft over the summer,and the public commented on the draft in the fall.All comments were reviewed by the Subcommitteeand necessary changes made.

The Project Workgroup met in December of 2004 fora final review and edit process. They unanimouslyapproved the final draft and recommended it to theWest Coast Area Committees for use as a planningand decision-making template to address ships’requests for a Place of Refuge. They alsorecommended that Canadian authorities, who were inthe process of drafting national guidelines toimplement the IMO Guidelines, should take thisdocument into consideration during that process.Finally, the Workgroup recommended that themember agencies of the Pacific States/BC Oil SpillTask Force endorse the Places of Refuge Annexdeveloped by the Project Workgroup, and that theirmember agencies participate in its implementationand monitor its application and the efficacy of its use.

On February 2, 2005, US Coast Guard CaptainRobert Lorigan, Chief of Marine Safety for the PacificArea, distributed the Places of Refuge Annex toDistricts 11, 13, 14, and 17 and encouraged their

Area Committees to complete the pre-planningappendices as soon as possible. He also copied theAtlantic Area US Coast Guard as well as theCommandant’s office.

Stafford Reid, the Task Force CoordinatingCommittee member for the British ColumbiaMinistry of Water, Land, and Air Protection, hasadapted the Places of Refuge Area Plan Annex intoan operational guideline to serve as part of the BCMarine Oil Spill Response Plan. As of April 21,Transport Canada had drafted a NationalContingency Plan for Places of Refuge and plannedto send it to all regions for comment. TransportCanada Pacific Region had developed a draft“Mapping of Potential Places of Refuge for the WestCoast of Canada” for consultation.

Jean Cameron, the Task Force ExecutiveCoordinator, has made presentations on the Placesof Refuge Annex to the Mexico/US Joint ResponseTeam for the Pacific and to the National HarborSafety Conference. She has been invited to presentthe annex at the CANUSLANT exercise in June andto the American Salvage Association conference in November, 2005. John Bauer of the AlaskaDepartment of Environmental Conservation, whoserved on the Subcommittee and was instrumentalin the development of the Annex, presented a paper on it at the International Oil Spill Conference in May.

The Places of Refuge Area Plan annex and the fullproject report are available on the Task Forcewebsite: www.oilspilltaskforce.org.

REVIEW OF TASK FORCE AGREEMENT ONDRILL/EXERCISE CREDITS

In 1995, the Members of the Pacific States/BritishColumbia Oil Spill Task Force acceptedrecommendations from a stakeholder ProjectWorkgroup regarding protocols for granting creditfor drills and exercises conducted in other TaskForce member jurisdictions.

The Oil Spill Task Force Coordinating Committeewas charged by our 2004-2005 Annual Work Plan toreview the 1995 Drill and Exercise credit protocols.After doing so at their 2004 Fall Quarterly meeting,the Coordinating Committee reported to the TaskForce Members that the credit protocols are nolonger practical. For example, the protocols requirethat a plan holder or response organization invitethe agency from which they are seeking credit to

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attend and observe the drill. This would involve out-of-state travel, and most member agencies facebudget restrictions on travel.

In lieu of actual observation of the drill, the 1995protocols do allow for an evaluation to be completedby the drilling agency or an “independent thirdparty,” (although that term is not defined in thereport), or as a last resort, a self-evaluation usingapproved checklists may be submitted. However,each member agency currently has a very specificdrill/exercise checklist and they do not believe thatthe generic checklist developed by theDrills/Exercises Workgroup in 1995 is adequate. Nordo they believe that one checklist would suffice forall member agencies. In addition, many of the TaskForce member agencies are now emphasizingunannounced drills, which preclude advancearrangements for review/credit. Furthermore, theissues involved in deployment drills – which theyconsider crucial – vary greatly from one location toanother.

Although the Task Force Members concur that the1995 drill/exercise credit protocols are no longerfeasible, they still encourage contingency planholders and Oil Spill Response Organizations toapproach member agencies on a case-by-case basison the issue of credit for drills and exercises in othermember jurisdictions.

SPILLS FROM TRUCKS: PREVENTION,PREPAREDNESS, AND RESPONSE

The Oil Spill Task Force sponsored a roundtablediscussion on truck spills on March 24th in Portland,Oregon. Thirty eight people participated,representing state and federal regulatory agencies,trucking companies, trucking associations,environmental response firms, and insurancecompanies.

Keith Anderson of the Oregon Department ofEnvironmental Quality (ODEQ) presented thekeynote address, which focused on the potential forharm to people, the environment, and infrastructurewhich truck spills represent. Case studypresentations by state and federal on-scenecoordinators followed, providing details on theimpacts of truck spills in Oregon, Washington,Idaho, and California.

Janelle Brewster of the Federal Motor Carrier SafetyAdministration briefed attendees on the US DOT’sspill prevention and response regulations and

programs. Although representatives were not able toattend for the US Coast Guard and TransportCanada, information about their regulations wassubmitted.

Industry perspectives were provided by CharlesTindall, Vice President Blue Line Transportation;John Skowronski of the Canadian PetroleumProducts Institute; Cholly Mercer, President ofRainier Petroleum Corporation; and Andrew Woods,Environmental Manager of Bulk Transportation.

Summary notes of the Roundtable, photos from thePowerPoint presentations, speaker bios, informationfrom the US Coast Guard and Transport Canada,plus a set of recommended actions by state orProvincial officials can all be found on our website:www.oilspilltaskforce.org.

CONTINGENCY PLANNING REQUIREMENTSFOR NON-TANK VESSELS

The Task Force member agencies were pleased thatSection 701 of the 2004 US Coast GuardReauthorization Act, HR 2443, authorizes the USCoast Guard to require non-tank vessels of 400 GT orlarger to submit oil spill contingency plans byAugust 9, 2005. Alaska requires contingency plansfrom non-tank vessels of 400 GT or larger; Oregon,Washington, and California require them from non-tank vessels of 300 GT or larger. British Columbia iscovered by the Canada Shipping Act, which requiresall vessels of 400 GT or larger to have contracts withcertified response organizations in addition to theirinternational Shipboard Oil Pollution EmergencyPlans.

Section 701 also contains language which requiresthat while developing non-tank vessel regulations,the US Coast Guard “consider any applicable State-mandated response plan in effect on the date of theenactment of the Coast Guard and MaritimeTransportation Act of 2004 and ensure consistencyto the extent practicable.” Towards this goal, theTask Force Executive Coordinator and CarltonMoore, the Task Force Member from California, metwith Captain Joe Saboe of the USCG Office ofResponse in October of 2004 and briefed him on thecontingency planning requirements of our memberagencies as well as the Task Force’s 2004recommendations regarding key contingency planelements. For non-tank vessels, we recommendedthat the emphasis should be on IncidentManagement Teams, response organizationcontracts, and streamlined contingency plans.



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The USCG issued a Navigation and Vessel InspectionCircular in February of 2005 which provides interimguidance for the development and review of non-tank vessel response plans, pending adoption of finalregulations. Regulations had not been published asof this writing.

1-800-OILS-911

The Task Force maintains this toll-free spill reportingnumber in California, Oregon, Washington, andBritish Columbia. The number automatically reachesthe 24-hour emergency reporting center in each ofthese four jurisdictions as a function of the locationfrom which the call originates. For example, a callmade to 1-800-OILS-911 from anywhere inWashington will automatically be routed to theWashington emergency reporting center.

Although it is available for anyone to use,information regarding the number is targeted atrecreational boaters and fishermen through the sameoutreach used by POSPET (see pages 15-16 above).Usage analysis for July 2004 through May of 2005shows that the OILS-911 number was used 374 timesduring that period.

THE INTEGRATED VESSEL RESPONSE PLANGUIDELINES

In 1998 the Task Force completed a cooperativeproject with the US Coast Guard and industrystakeholders that resulted in approval of a voluntaryIntegrated Vessel Response Plan (IVRP) format fortank vessels. This format allows correlation of WestCoast state planning requirements as well as theShipboard Oil Pollution Emergency Plan (SOPEP)required by the Canadian Coast Guard with the USCoast Guard vessel planning requirements.

The Task Force Members signed a formal agreementin 1998 reflecting their willingness to accept tankvessel response plans submitted in the IVRP format.They also agreed to communicate any new orrevised contingency planning regulations to the TaskForce Executive Coordinator for updates to theformat guidance matrix. In addition, the CanadianMinistry of Transport determined that the IntegratedVessel Response Plan format will be acceptable tomeet their vessel planning standards, since itincludes the SOPEP requirements. A formalendorsement from the US Coast Guard is also inplace.

The integrated format guidance matrix is available totank vessel planholders on the Task Force website athttp://www.oilspilltaskforce.org/docs/project_reports/ivrp2004.pdf and is kept current with any changesin member agency contingency planning regulations,thus is an ongoing project.

SPILL PREPAREDNESS/RESPONSE TOPICS OFCONCERN

As under the Spill Prevention Objective, theCoordinating Committee has monitored and sharedinformation on the following oil spillpreparedness/response “topics of concern”throughout the past year:

• Drill programs• Financial responsibility requirements,

state and federal • Response technologies, including research

and development• Task Force agency semi-annual reports on

implementation status of the recommendedcontingency plan elements

• OSRO certifications, mergers, mutual aid, and response capabilities

• NRDA initiatives and activities• Applied response technologies• Coordination of inter-jurisdictional

wildlife care

COMMUNICATIONS PROJECTS ANDACTIVITIES

THE TASK FORCE WEB SITE

The Task Force website offers the following features:

• The OVERVIEW provides background on theTask Force as well as bios and photos of allTask Force Members;

• CURRENT INTERESTS is where we postnewsletters, event announcements, andsummary notes from recent Task Forcemeetings;

• WHAT WE DO includes our current StrategicPlan and Annual Work Plan, our Memorandaof Cooperation, and Resolutions andAgreements signed by the Task ForceMembers since 1993;

• The LEGACY AWARD HONOR ROLL lists allthe Task Force Legacy Award Winners since1999;

• NOTES & REPORTS features the currentAnnual Report as well as recent newsletters,

Task Force comments on federal rulemaking,noteworthy correspondence, meeting notes,and project reports;

• CONTACT INFORMATION provides contactdetails for the Task Force’s CoordinatingCommittee and Executive Coordinator;

• LINKS provides links to all Task Forcemember agencies as well as key US andCanadian federal agencies;

• A SEARCH engine allows you to search thesite if you don’t find what you want in one ofthe categories above; and

• Information on POSPET and its memberorganizations.

The website has received a total of 453,993“requests” since it was initiated in the 3rd quarter of2003. A “request” is any visit to the site or to anypage on the site. The site received 22,269 requests in2003; 246,597 in 2004; and 185,127 through mid-May of 2005. The first quarter of 2005 has been themost active quarter to date, with 25.64% of allrequests received since the site was launched.

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21



STAKEHOLDER PARTICIPATION

Stakeholders monitor Task Force activities throughour web site and can also participate in Task Forcesponsored events or project workgroups. As notedabove, a Workgroup of thirty-eight persons wasconvened for the Places of Refuge project. We alsohost two public events each year: a roundtableforum and our Annual Meeting. See details regardingthe 2005 Roundtable on Oil Spills from Trucks onpage 18 above.

THE 2004 ANNUAL MEETING

Seventy-nine persons attended the 2004 AnnualMeeting of the Pacific States/British Columbia OilSpill Task Force, which was held in Portland,Oregon on July 20, 2004. The meeting was hosted bythe Oregon Department of Environmental Quality(DEQ); Alan Kiphut, Land Quality DivisionAdministrator for DEQ, chaired the Meeting. The2004 Legacy Awards were presented (see below),Task Force Members presented updates on programsand initiatives in each member jurisdiction, and theExecutive Coordinator reviewed Task Force activitiesover the past year as well as initiatives outlined inthe coming year’s work plan.

Since 2004 marked the Pacific States/BritishColumbia Oil Spill Task Force’s 15th anniversary,three of the original Task Force Members offered thecomments and observations. Fred Hansen, who wasDirector of Oregon DEQ in 1989, observed that “It’sthe relationship side that is emphasized” by the TaskForce. He commended the Task Force for its workover the years, and advised us to continue ouremphasis on spill prevention. Richard Dalon, formerDeputy Minister, BC Ministry of Environment, notedthat he was proud to have played a small part ingetting the Task Force launched, and cautionedagainst complacency – which can result in bothreduced funding and less attention to the ongoingrisks. Christine Gregoire, who had been the Directorat the Washington Department of Ecology in 1989,sent a letter noting that “The commitment that ourrespective governments showed in creating the TaskForce was an important step toward keeping ourmarine waters safe for future generations, and theTask Force’s achievements have provided ampleevidence of the positive results of suchcommitment.”

The theme of the meeting was “Partners inPrevention” and four Legacy Award winnersaddressed “Successful Spill Prevention Practices.”

These speakers included Anil Mathur, President,Alaska Tanker Company; Bill Deaver, President &COO, Totem Ocean Express; Steve Pollock, GeneralManager and John Staynor, ISO/ISM Coordinator,for Island Tug & Barge; and John Devens, ExecutiveDirector, Prince William Sound RCAC. In addition,Joe Angelo, Director of Environmental Standards, USCoast Guard, spoke on international spill preventionefforts.

The luncheon was co-hosted by the Task Force andthe Prince William Sound Regional Citizens AdvisoryCouncil. During the luncheon, Keynote SpeakerCAPT Peter Bonebakker, Marine Superintendent,ConocoPhillips Marine/Polar Tankers, describedefforts by his company to prevent spills.

The Task Force Members signed the Statements ofAuthority for the new Five Year Strategic Plan andthe 2004-2005 Annual Work Plan at the end of theAnnual Meeting. Both documents are available atwww.oilspilltaskforce.org, as are complete summarynotes of all presentations at the 2004 AnnualMeeting.

THE 2004 LEGACY AWARDS

The Pacific States/British Columbia Oil Spill TaskForce presented our 2004 Legacy Awards for Oil SpillPrevention, Preparedness, and Response to:

• The Alaska Tanker Company• Joan Lundstrom of the San Francisco Harbor

Safety Committee• The US Coast Guard Marine Safety Office,

Group Portland• The TAPS Trade Shippers, including SeaRiver

Maritime, Inc.; Tesoro Maritime and SeabulkTankers; the Alaska Tanker Company; andConocoPhillips Marine/Polar Tankers.

Legacy Awards are given to industry, non-profit orpublic agency organizations and individuals, or forteam efforts. The Task Force gives Legacy Awardsfor projects, accomplishments, or leadership thatdemonstrates innovation, management commitment,and improvements in oil spill prevention,preparedness, or response resulting in enhancedenvironmental protection. Efforts to promotepartnerships and involve the public are favored.Organizations, individuals, or projects nominated forthe Legacy Award must be located or primarilyoperating in the Task Force jurisdictions of Alaska,British Columbia, Washington, Oregon, California,

and Hawaii. Organizations or individualsrepresenting a regulated industry must demonstratea satisfactory history of compliance with state,provincial, and federal oil spill regulations. Moredetails on the four 2004 Legacy Award winners andphotos are available on our website at:http://www.oilspilltaskforce.org/legacy.htm

EXCEPTIONAL SERVICE AWARD

The Pacific States/British Columbia Oil Spill TaskForce presented its Exceptional Service Award toStan Norman at its 2004 Annual Meeting, in honorof his nine years of extraordinary service andcontributions as a member of the Task ForceCoordinating Committee.

Stan Norman, who retired as the Manager of thePrevention Section of the Washington Department ofEcology’s Spills Program on May 30, 2005, began his“career” as a member of the Task ForceCoordinating Committee in 1995, representingWashington’s Office of Marine Safety, and thencontinued as Washington’s Coordinating Committeerepresentative after OMS merged with Ecology.

As manager of Ecology’s Spill Prevention Program,Stan provided leadership for programs and initiativesthat are unique in the US. Noteworthy among thesewere:

• His work with stakeholders to set spillprevention standards, and after the Intertankodecision, working with industry to establishthe Voluntary BAP and ExceptionalCompliance programs, which now cover 30tank vessel and tank barge companies fromthe US and abroad;

• Establishing the Puget Sound and ColumbiaRiver field offices which partner with the USCoast Guard on vessel and bunkeringinspections – and the prevention of waste oildumping;

• Championing the dedicated rescue tugprogram at Neah Bay; and

• Serving on the Washington Pilotage Boardand the Olympic National Marine SanctuaryAdvisory Council.

As a Coordinating Committee member, Stanprovided oversight and direction for all our projectsand served as a member of many projectworkgroups. In addition, he was the project leader

for such key initiatives as:

• Our review of West Coast pilotage andrecommendations to improve pilotage safetythat was completed in 1997;

• Stan was also one of the leaders inestablishing our database program andadoption of the Data Dictionary which allowsour member agencies to use common terms;

• Stan led our work with tank vessel operatorsin 2003 to rank voluntary practices that helpprevent oil spills, led an industry paneldiscussion on these “Best Industry Practices”in 2004, and initiated a request that WestCoast Harbor Safety Committees adopt theseas Standards of Care; and

• Stan co-chaired the project focused onpreventing spills during bulk oil transfers.

OTHER TASK FORCE COMMUNICATIONS ANDOUTREACH ACTIVITIES

• Pursuant to our focus on submitting TaskForce consensus comments on federalinitiatives, the Executive Coordinator tracksrulemaking activities and notifies memberagencies of opportunities for comment onrelevant proposals. Consensus commentswere submitted by the Task Force this yearon the US Coast Guard’s Advance Notice ofProposed Rulemaking to require additionalnavigation measures for Buzzards Bay andon the US Coast Guard’s request forcomments on Inspection of Towing Vessels.Copies of all these comments are available onour web site at: http://www.oilspilltaskforce.org/comments.htm

• The Coordinating Committee of the TaskForce held its quarterly meetings inHonolulu, HI, Portland, OR, Lacey, WA, andVictoria, BC over this past work year. Thesemeetings provide opportunities forinformation exchange as well as decisions onadministration and implementation ofprojects outlined in our Annual Work Plan.

• The Task Force Coordinating Committeemet with representatives of the US EPAduring their fall quarterly meeting and withthe Marine Safety Officers from the CoastGuard Pacific Area during their wintermeeting. They also met with representativesfrom the Canadian Coast Guard,Environment Canada, Transport Canada,22



Burrard Clean Operations, and Fisheries andOceans Canada at their spring meeting.

• A periodic newsletter is published on ourwebsite; this “Report to Our Stakeholders”provides regular updates on Task Forceactivities and projects.

• Jean Cameron serves as a member of theUS Coast Guard’s Navigation Safety AdvisoryCouncil (NAVSAC), where she works withrepresentatives of the maritime community toprevent oil spills by promoting navigationsafety through applications of and revisionsto both the inland and international “rules ofthe road,” advice on implementation ofvarious Coast Guard programs, and reviewsof safety issues associated with developmentsin maritime and navigation technology.

• Jean Cameron also represents the TaskForce on the Pacific Region Quality SteeringCommittee of the American WaterwaysOperators and the US Coast Guard. This teamis focused on improving safety in barge andtowing operations on the West Coast. StanNorman of the Washington Department ofEcology serves as the Task Force's alternate.

• Task Force updates are regularly providedat meetings of the American PetroleumInstitute’s Spills Advisory Group.

• During the past year, Jean Cameronprovided briefings on the Oil Spill Task Forceand our key projects to the Prevention FirstConference (September 14-15); to ViceAdmiral Harvey Johnson, Jr, Commander USCoast Guard Pacific Area (February 1); to theMexico/US Joint Response Team (February10); to the National Harbor Safety Conference(April 18); to the NW Area Committee andRRT (June 2); and to the CANUSLANT(Canada/US Atlantic) transboundary exercisegroup on June 13-17.

• The Executive Coordinator andCoordinating Committee worked together todevelop an annual work plan for 2005-2006which will be adopted by the Task ForceMembers at the 2005 Annual Meeting andwill be available on our websitewww.oilspilltaskforce.org.

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PROGRAM MISSION

The mission of the Division of Spill Prevention andResponse is to prevent, respond and ensure thecleanup of unauthorized discharges of oil andhazardous substances. The Alaska Department ofEnvironmental Conservation’s Division of SpillPrevention and Response (SPAR) is responsible forprotecting Alaska’s land, waters, and air from oiland hazardous substance spills. Alaskans have madea concerted effort to prevent and clean up spills.Significant progress has been made in the safehandling, storage and transportation of oil andchemicals and the cleanup of historic contamination.We will never totally eliminate the risk of spills, butwe are constantly learning how to better managethat risk. SPAR pursues its mission in threeimportant ways:

Prevention – Ensuring a safer Alaska through thespill–free handling of oil and chemicals. SPARensures spill prevention through the review andapproval of prevention plans for oil terminals, tankvessels and barges, railroads, refineries, andexploration and production facilities; theunderground storage tank spill prevention programprogram; technical assistance to industry and thepublic; risk reduction measures; inspections; andeducation in proper spill prevention and responsemethods.

Preparedness – Making industry and government’sability to prepare and respond to spills better. SPARensures response preparedness through the reviewand approval of oil discharge contingency plans;inspections; spill drills and exercises; partnershipswith local communities and other state and federalagencies; pre-positioning of response equipment forlocal use; maintenance of statewide and regionalspill response plans; and implementation of theIncident Command System for spill response.

Response – Keeping Alaska cleaner through rapidresponse and cleanup of contaminated sites. SPAR

ensures an effective response through theidentification and rapid abatement of dangerousacute human exposures to hazardous substances;timely characterization and remediation of chronichealth exposure risks from hazardous substancereleases; mitigation of the effects of spills on theenvironment and cultural resources; and restorationof property value and usability through adequatecleanup.

NEW TASK FORCE MEMBER

On March 31, 2005 Governor Frank Murkowskiappointed Kurt Fredriksson as the Commissioner forthe Department of Environmental Conservation.Kurt filled the role of “Acting” Commissioner whenErnesta Ballard resigned as Commissioner in October2004. Kurt is not a newcomer to the PacificStates/British Columbia Oil Spill Task Force. AsDirector of the Spill Prevention and ResponseDivision from 1995-1999, Kurt served as a memberto the Task Force Coordination Committee.

Kurt came to Alaska in 1975 fresh from college witha Masters Degree in Environmental Studies. He hadvisited Juneau the year prior and knew someday hewould call it home. When Kurt returned to Alaska,he landed a job with DEC and for the last 28 yearshas had the privilege of working on Alaska'senvironmental issues.

SPILL DATA

ADEC received reports of 1,582 oil spills, 56 brinespills, and 344 hazardous substance spills incalendar year 2004. The Department conducted 261field responses to oil spills, 8 field responses to brinespills, and 33 field responses to hazardous substancespills. The Department estimates that 688,404gallons of oil, 159,047 gallons of brine and 20,670gallons of hazardous substances were spilled in2004. Of the 232 oil spills exceeding the Task Forcedata threshold of 500 gallons to land and one barrel24


TASK FORCE MEMBER AGENCY ACTIVITIES AND ACCOMPLISHMENTS

In addition to their dedication of staff and resources to Oil Spill Task Force projects, our member agencies havebeen involved in a wide range of initiatives in their own jurisdictions, as outlined below:

AlaskaTHE DIVISION OF SPILL PREVENTION AND RESPONSE, ALASKA

DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL CONSERVATION (ADEC)

to water; 148 were from facilities, 23 from vessels,and 28 from vehicles and 33 were from othersources.

In 2004, ADEC initiated emergency responses to 66significant/potential oil and hazardous substancespills statewide and continues to monitor ongoingcleanup and recovery activities. The releasesinvolved commercial and fishing vessel groundings,tank truck rollovers, overfills, ammonia releasesfrom vessels and fixed facilities, and process waterspills due to corrosion of piping. ADEC respondersactively worked 2,661 spill cleanups throughout thestate and removed the risk by cleaning upcontaminated sites and then closing or issuing “nofurther action” letters for 2,362 spills. Eighteen caseswere transferred to DEC’s Contaminated SitesProgram for long-term cleanup and monitoring andsix cases to the Department of Law for enforcementaction. Ten of the state’s response depots (inAnchorage, Bethel, Mountain Village, Toksook Bay,Dillingham, Palmer, Valdez, Cordova, Juneau andYakutat) were activated for 24 spills.

MAJOR RESPONSE EFFORTS

M/V LeConte Grounding: On May 10, 2004 the stateferry grounded on Cozian Reef in Peril Straits on thenorth end of Baranof Island near Sitka. The vesseldid not spill any oil during the grounding, salvage ortransit to Ketchikan. At the time of the grounding theferry system reported that the vessel hadapproximately 26,600 gallons of diesel fuel and 1962gallons of auxiliary oils on board. On May 12, theferry system revised the volume on board toapproximately 19,500 gallons of diesel fuel. On May13th the transfer of 17,000 gallons of diesel fuel was

completed. On May 14th the transfer of 1962 gallonsof auxiliary oil was completed. Approximately 3,000gallons remained on board to supply fuel to powerthe vessel during the salvage and transit. Duringthis response, Alaska’s draft Places of Safe Refugeguidelines were utilized to identify potentialanchorage locations during the transit to Ketchikan.

North Slope Kuparuk Unit Spills: In 2004 there werefour significant releases at the Kuparuk River Unitmanaged by ConocoPhillips. On February 29th anestimated 1,600 gallons of naphtha was released atthe CPF1 Topping Unit contaminating snow andgravel. On March 18th, an estimated 235 gallons ofcrude oil and 941 gallons of process water spilled atDrill Site 2D affecting snow, the gravel pad, and areserve pit. On May 12, ConocoPhillips reported anestimated a 2,545 gallon process water spill at 2Mpad; the spill impacted the gravel pad and adjacenttundra. Following the cleanup of the May 12th spill,

on July 15th an estimated 252 gallon process waterspill occurred at the 2M pad pig receiving module,with 84 gallons remaining inside the pig module, 126gallons released to the gravel pad, and 42 gallonsimpacting tundra.

DeHarts Marina/Fuel Dock Spill and Fire: OnSeptember 21, 2004 the Juneau Police Departmentreported a spill and fire at DeHarts Marine at AukeBay. An estimated 35 gallons of gasoline and 1600gallons of diesel were spilled. Fire Departmentinvestigators determined that the fire was arson.Vandalism was suspected as the flexible joints ontwo fuel lines were severed. A closed shut-off valveat one of the two diesel tanks failed and allowed the 25



contents into the severed fuel line. A suspect wasarrested by the Juneau Police Department and theDEC Environmental Crimes Unit was activated.

Marathon Beaver Creek Pad 1-A Spill and Fire: OnNovember 11, 2004 Marathon Oil reported thatabout 10,500 gallons of process water spilled at Pad1-A. On November 30, 2004 the DEC was notified ofa fire at the Beaver Creek Pad 1-A facility. Two 300-barrel (12,600 gallon) storage tanks were destroyed.Marathon Oil officials estimated approximately 381-barrels (16,002 gallons) of process fluids werereleased onto the pad. The fire caused anuncontrolled release of natural gas from well 1A. Awell control expert from Wild Well Control, Inc.(Houston, TX) was mobilized by Marathon to capthe well and stop the release. The DECEnvironmental Crimes Unit was activated; the causeand source of the fire remains under investigation.

M/V Selendang Ayu Grounding: On December 7,2004 the crew of the M/V Selendang Ayu reportedthat they had lost power and were adrift offUnalaska Island. Efforts to tow the vessel failed andit went aground and broke apart between Skan Bayand Spray Cape at approximately 6pm, December 8.An estimated 321,052 gallons of IFO 380 from thethree centerline tanks and 14,680 gallons of marinediesel/miscellaneous oils have been released to theenvironment. The total estimated amount of all oilsreleased to the environment is 335,732 gallons.Approximately 146,774 gallons of oil/water was

transferred into 2000 gallon tanks and transportedvia helicopter to Unalaska for disposal. UnifiedCommand response efforts focused on search &rescue, shoreline assessment, protective booming ofsensitive areas, shoreline cleanup, fisheries andwater quality management, subsistence use andwreck removal. (Insert photo sent separately)

NEW LEGISLATION

The Prevention and Emergency Response Programcoordinated with law enforcement agencies todevelop regulations for the evaluation and cleanupof sites used to manufacture illegal drugs in Alaska,as established in House Bill 59. The draft regulationsand supporting technical document under wentpublic review in September 2004 and were adoptedas final regulations in February 2005.

HB 197 passed by the Legislature in May 2005,clarifies DEC’s authority to exempt natural gasexploration wells – that do not pose a threat of an oilspill – from contingency plan and proof of financialresponsibility requirements. Benefits of thelegislation are:

• Allows DEC to focus its resources on thereview of c-plans and proof of financialresponsibility for those natural gas explorationfacilities that could potentially threaten theenvironment with oil spills; and

• Ensures that DEC can conduct the additionalinspections and drills that the Legislatureenvisioned would be performed when itchanged the contingency plan review renewalrequirement from three to five years;

• Relieves industry from the unnecessaryfinancial costs and schedule impacts ofpreparing and implementing oil spillcontingency plans for natural gas explorationfacilities where there is not a threat of an oilrelease from the well; and

• Relieves industry from the unnecessary cost ofdemonstrating proof of financial responsibility(i.e. insurance, bonds or letters of credit) torespond to oil spills at natural gas explorationfacilities where there is not a threat of an oilrelease from the well.

NEW RULEMAKING

The Industry Preparedness Program successfullycompleted Phase 1 of the Contingency PlanRegulations project updating and clarifying theregulations primarily affecting oil exploration andproduction facilities. The regulatory changes becameeffective May 26, 2004 for new and renewedcontingency plans.

The triennial update to the Financial Responsibilityregulations to reflect changes in the AnchorageConsumer Price Index are in final review. Thesechanges will increase the required financial26





responsibility amounts for all regulated facilities andvessels.

SPILL PREVENTION INITIATIVES

Inspections: ADEC Industry Preparedness staffconducted 146 inspections of oil terminal/tankfarms, crude oil transmission pipelines, tankers,non-tank vessels, and tank barges. This represents a40% increase over the prior year level. Staffinspected 90% of the crude oil tankers operating inPrince William Sound, 50% of the crude oil spotcharter tankers, and 17% of the non-crude tankersand tank barges operating in state waters.

Regarding the 1995-96 PWS Crude Oil Tanker RiskAssessment, the tanker operators have beendiscussing options with no proposals at this point.The PWS Regional Citizens Advisory Council hasalso recently hired a consultant to assist them in anyrisk assessment that is conducted. Their hiredconsultant, Martha Grabowski, was on the team thatconducted the 1995-96 PWS Risk Assessment.

Transition of the TAPS Fleet to Double Hull: PolarTankers has four double hull, redundant systemtankers operating with one more planned. AlaskaTanker Company has two double hull, redundantsystem tankers operating with two more planned.SeaRiver Maritime plans for the future are notcertain, although ExxonMobil has stated that itscrude oil will be transported only by SeaRiverMaritime tankers. Tesoro continues to charter twodouble hull tankers from Seabulk.

With respect to a Navigation Risk Assessment for theAleutians, DEC continues to work with the CoastGuard to develop information that will assist withthis effort. DEC commissioned a study of vesseltraffic in the Aleutians (see description in SpillPreparedness Initiatives below) that will be useful inthe assessment expected to be led by Coast GuardHeadquarters with the assistance of CG District 17and MSO Anchorage. Options for conducting therisk assessment may include using an independentcontractor or the National Academy of Sciences.Funding for the risk assessment is not yet specified.DEC will definitely be a partner in the riskassessment. There is currently no timetable for therisk assessment.

Home Heating Oil Prevention Initiative: DECPrevention and Emergency Response staff enhancedthe prevention of spills from unregulated homeheating oil tanks by airing public service

announcements in more than 250 Alaskacommunities through the Alaska Public RadioNetwork’s 26 stations. Since the inception of thisspill prevention initiative in FY00, there has been a23% reduction in the amount of home heating oilspilled to the environment.

SPILL PREPAREDNESS INITIATIVES

Drills and Exercises: DEC staff participated andevaluated 123 oil spill exercises (announced andunannounced) involving oil terminals and tankfarms, crude oil transmission pipelines such as theTrans-Alaska Pipeline, crude and non-crude tankers,tank barges, non-tank vessels, and the AlaskaRailroad. This represents a 46% increase over theprior year level.

Industry Contingency Plans: DEC conditionallyapproved the Strategic Reconfiguration amendmentto the Alyeska Pipeline Service Company’s Trans-Alaska Pipeline system contingency plan afterevaluation of extensive detailed and technicalinformation presented by Alyeska, other agencies,non-governmental organizations, and the public.Industry Preparedness staff reviewed and approved23 new, renewal, or amended oil dischargeprevention and contingency plans for facilities andvessels other than non-tank vessels. Staff alsoreviewed and approved 192 non-tank vesselcontingency plans.

Federal/State Spill Response Planning: The proposedchange #3 to the Unified Plan was delayed pendingdevelopment of the Places of Refuge annex, pluscompletion of the revised Dispersants and iI-SituBurn (ISB) guidelines. As of December 31, 2004, therevisions to the Dispersants and ISB guidelines hadnot been finalized by the ARRT Science andTechnology Committee. DEC staff is also involvedwith the Alaska Spill Response Permits Project andare attending work group meetings and providinginputs.

Sub-Area Committee meetings held for thedevelopment of Change #1 to the Cook Inlet Sub-Area Contingency Plan (SCP) and the SoutheastAlaska SCP. Public meetings were held for the draftChange #1 to the Cook Inlet SCP; Final Change #1was published with an effective date of May 2004.Staff also participated in a Southeast SCP Subareacommittee meeting and began developing Change #1to that plan. The PWS SCP workgroup is nowactively engaged in developing Change #2 to with ananticipated publication date of Summer 2005. 27

Geographic Response Strategies: DEC staffparticipated in the industry-led GRS field deploymentin Prince William Sound (PWS) that tested,corrected and validated several PWS GRS. ThePotential Places of Refuge section was finalized forPWS and will be incorporated as part of Change 2 tothe Sub-Area plan along with the completed GRS.

Staff also assisted in the field surveys of the GRSdeveloped for the Southeastern Zone of Cook Inlet.These GRS were then addressed at a workgroupmeeting in Homer, follow-up corrections were made,and the GRS subsequently approved by the group.This brings the total of Cook Inlet GRS to 129 andcompletes the first go-around of GRS developmentfor the Cook Inlet Subarea.

Vessel Traffic Study for the Aleutian Sub-Area:Following the M/V Selendang Ayu grounding theDEC contracted a study that considers the availabledata regarding vessel traffic within and through theAleutians. In some cases, data was limited becauseforeign vessels transiting the area are not required toreport to the US Coast Guard or the State. However,the following information was drawn from theavailable data: Over 2,700 ship voyages occurthrough the Aleutians each year; about 400 port callsare made in Aleutian ports each year; about 300million gallons of non-persistent fuel oil is movedinto and through the Aleutians as cargo for use inAlaska on approximately 130 tank barge and tankship voyages; and about 400 fishing vessels operatein the Aleutian fisheries. There are four ocean-goingtugs resident in the Aleutians.

Places of Refuge Guidelines: Prevention &Emergency Response staff assisted with concurrentdevelopment of Places of Refuge guidelines with thePacific States/British Columbia Oil Spill Task Forceand Alaska Regional Response Team work groups.The guidelines provide step-by-step procedures todecide if a ship in distress should be offered a placeof refuge considering various risk factors inidentifying actual anchoring or mooring locations.The draft guidelines were utilized during the M/VLeConte grounding near Sitka. Minor modificationwere made prior to being approved by the AlaskaRegional Response Team in October 2004. The finalguidelines will be incorporated into Change #3 of theUnified Plan.

Community Spill Response Depot/Corp System:DEC continues to expand the State’s overall capacityto respond to spills by increasing the number ofcommunity response agreements as part of the

Alaska Spill Response Depot/Corp System. DECsigned agreements with three additionalcommunities, bringing the total number of theseagreements to forty-eight. DEC also participated incommunity response training using state equipmentfrom depots located in Bethel, Seldovia, Ouzinkie,Port Lions, Kokhanok, and Fort Yukon.

Statewide Hazmat Response Workgroup & Exercises:The Statewide Hazmat Response Workgroup met inSeptember and December to discuss purchase of twomobile cascade systems. The Statewide HazmatResponse Brochure is also being updated. DECreceived additional funding to enhance ammoniaand chlorine response training in Alaska. AnAmmonia Response Training Course was held inValdez in November 2004 for first responders andother interested individuals.

Prevention & Emergency Response staff iscoordinating with other state agencies and the USEnvironmental Protection Agency in development ofa Hazmat Commodity Flow Study for Alaska.Periodic reports are received from the AlaskaRailroad. A semi-confidential Highway transportreport was received from Alaska West. However,information from the maritime industry is solelylacking. A final report is anticipated in 2005.

In order to update and understand the chemicalhazards in Alaska, DEC and the US EnvironmentalProtection Agency updated and completed astatewide comprehensive analysis of the Tier Twoinventory data for 2003 data. The most notablechange in the chemical inventory is the decrease inreporting quantities of chlorine. This is a directresult of water treatment plants converting tosodium hypochlorite systems for water chlorinationprocess. Also a lesser number of seafood processingplants submitted Tier Two report forms due to plantclosures; this resulted in a corresponding decrease ininventories of anhydrous ammonia.

SPILL RESPONSE INITIATIVES

Alaska Crisis Management Course: In coordinationwith British Petroleum Alaska, DEC conducted anExecutive Level Crisis Management Training Coursein Anchorage on October 7, 2004. While DEC usesthis system for oil and hazardous substance spillresponse, its management structure can be adaptedto nearly any significant emergency situation. Thecondensed four-hour executive level courseexplained the role and the operational character of acrisis management team. Discussion topics included:28





29

Incident Command System for spill response; threelevels of command from the field to the executive,crisis management level; the executive’s role on thecrisis management team; issues dealt with by thecrisis management team; and communications at thecrisis management team level.

Alaska Spill Response Tactics Manual: DEC staffinitiated the development of a statewide spillresponse tactics manual. This project was split intotwo phases with Phase I constituting a literaturesearch and draft format development of the manual.Phase 2 consists of the actual development of themanual, with guidance provided by a work groupconsisting of key individuals from federal, state,industry, and spill cooperatives.

M/V Selendang Ayu Unified Command Website: TheDEC developed and continues to maintain theUnified Command website for this event. Prevention& Emergency Response Program staff continues tobolster the site with documentation and photos,enhance the format, and meet the public’s demandfor current information needs. This site has receivedrecord hits and we continue to receive positivefeedback from the public.

R&D INITIATIVES

Industry Preparedness staff organized a highlysuccessful and informative Best AvailableTechnology Conference in May 2004. TheConference featured US and international presentersin six technology groups: source control, crude oiltransmission pipeline leak detection, well capping,secondary containment liners, fast water booming,and viscous oil pumping. Program staff is acceptingpublic comments on the draft Conference report.

North Slope Development R&D projects includeGround Penetrating Radar to Detect Oil In & UnderIce, Hydrocarbon Migration and CleanupTehnologies for North Slope Gravel Pads andFoundations, North Slope Breakup Studies –Offshore/Nearshore/Onshore, Best AvailableTechnology for Mechanical Recovery in Broken Ice –International.

Draft results of research on “Circulation and WaterProperty Variations in the Nearshore AlaskanBeaufort Sea” suggest that oil spilled beneathlandfast ice will stay in the vicinity of the source ascurrent speeds will rarely exceed the thresholdvelocity required to transport an oil slick once it hasattained equilibrium thickness. This is good news

because there was significant concern about theability of oil to spread vast distances under the ice.

ALASKA DEC’S DIVISION OF SPILLPREVENTION AND RESPONSE WEBSITE

For more information about ADEC’s program, visit:http://www.dec.state.ak.us/spar/index.htm

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PROGRAM MISSION

The Ministry of Environment works to protectpeople, property, and the environment from spillhazards through its environmental emergencymanagement program. The program’s missionstatement is: Exemplary Environmental EmergencyManagement through Leadership, Organization,Team Work, and Shared Responsibility.

On average, approximately 3,000 to 3500 spills arereported to the ministry annually - most areaccidental oil and hazardous material releases.Highly trained Emergency Response Officers locatedin regional offices throughout the province areavailable to respond to these spills. For large andcomplex spill incidents, the Ministry has twoIncident Management Teams. They are tasked withthe provincial delivery of the BC Marine Oil SpillResponse Plan, BC Inland Spill Response Plan andthe BC Hazardous Material Response Plan. Theseteams function according to the international andprovincial adopted Incident Command System whichincludes the application of Unified Command withthe Responsible Party (spiller) and other respondingjurisdictions.

The Environmental Protection Branch in Victoria(Headquarters) undertakes environmentalemergency planning for both the Regional ResponseOfficers and the Provincial Incident ManagementTeams. The Branch also does river forecasting andflood hazard assessment for the Province.

SPILL DATA/STATISTICS

For 2004, the Ministry received approximately 3500reports of hazardous materials spills in the province- 259 of these were incidents of high enough risk torequire field response by our RegionalEnvironmental Response Officers. There where noincidents resulting in the deployment of IncidentManagement Teams.

NOTABLE SPILL INCIDENTS:

The two notable spill incidents for 2004 were asinking of a vessel in Kootenay Lake and a Trainderailment into the Columbia River.

A very problematic spill in 2004 was the sinking ofan 55 meter (182 foot) private vessel in KootenayLake on January 11, 2004 (Approximately 5 km northof Ainsworth, BC adjacent to Woodbury Marina &Resort.) The vessel – a former ferry - was out-of-service and recently reverted from government toprivate ownership. The materials released werediesel (maximum 7000 litres / 1850 gallons and lubeoil (maximum 640 litres/170 gallons). It sank inabout 43 metres (140 feet) water depth.

The majority of diesel and oil discharged was duringthe first 24 hours; residual release occurred for afurther two weeks. Prior to installation of aneffective containment boom, the spill caused anexpansive fuel slick on Kootenay Lake. The pollutioncaused significant concern among local residents,general public and sports fisherman. Nearby potablewater intakes from lake also required protection.

The vessel owner took no action to control ormitigate the spill. As a result, the Ministry tookcontrol of the incident and conducted andcoordinated the field response. Adequate harborboom was obtained from a spill kit maintained byCastlegar Fire Department. Favourable off-shorebreezes moved the slick out to mid-lake andprevented fouling of shorelines. No mortality of fishor waterfowl was identified as result of the spill. TheMinistry also employed the use of a RemoteOperated Vehicle (ROV) to assess the wreck, confirmthe location of any leaks, and evaluate responseoptions. Hydrocarbon recovery operations continuedwith the assistance of contractors until January23/04, when the control of the incident wastransferred to the Canadian Coast Guard. Costrecovery for WLAP expenses/resources wereobtained through a claim to Canada’s Ship SourceOil Pollution Fund.

British ColumbiaENVIRONMENTAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AND PERMITS,

THE BRITISH COLUMBIA MINISTRY OF ENVIRONMENT

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Spills from train derailments were a commonoccurrence in 2004, particularly in southeast BritishColumbia (East Kootenay). The most significantoccurred on October 27/04 and involved a CP Railtrain derailment approximately 22 km north ofRadium. A locomotive went into the Columbia Riverand discharged a substantial amount of diesel andlube oil. Areas adjacent to that section of the riverare important waterfowl habitat with internationalrecognition. Other sensitivities included recreationalfishing, plus water use for irrigation and potablesupplies. Five containment booms across the fullwidth of the river were utilized in an effort tocapture/recover discharged product. Responseincluded contracted spill responders from BC andAlberta and lasted for over a week. In addition tospill containment and recovery, shoreline excavation

and comprehensive water quality and sedimentsampling were conducted. Furthermore, the spillerwas directed to undertake a thorough environmentalimpact assessment study that included fishsampling.

NEW LEGISLATION

The new legislation for the Ministry is theEnvironmental Management Act that - for spills - is aconsolidation of the Environment Management Actand the Waste Management Act. The new Actprovides the same legislative frame-work andcapabilities.

ENVIRONMENTAL EMERGENCYMANAGEMENT PROGRAM’S WEB SITE

For more information about the Ministry of Water,Land and Air Protection’s program for managingenvironmental emergencies related to spills see:ht tp://wlapwww.gov.bc.ca/eeeb/eephome/index.htm

Imperial Oil Exercise –Nanaimo (Group Photo of

an Integrated IncidentManagement Team under

Unified Command)

PROGRAM MISSION

The Office of Spill Prevention & Response (OSPR),division of the Department of Fish & Game (DFG), isthe lead State agency for marine and off-highway oilspill prevention and response efforts in California.The Lempert-Keene-Seastrand Oil Spill Preventionand Response Act of 1990 (Act) established OSPRand provides the OSPR Administrator withsubstantial authority to direct spill response, clean-up, natural resource damage assessment andrestoration.


Governor Schwarzenegger appointed Carlton Mooreas Administrator of the Office of Spill Prevention andResponse in June of 2004. He served as InterimAdministrator from March of 2003. Prior to thisassignment, he served as Staff Counsel handlingprimarily maritime, federal, and international law.As Special Legal Counsel to the Administrator from1992 to 1998, he was responsible for thedevelopment of regulations affecting oil spillcontingency plans and financial responsibilityrequirements for tankers and tank barges. Otherprograms involved tug escorts, salvors, oil spillresponse organizations, marine pilots, and oiltransfer operations. In that capacity, he representedthe State in matters involving proposals affectingships, tankers and other vessels before theInternational Maritime Organization. Additionally,he coordinated activities of the Oil Spill TechnicalAdvisory Committee, State Interagency Oil SpillCommittee and its Review Subcommittee, and wasCalifornia’s Coordination Committee representativeto the States/British Columbia Oil Spill Task Force.He also handled legislative proposals at the Stateand Federal level affecting navigation, ship safetyand international tanker insurance requirements.

Carlton Moore was appointed to the Coast GuardNavigation and Safety Advisory Council byDepartment of Transportation Secretary Dole in1986, and served as vice-chair for three years. In1997, he was awarded the Department ofTransportation Public Service Commendation for

work in establishing marine pilotage agreements inCalifornia’s five largest harbors.

He received his Juris Doctor, graduating top of hisclass, from Lincoln School of Law and completedpost doctoral studies in Admiralty Law and Law ofthe Sea at the University of the Pacific McGeorgeSchool of Law. He holds a post secondary teachingcredential and taught Contract law at night from1990-1998.

SPILL DATA

OSPR’s Communications Center received reports of3,243 petroleum spills in 2004. The majority ofthese were in Los Angeles, San Diego and Kerncounties. 13 petroleum spills reported in Californiaduring 2004 were above the Task Force reportingthresholds of 500 gallons to land and 42 gallons (onebarrel) to water. 23 percent of the spills whichexceeded the Task Force threshold occurred frompipelines, contributing to 96 percent of the quantityof petroleum spilled in California in 2004. Anadditional 23 percent of the qualifying petroleumspills came from each of vehicles, vessels, andfacilities, with the remaining 8 percent of qualifyingspills from “other” sources. In 2004, aviation fueland crude oil contributed to 91.5 percent of the totalquantity of petroleum product releases which met orexceeded the Task Force reporting thresholds.Similarly, 6 percent of the total Task Forcethreshold-related quantity of petroleum productsspilled in 2004 was attributed to a produced waterrelease; oil & water mixture releases accounted for 2percent of the total Task Force threshold-relatedquantity of petroleum spilled in 2004, and less than1 percent of petroleum product releases wereattributed to diesel fuel spills. Structural failuresand vehicular accidents were each listed as theprimary cause of 23 percent of the total Task Forcethreshold-related spills while material or equipmentfailures primarily caused 15 percent of the petroleumreleases. Finally, human errors contributed to 39percent of the secondary causes of petroleumreleases in 2004.

32



CaliforniaTHE CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF FISH AND GAME’S

OFFICE OF SPILL PREVENTION AND RESPONSE (OSPR)

THE TOP FIVE SPILLS OF 2004 (BY VOLUME):

1. Kinder Morgan/Suisun Marsh - 4/27/04 -104,000 gallons diesel from pipeline

2. Kinder Morgan/Baker - 11/24/04 - unknownthousands of gallons gasoline from pipeline

3. Pillar Point Harbor - 05/25/04 - 1,021 gallonsof gasoline from under-dock pipeline

4. AES/Cerritos Channel - 11/28/04 - >1,000gallons lube oil in power plant

5. Grounded sailboat/Ano Nuevo SB - 12/1/04 -200 gallons diesel from fuel tanks



33

RECENT SIGNIFICANT CALIFORNIA SPILLS :

Spill Date Location/Other Information Est Vol in Gal

Dawson Oil 4/7/05at Auburn

Kinder Morgan 4/1/05at Donner Pass

Pacific Pipelines 3/23/05at Pyramid Lake

Kinder Morgan 2/4/05at Oakland Estuary

My Albion 1/31/05at Monterey Bay

Ventura Oiled 1/11/05Seabirds Incident

Kinder Morgan 11/21/04at Baker

Tug Loui 12/27/04at Sacramento

Seacliff State Beach 9/11/04at Palo Alto

Valve left open on a holding tank; dieseloverflowed into Auburn Ravine

Kinder Morgan pipeline leaked gasolineunder snow, near Donner Ski Ranch.Wildlife impact unknown, as of 4/12/05.

Angeles Natl Forest, Posey Canyon;Crude oil transmission line broke inlandslide; At least 9 birds killed.

Port of Oakland, Berth 70; pipeline inport leaked jet-A fuel into storm drains;16 oiled birds – mostly coots – collected.Two died.

62’ classic yacht sank with 1700 gals.Diesel aboard

Over 1,528 seabirds – mostlywestern/Clark’s grebes, several loons,brown pelicans, eared grebes, surfscoters, Brandt’s & Pelagic cormorantsoiled, between Santa Barbara & Venice.At Least 1,272 died. Two CA sea lionsoiled (& lived). Oil source unknown.

Gasoline geyser from pipeline in MojaveDesert, near I-15 & Baker. Cause appearsto be old third party damage. No wildlifeimpact observed.

Old tug sank in Port. No wildlife impactobserved

Oiled cormorants, unknown source; foundnear old cement ship grounded at beach in1929. At least 20 cormorants killedbetween 9/04 & 2/05.

500

Unknown

126,000

500

Unknown

Unknown

Unknown

150

Unknown

Environmental Scientist Cory Kong investigatesenvironmental damage at Pyramid Lake.

2004 LEGISLATION:

SB 1742 changed the definition of Marine Waters toinclude the Ports of Stockton and Sacramento. Itoutlines generic Harbor Safety Committee positionsthroughout the State and allows for harbor specificpositions to be identified in regulation. In addition,SB 1742 amended the Harbor Safety Committee(HSC) statute to allow the HSC’s to adjust theirgeographic area of responsibility on a regional basisto address emerging economic and environmentaldevelopments, such as the proposals to build LNG

facilities. This legislation allows the HSCs to petitionthe Administrator to establish at-large membershipsaccording to local needs.

The bill requires the Environmental EnhancementCommittee to establish a process for the solicitation,submittal, review, and selection of environmentalenhancement projects. The bill also establishes theEnvironmental Enhancement Grant Program, whichawards grants on a competitive basis to cover thecost of those projects that are selected by thecommittee and that meet specified requirements. SB1742 makes clarifying changes, rearrangesGovernment Code sections, and deletes obsoleteprovisions.

AB 1408 requires the State Fire Marshall to reportevery 5th year on the condition of intrastatehazardous liquid pipelines. It also requires aresponsible party to immediately report spills andthreats of spills to the Governor’s Office ofEmergency Services.

SB 1408 required tug escorts for vessel carryinghazardous materials. The Governor’s veto messagenoted that “While I appreciate the authors efforts toensure the safety of California’s ports by requiringtug boat escorts for vessels carrying specifiedhazardous materials, I am concerned that this billwould duplicate existing authorities and isinconsistent with advice from the experts on theStates harbor safety committees.”

AB 2338 required appointment to certain HSCs of alabor organization member to represent “non-management” pilots. The Governor’s veto messagestated that “Harbor Safety Committees weredeveloped to enhance safety at California’s ports.With safety as their primary goal, committees pridethemselves on being inclusive and unbiased. It ismy goal to allow these committees to maintainsafety as a paramount concern. Further, SB 1742(McPherson) makes AB 2388 unnecessary. SB 1742

would allow any Harbor Safety Committee topetition the Administrator for new or additionalmembership positions as needed to conduct HarborSafety Committee business and to reflect the makeupof the local maritime community.”

2004 RULEMAKING:

Revised Tank Vessel Escort Regulations for SanFrancisco Bay Region

These amendments were needed to clarify ClearingHouse and pilot responsibilities in regard to tugescorts. Pilots had been required to have a blanktug-escort checklist (which details the informationneeded for a safe tank vessel-tug transit) availablefor the master when boarding a vessel. This impliedthat the master did not have to complete hischecklist until after the pilot boarded. In reality, themaster should have the checklist completed beforethe pilot came on-board, or significant delays to thetransit could occur. The language requiring the pilotto bring blank checklists on board was repealed.Also, the Clearing House (run by the San FranciscoMarine Exchange) had been maintaining a list ofapproved tug crew training programs. OSPR has theresponsibility to approve these training programsand as a matter of course maintains an up-to-datelist of programs. It was not necessary that theClearing House also maintain a list, so this languagewas repealed. These amendments were approved bythe Office of Administrative Law (OAL) on May 10,and became effective on June 9, 2004.

Revised Tank Vessel Escort Regulations for LosAngeles/Long Beach Harbor

Amendments to the regulation for tank vessel escortsfor the Los Angeles/Long Beach Harbor were neededto implement work hour, manning and trainingrequirements for tug escort crews performing therequired escort and assist operations. These changesenhance safety for the individuals involved in tugescorting and improve the efficiency of tug escortoperations. These amendments were approved byOAL on September 27, and became effective onOctober 27, 2004. The specific changes include thefollowing:

• Reference to federal requirements regardinghours of work for tug escort crews has beenadded. Further, “working hours” and “hoursof rest” are clarified to facilitate compliancewith the requirements. Long hours on duty34



can lead to fatigue which impairs judgmentand quick response actions. Theseamendments are necessary to reduce thechance of fatigue induced human error duringan escort operation.

• The number, make-up and level of readinessof the escort tug crewmembers have beenspecified. This is necessary to ensure thatduring an escort transit there would be asufficient number of line-handling crew torespond in an emergency, while still providingcrew to operate the vessel and monitor theengine room.

• Language has been added to require specificelements in a training and education programfor both tug masters and crew. Specifying thetypes and frequency of the required training isnecessary to assure that the tug escort crewscan fulfill their role safely and effectively.Comparable training required by the U.S.Coast Guard can be used to satisfy specifictraining elements. Language has also beenadded to specify how companies candemonstrate compliance with the requiredtraining elements.

• The Administrator is granted authority toreview the equipment and crew on an escorttug at any time, to assure compliance with themanning, work hour and trainingrequirements.

Revised Tank Vessel Escort Regulations for PortHueneme Harbor

The regulatory amendments to the Port HuenemeTank Vessel Escort regulations made non-regulatoryclarifying changes, deleted old date references, andprovided consistency with the administrative civilactions of the other tug escort requirements inCalifornia. OAL approved the amendmentsDecember 21 and they went into effect on January20, 2005.

Revised Regulations for Harbor Safety Committeesand Harbor Safety Plans

These regulatory amendments implement theprovisions of SB 1742 (Chapter 796, Statutes of2004), which outline generic harbor safetycommittee positions throughout the state and allowfor additional harbor-specific positions to beidentified in regulation. These harbor-specificpositions were developed in consultation with the

applicable harbor safety committees alreadyestablished. OAL approved the amendmentsJanuary 11, and they went into effect on February 9,2005.

SPILL PREVENTION INITIATIVES:

OSPR established two research analyst positions.This will allow OSPR to focus on the development ofdata. OSPR should have an improved ability toidentify causal trends and better focus preventionefforts.

SPILL PREPAREDNESS INITIATIVES:

In 2004 the Training Program facilitated thedelivery of many OSPR Core Training courses suchas Field Sampling and Preservation, Booms and OilSkimmers, Environmental Sensitivity Index, andIncident Command System position specific trainingin Logistics, Historian and Liaison positions. Manymore core training modules will be delivered in thefuture.

The priority this fiscal year has been to train all ofthe OSPR/ Department of Fish & Game responseemployees to meet Hazwoper requirements. To date,over 300 department response personnel have eitherattended an 8 hour refresher course or a 24 hour siteworker course.

This year has also seen the first introduction of ournewly developed Environmental Response to OilSpills Course. This course was developed incooperation with NOAA. It will be held twice eachyear (once in the fall in Northern California andonce in the spring in Southern California). It wasattended this year by OSPR, industry, Navy andCoast Guard personnel. The course receivedinternational recognition and in the fall, will includea component on international response.

During the next fiscal year, the Training Programwill be assisting in the revision and facilitation of thePollution Response Manual to OSPR anddepartmental personnel to broaden the department'sresponse knowledge.

The program looks forward to continuing to workwith industry and military personnel to prepare staffin prevention and response activities.

The OSPR Drills & Exercises Program performedseventy-four unannounced drills throughout 2004.Twelve announced drills were held. Additionally,OSPR’s Drill Design Team conducted two internal 35



spill response exercises in Northern California andtwo OSRO rating drills to confirm new applications.

California was also the location for the 2004 Spill ofNational Significance (SONS) exercise. This exerciseinvolved about 100 OSPR employees and was thelargest drill ever conducted by the US Coast Guard.

The Sensitive Site Strategy Evaluation Program(SEEP) continues to refine the Area Plan strategiesfor the protection of environmentally sensitive sitesin the San Francisco Bay area. For the year endingJuly 1, 2005, eight strategies were jointly testedthrough the Area Committee with either MSRC orNRC deploying their equipment, on behalf ofCalifornia contingency plan holders. Theapproximate total of harbor boom fully deployedwas 13,000 feet. This program is in the third year ofdevelopment and is ongoing.

The Wildlife Response Plan for California has beencompleted and is available at http://www.dfg.ca.gov/ospr/misc/wildlife.htm. Wildlifeand habitats are injured or put at risk or when oil isspilled into the marine environment. Both Federaland State statutes mandate protection, rescue andrehabilitation of oiled wildlife. This plan outlinesCalifornia’s strategy to meet that mandate.

R&D INITIATIVES

OSPR’s Scientific Study and Evaluation Program(SEEP) undertook the following initiatives in 2004:

TPH Test Kit: Validation of RaPID Assay

OBJECTIVES: To test the accuracy andreproducibility of the RaPID TPH test kit, anddetermine its utility for use in oil spill response andNRDA sampling work.

SUMMARY: Immunoassay test kits have been usedin many applications to provide rapid andinexpensive data related to contaminants in soil andwater. This study would evaluate spiked samples ofknown concentrations of oil to assess test kitaccuracy. Common field interferences such asbiogenic sheen, high turbidity, variable salinity, andvarious forms of organic matter content are all verycommon in oil samples. This study will evaluate theability of these test kits to perform given these real-world conditions. If the test kits perform well, OSPRresponse and NRDA personnel may use the kits toincrease efficiency of sample collection and analysison scene. A report of findings and recommendationswill be provided.

Use of Sand Crabs to Monitor PetroleumContamination

OBJECTIVE: To determine the Sand Crab’s ability todepurate (purify) petroleum hydrocarbons.

SUMMARY: Sand Crabs can be used to monitorsandy beaches for petroleum contamination. Thisstudy will determine the depuration rate ofpetroleum by Sand Crabs, and if oil extracted fromthe crabs can be “fingerprinted” to a specificcontamination source. The results (or “product”) ofthe study will be a report with conclusions regardingthe usefulness of using sand crabs as a monitoringand identification tool in petroleum contaminationinvestigations.

Estimating the Abundance and Distribution ofMarbled Murrelets

OBJECTIVE: Evaluating and comparing theeffectiveness of aerial plane surveys to those of boat

36



above: Oil Spill Prevention Specialist EdBoyes captures an oiled Western Grebe

below: OSPR’s Cindy Murphy coordinatesbird rehab volunteers

surveys in estimating the abundance and distributionof Marbled Murrelets along coastal shorelineenvironments.

SUMMARY: No known studies have been conductedthat compare boat-based surveys to aerial surveys indetermining the abundance and distribution of birdsat sea. In this study, six days of aerial and at-seaboat surveys will be conducted, the data of whichwill be used to assess relative efficacy of eachmethod for detecting Marbled Murrelets. The resultsof this study will add to our knowledge of coastalmurrelet distribution and concentration, which willaid in decision-making on the use of dispersants atsea. The data will also provide documentation tothe often debated and controversial use of at-seasurveys for evaluating injury in NRDA cases. Apaper will be prepared for publication in a peer-reviewed journal.

Coastal Biophysical Inventory of Marine Resources

OBJECTIVE(S): To conduct physical sampling ofcoastal marine resources in order to provide baselinedata for NRDA assessments and Resources at Riskdata during spill response.

SUMMARY: This project would consist of conductingfield surveys and sampling of flora and fauna toevaluate the distribution, abundance, and range ofcoastal natural resources along approximately 110miles of coastline within the Point Reyes NationalSeashore, Tomales Bay State Park, Golden GateNRA, and Angel Island State Park. The baseline datacollected will be made available in a spatiallyexplicit database, which can then be used as areference for use in NRDA projects.

Protection of Least Terns during an Oil Spill

Objective: To evaluate the effectiveness of usingportable artificial ponds stocked with fish in thevicinity of an oil spill for luring terns away fromcontaminated open water during a spill event.

Summary: To minimize injuries to the endangeredCalifornia Least Tern during an oil spill, thisexperiment would deploy readily purchased andavailable plastic swimming pools filled with waterand fish in the proximity of known Least Terncolonies to evaluate the effectiveness of attractingterns to the pools, and away from a hypothetical oilspill. If successful, this simple and relatively lowcost method could be used as a tool to protectendangered Terns during a spill.

Tracking and Sampling Dispersed Oil.

OBJECTIVE: To determine oil dispersant efficiencyand environmental impacts.

SUMMARY: This project will study the dispersal ofsimulated oil plumes (in space and time) - using anon-toxic dye in lieu of oil - to evaluate theenvironmental trade-offs when making decisionswhether or not to use dispersants in a spill. Applieddye plumes will be tracked as a simulated oil spill,and the observed trajectory will be compared withcomputer model simulation predictions. Stratifiedocean samples will also be collected to determine thevertical extent of water column impacted by the dyeplume. Determining the vertical extent of asimulated oil plume (by evaluating dyeconcentrations at different strata in the watercolumn) will provide data for extrapolating to realoil plume contamination, and potential toxicity towater column biota.

Central Coast Marine Bird Health Studies

OBJECTIVES: (1) To measure baseline health ofCommon Murres and Sooty Shearwaters; (2) Toquantify age-specific mortality factors affectingCommon Murres; (3) To identify and quantifyspecies-species disease factors; (4) To train selectedOSPR personnel in sea bird capture, marking, andhandling techniques; and (5) To establish acooperative marine bird health monitoring program.

SUMMARY: This study intends to conduct acomprehensive demographic assessment of diseaseand mortality factors affecting Common Murres andother seabird populations in central California, incooperation with Moss Landing Marine Laboratories.Data will be generated by conducting at-sea fieldbaseline health monitoring of wild seabirds;conducting atsea banding of first year murres, thenevaluating mortality factors affecting deceased bandedbirds; and by conducting necropsies on specimenscollected from beach survey programs, rehabilitationcenters, and state and federal agencies, to determinespecies-species disease factors. This study will helpprovide a support for marine bird mortalityinvestigations and lead to a systematic approach tomarine bird health assessments in California.

Coastal Habitats Quick-Response Procedures Kits

OBJECTIVE: To develop a response protocol thatcan be formalized into “Coastal Habitats QuickResponse Procedures (Go Kits).” 37



SUMMARY: “Go kits” would be developed thatcould be used to assess injury to biologicalcommunities immediately following an oil spill.Developed protocols and go-kits would be specific tohabitat (e.g., sandy beaches, rocky shores, andwetlands). The go-kits would contain equipment,worksheets, and instructions necessary to conductthe various sampling protocols. The go-kits willprovide a standard and consistent method to be usedwhen evaluating the effects of oil on wildlife.

Effects of Polycyclic Aromatic Hydrocarbon (PAH)Ingestion on Japanese Quail

OBJECTIVE: To establish dose-responserelationships between dietary ingestion of PAH byavian species exposed to petroleum, and to evaluateresultant reproductive, hematological, andimmunological effects.

SUMMARY: Current knowledge about thetoxicological effects of PAHs on birds is extremelylimited. This in turn limits the ability to assessinjuries to bird species at oil spill sites where PAHsare the main persistent chemicals of concern. In thisstudy, breeding Japanese quail (a standard testspecies to be used in lieu of aquatic birds that arelogistically difficult to use in controlled studies) willbe chronically fed PAH-spiked feed. Theinvestigators will evaluate pathological,hematological, and reproductive effects in the quailand determine threshold doses at which these effectsoccur. The results of this study will provide animportant tool for predicting long term injures toavian species from oil spills. The final product willbe a written study report, which will support NRDAassessment work, and be a significant contributionto the scientific literature.

OSPR WEBSITE

For more information about OSPR’s activities, pleasevisit www.dfg.ca.gov/Ospr/

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39



PROGRAM MISSION

The Hazardous Evaluation and Emergency Response(HEER) Office serves the people of the State ofHawaii by addressing all aspects of releases ofhazardous substances, including oil, into theenvironment. Our work includes preventing,planning for, and responding to hazardoussubstance releases or risks of releases. The HEEROffice accomplishes this mission by addressingcontaminated sites with the highest risk to humanhealth and the environment first, preventingcontamination rather than cleaning up after the fact,and basing decisions on sound scientific principlesand common sense.

The office is comprised of three operating sections,each addressing an important aspect of its mission.The implementing sections are organized as follows:1) Emergency Preparedness, Prevention andResponse; 2) Site Discovery, Assessment andRemediation; and 3) Hazard Evaluation.

The HEER Office Emergency Preparedness,Prevention and Response Section (EP&R) along withthe four State On-Scene Coordinators (SOSC) areresponsible for planning and preparing for, andresponding to releases of a hazardous substanceand/or oil that may causeimmediate and substantial threatto human health or theenvironment. The four SOSCshave been trained to enterhazardous atmospheres in selfcontaining breathing apparatusand various types of personalprotective equipment. As back-up personnel to first responderCounty HAZMAT teams, SOSCsare on 24-hour call.

SIGNIFICANT EVENTSUMMARIES

During FY 2004, the HEER Officereceived 356 notifications whichwere directly concerned with therelease of hazardous chemicals or

oil spills. Of the 356 notifications reported, 108required a site visit by a State On-Scene-Coordinator(SOSC) and/or a major off-scene coordination andresponse effort. Notable among the spill responsesduring FY 2004 are the following:

Honolulu Harbor Area-wide Contamination

The Iwilei District Operating Partners (IDOP) havecontinued to focus on preventing the release of theexisting area wide petroleum contamination into theHonolulu Harbor and the waters of the State. TheHawaii Department of Health HEER Office hascontinued the oversight of source control,containment, response activities, and pipelinemapping. The Environmental Protection Agency(EPA) Federal On-Scene Coordinators (FOSCs) areassisting in this State lead joint project.

IDOP is currently negotiating a voluntary agreementwith the DOH to define responsibilities forprevention of releases in the Iwilei area. Thisagreement will augment the current voluntaryagreement between the Iwilei District ParticipatingPartners (IDPP) and the DOH to control releases,delineate the extent of contamination, removesources, and remediate the Iwilei area.

Hawaii HAZARD EVALUATION & EMERGENCY RESPONSE OFFICE OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH ADMINISTRATION IN THE HAWAII DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH (HEER)

Honolulu Harbor oil clean-up.

40

FY 2004 emergency response issues for the HonoluluHarbor area included seepage of petroleumhydrocarbons from the Pier 26 bulkhead into theharbor, and Pier 32 seepage onto the pier at the oldPauley/Shell asphalt plant. The Pier 26 seepage waspatched and the IDPP has plans to excavate the areato find and remove the source. At the close of FY2004 the Pier 32 seepage was being cleaned up, andplans to investigate the source were underway.

Also during FY 2004, the Nimitz Highway corridor inthe area of Pacific and Sumner streets was in theprocess of being excavated for a new water mainand street resurfacing project. During constructioncontamination was encountered. The contaminatedarea was partially excavated by the contractor, andwas mapped and referred to the IDPP. The projectand mapping continues for FY 2005.

The HEER Office will continue to provide oversightof the prevention and cleanup activities. The workwill entail the evaluation of current facilities and thecontrol and elimination of future releases. It isenvisioned that the area wide remediation effort willrequire staff time for several more years.

Hilo Bayfront Soccer Fields

In November 2001, contaminated soil from an oldgasification plant was deposited onto the HiloBayfront soccer fields via the Alenaio Stream FloodControl Channel. Contractors removedapproximately 70 cubic feet of tar like fuel residuefrom the stream bank. The tar and the soilcontaminated with polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons(PAH) removed from the fields was disposed of as anon-hazardous waste. Following removal activities,the fields were capped with clean soil by HawaiiCounty.

The flood also wiped out monitoring wells that hadbeen constructed to assess the impact of the buriedtar on groundwater. These wells were restored bythe County and FEMA.

A berm located at the Northern end of the sitecontained approximately three thousand cubic yardsof buried tar left by the Army Corps of Engineersduring construction of a scour pond for the channel.Samples taken from the new wells show nosignificant impact to groundwater.

In an effort to find an on-island solution, the HEEROffice asked the EPA to assist in determining theenvironmental impact of the tar, as well asalternatives for its removal. There have been manyof these old cooking gas manufacturing plants on theWest Coast, and the EPA has been involved withcleaning up most of them.

A total of 4,000 yards of the tar material wasremoved from the berm and a dirt bottomed tank.All of the material removed was disposed of in alined cell at the West Hawaii Landfill. All of thematerial had been in the flood path of the floodcontrol channel.

Vessel Groundings

On January 14, 2004, a Navy vessel grounded at PortAllen Small Boat Harbor on Kauai with 400 gallonsof diesel fuel aboard. The Navy transferred the fuelfrom the vessel and the vessel was pulled from therocks. The vessel was dismantled and materialrecycled.



Port Allen Navy Ship grounding.

41



Island Recycling Fire (Sand Island)

On April 30, 2004 a fire at Island Recycling tireshredder ignited approximately 5,000 tires. Becauseof poor access and lack of fire hydrants, the fire wasdifficult to extinguish. The immediate health issuewas the smoke plume. And estimated 1,250 gallonsof pyrolytic oil was released with some eventuallyentering Keehi Lagoon.

ENVIRONMENTAL CRIMES UNIT INITIATIVE

Using emergency response funding a EnvironmentalCrimes Unit was created within the Department ofthe Attorney General.

The unit investigates and prosecutes environmentalcrimes that pose a substantial risk to public health orthe environment. These crimes may include thosethat pollute the air and water, dump or spill solid orhazardous waste, involve underground storagetanks, or misuse pesticides or restricted or regulatedchemicals. To promote environmental regulatoryintegrity, the unit also investigates and prosecutesfraud, false reporting, and concealment.

As of December 2004, the ECU brought five cases tocourt for criminal prosecution. Felony indictmentsand one felony conviction were secured. A numberof other cases are under investigation.

HAWAII DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH WEBSITE

Additional information about the environmentalprogram and available documents can be obtained at the Department of Health web site at:www.hawaii.gov/health/eh

Sand Island recycling fire.

PROGRAM MISSION

The Emergency Response Program at theDepartment of Environmental Quality (DEQ)supports the agencies strategic direction to protecthuman health and the environment from toxics bypreparing for and minimizing the danger posed bycatastrophic releases of dangerous chemicals.

2004 SPILL STATISTICS

• DEQ received 2,308 spill notifications fromthe Oregon Emergency Management Divisionin 2004.

• The 2,308 notifications resulted in 682projects that required detailed follow-up.

• There were 149 spills of petroleum productsover 42 gallons and seven spills of petroleumproduct larger than 1,000 gallons.

• Ninety four of the spills were to navigablewaters of the state, 67 of which involvedpetroleum.

• Three facilities regulated under the Oregon OilPollution Act experienced releases, howeverno vessels covered under the act reported anyreleases.

• Seven spills from fishing vessels werereported along with 27 “other vessel” spills.

• There were 14 spills from tank trucks.

MAJOR INCIDENTS

Train derailment near Riddle spills over 4,000gallons of diesel

The US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) andthe Oregon Department of Environmental Quality(DEQ) responded to a diesel spill resulting from atrain derailment approximately 17 miles west ofRiddle on October 26th, 2004. Contractors werehired by the Central Oregon & Pacific Railroad forthe emergency soil and water cleanup actions.

The EPA, DEQ and Railroad formed a UnifiedCommand to coordinate the response activities andto collect specific information to evaluate the extentand magnitude of the contamination.

The derailment occurred on the slope above CowCreek. Two fuel tanks from two locomotivesruptured, spilling about 4,300 gallons of diesel.

The terrain made cleanup work difficult. Booms wereplaced in the creek to capture as much diesel aspossible. A rainbow sheen of diesel could be seenflowing downstream from the site of the crash. Silverstreamers of diesel, the lightest observable quantity,could be seen farther downstream toward the townof Riddle. Water systems with intakes from CowCreek downstream of the crash site were notified,and the Department of Human Services, DrinkingWater Program worked with downstream users.Water Program worked with downstream users.

Tank truck crash in Amity

The Oregon Department of Environmental Quality(DEQ) and the Oregon Department of Transportation(ODOT) coordinated work at the site of the tankertrailer collision on July 3rd, 2004. DEQ coordinatedthe environmental investigation to determine theextent of the soil and water contamination from thegasoline spill. The east side of the road was impactedby the gasoline, and DEQ worked with ODOT tooversee the excavation of the contaminated soil.

The owner of the tractor trailer, HarrisTransportation Co., LLC, hired contractors toconduct the excavation, drilling and sampling work. 42



Oregon EMERGENCY RESPONSE PROGRAM, OREGON DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY

Responders work to recover fuel oil in a fastwaterenvironment.

43



Approximately 2,149 tons of contaminated soil wasremoved from the site. Crews reached a depth of17.5 feet in some of the excavations. A drill rig wasused to help locate the edge of the contaminationplume. Core samples were drilled to assist with thedetermination of the extent of the excavation, bothhorizontally and vertically. Work included removingsome of the pavement from the northbound lane.ODOT maintenance crews coordinated with DEQ toensure road stability was maintained while theexcavation continued. Once the excavation wascompleted and the contamination removed, ODOToversaw rebuilding of the road while continuingtraffic controls.

Four-Alarm Fire at Oil Recycling Facility Results inSpill into Johnson Creek Killing Fish

A four-alarm fire that broke out at a southeastPortland oil recycling facility resulted in the release ofoil and water treatment chemicals into nearbyJohnson Creek, killing a number of fish. The fire atthe Thermo Fluids facility, at 6400 SE 101st Avenuein Portland occurred as contractors andsubcontractors were doing work in the building. Thewater treatment chemicals stored in the buildingentered an adjacent drainage ditch and spilled intoJohnson Creek, raising the creek’s acidity and causinga fish kill. Officials from the US Fish and WildlifeService investigated the full extent of the fish kill.

The building that burned contained a large waste oil-water separator that became overfilled during firesuppression efforts, spilling 2,000 to 3,000 gallons ofoil from the facility. Absorbent booms placed at thescene helped prevent the majority of the oil fromentering Johnson Creek.

Unified Command assessed the quantities of oils andchemicals involved in the fire and spill. Members of

the group included Thermo Fluids, DEQ, the US Fishand Wildlife Service, and US EnvironmentalProtection Agency (EPA). Unified Command groupmembers remained on the scene to oversee andmanage the cleanup. Restoration efforts areongoing.

NEW LEGISLATION/RULEMAKING

• DEQ has not had any legislative activity withregard to oil spill prevention, preparedness orresponse this year.

• DEQ has been working on updatingenforcement rules for all programs.Enforcement rules specific to the EmergencyResponse Program include: oil spill preventionand contingency planning (OAR 340-141);emergency response to releases of oil andhazardous materials (OAR 340-142); andballast water (OAR 340-143). Theenforcement rules describe what actions DEQ may take when environmental rules are violated.

• The Emergency Response Program has beenparticipating in a general rulemaking effortthat revises rules for several Land QualityDivision programs. The key changes for theEmergency Response Program includeadopting dredge daily use fees that are instatute and the adoption of NIMS as theincident management system to be used in the State of Oregon.

OIL SPILL PREPAREDNESS

• DEQ and EPA sponsored a three day Fast-Water Practical Course in May on theMacKenzie River near Eugene. The courseutilized response strategies developed by the“MacKenzie River Group” in one of the firstinland geographic response plans developedin the state. The course is a hands-on classand was attended by over 35 local, state andfederal officials.

• DEQ has spent a significant amount of timeworking with other state agencies on StateHomeland Security issues.

OREGON EMERGENCY RESPONSE WEBSITE

For more information on the emergency responseprograms at DEQ, please go to: http://www.deq.state.or.us/wmc/cleanup/cugrpmain.htm

Firefighters respond to a fuel tank truck accident.

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PROGRAM MISSION

In 2004, the Spills Program had its share ofchallenges but with each challenge “lessons learned”were captured and are being used to makeimprovements. In all areas of the program, broadprogress continues to occur.

One of the priorities set for the program in the fall of2001, was the development and implementation ofDRILLTRAC. This training and competency programhelps staff manage spills through the IncidentCommand System (ICS). The goal for DRILLTRAC isto build relationships across the program andcapabilities for spill response that meet or exceedany standard set by the program for industry. AnIncident Management Assist Team (IMAT) wasestablished and each member of the team wasrequired to demonstrate competency in one or moreICS positions. In September, a very successfulinternal drill was held to test staff competency.

On October 14, the Dalco Passage oil spill wasdiscovered near Vashon Island. Delays in assessingthe spill occurred, and critical lessons were learnedfrom the experience. It is understandable that post-spill coverage focused on the delays and not on theresponse, although the response organization thatcame together was strong and effective. Theinvestments in training, testing, and maintainingresponse capability paid off.

In November, the Oil Spill Early Action Task Forcewas established to look at the first 12 hours of theDalco Passage response. In December, the task forcemade recommendations to the Governor andNorthwest Area Committee. One recommendationrecognized the need to strengthen citizenparticipation in the planning processes of the SpillsProgram. The Legislature, through SB 5432, soughtto address this need by establishing a citizens’advisory council. In May 2005, Governor ChristineGregoire signed the bill. It takes effect July 1, 2005,creating an independent citizens’ oil spill advisorycouncil.

The Spills Program is committed to finding betterways to engage interest groups and the public.Looking ahead for 2005, the Spills Program will:

• Rapidly and aggressively respond to spills andcontinue emphasizing the importance ofprevention and preparedness where fundingand jurisdiction allow;

• Continue investigating oil spills in depth toidentify systemic issues in the oiltransportation, use, transfer, and storagesystems that contribute to spills, and usevoluntary actions and rule developmentprocesses to prevent and prepare for them;

• Utilize our expertise to assist federal agenciesin cracking down on those that woulddeliberately discharge oil; and

• Take advantage of Gov. Gregiore’s emphasison performance measures. Use this process tolink our strategic goals with programaccountability, improved performance, andexternal communication.

The Spills Program team is moving aheadconfidently and assertively in delivering innovativespill prevention, 24-7 oil and hazmat spill response,and spill preparedness services statewide.


Jay Manning was appointed by Governor ChristineGregoire in February 2005 to be the Director of theWashington State Department of Ecology. Beforecoming to Ecology, Jay spent six years in private lawpractice, most recently as the managing partner inone of the Pacific Northwest’s leading environmentallaw firms, Brown, Reavis and Manning PLLC, whereJay advised private and municipal clients on how tocomply with federal and state environmental laws.

He also worked extensively with Indian tribes andenvironmental organizations. During this time, Jaywas a lead negotiator in resolving the lawsuit overthe state’s shoreline management guidelines,achieving agreement among business,environmentalists and Ecology on the first update tothe regulations in more than 30 years.

Before that, Jay spent 15 years working as anAssistant Attorney General, including nearly sixyears as head of the Ecology Division, where heserved as counsel to Ecology’s director and managed

WashingtonTHE SPILL PREVENTION, PREPAREDNESS, AND RESPONSE PROGRAM

OF THE WASHINGTON DEPARTMENT OF ECOLOGY

the 32-person division. As an Assistant AttorneyGeneral, Jay helped craft the Hanford cleanupagreement (Tri-Party Agreement) and led thelitigation team that prevailed before the US SupremeCourt in a groundbreaking water-pollution case. Jayis a fourth-generation Washington resident.

Jay received his bachelor’s degree in political sciencefrom Eastern Washington University in 1980 and hislaw degree from the University of Oregon in 1983.He enjoys all kinds of outdoor recreation, includinghiking, camping and mountain-biking.

SPILL DATA/STATISTICS

The Spills Program received 3,988 calls in 2004.More than 98% of those required followed up.Various petroleum spills accounted for 1,521 ofthose calls and 68 of the reported spills to waterwere at least 25 gallons or more. One thousand,three hundred and forty-one (1,341) calls wererelated to methamphetamine drug labs or methwaste found across the state. This number hasdecreased for the third year in a row, reversing asteady climb that began in the 1990s and ended in2001.

MAJOR 2004 INCIDENTS

Point Wells spill (December 30, 2003)

On December 30, 2003, approximately 4700 gallonsof a heavy fuel oil spilled from the tank barge FOSS248-P2 while it was loading bunker fuel at theChevron Point Wells oil storage facility north ofSeattle. A unified command made up of a

responsible party Incident Commander from FossMaritime, a federal on-scene coordinator (OSC) fromthe Us Coast Guard (USCG), a state OSC from theWashington Department of Ecology, a tribal OSCfrom the Suquamish Tribe and a local OSC from theKitsap County Department of EmergencyManagement formed to manage the spill. A large on-water response force was mobilized but the oilquickly impacted an environmentally sensitivemarsh and beaches owned by both the SuquamishTribe and the State of Washington. Commercial andrecreational shellfish beds, beach sediments, apristine marsh, and high-use public beaches were allaffected by the spill. A major four-month cleanupeffort occurred on the beaches and marsh to removethe oil. Shellfish and sediment sampling andmonitoring plans were developed jointly by agencyand tribal workgroups. The Suquamish Tribe wasplaced in the lead for conducting beach surveysunder a long-term monitoring plan approved by theunified command

A joint Ecology-USCG investigation into thecircumstances of the spill from the tank barge beganwith preliminary interviews, photographs of the spillscene, and collection of transfer-related documents.In depth interviews with various witnesses andparties were conducted. Follow-up eventuallyfocused on the operability, and operation of, thebarge’s tank overfill alarm system. The factorscontributing to the slow deployment of containmentboom were also identified. Both the USCG andEcology developed recommendations for preventionof similar spills to Foss Maritime and Chevron-Texaco.

Currently, all oil that can be removed has beenremoved, and sediment contamination is withinstate cleanup standards for contaminated sites. InApril 2004, the Department of Health tested clamsand mussels from the intertidal zone and determinedthat the tissues were safe for consumption. (Theseshellfish live well below the low tide line and wereleast likely to be affected by oil.) Beach access andshellfish restrictions were removed and vegetation isgrowing back in the marsh.

The 2004 Legislature directed Ecology to conduct astudy of oil transfer operations that occur on water.Based on those findings, Ecology will developadditional regulations to reduce the risk of oil spillsduring oil transfer operations. If legislation isneeded, Ecology will make recommendations to the2006 Legislature. 45



Oil on deck of the Foss 248-P2 barge.

Dalco Passage Oil Spill (October 14, 2004)

Since no party initially stepped forward to acceptresponsibility for the Dalco Passage spill nearVashon and Maury islands, identifying the sourcebecame an immediate priority in October 2004. Oilsamples were taken from the spill site and otherpotential sources. Inspectors also revieweddocuments aboard a number of ships that were inthe vicinity of Tacoma around the time of the spill aspart of a joint Ecology-USCG investigative effort.Under direction of USCG investigators, samplingefforts stretched to Alaska to locate ships that haddeparted Tacoma prior to discovery of the Dalcospill. Samples of oil products delivered from, orcarried to local oil handling facilities were alsoobtained for testing by Ecology's ManchesterEnvironmental laboratory and the USCG MarineSafety Laboratory in Connecticut. Both labs returnedresults indicating the spilled oil was Alaska NorthSlope Crude Oil from the tank ship Polar Texas,which had transited the area of the Dalco spill thatevening; a joint announcement to that effect wasmade by then Governor Gary Locke and the USCGRear Admiral Jeffrey Garrett on December 23, 2004.The state and USCG are continuing theirinvestigations and are preparing to recover the costsof cleanup from the responsible party.

McNeil Island Legacy Spill (August 17, 2004)

McNeil Island Corrections Center staff reported anintermittent sheen of petroleum oil coming from thecenter’s main stormwater outfall near the ferry dock.Releases tended to coincide with heavy rainfall. Thesource of the oil was traced back to an abandonedheavy fuel line. The legacy oil was located within thecenter’s high-security exercise yard, complicating theprocess of repair and research. All oil has beenremoved from the old line and the contamination wasflushed from the stormwater system and captured byvacuum truck to prevent any future releases.

US Oil and Refining (USOR) Jet Fuel Release toGroundwater (September 8, 2004)

Corrosion in an internal pipeline in the refineryprocess units at U.S. Oil and Refining in Tacomacreated a hole below grade where the line passedbeneath a service road. The line in this area was notprotected by sleeving, coating or other corrosion-prevention techniques. Jet fuel leaked for anunknown period of time until it could be seenpooling on the surface. Ground water elevations in

the area vary from surface level to 8 feet below, andit was quickly evident that ground water wasimpacted by the release. USOR initially estimated theamount released at less than 500 gallons. Extractionand cleanup of the jet fuel (and any other oilpresent) continues; the total recovery as of March 7,2005, has been 13,267 gallons.

Ground water is regarded as the “property” of thecitizens of Washington State, as is surface water. Arelease of this type requires immediate reporting tothe National Response Center and to the WashingtonDivision of Emergency Management.

NEW LEGISLATION AND RULEMAKING ISSUES

Study of Tug Escorts in Puget Sound

Washington State’s tug escort requirements weresigned into law in 1975 and require that laden oiltankers have a tug escort while transiting the watersof Puget Sound east of Dungeness Spit. The tugsprovide a backup steering and propulsion system inthe event of a tanker system failure. While thesestandards are one of the most important spillprevention measures in the state, they have not beensignificantly updated to reflect changes in industrypractices and environmental values.

In the 30 years since the requirements were adopted,many aspects of the escort system have beenimproved:

• New, state-of-the-art highly capable tractortugs have been brought on-line to escorttankers;

• Many existing escort tugs have beenextensively refitted with important upgrades;

• All new oil tankers are required to havedouble hulls and existing single-hulled tankersare being phased out;

• A few double-hulled tankers are being builtfor the Trans Alaskan Pipeline System (TAPS)trade that exceed national and internationalrequirements. These vessels have manyredundant systems including twin engines,segregated engine rooms, dual steeringmechanisms and other important safetyimprovements;

• The more stringent federal tug escortrequirements for Puget Sound do not apply todouble-hulled tankers, and will no longer bein effect once the single-hull tanker phase-outis complete;46



• The less stringent state tug escortrequirements will continue to apply to single-hulled and double-hulled tankers transitingPuget Sound waters east of Dungeness Spit;and

• The escort procedures used by tugs, tankers,and Puget Sound Pilots have evolved toenhance safety.

These improvements reduce the probability of majorspills from tank ships. However, since on-waterrecovery operations during major oil spills usuallyonly remove 10% to 20% of the oil, oil spillprevention remains one of Ecology’s topenvironmental priorities.

The 2003 Washington State Legislature directedEcology to complete “an evaluation of tug escortrequirements for laden tankers to determine if thecurrent escort system requirements under RCW88.16.190 should be modified to recognize safetyenhancements of the new double hull tankersdeployed with redundant systems.”

In early 2004, Ecology established a stakeholderadvisory committee to provide advice on the study.Criteria were established to ensure that anyrecommendations to the legislature and governorwould maintain or improve the current level ofprotection provided by escorts of conventionaldouble-hulled tankers.

A competitive bidding process was completed and afirm was retained to complete the study with the fullconsensus of the interview panel consisting ofrepresentatives from People for Puget Sound, thePuget Sound Steamship Operators Association, andthe Western States Petroleum Association. In July2004, a study contract was awarded to Glosten andAssociates, Herbert Engineering, Dr. MarthaGrabowski of Rennselear Polytechnic Institute, andDr. Dagmar Etkin of Environmental ResearchConsulting.

The study has a number of important findings. Thereader is encouraged to review the report and relatedinformation on Ecology’s web site at:http://www.ecy.wa.gov/programs/spills/spills.html(look under hot topics/ tug escort study). Ecology’splan of action for 2005 is to:

• Consult individually with key stakeholders;• Reconvene the steering committee to discuss

the study results and how to proceed on theissue; and

• Submit a report to the 2006 legislature.

Ecology is committed to ensuring that tanker tugescorts continue to be one of the cornerstones ofmaritime safety and environmental protection inWashington State.

Zero spills to water – new goal for Washington

The 2004 Washington State Legislature set a goal ofzero spills to Washington waters and directedEcology to develop a strategy to safeguard oiltransfers. Rules will be developed by June 2006,requiring facilities conducting oil transfers to vesselsto have access to response equipment, training on itsuse, pre-deployed spill boom prior to the transferwhen it is safe and effective, and to employ otheralternative measures where pre-booming is notfeasible. Near the end of 2004, an AdvisoryCommittee was formed to help with the rule process.A study of the experiences in other states with oiltransfer monitoring and oversight has beencommissioned to inform the committee.

Currently, data on transfers, regulatory requirementsand industry practices is being gathered from manyparts of the state to determine if regulatory orfunding gaps exist. An interim report to theWashington Legislature was delivered in December,and a final report will be presented in September2005. The final report will contain recommendationsfor regulatory and funding enhancements.

SPILL PREVENTION INITIATIVES

The Exceptional Compliance Program (ECOPRO) andthe Voluntary Best Achievable Protection (VBAP)Program for 2004

Each year, tank vessel operators are invited toparticipate in two Department of Ecology programsto protect Washington’s irreplaceable naturalresources from the damage caused by an oil spill.

In 2004, five companies renewed their commitmentto the Voluntary Best Achievable Protection (VBAP)program: AHL Shipping Company, KeystoneShipping, Scorpio Ship Management, Solar Japanand West Coast Fuel Transport. At the same time,three companies joined Washington’s ExceptionalCompliance Program (ECOPRO): Tanker PacificManagement, Island Tug and Barge and MarineTransport Corporation. Both programs are voluntary.

The influence of these voluntary programs isapparent in the positive feedback Ecology hasreceived from participating companies. “Our crews 47



have learned a lot from Washington’s ECOPROprogram and are using what they have learned insimilarly sensitive waters around the world.Implementing the ECOPRO standards and pursuingexcellence in our daily activities has made us abetter organization overall,” noted EmmanuelVordonis, Executive Director of Thenamaris ShipsManagement Inc. in Athens, Greece.

A United States tank barge owner/operator hasnoted that “Operating under Washington’s initiativesfor tank vessels has helped our company, as awhole, to perform better and operate our tankvessels more safely.” The ECOPRO Program has thefollowing participants:

Washington Exceptional Compliance Program(ECOPRO) Full Members

• SeaRiver Maritime Inc.Houston, Texas USA

• Alaska Tanker Company, LLC, Beaverton, Oregon USA

• M.T.M. Ship Management Pte. Ltd., Singapore• Thenamaris Ships Management Inc.,

Athens, Greece• Island Tug and Barge Ltd.,

Vancouver, B.C., CanadaECOPRO Associate Members (Full Membershippending vessel inspections.)

• Marine Transport Corp. (ATB Division), Long Beach, California

• Tanker Pacific Management Pte. Ltd.,Singapore

Vessel Entries and Transits (VEAT) 2004

During calendar year 2004, there were 6,865 largecommercial vessel entries (300 gross tons or largerand tank ships of any tonnage) into WashingtonState waters. Of these entries, 5,149 (75 percent ofthe total) were entries into Puget Sound bound forWashington and Canadian ports, 1,669 were entriesinto the Columbia River bound for Washington andOregon ports (24.3 percent of the total), and 47 wereentries into Grays Harbor (0.7 percent of the total).

In 2004, cargo and passenger transits entering PugetSound via the Strait of Juan de Fuca dropped 14percent from the previous year (2003). This can beattributed to the fact that during the last two yearsan increasing number of foreign flag ships call firstat Vancouver, BC via the Strait of Juan de Fuca, andthen enter Washington waters via the Haro Strait,which reduces the number of entries bound directlyfor Washington ports via the Strait of Juan de Fuca.

There was a notable increase from calendar year2003 in vessel entries into Grays Harbor. In 2004there were 47 entries, up from 31 entries in 2003,which is a 52 percent increase over the previousyear. This change is attributed to a new agriculturalbulk loading facility at the Port of Grays HarborTerminal 2.

48



Receiving the ECOPRO Award: Capt. LauraStratton - Ecology Spill Prevention Program VesselInspector and VBAP/ECOPRO coordinator, StevePollock - Island Tug and Barge General Manager,Stan Norman - Ecology Spill Prevention SectionManager, Capt. Bob Shields - Island Tug and BargePresident, Dale Jensen - Ecology Spills ProgramManager, and Jay Manning - Washington StateDepartment of Ecology Director

Another significant change was oil barge traffic onthe Columbia River system, dropping from 1,530transits in 2003 to 822 transits in 2004, which is an86 percent decrease in oil barge traffic during 2004.This change is due in large part to restored regionalpipeline capacity.

Vessel Incident Rate/Bunker Monitoring

The overall vessel incident rate (see chart) computedas a percent of the number of entering vessels, hadbeen on a downward trend for the two previousyears but showed signs of leveling off in 2004. It isworth noting the low number of spills from regulatedvessels; there were just 24 spills during this period,compared with 40 in 2001 and 46 in 2002.

Vessel inspectors have focused on increasing theirpresence aboard vessels, and specifically on bunkermonitoring inspections, raising the number ofinspections from about 1,000 per year in 2000-2001to 1,533 in 2004. Concurrent with the higherinspection rate, bunker monitors have accounted formore than 40 percent of the compliance inspectionssince 2002.

The effect of this emphasis can be seen in thebunkering chart which compares bunker spills byvessels that received a bunker monitor inspection toall bunker spills. Vessels inspected have had nospills within 60 days of the inspection for the pastfive years. This clearly is paying off: The total of allspills during bunkering operations has beendecreasing since 2000. Only one spill was reported tohave occurred during bunkering operations in 2004.

SPILL PREPAREDNESS INITIATIVES

The ability of industry to respond quickly andeffectively to spills requires continuous self-improvement and close coordination with agenciesand local communities. Investing in preparednessreduces spill impacts to public health and theenvironment, minimizes the costs for spill responses,and increases recovery of spilled product. The coreelements of preparedness include:

• The Northwest Area Contingency Plan andindustry oil spill response plans;

• Ecology’s DRILLTRAC program, an internaltraining and competency program for theIncident Command System;

• Drills and training exercises; • Geographic response plans;• Response contractor application and approval;

and• Vessel financial responsibility.

Oil Spill Response Plans

The Preparedness Section participates indevelopment and maintenance of the NorthwestArea Contingency Plan and the various work groupsthat help maintain the plan. Preparedness staff alsoreview and approve industry contingency plans fortank vessels and barges, non-tank vessels, oilterminals including refineries, pipelines, and otherfacilities that transfer oil near waterways. Theseplans describe the equipment, resources, andstrategies required to quickly respond in the event ofa spill.

There are currently 41 oil spill contingency plans forregulated vessel fleets and oil-handling facilities. In2004, eight of those were reviewed and approved.

The two regulations governing the content andimplementation of contingency plans are currentlyopen for amendment. Information can be found onour website: http://www.ecy.wa.gov/programs/spills/preparedness/preparednesstable.htm#ContingencyPlans

Summary of drill activity in Washington State for 2004

Drills and exercises test the viability of oil spillresponse plans and the ability of operators to carrythem out. Announced and unannounced drills areconducted, ranging in size and complexity. ThePreparedness Section participates in and evaluatesall deployment and tabletop exercises. In 2004: 49



• Drill credit was granted and evaluations wereperformed on 26 tabletop drills. Nine of thesewere worst-case exercises.

• Evaluations were also performed on 48deployment drills. Two companies receiveddrill credit for their responses to small spills.Plan holders tested and received drill creditfor deploying 17 geographic response planstrategies (pre-identified environmentallysensitive areas).

• Ecology initiated 248 unannounced vesselnotification drills on board vessels duringroutine vessel inspections.

Two on-water SMART protocol dispersantmonitoring drills were held (joint efforts of NOAA,Coast Guard, Clean Sound, Polaris and Ecology).

In April, the Yellowstone Pipe Line Company hostedthree days of fast water spill response training forresponders from Washington, Idaho and Montana.The training brought together 40 people from threepipeline companies (Yellowstone, Olympic andChevronTexaco), four primary response contractors(Marine Spill Response Corporation, NationalResponse Corporation Environmental Services,Cowlitz Clean Sweep and Tidewater EnvironmentalServices), and one agency (Ecology).

Each of the three training days featured adeployment drill. The boom deployment operationswere designed to push the limits of equipment andpersonnel in a controlled setting. Participantslearned the pitfalls of everything from boom failureresulting from excessive current speed to partinglines from excessive force and chaffing. Safety wasemphasized at all times. Above all, the trainingresulted in better understanding of the magnitude ofthe job in the event of a real spill, an appreciationfor the power of a river, and the equally impressivepower of teamwork.

Response Contractor Approval

Response contractors whose resources are listed in oilspill response plans must meet the state’s applicationand approval requirements. Eleven private and non-profit companies have grown and matured since theoil spill response requirements came into effect in theearly 1990’s. Today these companies, along withindustry-owned resources, form the backbone ofWashington’s response capability.

SPILL RESPONSE INITIATIVES

Lessons Learned

The Spills Program has always had a tradition oflooking inward and accepting outside input in orderto learn and improve performance based on debriefsand critiques. In 2004 we formalized our processesaround lessons learned and implemented newpolicies for major events. These include:

• Internal debriefings are held for all significantevents and even for small events where thereare substantive lessons to be learned.

• We hold external debriefings, inviting ourresponse partners, other agencies, responsecontractors, local organizations, and otherstakeholders to participate.

• On major spills, such as the Foss Barge P-248Spill, The Dalles Dam Spill and The DalcoPassage Spill, we hire an independentcontractor to produce an independent LessonsLearned report.

These lessons and recommendations aresummarized and prioritized for implementation.Program staff lead and track their implementation.They are worked into the program policies andprocedures, and practiced in the drill program.

Some recommendations are slam dunks; they can beeasily implemented through policy, training, andmodification of existing systems. Others take sometime to develop and are coordinated with changeswithin the Spills Program, such as when trainingstaff, or purchasing new technologies. Otherchanges, like many recommended by the Oil SpillEarly Action Task Force, require legislative action orfunding.

The following are examples of recentrecommendations implemented by the SpillsProgram as a result of our lessons learned process:

• We have updated our notification and Go/No-Go policies and procedures.50



Boom deployment training on the Spokane River.

• We have an agreement with the King CountySheriff’s Forward-Looking Infra-Red resourcesand privately contracted infra-red imagingresources.

• We have provided volunteer beach watcherand clean-up training to community basedorganizations.

• Ecology has expanded its contact list forcontracted air support and on-water radarequipped assets.

• We have provided beach clean-up training toEcology employees to create a surge capacityto rapidly respond to catastrophic impacts.

• Ecology has enhanced its IncidentManagement Team with additional training,including 50 Ecology staff trained to performshoreline cleanup and assessment.

• We have expanded our drill program toincrease the number of unannounced drills.

Check the Ecology Spills Program website athttp://www.ecy.wa.gov/programs/spills/spills.htmlfor more information on lessons learned. At thissite, you will find the individual Lessons Learnedreports and reports from the Oil Spill Early ActionTask Force.

Work Continues with the Columbia, Snake RiverSpill Response Initiative

Development of the Columbia/Snake River SpillResponse Initiative (CSRSRI) has proceeded in recentmeetings between Ecology’s Spill Response andPreparedness staff and US Army Corps of Engineersenvironmental coordinators. The CSRSRI wasdeveloped in recognition that most dams aregeographically remote from contractor assistanceand pose a spill threat to state waters. As part of theCSRSRI, Ecology staff are assisting the Corpsenvironmental coordinators in developing a specificspill plan for each dam on the Columbia and Snakerivers. Each plan identifies significant responsestrategies below the dams that can be deployed bythe Corps in case of a spill. These strategies wouldbe deployed by the Corps in advance of a spillcontractor response. The plans not only identifydeployment strategies but describe the types andkinds of equipment needed to conduct deployments(booms, boats, anchors, etc.) and the associatedtraining needs for these operations.

The CSRSRI planning phase for all Corps projects onthe Snake and Columbia rivers has been completedwith the exception of the Chief Joseph Project,

which will be addressed by summer. It is now up tothe Corps to purchase the identified equipment,receive training, and practice deployments on therivers. The Corps is working toward completing theCSRSRI plans by this fall. Ecology will then focus onpublic utility dams and Bureau of Reclamation dams.

Ecology staff also conducted joint Spill Prevention,Containment, and Countermeasure (SPCC) planinspections with EPA for the Columbia River damsin the summer of 2004. Inspections focused onverifying the following:

• The capacity of secondary containmentsystems;

• The adequacy of oil transfer and storageequipment inspections and maintenancepractices, including pipelines, valves, tanks,and transformers;

• Oil transfer procedures;• Records of oil usage and consumption; and• The effectiveness of the oily water separators.

The inspections revealed that the Corps had madesignificant improvements to prevent oil spills at thedams. However, there are still measures that can beimplemented to further reduce the potential for damoil spills, and the Spill Program staff will continue towork with the Corps on those issues.

Natural Resource Damage Assessment andRestoration Activities

Protecting the environment is important but whenaccidents happen restoration is critical to preservingour natural resources. Even small oil spills can causesignificant damage to sensitive areas that may be

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U.S. Army Corps Dam inspection.

crucial to the survival of threatened or endangeredspecies. That is where the Resource DamageAssessment (RDA) and Coastal Protection Fundsteering committees come in. Members of thesecommittees represent several state agencies: StateParks and Recreation, Department of Fish andWildlife, Department of Natural Resources, Office ofArchaeology and Historic Preservation andDepartment of Ecology.

After an oil spill, the RDA committee evaluatesdamage to the environment, and Ecology uses thatinformation to determine a monetary damageassessment against the party responsible for thespill. The assessment can be paid in cash, or aproposal to restore the environment can besubmitted to the committee for consideration. Cashpayments go into regional sub-accounts of theCoastal Protection Fund. In the past 14 years,damage claims have been assessed on more than360 oil spills, providing funding for 64 restorationprojects related to those incidents.

One example is a shoreline area purchased withmatching funds from National Oceanic andAtmospheric Administration in 2002. Nick’s Lagoonin Seabeck Bay, was created. Named after NickHolm, a 14-year-old at the time, Nick‘s efforts tosave salmon habitat in the Northwest, and JerryZumdieck, founder of the Salmon Team, joinedforces to educate the public on salmon and waterrelated issues linked to their survival.

Restoration Projects are funded in three ways:

1. Projects are paid for by the responsibleparty. http://www.ecy.wa.gov/programs/spills/preparedness/restorationprojects/direct.htm

2. Projects are paid for by money which hasbeen deposited by the responsible party intosub-accounts of the coastal protectionaccount. The four sub-accounts are asfollows:

• South Puget Sound/Hood Canal • North Puget Sound/Strait of Juan de Fuca • Columbia River/Outer Coast • Special Projects 3. Projects are also funded from an accountin which spill penalties are deposited. Themoney from this account is used tosupplement the sub-accounts listed above.Formore information on the Coastal ProtectionFunded projects, go to the following website:

http://www.ecy.wa.gov/programs/spills/preparedness/restorationprojects/cptrestorationprojects.html

ECOLOGY SPILL PROGRAM WEBSITE

For more information on the WashingtonDepartment of Ecology, please visit their website at:www.ecy.wa.gov. The Ecology Spill Prevention,Preparedness, and Response Program website is:http://www.ecy.wa.gov/programs/spills/spills.html

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Shoreline cleanup project: Crew from the USS Camdendismantling old dock near Bangor, Washington.

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